Post-Conflict Archaeology and Cultural Heritage

The human cost in any conflict is of course the first care in terms of the reduction, if not the elimination of damage. However, the destruction of archaeology and heritage as a consequence of civil and international wars is also of major concern, and the irreversible loss of monuments and sites through conflict has been increasingly discussed and documented in recent years.

*Post-Conflict Archaeology and Cultural Heritage* draws together a series of papers from archaeological and heritage professionals seeking positive, pragmatic and practical ways to deal with conflict-damaged sites. For instance, by showing that conflict-damaged cultural heritage and archaeological sites are a valuable resource rather than an inevitable casualty of war, the authors suggest that archaeologists use their skills and knowledge to apply good practice, protocols and procedures to bring communities together and giving them ownership of, and identification with, their cultural heritage.

The book is a mixture of the discussion of problems, suggested planning solutions and case studies for both archaeologists and heritage managers. It will be of interest to heritage professionals, archaeologists and anyone working with post-conflict communities, as well as anthropology, archaeology, and heritage academics and their students at a range of levels.

**Paul Newson** is Associate Professor in Archaeology at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. He is interested in landscape archaeology and the rural environments of the Graeco-Roman world, particularly the Eastern Mediterranean. He has directed fieldwork in Syria, Libya and Lebanon.

**Ruth Young** is Reader in Archaeology at the University of Leicester, UK. She is interested in the historical archaeology of the Middle East and South Asia and has directed excavations and fieldwork in Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Her recent publications include *The Archaeology of South Asia* (2015).
Post-Conflict Archaeology
and Cultural Heritage
Rebuilding Knowledge, Memory and
Community from War-Damaged
Material Culture

Edited by Paul Newson and
Ruth Young
Contents

List of Contributors viii

PART I
Introduction 1

1 Conflict: People, Heritage, and Archaeology 3
PAUL NEWSON AND RUTH YOUNG

PART II
Legal Frameworks 21

2 Cultural Heritage Destruction in the Middle East: UNESCO’s Work to Mitigate Damage and Plan for Recovery 23
NADA AL HASSAN

3 The Need for Pre-Conflict Planning for Cultural Property Protection in the Event of Armed Conflict 41
CHRISTOPHER L. MCDAID

PART III
Strategies: Post-Conflict 55

4 Post-Conflict Heritage and Recovery: A Role for the Military 57
LAURIE W. RUSH

5 Conflict, Memory, and Material Culture: The Archaeology of the Contestado War in Brazil (1912–1916) 72
JAISON TEIXEIRA LINO, JAMES SYMONDS, AND PEDRO PAULO FUNARI
6 The Importance of Cultural Heritage in Enhancing a Syrian National Identity and the Role of Local Non-State Actors in Preserving It
AMR AL-AZM

7 Reconstructing Post-Conflict Heritage in Rwanda
JOHN GIBLIN

PART IV
Methodologies of Recording

8 Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (EAMENA): Approach and Possible Solutions
ROBERT BEWLEY

9 A Post-Conflict Scenario in the Caucasus Region: A Documentation Drive to Assess Monumental Heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh
ALVARO HIGUERAS

10 Maximising Information from Conflict-Damaged Sites: A Case Study from Lebanon
PAUL NEWSON AND RUTH YOUNG

PART V
Community Building

11 In the Aftermath of Violence: Heritage and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland
AUDREY HORNING AND COLIN BREEN

12 After Angkor: An Archaeological Perspective on Heritage and Capacity-Building in Cambodia
MIRIAM T. STARK AND HENG PIPHAL

13 Archaeology from below in Swat, Pakistan: Heritage and Social Mobilization in a Post-Conflict Reality
LUCA M. OLIVIERI
PART VI
Contingent Solutions: The Archaeologist’s Role  239

14  Archaeology in Post-War El Salvador  241
   KATHRYN E. SAMPECK  

15  Mes Aynak (Afghanistan), Global Standards,  
   and Local Practices  263  
   HANS H. CURVERS  

Index  284
Contributors

Amr al-Azm (Shawnee State University)
Nada Al Hassan (UNESCO)
Robert Bewley (University of Oxford)
Colin Breen (Ulster University)
Hans H. Curvers (Archaeological Heritage Management, Netherlands)
Pedro Paulo Funari (IFCH, Unicamp, Brazil)
John Giblin (British Museum)
Heng Piphal (University of Hawai‘i-Manoa)
Alvaro Higueras (Simon Fraser University)
Audrey Horning (College of William and Mary, Queen’s University Belfast)
Jaisson Teixeira Lino (IFCH, Unicamp, Brazil)
Christopher L. McDaid (US Military)
Paul Newson (American University of Beirut)
Luca M. Olivieri (Italian Archaeological Mission in Pakistan)
Laurie W. Rush (US Military)
Kathryn E. Sampeck (Illinois State University)
Miriam T. Stark (University of Hawai‘i-Manoa)
James Symonds (University of Amsterdam)
Ruth Young (University of Leicester)
Part I

Introduction
1 Conflict
People, Heritage, and Archaeology

*Paul Newson and Ruth Young*

**Introduction**

Conflict is an inescapable aspect of human life, and has had a huge impact on a significant proportion of the world’s population in the recent past and present. Conflict is arguably an integral part of human interaction, and archaeological studies have provided evidence for conflict from at least the Palaeolithic onwards (Thorpe 2003). Conflicts have occurred throughout prehistory and history, and conflict is an unavoidable evil in many parts of the world today, often impacting on all aspects of human life and culture (Bevan 2006; Boylan 2002; Stone 2013; Wimmer 2014). The human cost in any conflict is high and obviously protecting people has to be the first priority during times of war. However, damage to heritage can be a deliberate tactic during conflict, and this can have major psychological consequences. This volume aims to explore several linked themes around heritage and archaeological sites damaged as a result of conflict.

Archaeologists, politicians, and many others recognize that damage to heritage is irreversible and has very serious, lasting consequences. Research by Boylan (2002, 44) notes the longevity of the practice of destroying, defacing, or converting significant religious and national buildings and monuments in times of conflict, and work by Harmanşah (2015) explores the explicit use of purported heritage damage by ISIS (Daesh) to enrage the international community and garner publicity. The impact of war on archaeological and heritage sites is rightly an area of great significance and concern to archaeologists and other heritage professionals, and is increasingly an area of research and debate, both within and outside academic circles, including the military of several countries. Steps taken by the US Military to educate and inform troops active in areas of conflict about archaeology and heritage form the basis for Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume.

Heritage, in its broadest sense a recognition of the past in the present, is a key element in allowing and supporting individuals and groups to have, create, and develop a secure sense of belonging and place, as well as playing a major role in individual and group identity creation and re-creation (Cresswell 2015; Harrison 2013, 155; Smith 2010, 11). Being aware of heritage and being
involved in heritage creation, interpretation, and presentation is important for building and maintaining engaged, stable communities: heritage is such a powerful concept and tool that it can play a vital role in post-conflict community re-building and re-engagement. While preventing conflict in the first place would be (arguably) the best approach, the reality is that conflicts continue to occur, and there is little sign that international peace and stability will prevail in the foreseeable future. If conflict is not preventable, then protecting all heritage in times of conflict in order to prevent any damage, whether deliberate or collateral (Cunliffe 2012), would be highly desirable. While major progress has been made around the listing and protection of key sites during conflict (e.g. Stone 2013), it is impossible for any country to fully protect its entire heritage during conflict. We believe that if conflict is inevitable and unstoppable, then it is critical to begin to explore ways of using archaeology and heritage in post-conflict situations as a means of helping communities to re-build themselves and overcome divisions and disengagement. At the same time, we also believe that as conflict-damaged sites are very much a reality, archaeological and heritage professionals need to consider how to obtain maximum knowledge from damaged sites, both for academic research and preservation purposes, and not simply disregard even very badly damaged sites as beyond usefulness.

**Post-Conflict Archaeology and Heritage: Our Position**

We have both conducted archaeological fieldwork for many years in countries that have been affected by conflict in different forms (e.g. Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria). This has of course shaped the ways in which we approach fieldwork and interpretation, and has increasingly required us to think about the impact of our work on different local communities and how this might be both positive and negative. Our fieldwork and community engagements have allowed us to evolve our working definitions of what we understand post-conflict archaeology and heritage to be, and what we hope it could become. Given the huge potential value of understandings of the past to community re-building, including helping enfranchise groups and individuals, we believe that archaeologists and heritage professionals have a duty to protect and preserve sites and material during periods of conflict. They also need to commit to working with community groups, NGOs, government groups, and so forth, during and following conflict, in order to find ways in which archaeological and heritage material can be used to provide or strengthen a sense of belonging and identity development. This may come partly through the interpretation and presentation of extant materials, and partly through the practical processes of the production of both archaeology and heritage; through team activities and involvement in decision making, the latter can play a major role in rehabilitation (see Chapter 13). It is also vital that professionals recognize the potential in conflict-damaged sites. Rather than dismissing sites as badly damaged, and thus not worth investing time, money, and effort in exploring them, if the right methodologies and research questions are deployed usefully, a surprising
amount of information can be obtained (see Newson and Young 2015, and Chapters 8, 9, and 10 in this volume).

**Destruction of Heritage: Sites of Global Importance**

Sites of international importance draw out the greatest public and arguably professional response when they are damaged or destroyed during conflict, whether deliberately or as collateral casualties of war. The Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan, and the temples of Palmyra in Syria, are two excellent examples of this, both provoking international outrage over their destruction among the public and professionals alike. In 2001 the Taliban government of Afghanistan enforced the destruction of two monumental statues of the Buddha carved into rock (Chiovenda 2014). The Taliban held press conferences and ensured that their plans to destroy the Buddhas were widely reported by the media of many countries, which led to attempts by various international agencies to stop them, including meetings between, e.g. UNESCO, the UN Security Council and Taliban officials (Chiovenda 2014, 417). The acts of destruction were effectively portrayed as evidence for Islamic Iconoclasm in the west (Flood 2002, 641), and at least in part as justification for further western involvement in the region. ISIS (ISIL, Daesh) have also deliberately targeted cultural heritage in both Syria and Iraq as part of their ongoing (at the time of writing) conflict strategy. Harmanşah (2015) has argued that ISIS members have deliberately staged and recorded ‘acts of destruction’ as part of their campaign to horrify and appall the west, while raising their profile as successful upholders of ‘true’ Islam, thus acting as a powerful propaganda tool. Condemnation of attacks on sites such as Palmyra by the Head of UNESCO, Irina Bokova (States News Services 2015), expresses the outrage felt by western organizations, and shows how important such sites are when understood to be part of an international heritage. While the Bamiyan Buddhas were not UNESCO World Heritage sites at the time of their attack, their global cultural significance was recognized (perhaps partly as a result of their destruction), and the Bamiyan Valley was inscribed in 2003 (WH List 2017). Since then, recent attacks on sites that have been inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage list, such as Palmyra, the ancient cities of Aleppo and Bosra, and the ‘Dead Cities’ of Northern Syria, have been characterized as attacks on humanity itself (Lostal 2015). The considered use of different international media meant has ensured even a decade apart the wanton destruction of unique, monumental heritage has drawn worldwide condemnation and outrage.

**Destruction of Heritage: Quotidian Sites**

While a small number of sites deemed of international significance dominate news headlines and capture public imagination, an unknowable number of lower profile sites of all forms and sizes from many periods will also have been severely damaged in recent conflicts. Sites such as Palmyra, Hatra, Babylon,
Paul Newson and Ruth Young

and Ninevah have all sustained considerable damage during conflict from a range of different causes, and all have received considerable media attention. That they are all major, monumental sites, with impressive, extensive standing architecture is undoubtedly why they have been the subject of attacks or occupation, and also why they have received such media attention. It is far harder to glamorize a small tell or a series of post-holes and middens. UNESCO and their list of sites that are deemed to represent World Heritage has also played a key role in the recognition of what constitutes ‘heritage’ and how it is valued, in some parts of the world at least (Askew 2010; Harrison 2013). With a clear bias towards monumental sites built from stone and other durable materials, the WH List has undoubtedly shaped a particular approach to heritage. The role of UNESCO in dealing with post-conflict heritage is explored in Chapter 2, and it is not our intention here to offer a critique of UNESCO or the WH List in relation to post-conflict archaeology and heritage. It is, however, incredibly important that the loss of quotidian sites through conflict is recognized and discussed, and strategies both for the protection of sites during conflict, and approaches to post-conflict archaeology and heritage are based at least as much around these ‘ordinary’ sites as they are around those deemed valuable by UNESCO or other western agencies. Monumental sites are far more likely to be reconstructed and subject to redevelopment and academic study, while smaller, quotidian sites are far more likely to be dismissed as having been compromised, both in terms of stratigraphy and authenticity. We argue that archaeologists should view conflict-damaged sites as opportunities to gain information and explore sites and regions with new agendas, as well as providing opportunities to engage different communities with their heritage (Newson and Young 2015).

That concern for heritage sites damaged in conflict is very much a political act is not in doubt; the disparity between attention, effort, and funding given to major sites at the expense of minor sites is clear, even when ‘minor’ sites might well hold more information, or be less well-studied than the ‘major’ sites. Many archaeological and heritage sites are known to have sustained damage in antiquity – not just by conflict, but by disasters such as earthquakes – and this seamlessly becomes part of the site history, and is treated as such by archaeologists (e.g. work in the Islamic period in the Middle East, Walmsley 2007). That modern conflict acted upon a site somehow renders it beyond or unworthy of academic investigation is not an approach we can reconcile.

Why We Came to This Subject

As noted above, we have both carried out fieldwork in conflict-affected countries over many years. Although we both started our careers as archaeologists, i.e. interested in the material culture of particular regions and people in the past, we very quickly discovered that it was impossible to separate our practice in the present from the contemporary context: a context that clearly included many difficult issues such as conflict, religious tensions, ethnic tensions, and
political manipulation of heritage. Of course we recognize that as western, educated ‘experts’ or ‘elites’ in our field, this brings with it all sorts of questions around archaeological imperialism and biases. We have always striven for a post-colonial approach in all our projects: to be as open and reflexive as possible about our theoretical and analytical orientations, and our academic and personal biases. In this way, we have become increasingly aware of the critical need for bottom-up community engagement in all archaeological and heritage work, including through outreach and education programs.

Working extensively in countries, such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Syria, during and after diverse forms of conflict, exposed us to a wide range of ways in which these conflicts have affected archaeology, heritage, and communities. These impacts include immediate, very direct damage from conflict, such as occupation and activity by military forces, bomb and gun damage, and much longer-term impacts around lack of infrastructure, planning laws, encroachment, looting, and so forth (we discuss the latter further below, see also Chapter 8). This work has also forced us to recognize that if all conflict-damaged sites are dismissed as compromised, then a huge heritage resource is simply being lost – not just through conflict, but also through deliberate professional decisions to disengage with sites that are not pristine, or have only been previously investigated by other professionals.

Our separate work in both field archaeology and different conflict-damaged countries intersected in a project dealing directly with a severely conflict-damaged site in Lebanon (see Newson and Young 2011, 2015). This site – Hosn Niha in the Bekaa Valley – is discussed in more detail as a case study in Chapter 10, and is an excellent example of how prior to our project professional interest and expertise had been lavished on the monumental, religious buildings largely untouched by conflict, and the dismissal of the surrounding village which had been subject to extreme and repeated episodes of destruction. In many ways Hosn Niha can be seen as a typical site subject to extensive damage during conflict, and exemplifies our argument that not only can these sites still provide a great deal of unique information, but that archaeologists need to make plans to investigate such sites post-conflict.

Syria as an Example of Post-Conflict Preparation

The recent conflict in Syria has seen a great deal of deliberate (and collateral) damage to archaeological and heritage sites, and this has been the focus of a good share of both media and academic attention. Ever since 2011 as Syria rapidly descended into an increasingly brutal civil war, the international community has looked on seemingly powerless to halt the destruction to lives and property. At this point in time (2017), after six years of conflict, there have been almost half a million reported deaths, and more than 10.9 million people have been forced to leave their homes (McKernan 2017). Furthermore, the damage done to archaeological sites and cultural heritage has been on an unprecedented scale.
A tremendous effort has gone into recording damage in Syria (as has been the case in other conflict areas), through a variety of approaches such as analyses of aerial photographs and social media accounts, occasional site visits in person by both local and international professionals and conventional media. The accessibility of the destruction evidence has led to numerous campaigns to alert the world to the loss of heritage (e.g. Perini and Cunliffe 2013–2015; Leckie et al. 2017) and many articles which have progressively analyzed the threats (e.g. Ali 2013; Al Quntar 2013; Casana 2015; Casana and Panahipour 2014; Cunliffe 2014, 2016; Danti 2015; Kila 2013). Such records play a valuable role as a potential base for developing heritage management plans, as shown in the work carried out by the Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa project (see Chapter 8).

Naturally, the shocking destruction of cultural heritage in Syria has galvanized a wide range of concerned individuals, experts, and institutions such as the AIA (Archaeological Institute of America), to come together in a range of organized conferences to discuss the extent of damage, and ways to protect cultural heritage from further destruction (e.g. Chalikias et al. 2015). With the changing fortunes of the war in Syria, more recent initiatives are beginning to discuss how best to plan for the end of the war and the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure, including heritage (e.g. the recent conference series on postwar reconstruction of ancient Syrian cities – Urbicide Syria 2016). In fact, where possible, on the ground small-scale projects are beginning to make assessments and begin restoration work. For example, ASOR (the American Schools of Oriental Research) have begun funding a long-term project to repair and restore the ancient structures of the Syrian city of Bosra damaged in the conflict (ASOR 2016).

Therefore, among the outcry over destruction to major sites and deliberate destruction of globally important cultural heritage, we cannot lose sight of the professionals and concerned community leaders who are spending considerable time and effort developing and implementing positive and practical solutions to both working with conflict-damaged heritage and sites, and engaging with communities through heritage. It is a key purpose of this book to foreground the work of these people, and to show that while conflict remains an inescapable part of life for many, heritage and archaeological hand-wringing is not the only response open to us.

It is also vital to be aware that post-conflict problems are not only ongoing, but that they do not just cease after a certain period. The impact of conflict, direct and indirect, can continue over decades and in many cases is very intimately bound to political aspirations and developments. Looting is a consequence of conflict which has been widely reported and discussed, and while it is often closely linked to poverty and dire economic need, work by Elizabeth Stone (2015) in Iraq has shown that this is not always the case, and may be the product of opportunity, and the chance to assert some measure of control over heritage. In countries emerging from conflict, laws may be inadequate to directly protect heritage, or there may not be appropriate planning laws to protect heritage from
encroachment and development. In such situations housing, farmland, infrastructure development, and repairs are likely to take precedence in the minds of many over the protection and preservation of minor (even unrecognized) archaeological sites. It may also transpire that where religion or ethnicity has played a part in conflict, protection of the heritage of minorities and/or the defeated may not be a priority with the majority and/or the victors.

Ways Forward

In order to advance post-conflict recovery, including community re-building, it is vital that we look forward, and find ways of exploring and exploiting archaeology and heritage as part of these agendas, as well as ensuring that conflict-damaged sites are not routinely overlooked during research. Dialogues between archaeologists, heritage professionals, and communities in different parts of the world are increasing, and this is a vital element of post-conflict work. Looking at examples where these groups are working together on all sorts of projects is inspirational, and this volume aims to offer further case studies of content, approach, and method.

For any post-conflict initiative to be as successful as possible, and perhaps even to ensure that sites are as well-protected from further harm as possible, it is critical that planning begins even while conflict is still occurring. Syria is a clear example of this need, not only because heritage sites have played a high profile role in the media throughout the conflict there, with destruction clearly being used to both outrage an international audience and demonstrate the power of ISIL and their contempt for national symbols of identity and place, but also because heritage and heritage tourism potentially have a major role in the reconstruction of civil society. The example of Syria highlights the pressing need for a volume such as this, to focus the attention of archaeologists and heritage professionals on ways forward and how to use heritage in community re-building, and not just to lament the destruction of resources.

Planning for What Comes Next: Lessons Learnt from Iraq

Being prepared to act as soon as it is safe and practical to do so on the ground is therefore a key foundation in post-conflict heritage action. Looking forward beyond the conflict itself and planning for this time are clearly critical. Ideally, plans being developed should cover immediate actions, and then short-, medium-, and long-term strategies. In this respect, many lessons have been learnt from Iraq, where various initiatives both during and after conflict have engaged communities with heritage and heritage professionals through careful planning and long-term visions (Stone 2013; Stone and Farakh Bajjaly 2008). The newly opened museum at Basrah in Iraq is an example of long-term vision, planning, and co-operation between a range of local and international groups and individuals (BBC 2016; Friends of Basrah Museum 2017). The support for the project by the local community shows that not only is heritage
an important part of identity and belonging, but that heritage projects have the potential to unite fragmented communities.

The Role of Politics

Politics, of course, plays a major role in the success or otherwise of all post-conflict endeavours, including those based in archaeology and heritage. That heritage sites are so consistently and publicly manipulated and attacked during times of conflict (Bevan 2006; Boylan 2002) demonstrates they are (or can be) heavily politicized, and this holds true in post-conflict periods also. Politics shapes the form post-conflict nation and community re-building will take, and this will include both heritage sites themselves, and the relationships between communities and these sites, both directly and indirectly. All of the case studies presented and explored in this volume show that politics is an inescapable issue in heritage and archaeology, although in some (e.g. Chapters 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15) politics plays a major role in directly shaping and even preventing post-conflict heritage and archaeological engagement. In others (e.g. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 12, and 14) the political is more overt, but no less potent for being more oblique in the impact on heritage.

One thing certainly is true of all post-conflict situations: there are no quick, easy solutions. Each situation is complex, and is complex in its own particular way. The human cost should always be the first concern in conflict and post-conflict situations; archaeology and heritage must be put in perspective. However, if we are committed to working with heritage in post-conflict situations then we need to be both prepared and flexible. We must be aware of and able to take advantage of useful models and previous experience, while at the same time fully conscious that each community, heritage site, and conflict is unique. Even within the same country and same broad conflict, differences between community characters have to be understood and treated with sensitivity in order for post-conflict actions to be successful.

The First Volume to Deal with Post-Conflict Archaeology and Heritage

This book is the first volume to bring together discussions and case studies of work that deal explicitly with post-conflict work in archaeology and heritage. Volumes exist that deal with threats to archaeology and heritage, damage to sites, and attempted preservation during conflict, alongside an increasing mass of academic journal articles and web sites on these topics. While individual accounts of post-conflict work have been published (e.g. Leslie 2012; Newson and Young 2015), this is the first volume to explore the key issues, a selection of case studies, and consider ways forward. Given the global impact of local and national conflicts, we believe that it is vital professionals, governments, and communities are all committed to developing post-conflict heritage and archaeology initiatives. As noted above, the developments in Syria and other
current conflicts such as Yemen, make this volume a timely contribution to wider debates about protection of cultural heritage.

In planning this volume, we wanted to aim for an explicitly international reach, and we hope that we have achieved this. We are aware that it is always impossible to cover every potential topic, case study, or conflict-affected area in one volume alone, but we hope that this will be a positive beginning, and that alongside debate (even disagreement), the challenges and achievements presented in the following chapters will stimulate archaeologists, heritage professionals, and others to think about how to engage with communities and governments in order to initiate and support post-conflict development. What all the chapters have in common is that they deal with places that have been affected by conflict, and where the archaeology and heritage has been damaged (often very badly) by such conflict. While this may be the first volume to deal explicitly with post-conflict archaeology, heritage, and communities, we sincerely hope that it will not be the last, and that it will at the very least raise awareness of potential and possibilities.

The authors who have contributed to this volume come from a wide range of backgrounds, all with different experiences in post–conflict archaeology and heritage in many different areas of the world. Engagement with communities, heritage, and archaeology therefore takes many different forms, but it is clear that for each author, their time and work in these places has had a huge personal and professional impact. It would be very difficult indeed to imagine a situation where this was not so – witnessing first-hand the devastation of conflict on people and a community is a profound and often very difficult experience. Drawing on such experiences to use professional skills and knowledge to help re-build and support communities is one way of channelling sadness, even despair, towards a more positive end. This means that post–conflict archaeology and heritage endeavours are not purely an intellectual exercise. While we would definitely argue that post–conflict strategies can result in increased academic knowledge, we see this as one part of the wider practical outcomes of engaging with heritage in post–conflict situations. Just as people are the primary concern during conflict, so benefits to people via community engagement and possibly even through heritage tourism, is a major concern of post–conflict work.

**Local, Practical, Context-Based Solutions**

As we have stressed throughout this introductory chapter, heritage and archaeology can play multiple roles in post–conflict situations: recognizing that damaged sites can still yield considerable information could transform archaeological understandings in some areas; the practice of archaeology as a team–building exercise can contribute hugely to community cohesion and engagement; gaining some control over what and how a past is presented can lead to an enhanced sense of identity and belonging. Critical to the success of post–conflict work is the recognition that there are no global models that
can be developed and applied to all situations. Local, practical, context-based solutions produced through collaboration between local communities and heritage professionals are essential, and these need to be supported by governments. Without informed and imaginative projects that address local needs and local issues, post-conflict work risks being yet more well-intentioned aid from external, international sources that ultimately changes little, as in the case of Afghanistan.

**The Themes of the Volume**

One of our aims in planning this book was to take disastrous scenarios and seek positive, pragmatic and practical solutions that aim to mitigate the destruction of conflict-damaged cultural heritage and archaeological sites, and show that valuable information can still be produced from them, and that they can still serve useful purposes within and for society. It is also important to address issues and situations critically, as many of the case studies presented in the following chapters provide examples of problems, challenges, and the ways in which heritage can be used for less than positive outcomes.

This book is divided into six parts, although there are strong links and resonance between many of the chapters. This introductory chapter is a review of the key issues as we understand them, around post-conflict archaeology and heritage. As we have been at pains to stress throughout this chapter, post-conflict archaeology has been largely under-explored, and the use of archaeology and heritage in post-conflict situations is not always a priority or included in post-conflict planning. We want this volume, the first of its kind, to raise awareness of issues and possibilities and signpost ways forward. This volume is not intended to cover all situations, or provide hard and fast models and processes to ‘fix’ post-conflict societies or heritage. We hope it will engender discussion, even disagreement, and then encourage further action. The different parts of the book are intended to explore themes that are important to considerations of any kind of archaeological or heritage work in post-conflict situations, ranging from how legal frameworks enable or challenge work on the ground; the importance of planning and preparation; the role/s of the military in post-conflict work; heritage as a source of identity and memory; the importance of the right methodologies for dealing with conflict-damaged heritage and even preventing or mitigating further damage; how to link with communities and the roles of communities; and the role of the archaeologist in post-conflict work.

While international laws, conventions, and institutions have valuable roles to play in recognizing and protecting heritage in conflict and post-conflict situations (see Chapters 2 and 3), these frameworks work through engagement with nation states, or state parties, i.e. the internationally recognized political entities. Other geo-political bodies and non-state actors may well be involved in conflicts, but may not be recognized by the external, often international bodies such as the UN or UNESCO. This presents many heritage-related
difficulties even in peace, such as the struggle by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) within Iraq to gain control of its own identity and resources, including heritage (Hadji 2009), and the situation becomes even more complex during conflict. When a region within a country demands autonomy but this is denied, the region and its heritage can lapse into a state of unrecognized, unprotected limbo. Western Sahara is a good example of this (Brooks 2005) where Morocco has not only claimed the territory for itself and disregarded calls for a separate state (i.e. Western Sahara), but it has made any kind of foreign movement into this area extremely difficult. Further, any archaeologist or heritage professional who works in the Western Sahara will then be unwelcome and unable to work in Morocco itself. Similar political forces are at work in other places around the world, such as Northern (Turkish) Cyprus – any non-Turkish archaeologist who works in that region would find they are unable to work in the south, or in other parts of Greece, and may even be considered to be working illegally (Hardy 2008).

In Chapter 9 Higueras explores the major problems that his project has faced trying to work in the Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh territory of Azerbaijan, where the geographical separation of the territory from the majority of Azerbaijan acts as a further complication. In Chapter 6 al-Azm points out some of the problems that occur when international bodies and agencies are only willing to engage with official state parties. In situations where the official government is unable or unwilling to protect and preserve heritage and archaeological sites, archaeologists and heritage workers may act independently, or non-state military or political groups may involve themselves in heritage protection. Not dealing with these non-state actors might well seriously endanger the archaeology and heritage, or even individuals, as al-Azm notes has happened in Syria. Such issues are linked to wider debates around ethics and law in times of both conflict and peace that are increasingly important in archaeology and heritage (Soderland and Lilley 2015).

In some contexts, heritage and archaeology may not have a contribution to make to re-building post-conflict societies with stable, diverse communities. This point is made explicitly in Chapter 11 where Horning and Breen discuss community members who chose not to engage with archaeology and new, more nuanced understandings of a hitherto straightforward historical narrative. When peace is obtained by drawing a line under the past and moving forward, attempts to critically evaluate the causes of conflict can in fact destabilize communities and undermine a fragile reconciliation. This should act as a warning to archaeologists and heritage professionals to consider whether their work is indeed appropriate for any given situation, particularly in the face of resistance or repeated failure to engage, but also to remember that heritage is incredibly powerful, and has the potential to complicate simple narratives much beloved by politicians and military leaders and ask people to confront often uncomfortable, if not painful, truths.

Memorialization is a very difficult, politically fraught process, often contested and rarely subject to consensus. Memorials linked to conflict are even more
complex and difficult to achieve, as examples from around the world, such as the contentious Genbaku Peace Dome, a memorial erected to mark the dropping of the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, attests (Beazley 2010). Giblin’s work in Rwanda (Chapter 7) throws this into stark relief, where very visual, even visceral memorials to conflict are often partial and selective in what is preserved and displayed, and who is being commemorated. Memorials and museums dedicated to conflict have proliferated in recent years, not least because of a heritage paradigm shift which stresses the importance of presenting the realities of conflict not only as a means of remembering those involved and impacted by violence, but also as a means of underscoring the need and processes for peace. Amna Surka, or the Red Museum in Sulimaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan presents the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s sustained campaign against the Kurds and is located in the very buildings where imprisonment and torture of large numbers of Kurds took place. Like many of the examples from Rwanda that Giblin presents, this use of place is incredibly powerful and underscores the impact that heritage can have. This power and impact of course need not necessarily be positive, or a force for what we might deem good – heritage can be, and indeed frequently is, manipulated. There are also situations, such as the Khmer Rouge sites of Anlong Veng, where it is argued that preserving the “sites does little or nothing to further understanding of or commemoration of Cambodia’s tragic and painful past” (Long and Reeves 2009, 80).

The power of archaeology and heritage is seen clearly in Chapter 5 where Lino et al. talk about the ways in which an archaeological project has explored the materiality of a largely forgotten war and the impact this has had on the local community. Such work brings into focus the ways in which communities can be marginalized by having major events of their past denied or downplayed, and further emphasizes the power of heritage in both remembering and forgetting. Revisiting this war and explicitly engaging local people in the presentation of the material remains of this war has raised many issues around how to approach and deal with contested heritage, and has also shown how heritage can be used in the present to highlight social injustice. Lino et al. also draw attention to the politics at work that attempt to limit the use of archaeology and study of material culture in the recent past, deeming them an inappropriate way to think about events and processes that many claim are better served by historical sources.

Recognizing the potential value of even badly damaged archaeological and heritage sites is one of the main themes of this book, alongside the value to communities of heritage as both a practice and in symbolic terms. In Chapter 10 we present the methods and results that were used to explore one archaeological site that had been very badly damaged by conflict over a long period in Lebanon. While the monumental religious buildings at this site had not been damaged during conflict, and had been subject to intense study by archaeologists both before and after the civil war, the surrounding village which had been extensively damaged was seen as being compromised and was therefore dismissed by archaeologists as unsuitable for investigation. When compared
with the efforts expended on the major sites in Lebanon that had also been damaged during conflict, this highlights the ways in which heritage hierarchies are created and judgements enacted (see also Hamilakis 2009).

Re-building and organizing archaeology and heritage frameworks in a country deeply traumatized by long-term conflict is a major undertaking, and with many other immediate demands placed on post-conflict governments, this may not be a high priority. Stark and Heng (Chapter 12) offer a fascinating account of the ways in which history and politics played their part in shaping the ways in which archaeology and heritage were organized and conducted in postwar Cambodia. Many of the issues and decisions covered in this case study are also important in the examples presented in other chapters in this volume. As well as finding the capacity to train and equip professional archaeologists, there are many decisions around what to excavate, preserve, conserve, and present, and what to leave aside, or even actively discard. Decisions around public engagement and interpretation of heritage need to be made, even if this happens by default – offering no interpretation or minimal interpretation is as much a decision as offering biased or partial information. There are many lessons to be learnt from the Cambodian (and other) experiences that we should be taking forward into discussions and plans for countries such as Syria. Developing extensive databases and records of archaeological sites that cut across borders based on aerial photography (Chapter 8) is one way of being able to support archaeologists in countries emerging from conflict. While the ability to gather detailed information remotely is hugely advantageous, Bewley notes that there are still issues and questions around verifying such data and decisions on who has access to this data, e.g. state parties only, or non-state parties, and if so, what criteria are used.

Practical issues around heritage and archaeology (such as making sure workers are paid regularly and on time) may seem both mundane and obvious, but they can be critical, as Curvers’ work in Afghanistan showed (Chapter 15). Curvers’ work, and some of the projects outlined by Rush (Chapter 4) also serve as very timely reminders that archaeology and heritage projects can fail, either entirely or in part, and for a whole host of reasons – there are many ways to fail. We are all aware that heritage is not a magic solution for post-conflict societies, and for any project to be successful (however that is measured), political will, funding, and being able to identify the right approach for each individual situation are essential even before we draw on specialist knowledge and skills.

There is also perhaps a role for serendipity in post-conflict work; for being in the right place at the right time (having put in all the effort and hard work to get to that point, of course). In Chapters 6 and 15, both al-Azm and Curvers document some of the frustrations that can come when working in countries without fully functioning governments and infrastructure. However, both Olivieri (Chapter 13) and Sampeck (Chapter 14) have found that even working in very difficult political and logistical situations in war-torn countries and regions can lead to spectacularly good post-conflict co-operations and projects. Perhaps at least part of the success of both these projects (in the Swat region of
Pakistan, and El Salvador respectively) was the longevity of institutional and personal relationships made to these areas based on archaeological fieldwork. These long-term commitments to both communities and places had long preceded the conflict in each, but in both the key actors were willing to return to work very quickly after the conflicts had ceased, and despite major logistical issues resulting from the conflicts.

Anyone who has attempted any kind of community engagement in their work will know that building relationships and networks is critical, and that these cannot be forced; they need to develop organically and over time. The very long commitment the Italian Archaeological Mission has made in Swat has rightly earned the whole archaeological team great local respect and trust (particularly Luca Olivieri), and the local community has therefore shown great willingness to work with and for the team in their new venture discussed in Chapter 13, and even challenge the enactment of entrenched social structures. For Kathryn Sampeck, being able to work in El Salvador with her husband, and thus combine both personal and professional interests, has clearly been a very important element in being accepted by local communities and archaeologists; they trusted her and her husband’s commitment to them and their heritage.

One issue that is clear from all of the chapters and examples in this volume is that post-conflict projects that aim to draw on archaeology or heritage to build stronger, more stable societies, are not just the responsibility of the archaeologists and heritage professionals alone. Any project that impacts, or wants to impact on communities must involve these communities right from inception, and also involve a whole range of stakeholders. Only with discussion, inclusion, and co-operation do such projects have any chance of real, long-term success.

**Conclusion**

This book alone cannot cover all the issues around post-conflict heritage and archaeology. Building on all the work that has been published around the protection of cultural heritage during conflict, and on the publications of individual experiences and projects dealing with post-conflict heritage, we wanted it to cover some of the main challenges and issues that archaeologists and heritage professionals working in these areas face. As the case studies presented in the following chapters show very clearly, there are no easy solutions and there are as many problems and difficulties as there are situations of conflict. We hope that this volume will both raise questions and stimulate discussion, and also offer ideas and encouragement (or warnings) for readers to take forward into their own work.

In order to offer the best and most appropriate approaches to post-conflict heritage we need to draw from community and public archaeology, museology and interpretation theories, sociologies of memory, geographies of place, peace studies, and much more. Just as no individual or agency can work alone in post-conflict heritage projects, so there is no single academic or professional
approach that can offer all that is needed in such complex endeavours. Learning how to listen to disparate communities and translate their needs and aims into meaningful heritage projects is our major challenge, and one that we must meet with sensitive and context-driven solutions. We also have to be honest about our failures and learn from them.

Whether successful or unsuccessful, heritage is undoubtedly incredibly powerful. It has a major role in the modern world, and is inextricably linked with politics, power, identity, belonging, and the economy. Heritage cannot be ignored, and it needs to be treated with great respect, and recognizing this is perhaps more important in periods of post-conflict social and political rebuilding than at many other times. Material remains, including places, have immense power, as the discussions in this volume show very clearly, and heritage plays a major role in memory, both remembering and forgetting. We hope readers will find the volume challenging and thought provoking, and that it will, at the very least, help bring the problems into clearer focus and stimulate further discussion and action.

Bibliography


Part II

Legal Frameworks
Cultural Heritage Destruction
in the Middle East

UNESCO’s Work to Mitigate Damage and Plan for Recovery

Nada Al Hassan

The escalation of conflicts in the Middle East since 2011 has caused widespread human suffering. Tragically, it seems unlikely that this suffering will cease any time soon. The destruction of cultural heritage in the Middle East has been an important part of the devastation inflicted on the region since the present round of conflicts began, with the extremely rich and diverse monuments, archaeological sites, and other forms of tangible cultural heritage of countries across the region being either destroyed or very severely damaged, and intangible cultural heritage being dispersed or lost. This has been particularly the case during the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, where in addition to the cultural heritage being either damaged or destroyed as collateral damage in the conflicts, there have been episodes of intentional destruction carried out at iconic cultural heritage sites. In some cases, this has targeted minority populations or eliminated certain groups or communities from their historic homelands. There has also been widespread illegal excavation, looting and illicit trafficking.

As the United Nations organization responsible for the preservation and conservation of the world’s cultural heritage, notably through the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and other statutory instruments, UNESCO has a particularly important role to play. It has been leading international efforts to mitigate the damage inflicted on cultural heritage throughout the Middle East in the present conflicts and in planning its rehabilitation and restoration in the post-conflict recovery phase (e.g. UNESCO 2017). In this respect, UNESCO actions with regard to protecting the cultural heritage of the countries concerned in the present conflicts have been significantly different from those the Organization has undertaken in the past. While there have of course unfortunately been many instances of armed conflicts causing considerable damage to the heritage of the countries concerned, with the examples of Lebanon, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo coming immediately to mind, in these cases UNESCO generally intervened only after the conflicts had at least formally ended. One possible exception was during the conflict in Afghanistan, when the Organization made considerable, but unfortunately inconclusive, efforts to reach out to the Taliban in order to dissuade them from destroying the Buddhas of Bamiyan (Bouchenaki 2016).
Today, UNESCO is extending its work in countries suffering from armed conflict, to intervene more fully both during the conflict itself in efforts to mitigate the damage caused to the cultural heritage, and to extend that activity more deeply into the post-conflict recovery period. These efforts have taken place on three main levels. First, there has been the diplomatic level, including advocacy to decision-makers and parties to the conflicts within UNESCO governing bodies and at the UN Security Council. Second, there has been the statutory level, dealing with the implementation of UNESCO Conventions and other international treaties relating to the tangible and intangible cultural heritage. Third, there has been the operational level, including the wide range of activities being implemented by UNESCO across the Middle East today. These include technical activities designed to document, protect and rehabilitate cultural heritage sites and properties and also broader awareness-raising activities designed to emphasize the collective responsibility of the international community to protect cultural heritage during conflicts and the role that this can play in enhancing community cohesion and peace-building.

This chapter looks at each of these levels in turn, explaining how UNESCO addresses cooperation and coordination with cultural heritage actors across the region and at the international level. It addresses UNESCO’s approach to the physical reconstruction or rehabilitation of the cultural heritage in conflict zones and in post-conflict periods, highlighting its potential in restoring stability and building peace and social cohesion in the countries concerned. It also elaborates on the complexity of the work involved, detailing the wide array of disciplines it involves and the numerous challenges it raises, and ends with case studies taken from UNESCO’s post-conflict reconstruction activities in the Middle East. Thanks to its extensive networks, its presence in the field, its contacts at the highest levels of the international community, and its character as an intergovernmental organization, UNESCO is uniquely placed to play a major role in protecting cultural heritage in situations of armed conflict and in the post-conflict reconstructive phase. Extensive experience gained in countries previously affected by armed conflict, for example in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, and more recently in Mali, has allowed the Organization to move quickly in marshalling the resources and expertise needed to protect the heritage of other countries suffering from armed conflict in the world at present. It is these resources, and this expertise, that UNESCO is bringing to the needs of the Middle East today, at a time when periods of conflict are becoming more prolonged, are covering wider geographical areas, and have been witnessing the intentional and targeted destruction of cultural heritage.

The Diplomatic Level
UNESCO’s work at the diplomatic level has included advocacy at the highest levels of the international community, notably at the UN Security Council, in order to raise awareness of the damage being done to cultural heritage across
the Middle East in the present conflicts. The protection of this heritage should be seen as a priority during humanitarian and security operations and its rehabilitation emphasized once the conflicts have ended as a central element in the peace-building and recovery processes. With these aims in mind, UNESCO has been instrumental in the passage of a number of UN Security Council Resolutions bearing on the present conflicts in the Middle East that make specific reference to the protection of cultural heritage. UN Security Council Resolutions 2199 and 2139 (2015 and 2014, respectively) on the situation in Syria and the problem of the illicit trafficking of cultural heritage in the region, both make explicit reference to the need to protect the country’s cultural heritage (UNESCO n.d.). For example, UN Security Council Resolution 2199 prohibits trade in cultural property from Iraq and Syria, from the respective start of the conflicts in these countries, in order to counter illicit trafficking. Earlier Resolutions, among them the series of Security Council Resolutions on conflicts in Iraq after 2003, also make explicit reference to the need to protect the country’s cultural heritage, as do UN Security Council Resolutions 2100 and 2227 (2013 and 2015, respectively) on the destruction of the cultural heritage in Mali where the protection of cultural heritage was integrated in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) mandate (UNESCO n.d.).

Most recently, there has been the ground-breaking UN Security Resolution 2347 in March 2017, the first ever Resolution adopted by the Security Council focusing exclusively on the need to protect cultural heritage, which refers particularly to UNESCO’s strategy and actions in this regard. The Resolution contains measures that UN Member States are encouraged to implement in protecting the cultural heritage of conflict zones, and it also affirms that the protection of cultural heritage may be integrated into UN peacekeeping operations with the support of UNESCO whenever a Member State requests it. In addition to these very significant UN Security Council Resolutions obligating the international community to step up its efforts to protect the cultural heritage of the Middle East during the present conflicts, UNESCO has also been able to raise awareness of the threats to this heritage and its ongoing destruction in a range of other international and national fora. The resulting resolutions and other initiatives have been too many to go into detail here. However, reference might be made to resolutions made within other UN bodies, for example at the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council, as well as by the UNESCO General Conference, the UNESCO Executive Board, and the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, and in other international and national bodies.

The European Parliament passed a resolution on the destruction of cultural sites being carried out by ISIS/Da’esh in Iraq in 2015, for example, and in May 2015 a regional conference on Cultural Property Under Threat in the Middle East resulted in the Cairo Declaration on the need to increase protection of the cultural heritage (Antiquities Coalition 2015). In April 2016, the US Senate passed the Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property
Act, indicating heightened awareness in the United States of the crisis facing the cultural heritage of the Middle East (US Congress 2016). In September 2016, French president François Hollande announced the creation of a Global Fund for Heritage at Risk that would set up an international fund for the protection of cultural heritage in conflict areas and a network of ‘safe havens’ to safeguard cultural property (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development 2016). This Fund was later formally announced at a major international conference on the safeguarding of endangered cultural heritage in Abu Dhabi as the Abu Dhabi Declaration in December 2016. These and other actions at the international and national levels indicate growing awareness of the extent of the damage being inflicted on cultural heritage across the Middle East region. On 20 March 2017, the French and UAE Governments convened a donor’s conference at the Louvre Museum in Paris at which several countries and private-sector entities pledged contributions to the Global Fund.

UNESCO has played, and is playing, a vital role in bringing this crisis to international attention and in coordinating efforts at the diplomatic level to mitigate it. At the 38th Session of the Organization’s General Conference in November 2015, a ‘Strategy for the Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Actions for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict’ was presented to Member States that noted that the destruction of cultural heritage was far more than just a cultural tragedy (UNESCO 2015a). This Strategy was later specifically referenced in UN Security Council Resolution 2347 in March 2017. It came in response to a development seen in recent years of an increase in the deliberate and systematic destruction of the cultural heritage by extremist groups seeking to destabilize societies and to target particular ethnic or religious groups by destroying their heritage. Such actions, intended to eradicate cultural diversity and deny cultural rights and freedoms, have meant that the protection of the cultural heritage must now be understood as part of a wider programme to promote tolerance and peace-building across the Middle East region.

When UNESCO was founded some seventy years ago in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, its founders placed the building of ‘peace in the minds of men and women’ at the core of its constitution (UNESCO 1954). As a result of the attacks that have taken place on the cultural heritage across the Middle East over recent years, the protection and preservation of the cultural heritage has become far more than just a technical challenge. At stake are basic principles of human rights, societal cohesion and historical memory that have rarely been as threatened in the region before as they are today. UNESCO has led efforts to raise awareness internationally of such new threats to the cultural heritage, working closely with the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, in insisting that certain forms of intentional destruction need to be seen as war crimes, as was the case in the destruction of manuscripts and religious buildings in Mali in 2012 (Bokova 2016; ICC 2016). UNESCO has also been building cooperation in this regard with humanitarian, security
and peace-building actors, including civil society groups, such as with the UNHCR and the Red Cross (ICRC). In December 2015, a worldwide ‘Unite for Heritage’ (#Unite4Heritage) campaign was launched at Baghdad University in Iraq, indicating that while UNESCO is able to advocate at the highest levels of the international community, notably with national governments, at other international organizations, and at the UN Security Council, it is also conscious of the need to raise awareness and advocate on the ground and in particular among young people (UNESCO 2015b).

The Statutory Level

The best known of the UNESCO International Conventions bearing on the protection of the world’s cultural heritage is the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), which established a listing system (World Heritage List) of cultural and natural heritage sites of outstanding universal value together with various internationally monitored protection mechanisms. Some of the sites affected by the destruction of cultural heritage in the Middle East today are listed on the World Heritage List or the World Heritage Tentative List of sites nominated by States Parties to the Convention for potential listing. Many of these sites have been inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger as a way of signalling the threats against them and calling for their enhanced monitoring and protection. Detailed reports on the sites concerned and the threats against them can be found on the World Heritage Website maintained by the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, which is the Secretariat responsible for overseeing work carried out under the Convention.

The 1972 Convention is an effective way of promoting international involvement in the protection of cultural and natural sites of outstanding universal value within specific national territories. UNESCO, operating through the World Heritage Centre and World Heritage Committee, may choose to inspect World Heritage Sites thought to be in particular danger, to order emergency and other protection work, or to remind states parties of their responsibility to protect such sites on their territories through management and conservation measures. However, the Organization also has other statutory instruments at its disposal that are also valuable in protecting cultural heritage from various threats, including those of armed conflict. Among these is the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its 1954 and 1999 Protocols and the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. The precise stipulations of these Conventions can be found on the UNESCO Website (UNESCO n.d.). Perhaps the main points to be made here are that these Conventions oblige state parties not to target or to use cultural heritage sites within their jurisdiction for military purposes and to fight against illicit trafficking through specific measures, regulations and laws.
On the latter point, it should be underlined that the fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural objects is not only the responsibility of the countries from which those objects come or in whose territories the sites concerned are located. Auction houses and other organizations buying or selling cultural objects have a responsibility to assist the authorities in not dealing in objects that have been looted or acquired by illegal means wherever they may be located. State parties to the Conventions are obliged to ensure that stolen objects do not pass through their territories and to cooperate in the restitution of such objects to their countries of origin when this has been shown to be the case. UNESCO’s work in administering these Conventions means that the Organization cooperates with institutional partners such as ICOMOS, ICCROM, ICOM, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO), UNODC, and other UN organizations and agencies, along with NGOs and civil society organizations and a wide range of other partners including academic institutions, museums and other foundations, auction houses, national police forces and individual experts. The changing nature of the situation on the ground requires the continual review and adaptation of its working methods.

As far as specific threats are concerned, among the most important have been the looting of cultural heritage sites and institutions in countries caught up in conflict in the Middle East and the illicit trafficking of stolen cultural objects. Various figures have circulated for the Syrian conflict, but 2015 figures suggest that out of some 740 archaeological sites in Syria, more than 200 have been severely damaged or destroyed by illegal excavation (UNITAR 2014). Similar figures have circulated for cultural heritage sites in Iraq, and there have been similar incidents of illegal excavation or looting reported from other countries in the region, among them Libya, Egypt and Yemen. ICOM has put together Red Lists of stolen cultural objects from Syria (2013), Libya (2015), Iraq (updated in 2015) and Yemen (in preparation), these being intended to raise the alert among international police agencies, customs authorities, antiquities dealers and others on the cultural objects that are at risk of illicit trafficking (ICOM n.d.). UNESCO itself has acted as a clearing house for reports on looting and illicit trafficking from the region, receiving reports from Member States on measures taken in relation to UN Security Council Resolution 2199 (2015), which contains provisions on illicit trafficking. The Organization organizes training and coordination workshops and other activities for police forces, customs agents and other authorities under the 1954 and 1970 Conventions.

UN Security Council Resolution 2347 (2017) makes specific mention of the need to raise awareness of such trafficking and of UNESCO’s efforts to reduce it, acting under the Conventions detailed above and in cooperation with other UN and international agencies. Among such actions one that might be highlighted here is the work of the Italian Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage. UNESCO’s ‘Strategy for the Reinforcement of Actions for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the
Event of Armed Conflict mentioned earlier includes the creation of a rapid response mechanism for the protection of cultural heritage in emergency situations that could be used in UN peacekeeping missions. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the Italian Government in February 2016 that puts at UNESCO’s disposal a task force including members of the Carabinieri Command for emergency interventions in countries affected by natural disasters or armed conflict. This task force has not yet been deployed, but the deployment of this or similar forces, acting in cooperation with UNESCO, is affirmed as possible within UN peacekeeping operations when their mandate calls for it in UN Security Council Resolution 2347.

Recent activities organized by UNESCO to address this problem have included a meeting at the Organization’s headquarters in Paris in March 2016. This brought together representatives of ICOM, UNODC, INTERPOL, the WCO, and other international organizations, representatives of national governments, customs and police authorities, and representatives of auction houses and the art market. The meeting discussed the tools that should be used and the codes of conduct that should govern the activities of all actors in ensuring due diligence and the traceability and proof of origin of all objects on the market originating from conflict zones.

The Operational Level

While it is generally not possible for UNESCO to undertake operational activities directly in countries suffering from armed conflict, it is possible to undertake such activities remotely and to carry out work that will both mitigate damage caused to the cultural heritage during the conflict period and help prepare for the post-conflict recovery period. In order to devise informed and well-crafted operational action plans, over the last six years UNESCO has convened various international expert meetings for the emergency safeguarding of the cultural heritage of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, often gathering around the table national counterparts from different political backgrounds who are united in safeguarding their common heritage regardless of political differences.

The following five sets of activities that have emerged from these action plans are as follows: (1) monitoring and assessment; (2) preparation of post-conflict recovery activities, for example through drawing up inventories and databases of documents, experts and initiatives; (3) awareness-raising of the public and military personnel during conflict and post-conflict periods; (4) capacity building and training courses in areas such as securing museums and museum collections, inventories, surveys and documentation, emergency consolidation and the training of border and customs authorities; and (5) the tracking and authentication of illicitly trafficked cultural objects in cooperation with INTERPOL and the WCO. UNESCO also works to coordinate international and national activities carried out by other agencies in order to create synergies, avoid duplication, increase the effectiveness of protection activities and harmonize similar initiatives.
Taking these activities in turn, as far as monitoring and assessment are concerned throughout periods of armed conflict, UNESCO carefully monitors the situation on the ground and acts to gather information from a variety of sources regarding damage done to the cultural heritage. Under its statutory duties outlined earlier, the Organization reminds state parties to the 1954, 1970 and 1972 Conventions of their obligations to protect cultural heritage during periods of armed conflict, and it actively solicits information regarding damage suffered by cultural heritage either as a direct result of military action or as a result of looting and illicit trafficking. These activities are complemented by the preparation of post-conflict recovery activities, notably the production of databases of expertise and documentation such as the Observatory of Syrian Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2014). During periods of armed conflict, it is usually not possible for UNESCO experts to verify directly the condition of cultural heritage sites, monuments and collections, though there have been some exceptions over recent years such as missions to Syria: Palmyra in April 2016 (UNESCO 2016a) and Aleppo in January 2017; and Nimrud in Iraq (UNESCO 2016b). However, the Organization can act as a central clearing house for information from elsewhere, helping to keep track of damage known to have been suffered by cultural heritage and the status and condition of collections, for example museum collections.

Figure 2.1 The destroyed triumphal arch in Palmyra (Palmyra, Syria). April 2016. (Photo: N. Al Hassan; Copyright: UNESCO).
Raising the awareness of the need to protect the cultural heritage among the public and military and other personnel during periods of armed conflict and in post-conflict situations is a statutory obligation under particularly the 1954 Convention and its Protocols. UNESCO routinely informs the military authorities of the country concerned, as well as the military authorities of any other country taking part in the conflict, of their obligations to protect cultural heritage sites and institutions during periods of armed conflict, including by not using them for military purposes. In the recent conflict in northern Iraq, for example, during the preparation of the military operations to retake the city of Mosul and the Nineveh region from ISIL, UNESCO drew up a list of cultural heritage sites, institutions and monuments in the region that could be affected by military actions designed to retake the city. This list was shared with the Iraqi armed forces and with those countries that are part of the international coalition fighting ISIL so that these sites and institutions could be taken into account during military operations (UNESCO 2016c).

One of UNESCO’s main activities during periods of armed conflict has been capacity building and training courses for national authorities and other actors working in the field of the built, movable and intangible cultural heritage. In the present conflicts in the Middle East, the Organization has worked since the 2010s to organize training sessions in emergency protection and consolidation, inventorying, and the fight against illicit excavation, looting and trafficking. In Syria, for example, in the framework of the UNESCO Project for the Emergency Safeguarding of Syrian Cultural Heritage (2014–2017), some twelve such workshops have been organized since 2014. Among them have been emergency ‘first-aid’ meetings aimed at protecting the directly threatened heritage of Krak des Chevaliers, Palmyra, and the Old City of Damascus (all World Heritage Sites), and the collections of the Aleppo Museum. Training sessions have been held to create and improve inventories, including by using 3D digital documentation, and workshops have been held for police and border authorities to assist in the fight against looting and illicit trafficking. These workshops, held in neighbouring Lebanon, have also targeted customs and police officials from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in recognition of the fact that illicit trafficking is a cross-regional problem. The activities outlined in the preceding section of this chapter on statutory activities are obviously also relevant (UNESCO 2014).

In Iraq, five workshops or training sessions have been held since 2014, including two training workshops on architectural conservation in September 2015 and January 2016, and other workshops on preparing inventories of the intangible cultural heritage (UNESCO 2015c). These workshops were in addition to previous workshops and training sessions carried out after 2003. In Yemen, training on cultural heritage risk-management took place in 2015, along with the delivery of risk-assessment tools to the field. Training has been carried out on damage-assessment reporting and on the preventive conservation of cultural heritage in conflict areas and risk-preparedness (UNESCO 2015d). In Libya, a dozen workshops and training sessions were
Figure 2.2 The destroyed cella of the Temple of Bel (Palmyra, Syria). April 2016. (Photo: N. Al Hassan; Copyright: UNESCO).

Figure 2.3 Nimrud entrance gate with destroyed lamassu (Nimrud, Iraq). December 2016. (Copyright: UNESCO).
held between 2013 and 2015. Some of these were on emergency conservation measures, preventive conservation and risk-management, including anti-terrorism measures, while others addressed the security of sites, museums and collections, the development of inventories, and training for police and customs officials in the fight against the looting of cultural heritage sites and collections and the illicit trafficking of cultural objects. Training workshops were also held to assist Libyan heritage professionals, from both government agencies and the NGO community, in the production of educational materials designed to raise awareness of cultural heritage among young people and in schools (UNESCO 2016d).

In addition to organizing such workshops and training sessions, UNESCO has also been able to mobilize funds from the international community in order to carry out activities designed to help safeguard the cultural heritage of countries suffering from armed conflict even while the conflict is still taking place. Remote assessment and monitoring using UNITAR-UNOSAT satellites have been carried out in Syria, Iraq and Yemen (UNESCO 2015a; UNITAR 2015). In Syria, UNESCO has been implementing a pilot project for the emergency safeguarding of the built, movable and intangible cultural heritage since March 2014, with financial contributions from the European Union, the Government of Flanders in Belgium, and the Austrian Government (UNESCO 2014).

**Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

How do societies recover from periods of armed conflict, not only with respect to the reconstruction of the destroyed or damaged cultural heritage, but also and most importantly with respect to the fabric of values, experiences and opportunities of which that heritage is an essential part? Even when considered from a narrowly technical perspective, post-conflict reconstruction is an extremely complex field that involves a large number of political, social, economic, environmental, aesthetic, financial and other considerations. It also raises numerous challenges, such as international and national coordination during the recovery phase, often short timeframes for decision-making, and the involvement of the private sector and development pressures that can often entail gentrification. There are also other challenges such as new discoveries of archaeological remains, the possible lack of documentation to guide restoration and reconstruction choices, the existence of a brain drain, the lack of suitable professionals, and the displacement of skilled workers, among others. Many of these challenges have of course been identified by scholars, heritage professionals and other organizations, or are being actively thought through with UNESCO’s cooperation: the recent ICOMOS ‘Guidance Note on Post-Trauma Recovery and Reconstruction for World Heritage Cultural Properties’ is a good example (ICOMOS 2017). Some of these challenges have been exacerbated by the specific characteristics of the Middle Eastern countries, where geo-political changes in the region, the representation and participation of diverse communities, the large-scale character of projects, insufficient urban
regulations, the lack of master plans, the complex legal frameworks with regard to property rights and inheritance, and the absence or disappearance of cadastral documents can all add to challenges faced elsewhere.

UNESCO has been extensively involved in post-conflict reconstruction projects, either as lead actor or with the Organization’s broad participation. The rebuilding of the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia, implemented in collaboration with the World Bank, in the early years of this century, or the consolidation of the niches that used to house the statues of the Buddha at Bamiyan in Afghanistan before their destruction in 2001, are recent examples. They raise both technical issues regarding the planning and execution of such projects in the field and broadly political or moral ones about the possibility or necessity of reconstructing sites and monuments that have been destroyed in periods of armed conflict, sometimes intentionally so. In the case of the statues of the Buddha at Bamiyan, for example, there have been intense discussions about the feasibility or desirability of reconstructing the statues, with proposals ranging from their complete reconstruction using 3D laser techniques, to hologram reconstructions, or to a permanent exhibition that would through extensive documentation showcase their dramatic history (UNESCO 2016e).

Other examples have included UNESCO’s reinstallation of the Aksum Obelisk in its original location within the Aksum Archaeological Site in Ethiopia; some eighty years after it was looted by the Italian fascist regime and installed in front of the Ministry of the Colonies in Rome (UNESCO 2008). Following the intentional destruction of mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu in Mali in 2012, UNESCO, with the participation of the local communities, intervened to help rebuild the damaged or destroyed buildings according to their original plans. Both these examples are of post-conflict reconstruction work that has contributed to peace and confidence-building following episodes of collective trauma. These experiences raise many questions, the full answers to which will require further and broader reflection. At the very least, they raise questions about how societies can work through episodes of traumatic conflict, with dynamics of power giving way to post-conflict dialogue and reparation. They also show how the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage can contribute to, or be a motor for, sustainable development and broader economic and societal reconstruction. There have also clearly been questions regarding the full involvement of local people and local communities in post-conflict cultural heritage reconstruction.

The sheer scale of the destruction that has been seen across the Middle East in recent years has undoubtedly left bitter memories behind it. There has been the large-scale destruction of urban centres, notably in Aleppo and Homs in Syria, Sana’a in Yemen and Mosul in Iraq, and the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage sites such as Nimrud and Khorsabad in Iraq or Palmyra in Syria, to name but a few. This destruction raises very important questions of legal and moral accountability, memory and reconstruction, some of them already seen after the destruction of the giant statues of the Buddha at Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001, but now reproduced on an even larger scale.
UNESCO has a major role to play in leading and clarifying such debates and in suggesting best practices that might be followed on the ground, notably in the Middle East where the conflicts that have hit the region since 2011 have been responsible for some of the most prolonged and wide-ranging episodes of cultural heritage destruction yet seen.

In concluding this chapter, I would like to turn to two case studies that highlight many of the complex issues involved. The first example, UNESCO’s work in reconstructing and safeguarding the cultural heritage of Mali following the destruction that took place in 2012, comes from outside the Middle East region but raises many of the same issues (UNESCO/MCATM 2017). The second example, the Organization’s work in planning for the reconstruction and safeguarding of the Old City of Aleppo following its widespread damage and destruction in the present conflict in Syria, is a central example of the kinds of destruction unfortunately taking place across much of the Middle East today.

As far as the example of Mali is concerned, religious buildings in the north of the country, notably in Timbuktu and Gao, were targeted by repeated attacks from May 2012 onwards leading to the destruction of fourteen mausoleums in Timbuktu, including the two mausoleums of the Djingareyber Mosque, the largest in the city. Ancient manuscripts from the Ahmed Baba Institute, a religious centre in Timbuktu, were burned by armed groups, and there was a high risk of the looting and illicit trafficking of other manuscripts and cultural objects outside the country. The exact number of manuscripts destroyed, possibly numbering in the thousands, at present remains unknown. In June 2012, the Old City of Timbuktu and the Mosque of Askia in Gao were placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee as part of the Organization’s work to draw attention to the threats facing the cultural heritage in Mali. As a State Party to the 1954 Convention and its Protocols, the cultural heritage of Mali is protected by international law, and UNESCO was able to make representations to the UN Security Council that led to the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions 2056, 2071, 2085 and 2100, all of which contain measures intended to help assist in the protection of Mali’s cultural heritage. The Organization also worked with the MINUSMA peacekeeping forces and the ICC in order to raise awareness of the need to protect the cultural heritage and to assist in ICC efforts to prosecute those responsible for its destruction, which has been designated a war crime. In August 2013, the first reconstruction work began on the damaged mosques, with work on the damaged mausoleums starting in March 2014. A major international conference on the damaged manuscripts was held in Paris in January 2015, and in July of the same year the reconstructed mausoleums were inaugurated in Timbuktu. Work on the damaged manuscripts and the reconstruction and safeguarding of the damaged buildings continues.

The second example, UNESCO’s work in protecting and planning for the reconstruction of the Old City of Aleppo in Syria, is much larger in scale and it raises different issues as Aleppo is the economic heart of Syria and the country’s second-largest city. Over the past six years of the conflict in Syria, the Old
City of Aleppo, a World Heritage Site, has been very severely damaged like much of the rest of the country, and many of its most emblematic buildings have been severely damaged or even partially or completely destroyed to the point where the city has been compared to the situation of Berlin, Dresden or Warsaw in Europe after World War Two. In June 2015, UNESCO brought together a group of multidisciplinary national and international experts and cultural heritage specialists for a meeting in Paris on post-conflict reconstruction in the Middle East and particularly in Aleppo. Many of the technical and broader points raised above were discussed in order to launch reflection on the city’s eventual post-conflict reconstruction. Following the end of the worst of the fighting in Aleppo earlier this year, the city has become at least partly accessible once again, with a UNESCO mission visiting Aleppo in January 2017. Work has been stepped up with regard to the assessment of the damage, the management of the debris, the consolidation of the most threatened buildings and monuments, and the estimation of future needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation. A coordination meeting with national stakeholders and international organizations and experts working on Aleppo was held in the UNESCO Beirut Office in March 2017. This set out coordination mechanisms and actions that can now be carried out with a view to the city’s eventual reconstruction, including strategic planning, coordinating the activities of all those working in the field, and taking short- and medium-term
technical measures. The strategic planning included consideration of the legal
issues that can arise regarding land use and ownership, tax reductions, financial
support, construction permits and property regulations.

Damage assessment and documentation will clearly be crucial to proper
reconstruction planning, and here too UNESCO is acting to coordinate activ-
ities in the field, working with both Syrian and international stakeholders.
Capacity building, delivered either by UNESCO or UNESCO partners such
as ICOMOS and ICCROM, among others, is also being actively pursued,
again in coordination with Syrian stakeholders along with national and interna-
tional NGOs. There is also the emergency restoration and rehabilitation work
that must be planned now and will be carried out by national and international
agencies with UNESCO input and coordination. Above all, there is the more
complex and perhaps even longer-term work of harnessing the cultural herit-
age to restore social cohesion, dialogue and peace.

Conclusion

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, UNESCO in earlier years generally
intervened only after conflicts had at least formally ended, restricting cultural
heritage activities in some cases to largely technical matters of reconstruction,
consolidation and safeguarding. However, major shifts at the international and
regional levels have prompted the Organization to develop significantly in its
dealing with post-conflict recovery in general and with cultural heritage con-
servation and reconstruction in particular.

On the one hand, UNESCO has embraced the experience accumulated
through work on the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from
2000 to 2015, and more recently on the UN 2030 Agenda and its associated
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), by advocating actively for the inclusion
of culture in the broadest sense on the sustainable development agenda through
evidence-based reports, such as the ‘Creative Economy Report’ (UNESCO
2013a) and the ‘Global Report on Culture for Sustainable Urban Development’
(UNESCO 2016f); international conferences, such as the Hangzhou Congress
on ‘Culture: Key to Sustainable Development’ held in China in May 2013
(UNESCO 2013b); and pilot operational projects, such as the MDG Fund sup-
ported by the Government of Spain. On the other hand, as conflicts have tended
to lengthen in recent years, widening and deepening to take in the deliberate or
systematic destruction of the cultural heritage by extremist organizations seek-
ing to destabilize societies and to target particular ethnic or religious groups,
UNESCO has sought to address the roots of conflicts in the Middle East in
particular through awareness-raising, education and targeted advocacy actions,
and by working on risk-preparedness and risk-mitigation in the area of cultural
heritage. While UNESCO has always considered post-conflict cultural herit-
age conservation or rehabilitation as an opportunity to promote tolerance and
peace-building, today the efforts of the Organization in this regard have been
re-oriented to address wider social, economic and environmental recovery plans
within the larger context of the humanitarian response to conflict and post-conflict situations. It is this rethinking that is reflected in UNESCO’s 2015 strategy and in its operational activities.

One way in which all this can be done is by reflecting critically on the existing frameworks and the lessons learned from previous episodes of post-conflict reconstruction. For this reason, it is important to re-examine the reconstruction of European societies after World War Two, notably experiences of rebuilding the social fabric after extended periods of internecine fighting and destruction. UNESCO’s experiences from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and Mali also shed light on the true complexity of post-conflict experiences that involve cultural heritage, and they raise important questions relevant to future planning. These questions include thinking through the ways in which the reconstruction choices of post-World War Two Berlin helped heal the scars of major collective trauma (Detry 2014). What can be learned from the mistakes that were committed, and the successes that were achieved, in Berlin, Dresden and Warsaw, for example, in the reconstruction to come of Aleppo, Mosul or Sana’a? Since reconstruction is often confronted with questions of reinterpreting the past, how can this process be fair and equitable to all and a driver for social cohesion? Can post-conflict recovery plans provide ‘opportunities’ for creativity and renewal in historic settings? How can it be ensured that recovery plans address the divides in war-torn societies in the most relevant locations and beyond merely historic ones (Pullan and Baillie 2013)?

Other questions that should be asked include looking at the ways in which commemoration and interpretation can contribute to ensuring that societies do not repeat past mistakes and instead place the restoration of justice in the collective memory. To what extent and in what ways can formal and informal education and communication at large, including through social media, embed respect for cultural diversity and harness the crucial importance of cultural heritage in uniting instead of dividing societies? How can cultural heritage reconstruction be part and parcel of economic recovery and growth, notably with regard to job creation for young people, skills development, capacity building and sustainable development? It may be suggested here that while bringing to justice those accused of playing a leading role in the intentional destruction of the cultural heritage in conflict zones, as has happened to those responsible for the destruction in Mali, then, raising the stakes of destroying cultural heritage to the level of a war crime, addressing the roots of intentionally destructive acts through education, awareness-raising, working towards achieving fair and equitable societies, and bringing about sustainable development are also important endeavours in building ‘peace in the minds of men and women.’

The author is responsible for the choice and presentation of the facts contained in this article and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.
Bibliography


UNESCO. 2015a. Reinforcement of UNESCO’s Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed


3 The Need for Pre-Conflict Planning for Cultural Property Protection in the Event of Armed Conflict

Christopher L. McDaid

Introduction

At the turn of the twenty-first century the illegal looting of archaeological sites was seen as the most significant threat to cultural properties by a leading scholar (Renfrew 2000, 15). In the time since Renfrew’s statement, the destruction of cultural properties during armed conflict has risen to the top of the list for many (e.g. Kila 2012; Newson and Young 2015; Rush 2010; Stone 2009). While the focus of this volume deals with the aftermath of armed conflict and impact on cultural properties, discussion of the existing international framework for cultural property protection (CPP) in the event of armed conflict, how that framework developed, and what concerned scholars can do to participate (if they wish) in CPP is appropriate. Pre-conflict planning for CPP provides a means of possibly lessening the damage done to cultural properties during a conflict, and the potential to create a record of the cultural property. This record could be curated outside the affected region and would be beyond the reach of the conflict, meaning that it could be used to guide post-conflict restoration or research. The current international framework for CPP is based on the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Properties in the Event of Armed Conflict (the Convention) along with its two protocols. Along with governmental agencies there is a network of learned societies and non-governmental organizations that work to protect cultural property during armed conflict.

The Convention is binding on those state parties that ratify or accede to it. Nations that have not formally agreed to the Convention may be bound by its practices, if those are considered to have become part of customary international law (Howe 2012, 417). Alongside state parties there are of course also non-state actors, and these are an increasingly significant aspect of armed conflict in many areas of the world (Andreopoulos 2010; Briscoe 2013; Hakimi 2015). However, the Convention only addresses armed conflict between nation states, which indicates the need for international institutions to revisit and revise conventions and legal frameworks. In the current geo-political climate, many of the conflicts that have the potential to destroy cultural property (or indeed have already destroyed cultural property) involve non-state actors. This chapter
will not address questions about the applicability of the Convention on non-state actors, although the importance of doing so is not underestimated; rather this chapter will focus on the requirements the Convention places on parties that have ratified or acceded to the document. Those nations have clearly accepted the task of complying with the Convention, although in practice this is not always easy to do, or evident.

**CPP and the Military**

Fundamental to this whole discussion about preparing for the protection of cultural property in times of conflict are some sensitive topics that scholars should consider as they decide whether or not to involve themselves with CPP. CPP during armed conflict usually involves working with governmental military organizations, and an individual must decide if they are willing to work with military organizations and military personnel in this field. Attempting to protect cultural property during armed conflict or working on cultural property after armed conflict requires dealing with situations that involve all the suffering and pain that accompanies armed conflict. Are scholars prepared to answer this question: “Why do you care more for old things than you do about the suffering people?” The choice of which properties to protect, restore, or research can easily be interpreted as signs of affinity or loyalty to one of the parties involved in the conflict, and this can lead to personal and political tensions. I cannot provide the answer to these questions for anyone but myself, and suggest that readers consider the very difficult and complex issues before any attempt to develop answers for themselves (Gerstenblith 2009; Hamilakis 2009; Stone 2009).

The Convention was significantly influenced by the work carried out during World War Two by the Allied Forces Monument, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) officers, referred to as the “Monuments Men” (Wegener 2010, 2). However, the concept of CPP during armed conflict predated World War Two. The idea of providing military guidance to protect culturally or historically significant properties during armed conflict goes back to at least the American Civil War (1861–1865) when General Order 100 was adopted by the US Army. The development of that document and its principle author will be addressed below.

Prior to describing the framework laid out in the Convention several terms and their underlying concepts need to be introduced and defined. The first is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as:

> [a] branch of public international law that consists of rules that, in times of armed conflict, seek—for humanitarian reasons—to protect persons who are not or are no longer directly participating in the hostilities, and to restrict means and methods of warfare.

(ICRC 2016)
Traditionally, IHL is divided into two types, Geneva law and Hague law, named after the cities where the nineteenth-century international conferences were held and where the well-known conventions were written.

Prior to the nineteenth century, scholars had addressed the concept of the Just War (*jus ad bellum*) and the concept of waging war justly or properly (*jus in bello*). *Jus ad bellum* addresses the reasons states go to war and when warfare is justified in international relations, while *jus in bello* focused on the conduct of the war once it was begun. The concepts behind *jus in bello* had been put into practice many times by commanders in the field, in areas such as decisions about accepting prisoners, granting quarter, and so forth. These were required to deal with immediate situations, and were not overarching rules of conduct for an entire army or an entire war (Best 1999). This changed when the United States Army issued a document called General Order 100 in 1863 during the American Civil War, which is more fully discussed below.

Geneva law addresses the treatment of individuals engaged in or affected by armed conflict and emerged from the 1864 conference. Topics such as the treatment of prisoners of war, wounded combatants, and civilians fall under Geneva law, and Geneva IHL is codified in the various Geneva conventions (Best 1999). Hague law is in the tradition of *jus in bello* and addresses the manner in which armed conflict is conducted, not when armed conflict should be waged. The Hague conference (1899) built on two prior international conferences, one in St. Petersburg, Russia in 1868, and another in Brussels in 1874, indicating the escalating importance of international codification of behavior during conflict (Doty 1998, 228–229). Issues such as the types of weapons that can be used in conflict, what constitutes valid military targets, and how military operations should be conducted fall under Hague law, as does the protection of cultural property.

A further term that needs to be discussed here is the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence describes the goal of LOAC:

> [t]o protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering and to safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in the conflict (such as prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked) and of civilians.

(Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre 2004, 3)

The military institutions of individual countries of course have their own approach to LOAC and IHL and archaeologists and heritage professionals should endeavor to identify and review these, if they are intending to engage with these issues in particular regions.

I believe that persuading any military organization to buy into the validity of policies or procedures around CPP is far more effective (and likely) if they have a major role in developing these themselves, rather than crafting approaches outside the military and trying to convince them to adopt those. In other
words, requiring that the military follow rules that they developed themselves is likely to be far more compelling than demanding that they follow rules that were developed by an outside entity. Advocates of the critical importance of CPP during conflict must be aware (and able to argue) that it is a recognized component of LOAC, and that it has been included in both LOAC and IHL since the American Civil War and the early Hague Conferences, and so has been fully recognized by major international players. Being able to point out these facts will allow advocates to counter possible criticisms that CPP is not a military matter and shows this is not a new issue.

CPP History

One generally accepted starting point for CPP and the first formally drafted military order to limit the conduct of war was the United States Army’s General Order 100 of 1863, also known as the Lieber Code (Cunning 2003, 214; Doty 1998, 224–225). This document marks the first time that an army engaged in a war was, by its own regulation, tasked to grant protection to culturally significant properties. Prior to this, the protection of cultural property had been discussed in the abstract by jurors and academics, such as Hugo Grotius in the early seventeenth century, and Emmerich de Vattel in the mid-eighteenth century (Cunning 2003, 211–214; Gerstenblith 2010, 4–5). Cultural property advisors, who were really fine art advisors, had traveled with military units under Napoleon, mainly to determine which items were suitable to take back to France as spoils of war rather than more abstract protection per se (Cunning 2003, 213–214; Spirydowicz 2010, 25).

Dr. Francis Lieber was born in 1800 in Berlin, and took part in the Napoleonic Wars as part of the Prussian army before completing his education at the University of Jena (Germany), and then taking part in the Greek War of Independence. Having moved to the US, Lieber began teaching history and political science at New York City’s Columbia College in 1858 (Paust 2001, 112). Lieber had published major texts in political science and early in the American Civil War developed a lecture series on what is now called LOAC (Paust 2001, 113). In the winter of 1862–1863 Dr. Lieber traveled to Washington DC and led the small group that developed General Order 100, or the Code for the Government of Armies in the Field, also widely known as the Lieber Code. While Lieber’s experiences as a soldier clearly influenced his approach to the law of war, searching for his wounded son in Tennessee in 1862 made him more sensitive to the impact of war on non-combatants (Freidel 1947, 325; Manning 2016, 4–6).

While the code addressed many issues in its 157 articles, Articles 34–36 speak directly to the types of properties that would now be considered cultural properties and should receive protection (Avalon Project 2016). The achievement of the Lieber Code was not seen in prosecutions during the Civil War, but rather as creating the basis for further developments in LOAC. The code clearly served as the “quarry from which all other codes were cut”
As noted, there were a series of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century peace conferences that led to the Hague Convention of 1907. In the 1907 Hague document, Article 27 requires that combatants take all “necessary steps” to spare buildings “dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments,” and medical facilities; however, this protection would be eliminated if the structures were being used for military purposes (Avalon Project 2016). This clause points out that the protection for properties outlined in the Hague conventions is not absolute. If one side ‘militarizes’ a location, i.e. moves troops, weapons, or war-making material into it, then that property becomes a valid military target and any protection granted by the conventions are no longer in force.

Article 56 of the 1907 Convention made the willful destruction of cultural property a crime subject to legal prosecution. However, how a military force or an individual would know a building or structure fell under the 1907 Convention’s protection was unclear, and thus the Convention required the besieged nation or area to identify protected properties that fell under the protection of Article 27 with a distinctive emblem. In an important omission, the Convention failed to state what emblem would mark protected buildings. There was an assumption (possibly unwarranted) of communication and concurrence between the warring parties to identify the symbol that identified protected property, as there was no generally agreed upon symbol for this purpose—no red cross for cultural properties.

This major issue was not fully addressed until the 1930s, when the earliest standard international symbol to identify cultural properties was defined by the 1935 Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, or the Roerich Pact, signed by the nations of the Americas in Washington DC. The Pact declared cultural property to be neutral, and identified the symbol that should be used to identify cultural properties. This symbol, called the ‘Banner of Peace’ is a red circle containing triple red spheres on a white background. Perhaps an even more significant aspect of the Roerich Pact is that it contains no exception for military necessity, unlike the Lieber Code and the 1907 Hague Convention which both had exceptions for military necessity. Military necessity was defined and explained by Dr. Lieber as, “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war” (Avalon Project 2016).

One major problem with allowing military necessity to override the protection of the conventions is the ease with which commanders confuse military necessity with military convenience, which was recognized during World War Two. General Eisenhower sent a directive to his subordinates in December of 1943 decrying claims of military necessity, “where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience” (Cotes and Weinberg 1986, 417). The Supreme Allied Commander went on to demand,
“I do not want it [the claim of necessity] to cloak slackness or indifference” (ibid.). During World War Two various scholars and learned societies kept demanding that the Allied Nations develop a process to attempt to lessen the effects of the inevitable invasion on the extensive cultural properties of Europe (Cotes and Weinberg 1986, 84–90). This led to the creation of MFAA officers who initially were tasked:

To prevent as far as possible destruction of and damage to historical monuments, buildings, works of art and historical records of Italy [later expanded to all Europe after the Normandy landings]; to safeguard and preserve them, and to give first aid in repairs when needed; and to assist in the recovery and restitution to their rightful owners of any works of art which have been looted, removed or otherwise misappropriated.

(Cotes and Weinberg 1986, 419)

The work of the MFAA soldiers served as the basis for the Hague Convention of 1954. Like the Lieber Code and the earlier Hague conventions, the 1954 document accepts the concept of military necessity. It also provides guidelines for military conduct during conflict, identifies activities that should take place during peace to prepare for conflict, and lays out a mechanism for sanctions in cases of violations of the Convention. The Convention, as of 2016, has been ratified or acceded to by 124 state parties, more commonly called countries. The Convention’s first protocol has been accepted by 101 state parties and 68 have accepted the second protocol (UNESCO 2016). The decision to join the Convention is a governmental one, but there are several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work to help implement the requirements of the Convention and to raise awareness of the issue. Given the number of armed conflicts in the world involving signatory nations, it does not appear that signing on to the Convention limits conflict, which is perhaps to be expected. The main role of the 1954 Convention is to help ensure protection of cultural property during conflict. The Convention offers a detailed definition of cultural property which includes buildings, books, art, archaeological sites, and so forth, and institutions such as museums, libraries, and galleries (UNESCO 1954, 8–10).

Taking the lead of the Roerich Pact, the 1954 Convention described a new symbol to be used to identify cultural properties: the Blue Shield. Article 16 of the Convention details the specific symbol to be used to identify cultural properties:

The distinctive emblem of the Convention shall take the form of a shield, pointed below, per saltire blue and white (a shield consisting of a royal-blue square, one of the angles of which forms the point of the shield, and of a royal-blue triangle above the square, the space on either side being taken up by a white triangle).

(UNESCO 1954, 22)
There is an international Blue Shield Organization, which is similar to the Red Cross, and there are many national committees: as of May 2016 there were 23 National Committees of the Blue Shield and 23 in formation (see Table 3.1) (US Committee of the Blue Shield).

**Opportunities for Individuals**

The requirements of the 1954 Hague Convention create several opportunities where individuals who are interested in CPP can become involved. There is a requirement for state parties to identify the property in their country that meets the definition of cultural property and mark those sites with the Blue Shield. Ensuring that properties are identified, that the information about the locations is correct, and that the Blue Shield is prominently displayed, are tasks that can be performed and encouraged by scholars who may not wish to interact directly with the military. Individuals who work for an institution that meets the definition of cultural property can and should place the Blue Shield on their facilities. In Vienna, buildings that meet the Convention’s definition of cultural property are marked with the Blue Shield, if practicable. Complying with the Convention’s domestic requirements is overseen by Austria’s Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture (Schipper et al. 2010, 148–150), meaning that CPP is not just a military mission or responsibility.

**Table 3.1 Existing and Forming Committees for the Blue Shield**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered Committees</th>
<th>Committees under Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curaçao</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Curaçao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an international Blue Shield Organization, which is similar to the Red Cross, and there are many national committees: as of May 2016 there were 23 National Committees of the Blue Shield and 23 in formation (see Table 3.1) (US Committee of the Blue Shield).
At the US Army’s Fort Drum in New York State, the installation cultural resources management program has marked several archaeological sites with the Blue Shield. This identifies those locations as cultural property and familiarizes soldiers with the symbol and its meaning. Any museum or historic site could perform a similar function by posting the Blue Shield and developing the interpretive narrative for tour guides and docents to include explanations of the symbol. Doing this would provide opportunities to explain to visitors the importance of CPP and to develop support for the issue among the general public. Many academic campuses may meet the definition of CP and could develop programs to raise awareness around the Blue Shield.

If individuals are willing to work directly with the military, then the Convention’s requirement to train military personnel in times of peace in CPP creates an opportunity. The first step is establishing which office or organization to coordinate with within a particular national military. Military organizations vary from nation to nation so some research would be necessary to ensure that communication is with the right military activity. There is often a distinction made between the parts of the military that oversee the domestic training facilities and those elements of a military that deploy during operations. In the US military, the term ‘institutional’ is used to describe the organizations that manage permanent installations, while in the UK and Australia the ‘Defence Estate’ organization manages the military infrastructure (Brown 2006; McDaid 2010).

Some nations have statutes that require the military to address CPP on the bases and installations on which they train. Those facilities are generally managed by the institutional military or the Defence Estate, and this often results in preservation professionals, archaeologists, architectural historians, historic architects, and others working for the military at the installation level to ensure compliance with the relevant statutes. The US has the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and this law is the principal legal requirement for the US military’s domestic CPP or cultural resources management (CRM) program. The Act requires each federal agency, including the military services, to have a preservation officer, a program to identify, evaluate, and nominate to the National Register of Historic Places the historic and cultural sites on land that they manage. It also requires that military installations consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer and other parties when its actions could affect archaeological sites and other types of cultural or historic properties. Having to deal with this and similar legal and policy requirements, as well as a large number of archaeological sites on military lands, has led to the US military directly employing archaeologists and other preservation professionals. These preservation professionals within the institutional military, or working for any nation’s equivalent of the Defence Estate, can act as a bridge for individuals concerned about CPP. They are a good place to start for individuals who are not familiar with military structure or organization. While the military archaeologist’s expertise will probably focus on the geographical area of the installation on which they work, their day-to-day job is CPP linked to CRM.
and heritage management, so they will be experienced in presenting information to military staff regarding cultural properties.

These professionals are generally members of larger professional associations, which make regional and national professional associations a good place to initiate contact in a familiar and collegial setting. Conference presenters or attendees from a military organization will gladly talk about their work and programmes. Alternatively, there are groups that focus on CPP present at the large North American archaeological conferences who hold open meetings. Perhaps one of the simplest ways for concerned scholars to become involved in CPP is to join the special interest group or committee of a professional association. CPP involves more than archaeology of course, but there are two main associations in North America noted here. The Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) and the Society for American Archaeology (SAA) both have groups concerned with CPP. The AIA has a special interest group, ‘The Cultural Heritage by Archaeology and Military Panel’ (CHAMP) that formed as a result of the destruction of cultural property in Iraq in the early 2000s. Based on input from concerned members, the SAA created the Military Archaeological Resources Stewardship (MARS) interest group in 2012. The group meets annually and discusses CPP as well as archaeology located on military lands.

Outside the framework of professional associations or CPP interest groups there are still actions that can be taken. First, if your country has not ratified or acceded to the 1954 Convention, work to have that happen, lobby your political representatives, develop a network of concerned professionals, and build support for the Convention. If your country is a party to the Convention, work to ensure that your nation is complying with Article 4, Paragraph 1 which charges nations to “undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory” (UNESCO 1954, 10). This is how actions at historic sites, museums, and academic campuses are associated with the larger CPP issue. The Convention’s Article 4 asks for a general respect for cultural property but the Convention’s Article 7 has a specific requirement.

That Article 7 requirement is for signatory parties to insert provisions into the regulations of their military forces to implement the Convention during armed conflict, and to develop specialist personnel to secure cultural property. During peacetime, signatory nations are required to insert provisions into the regulations of their military to “ensure observance of the Convention, and to foster in the members of their armed forces a spirit of respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples” (UNESCO 1954, 14). It is worth taking time to review your national military regulations to see if they are consistent with Article 7, and also check to see if military regulations are clear about the need to train members about the requirements of the Convention. There is also a requirement for the military to have trained specialists who can assist in complying with the Convention. Concerned scholars should determine who the specialists are and what programs have been developed to provide the information needed by military planners to provide protection to cultural
properties. The structure of each military is different so it may take some research to determine where in the bureaucracy the CPP tasks are housed (Schipper et al. 2010; Zellmeyer 2010). Sorting out the organizational structure of any military will be aided by first making connections with the CPP professionals who work with the military, and like most endeavors, networking over a period of time is often critical to success.

One action the founders of the AIA’s CHAMP group took was to develop lectures on the importance of cultural property, which they delivered on several US military installations. If you are located near a military installation, consider contacting the installation to discuss the possibility of presenting information to the personnel on post. In the US and the UK there are officer training programs that are affiliated with universities. Interested scholars can contact these programs and ask about making presentations to the students on the importance of cultural property, the requirements of the 1954 Convention, and why cultural property should be protected during armed conflict.

These efforts require time for interested scholars to research the organization of their national military, identify and then make contact with the appropriate portion of the military organization, and then finally begin to work towards protecting cultural property. Therefore, it is best to start initiatives prior to conflicts and continually work to build a process to get the information about cultural properties into the locations where it can be effective. As disconcerting as it may be to expect and plan for armed conflict, scholars interested in all regions of the world should develop plans for CPP. The challenges of building the capabilities for effectively protecting cultural property are best addressed prior to the tensions of imminent conflict. Scholars who work or are interested in areas where armed conflict is a possibility may be more immediately motivated, but everyone interested in CPP should be working to build capability and processes for CPP—it is not solely the responsibility of military forces, neither should it be solely the responsibility of heritage professionals working in countries in danger of conflict or already in conflict. All heritage professionals have a potential role.

The Convention places the requirement on the military to protect cultural property. This raises the issue of how the military will know about cultural properties that fit the Convention’s definition and need protection. Clearly locations on the World Heritage list or any nation’s official list of cultural property fits the bill, but as everyone who works with cultural property and heritage management is aware, there are many properties that would qualify for official designation but are not currently listed for reasons associated with possible damage from looting or visitation, political disagreements, and funding issues. So how do militaries plan to protect cultural property which is not on official lists? The obvious answer is someone must inform them; this places at least some of the burden on concerned scholars with knowledge of properties that meet the Convention’s definition.

One of the challenges inherent in the Convention is the definition of cultural property. The language used has room for interpretation about what qualifies as cultural property, and concerned scholars can work to have cultural property
described in order to fit the definition in the Convention. By working with other CPP professionals and stakeholders, concerned individuals can work to develop processes for determining which sites and locations fit the Convention’s definition of cultural property, and these discussions should include military organizations. If the various militaries are not included in developing the lists, they may not accept the results. The military should not be allowed to influence the process of determining what constitutes a cultural property, but the military will need to recognize that the determinations are valid and binding for the purposes of the Convention. This means that the military should be involved early in the planning process, ideally prior to conflict arising. This will allow the ‘ground rules’ of the process to be established and all concerned parties to accept the results without the added pressure of impending or on-going armed conflict.

Even after there is consensus on which sites and locations qualify as cultural property, there is a question of what data is needed to assist the military in complying with the Convention. Detailed information about a property may be needed to demonstrate that it meets the definition of cultural property, but almost certainly will not be needed by military planners. Military planners generally need the geospatial data for a given property, its location, size, and defined boundaries, and that it meets the Convention’s definition of cultural property.

The need to share data raises several challenges that need to be addressed when developing an approach to CPP. Along with the discussion of what data is required, interested parties will need to discuss the format of the data. Formatting questions include, but are not limited to: the format in which digital data is shared, the mapping datum that will be used for geospatial data, how data that is not digital will be shared, and how the quality of the data will be assured (Green 2010). Another area of concern is who holds on to the data related to cultural property and who has access to it. For a variety of reasons, researchers may not be comfortable turning data over to the military. Can a third party be identified to hold the data and then only provide it to the military if needed? This may be a role for the various Blue Shield committees or other non-governmental or academic organizations. Efforts to protect cultural property during armed conflict need to be on-going not just considered when conflict looms. Understanding who should have information, what that information should be, and how to most effectively share the data are key discussions to have on an on-going basis among stakeholders.

**Conclusion**

The concept of significant cultural property warranting protection during armed conflict is not new; it has been discussed by scholars since the seventeenth century and formally written into military regulations since the Lieber Code of 1863. While it can seem an impossible task to protect cultural property during armed conflict, there have been successes such as
the work of the Monuments Men during World War Two and the NATO no strike list in Libya (Edsel and Witter 2009; USCBS 2013).

One recent complication is the rise of non-state actors in armed conflict. The rise of non-state actors who are not bound by the 1954 Convention make getting the state parties that have acceded to the Convention to comply with the Convention more imperative. The main aim of this chapter has been to stress that working and planning prior to armed conflict is key for any kind of post-conflict heritage work, and that the requirements of the Convention create multiple opportunities for concerned scholars during peace. Work carried out during times of peace will provide a base-line, build consensus around what should be protected, and help the archaeologists and heritage specialists who address heritage issues post-conflict as well as the military. Concerned individuals can work to have their nation accede to the Convention and join with an NGO that focuses on the issues surrounding CPP. Another possible path is to work as a public scholar and engage the public to build up a belief in the public that CPP is important at home and in other parts of the world. It is also important that professional and scholarly organizations develop clear processes for addressing the issues around what fits the criteria of cultural property and how information sharing with the military will be handled. The Convention’s requirements place a great deal of onus on the military of signatory nations, but heritage professionals also have an important role to play in protecting humanity’s patrimony.

The opinions and conclusions in this paper are the author’s and do not reflect any official position of Joint Base Langley-Eustis, the US Air Force, or the US Government.

Bibliography


Part III

Strategies

Post-Conflict
4 Post-Conflict Heritage and Recovery

A Role for the Military

_Laurie W. Rush_

Introduction
As the incredibly tragic examples of deliberate destruction of cultural property unfold as part of contemporary genocidal conflict, members of the civilized world are increasingly recognizing the importance of heritage and preservation as a global imperative. With representatives of western military forces serving as first responders in many of these situations, the ability to protect and restore cultural property emerges as a component of mission success. Preservation of the material components of heritage such as structures, monuments, objects, sacred sites, and gathering places, offers a foundation for rebuilding communities post disaster or conflict. Preservation though, does not happen by accident. People who live in peaceful societies often ask whether efforts to save material culture are worth risking human lives, yet many times, in desperate situations, we find courageous people who risk their lives to save their heritage. It is those individuals who are committed to a belief in the survival of their community, history, and culture. When encountering profound gestures of this nature, responsible military forces can contribute to the potential for a stable, more peaceful future by recognizing the significance of these acts of bravery and being prepared to encourage and build upon them. There are recent examples where military post-conflict stabilization operations have included heritage and conservation projects. From the soldier’s perspective, the goal of western military intervention is to create a post-conflict environment conducive to peace and stability, a place where there will never be a need for foreign soldiers to return.

Military Heritage Projects
Heritage is a component of a healthy stable community. It is important to distinguish between the survival of individuals and the recovery and survival of a community as a corporate entity after a conflict or natural disaster. One of the reasons why the implementation of cultural property protection planning and education for military operations is so important is that if damage to sacred sites and heritage properties can be minimized at the very local level, it is far more
likely that the community will be able to recover more rapidly and prosper in the post-conflict environment.

With that concept in mind, since 2003, the US, UK, and other NATO allies have worked to establish comprehensive approaches to cultural property protection. In 2009, the US ratified the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and the UK may be on the verge of ratification as well (UNESCO 2017). NATO is just about to complete a Science for Peace and Security funded project to develop recommendations for cultural property protection policy, doctrine, and best practices. In the meantime, NATO has incorporated protection of cultural property into its new policies and practices on Protection of Civilians, again recognizing the importance of heritage preservation as a component of protecting communities and the innocent caught in the midst of conflict.

In addition to their efforts to educate their personnel and to develop and provide more comprehensive information concerning cultural property on the battlefield, the US, UK, Italy, and other NATO countries have also begun to experiment with heritage projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the goal and hope of contributing to the re-establishment of social order. Even though the Austrian experience in aiding the Italians after the devastating Calabritta earthquake in 1980 is a post-disaster rather than a post-conflict example, it still offers a compelling account of saving heritage as a component of community survival. As relayed in General Furstenhofer’s account at the World Archaeological Inter-Congress in Vienna in 2010, once all of the potential survivors had been rescued, the Austrian military contingent chose to focus on the area where the church had collapsed. They successfully recovered sacred objects hidden in the rubble including nearly intact statues of three saints. As the Austrians returned these objects to the village priest, he was able to gather the traumatized members of the community together for the Holy Eucharist. As the priest later described the moving ceremony, it became clear that this gesture was the first sign of hope that the survivors might also recover not just as individuals but also as a community (Furstenhofer 2010). The experience of the young Austrian officers present still informs the Austrian approach to cultural property protection today.

The importance of preservation of iconic and sacred objects has also been demonstrated repeatedly in a similar way in post-conflict contexts. As the Germans retreated from Italy in World War Two, they systematically destroyed every structure in the tiny village of Pieve Santo Stefano, Italy. After their departure, the citizens discovered that by some miracle their della Robia altarpiece, The Assumption of the Virgin, had survived. The community adamantly opposed any efforts by the monuments officers on the scene to remove the altarpiece for its own protection (Hartt 1949). Instead, the masterpiece remained in the village as an anchor for reconstruction of the community (Rush 2012). As the community members told Dr. Hartt, “E tutto quello che ci rimane,” “It is all we have left.”
Saddam’s Palaces, Iraq

In contrast, Saddam’s palaces offer a complicated example for proper management of cultural property not just during conflict but post-conflict as well. After the First Gulf War in 1990–1991, Saddam Hussein built over 80 opulent palaces in every major city across Iraq. His motives were to demonstrate his power and authority in every province in addition to confounding international representatives who were searching for weapons of mass destruction but who were forbidden access to Saddam’s ‘private’ residences. At one point, the US State Department estimated that he spent over $2 billion on these structures, even as the Iraqi people were suffering under sanctions (Freeman 2009).

As fortified structures, many of the palaces offered what the US perceived to be relatively ideal situations for field headquarters and so they were requisitioned as such. Iraqi attitudes about the palaces were mixed. Some Iraqis felt the palaces should be destroyed, not only to try and erase the memories of the atrocities committed within their walls but also to ensure there would be no memorials to the brutal dictator. Other Iraqis felt that the palaces could serve as monuments that could also tell of the story of the brutality of the regime. Still others recognized that the structures could be transformed. The palaces had potential as development into future hotels, casinos, cultural centers, and more traditional museums designed to celebrate Iraq’s ancient past. Some tour operators even recognized that international fascination with the phenomenon of Saddam might create a market for tourists who would be interested in just touring the palace complexes.

Initially, from the US military legal perspective, the palaces were considered to be the private property of a criminal. As such, the structures and their contents could theoretically be requisitioned under international laws of war. The US did indeed occupy several palaces and in the case of Faw Palace, Baghdad, completed extensive renovations in order to transform it into a state-of-the-art military command center. As the months of occupation transformed into years, there began to be a realization that Saddam’s palaces actually had been constructed at the expense of the Iraqi people and perhaps should be viewed as public property and possibly as historic structures. The US began to repatriate the palaces and in some cases turned them over to representatives of the Iraqi military.

In Hillah province, Saddam’s palace, built on the ruins of ancient Babylon, is now a tourist attraction and hotel. According to the Daily Mail online (Qin 2016), visitors may tour the palace grounds for the equivalent of 85 US cents, or may stay the night in luxurious palace rooms for approximately $200 US. Iraqi tourists seem to be very interested in visiting a place where trespass under Saddam would have meant certain death. Evidently, they are especially fascinated by a tree where only Saddam was allowed to eat the dates. According to Hartley (2009), honeymooners may even spend the night in Saddam’s bedroom. There is very little information about the transformation of the palace...
once held by US forces into a hotel, although a brief news story appeared in 2008 mentioning that both US and Russian companies had expressed interest in developing the property into a casino (Clegg 2008).

**Operations Heritage and Bell, Basra, Iraq**

The British contingent in Iraq focused on the south, and their approach to the palace complex in Basra was quite different from the US. In 2008, Lt. Gen. Sir Barnabas “Barney” White-Spunner KCB, CBE, in cooperation with academics from the British Museum, conceived Operation Heritage and Operation Bell. Operation Heritage was an effort to assess damage to archaeological sites in southern Iraq, and Operation Bell was the idea to transform one of Saddam Hussein’s palace complexes located on the waterfront in Basra into a museum campus for the region. British forces did occupy the palace complex in 2003, making it a military target, and in fact, the palace was attacked on more than one occasion by car bombs. However, it came through the worst years of the conflict in relatively good condition.

Educated at Eton and St. Andrews, Lt. Gen. White-Spunner brought a scholarly perspective to his command of the British Field Army in Iraq, and in 2009 he began to consider what a positive legacy from the British involvement in Iraq could be, and chose to encourage projects that would celebrate the glorious heritage of ancient Mesopotamia. The General worked with professionals from the British Museum and reached out to Dr. Qahtan al-Abeed, Director of the Basra Museum. It quickly became clear that renovating the palaces would result in a much nicer facility than attempting to repair the existing museum that had been damaged in the conflict and was being used as a shelter by refugees. The British military engineers quickly became engaged in the project, and the military effort was supplemented by outside fund raising including formation of a British group called ‘Friends of the Basrah Museum’.

In the meantime, Dr. al-Albeed spent three years convincing the Iraqi central government to approve of and invest in the project. There were concerns that some Iraqis might view use of the palace as a celebration of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, and perhaps there was tension between the central office of the State Board of Antiquities and advocates for a major institution outside of the capital. However, over time, the Iraqi government became supportive of the project, allocated funding, and even arranged for the loan of objects from the National Museum in Baghdad. The clear progress toward opening a new museum also created an opportunity for Iraqi citizens to turn in over 133,000 objects that had been excavated illegally from archaeological sites throughout the region, including over 80,000 coins (Higgins 2013). Basra is located immediately adjacent to the ancient city of Zubair, an archaeological site of nearly 500 acres. Saddam opened the area as an industrial zone resulting in the construction on top of the site of the ancient city of at least 17 factories with associated roads and infrastructure. It is possible that the excavation of many of these tens of thousands of artifacts were a by-product of development and new construction in an area
of tremendous archaeological significance. The palace museum will also tell the story of Saddam’s opulence; some of the gold-plated bathroom fixtures are intact and will be on display.

As of autumn 2016, the first gallery has opened (Hua 2016). The palace museum is intended as an anchor for an entire heritage area of the city including a heritage museum located in the mansion of a Jewish merchant that is already hosting exhibitions, courses, and conferences. Successful cultural institutions that attract visitors can then encourage development of hotels and restaurants. Dr. al-Abeed’s vision is that perhaps someday Basra can offer a tourist experience similar to Granada in Spain (Lawler 2016). As the first new museum to open in Iraq in many years, this cultural institution offers hope for tourism and will be an educational resource for the Iraqi people.

Protection of Archaeological Property: Setting a Global Standard

Heritage preservation is a core value of Italian culture, and the Italian military embodies this value when they deploy. Dating back at least as far as the conflict in the Balkans, the Italians have an established reputation for respecting and protecting cultural property throughout and post-conflict. In Kosovo, the Italian area of responsibility included Decani Monastery, a Roman Catholic monastery at risk of attack from extremist members of the Muslim community. When the Italians assumed command for protecting the monastery, the beauty of the place captured the imagination of the Italian people, and there was coverage in the Italian press. An Italian journalist, Maria Lina Veca (2003a), interviewed the former Mayor of Venice, a philosopher, Massimo Cacciari, who spoke passionately about the moral obligation to preserve this sacred place. In discussing the exquisite beauty of the frescos, Mr. Cacciari explained that he believed the loss of Decani would be equivalent to the loss to Venice if the horses of San Marco were to be destroyed. In the same article the Italian Commander of Task Force Sauro (the name of the mission to Decani), Generale Fabio Mini, confirmed that the Italians would stay. As of 2016, Italian soldiers are still based at Decani. What is interesting about Decani and its valley is that for centuries it has been a sacred place for local people of all religions. The earth there is believed to have sacred healing powers, making it a destination for pilgrims. Decani has also been a place of refuge and the monks allowed members of the local Muslim community to take refuge there when they were threatened in 1998–1999. The Italians have discovered that by protecting Decani, they have been able to maintain a measure of peace in the local area and perhaps the continued existence of the monastery will be able to provide a foundation for reconciliation in the future.

In 2003, in response to looting of museums and sites throughout Iraq, UNESCO initiated a series of meetings designed to encourage international response to the problem. UNESCO also wrote to all of the countries surrounding Iraq as well as to the US and British authorities requesting cooperation in
the effort to stop the smuggling of antiquities out of Iraq (UNESCO 2016). Of special note was a meeting at Interpol headquarters in Lyon on May 5–6, 2003 co-chaired by UNESCO and attended by over 70 delegates representing the United Nations, the International Council of Museums, antiquities dealers, academic experts, customs officials, and numerous countries. One of the outcomes of this meeting was the decision to create a database of known objects stolen from Iraq.

At this conference, the delegates decided to create a database for archaeological objects stolen in Iraq, create an Interpol experts group for stolen heritage, and create an Interpol special unit for the recovery of stolen heritage, known as the Interpol Tracking Task Force (ITTF). Given their domestic accomplishments and experience with the use of database information for recovery of stolen property, the Italian Carabinieri TPC were an ideal choice for this response effort. Co-sponsored by the Italian Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Culture, two Carabinieri officers reporting to the Senior Advisor for the Minister of Culture were sent to Baghdad for six months from June 2003 until January 2004. Their goal was to compile description cards of stolen objects in order to create a catalog that could be sent to the Carabinieri database of stolen objects in Rome that could, in turn, link to the Interpol international database. The Italian officers were also hoping to create an Iraqi Interpol liaison office and were anxious to trace the illicit exportation routes out of Iraq with associated investigations concerning destination and markets for the stolen materials.

The Italians worked hard to strike a balance between opposition to the invasion of Iraq voiced by European countries like France and Germany and wanting to maintain good relations with the US, UK, and coalition allies. Adding to their effort in Baghdad, the Italians deployed a contingent of Carabinieri to the south of the country as a compromise solution (Hummel 2007). The Carabinieri, a multidisciplinary law enforcement organization, is ideal for this type of mission. The structure of their force in nucleated subdivisions enables them to offer specialized policing in a wide variety of areas. The Carabinieri mission to Nasiryah, also called Operation Antica Babilonia, included not only two officers from the TPC but also officers specializing in food safety, depleted uranium, DNA analysis, and ballistics. Carabinieri make excellent peacekeepers because of their approach to and experience with domestic and community-based policing. Quite often in small Italian villages, key community leaders include the priest, the mayor, the physician, and the marshal of the Carabinieri. As a result, these officers gain experience in keeping track of community activities and dynamics of all types. At the local level there is also latitude and responsibility for managing resolution of disputes, so Carabinieri officers have the opportunity to gain experience with pro-active approaches for keeping the peace in very local contexts. Much of the initiative for the Iraq mission came directly from the Carabinieri, and they selected their very best officers for duty in Iraq. The Italians had been offering support to Iraq as part of bilateral and multi-lateral partnership agreements since the 1990s, and in 2003, the Italians sponsored over 100 projects in Iraq.
Initiatives ranged from those based around culture, education, archaeology, and heritage to health, environment, public administration, irrigation, rule of law, and agriculture.

The deployed Carabinieri worked together as a team assisting each other with their respective missions. After encountering evidence of the looting of the ancient Mesopotamian city sites on an industrial scale in Nasiriyah and Dhi Qar Provinces, the Italians also realized that one key to stability in the southern regions of Iraq would be restoration of the rule of law for archaeological site protection. The goals of the anti-looting and archaeological site protection missions were to document and map sites in the south of Iraq. After establishing an initial introductory relationship with Mr. Abdul Amir Hamdani, the Iraqi archaeological site inspector for the region, two Carabinieri TPC Officers began by asking for a map of archaeological sites in the area so they could begin logistical planning for site protection. During the first phase of the deployment, the Italians completed 39 cultural property missions, visiting 23 archaeological sites, completing 6 over flights, recovering 92 objects, identifying 54 looters, with 19 arrests. During the course of interdiction, the Italians confiscated looting tools such as shovels and probes in addition to rigs for electrical lighting designed to run off car batteries.

While his counterparts were working in the south of Iraq, the lead Carabinieri officer in Baghdad, Capitano Giuseppe Marsiglia played a key role in the recovery of the Museum. Captain Marsiglia’s patience encouraged members of the Iraq Museum staff to trust him, and they slowly began to share artifact documentation that had survived the looting and vandalism. He compiled this evidence into the Carabinieri database format and uploaded it into the Italian system. This information is still available today on the Carabinieri website where it can be used immediately should any of these objects reappear in the marketplace or on public display. The Captain also spent hours, days, and weeks perusing the markets of Baghdad and talking with vendors and looking for objects with the tell-tale Iraq Museum number recorded in ink. Again, his patience prevailed as he convinced Iraqis to return objects that did not belong to them. In cooperation with the University of Torino, the Italian Carabinieri also created the Virtual Museum of Iraq, a compelling tour of the collections and interpretation of the history of Mesopotamia for people who may never have the privilege of visiting the Iraq Museum galleries in person (Virtual Museum Iraq 2017). Captain Marsiglia also coordinated with officers from the TPC who were serving on the Nasiriyah peacekeeping mission in the south of Iraq and played a key role in the development and implementation of training for Iraqi archaeological site guards (see also Rush and Millington 2015).

By the time the Operation Antica Babilonia was completed in total, the accomplishments included 90 missions performed, 60 sites inventoried, 24 helicopter missions, 302 objects recovered, 94 looters identified, and 46 looters arrested. It is difficult to know how these statistics compare to overall intensity of looting in the region, but by 2009, the Iraqis felt confident that they were ready to provide site security for the ancient Mesopotamian city sites in these two southern provinces.
to the point where the US reconstructed the fence at Talil Air Base in order to return stewardship of Ur to the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and the provincial site inspector. The Italians also left the Iraqis with better maps and initiated a site guard program, helping to establish a specialized guard force with uniforms, communications, vehicles, and permission to carry weapons.

**Repair of the Ziggurat at Aqar Quf**

The American Army also discovered that investing in restoration of an historic site can contribute to longer-term community stability. Prior to 2003, the ziggurat of Aqar Quf was an important regional tourist destination. Iraqi families enjoyed visiting the site, often stayed for picnics and, of great importance to local authorities, spent money in the local community. When the tourist amenities were destroyed during the civil unrest in 2003, the situation compromised the economy of the village. US Civil Affairs officers used the US Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to assist the community in rebuilding the snack bar and the park infrastructure so that the village could begin welcoming visitors once more.

The US Commander’s Emergency Response Program began when US forces discovered and recovered millions of dollars in cash that had been left

*Figure 4.1 The ziggurat at Aqar Quf, Iraq. (Photo: courtesy of Captain Benjamin Roberts).*
behind by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist Regime. The influx of cash offered an immediate solution to the challenges US forces were facing in terms of encouraging stability and providing economic incentives for males of military age to contribute to community recovery as opposed to joining insurgent organizations. The fact that the funds were not provided by US taxpayers offered the military commander flexibility in terms of project selection and implementation. However, when the Ba’athist funds ran out, the military leaders with CERP experience encouraged additional funding, and at one point the Congress allocated more money to CERP than to the entire US Small Business Administration budget. When considering worthwhile projects, the CERP commander would evaluate a proposed cultural heritage project against potential projects in a wide range of categories including the education, health care, agricultural, and infrastructure sectors (Roberts and Roberts 2009).

Aqar Quf offered an economic development opportunity in addition to the heritage preservation opportunity. The US funding criteria emphasized that the investment focus should be on the tourist amenities and site visitation infrastructure. The US leaders recognized that it would be inappropriate to become involved with archaeological site conservation or stabilization, and they encouraged the local authorities to coordinate directly with the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities for those challenges. Aqar Quf is now used as an example for the US military when teaching the importance of heritage and community restoration projects for post-conflict stability (Roberts and Roberts 2009, 2013). However, Roberts and Roberts (2009, 2013) also point out important lessons learned from Aqar Quf and other CERP project experience. Clearly, heritage projects in the post-conflict context will be far more successful when there is heritage expertise available to the project team. In the case of Aqar Quf, the then Lieutenant Benjamin Roberts was co-opted, a preservation professional with work experience and an advanced degree in historic preservation who was a military officer serving in the region. The requirement that the Iraqis focus on infrastructure and defer to the State Board of Antiquities where the actual archaeological remains were concerned prevented inadvertent damage. Since US forces are no longer on the ground in the vicinity of Aqar Quf, it is difficult to know more than a decade later whether the project was a success over the long-term. The Aqar Quf experience also points out the importance of setting up a project where local personnel appreciate the value, can take over maintenance or improvements, and share belief in the long-range project goals.

**Mar Elia Monastery, Iraq**

The Monastery of Saint Elijah in Iraq, although now tragically destroyed by Daesh/ISIS, offers a fascinating example of how the US approach to cultural property changed over the duration of the 2003 Iraq conflict. In 2003 when the 101st Airborne Division took possession of the monastery, they stenciled their screaming eagle insignia onto the monastery wall (Myers 2009). As news
of this disrespectful behavior traveled through military channels, the order came down to remove the symbol, but the soldiers did even more damage by removing a small section of the wall with it. Over time though, with guidance from chaplains and higher ranking personnel, the personnel assigned to the region began to realize that they were responsible for an historic treasure. Built between AD 582 and 590, Dair Mar Elia was the oldest Christian Monastery in Iraq. Adopted by the chaplains who were offering tours to US personnel, by 2009, the US Army had developed plans for a detailed architectural survey, documentation, and potential restoration. In addition, US military personnel were holding religious ceremonies at the site including sunrise Easter services (Associated Press 2016). As the security situation in the region deteriorated, the hopes for partnership with the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and Iraqi experts for completion of the project evaporated, but the Americans pursued the dream. Ironically, any hope of restoring a facsimile on the ancient site now may rest with documentary evidence prepared by US military forces.

**Gardens in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan also offers examples where heritage projects had potential for creating stability in the midst of chaos. The Afghan emphasis on gardens offers a lesson for well-meaning outsiders on how important it is to gain an understanding of what heritage and post-conflict project priorities will be for a local population. The US and other NATO allies began to discover that for Afghans, preservation and restoration of gardens is extremely important. At Kandahar Airfield, local Afghans made it very clear to US military personnel that respect for the airport rose garden was a priority for the local community. Plans to sacrifice the garden in order to expand the parking lot needed to be quickly canceled, and US forces reconfigured security at the airfield in order to allow local citizens access to maintain and enjoy the garden (Anderson 2012). The British had a similar experience at Camp Bastion, now Shorabak, and the importance of the gardens continue at this location. Prior to deployment, this author briefed deploying US 10th Mountain Division personnel on the importance of respecting the Afghan gardens that had been established and maintained within the military installation. Interestingly enough, two months later (Nordland 2016), the *New York Times* featured the Afghan General Faqir taking command at Shorabak, along with his gardeners, when the General said: “Helmand is a desert. We need some color out here.”

The Netherlands philanthropic organization, The Centre for International Heritage Activities, committed to restoration of Bagh-e Jehan Nama Palace south of Mazar-i-Sharif as part of the Netherlands contribution to post-conflict capacity building in Afghanistan. The Dutch participants quickly discovered that members of the community felt it was much more important to restore the gardens than it was to rebuild the palace structure. The local community asked the Dutch to begin by removing the concrete and tanks that the Russians had installed as a form of defense for the palace, destroying...
not just the aesthetics but also the spirit of the gardens. The Elders remembered what the gardens looked like 50 years before, and guided by those memories, the Dutch worked with the Afghans to restore the former beauty. Once the gardens came back to life, the Dutch also discovered how important the gardens were as a stopping place for travelers heading south from Mazar-i-Sharif toward Kabul (Leijen 2014).

In the context of a discussion of heritage as a contribution to post-conflict stabilization, it is important to note that restoration of the Gardens of Babur in Kabul is one of the most successful international heritage projects in that city. The Afghans worked with the Aga Khan Trust for Culture along with the German Archaeological Institute to realize the project. The original garden features, including burials of ancient Afghan leaders, date back to the sixteenth century. The German archaeologists contributed by using archaeological excavation techniques to discover the monumental gateway along with evidence of an historic caravanserai. The significance of garden restoration increases when one considers that gardens are one of the few public spaces in Afghanistan where women can gather and socialize. Since the beginning of restoration in 2002, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have enjoyed the gardens at Barbur in Kabul.

**Archaeological Survey, Ghazni, Afghanistan**

As part of a provincial reconstruction team project, Poland provided a state-of-the-art archaeological survey for archaeological and historic features throughout the City of Ghazni and its environs as part of the planning process for infrastructure improvements. It was hoped that Ghazni would serve as the international Islamic City of Culture in 2013, and there were major plans for road and water projects in anticipation of the many visitors. Even though security challenges compromised the celebration, the detailed survey was designed as a form of compliance archaeology with a goal of discovering archaeological deposits so that they could be avoided during the course of infrastructure development. As the ancient home of the Ghaznavid rulers of Afghanistan, the city features remains of tombs, ancient minarets, and palace ruins.

Ghazni also offers a cautionary tale for well-meaning outsiders who wish to assist with preservation. In analyzing aerial photos, I noticed what appeared to be a pile of junk in a central location in the midst of the heritage area. My initial advice would have made a clean-up of this feature a priority in the preservation plan. However, in discussing the matter with a science officer (Stewart 2011) serving with the 10th Mountain Division on the ground in Ghazni, it turned out that the ‘pile’ was actually composed of the remains of Russian military vehicles that had been destroyed by local warriors. The ruined vehicles had been deliberately placed between the historic minarets as a highly valued monument to heroism and victory. ‘Cleaning them up’ would have been a gesture of tremendous disrespect and could have been disastrous from a US military perspective. Removing the vehicles would have offended
Afghan veterans, warriors, and their family members, and probably citizens of the wider community as well.

**Cultural Communication, Herat, Afghanistan**

The Italians also made tremendous contributions to heritage preservation in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. One stellar example was the mission of Dr. Elena Croci to Herat. As an Italian Army reservist, Dr. Croci worked closely with the mayor of Herat to help the citizens rediscover their history. They created a publication in Dari and English called ‘Herat is Heart’ with the community holding the copyright so that they could print as many copies as they wanted. Dr. Croci also worked with the community on a project to restore a portion of the Citadel for use as a public library and museum, and in 2010 was in the process of developing a series of educational posters about the history of the Citadel, designed to be viewed by women through the burqa, to be installed along the walls on the way to the marketplace. Tragically, the security situation deteriorated, and suicide bombers destroyed the museum project, so many of the Herat initiatives were not able to be completed.

Dr. Croci’s area of specialization is cultural communication, and her efforts offer a model for consideration by future post-conflict project planners. Her ability to see heritage from the community’s point of view enabled her to suggest genuinely meaningful projects with implementation specifically designed to engage members of the local community of all ages. In her 2009 publication, Dr. Croci points out that well-meaning heritage projects are often a mystery to

![Figure 4.2 Designed for burqas: proposed educational display board at Herat Citadel, Afghanistan. (Illustration: Elena Croci).](image-url)
members of the local community. Foreign scholars sometimes forget to explain why a specific site has been selected for preservation, and sometimes even physical barriers are put in place, ‘protecting’ a site from the very members of the community that the project is supposed to benefit. Dr. Croci’s efforts also achieved a military mission benefit. As the citizens of Herat began to recognize that Dr. Croci and the Italian contingent were genuinely interested in the history and culture of the community, the overall acceptance of the presence of Italian forces improved (Caputo and Croci 2012).

It may be coincidental, but the Italian experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan offer examples where meaningful heritage projects embraced by the local community were attacked by Islamic extremists. Heritage literature offers multiple case studies where recognition of shared heritage has served as a post-conflict platform for reconciliation (Stanley-Price 2005). Few would question the fact that the ability to appreciate a shared distant past can help to challenge hostility generated by recent conflict and violent events. Perhaps those forces who oppose a peaceful stable future at the local level also recognize the potential value of heritage preservation.

Conclusion

There is no question that cultural property protection and heritage preservation have critical roles to play in the re-establishment of the social order and a healthy community in the post-conflict environment. Successful preservation requires military elements that are able to recognize, identify, and respect valued cultural spaces and features in a cross-cultural setting. If the military is effective in protecting cultural property or at least in minimizing damage to heritage during the course of a conflict, the community post-conflict has an advantage in that this property also offers a foundation for reconstruction and reconciliation. When UNESCO offered a course on cultural property protection for representatives of the former Yugoslavian states in 2010, it was the first time that representatives of all the states agreed to meet in the same room for discussion of any topic. I was fortunate to be a faculty member for this course and had the privilege of being present as tension between the delegates transformed into a genuine willingness to work together. When we consider attacks on communities composed of religious minorities, it immediately becomes clear that for those communities to survive in place, the places of worship, ancestral burials, and holy shrines must be protected and preserved.

A similar post-conflict example is offered by the Iraq Conservation Institute located in Erbil, Iraq. Initially funded by the US State Department and hosted in a building provided by the municipality of Erbil, the Institute offers continuing education for heritage preservation professionals. It encourages students of all disciplines from all parts of Iraq to attend. It has been the faculty experience (Lione 2014) that the students—Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Christian—live and work productively together because they all share values associated with celebrating their history and protecting their heritage.
Once military operations are complete, the world is filled with examples where preservation of a garden, library, place of worship, or museum has helped a community rebuild as a corporate entity, offering the citizens hope for the future. The more experience and knowledge we gain as we improve our efforts to protect the cultural property of others, the better we can understand the heroes who have risked their lives to save their heritage under the most challenging of circumstances.

This chapter is written in the author's personal capacity. Opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the US Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US Federal Government.

Bibliography


5 Conflict, Memory, and Material Culture

The Archaeology of the Contestado War in Brazil (1912–1916)

Jaisson Teixeira Lino, James Symonds, and Pedro Paulo Funari

Introduction

In recent years researchers have shown an increasing interest in exploring the use of material culture to study social conflicts, and the ways in which past events are interpreted on the basis of modern ideas. Past conflicts and their interpretation are a matter of present concern. Society is always defined by conflict. Dialectical thinking teaches us that the experience of past societies is part and parcel of a constant struggle among social actors. The history of class societies involves the analysis of surplus appropriation, internal contradictions, and different forms of domination and resistance. The interpretation of conflict is subjective. As a consequence, we can interpret past events as a series of complex texts composing a discourse.

If conflict and subjectivity are integral to archaeological evidence and interpretation, then it is impossible to reject the existence of multiple points of view. There are always different ways of knowing the past. With this in mind we must pose some significant questions: Who is in a position to gain access to knowledge? Who is in a position to participate in the creation and reinterpretation of past? And are these constructions of the past potentially inclusive, or exclusive, in terms of the social interests that they serve?

In this chapter, we consider the study of post-conflict landscapes in Brazil. Brazil has often been characterized as a violent society for several reasons, not least because of its very visible social inequalities. In our case study of the Contestado War we aim to demonstrate that material culture is a powerful tool and can shed important new light on subaltern stories. Two good examples of the relevance of the past to the present are the transference of power to social agents, and the controversies aroused by the interpretation of repression. This chapter posits many questions and proposes some answers. Rather than presenting an absolute solution, however, we encourage a pluralistic discussion of our subject.

The Contestado War

The Contestado War occurred in the southern region of Brazil between 1912 and 1916, opposing the local population, known as sertaneja or cabocla, against the state and federal military forces. It was triggered by the construction of railroads and the expansion of commercial logging activity. These early capitalist
enterprises threatened natural habitats and led to the imprisonment or displacement of local communities. The displaced population congregated in so-called ‘holy strongholds,’ new villages which were rigidly controlled by religious institutions in remote or relatively inaccessible locations. In three years of terror from 1912 until the end of 1915, state and federal military forces attempted to systematically destroy these new settlements. It has been estimated that as many as 6,000 people died in the conflict, mostly local caboclos (Valentini 2000).

After the war, public agents tried to resolve the territorial disputes in the States of Santa Catarina and Paraná through a process of social engineering (Figure 5.1). Colonization companies were set up to attract European immigrants to settle the land. This process served to further marginalize the remaining local population, who had already been worn down by the years of conflict and disruption. The area remains one of the poorest and economically disadvantaged regions of southern Brazil to this day. We offer our reflections on this subject below, with an emphasis on the post-conflict history of the territory, and the ways in which a programme of public archaeology has been devised to explore and disseminate information about this painful past.

Archaeology, History, and the Past in Brazil: A Battle of Sources

Although still largely unknown to the general public in Brazil, the Contestado War has been the subject of a considerable number of academic studies by sociologists, geographers, and anthropologists (e.g. Fraga 2009; Monteiro 1974;
The largest numbers of studies have been undertaken by historians, however. These have ranged from pioneering studies in oral history to reflections on newly discovered documents (e.g. Machado 2004; Valentini 2000, 2009; Valentini and Rodrigues 2014; Valentini et al. 2012).

Archaeology has only recently been added to this burgeoning field. It may seem odd that Brazilian archaeologists have ignored the materialities of this war for so long, but this comes down to the history of archaeology in Brazil. From its beginnings in the mid-nineteenth century, archaeology was largely concerned with the study of pre-literate pre-contact societies as it was felt that it was the role of archaeology to fill the vacuum of the prehistoric past. The nineteenth-century European colonialist trope of prehistory has been extensively problematized in recent years. It has been pointed out, for example, that the idea of prehistory serves to deny any sense of history and historical identity to non-literate societies, and that more inclusive deep history needs to be crafted for indigenous peoples (Schmidt and Mrozowski 2013).

In the case of Brazil, this problem was exacerbated by the tri-fold division that governed the ways that peoples, cultures, and the past were studied. Up until the 1980s, archaeologists studied prehistory, anthropologists studied indigenous peoples, and historians studied the histories of incoming literate colonizers, with little or no interaction between the three fields (Barreto 1999/2000; Funari 1999/2000, 2003; Robrah-Gonzalez 1999/2000; Trigger 2004). Some Brazilian historians remain skeptical that archaeology can be used to study all human groups, regardless of time period, and retain the belief that the writing of history must rely upon the ‘pure’ and ‘impartial’ evidence that is found in documentary sources.

The absence of any previous archaeologically oriented studies of the Contestado War may thus be attributed to two factors: a general disinterest among Brazilian archaeologists in the vestiges of conflict and the recent past, and an insistence by historians that only documentary evidence should be used to construct narratives of the conflict. In short, there is a conjunction of factors that pass through the consolidated habitus in the communities of historians and archaeologists (Bourdieu 1989), with the slowness with which scientific paradigms are transformed, replaced, or revised (Kuhn 1970).

The approach adopted in this chapter draws inspiration from recent international research in contemporary and historical archaeology (González-Ruibal 2007; González-Ruibal et al. 2008; Olsen and Pétursdóttir 2014; Saunders 2004; Sørensen and Viejo-Rose 2015). In particular, we explore the materialities of conflict in the belief that an integrated archaeological and historical approach can create insights that throw new light on the conventional master narratives of the war.

We openly acknowledge that our work is an intervention with political implications (Tilley 1989) and recognize the tensions that exist between different sources of evidence, and how they have been conventionally put to use. As Pedro Paulo Funari (2003, 40) has observed:
written documents inform us of the ideas of their authors, generally belonging to a minority of those who can read and write. Writing, then, is an instrument of power, of class. Material culture, on the other hand, is largely the result of the effort of ordinary people, and is often preserved without being wanted or planned as involuntary testimonies of history.

Our interdisciplinary approach attempts to harness what have been termed the ‘democratic’ and ‘transformative’ qualities of archaeological deposits (Atalay et al. 2016; Wood 2002). It has become a cliché to say that history is written by the victors, but in the case of the Contestado War, this was certainly the case. Most of the surviving written sources were produced by the ‘winners’, i.e. military commanders, politicians, priests, industrialists, and journalists supporting the status quo. Everyday archaeological residues, in contrast, can more readily provide first hand evidence about the ‘losers’ of the conflict. In this sense the study of material culture embraces all segments of society and forges a direct link to the past in the present that is tangible and palpable (Ballart 1997).

Archaeological Perspectives on the Contestado War

The first archaeological study of the Contestado War was carried out by Jaisson Teixeira Lino in 2009. This took the form of contract archaeology survey work in the municipality of Ibiraré-SC and resulted in the discovery of a group house and former tourist graveyard close to an historic railway line (Lino 2009). Further archaeological studies have been carried out since 2009. These have included a PhD thesis (Lino 2011), a research project funded by CNPq (Brazilian Public Scientific Agency) and a number of internal projects funded by the Federal University of Fronteira Sul (UFFS) (Lino 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 2014).

The research by Jaisson Teixeira Lino has raised the public profile of the Contestado War in southern Brazil; however, this has yet to be reflected in an increased number of designated heritage sites. It remains the case that no heritage protection is given to battlefields or strongholds at federal, state, or municipal levels, with the exception of the site of the Battle of Iriani (1912) which was designated by archaeologist Rossano Lopes Bastos of the Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional (IPHAN), in the 1990s.

One of the driving factors behind research into the war since 2009 has been the desire to understand how the twenty-first-century population of the region appropriate and make use of former sites of conflict through public and private means. A program of public archaeology offers a means for the valorization of local identities and a way of highlighting the continuing economic and social struggles within the region. By building a case for the preservation and enhancement of the cultural heritage associated with the Contestado War we also aim to stimulate local employment and to improve living standards for the local population by creating new forms of income generation through cultural tourism.
Archaeological studies of the Contestado War have adopted theoretical and methodological approaches from landscape archaeology. According to Criado Boado, landscape archaeology can be defined as the archaeologically oriented study of the landscape, seeking an understanding of past landscapes by studying the ‘culturalization’ of spaces occupied by humans. For this to be possible, it is necessary to consider three different dimensions of space: the physical environment, being the stage for the evolution of human activities; the social environment, where different peoples and individuals construct their world; and the symbolic environment, through which interventions in the landscape are conceptualized and the way of life is structured (Boado 1999).

In the case of the Contestado War, the physical space is the southern plateau, with its particular geographic and environmental configurations. The social environment is dominated by religiosity, capitalist projects, and the war itself. For Silva (2009, 49) this tri-fold configuration of religion, capitalism, and conflict is the main feature of the Contestado War, and its material legacies can be seen in the landscape to this day. The symbolic or ideational milieu are the modes of thought that structured this materiality. These can be accessed by examining documentary evidence and by collating written, cartographic, iconographic, and photographic sources. An insight into symbolic practices can also be gained by studying natural features in the landscape, such as the caves and water sources which monks used for baptisms, or the natural relief features which were used for defensive purposes by *sertanejo* warriors (Lino and Silva 2011).

So far, field research strategies have focused on surface survey and soil coring. No extensive excavations have been carried out and we have gathered information by inspecting soil exposures in wells and trenches in a non-systematic way, guided by information obtained from primary and secondary sources, and local residents. Other sites have been located by using information held on historic maps and aerial photographs. Some metal detection work has also been undertaken in recent years, but this has been limited in extent (Figure 5.2). In the absence of more extensive metal detecting surveys, a failing that will be rectified by future fieldwork, relatively few artefacts have been recovered by the walk-over surveys (Lino 2016).

The walk-over surveys have been more successful in locating visible surface features such as defensive trenches, the remains of railway engineering infra-structure, cremation areas, structures associated with logging, cemeteries, caves, and other buildings.

Since 2015 intensive research has been carried out in two places: Lumber Company in Três Barras and the Holy Stronghold of Santa Maria in Timbó Grande (Lino 2016). At Lumber Company the remains of early twentieth-century logging activity have been recorded. This work included photographic surveys of the former factory and company office, as well as recreational buildings, such as the former cinema and casino. Prospection in the probable disposal areas recovered fragments of logging-related steel cables. Prospection in the area of the company hotel was less successful and failed to recover any artefacts, or to locate the position of the former hotel rubbish dump (Lino 2016).
At Santa Maria, soil coring, the inspection of soil exposures, and metal detecting succeeded in identifying the location of the former stronghold. Three trenches were found. The first measured 5.7m × 3m and was 0.9m deep; the second measured 3m × 3m and was 0.6m deep; and the third measured 5.2m × 2.3m and was 1m deep. In addition to the three trenches a structure of basaltic stones (river pebbles), measuring 4.4m × 5.2m, with circular shape and funnel-shaped entrance facing to the Northwest was found in an area that local informants had identified as a cremation area associated with the former stronghold (Figure 5.3).

In addition to the sites already discussed above, additional surface surveys were conducted in the following locations (Lino 2011, 2016):

1. Caraguatá, Taquaruçu, Pedra Branca, Maria Rosa;
2. The battlefields of Irani and Rio das Antas;
3. The railway stations at Engenheiro Melo, Rio Uruguai, and Affonso Pena;
4. The Lumber Company site at Calmon;
5. The caves and water sources of Lapa and Porto União;
6. Cemeteries in Pinheiro Preto, Timbé Grande and Bela vista of Toldo;

Figure 5.2 Metal detector prospection in the Redoubt of Santa Maria, Timbé Grande. (Photo: Jaisson Teixeira Lino).
These surveys identified two archaeological features which are not recorded in documentary sources. The first is a former cremation area in Lebon Régis. Local informants recalled that this place had been used in the final phase of the Contestado War when soldiers cremated the bodies of the sertanejos who had been killed in the confrontations, or prisoners who had been held in camps. This took the form of a square stone structure measuring 3m × 3m and with a depth of 1m and had been constructed using basalt stones, as is common in the area.

The second previously undocumented structure was a human-made subterranean feature, measuring approximately 4m x 4m. This dug out had been cut out of the rock using picks and other small hand tools. It contained two rooms and could be accessed by two entrances on one side. According to local informants, this dug out had been used as a secret store where rebel weapons had been stored during the Contestado War. It may also have functioned as an aircraft observatory, or a temporary refuge, but no collaborating archaeological evidence has been recovered to support any of these possible uses (Lino 2011).
Remembering and Forgetting, Communities and Feelings

Archaeology has the capacity to expose difficult and painful pasts by gathering together and validating material evidence for acts of violence and aggression. With this in mind, the question ‘who is served by archaeology?’ has been at the forefront of archaeological research into the Contestado War. A previous generation of processual archaeologists believed that it was possible to conduct archaeological research with scientific objectivity and detachment. We refute this position and stress that archaeology is a socially embedded form of discourse. Archaeologists examine the material residues of past human actions in the present. The stories that we produce by studying these residues are of social use and have potentially transformative powers (Atalay et al. 2016; Saitta 2007). In this sense, archaeological interventions have the capacity to change popular understandings of the past, but perhaps more importantly, can also help to shape future attitudes and social policies.

In the case of the Contestado War, archaeological research has served to reconstitute social memories and to amplify evidence for social injustices and oppression at a pivotal point in the early industrialization of Brazil. Many residents in the midwest of Santa Catarina lost everything in the Contestado War, their land, their communities, their homes, and in some cases, their lives. The process of encouraged immigration that followed the war was a cynical attempt by the Brazilian authorities to wipe the slate clean and to deny the survivors any access to their indigenous history and former identities. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, many municipalities in Santa Catarina have low rates of development, according to the Brazilian Index of Human Development. The continuing underdevelopment and inequalities in the region are arguably direct consequences of the Contestado War, which ended a century ago. In this and other examples from history, the poverty unleashed by war casts a long shadow and can often have a negative impact upon the lives of three or more generations of descendants.

Thinking about collaborative and public archaeology, we can see that archaeological research has a very real potential to empower disadvantaged local communities. One way that this can be achieved is through the action of place-making (Hodges 2017). Heritage sites that are given official recognition can serve as ‘places of memory’ that act as a kind of fulcrum for resistance and struggles over identity. Local residents, assisted by the Catholic Church authorities, have already made use of three sites associated with the Contestado War, signaling the potential for official designation and protection.

In 2012, the Catholic Church organized a rally of several thousand people at the site of the Battle of Irani. This battle, which took place on October 22, 1912 marked the beginning of the conflict. Nowadays the site is visited by a broad spectrum of Brazilian society. On the 100th anniversary of the battle, speeches
were given by a diverse range of community leaders and officials. The speeches included different memories of the Contestado War and aimed to create a sense of social unity and conciliation. The Catholic Church also organized a social forum at the former holy stronghold of Taquaruçu in 2013, which has also been the setting for meetings by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). Finally, in 2015, segments of the Catholic Church and worker’s movements from the city of Timbó Grande organized an Earth Pilgrimage near the Santa Maria stronghold (Figure 5.4). This site is thought to have held the highest number of sertanejos fighters in the final phase of the war in 1915.

The case can therefore be made that the continued use of sites associated with the Contestado War provides ready access to regional histories and cultures. Official recognition and interpretation of these sites might also provide a framework for the growth of sustainable forms of income through heritage tourism which is linked to the conflict and religious festivals.

The gatherings at these sites have drawn attention to regional socio-economic and ethnic diversity. They have also been used to highlight the continuing struggles of the poorest members of society, who are still classified as caboclos. This last point stresses the social divisions which are still very much
a feature of life in southern Brazil. These social differences, both past and present, are entwined with the production of memory-making, and how the Contestado War is either remembered, or selectively forgotten.

Interviews conducted as part of this research have shown differences in the way in which local informants speak about the war. There is a widespread knowledge of the war among the middle-aged and elderly, and everyone has an opinion. Many, however, try to avoid commenting when questioned or offer vague or non-committal answers in an effort to distance themselves from the conflict. It would seem that this is one way of coping with the traumatic events and aftermaths of the conflict. Other informants take refuge in the security of traditional forms of oral narratives and tell the story from generation to generation relating the events to their family members. In the latter case, the word *jagunço* often crops up in interviews. The term *jagunço* was used at the time of the conflict by establishment figures such as military commanders, politicians, and priests and was used to classify those people who resisted the military advance. When used today, the term still holds profound social meaning, but that meaning varies between families. On the one hand, it is used in a positive way, as a badge of rebel identity and pride: ‘I am a roughneck and am a descendant of those who resisted and fought for their rights.’ Alternatively, it is used in a pejorative way: ‘My relatives were never *jagunços*.’

The way in which knowledge of the conflict is relayed through oral testimony therefore needs to be scrutinized in terms of family contexts, and possible relationships to past victims, or perpetrators, of violence. What is also clear, however, is that when inhabitants of the region choose to speak, they frequently display a detailed knowledge of the battlefields, strongholds, and camps associated with the conflict. This is an important point. Without the support of the local community it would not be possible to conduct a comprehensive survey of the Contestado sites. In addition to guiding researchers to areas of interest, local informants also frequently provide information on miscellaneous objects that they have found, or instances where locals have observed artefacts being retrieved and removed from sites by collectors from other regions. We will explore the issue of collecting in more detail later.

To conclude this section of the discussion, it can be said that our multiple lines of evidence do not always produce the same information and that it may be unhelpful to privilege one source of evidence over another. Thus, even when archaeological testing at a potential site has failed to recover material evidence to corroborate use during the Contestado War, that site or landscape feature might still be worthy of designation as a ‘place or memory’ based on the intangible heritage of oral testimony. The fact that a site is classified as a place of memory on the basis of intangible evidence will still enable future archaeological investigations to take this place into consideration and to explore the spatial and temporal interplay between the shifting manifestations of power, identity, and memory (Figure 5.5).
Collectors, Collecting, and the Materiality of Conflict

The act of collecting has been central to archaeological activities since the antiquarian origins of the discipline. Collections can take many forms, from government-funded repositories in national or regional museums, to collections of rare items or curiosities assembled by private individuals (Robrahm-Gonzalez 1999/2000; Trigger 2004). Many European countries witnessed an upsurge of interest in the late-twentieth century in the collection of artefacts and other memorabilia from the two world wars. This phenomenon reflected a growing public interest in the residues of conflict and dark heritage (Herva 2014; Robertshaw and Kenyon 2008; Saunders 2010; Thomas et al. 2016). It also reflected a desire by some individuals to make a personal connection to historical events, either by researching their family history using online databases and advances in internet technology, or by the acquisition of a commercially produced metal detector. Both of these pastimes can be linked to a global interest in individualism, which has been promoted by neo-liberal politics since the early 1980s.
Individuals can of course collect things for many reasons. Private art collections are generally assembled for their ascetic or financial value. Other collectors may acquire objects in an effort to make a connection to the past, most often to an historical period which they admire for political reasons, or to one that has a real or imagined association to their family or ancestors. In southern Brazil there is a strong interest in collecting objects associated with the Contestado War. This tradition goes back to the final days of the war, when it was arguably difficult to draw a fine line between the collection of souvenirs, and the act of looting or otherwise appropriating items of potential value by a starving peasantry. The sertanejo redoubt at Taquaruçu, for example, was destroyed by military forces in 1914. Within a matter of days, the local population started to make regular visits to this site to salvage material. Although some of this material has since been mislaid, surviving items from this time include weapons, ammunition, fragments of clothing, objects of daily use such as ceramics and coins, and even human remains.

A Jagunço Museum has been established at Fraiburgo, close to the center of the former Taquaruçu stronghold. This institution has been set up to care for the material that has been amassed over the last century by private collectors and to provide a venue for public displays and exhibitions relating to the war (pers. comm., Mr. Pedro Felisbino, founder and head of the museum); see Figures 5.6 and 5.7.

Figure 5.6 Firearm cartridges and fragments of ceramics found in the Redoubt of Taquaruçu and now in the collections of the Jagunço Museum, Fraiburgo. (Photo: Jaisson Teixeira Lino).
It should be clear from the earlier examples that there is a strong local interest in the material remains of the Contestado War. Indeed, interest in recovering or ‘rescuing’ collectible materials from the conflict would seem to be growing rather than diminishing over time. Several ‘battlefield recovery’ style excavations have been conducted by archaeologically untrained local enthusiasts. Interventions have also been made by historians seeking material evidence to support their theories, and by non-governmental organizations. From this we draw the conclusion that the heritage of the Contestado War is a potent but highly contested cultural resource. If professional archaeologists and state officials are unable or unwilling to recognize these sites and landscapes as being worthy of legislative protection, and engage in a program of public education and outreach, then other individuals will move in, destroying archaeological contexts in a search for collectible commodities.

After the Contestado War: ‘Ethic Cleansing’ and the Transformation of the Cultural Landscape

The legal dispute between the states of Santa Catarina and Paraná over the appropriation of land in the Contestado region was settled in 1916, with the
the signing of this agreement the State of Santa Catarina initiated a process of
colonization within the region. This process was designed to water down the
indigenous inhabitants of the region, and where possible to replace this popu-
lation with European immigrants who would be more willing to participate
in the economic development of the region. In short, it was a form of social
engineering, based on the concept of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Radin 2006; Renk
1997; Valentini 2009; Werlang 1999).

Further changes were made in 1917, when the State of Santa Catarina
created three new municipalities: Mafra, Cruzeiro (now Joaçaba), and Porto
União. A fourth municipality, Chapecó, was created in 1919. These new
administrative areas were designed to appropriate so-called vacant lands in the
former disputed territory with the intention of allocating this land to European
immigrants. These administrative reforms and the active colonization programs
of the early twentieth century succeeded in radically changing the social land-
scape of the Contestado lands.

In essence, three self-defined cultural/ethnic groups were created: indig-
enous; Portuguese-Brazilian and African; and Europeans of non-Portuguese
origin. These three distinctive cultural groups are still present in southern Brazil
today and interact dialectically, sometimes in harmony leading to hybridity, and
at other times less happily, leading to ethnic tensions and conflicts (D’Angelis

Of course, this process of social engineering had started before 1916, and
was one of the reasons that the Contestado War erupted. It was this great
miscegenation, however, that created the typical inhabitant of the region, the
caboclo. It is interesting to note that rather than erasing memories of the conflict,
this displacement has if anything served to strengthen a sense of unjust repres-
sion. The term caboclo has now become virtually synonymous with the term
sertanejo indicating an empathy and sense of solidarity with the former inhabit-
ants of the Santa Catarina plateau who attempted to withstand the aggression
of the state forces during the war.

Jaci Poli (1995) has sought to outline a basic profile of the caboclo of the pla-
teau and the west of Santa Catarina, noting that although these people formed
the greater part of the population, they were desperately poor and had few
material possessions. For this reason, Poli has noted that even though the caboclo
can be classified on ethnic grounds they can also be categorized as a highly dis-
advantaged socio-economic group who were dispossessed of their livelihoods
and means of production by the introduction of large-scale cattle rearing and
logging industries (Poli 1995).

It was noted earlier that Europeans of non-Portuguese origin began to settle
in the region before the Contestado War, encouraged by the Southern Brazil
Lumber and Colonization Company, which as its name suggests, installed set-
tlers in the vicinity of railway and logging stations. Colonization took second
place to logging activities in the years prior to the war, but some new settle-
ments were created. One of these newly installed lumber colonies, Rio das

Archaeology of the Contestado War in Brazil 85
Antas, was attacked by *sertanejos* on November 2, 1914. The colonists managed to repulse the attack and twelve of the *sertanejos* were killed. However, seven of the Lumber Company workers were also killed and the remainder abandoned the village shortly afterwards (Queiroz 1966). The abandoned village is now a ‘place of memory’ awaiting archaeological research (Lino 2011).

It was only after the end of the war, however, when the new municipalities were formed and a renewed emphasis was placed on colonization, that the landscape was parceled up into lots for sale to incoming European settlers in the neighboring state of Rio Grande do Sul (Radin 2006; Valentini 2009; Vicenzi 2008; Werlang 1999).

The colonization project in the west of Santa Catarina was in harmony with the social thought of the time, which believed that Europeans possessed a strong work ethic and superior organizational skills and thus would assist the economic development of the Brazilian Republic. An emphasis was placed on the agricultural knowledge of incoming Europeans and their ability to manage large scale agricultural production and cattle ranching, with a view to creating surpluses for the export economy. This drive towards intensive agricultural production intentionally side-lined resident Indians, blacks, and *caboclos*, who were often considered to have a primitive outlook that was impeding Brazilian ‘progress’ (Radin 2006). According to Arlene Renk (1997, 48):

> The main measure of incorporation of the former Contestado to Santa Catarina was colonization. The effectiveness of the colonizing project required a human agent, whose model was the descendant of the European, coming from the old colonies of Rio Grande do Sul. This aspect bears similarities to the ideology of European colonization in the country. Builders of progress and civilization, however, did not contemplate in this project the Brazilian population, who had been the possessor.

Of the dozens of colonizing companies that settled in the region, racially transforming the cultural landscape, the Austrian Society of Colonization Abroad, with its colony in the geographical epicenter of the Contestado War, stands out. Founded by the Austrian Minister of Agriculture, Thomas Thaler, this brought Austrian settlers who wished to escape the inter-war European economic depression to settle in the Peixe River Valley in a region that the Austrians named DreizehnLinden (in Portuguese, Treze Tiliás; in English, Thirteen Lindens). Thaler had originally hoped to create the Austrian colony in a more isolated region, to avoid contact and interaction with other ethnic groups but eventually settled on Treze Tiliás, an area covering 185.205 km², some 470 km from the state capital, Florianópolis.

The municipality of Treze Tiliás was founded on October 13, 1933. Between the end of 1933 and 1937 around 800 Austrian settlers moved to the colony. The majority of these immigrants came from the Austrian Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The southern Austro-Bavarian dialect of Austrian German is still spoken in the region to this day, and many villages possess Alpine style timber-framed architecture (Gintner 2003; Piazza 1994; Pirker *et al.* 2012).
The colonization projects in the 1930s had a radical impact on the socio-economic and cultural configuration of the region; however, diverse cultural and ethnic groups continued to exist, creating pockets of resistance and ethnic pride. Today, the Contestado region has indigenous lands (for example, Toldo Chimbangue and Aldea Condá in Chapecó, Xapecó in Ipuacu, and Entre-Rios, Imbu in Abelardo Luz, etc.), along with quilombos, or pre-nineteenth-century hinterland settlements founded by escaped African slaves and Maroons (for example, Campos Novos and Palmas). There are also towns and cities which are mostly inhabited by caboclos (for example, Lebon Régis and Timbó Grande). In short, despite legal and political measures for their disappearance, the ethnic elements responsible for resistance to capitalist enterprises in the region are still present and creating new forms of resistance.

**Conclusion and Future Directions**

This chapter has described the emerging programme of archaeological research on the Contestado War. In the coming years, it is hoped that this project can be extended to enable the registration and heritage protection of sites and landscapes associated with the Contestado War. Additional field research is also planned. This will include excavations at the well-preserved redoubt of Santa Maria.

We also intend to initiate a wide-ranging and sustainable program of community archaeology. This will develop educational activities and will strive to encourage the diverse regional population to participate in the archaeological work. The dialog with amateur researchers and metal detectorists will also be continued and strengthened in an effort to find new ways of working together, and new ways to prevent the looting of sites. When drawn together, all of these initiatives will combine archaeological and historical evidence to create sustainable ‘biographies of place’ (Sørensen and Viejo-Rose 2015) linked to officially recognized and local ‘sites of memory.’

It is our hope that this construction of tangible and intangible heritage will be of social use, and that it will enable the current and future generations of Brazilians to reflect upon the futility of war, the injustice of government, and corporate sponsored forms of economic and social repression, and the power of social solidarity and informal ‘every day resistance’ (Scott 1985, 1992).

In the mid-1960s, Frances Yates’ book *The Art of Memory* argued that social memory was dependent upon the stability of place (Yates 1966). In the twenty-first century, supermodernity has destabilized objects, events, and places (González-Ruibal et al. 2008). Contemporary society is arguably characterized more by forgetting than remembering (Connerton 2009). For this reason, it is important that archaeologists should use their skills to engage with local communities in post-conflict localities to craft credible and sustainable narratives. It should no longer be the case that history is written exclusively by the victors, or simply to promote nationalist agendas. Social memory can be actively created through an active engagement with the materialities and oral testimonies of conflict. Hence rather than confusing the issues, the multiple
narratives that arise from archaeological work can be effectively used to expose the lies and hypocrisies which have so often been used by those in positions of power, or in search of profit, to set one social group against another.

**Acknowledgments**

We would like to acknowledge the following institutions: Federal University of Fronteira Sul (UFFS), the University of Amsterdam (UvA), the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), the City Halls of Timbó Grande and Canoinhas, the Brazilian National Science Foundation (CNPq), São Paulo Science Foundation (FAPESP), and The World Archaeological Congress (WAC). We must also mention colleagues who contributed to the research and the chapter: Siân Jones, Alexandre Assis Tomporoski, Delmir José Valentini, Claiton Marcio da Silva, Fernando Tokarski, Soeli Lima, Mr. Vicente Telles, Mr. Pedro Felisbino, the editors of the volume, students engaged in the research, and all the people of the Contestado Region. The research presented in this chapter has been funded by ‘Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas—CNPq’ under the project entitled ‘Arqueologia do Conflito Bélico: Paisagem, Cultura Material e a Arqueologia do Contestado (1912–1916).’ The ideas presented in this chapter are our own and we are therefore solely responsible for them.

**Bibliography**


Thomas, S., Seitsonen, O. and Herva, V. 2016. Nazi memorabilia, dark heritage and treasure hunting as ‘alternative’ tourism: Understanding the fascination with the material remains of World War II in Northern Finland. *Journal of Field Archaeology* 41,3: 331–343.


6 The Importance of Cultural Heritage in Enhancing a Syrian National Identity and the Role of Local Non-State Actors in Preserving It

Amr al-Azm

Introduction

Ever since the children in Dera’a went out and wrote slogans on the wall of their school saying ‘the people want to topple the regime’ in March 2011, Syria has gone through a traumatic and destabilizing process that has strained the ethnic, sectarian and social fabric of the country to beyond breaking point. Almost everything that contributes to make Syria a single unified state with a people that share a common history, goals and aspirations has been tested and any sign of difference exploited in order to create division. Currently, over 50 per cent of Syria’s population has been displaced (Amnesty International 2016), with nearly three million of those externally, putting neighbouring countries under severe strain. Particularly vulnerable is Lebanon, which has seen an increasing spillover of violence as Hezbollah and other parties are now fully engaged in the conflict.

Therefore, any transition process that aims to bring Syrians together and assist them in working towards ending the bloodshed and rebuilding their shattered country, needs to identify where common denominators exist between the opposing sides and provide mechanisms that will help them work towards consensus. The question of national identity is one area of common interest that all Syrians may wish to discuss, and by identifying challenges and establishing common goals it may be possible to begin a process of cohesion. With that in mind I believe that cultural heritage has a critical role in enhancing this Syrian identity and helping to steer Syria on a path towards post-conflict stabilization and reconciliation.

Importance of National Identity and Cultural Heritage

Syria is a rich and diverse country that incorporates great social and ethnic variety. Syrian society is made up of an Arab majority with significant minorities of Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians and Circassians, amongst others. Similarly, not all Syrians are Muslim; there are Christians and Yazidis too. Amongst the Muslims there are at least five major sects: Sunnis, Alawites,
Druze, Ismailis and Shiites, all with varying degrees of observance and tolerance. In light of this diversity, being Syrian is the only common denominator that the various communities share. So it then becomes imperative here to determine what makes a Syrian a Syrian. Furthermore, the only way to ensure harmonious relations between the different communities is to make certain that they enjoy the same social, political and economic rights because they are all Syrians. Thus I argue that any post-conflict planning should make it a priority to re-establish and enhance a sense of Syrian national identity as a principal way towards reconciliation and stability.

Ethnic, social and cultural diversity in itself is not the problem. The real challenge is when there is no correspondence between the composition of an imposed social and political structure and the reality on the ground. Any effort to create a valid Syrian identity must therefore accommodate the widest possible participation by Syrians from all segments of society. However, such an effort cannot succeed if any policy or cultural practice attempts to impose itself over and above the national identity — a form of supra–Syrian identity — such as by asserting that this identity should be exclusively sectarian (Sunni or Shiite) or inherently ethnic (Arab or Kurdish) or even a supra-politico-ideological identity such as the one–party state system of the Ba’ath.

A supra-identity would essentially bestow a preferential position on those within Syrian society who shared its principal characteristic, be it ethnic, sectarian or ideological, giving them a clear advantage in delineating the country’s political system, its social and cultural choices and the manner in which it interacts with the rest of the world (Haj Saleh 2006). Such distorted representation, by failing to reflect the realities on the ground, would disrupt the process of post-conflict stabilization, destroying trust and understanding amongst the citizens, and weakening the country’s defences against new outbreaks of civil strife.

Therefore, the creation of an all-inclusive Syrian national identity that takes no account of ethnic, sectarian or tribal affinities, and builds on common shared history including cultural heritage, goals and aspirations would surely be an effective way to unify the Syrian people and ensure the future stability of their state. One of the major challenges to the creation and enhancement of such an identity is the alienation of the vast majority of the Syrian people for many decades from the political, symbolic, intellectual and cultural institutions of their country, and that includes cultural heritage.

Since 1963, under the Assad regime, cultural heritage has been subverted and exploited to support and reinforce one such supra-identity, which melds Arabism, Arab nationalism and the one-party state led by the Assad family with the Ba’ath party as its instrument of implementation. Cultural heritage and its administrative institutions became tools for the state to sustain this supra-Assad-Ba’ath-led narrative at the expense of all else. The past is coopted by rewriting (or worse: fabricating) history, and the cultural and educational institutions of the state are politicized and suborned to serve and perpetuate this narrative by manipulating the presentation of cultural heritage.
This appropriation and reinvention of history is best exemplified by the creation of the grand narrative that seeks to connect the present represented by the Assads and the Ba’ath with the wonderous glorious deeds of heroes from the past. This has been achieved through the systematic Arabization of places such as Ugarit, Ebla, Palmyra and people such as Salah Al-Din and Queen Zenobia. Queen Zenobia then becomes an Arab national hero who fought Roman imperialism and Salah Al-Din becomes the Arab Muslim liberator of Jerusalem and the defender of Arabs from western invaders and occupiers. This grand narrative is constructed by the state and incorporated in official school textbooks, formally taught in universities by its professors and celebrated in television series and documentaries.

It is not difficult to miss the connection between the above representation of Salah Al-Din as an Arab hero and the Pan Arab Ba’athist pro-Palestinian discourse of the Assad regime. In this discourse, Hafez Al-Assad is presented as a second Salah Al-Din with the government-controlled press, schoolbooks and Ba’ath party propaganda all reinforcing the historical parallels. Images of Salah Al-Din are promoted through statues, stamps and banknotes; monuments and sites including his tomb in Damascus; television dramas about his life and achievements all become part of the state-propagated cult of Salah Al-Din (Sayfo 2017).

Public spectacles and celebrations using historical sites and monuments are another demonstration of the manner in which heritage and culture have been conscripted into the construction of the grand narrative of legitimacy. Such events formed a significant part of Hafez Al-Assad’s nation-building agenda, and his son Bashar Al-Assad has continued to reinforce his father’s policy by now presenting himself and his family as custodians of this heritage and history (Deknatel 2014). The Silk Road Festival is a good example of mixing history and culture. Organized by the Ministry of Tourism, folklore, dance and other cultural activities are performed within ancient sites and monuments such as the citadel of Damascus and the Roman amphitheatre in Palmyra. This in turn provides the grand narrative with a linearity of time that spans centuries linking the state-controlled present with an officially authorized version of the past (Kastrinou 2016). Through this and the other state-sponsored festivals such as the Bosra International Festival organized annually in one of the world’s best preserved Roman amphitheatres, the Assads create legitimacy by linking the modern political ideology of Syrian homogeneity with the cultural legacy of Syria’s heritage.

Other ways in which the Assads have succeeded in asserting ownership of the State and its institution include the fact that at any Syrian border crossing or airport, visitors and returning nationals are greeted with ‘Welcome to Souriya Al-Assad’. The primary purpose of this is to remind both visitors and Syrian nationals that this country belongs to the Assad family; that it is in fact their personal property. Similarly, the façades of public buildings, monuments and museums, are invariably adorned with giant pictures of the Assads all serving to reinforce the connection between, and legitimize the rule of, the Assad family.
and its instrument the Ba’ath party. In this manner, the identity of the state and that of the Assad family become integrated and inseparable.

As a result of this monopolized control and ownership of Syria’s cultural heritage, its management and preservation have become identifiable with the state and the regime. Yet the vast majority of Syrians, even those involved in its destruction, understand the importance of their cultural heritage and the value it adds to their history. This common ground may then be exploited to become the framework for consensus amongst all sides.

**Damage to Syria’s Cultural Heritage**

Currently all sides in this conflict lay claim to Syria’s historic cultural heritage for political, cultural or financial considerations, yet all of them have been implicated directly or indirectly in its destruction. In 2012, the changing nature of the conflict in Syria from peaceful mass protests and civil society activism to one of armed confrontation between regime and opposition led to a collapse of state authority. The collapse initially began in the rural countryside and gradually spread to cities and major urban centres like Aleppo and Damascus as the territory under the direct control of the regime shrank. This resulted in a power vacuum and the breakdown of law and order coupled with the collapse of basic services traditionally provided by the state in many parts of the country. All of which helped facilitate damage to Syria’s cultural heritage, which has since accelerated at a catastrophic rate.

It is possible to attribute damage to Syria’s cultural heritage to three main causes: opportunistic looting, damage due to military operations, and deliberate destruction. Opportunistic looting, also referred to as subsistence looting, is a primary cause of damage to Syria’s cultural heritage. Local populations, many of whom have lost their livelihoods due to the conflict in addition to becoming displaced, find themselves desperate for alternative sources of income as well as shelter (United Nations OCHA 2016). As a result, archaeological sites including the Dead Cities in Idlib have been taken over by refugees for shelter and are being looted in the process. Major sites such as Apamea, Dura-Europos, Mari and Palmyra have also been intensively looted right from the early stages of the conflict. The culprits include members of the local populace, opposition fighters and Syrian regime soldiers. The looting and damage has been clearly demonstrated in the before-and-after satellite imagery taken of these sites (see Figure 6.1) (Casana 2015) and reports provided by members of the local communities (TDA-HPI 2016). The legacy of local communities not being treated as stakeholders in cultural heritage, the lack of a sense of ownership and the disenfranchisement of ordinary people over more than four decades has further exacerbated the problem.

Syria boasts six UNESCO designated World Heritage sites: the old cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Bosra, the Dead Cities, Palmyra and the Krak des Chevaliers. Military operations unfortunately caused significant damage to five of the six, with only Damascus being spared (AAAS 2014). Much of the old
city of Aleppo lies in ruins and the Crusader castle of the Krak des Chevaliers was heavily damaged in the efforts by regime forces to recapture it in 2013 from opposition control (AAAS 2014). The old city of Damascus has avoided becoming a major theatre of operations till now (unlike Aleppo) and has only suffered from the occasional stray shell. Numerous other archaeological sites,
however, have been repeatedly hit by airstrikes, including Ebla and the Dead Cities of Shinsharah and St. Simeon (TDA-HPI 2016).

Museums have also been targeted by airstrikes. The museum in the city of Ma’arra Al Nu’man is located in Khan Murad Pacha, an Ottoman Caravan Serai. The museum houses a unique collection of mosaics and artefacts from the nearby Dead Cities region. The mosaic collection comprises approximately 2,000m² of which 1,700m² are on display and the remainder kept in the museum storerooms. The museum suffered extensive damage as a result of air strikes on 15 June 2015 (see Figure 6.2) and 9 May 2016 (TDA-HPI 2016) (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4).

Then there are the documented instances of deliberate, punitive destruction and looting of sites and monuments. This latest threat to Syria’s cultural heritage comes from the extremist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Al-Dawla or Da’ish. ISIS claims to be iconoclastic in its approach to cultural heritage, yet the picture emerging today from areas controlled by ISIS is far more complex than the simple narrative often portrayed in the media. ISIS has a clear evolution in its approach to the looting and destruction of antiquities and cultural heritage sites.

When ISIS began to occupy large swathes of territory in Syria in the latter half of 2013 and early 2014, it came upon an already-thriving trade in looted antiquities. Recognizing their potential value as a source of income, it initially permitted locals to continue looting archaeological sites and imposed a 20 per cent sales tax, also known as khums, on any transactions. Following the

Figure 6.2 Maara Museum; first airstrike June 2015. (Photo: TDA-HPI).
Figure 6.3 Maara Museum; second airstrike May 2016. (Photo: TDA-HPI).

Figure 6.4 Maara Museum; second airstrike May 2016. (Photo: TDA-HPI).
declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014, ISIS set up Diwan Al-Rikaz one of numerous Diwans or ministries established to administer and institutionalize ISIS operations. Diwan Al-Rikaz or the Ministry of Natural Resources is primarily responsible for the exploitation of resources extracted from the ground including oil, mineral wealth and antiquities. Shortly afterward, ISIS began to institutionalize the looting of antiquities by increasingly taking control of the process through regulating access to sites and threatening to impose penalties for non-payment of khums. By the end of the summer of 2014 ISIS, through Diwan Al-Rikaz, was issuing digging permits or licences and hiring contractors to loot sites in areas under its control (al-Azm 2014). The permit seekers are most often locals or contractors who claim to have knowledge or information pertaining to hidden or buried treasure.

In the autumn of 2014, as part of ISIS’s aggressive expansion into the illicit antiquities trade, Diwan Al-Rikaz established a local office in the city of Manbij, close to the Turkish border, called the Archaeological Administration (AA) to manage and coordinate the systematic looting of archaeological sites in that area. The AA quickly became a major epicentre for the illicit antiquities trade in northern northeastern Syria. Through the AA, ISIS intensified its activities and became increasingly engaged directly in the looting, as opposed to earlier reliance on locals and contractors. The AA organized the sale and transfer of artefacts it acquired directly through its own digging operations and established a network of approved dealers to whom the looted antiquities were sold, with middlemen facilitating the sales. It also coordinated its activities very closely with the main Rikaz office in the city of Raqqa. The AA routinely used earth-moving machinery, including bulldozers and trucks, to accelerate the digging and recovery process, which intensified the amount and rate of destruction to archaeological sites (see Figure 6.5). Many sites have been deeply scarred and suffered extensive destruction as a result of this highly aggressive practice (al-Azm 2015).

This indicates that the control and sale of looted antiquities is extremely lucrative, well worth the time and financial investment by ISIS. ISIS is clearly involved and profiting at every level from the illicit trade of antiquities – from initial extraction from the ground to their final sale and exit from ISIS-controlled territory.

Another disturbing fact is that important archaeological sites such as the citadel of Ja’bar (Qala’t Ja’bar) located on the left bank of Lake Assad, and the site of Resafa, with its extensive buildings and fortifications located southwest of the city of Raqqa, are being used as permanent ISIS bases and training camps. The sites are completely closed off and no one is allowed to approach them. Other sites like Meskene (ancient Emar) also on the banks of the Euphrates is being used as a base for oil refining installations (see Figure 6.6). A possible explanation is that ISIS believes that using high profile archaeological sites like Meskene, Ja’bar and Resafa as bases will shield them from potential coalition airstrikes. It is also very likely that these sites are being looted extensively.
In 2015 a darker and more sinister manifestation of ISIS’s control and exploitation of cultural heritage was heralded, which can only be described as cultural atrocities.

It began with the highly publicized destruction of the contents of the Mosul Museum and the archaeological sites of Nineveh and Hatra in Iraq (most likely extensively looting them as well) (Cullinane et al. 2015). ISIS seized control of the city of Palmyra in 20 May 2015, and a few months later, between the last week of August and the first week of September, the smaller temple of Baal Shamin, the grand temple of Bel, and three funerary towers from the necropolis were blown up in what has become the hallmark signature of ISIS’s destruction of cultural heritage sites, all of which attracted enormous publicity, and waves of outrage and condemnation from the international community. Then followed the destruction of yet another iconic landmark of Palmyra, the monumental arch, also known as the Arch of Triumph that stands at the entrance to the Grand Colonnade. The main arch with its two smaller arches flanking it was originally built in the second century by the Roman emperor Septimius Severus to commemorate his victory against the Parthians.

The reason for this deliberate destruction lies beyond the simplistic narrative of an extremist Islamist group with an iconoclastic approach to cultural heritage generally portrayed in the media. ISIS commits cultural heritage atrocities
to shock the world, allowing ISIS to demonstrate its ability to act with impunity, and illustrating the impotence of the international community to prevent them. These atrocities along with others such as the very well-orchestrated and public executions of Westerners in orange jumpsuits are part of a carefully crafted propaganda campaign by ISIS. The release of the videos showing destruction of the Mosul Museum and Nineveh was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001. Such propaganda resonates well with ISIS’s narrow base of supporters and helps bolster morale by reinforcing the ability to act with impunity whilst shocking the world at large and drawing attention to their actions.

Such atrocities, however, should be distinguished from the destruction of shrines and places of worship which ISIS considers to be un-Islamic. These sites include the destruction of the tomb of Jonah in a fully documented explosion followed by the bulldozing of the site to eradicate it completely, and the destruction of fourteenth-century shrine and mosque of the prophet Jirjis in Iraq (The Guardian 2014). Similarly, in Syria, ISIS has targeted shrines and places of worship such as the monastery of Mar Elian near Palmyra dedicated to a fourth-century saint (National Geographic 2015). These destructions, unlike the atrocities committed against cultural heritage sites described earlier, are carried out for religious reasons.
The logic that ISIS employs here is one based on the Wahabist ideology of strict adherence to Islamic practice in its purest essence. Islam in its essential, purest and most potent form is that represented by the time of the Prophet and his rightly guided Caliphs. ISIS and other Wahabi-based ideological groups believe that this pure form of Islam has become tainted over time by schismatic sects and local styles of worship represented by shrines (mazars). Accordingly, these heresies need to be purged in order for Islam to regain its true potency. The destruction of shrines and places of worship in Syria and Iraq by ISIS therefore should be seen in that context, and as part of the process by which ISIS considers itself to be cleansing Islam and rejuvenating it.

The Role of Non-State Actors in Saving Syria’s Cultural Heritage

The ongoing conflict in Syria has left the country divided into numerous areas controlled by the many warring factions. These can be grouped broadly into four principle zones: regime-controlled areas, opposition-controlled areas, Kurdish-controlled areas and areas under ISIS control. The latest assessments indicate that the Syrian regime and its state institutions only control around 30 per cent of the country (Kozak 2016) (at the time of writing, December 2016). Accordingly, many of Syria’s famous heritage sites, including three of the six UNESCO designated World Heritage sites, are in territory outside or partially out of the control of the Syria regime and are therefore more likely to be threatened by looting, damage as a result of conflict, and deliberate attack. These include most of the old city of Aleppo, the entire Dead Cities sites and Bosra.

In the absence of the state institutions (Department General of Antiquities and Museums, and the Ministry of Tourism) that are traditionally tasked with the care and management of cultural heritage in those areas, the greatest burden has fallen on local stakeholders and non-state actors, including local councils and NGOs. The majority of these non-state actors are centred on networks of local heritage professionals, museum curators, archaeologists and civil society activists. These local networks are working in desperate conditions to protect museums, cultural heritage sites and collections, often finding creative and simple solutions to overcome these daunting challenges whilst trying to preserve Syria’s cultural heritage. Their efforts include documenting damage and violations caused by looting and the ongoing conflict, tracking the sale and transportation of looted antiquities, and implementing small-scale intervention and preservation projects.

Given the appalling carnage and unprecedented levels of human suffering sweeping the country, particularly in the areas outside regime control, there is the danger of an emerging binary that you either care about ancient stones, monuments and artefacts, or you care about current humanitarian issues and the people affected. More significantly, that there can be no possible connection between the two issues and that you can only care for one or the other.
Yet these heritage professionals and activists have rejected this binary by recognizing that culture and people are inextricably linked. A people without their cultural heritage are lost and cut off from their identity; similarly, a heritage without the people it represents lacks context and meaning. Through their sacrifice and commitment, it is clear that these heritage professionals and activists recognize the importance of Syria’s cultural heritage in determining what makes a Syrian a Syrian and that this has a key role to play in post-conflict stabilization and reconciliation. Yet trying to save and preserve this valuable heritage has proven to be a daunting task with considerable challenges.

The challenges these people face beyond the daily danger of simply living in a conflict zone, include economic hardship since heritage professionals in regions outside of the control of the regime have not been paid for many months. They may also lack expertise in dealing with many of the preservation and documentation problems they are presented with. Furthermore, as non-state actors, they are often denied any financial or technical support from international organizations and donors such as UNESCO, ICCROM and ICOM who traditionally only deal with member states and their institutions. This situation, however, may be slowly changing as there is growing recognition that in Syria the state institutions are unable to reach large parts of the country’s cultural heritage sites and monuments, and that the only heritage preservation and documentation efforts in these areas are being carried out by these non-state actors.

There are, however, NGOs such as The Day After (TDA) who have attempted to fill this expertise and resource gap for local heritage professionals and activists. TDA is an independent, Syrian-led civil society organization working to support democratic transition in Syria. TDA also has a heritage protection initiative, TDA-HPI, that supports cultural heritage protection activities in Syria. Through its ability to reach the network of heritage professionals and civil society activists who are working in Syria in areas outside the control of the regime, TDA-HPI provides an organizational framework for addressing emergency preservation concerns through them. TDA-HPI arranges training and supplies for emergency stabilization, collecting verified documentation on deliberate acts of cultural destruction for human rights groups, and advocates targeted heritage protection from the international community. TDA-HPI also produces regular reports on the state of cultural heritage sites and monuments including rapid assessment and damage reports due to bombing, looting and other violations (TDA-HPI 2016).

With the support of TDA-HPI, local heritage professionals from the museum of Ma’ara Al Nu’man were able to protect the unique collection of mosaics and artefacts from the nearby Dead Cities region it housed. Following advice from conservation and mosaics experts, layers of white glue and cloth were applied to the mosaic panels, then they covered them with sandbags to protect them from any damage that could be caused by the impact of an explosion or falling masonry (see Figure 6.7). The initial efforts to protect the museum contents with sandbags were completed just three months prior
to the first airstrike to hit the museum on the 15 June 2015. As a result of these efforts, and despite the extensive damage caused by the airstrike to the historic building itself, the mosaics were fully protected from the blast by the sandbags and none was damaged. The museum suffered another airstrike on 9 May 2016 and there have been several more projects implemented with the support of TDA-HPI at the museum to repair the damage and further protect its contents (TDA-HPI 2016). A similar project to protect the mosaics at the museum in Apamea using sandbags was also recently completed in August 2016 (TDA-HPI 2016).

Local heritage professionals and activists are also at the forefront in promoting awareness about the importance of protecting cultural heritage. They organize meetings and workshops in schools aimed at strengthening local communities’ sense of ownership of their cultural heritage, in order to mobilize them against looters and trade in artefacts. As stakeholders, local communities can play a very important role in protecting cultural heritage, and be an integral part of the preparedness on the ground for emergency protection procedures when sites are under immediate threat. TDA-HPI has organized a number of training workshops for local heritage professionals and activists in areas outside regime control on how to communicate with local people. By acting as communicators, they
help to spread awareness, advocate the protection of cultural heritage and mobilize them to find local solutions to local problems.

One of the most effective outcomes of this local engagement has been the willingness of people to come forward and report looting activities or the recent discovery of archaeological finds. In one particular situation, a Roman mosaic was partially uncovered on private property in Baboulin (near the city of Ma’arra) in 2014. After reporting the discovery to the local archaeology team based at the museum in Ma’arra, they were able to persuade the owners to cover up the mosaic and rebury it for safe keeping. Another example is an initiative by local archaeologists and museum staff from Idlib to persuade the religious authority associated with Jaysh Al-Fateh to issue a ban on the looting and trade in antiquities in 2015 shortly after the city was captured by them. Whilst it is too early to tell if these communication and engagement efforts will have any long-term impact, in the short term it has helped local communities exercise oversight and ownership of their own cultural heritage instead of the state.

Conclusion

Yaseen Haj Saleh, a dissident Syrian writer and prominent opposition figure, prophetically predicted in 2006 that unless political and institutional reform occurred leading to a transition based around a Syrian national identity he defined as ‘Syrianism’, the eruption of civil strife and national division leading to possibly decades of instability was a likely outcome (Haj Saleh 2006). His warning now haunts all Syrians who did not heed it then and now must deal with the maelstrom it so rightly predicted.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that a sense of national identity, even when unevenly consolidated and often contested, has proven strong amongst Syrians. Syria has a resilient sense of identity based on the concept of a shared citizenship around a common history and supported by a long and rich cultural heritage. This is perhaps in part due to the manner in which the complex, overlapping and layered characteristics of tribal, ethnic, sectarian and regional identities have managed to coexist with national identities for so long despite the efforts of the Assad regime to suppress them in favour of the grand narrative that sought to transcend diversity. The resilience and malleability of the Syrian sense of identity offers hope that once the current violence ends, the people of Syria will be able to find ways to reconnect with the symbols that once united them across religious and political lines.

In this context, museums, ancient sites and monuments can provide legitimizing spaces in which these different identities can be both recognized and shared. They can become places in which Syrians can be taught to reconnect with these ‘symbols’ through a ritual of genuine shared citizenship to help create a shared sense of identity in the nation state. Museums, ancient sites and monuments effectively become the vehicle for identity creation, community outreach and cohesion (Zobler 2010). Similarly, the festivals which have long been used by the state to reinforce the grand narrative of legitimacy of the Assad regime,
can now be repurposed to reflect and encourage the coexistence of regional identities with the national one. The country’s ancient past as represented in this rich cultural heritage will be key to this. Protecting and preserving Syria’s history and heritage therefore is about safeguarding its future too.

Bibliography


7 Reconstructing Post-Conflict Heritage in Rwanda

John Giblin

Introduction

In post-conflict, post-genocide Rwanda, the heritage focus has not been on the reconstruction of war-affected archaeological and architectural sites to restore them to their pre-conflict conditions. Neither has it been to preserve the sites as they were found at the end of the civil war and genocide. Instead, professional heritage practice has concentrated on the reconstruction of sites of violence as memorial presentations of civil war and genocide evidence for dissemination to public audiences. This chapter thus describes some of these activities at national heritage sites that are publicly accessible, including genocide massacre memorials and the Presidential Palace Museum, all of which were created after the civil war and genocide. Although some of these examples ostensibly include acts of preservation intended to maintain the sites as they were found at the end of the genocide, the chapter argues that they are better understood as new post-conflict reconstructions intended to serve contemporary and future political and emotional aims. This chapter locates these activities within a wider context of post-conflict heritage activities that typically involve the re-appropriation and recycling of the past for cultural renewal in a new era of post-conflict development.

The Rwandan civil war (1990 to 1994) and genocide (1994) resulted in the deaths of approximately one million people. The war was fought between the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the government Hutu-dominated army, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a largely Tutsi rebel refugee organisation that had formed in neighbouring Uganda. Although the Rwandan government today promotes a single unifying national identity, historically the population was made up of three social groups: a Hutu majority of approximately 85 per cent, and Tutsi (14 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent) minorities. By the late nineteenth century, a Tutsi elite had emerged in the country and in the early twentieth-century colonial period they were privileged at the expense of Hutu. With the end of colonial rule and the coming of independence in 1962, the Hutu majority took power and over the following decades a series of pogroms were enacted against Tutsi leading to a large Tutsi refugee population in neighbouring countries. In 1990, the RPF entered Rwanda and launched a campaign
to overthrow the Hutu government, establish rights for Tutsi and allow the
return of Tutsi refugees. In 1994, following the signing in 1993 by the FAR
and the RPF of the Arusha Accords, a power-sharing agreement intended to
precede a general election, the then Rwandan President’s plane was shot down
killing him and everyone on board. This act triggered a pre-planned genocide
of Tutsi, and a return to civil war, which was only stopped approximately 100
days later when the RPF defeated the FAR (for a discussion of the causes and
events of the civil war and genocide see Eltringham 2004; Mamdani 2001;
Pottier 2002; Prunier 1995). Since 1994 the RPF have ruled Rwanda and con-
tinue to do so today. One of the primary mechanisms that they have used to
manage what could be considered minority rule is to first promote a single
national identity to do away with socio-cultural divisions, i.e. Tutsi, Hutu and
Twa, and to restrict political opposition (Longman 2011). In addition, they
have also used heritage sites, amongst other media, to concurrently promote an
official conflict narrative that reminds everyone who were the victims, perpetra-
tors, survivors and heroes, and thus who has the right to rule. It is within this
post-conflict context that the discussion undertaken here sits.

This chapter is based on interview- and observation-based research con-
ducted at all national museum and national memorial sites by the author in
2011, and observations at a range of these sites during unrelated research trips
since 2004.

**Re-appropriation, Recycling and Renewal**

Elsewhere I have argued that post-conflict heritage practices can be characterised
as consisting of at least three ‘re’ elements, including the (1) re-appropriation and
(2) recycling of the past for cultural (3) renewal (Giblin 2015a; see also Giblin
2014 for earlier arguments to this effect). I have argued that when new admin-
istrations establish control following significant violent or structural conflicts,
those agencies commonly attempt to take ownership of once apparently divisive
historical events, sites, objects and/or national narratives. This is achieved not
by re-writing history entirely but by taking those parts that are deemed unify-
ing and/or legitimising, and by reworking those that are not into empowering
narratives, or by selectively ignoring them. One of the aims of these actions is
to recreate or renew society for a post-conflict era. This may be for laudable
reasons, such as promoting peace through unifying narratives, or for potentially
less laudable means, such as restricting public political debate. Although such
eamples are usually justified as processes of preserving the past as it once was,
they are invariably a part of decision-making that physically and/or symbolically
change and reconstruct those materials for contemporary and future purposes.

The three case studies that I used to argue the common existence of
post-conflict heritage re-appropriation, recycling and renewal included an
international event, the 2010 Shanghai Expo (Winter 2013); a site, Great
Zimbabwe (Fontein 2006); and a national narrative in post-apartheid, new,
South Africa (Meskell 2012). At the Shanghai Expo, Winter (2013) described how in contrast to countries that sought to present themselves as ‘hyper-modern’, African nations engaged in a form of ‘auto-exoticism’ in which they used once colonially derogative representations of pre-colonial African identities and represented the same visualisations to promote international tourism for economic gain. Similarly, Fontein (2006) described how Great Zimbabwe remained a powerful form of heritage for a succession of ideologically divergent regimes over the past 150 years, including pre-colonial, colonial, anti-colonial and post-colonial authorities. With regards to post-apartheid South Africa, Meskell (2012, 1) described a process of ‘past mastering or the struggle to come to terms with the past’. In that characterisation, then President Mbeki’s “rhetoric around the African Renaissance was a clear example of the strategy to revive, regenerate, and reconstruct the past for the present” (Meskell 2012, 46). In this example, what had been a ‘burden’ for the African National Congress under apartheid, namely the racialisation or ethnicisation of society, became an asset in the new South Africa as a celebration of cultural difference labelled as the Rainbow Nation (Meskell 2012, 52).

Although different, each of these cases demonstrate how, following conflict, ostensibly the same heritage may be owned anew by very different groups and revalued for contemporary purposes that are not forms of post-colonial or post-conflict conformity, but must “be seen in terms of the agency and sovereignty” that they reflect (Winter 2013, 88). Furthermore, these case studies exist within a wide range of African examples, including the performative re-enactment of colonial genocide in contemporary Namibia (Förster 2008), and the more general appropriation of the discourse of heritage in Liberia (Rowlands 2008), Sierra Leone (Basu 2008), Kenya (Coombes et al. 2013), Uganda (Giblin 2014; Peterson 2016) and Rwanda (Giblin 2014). Some of these examples can be compared with Chatterjee’s (1993) identification of the way African states, amongst other once colonised nations, actively constructed post-colonial nationalisms out of colonially devalued pre-colonial tradition, and spirituality as a symbolic resource that challenged notions of colonial modernisation. However, they also sit within a much wider field of post-conflict heritage practices that goes beyond post-colonial nationalisms into the post-conflict international heritage sphere. Famous examples include the Bamiyan Buddhas (Harrison 2010), Mostar Bridge (Viejo-Rose 2013) or The Arch of Triumph of Palmyra (Richardson 2016). In each of these cases, following conflict, international heritage agencies have involved themselves in the re-appropriation and the recycling of the past to contribute towards cultural renewal, what might otherwise be called post-conflict development. In the case of the Buddhas that were damaged by the Taliban, it was intended that they would be reconstructed as projections, while the Palmyra arch has been reconstructed by 3-D printing and placed in Trafalgar Square, and by contrast Mostar Bridge was physically reconstructed as it ostensibly once was. However, in all the cases, the damaged or destroyed heritage structures were
not returned to their original state, because that would be impossible, not least because important parts have been destroyed, and archaeologists, despite their most enthusiastic endeavours, cannot turn back time. Instead, the once physical remains of the past have been appropriated and recreated anew, whether as tangible replicas at the site of destruction, at alternative sites, or as intangible representations. Furthermore, in these cases this has been done at least partly, if not primarily, to produce symbols of post-conflict unity that make statements about shared heritage and ascribed meanings that did not necessarily exist, at least in the same way, before the conflict occurred.

Following this positioning, this chapter argues that the post-genocide Rwandan government’s approach to its architectural heritage can also be understood as a form of ‘past mastering’ or re-appropriation and recycling for cultural renewal. All the national post-conflict heritage sites described here have ostensibly been created by the civil war and genocide but can also be said to have been re-appropriated and recycled purposefully into something new for post-genocide development in Rwanda.

Heritage Management in Rwanda

Post-conflict heritage management of archaeological and architectural sites in Rwanda has received little academic attention. In terms of archaeology, site damage due to lack of legal protection and new post-conflict development policies has been discussed with regards to the value of pre-colonial archaeology as a resource for the construction of new non-racial historical narratives (Giblin et al. 2011). In a similar vein, tourism damage to the Musanze Caves archaeological deposits has received individual attention (Giblin et al. forthcoming). The Musanje sites, which preserve significant, rare and vulnerable archaeological deposits dating from approximately AD 1000 to the present, have been dug into and paved over by government agencies to make way for tourist walking routes that traverse hundreds of metres of cave floors. However, there are few publications concerned with architectural sites or other site-based heritage management.

The lack of a developed academic debate about heritage management in Rwanda is surprising considering the very visible and politically significant level of heritage praxis that has taken place, as led by the Institute for National Museums of Rwanda (INMR) and the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG). Following the end of the genocide, for example, the INMR established six new national museums, in addition to the Ethnographic Museum that was opened in 1989. Two of the museums are in existing heritage structures: Kandt House, the early twentieth-century home of the German colonial Resident of Rwanda and founder of Kigali; and the Presidential Palace, the pre-genocide state house. INMR were also responsible for the installation of heritage interpretation panels at historic buildings around Butare (also now known as Huye), the early- to mid-twentieth-century Belgian colonial capital of Rwanda. In addition, from 1995, INMR managed the national genocide memorials (described later in this chapter) until 2008
when they were taken over by the CNLG. In recent years, INMR has also been responsible for the production of two separate cultural heritage policies (RoR 2008, 2015) and in 2012 the government of Rwanda nominated Sites mémoraux du génocide: Nyamata, Murambi, Bisesero et Gisozi to UNESCO’s Tentative World Heritage List.

In contrast to the lack of explicit academic debate regarding heritage site management, other heritage issues centred on genocide memorialisation have received more attention. As discussed below, many of the memorials display human remains, or have involved controversial reburial strategies, both of which have provoked a strong academic response. For example, the politics of the preservation, display and/or internment of human remains at the memorials has received concerted attention, and specifically the way in which the treatment of human remains at the memorials does or does not help post-conflict healing; their potential to further anonymise the victims; the allegedly voyeuristic nature of the display; and the continuation of genocide violence through display (Bolin 2012; Caplan 2007; Cook 2006; Eltringham 2014; Guyer 2009; Jinks 2014; Major 2015; Tadjo 2010; Vidal 2001). Elsewhere the contribution of survivor groups to memorial development (Ibreck 2010) and the internationalisation of the memorials through foreign donor aid has been considered (Ibreck 2013). The memorials have also been located within a wider field of soft power as sites of apology visited by world leaders (Giblin under review; Mckinney 2012). In addition, their promotion as so-called dark-tourism sites has received attention in tourism studies (Friedrich and Johnston 2013; Mckinney 2012; Robb 2009), and the national massacre memorials have been located within a wider national landscape of memorialisation (Brandstetter 2010; Meierhenrich 2013).

Post-Conflict Heritage Sites

The civil war and genocide in Rwanda were so extensive that almost all the country can be considered a post-conflict heritage site made up of hundreds of thousands of different violent events that took place from 1990 to 1994. Within this post-conflict landscape several locales have been selected by the government as formal post-conflict national heritage sites that have been subjected to various degrees of ‘preservation’ and reconstruction for public visitation. These include the genocide massacre sites of Murambi, Nyarubuye, Ntarama, Nyamata and Bisesero, and the Presidential Palace, where the remains of the plane crash that triggered the genocide can be seen.

Genocide Massacre Sites

The genocide massacre sites described here are all locations where thousands of mostly Tutsi were murdered by Hutu génocidaires and were selected by the Rwandan government because they were some of the worst individual cases of massacre that occurred during the genocide. Except for Bisesero, all the sites
were buildings where Tutsi were encouraged to congregate for protection from the civil war and genocide but were instead attacked and massacred over a few days. By contrast, Bisesero is a hillside on which Tutsi gathered to protect themselves from the génocidaires. Since the end of the genocide, these massacre sites have been reconstructed as national genocide memorial centres, first under the management of the INMR and latterly of the CNLG. In each case, as indicated by Cook (2006) in her early assessment of the politics of preservation in Rwanda at Murambi, the post-conflict heritage management aim has been the reconstruction of the sites as memorials and not their preservation as they were found or as they were during the conflict. As described later in this chapter, tangible reconstruction in these cases involves not only physical architectural changes but also the movement and rearrangement of human remains.

**Murambi**

Murambi memorial, in Southern Province, was an unfinished technical school. On 20 and 21 April 1994, approximately 40,000 to 50,000 people that had taken refuge there were overrun and massacred by génocidaires. The dead were quickly buried in mass-graves to hide the crime and to remove the rotting corpses. After the end of the genocide, the mass-graves were located by the few remaining survivors and the bodies were exhumed. Most of the exhumed remains were reburied in new formal consecrated mass-graves with large, low, flat rectangular concrete caps at the front and side of the main technical college building. However, the remains in one mass-grave were found to be well-preserved, with flesh intact, and a selection of these, approximately 800, were kept above ground to show to visitors as evidence of the genocide. The bodies are preserved with regular treatments of lime and insecticide and have been placed in 24 of the school rooms at the rear of the main building, where some have been ordered typologically by sex and age (see also Cook 2006, 300). Some of the clothes of the victims have also been removed from the bodies and are on display in one of the larger rooms. Over the years, these have been displayed either on shelves or hung across the room, dependent on the prevailing opinion as to the best arrangement for conservation and visual impact. The main building was also significantly reconstructed so that it now has two levels with a large glass frontage in the middle; it contain offices, teaching and reflection rooms, and a permanent exhibition, which tells the official historical narrative of the genocide and the specific events that took place at Murambi. Outside the buildings, tangible reconstruction has also taken place. For example, the mass-grave that contained the bodies that are now on display has been left open, whereas the others have been filled, and heritage signage has at times been added to parts of the site to highlight crimes. As discussed by Eltringham (2014, 201), by 2007 three signs had been installed at different locations that read in English, French and Kinyarwanda: ‘FRENCH SOLDIERS WERE PLAYING VOLLEY HERE’; ‘MASS GRAVE OF VICTIMS’; ‘PLACE OF FRENCH FLAG DURING OPERATION TURQUOISE’. The signs refer
to the French operation during the genocide, which the Rwandan government claim provided protection to génocidaires as they escaped into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. Specifically, the signs refer to the French occupation of Murambi as a base after the massacre and the claim that French forces deliberately concealed a mass-grave by building a volleyball court over the top. In 2006, a French judge had also issued arrest warrants for nine of President Paul Kagame’s aides, alleging RPF complicity in starting the genocide. Eltringham (2004, 201) thus suggests that these signs are not merely heritage markers but “were engaged in a long-distance confrontation with the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris”. At Murambi then, as with the other genocide massacre memorials, the technical school has not been preserved as found, or reconstructed as it was before the genocide, or as a snap shot of the violent event that took place there during the genocide. Instead, it has been constructed as a memorial with specific purposes, to not only act as a place of national mourning but also as a communicative space that disseminates a blame narrative regarding the causes and events of the genocide.

**Nyarubuye**

Nyarubuye memorial in Eastern Province was a Catholic church. On 15 April 1994, approximately 20,000 people who had taken refuge there were massacred by génocidaires. After the end of the genocide, some of the bodies were left on the floor of the church. When Gourevitch (1999) visited the church 13 months after the massacre he found at least 50 corpses and skulls with machete wounds on the floor, an assemblage that he suggested had not been moved since the killings, and had been left deliberately in situ for ‘memorial purposes’. Based on interviews and observations in 2011, because of preservation and storage problems after the genocide, and the intention to return the church to a place of worship, most human remains were buried quickly in mass-graves, while a sample was retained above ground as evidence. In 2011, the consecrated mass-graves were comparable to those at Murambi and were located at the front of the church. During that visit, I was told that the rapid internment of the bodies meant that they were not properly cleaned and buried with the respect they deserved and thus there was a plan to exhume, clean and rebury the remains. Consequently, in 2016, new mass-graves were under construction and it is presumed that this process is now complete (see Major 2015 for a detailed discussion of the practice and politics surrounding the exhumation, disarticulation, cleaning and reburial of human remains at other massacre site memorials). The unburied human remains at Nyarubuye were eventually removed from the church and arranged in buildings to the side, where they have been lain out on tables typologically, not by age and sex as in the case of Murambi, but by bone type in disarticulated rows, with skulls in vitrines. The skeletal remains are shown alongside blood-stained clothes and some of the weapons. Nyarubuye, like all the remaining massacre memorials, does not have a permanent exhibition and instead the official narrative is disseminated to visitors by a guide.
Thus, although the massacre was originally preserved ostensibly as it was found, the church complex was latterly reconstructed as a memorial site, with a human remains exhibit and a large mass-grave area, which has recently been reconstructed again, alongside the pre-existing church.

**Ntarama**

Ntarama memorial in Kigali District was also a Catholic church. From 15 April 1994, génocidaires attacked the church leading to the massacre of 5,000 people over the following days. Like Murambi and Nyarubuye, some of the bodies were buried in concrete mass-graves to the side of the church, while others were kept above ground as evidence of the genocide. By 2005, when I first visited the memorial, the church and neighbouring buildings had been covered with large metal protective open-sided structures that had been introduced to preserve the buildings, while the front of the site had been separated from the surrounding settlement and road by a large wall and gate. However, like the other sites, Ntarama has not been preserved as it was before or during the genocide but has been reconstructed to be a memorial. For example, when I visited in 2005 human remains were scattered across the floor of the small church, with skulls on shelves at the rear, and visitors were encouraged to move through the church by stepping from pew to pew over the bones, and blood stains were pointed out where babies had apparently been smashed against the walls. In other buildings clothes were piled up for display (for a comparable slightly later account, see Caplan 2007). Sodaro (2011) has suggested that this strategy may have been influenced by display practices in Cambodia’s ‘Killing Fields’ where visitors also walk over bones, teeth and other remains, to a stupa stacked with skulls. However, by the time I visited the church again in 2011 the remains had all been cleared from the floor and had either been put on shelves, or in coffins, and there were plans to bury all of them. By this time, the site had also received a memorial wall and reflection areas, located alongside the mass-graves. An important observation from Ntarama, which is relevant for all the memorials, is the way in which memorial reconstruction is a long-term process that persists today as the tangible remains of the site continue to be moved, adapted and added to.

**Nyamata**

Nyamata memorial in Eastern Province was also a Catholic church. On 10 April 1994, génocidaires began a massacre of those taking refuge there leading to the murder of approximately 10,000 people. Today, the church and its grounds contain the remains of 50,000 people killed there and in the surrounding area. Caplan’s (2007) account of her visit describes how the main church room was empty except for an altar with a blood-stained cloth where victims had been killed, and a small room that contained a pile of human remains. When I visited in 2011, however, large piles of clothes had been spread across
the church floor. Beneath the church is a crypt, which in 2011 contained human bones and skulls in vitrines, as it did when Caplan visited in 2007. However, in 2011 it also contained the remains of an unnamed woman that had been raped and killed by génocidaires. To the rear of the church have been constructed a series of mass-grave catacombs, some of which can be entered by visitors. Inside the graves, the human remains have again been ordered typologically by anatomical element. Of note, when Caplan (2007) visited the ‘catacombs’ she reported that a coffin draped with purple was shown to her in one of the outside mass-graves and she was told it contained a “‘femme violée’ – woman who was raped’. Why this woman was selected from the thousands that were murdered, many of whom were presumably also subjected to sexual violence, is not known, but this may be the woman that was similarly specially interred in the crypt of the church in 2011, and if it is then it is another example of the ongoing slow process of reconstruction.

**Bisesero**

In contrast to the other sites Bisesero memorial, in Western Province, was not created out of a pre-existing architectural structure. Bisesero was selected because it was one of the hills on which thousands of Tutsi had collected together to protect themselves from attack. Over a few weeks, they moved from hill to hill fighting running battles with génocidaires. Although most were eventually exhausted, overwhelmed and killed, the site is remembered particularly for the resistance that was put up against the génocidaires, and for the alleged culpability of French soldiers who did not intervene until the majority had been killed. It is estimated that 40,000 people were murdered in the Bisesero area. The site was designated as a national memorial in 1998, and by 2011 the hillside had been subject to considerable and highly symbolic architectural construction. At the base of the hill was a temporary metal structure that contained typologically ordered human remains from some of those killed in the area. Winding its way up the hill was a stone-built path that passed through three buildings before it reached graves at the top. Each of the three buildings contained three separate rooms, which together symbolised the nine communes of the old Kibuye Prefecture. It was intended that the human remains in the building at the foot of the hill would eventually be placed in each of the rooms. This had not yet occurred, it was reported by the guide, because the area for the human remains had been built too high, meaning that the bones and skulls would not symbolically be beneath the ground as wished, and thus they were awaiting future adaptations. It is not known if that has happened yet. As the path climbed the hill it narrowed to symbolise diminishing numbers as people were killed over the weeks of the massacre. The graves at the top of the hill were reported to be the resting place of heroes who had fought the génocidaires. Bisesero can thus be considered one of the most heavily reconstructed memorial sites, as there were previously no permanent structures on the hill, but there has since been significant development. It is also one
of the sites at which most effort has been made to create symbolic features through architecture and landscaping.

**Presidential Palace**

The Presidential Palace, on the outskirts of the capital, Kigali, can also be considered a formal national post-conflict heritage site. The palace was once the home of Juvenal Habyarimana, the third president of Rwanda and leader of the country during the civil war. On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the president of Burundi, were returning by plane from a meeting in Tanzania, when their plane was shot down by surface-to-air missiles. The plane crashed into the garden of the Presidential Palace killing everyone inside. Immediately after the crash, political killings that acted as a precursor to the genocide began. The shooting down of the presidents’ plane is one of the most contentious events that precipitated the genocide. The RPF, who were fighting against Habyarimana’s FAR, have always claimed that the plane was shot down by Habyarimana’s own army to provide a trigger for the genocide that followed, while RPF opponents and some outside observers have suggested the RPF shot down the plane. Although an independent expert investigation concluded in 2012 that the plane was shot down from a position controlled by Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard (Eltringham 2015, 165 citing Oosterlinck et al. 2012), it remains a controversial event and the RPF have consequently sought to control how it is represented. This has been achieved in part by reconstructing the site as the Presidential Palace Museum, managed by INMR, which first opened as the State House Museum in 2008. The house and gardens are now the theatre for guided tours that emphasise the eccentric tastes of the past rulers that lived there, including a ‘temple’, snake pit and secret corridors, while weddings and other events take place in the garden and wealthy locals come to play tennis in the renovated courts. Of specific interest here, however, is not the reconstruction of the house and gardens as a museum, which shows little visible structural change, but the movement and collection of the physical remains of the plane that crashed. The rear wall that the plane crashed through has since been rebuilt, and a small collection of the remains of the plane, including a wing, engine, fuselage and wheel, have been arranged just outside the wall beneath a viewing platform. Visitors are encouraged to climb a ladder inside the garden to reach the top of the wall and view the remains from above (see also Giblin 2015b, 134–5). In this example, the physical remains of conflict, the plane debris, are presented as evidence; however, the site has been significantly reconstructed as an exhibit for public consumption that informs or reminds visitors how the genocide began.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In each of the examples, divisive historical events that took place during the civil war and genocide have since been re-appropriated by the state through
its agencies, the INMR and the CNLG. Although some aspects of the post-conflict heritage management of these sites was ostensibly intended to preserve them as they were found, they have all received considerable work to reconstruct them as memorials. This is both the case with regards to the massacre memorials that remember the dead, and the plane crash remains that mark how the genocide began. For example, while the bodies at Murambi, the covered buildings at Ntarama and the plane crash debris at the Presidential Palace have all been ‘preserved’, these ‘preservations’ are also part of a much larger post-conflict re-imagining of the sites as they have continually been reconstructed as memorials over the past few decades. Consequently, the original uses and meanings of all but one of the sites have changed from school, church, hillside or presidential house, to sites of violence during the civil war and genocide, and finally to didactic memorial spaces today. Nyarubuye, by contrast, combines its original church function with genocide memorialisation. Although, considering the visibility and materiality of the mass-graves and human remains displays, it is hard to imagine that anyone visiting could separate the church from the memorial.

The reconstruction of the past at sites of genocide violence must be contextualised within a broader landscape of historical revision in Rwanda. As Pottier (2002) suggests, the RPF became experts at ‘knowledge construction’ before and since the genocide as they developed an official historical narrative in which pre-colonial Rwanda was a utopian unified state before it was divided by ethno-racial colonial policies, a process that led to conflict in the later twentieth century including the genocide. To address this, after the genocide the government has promoted a single national identity – Rwandan – and has effectively restricted the use of the identity labels Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (Longman 2011). In addition, from 1995 to 2011, the RPF removed secondary school history teaching to prevent the teaching of colonially constructed ethno-racially divisive histories (see Buckley-Zistel 2009; Freedman et al. 2011, 2009; Obura 2003). The reconstruction of sites of violence as memorials is thus only one aspect of the post-conflict heritage practice in Rwanda that involves re-appropriation and recycling of pasts for cultural renewal.

The reconstructive display of evidence in Rwanda can also be placed in an international context. For example, the curatorial decision to collect and display human remains in this way may be traced to post-conflict strategies in other countries. Visitor experiences at the Rwandan memorials are frequently compared to those at Cambodian sites created after the genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, which caused the deaths of approximately 1.5 million people (e.g. Jinks 2014). Today, human remains are on public display at two Cambodian sites, Tuol Sleng prison and Choeung Ek Killing Fields (Sion 2011, 2). The Cambodian sites and the massacre memorials in Rwanda are comparable because both use disarticulated human remains, ordered into skulls and long bones, to create a powerful display of genocide evidence that communicates governmental legitimacy to visitors (Jinks 2014; Sion 2011). However, in contrast to those in Rwanda, Sion (2011) suggests
that the Tuol Sleng prison and Choeung Ek Killing Fields are not memorials but are instead heavily commercialised tourist sites controlled by private organisations. They are not engaged with by the Cambodian public as memorials, there are no memorialisation events at the sites, and there is little sensitivity to the remains as tourists “often walk on clothes and bones that stick out of [mass-graves] in the ground” or touch skulls (Sion 2011, 7). This is different from the Rwandan memorials which do host national memorialisation events, are free to enter, and do encourage visitors to treat the human remains with respect.

The RPF may also have been influenced by their experience of human remains collections following the end of the 1980s ‘Bush War’ in Uganda, a conflict that involved the genocide of between 50,000 and 300,000 civilians, and one in which many senior RPF members fought (Bernard 2017; Major and Fontein 2015). At the end of that conflict, some residents collected the human remains that then littered their fields and placed them in ordered displays of skulls and long bones by the sides of roads. There is debate as to whether the residents collected the remains on their own initiative, or if they did so because they were told to by the new government (Bernard 2017). If the former, it may have been meant as a message to the government about civilian losses and reparations; if the latter, a message from the government to the international community about their legitimacy to rule. Either way, the government, first through the Uganda Museum and then through veteran’s groups, eventually took control of the human remains and interred them in 33 mass-grave memorials. However, despite some similarities regarding human remains’ treatment, the memorialisation strategy in Uganda is also quite different from that in Rwanda. For example, the Ugandan memorials are not located at massacre sites, and while the display of human remains may originally have communicated a public message, the resulting memorials are largely hidden from public view and international tourists are not encouraged to visit them. Furthermore, the Ugandan memorials explicitly only memorialise ‘freedom fighters’ and not civilians.

Nevertheless, despite differences in approach to ‘past mastering’, the Rwandan, Cambodian and Ugandan examples all fit within the post-conflict heritage model proposed here, in which divisive remains are re-appropriated and recycled for post-conflict aims. In all the examples, post-conflict actors have taken control of the re-telling of divisive events by turning physical remains into objects of evidence with the intention of promoting their own causes, be they political, social or economic.

**Bibliography**


Part IV

Methodologies of Recording
Introduction

In 2014 it was becoming increasingly apparent that the various conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were not going to end quickly, and that the important archaeological remains of the MENA region were under great threat. It was in this context that the Arcadia Fund, a charitable philanthropic organization that aims to preserve cultural heritage, made an approach to fund a project to undertake the ‘documentation of endangered archaeology’ in the MENA region (Bewley et al. 2016). Previous projects had paved the way, especially the Aerial Archaeology in Jordan Project, founded by David Kennedy (APAAAME 2017; Kennedy and Bewley 2004), the work of Kennedy and Bishop (2011), David Mattingly’s work in North Africa (Mattingly 2004, 2013) and my own experience in Europe (Bewley 2003; Bewley and Rączkowski 2002). The current project is based in the University of Oxford but is conducted in partnership with the Universities of Leicester and Durham (EAMENA 2017).

The broadly defined area of the MENA region has a huge number of well-preserved archaeological sites, from the early Paleolithic to the twentieth century, that are facing enormous threats. These threats are from a variety of agents of destruction, including the intensification of agriculture, dam building, industrial and residential development, as well as conflict (Cunliffe 2014). Although it is a region where there has been a huge amount of excavation over the years, and many surveys (Adams 1981; Casana 2015; Casana and Wilkinson 2005; Glueck 1939; Klemm and Klemm 2011; Matthiae and Marchetti 2013; Mattingly 2000, 2013; Mattingly and Sterry 2013; Ur and Wilkinson 2008), there are few national inventories of archaeological sites and records for cultural heritage, and even fewer available online.

The EAMENA project aims are to provide information that will be useful for all countries affected by conflict, and especially after a conflict phase is over. The four-tier approach developed by Peter Stone (Stone 2013, 173–174) is an excellent framework for developing a future strategy, for protecting cultural property before, during and after conflict. Undertaking the work required (in this case creating archaeological records) before the conflicts are over means that when the conflict ends, the necessary information is readily available.
heritage has been affected by the consequences of conflict in all the countries in the MENA region, even those not currently engaged in active conflicts.

The EAMENA project is recording and documenting archaeological sites across 20 countries from Mauritania to Iran by interpreting satellite imagery and creating records in a bespoke database: therefore, the basic forms of the site are recorded as well as an assessment of threats to the sites. The EAMENA project has been pragmatic in ensuring it does not duplicate the work of others, for example the ASOR (American Schools of Oriental Research) Cultural Heritage Initiative (Casana 2015; Casana and Panahipour 2014) or others who have worked in the same field (Brodie and Contreras 2012; Contreras and Brodie 2010) or in the same region (Parcak 2015). Through our partnership, between the Universities of Oxford, Leicester and Durham, we are able to collaborate with many of the fieldwork projects (past and current) that have taken place in the region over the past decades.

The impact of conflict on cultural heritage stretches beyond just those countries in conflict. Neighbouring countries (and even those further afield) have been and are currently affected by conflict, be it from an influx of refugees or as a result of changes in economic circumstances with interruptions in trade and tourism. The EAMENA project is adding flesh to the bones of the framework that shows there are many causes of damage and destruction. These agents of destruction (ploughing, road and house-building for example) do not capture the media’s attention in the same way as the deliberate destruction, through the use of explosives, of sites such as the Temples at Palmyra or Palaces at Nimrud and Nineveh. There is no question over the impact of conflict-related damage, which has significant political, economic and social consequences, but there are other continuous, everyday destructive agents at work: the intensification of agriculture, large construction projects (especially dams), village, town and city expansion as well as the looting and trafficking of antiquities. In a post-conflict scenario, it is important that these are addressed as well as the damage and destruction that was directly caused by the conflict. It can be argued that the impact of these agents are caused by conflicts; agricultural production may have increased due to a shifting refugee population, or more water required as the population rises, meaning more dams are built for example. Over time, these actions can cause more damage across a wider area than the more visible and dramatic but specific damage caused in a war. Unintentional damage and destruction can happen for many reasons, including ignorance or a lack of information and not understanding the significance of the remains. Therefore, we have a responsibility to create and share our knowledge with everyone whose activities might adversely, even if unintentionally, affect cultural heritage.

Methodology and Approach

The EAMENA methodology is based on the principle that it is important to record as many archaeological sites as possible, in a systematic manner, as a prerequisite for understanding their nature and distribution, and also to assess the
threats to these sites. Once this information has been collected and analysed, plans for improving the protection of the sites can be implemented. The approach of the project is to work as collaboratively as possible, especially with partners in each of the countries (Schiettecatte 2011), and share our data and studies with as many people as possible. In addressing the post-conflict situation, the project has already shown that there are some areas where the density of archaeological sites and the state of preservation is so great that these sites could be recommended for immediate protection (under existing national laws), by working with national agencies and the relevant ministries in each country, NGOs and UNESCO. Sometimes a sign and a fence is enough to deter unintentional damage, but more often there needs to be positive and active management of the sites by the land owner, especially if damage is to be minimized. Unless we do this as a matter of urgency, there will be fewer places where the bulldozer has not wrought some destruction prior to any archaeological investigation. This is particularly noticeable in the basalt landscapes of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia where the activities of bulldozer drivers are clearly marked on the landscape, but also where the preservation of sites in large (and often poorly researched) landscapes is very good (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). Similar conditions apply to many of the limestone landscapes in Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

Figure 8.1 Safawi Kite 118, Jordan. The kites are so-called because of their shape and the walls (being the strings of the kite) by the RAF pilots in the 1920s. With origins in the Neolithic these are likely hunting sites for gazelle and oryx. A well-preserved example, but in an area under increasing threat and thus worthy of careful preservation. (Photo: Robert Bewley, APAAME_20090928_RHB-0461, courtesy of APAAME).
Archaeologists are all too often defined by what they excavate; archaeology and excavation are too often seen as synonymous terms. Thankfully this view is changing, but only slowly. The remote sensing and aerial archaeological approach, adopted and adapted by the EAMENA project, is a sub-discipline of archaeology in its own right, and not necessarily a precursor to excavation. We cannot preserve everything, let alone excavate anything but a very small percentage of sites. For the post-conflict situation this raises the question of how decisions are made about the protection of sites and the priorities underlying those decisions. Increasingly this is being seen as an area that should not be left to the experts alone, and that local communities especially should have a say in the future of their cultural heritage (Holtorf 2007). For the vast majority of the sites recorded by the EAMENA project, there are no previous records; thus the EAMENA record will often be the only record of a site, as many sites may have already been destroyed through conflict, bulldozing or ploughing.

The accessibility of freely available satellite imagery (mainly Google Earth and Bing Maps) and an increasing archive of historical digital photographs such as the Aerial Photographic Archive of the Middle East (APAAAME 2017; Kennedy and Bewley 2010), and the Corona Atlas of the Middle East (Casana and Cothren 2013) has made the EAMENA approach a viable, if ambitious, one. However, it does not remove the need for other forms of survey and investigation in the future; our current work is very much a first step. It does

Figure 8.2 Wisad Kite 24, Jordan. Many such as this are damaged, often from bulldozing, for no apparent reason. (Photo: Karen Henderson, APAAME_20091004_KRH-0037, courtesy of APAAME).
not matter if the imagery is from balloons, kites, aeroplanes, drones or satellites, none of these sources replaces the other, but they are all complementary. The key point is they provide a unique perspective of the landscape beneath, i.e. an ‘aerial view’. This is important not only because it provides a unique view, but also because for many countries in the middle of conflicts, access to archaeological sites on the ground for study is impossible. So for many areas in this region remote sensing is the only means of understanding the breadth of the cultural heritage and the threats to it.

All archaeological surveys have their limitations and are a snapshot in time. A fully comprehensive archaeological survey does not, and cannot exist: there will always be new information to be gained over time, through new techniques or in the course of new surveys. There will always be new discoveries being made and although the EAMENA project will have covered a huge area, it is relying on remotely sensed data, which is only one source of information revealing evidence of the archaeological past, and thus the project cannot record everything. The ability of the interpreters to record sites depends on the variable quality of the satellite imagery, the reports from existing surveys, and their own experience and knowledge of the area (Banks et al. 2017). This means that being as consistent as possible in recording sites is crucial, through the use of glossaries and standard terminologies in our database.

The methodological approach for the EAMENA project can be summarized as producing ‘dots on maps’ (sometimes polygons) with accompanying digital records in an online database (Zerbini 2016), achieved through the examination and interpretation of satellite imagery and historical air photographs. The work carried out is intended as a record of the nature and location of the site, and where possible a suggestion of the site’s date and function (Bewley et al. 2016). The project has already created more detailed surveys of some sites, e.g. Cyrene and sites in Al-Jufra oasis in Libya. These will be very useful once the conflicts are over, as they can be used by the local archaeologists for developing new interpretative stories for the sites and hopefully supporting claims for better protection (Rayne et al. forthcoming). One of the main challenges for the project is the importance of adopting the same approach across such a diversity of landscapes. At the time of writing, we have tested the method in 14 countries and apart from either a lack of visibility because of ground conditions (especially sand cover) or poor resolution satellite imagery, the method has worked extremely well, with a total of over 150,000 records having been created so far. The sites can vary in size from well-known ancient cities built of stone, or preserved as mounds or tells, to small prehistoric burials, stone cairns or small houses, visible as small dots on the satellite imagery.

It is a sobering but compelling fact that as archaeologists we do not know how many archaeological sites there are, and therefore, we also do not know where they are. This project is addressing this issue for the MENA region. National archaeological databases exist for some of the countries in the project area (e.g. Qatar, UAE, Jordan and Israel) and in addition there is MEGA-J (MEGA-Jordan 2010) for Jordan. This latter database is only one
of two available online, and was the prototype for the EAMENA database; it can be accessed in English or Arabic. The other online database is for Israel (AMUDANAN 2017) and is available in Hebrew and English.

The areas to be surveyed and the records created have been chosen (so far) by a combination of factors, taking into account previous archaeological surveys, the quality of the satellite imagery, the availability of previous aerial photographs, and previous knowledge indicating the density and significance of the archaeological sites. When planning where we work, we also aim to take into account imminent threats to these sites, by liaising with the local Departments of Archaeology, Antiquities or Universities. Creating records prior to the commencement of large infrastructure projects is good practice and can lead to the most effective means of limiting unrecorded destruction. Communicating with the Department of Antiquities in Jordan, where the large construction project in the form of a ring road around the city of Madaba, Jordan, would have threatened a number of sites, offers a good example (Bewley et al. 2016, figure 2; Figure 8.3). The full report is available on the EAMENA website (EAMENA 2017), but in summary in the zone chosen for the survey 141 sites were recorded, 11 of which would be directly affected by the construction of the road. By supplying this information to the Jordanian Department

Figure 8.3 The hinterland of Madaba, Jordan showing the distribution of archaeological sites in the ring-road buffer zone, recorded as part of the EAMENA project.
of Antiquities their staff were able to go and inspect the 11 sites in advance of road construction and halt its development until the sites had been recorded.

The credibility of the EAMENA project, and the records created, rely on the interpretative skills and experience of the team members undertaking the examination of the satellite imagery, aerial photographs and existing available published sources. It is available in two languages (English and Arabic) with the expectation that translation into Kurdish and Farsi will follow. The main use of the database will be for managing the cultural heritage in each country and hopefully this will form the basis for Historic Environments Records (HERs to use the British term) in many of the countries. It will also be a very useful research tool for geographical, locational and chronological enquiries by those wanting to undertake research in the region. A simple distribution map of all the sites recorded for the region or a country is relatively easy (see Figure 8.3), but more refined searches can be undertaken.

The database has been created using the Arches open source software (version 3), developed by the Getty Conservation Institute and the World Monuments Fund, as an open source data management platform for the heritage field (ARCHES 2017; Myers 2016, 102). The policy is for open access to the database, i.e. it is free for non-commercial use by bona fide archaeologists and interested parties. As with any data concerning archaeological sites, there will be confidential or private information that cannot be shared, so levels of access are being developed and will be implemented during 2017.

Results

One of the key objectives of the project is to work with the national agencies in all the countries to effect the transfer of information and data collected by the project (primarily the EAMENA database) for their use, if they wish it, as a record of their archaeological sites. An individual country will not need to have information from other countries, so we are devising ways of providing nationally specific databases. The first country this is likely to become a reality for is Yemen, but we are in detailed negotiations with a number of other countries too. Systematic investigation of over 82,000 km² of Yemen resulted in the recording of over 42,000 sites (Banks et al. 2017). While many of them appear to be in good condition, there have been some notable examples of destruction caused as a result of human action: conflict, agricultural development, construction and looting, and there is also evidence of destruction by natural events (e.g. flash flooding). Among the sites affected by the ongoing conflict are the city wall and temple of Nakrah at Baraqish, the Dhamar Regional Museum, the al-Qahira fortress in Ta’izz and the Ma’rib dam (Bewley et al. 2016, 923). An international initiative coordinated by UNESCO (Doha office) is aiming to build a national inventory of archaeological sites for Yemen’s General Organisation of Antiquities and Museums (GOAM). EAMENA is a major partner to this initiative, to which it has been contributing not only data, but also the technical expertise to develop
the underlying heritage management platform on which this inventory will be run (Zerbini pers. comm.). Similarly, the project’s partnership with the University of Durham is working on a similar approach for a national database for Syria, in association with SHIRIN International (SHIRIN 2017).

The database is also a basis for research, especially for those interested in the wider region, beyond national boundaries (Figure 8.4). Regional studies will also be significant in the wider educational aspect of the project’s work, to increase understanding of the past and the future preservation of local archaeological remains. At the time of writing the total number of records in the database is 154,312; with each record representing a definable archaeological site; for larger, more complex sites there will be multiple records, for a single burial cairn for example, only one. The definition of an archaeological site is an arbitrary one, as we know that what we can see from the satellite imagery is a partial view. Each site has a record that shows (at least) its location, function (when possible from the evidence that the interpreter has), overall site morphology, shape and cultural period (if this can be interpreted from the evidence available). Each record has certain values attached to it; for example, there are a number of ‘certainty’ scores (high, medium or low) for the interpretations (date, function and condition). There are also fields in the records for bibliographical references. The records are created as the product of an interpretative process and require testing by further research, in the air, in the field; possibly by ourselves, but more likely by those living and working in the region. When assessing the condition there are six categories from ‘good’ to ‘destroyed’, allowing for more subtle analyses to be carried out and for future monitoring of the sites to show a change through time.

In serving the EAMENA project, Libya has been one of the countries where there have been a number of archaeological surveys that provide very good sources of information and evidence of the nature and types of archaeological sites (Barker et al. 1996a, 1996b; Mattingly 2004, 2013). This information is being incorporated into the database, and the team have also examined areas not previously surveyed. In one example of the coastal zone of Zliten, in the Murqub District of Libya, there are 278 sites (in an area of c.600 km²), mainly buildings and enclosures with 170 (61 per cent) in a good condition, 50 (18 per cent) were assessed as fair, 24 (9 per cent) as poor, 15 (5 per cent) as bad, and 16 (5.5 per cent) as completely destroyed (Rayne et al. forthcoming). Of the Libyan data so far collected, 16 sites have since been destroyed. This demonstrates the project database can act as a useful tool for assessing the state of archaeological sites, and one which will be of enormous potential use in assessing post-conflict scenarios.

All the site records are new to the EAMENA database and a small percentage exist on other databases that are generally not accessible online. However, for some countries, Saudi Arabia for example, we estimate that 90 per cent of the sites identified by the team are newly identified sites, in areas where no-one has worked previously. There is a small chance some previously completed surveys have escaped our notice, especially if they are unpublished; however, we aim to capture all the published material.
The headline news in the media in the UK suggests that the major cause of damage to archaeological sites is as a result of conflict, and that the MENA region has a monopoly on conflict. The deliberate damage to archaeological sites in Yemen, Syria and Iraq has been extensively reported, with varying degrees of accuracy (Al Arabiya News 2015; Bevan 2016; Burns 2016; Field 2016), as has the extensive nature of looting and subsequent trafficking of artefacts (Contreras and Brodie 2010; Kila 2013; Stone 2015). However, the most destructive agent of damage and change in the landscape has been the intensification of agriculture, in Europe and the MENA region, if not the whole world (Bewley et al. 2016; Brodie 2015a, 2015b; Casana 2015). The process of change has been a long one, but a continuous, daily and dramatic one.

Overall, for the sites for which we have data, 64 per cent are threatened by agricultural activities, 20 per cent by development activities (e.g. road building), 20 per cent by domestic/residential building, 5 per cent by industrial and production activities (including quarrying), and 1.6 per cent from looting (the totals exceed 100 per cent as there are sometimes multiple threats). The assessment of threat is different from ‘disturbance’; 15 per cent of the sites have a ‘disturbance’ (i.e. not a threat but a reality) caused by bulldozing, for example. If we take one example, the Al-Jufra oases in Libya, the preliminary analyses show that 35 of the 92 of the foggara (ancient water channels, visible as mounds that represent the air shafts that allow the water to flow in the buried channel beneath the shafts) have been ‘badly damaged’. They have not been completely destroyed but are clearly in need of protection.

Addressing the impact of looting will be a major undertaking in the MENA region; however, it must be understood this has not been a new activity and is likely to increase (Parcak 2015). We do need to recognize the mechanics of illegal trade better, and the reasons why looting occurs (over and above the simple economic one). Reducing the demand for the artefacts is a key interest and apart from the EAMENA project (which includes Dr Neil Brodie’s expertise), there are a number of other projects looking into this area, including the ‘Follow the Pots Project’ (2017) and the ‘Trafficking Culture’ (2017) consortium.

The satellite image from 25 December 2015 (Figure 8.5) of the site at Dura Europos, Syria, shows there has been recent looting on a massive scale; almost every building has been looted. This is a result of a targeted campaign to remove artefacts from their archaeological contexts for monetary gain, with so-called ISIS issuing licences (al-Azm and Periche pers. comm.; see Chapter 6 this volume). This deliberate destruction is a crime, and it is unlikely that we will discover who the perpetrators were. The priority has to be to explore the site to ascertain just how much damage has been done and what the possible future restoration of the site might entail.

The EAMENA project is still in its data collection phase, and further research will be required to refine these results, but they indicate that human action in the landscape (urban and rural), for a variety of reasons, is the major cause of damage. As archaeologists, we are responsible for protecting the past
Figure 8.4 Distribution of the sites recorded in the EAMENA database (March 2017). (Andrea Zerbini, EAMENA).

Figure 8.5 Satellite image of the ancient city of Dura Europos, Syria. The city was known as the *Pompeii of the Desert*, because of the good preservation of many of its artefacts and buildings; originating from at least the 3rd century BC and continuing in use well into the first millennium AD. Now severely damaged by looting as a direct result of the conflict in Syria. (Photo: Digital Globe, taken on 25 December 2015).
from deliberate destruction, so that future generations, if they so wish, can understand and enjoy it. Therefore, making information available to as many people as possible about their past is a key task if we are to preserve even a small fraction of the archaeology which is all around us. Recent research in the UK has shown that visiting sites and heritage tourism is a £12.4bn ($16.4bn) a year industry, and this makes a significant contribution to the economy (Bewley and Maeer 2013; Heritage Lottery Fund 2010). In many of the MENA countries this is not going to be a factor until the conflicts have ceased; even in Jordan the tourism industry had reduced by up to 50 per cent. However, the future potential of heritage tourism in purely economic terms is clearly immense, and needs to be considered in all post-conflict heritage discussions.

**Conclusion**

The damage and destruction to archaeological sites does not stop just because the conflict does, and we need to be aware that more damage can be caused post-conflict, with the re-building and reconstruction work of cities, towns and villages than even through the conflict itself. Being prepared with the right information is essential (Stone 2013). The EAMENA information is a beginning, and through its use will provide a foundation on which to build the evidence for protecting cultural heritage in post-conflict countries. We need to prepare for the worst now, in the present, to counter future threats to archaeological sites and be ready in the future to provide information and advice, if this is requested. The EAMENA approach has begun this preparatory work so that discussions on damage assessment for post-conflict conservation and restoration work can begin even while the conflicts are ongoing.

Understanding why people might wish to destroy the remains of the past, because it represents a particular view of their society (which they wish to deny or eradicate) is a key to the future; education concerning cultural heritage, and an awareness of the vital role it can play in a post-conflict situation is an important element of the project’s future plans. With a grant from the Cultural Protection Fund the EAMENA project will be undertaking training courses in Beirut, Tunis and Amman for local heritage professionals in the EAMENA methodology from seven countries: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. In addition, there will be touring exhibitions and workshops for the decision makers, officials and politicians in local, regional and national governments to raise awareness of the existence of the cultural heritage under threat. These workshops will also discuss the future protection of archaeological sites. This approach builds on the first two tiers of the four-tier approach (Stone 2013, 173) that argues for long-term awareness training (tier 1) and specific pre-deployment training (tier 2). Although these tiers are aimed at military involvement in particular, the relevance here is that each region, each country, will have its specific needs, from a conflict or non-conflict perspective, in terms of future training. Any training in protecting cultural property, at any point (pre- or post-conflict) can only be encouraged.
We may not be able to prevent destruction in the future, but we may be able to adapt the way sites are presented so they are seen to represent a borderless and common past rather than an interpretation of the past to promote either a disputed national identity or a specific ideology. Unless we understand the nature of our past and our collective human heritage, we run the risk of losing an untapped, invaluable resource. There are many who value the past at a number of levels, but it will never compete when the basics of human survival are at stake – food, water and shelter. Therefore, we do have to aim to prevent the loss of cultural heritage, and be prepared, anywhere in the world, as we do not know where the next conflict will be. Many archaeological sites have only ever been recorded from the air or from a satellite, and although this is no substitute for a more detailed survey, it is often all that exists. Therefore, using the information gained from these archaeological surveys is a crucial step in understanding the nature of the archaeological resource in any country and region. Without this information, the future preservation and presentation of archaeological sites and landscapes will be much harder.

Acknowledgements

The thoughts and words are my personal views and interpretations but the data has been gleaned as a result of teamwork, through the EAMENA project and the Aerial Archaeology in Jordan project. I am very grateful to all the members of the teams for their dedication and support.

Bibliography


9 A Post-Conflict Scenario in the Caucasus Region

A Documentation Drive to Assess Monumental Heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh

Alvaro Higueras

Introduction

Post-conflict contexts are extremely difficult for cultural heritage. Heritage managers must wait for a reasonable easing of the humanitarian situation; that is solutions for food, health, and shelter issues for displaced and affected populations must be enacted before cultural heritage can be addressed (Barakat 2007; Barakat et al. 2005; Calame and Pasic 2009; Teijgeler 2006). It would be unreasonable to see heritage projects prosper in the field when humanitarian emergencies are still present. This said, with a long-term perspective in place heritage projects focusing on searching archives or laboratory work might develop before, during, and after conflict scenarios (Higueras 2013). This would then allow a far more responsive, even proactive approach by heritage managers throughout and after conflict.

As conflict begins, develops or continues in a given region, a program of documentation and monitoring is an effective way to engage with heritage, be it focusing on trafficking, looting, purposeful destruction of monuments, or other impacts. The monitoring strategy in conflict situations should involve a swift documentation of the damage from a basic assessment of risk involved (Massue and Schvoerer n.d.; Stovel 1993), but it is a hard task to sell to any party involved while conflict rages. Furthermore, it is also extremely difficult to address heritage issues in a coherent manner when the more active warring part of the conflict is over, but two parties (or more) are still in military and political confrontation over the control of a region, with occasional skirmishes along the established frontlines and little effective dialogue to reach a peace agreement (Hopmann and Zartman 2010; Ziyadov 2010). In this type of situation aggression towards heritage persists despite calls for the parties in conflict to avoid purposeful or collateral damage to it (Kila and Zeidler 2013; Perring and Van der Linde 2009; Pyburn 2003). This was the scenario in which we planned an off-site heritage documentation drive in the now Armenian controlled Nagorno-Karabakh territory (hereafter NK; Figures 9.1 and 9.2).

The autonomous territory of NK (the land of the “mountainous black garden”) became part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan in 1921, and remained
so after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989. Shortly before the end of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in a conflict (1988–1994) that ended the coexistence of Azerbaijani and Armenian populations in both countries and in NK. As a result, NK’s minority Azerbaijani population was expelled, and the Armenian population in Azerbaijan was ejected, many back to NK itself. The territory of NK is currently under Armenian occupation which includes some additional Azerbaijani territory (Zürcher 2007). It is today referred to as Artsakh (“the gardens of Aran”) by the Armenian community. The economy of the region is mostly agricultural and pastoral. Despite the Armenian occupation, the Republic of Azerbaijan is today the legal sovereign government of the NK territory, as supported by various United Nations resolutions (UN 2008). Currently a state of war remains in the region, albeit in the line of contact (i.e. the temporary border between NK and Azerbaijan).

NK is an important region in the history of the Caucasus region, located at the crossroads of the defunct empires of Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire (now Turkey). The two ethnic groups of Armenians and Azerbaijanis coexisted peacefully over the last millennium in the region. The monumental heritage of NK reflects the presence of both since c. AD 400, most notably through the advent of Christianity, and then the emergence of Islamic polities around the southern Caspian Sea c. AD 900 (Forsyth 2015).

I present here the Nagorno-Karabakh Documentation Project (hereafter NKDP) as a case study to underline the powerful potential that a systematic heritage documentation program can have in the medium and long term in a context of armed conflict around that very heritage; indeed, this documentation is vital for heritage regeneration, as I will demonstrate. The NKDP was prepared as the joint effort of two heritage advocacy groups, Mədiİrsin...
Alvaro Higueras

Öyrənləşməsinə Kömək İctimai Birliyin (Social Group in Support of the Study of Cultural Heritage) (MIRAS) of Azerbaijan, and Youth in Conservation of Cultural Heritage (YOCOCU) of Italy, which I represent. The proposal was presented to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism for comments and support. Following our preparation of the final version of the project proposal, the Ministry added a series of political statements relating to the conflict which were at odds with the heritage-grounded spirit of the proposal. Such heavily politicized arguments in the proposal were noted and underlined by the potential sponsors, and it was hence not deemed suitable for international funding from one important heritage organization. Neither did the Azerbaijani government see fit to self-finance the initial phase of systematic documentation of NK’s heritage, despite their alterations to the draft proposal. Currently on stand-by, the NKDP remains the best (and only) option in the field of heritage management in Azerbaijan to address the issues facing the cultural heritage of NK.

The project set out to underline the needs of NK’s cultural heritage. Twenty years after the end of the main war there has been little serious evaluation of the condition or potential needs to preserve the future integrity of any areas of heritage. In this same period, events in NK have involved new migrations, changes in populations, and drastic changes in the state of heritage interests, particularly in disregarding monuments of ‘others’; heritage in NK is in a critical state. The NKDP aims to enhance the information available on the state

Figure 9.2 The Nagorno-Karabakh territory, with details of the borders status today and sites mentioned in the text. Armenia is joined to NK by occupying Azerbaijan’s territory that surrounds NK. Khankendi (Stepanakert in Armenian) is the capital of the temporary republic. (© Alvaro Higueras).
of heritage of the two main ethnic groups, Armenian and Azerbaijani, which made up more than 95 per cent of the population throughout the twentieth century, and is also committed to recording heritage resources of other minorities, such as Assyrian, Kurd, Greek, Jewish, Russian, and Ukrainian, for which little is currently known.

Pillars of Post-Conflict Strategies

I believe there are three key pillars to post-conflict heritage management. First, it is helpful to have a process of social reconciliation involving rebuilding social networks, as heritage lives within and between societies, and modern societies are often multiethnic, as was the case of NK where Armenians and Azerbaijanis and other minorities shared the land (Kopecek et al. 2016; Wolferstan 2007). Second, it is critical to have a register of the heritage, both tangible and intangible, that might have been damaged and is in need of reconstruction, restoration, consolidation, or conservation in different degrees. Ongoing documentation of this heritage during and after periods of conflict can be incredibly helpful, even vital, in this process. How such heritage is selected and what criteria are used to manage it is part of an ongoing heritage debate (Pendlebury 2009). Third, even before the end of the conflict it would be ideal to have in place a strong political will that would benefit heritage along with a good understanding of management strategies. If we wait for the end of the conflict to start addressing these issues, a great deal of time and heritage could be lost, more so where attacks have targeted heritage with the deliberate intention of striking blows to the psyche of locals and the heritage community (Cunliffe 2012). In Syria, as in many other conflict-affected regions, the use of more precise satellite imagery for monitoring damage to sites during conflict is highly recommended (Casana 2015; Casana and Panahipour 2014; Danti 2015) (see also Chapter 8, this volume). Documentation drives in peace time should be a priority at particular sites and regions deemed of great patrimonial value (Gibson 2003; Stone 2010).

Modeling management strategies in conflict scenarios has recently become a major field of interest, in the likes of humanitarian or even military intervention (see e.g. Chapters 3 and 6, this volume). Part of these involve the exploration of strategies by local experts for ‘first aid’ endeavours, which generally involve finding ways to pack and store collections and find safe havens for heritage away from the conflict area if possible (ICCRom 2011). However, the funds available for these kinds of endeavours amidst ongoing conflict are extremely limited and the very real dangers affecting people stewarding the collections make it a very difficult task.

The NKDP Project

The NKDP project started under unique and challenging conditions. NK is an integral part of the territory of Azerbaijan, but is not under its control. Despite the Azerbaijani population being a minority in NK throughout the
twentieth century and earlier, the territory has been an important source of traditions and culture for Azerbaijan, as is the case for the majority Armenian population. In planning a documentation project in NK, we are concerned about the impact of conflict which has lasted beyond the end of serious confrontations in 1994, and continues to have a major effect on the state of heritage, in great part rooted in population shifts. At present we cannot state – as is arguably highly likely considering the sole Armenian population of NK – that Armenian (Christian) heritage is in better shape than Azerbaijani (Muslim) heritage. Unfortunately, we have no knowledge so far of the heritage protection and reconstruction strategies currently pursued in post-conflict times by the local government with regard to either heritage, neither do we know the damage caused by military hardware on that heritage by (and of) both parties.

The existence of a basic register of architectural heritage resources and their state of conservation in a particular institution, region, or country is a critical resource in the task of managing cultural heritage and monitoring the decay of archaeological or historical monuments in cases of conflict or natural disaster. The core of the NKDP documentation drive is to record all archival, library, artefact, architectural, photographic, film, and literary information from the last two centuries to use in assessing the damage affecting heritage during the conflict in NK. The resulting database will be used to inform the reconstruction process of heritage in order to know exactly what and how heritage has been damaged in current conflicts and plan future strategies.

The long-term, future-oriented focus of the project is essential, yet this focus is difficult for the Azerbaijani authorities to grasp. We argue that while NK is still out of Azerbaijan’s control, the NKDP could start in advance to address the issues of heritage stock in the territory. The documentation phase would be followed by a phase of field research carrying out visual inspection of heritage in NK, and only later would the issues of reconstruction and restoration strategies be addressed.

The NKDP was conceived from the Azerbaijani side for several reasons. First, NK legally belongs to Azerbaijan and therefore this country should lead the management of NK’s heritage. However, while NK’s music and poetry is highly appreciated and sponsored by official circles in Azerbaijan, any stewardship for NK’s monumental heritage, in the shape of the NKDP, was seen as an unworthy interest for the government. Second, MIRAS and YOCOCU were developing partnered projects in Azerbaijan and the idea for the NKDP was conceived in one of our training meetings. Third, no matter where this documentation project was conceived, it needed official financial and political support. We tried the Azerbaijani government first, and have not yet asked the authorities in NK for support.

The proactive strategy of documentation of heritage for matters of master plans or long-term projects is a central issue for the heritage community (Thornes and Bold 1998). New “core data” standards have been set for the systematic recording of monuments and their features in the last few decades.
The strategy of documentation is more urgent when its role in the recording of heritage in the conflict region can have a crucial impact on the initial strategies of heritage reconstruction. Alternatively, as with the NKDP, the documentation strategy might start after conflict, when an assessment of the physical integrity of monuments and heritage affected by weaponry or vandalism is urgently needed. One more option, at least in the early stages of conflict, is the planning of strategies of “first aid” intervention, aiming at tasks to safeguard collections, archives, and ultimately monuments (Begić 1995; ICCROM 2011).

There are no cultural or natural sites from NK inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. The main historic city in NK, Shusha, was proposed for inclusion on the World Heritage Tentative List in 2001 by Azerbaijan, even though it had no physical access to the city and its surroundings at that time. Azerbaijan did not follow through with a more complete proposal due to lack of access to the site; the NKDP would resolve this issue of lack of details in the long term. With the NKDP documentation Azerbaijan would be in a position to submit NK for emergency status for its heritage at risk, and, as planned, Shusha for World Heritage UNESCO status (WHC 2001).

Indeed, Shusha was declared a historical and architectural reserve in Azerbaijan in 1977 during Soviet times. Hence the city received funds from the then government for the restoration of monuments. The current state of those reconstructions is unknown. The poetry, musical songs, and instruments of NK have national ‘protected’ status. Most of the holdings of the regional museum in Shusha were moved to the capital Baku before the war, thus preserving part of the portable heritage from destruction.

Finally, while Azerbaijan is interested in promoting the city of Shusha as the center of Azerbaijani culture in NK, the NKDP aims to have a broader focus. It is important to document the state of all heritage, be it archaeological, historical, or intangible, from all ethnic groups in NK. This would require Azerbaijani specialists not to undervalue and overlook the Armenian or other heritage in NK.

**Development of the NKDP**

The aim of NKDP was to submit a proposal for funding the documentation project to a non-profit Western heritage organization as a first step to present a new perspective on the heritage of the region. This external funding was expected to complement the local funding by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture and Tourism. We assumed that given the importance of NK’s folklore, which is celebrated in periodic festivals in Azerbaijan, a similar interest would be conveyed towards the material and monumental heritage of NK. Again, it seems that NK not being under Azerbaijan’s control is a deterrent to promoting such stewardship towards heritage.

We hoped for recognition of its conservation plight from international and local audiences. The strategy of this project is intended to help overcome the
inaction generated by solely political issues and direct our attention to heritage, the central concern of this project. In that light, this project presents a new scenario in the diverse world of cultural heritage management. The lack of preventive heritage strategies before and during the war meant that a wide array of cultural heritage in NK was destroyed. Because of this, the current project is founded on what we call an anticipatory pre-reconstruction preparedness strategy. The philosophy of this documentation project relies on the following four points:

1. The territory of NK will revert to control by Azerbaijan in the long term, as per United Nations resolutions; therefore, Azerbaijan might want to work on maintaining research and knowledge on this region.

2. Azerbaijan would assume a “virtual” ownership of the cultural heritage of NK. This means exerting stewardship without physical (or political) control of said heritage, addressing its fiduciary role in a virtual manner. There is already a strong public identity in Azerbaijan with NK; this project was expecting to entice the authorities to enhance the stewardship role in promoting and overseeing monumental cultural heritage in NK. The physical control of the monuments would be secondary for now.

3. To proceed with a professional and authentic reconstruction of war-ravaged monuments, the documentation for these monuments would be gathered in a database built on extensive archival resources. The concept of authenticity in monumental heritage was introduced in the 1990s to attempt to rein in the adoption of “standard procedures” in the realm of conservation and restoration. Rather, experts aimed at defining particular techniques and features relevant to the monuments of a given society (i.e. context specific) so they would be conserved following local parameters and therefore be “authentic” (Feilden and Jokilehto 1993). This is an important factor in the territory of the ex-Soviet Union as standard concrete-based procedures were applied extensively to monuments from the Baltic regions to Siberia, including NK.

One example of the utility of the database would be in the rebuilding of the destroyed minarets of the Govhar Agha Mosque in Shusha. The question is which style of minaret should be selected (Figure 9.3)? Should it be the one built in the seventeenth century, or the one standing in the eighteenth, or even the twentieth century (Figure 9.4)? A thorough analysis of the construction and renovation stages of the Govhar Agha Mosque, as recorded by the NKDP, is essential to justify the choice of any one of the styles, and even then, there will be political issues involved, no matter how subtly presented or argued. This database will be filled and managed by the team put in place to research the archives on existing information on the heritage of NK. The information in the database will then be queried and analyzed by the experts to define priorities in planning field surveys and defining the patterns of decay or destruction to heritage in NK.
Figure 9.3 The Govhar Agha Mosque in Shusha in 2014. (Photo: Marcin Konsek; Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0).

Figure 9.4 A procession in Shusha with the Govhar Agha Mosque in the background, in a historic rendition by H. Clerget published by Vasily Vereshchagin (1842–1904) in 1865.
When physical control by Azerbaijan is reinstated and/or accords established between the parties, the reconstruction of outstanding and endangered monuments, which may well represent the heritage of any of the groups in NK, would be prioritized thanks to the information gathered by the NKDP. A sense of neutrality amidst Muslim and Christian heritage would be safeguarded by the database, which would help to prioritize the work regardless of ethnic affiliation. The database, as it is planned, will provide us with diverse data on a set of parameters, from the state of the foundations to the quality of the visual historical information to the physical accessibility to the site, that will allow the specialists to take informed decisions on the future strategies in the field so as to target the monuments most in need. We foresee shortcomings in the information available on some monuments. If information is not found on a site or monument or the information is partial, we would need to wait for the phase of visual inspection and take the process from there. We will assume also that much of the archival information would be outdated, but the NKDP thrives on creating a file for each monument with a diachronic string of data so the evolution of the monuments could be assessed.

**Logistics and Phases of the NKDP**

The project was planned to be a long-term, joint effort of YOCOCU (Italian chapter) and MIRAS. Two of MIRAS’s aims are to assist in the development of scientific research in the study of cultural heritage and contribute to the restoration and conservation of historical monuments and movable objects in their original context. At this point no NK component was included, and in any case, the team to assess heritage in NK would have to be international. Access to NK is difficult for many: with no peace treaty in place, Azerbaijani nationals are not allowed to enter the territory of NK. On the other hand, international specialists visiting NK for the phase of inspection of the state of heritage would not then be able to enter Azerbaijan. This presents major logistical problems. Unless the Azerbaijani government concedes special dispensation for team members to travel to Baku to discuss their findings with the local team (after all this project would be in part financed by the government and sanctioned by it), meetings would have to be online, or work with the central database carried out remotely, or meetings would need to be in a convenient third-party country (e.g. Georgia).

The NKDP has four phases with specific and sequential tasks. The time frame is a long-term development, of at least one year for each of the first three phases. The four phases of the NKDP project are: (1) documentation and recording; (2) analysis and verification; (3) setting strategies and priorities; and (4) implementation of conservation strategies.

The first phase would concentrate on building the documentation database from archival information outside NK. The systematic scanning and ordering of photographs, drawings, and architectural plans would be essential for
understanding the physical evolution of monuments, past destruction events, former reconstruction phases, completed restoration campaigns, and other pertinent information. This information would be entered in the open source, heritage-oriented Arches database (GCI n.d.) to obtain a relational set of data with spatial-analysis handling capabilities. In this phase, we would expect to add other monuments and sites that may be in current informal lists held by heritage agencies. This phase would be led by Azerbaijani researchers who would begin with evidence in depositories in Azerbaijan and other ex-Soviet republics. For instance, heritage institutions in Moscow or Kiev should hold resources on the NK region, considering the centralized cultural system that existed and which was dominated by Russian institutions during the times of the USSR.

The second phase of the project would require the physical presence of team members in NK to conduct field verification and current assessment of the monuments, greatly enhancing the NKDP database. Given the logistical constraints noted earlier, we would have to work carefully in the diplomatic and political realms to arrange to have a team in NK. In terms of safety, while there is an ongoing conflict, skirmishes occur only at the line of contact but not in the interior of NK.

The scope of material heritage of NK comprises different types of sites, as expected in a large region, such as archaeological, historic, civic, military, residential, religious/sacred, technological (e.g. those linked to nineteenth-century silk production), and the potential for mixed cultural-natural heritage areas. The cultural heritage of NK is a rich combination of Christian churches, Muslim mosques, madrasas, elite houses, forts, and so forth reflecting the diverse historical political influences throughout many centuries and serving the existing populations of the territory in the twentieth century (Henze 1991; Matveeva 2002; Rowland 2008).

In this phase engaging with different social groups in NK is also of paramount importance: the will of the communities towards heritage reconstruction and preservation is ultimately far more powerful than the dictates of international organizations or governments. The establishment of a sense of stewardship is therefore an important factor in our process (Gamaghelyan 2010; Higueras 2014). In addition, in this phase the survey will identify local specialists in traditional stone carving, wall building, and woodworking, lime production, and brick-making techniques. Similarly, we will seek to locate historical sources for fine stone, wood, calcareous stone, sand and gravel, or the set of components of traditional mortar or bricks which will enhance the authenticity of the conserved or reconstructed monument.

The third phase, built on the first two phases, will allow us to prioritize the regional conservation strategies to be implemented in the final phase. This implies the analysis and comparison of archival and field data, examination of specific cases, updating the maps and lists of the heritage resources in the region, and, ultimately, defining a sequence of interventions based on the needs and emergency levels for the monuments in the database. These priorities should be
defined in combination with the social needs manifested by the communities of the region, recorded in the previous phase.

Finally, the fourth phase is the implementation of reconstruction, restoration, and conservation strategies which would fulfill the long-term aim of this project. We foresee a reconstruction process achieved through a joint effort from international specialists coordinated by MIRAS, including highly specialized Turkish experts regarding Ottoman-affiliated heritage (among others), and involving members of YOCOCU who specialize in preservation and reconstruction of murals.

**Involvement of Stakeholders and Community Engagement**

We are aware of a broad base of stakeholders who aim to keep the heritage of NK alive and support strategies that would help preserve it in the future. These stakeholder groups include the displaced community of NK, now living in different parts of Azerbaijan (and keeping, for political purposes, the status of Internally Displaced Populations [IDP]), the national community of Azerbaijan, the current (completely Armenian) population of NK, and members of the international community. In future phases of the project, the team plans to explore establishing ties or negotiations between refugee and diaspora communities concerned with the integrity of their cultural heritage, whether they live in NK or elsewhere.

The role of MIRAS as a steward of Azerbaijani heritage, and in this case the heritage of NK, is central to ensuring a neutral approach to the documentation of all cultural resources with no distinction based on factors such as ethnicity, faith, or period of construction. Some of the objects removed from the Shusha museum prior to the war are displayed, albeit with little in the way of explanation, in the Carpet Museum in Baku, and other objects could also be displayed in existing cultural centers in Azerbaijan. Being able to show the material heritage of NK is an important step in demonstrating the potential of heritage as a means of celebrating diversity, rather than focusing on the damage of the past.

**Analysis of Challenges**

The most critical challenge to any conservation program in NK is the lack of a master plan founded on a comprehensive, up to date, diachronic database of cultural heritage resources. The plan of the NKDP is precisely to create the database upon which updated field information on the state of conservation of heritage would be gathered. Challenges to the project include difficulties of physical access leading to delays of unknown length before being able to carry out the detailed visual inspection of NK’s heritage. We also suspect that there will be cases of incoherence in the correlation between the data from Phase 1 – the archival phase, and Phase 2 – the survey phase, due to the length of time that has elapsed since the war and the likely blanks in the archival material. Added to this, continuous decay and slow destruction of
portable and monumental heritage is inevitable, although this is worsened in scenarios when architectural elements may be lost and not collected for future restoration work.

We are also aware of a number of potential threats to the project whereby politics may take over and force us towards unwanted directions, or there may be political hostility towards cultural heritage aims. There may also be the adoption of an extreme political view, which might even be expressed as a total lack of concern with the cultural heritage of the region until NK is returned to Azerbaijan’s control. It is also possible that there could be some retaliation by the current local population, especially if there are vocal political views which favour particular groups over others, and this may lead to difficulty in accessing the monuments in the field, let alone conducting conservation work.

Final Arguments: A Future Management Plan

The members of NKDP think the concept of “virtual” ownership for Azerbaijan is core to the project, as it transcends the lack of physical control over NK at the current time. This special, unorthodox ownership status over NK’s cultural resources draws on the deep interest, commitment, and identification with the region and its traditions existing in Azerbaijan. A concerted effort would be needed to achieve the aim of a thoughtful, long-lasting, and authentic reconstruction and conservation program for the cultural heritage of NK. It is an opportunity to prepare a targeted, well-integrated project founded on strong documentation in advance of the return of NK to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. The NKDP team is not intended to ever be the sole steward in this project, and so will explicitly reach out to a range of interested parties and stakeholders to disseminate the arguments that lie behind our aims to record, conserve, and present the heritage of NK. It is an opportunity to probe creative ways of building bridges between politically opposed groups for the benefit of cultural heritage of a region where Azerbaijani and Armenian communities have vested interests in keeping traditions, arts, and architectural styles alive. Therefore, a strong sense of stewardship would be nurtured in the diasporic populations while also attempting to reach the local populations currently inhabiting NK (Paul 2000). This is an opportunity to rectify years of neglect and lack of direction in the heritage of NK.

A master plan for the management of NK’s cultural heritage is yet to be achieved. While there is a lack of concrete, detailed, and accurate information on the physical integrity of monuments in NK, no one is able to decide, prioritize, and channel resources within an appropriate wider strategy. We wish to avoid the sort of hypothetical scenario where the Govhar Agha Mosque of Shusha, without doubt an extraordinary monument, is automatically selected for conservation and restoration, thus making it the perceived focus for heritage, identity, and belonging, despite other cases being as potentially important and requiring just as much (if not more) attention. The project aims to have the management strategy in place after completion of phases 1 to 3.
Putting in place the information and knowledge needed to assess the state of heritage sites ahead of reconstruction programs is not a straightforward initiative in NK. The politics of international territorial disputes may stand to be more important than the future of heritage issues. I understand that it is ambitious for the Azerbaijan heritage community to invest in the documentation of a territory not under their current control. However, in daily life and in the government’s discourse, the intangible and tangible heritage of NK is at the core of the national psyche. In addition, in the field of cultural heritage in post-war societies, the timeframe for settlement, reconciliation, and then agreeing on the reconstruction of heritage is extremely variable; distinct societies have come to terms with coexistence even in post-war scenarios, as is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Higueras 2013; The Guardian 2016).

The current version of the project has striven to retain neutrality in political issues and overcome any overt political biases that may affect cultural heritage integrity. The representation and preservation of the heritage of all groups who have lived in NK in both the past and present is the ultimate objective of the reconstruction process in the long term, a plan firmly grounded in the awareness of the importance of the integrity of cultural heritage as a reflection of the historical evolution of the region.

We believe this would be a groundbreaking program in the field of cultural heritage management. This project is similar to many others in that it aims to prepare a detailed and accurate documentation of the resources of a city, site, or region, and this is necessary preparatory work for a thoughtful and successful reconstruction strategy. But unlike others, it presents a scenario which aims to overcome the political issues involved in the contestation regarding the sovereignty of NK while attempting to create a neutral umbrella for the conservation of cultural heritage. Given the political situation of the territory of NK, legally in the confines of Azerbaijan but not under its control, the scenario of Azerbaijan engaging in the stewardship of NK’s cultural heritage alongside the current population of the territory, is an odd, but original and far-reaching choice.

In light of the long, delicate, ethnic history of NK, the ongoing conflict and recent clashes, the population relocation in the exodus from the territory, and the current animosity between its traditional populations, Armenian and Azerbaijani alike, we are aware of the difficulty of this research in years to come in anticipation of its ultimate aim of heritage reconstruction work. We feel it would be a flaw in the spirit of the NKDP to underestimate the difficulties of reaching the long-term objectives of preserving and even reconstructing the most relevant cultural heritage in the territory. Therein lies the challenge to this project: assuming a responsible stewardship position towards heritage with a well-founded master plan while expecting to have earned the credentials to redress the integrity of NK’s cultural heritage.

Finally, as the reader is probably thinking, what is the future of such a project as a private endeavour by YOCOCU? We have clearly stated that this project was started in Azerbaijan, in cooperation with an Azerbaijani heritage
organization, and we were applying for Azerbaijani official support, which included financial backing. This was a circumstantial situation certainly aided by the fact that NK belongs legally to Azerbaijan. But we need to keep the focus on the monumental cultural heritage of NK and its documentation as our main goal. We have to change the means to achieve the project given that the status of the NKDP in Azerbaijan has not progressed and it is time to address the project from another angle. While the principles and strategies of the strictly heritage-oriented work of the NKDP project will remain the same, we will initiate conversations with the NK authorities to have their input on the project; this will be no easy task, because the project was conceived, but is not defined and certainly not really started, by conversations in Azerbaijan. We are hopeful that the heritage authorities in NK might better grasp the opportunities the documentation of the monumental heritage in their territory holds for the future of the region’s heritage.

Bibliography


Maximising Information from Conflict-Damaged Sites
A Case Study from Lebanon

Paul Newson and Ruth Young

Introduction

The modern country of Lebanon is rich with archaeological and heritage potential. It is also a country in which this potential has barely been tapped, in part a consequence of the multiple conflict episodes that have afflicted the region since its inception as an entity in the modern era. These conflicts have been the result of a large number of factors, including Lebanon’s location in the world, its geography and its earlier history. All of these have combined to influence the complex social makeup within the borders of the country carved out by the French in 1920, and have contributed greatly to the conflicts which have occurred since then. Much of modern Lebanon, as it exists today, was a region with a specific character within the larger country of Syria. The French took advantage of this arguable distinctiveness and created an opportunity to formalise Lebanon as a separate country. This was done in an attempt to favour, protect, and effectively control this region of the Near East in which Christians, with a long history of connection to France, were in the majority. Lebanon gained independence from France in 1943, and with what had already been a complex history for the new country, continued to be a nation at the centre of various geo-political tensions.

In recent times, the key issue impacting on Lebanon has been the series of conflicts from 1975 until 1990, which together form the Lebanese Civil War. However, there have been other conflict situations that have periodically affected Lebanon and had the capacity to damage cultural heritage and archaeology. Among them has been the short July war of 2006, and since 2012 episodes of border fighting linked to the ongoing civil war in Syria. With this unwelcome set of circumstances, Lebanon provides an interesting set of case studies in dealing with post-conflict-affected cultural heritage and archaeology. Perhaps the best-known example of these is the post-war reconstruction of downtown Beirut with its associated programmes of rescue archaeology and the ongoing debates over culture heritage and management. The project to rebuild Beirut and the resulting political and economic arguments over the extent to which the central district should be redeveloped has been well-documented over the last twenty years. Some debates
were documented while the major work was under way (e.g. Makdisi 1997; Naccache 1998; Rowe and Sarkis 1998; Seeden 2000); and many articles continue to discuss these issues (e.g. Curvers and Stuart 2016; Perring 2009; Sandes 2010, 2013; Seif 2009). Through these discussions, the contested central district of Beirut has provided rich evidence for the approaches and problems in managing the archaeological and cultural heritage resources of a rich and complex ancient urban site within a post-conflict scenario.

But Lebanon is not just Beirut, and beyond the city many sites of cultural importance have been damaged over the years as a result of conflict. While much attention has been lavished on key cultural sites of historic or archaeological importance, especially those designated as World Heritage sites, very little effort has been expended on the myriad of rural sites and standing buildings. These sites are important both to the local community and the wider region as symbols of the history of place and people, and as elements of identity. Monitoring, assessing, and investigating such sites has taken a back seat to work on major and urban sites. Many of these small, rural sites have suffered damage from conflict (both looting and deliberate damage to structures), a lack of planning regulations leading to encroachment, and the impact of vast numbers of displaced people being forced to settle in Lebanon. As a result, many sites have been summarily dismissed as too damaged to warrant further investigation or investment. There has been no attempt to create links between rural sites and local communities, meaning that there is little official recognition of their role in the creation of a sense of place and belonging, which is critical for stable social groups.

However, recent work at the Graeco-Roman temple and village site of Hosn Niha, located in the Central Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, by an archaeological team from Lebanon and the UK, has shown that with the right methods and questions, it is possible to obtain a great deal of original and important information from sites that have suffered badly through conflict (Newson and Young 2011, 2015; Figure 10.1). Hosn Niha, along with many other sites in Lebanon, sustained severe damage during the decades of civil war and the associated unruliness and accelerated looting that accompanied it. Sites which have been badly damaged by various causes may be disregarded by professionals who consider their archaeological or heritage potential has been too badly affected to warrant any investigation. Instead, as demonstrated by the Hosn Niha project, we argue that an entirely different approach should prevail: archaeologists should view conflict-damaged sites as opportunities to gain information and explore sites and regions with new agendas. The results from Hosn Niha are shedding new light on understandings of the relationship between temples and surrounding villages in this region, as well as the structure of the Roman colony of Berytus (modern Beirut) and its hinterland. There is a further, related issue of vital importance here, and that is the potential of archaeological sites as foci of belonging and identity, and thus as elements in the construction of stable and secure post-conflict societies.
Figure 10.1 Modern Lebanon showing the position of Hosn Niha within the Bekaa valley, and sites mentioned in the text. (Paul Newson).

Historical Context

Although Lebanon dutifully signed up to major international agreements, including The Hague Convention and The Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property (both 1954), historical events have ensured their inoperability. This is also the case for other local laws of recent times, such as N37, Law of Cultural Property 2008 (Savage and Rempel n.d.; UNESCO n.d.). In 1933 the Lebanese Law on Antiquities was passed which established the Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) as the body
responsible for overseeing archaeological activity, including the protection of archaeological and cultural heritage sites (Sader 2013).

With the establishment of modern Lebanon in 1920, the French mandate authorities were faced with the task of differentiating this new entity from its regional environment, part of which involved the creation of a national identity. Archaeology played its part with the extensive excavations at Byblos to reveal physical remains from which associations could be made and justified between the ancient Phoenicians (inventors of an alphabet system of writing, among other noteworthy achievements), and the region’s majority Christian population (Seif 2009, 283). In the two decades immediately after the Second World War, further use of archaeology was made to encourage tourism and forge a distinct national identity with wider appeal to the seventeen or more different religious-centred cultural communities which composed the newly independent country. Under the leadership of the Emir Chéhab, the DGA played a role in this process by developing a programme of excavations and obtaining ownership of sites of significant cultural importance.

Key to this strategy was the set of well-preserved Graeco-Roman temple sanctuaries scattered throughout much of the country, but particularly concentrated on the slopes of Mount Lebanon (Aliquot 2009). Prominent among these sanctuaries were the monumental ruins of Baalbek, which among other culturally symbolic promotions were reproduced on banknotes and formed the backdrop to a yearly internationally aimed cultural festival (Tohme 1998). The smaller temples on the mountain slopes were celebrated as isolated sentinels of ancient civilisation framed by the picturesque natural beauty of the mountains. Nowhere else could such a combination be explored and appreciated, and this nurtured new identity helped underpin the glamorous image of Lebanon as the 1960s ‘Switzerland of the Levant’ (Kassir 2010, 9–13).

The intermittent crises of this post-war period descended into a full-scale civil war in the 1970s which destroyed the nascent national identity as much as it destroyed or damaged the country’s irreplaceable cultural heritage. The importance of Lebanon as an archaeological resource ensured the damage to cultural and archaeological sites received extensive coverage. As government authority weakened and chaos reigned, widespread looting and destruction of archaeological sites became commonplace. Tombs and other burials were targeted for treasure; thousands of tons of stolen artefacts were exported, and artefacts from the National Museum and the Archaeological Museum of the American University of Beirut (AUB) were also taken (Fisk 1991, 243; Seif 2015). Many archaeological sites and stores across the country, for example at Byblos and Tyre, were affected (see Savage and Rempel n.d.). However, different accounts from different sources show how difficult it is to offer assessments of damage to archaeological and heritage sites during conflict. During the 2006 war, National Geographic celebrated Baalbek and Tyre escaping damage (Milstein 2006), while an ICOM report claimed that both Baalbek and Tyre, as well as Byblos, had been damaged during the conflict (cited by Tahan 2006, 107). The aims and
biases of different observers are also important, and need to be taken into account when analysing supposed eye-witness testimony.

Site Rehabilitation/Resurrection

As a result of the turbulence of the civil war years, and because of the concentration on specific monumental sites generally for the purposes of nation-building and tourism, very little is known about the wider Bekaa Valley archaeologically. Notable among the monument-based activity has been the long excavation campaigns of three spectacular sites on the Bekaa Plain: the large multi-period tell site of Kamid el-Loz (Hachmann 1989; Heinz 2016a, 2016b); the Roman temple sanctuaries at Baalbek (Sader and Scheffler 1998); and the Umayyad period city of Anjar (Hillenbrand 1999; Walmsley 2007, 92–4). Beyond these a number of sporadic excavations have been completed when the opportunity has arisen, and a handful of archaeological surveys have been attempted (Newson 2016). The only major multi-period survey of multi-period sites so far undertaken was completed just before the outbreak of the civil war in the 1970s (Marfoe 1978, 1995, 1998). As a result, relatively little is known about settlement development and history of this archaeologically very rich, and historically very important area, outside a few key sites.

One important question related to the settlement of the Bekaa is the appearance of monumental stone temples on the mountain slopes lining the flanks of the valley. The substantial remains of a number of these temples, built in the Roman period, survive and consequently have received much academic attention (Aliquot 2009; Krencker and Zschietschmann 1938; Nordiguian 2005; Yasmine 2005, 2006, 2009, 2013). The temple sanctuary complex at Hosn Niha has one of these monumental temples, generally thought to have been constructed in the second century CE (Figure 10.2). Below the sanctuary and intimately related to it is the site of an abandoned village settlement. Such villages should be the focus of research, particularly with the advent of social archaeology and a concern with quotidian matters, rather than privileging elites and the monumental. While a great deal is known about the temples, little is known about the people who built or used them.

The area of the village settlement had been purchased by the DGA of Lebanon in the period after the end of the Second World War, but before the civil war; in the same period that the temple sanctuary further down the Niha Valley, in the village of Niha (see Figure 10.1) was being excavated and reconstructed. What the DGA did not have was an accurate record of the structural remains relating to the settlement site. As part of a major study of the temple sanctuary undertaken at the beginning of this century, some exploratory work was carried out on the village site and identified remaining evidence for different types of structure (Yasmine 2006). This work had also served to highlight the considerable evidence for destruction of the archaeological remains. A high proportion of this destruction could be directly linked to the time of the civil war, during which the site had been occupied at
Maximising Information from Conflict Sites

various times by different organisations connected to the civil war. Further, the whole region was periodically without security or governance, in effect a lawless state. This lack of central control and law enforcement was particularly acute during the later period of the civil war in the 1980s, when “treasure hunters equipped with bulldozers came to excavate the village” whose actions “disturbed irreversibly a good amount of evidence” (Yasmine 2006, 14). We also understood from a study of the literature on the temple sanctuary that incidents of looting may also have occurred prior to the civil war. Certainly, Krencker and Zschietzschmann, who had made the first very detailed studies of the temple sanctuary at the start of the twentieth century, described the village ruins as providing “a picture of complete ransacking, there is hardly a stone present which would provide a clue to an interpretation of the debris” (1938, 122). Unfortunately, it is impossible to evaluate from this statement the extent to which this “ransacking” was due to systematic looting or just collapse and decay of the village over time.

However, our initial site visits in 2008 revealed large piles of rubble, some up to around three metres high, which were the result of quite recent earth-moving activities indicating large areas of the settlement below the village had suffered substantial damage, if not outright destruction (Figure 10.3). This devastation had persuaded other archaeologists that useful information could not be collected from the village site, and it had been archaeologically largely ignored for decades. We were then faced with the question of whether to continue...
to ignore heavily disturbed and looted, war-damaged sites, such as Hosn Niha, or to actively engage with them as post-conflict sites. If we decided on the latter course of action, we then had to think about the form this engagement would take. By thinking of the site both as a Graeco-Roman-Byzantine entity, and as a site damaged by conflict, we aimed to obtain information about the settlement history from the remaining archaeology. In taking into account the war damage, this in turn provided different archaeological opportunities, and an acknowledgement that these conflicts were now part of the history of the site itself. In this endeavour, the first critical step was to ascertain the extent of damage to the site and also to map the nature and effect of other actions on the site post-war, such as the ever-encroaching agricultural development. Not only is this important for understanding the site itself but it is also information that the DGA can use in planning and attempting to protect and manage sites.

The main research question driving our work at Hosn Niha was to contextualise the construction of the temple sanctuary within the development of the settlement, and consequently obtain a better understanding of the relationship between the temple and the society that built and used it. It was therefore vital to take a specific methodological approach which would allow us to obtain information from areas which had been damaged and to simultaneously map
the damaged areas. We decided to begin with a survey using standard methodologies based on surface survey and pottery counting/collection, in order to determine whether it was indeed possible to learn about the nature and morphology of the settlement, and attempt to delineate different patterns of use across the site. The site was therefore divided into 50m length sections so the surface sherd information, gathered from both counted and collected sherds, could be spatially geo-referenced with a degree of accuracy and consistency across the whole site (Newson and Young 2015, 455–8).

Recording surface pottery also allowed us to plot the extent of the site based on levels of density, and of course permitted the construction of a working chronology for the site based on diagnostic sherds. In addition to this, we also identified a range of surface features and structures across the site, such as exposed wall fragments, stone door lintels, and rock-cut tombs around the site periphery. These structural features were also mapped using a rover and base station GPS system (Newson and Young 2011, 2015: Figures 10.4 and 10.5). At the same time careful observance, categorisation, and mapping of the damaged areas added an extra layer of data which could be used to mitigate the results from the more standard fieldwork assessment. That is, the damage map allowed us to factor in any bias the destruction might have produced in our interpretations of the evidence.

*Figure 10.4* Recording an extant section of wall (on structure HN003) using a GPS rover. (Photo: Paul Newson).
Integral to this methodological approach has been the construction of a data-rich GIS (Geographic Information System) environment in which initial research analyses could be generated, future research areas identified, and potential CRM (Culture Resource Management) needs formulated (Newson and Young 2011, 2015; Figure 10.6). The detailed mapping of the extent and degree of site damage has greatly assisted in shaping what further questions we might address in our research, where to focus our work, and the methods to use, as well as allowing us and the DGA to monitor any future site damage. In this way, four basic classes of damage were identified and mapped: bulldozing, clandestine excavations, older agricultural land expansion (i.e. pre 2005), and recent agricultural land expansion (i.e. post 2005). Evidence for each of these four types of destruction was plainly distinguishable: bulldozed areas were characterised by deep trenches surrounded by steep sided banks of rubble up to three metres in height, interspersed with large levelled banks; clandestine excavations by pits with spoil heaps; agricultural land was ploughed and planted with well-established vine and tree crops, or recently cleared land (post 2005 clearance could be defined by fresh-looking stone piles at the field edges and young crops). During fieldwork the spatial extent of these classes were mapped using plans and supplemented by GPS measurements of specific features which was then fed into the site GIS. One immediate result from the mapping exercise was the revelation that the majority of the displaced material from the heavy bulldozing had not been

Figure 10.5 Simplified map of the key features recorded using the GPS base and rover system. (Paul Newson).
moved very far, usually left very close to the destroyed structure or area, and certainly less than 50m when moved further away.

The results of the fieldwork so far have given us a wealth of important information and avenues to be pursued in future (see Newson 2016; Newson and Young 2011). It is now abundantly clear that the large temple sanctuary dominating the village was not an isolated feature which attracted a later settlement, but was one which grew in stature and size over time as the village developed and matured. The fortunes of the temple sanctuary were intricately linked to those of the village: when the village withered in size during the late Byzantine and into the early Islamic period, so too did the sanctuary, as first the temple was abandoned and then replaced by a small Christian basilica which also eventually fell into decay (Yasmine 2009). The foundation of the village settlement is now dated to the end of the first century BCE and the early first century CE, and for the first time it is possible to give date estimates for the life of the village based on the analyses of material culture closely linked to individual areas and structures. This foundation date is broadly in keeping with the establishment of the Roman colony of Berytus, which is also the period when Roman veteran soldiers were settled in the Bekaa Valley. While there is no direct evidence yet to suggest that some of these veterans were settled at Hons Niha, the foundation date does reveal that the creation of the colony had a profound effect on settlement as a whole within the Bekaa Valley region.

Figure 10.6 GIS generated map showing density of surface sherds and main areas of disturbance to the settlement from recent activities. (Paul Newson).
The spatial distribution of the pottery assemblage has also allowed us to determine the maximum size of the settlement (6 hectares), and the combination of the density maps of surface sherds and the targeting of this region by the bulldozers has revealed that the village core was located near the south bank of the intermittent stream of the Nahr Niha. The GIS mapping of the inhabited area has given us an approximate idea of how much of the total ancient settlement has been affected by modern activity, be it bulldozing or agricultural development (Figure 10.6). Around 34 per cent of the presumed settled area has been bulldozed, much of this at the centre of the village. A further c.15 per cent has been disturbed by agricultural development and c.5 per cent by the building of roads and tracks across the site. In total, around 54 per cent of the inhabited area of the village has been damaged by recent activity, the majority of it as a consequence of conflict-related activities. Although the core area of the village (apart from the sanctuary) has been severely damaged, our intensive fieldwork approach has demonstrated that 46 per cent of the potential inhabited region has not been seriously affected, apart from occasional episodes of opportune looting within small pits (Newson and Young 2015, 461).

In our most recent field season we trialled a series of small sondages in different areas of varying estimated disturbance in order to assess the extent to which there is undisturbed archaeological stratigraphy beneath the surface. The results have been very promising, with an in situ large storage jar (a pithos), uncovered in a sondage within one structure that had been badly damaged by bulldozing, and undisturbed layers of a collapsed house wall with pottery of the Medieval Islamic period being found in another badly damaged structure. This suggests that although there is clearly considerable damage to a lot of the site, particularly the core village structures, it is still possible to obtain useful information from undisturbed archaeological layers by looking beyond the extensive damage.

**Hosn Niha as a Post-Conflict Site: The Ongoing Dialogue**

As our archaeological knowledge of Hosn Niha continues to expand and change through ongoing fieldwork and analyses of the material and information recovered and recorded, the battle for the site’s continued existence is also facing new threats and challenges. Currently, the site is under pressure from a variety of external influences, both local and regional. As a small site in one of the less populated regions of Lebanon, it is not a priority for protection in the way major sites such as Baalbek, Byblos, and Tyre are, and this inevitably affects how it is curated and presented. Perhaps the biggest factor impacting Hosn Niha’s security and care is its continued vulnerability to casual and systematic damage, and its isolated context increases the sense of it being exposed to further damage.

In terms of its position within both the physical landscape and within modern settlement, the site of Hosn Niha is difficult to monitor continuously, and this is due to a number of specific geographic conditions. The head of the
narrow valley of the Nahr (River) Niha is crossed by the line of a scarp valley running parallel to the main plain of the Bekaa and has thus created a small high level triangular vale of open fields which cover around 75 hectares. These fields are surrounded on all three sides by steep hill slopes, and at the south-western corner of this triangle, at an altitude of 1,310 to 1,360m above sea level, is the site of the Graeco-Roman settlement and temple sanctuary of Hosn Niha. The site and its vale appear to be very isolated, surrounded by the steep hills and hidden away from the nearest permanent settlement of the village of Niha two kilometres downstream, and the populated plain of the Bekaa beyond. There is one road up to the site which follows the line of the Niha Valley past the village of Niha. In the last five years, this road beyond the village of Niha has been upgraded from a rough track to an all-weather tarmac road surface.

The building of the road was intended to allow easy access to the vale for farmers who live in the village of Niha and to the temple site for tourists. It has also provided new opportunities for locals from the Bekaa as a whole to find a quiet shady spot in which to have family picnics away from the bustle of the plain below. Running the length of the scarp valley which intersects the Niha Valley is a network of tracks. These tracks continue for many kilometres away from population centres and allow access to the site unobserved by any local villager in Niha. Except during the months in winter when it is covered in snow, the archaeological site is accessible at all times. The building of the

Figure 10.7 A recent attempt at looting (2015): in this instance the looters were caught in the act by the site guards employed by the DGA. (Photo: Ruth Young).
road has ironically also helped to emphasise how vulnerable Hosn Niha is to the continued threat of illegal digging in the tombs, houses, and temples of the site by looters (Figure 10.7).

The Bekaa Valley is intricately linked to the ongoing civil war in Syria. This is in part due to the physical closeness of Syria, whose mountainous border region forms the eastern boundary of the Bekaa Valley. Syria’s proximity is underlined by being within view of the Niha Valley and indeed on occasion the sounds of the Syrian civil war were heard within the village of Niha itself. The people who live within the Bekaa Valley form, on many different levels, the other connection to the civil war in Syria. The Bekaa is a patchwork of different communities with a complex mix of cultural backgrounds, socio-economic practices, religious beliefs, and political loyalties arranged in a variety of social structures including tribal and clan affiliations. This has resulted in differences in the geographical spread of these communities from tight-knit villages with a largely homogeneous outlook, to large heterogeneous towns, and also in some defined cultural groups being located in just one place in contrast to others scattered throughout the valley and beyond. The modern boundary between Syria and Lebanon arbitrarily cuts across this older patchwork in many places, which has resulted in the further fragmentation of loyalties and a sense of place and belonging within the Bekaa Valley. The presence of substantial numbers of refugees from many parts of war-torn Syria distributed in makeshift camps all around the valley have had a major role in increasing tensions in the Bekaa. The stresses on the government caused by these different loyalties have resulted in a careful enforcement of the law so as not to aggravate an already complex situation, although at times there have been clashes and violence (NaharNet 2013; Reuters 2016). Government resources are very stretched, and with so many other priorities to take account of and urgent issues to consider, it is understandable that a site, one of a myriad of archaeological sites within Lebanon and one already perceived as damaged irrevocably by conflict, may not receive the total protection it deserves.

**Historical Ambivalence**

The challenges to archaeology and heritage in Lebanon run deep and are ongoing, as confirmed by reviewing some of the key archaeology and heritage-focused literature that has been published during and after the civil war. For example, Helga Seeden writing in the 1990s drew attention to a number of issues that were having an adverse effect on the preservation of archaeological sites and looting of cultural heritage at the time (1994a, 1994b). Seeden stated these issues resulted from “intermittent warfare, increasing fragmentation of communities, prolonged economic and cultural deprivation, and declining educational facilities” (1994a, 95), and all of these factors had combined to instil within the population at large the notion of archaeology as an exercise in treasure hunting. As an example of this exercise, Seeden described the bulldozing of the important Bronze Age layers at the tell site of Kamid el-Loz in
the Bekaa (Seeden 1989). This systematic bulldozing occurred following the Israeli invasion of 1982 and its related collapse of government control. The looters had been made aware of the site and were attracted to it because of the widespread local press publicity that highlighted a small gold necklace and other objects connected with the tomb of a young girl that had been excavated by a foreign team (Seeden 1994a, 97). At the time Seeden and others suggested the best way to lessen the looting and the general disregard for archaeological sites was to develop “active museum and site protection programmes, coupled with public information campaigns”, while simultaneously the media were to be encouraged “to create local awareness of the cultural value of the past and help to meet the popular demand for information” caused by sensationalist publicity of spectacular finds (or those perceived as having a high monetary value) (Seeden 1994a, 107).

Another more recent Lebanese example of the intersection of conflict, archaeology, and cultural heritage, demonstrates the complexities of the regional political situation and its inherent dangers, and to some extent partly explains the continued disengagement of the local population. In 2007 the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared situated on the coast of North Lebanon developed as a haven for Islamists of the Fatah el-Islam group who subsequently came into violent conflict with the Lebanese army. After four months of bombardment the camp was completely destroyed, and the following operation to clear the rubble revealed significant archaeological evidence for the ‘missing’ Roman town of Orthosia (Farchakh Bajjaly 2011, 186). This well-preserved evidence presented a unique opportunity to gain essential knowledge of this important but little-known region of Lebanon, though at the same time it presented a severe test of political priorities for the government.

The displaced Palestinian refugees, understandably angry and aggrieved, rightly demanded restoration of their homes. A group of concerned archaeologists and politicians tried to challenge in the courts the ministerial decree to rebuild the camp instead of a plan to build new homes on an adjacent green field site, which would have allowed preservation and exploration of the archaeology. As noted by Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly “For the first time since the end of the civil war the notion of heritage protection was raised” (2011, 187). However, a decisive political and media campaign reframed the argument to one of “the precedence that shards of pottery take over human rights” and eventually, because of political expediency, the remains were subsumed under a thick concrete foundation for future generations to discover and the refugee camp was rebuilt (Farchakh Bajjaly 2011, 187–9).

These two examples reveal the continuing political tensions and point to the prevailing ambivalence of many people in Lebanon towards archaeological heritage. Cultural heritage continues to be, for many people, a lower priority than the many issues linked to refugees and housing for example. The different communities remain essentially separated, and for most, their identities are not linked to the distant past, so there is a general dislocation from history and place. This is perhaps not surprising in a country whose warring communities are still
not reconciled to the events of the recent civil war, and in whose schools the teaching of Modern History as a subject can be problematic.

**Future Needs**

While the usefulness and importance of the site at Hosn Niha has been proved through our recent archaeological work, in such a difficult and volatile context it is essential to ensure that this will remain the case in the future, not just for this particular site, but for the numerous other small sites of archaeological importance in Lebanon. The key to the sustainable preservation of Hosn Niha and other sites is the establishment of a locally centred management programme in which not only archaeologists and government can play their part, but that all the local community can feel like they have a crucial stake in the continued preservation of sites. This should not be achieved via top-down dictation of actions, neither should it necessarily conform to European ideals of what cultural heritage should be. Considerable work has challenged the validity of concepts such as ‘world heritage’ (e.g. Smith 2006) and shown that in the Middle East and South Asia local approaches to archaeology and heritage are as, or more important than, Eurocentric models (Ali *et al.* 2013; Bhatti 2012; Exell 2016; Exell and Rico 2014).

In recent work on the treatment of the cultural heritage of Beirut, Caroline Sandes identified five motives for the conservation of different sites: academic; commemorative; active public interest; political; and as an attraction, for various activities such as public gardens (2010, 100). Each of these motives has an attached set of values. For example, a site conserved for political reasons may have a set of values which relate to identity formation or the continuation of an identity; a site treasured for academic reasons may have values related to historical development or education purposes and so forth (Sandes 2010, 100–1).

The key therefore to maintain the continued preservation of sites such as Hosn Niha is to attach particular values to the site that benefit the local community – and these values should be initiated by the community and then negotiated and agreed with other stakeholders. At present, although the temple sanctuaries are seen as being of huge value because of their high level of preservation, as attractions to clamber over and explore, and to some, even as a symbol of Lebanon as an ancient civilisation with links to Europe, the village site has limited value because it has been seemingly destroyed and is now really of value only as a potential site for looting.

As has long been suggested, education is one avenue through which values can be nurtured and through these, the long-term preservation of an archaeological site can be maintained (Seeden 1994a: 104–7). And indeed the Hosn Niha project is involved in just such outreach work, not only through collaboration with fine art exploration projects in Europe which serve to highlight the aesthetic and political value of post-conflict information for example, but also through local talks to the neighbouring villagers of Niha, and collaboration with the DGA over information display boards. These values should not
only draw on academic aims, but should involve other factors such as political motives or active public interest.

In Lebanon more generally, the current narrow politicised associations concerning two archaeological periods – the Iron Age of the Phoenicians and the Classical period – need to be re-assessed. Other heritage possibilities, such as exploration and preservation of rural quotidian lifestyles, or the way farming communities have developed and contrasts with the past, need to be offered as a point of discussion and possibility with local communities. People should be able and encouraged to make connections with abandoned village sites such as Hosn Niha, and strengthen their identity as timeless inheritors of this intrinsically historic and dramatic region.

Ironically, these connections could well be established by the excavation of part of the site, particularly if the team involved local people. If an excavation of one dwelling was undertaken for example, along with its detailed presentation through on-site information (and possibly through individually accessed digital reconstructions via, e.g. mobile phones), visitors would perhaps identify with the site as a place of habitation, much like their own village, where their forebears worked the land producing crops of cereals, fruit, and vines for wine production, just like today in the Niha Valley and wider Bekaa Valley. The destruction at Hosn Niha, and indeed any other conflict-damaged site, needs to be recognised as an integral part of the site itself and its history.

The National Museum of Lebanon in Beirut has a very moving display case containing glass artefacts which have been subject to such intense heat that they have melted. The accompanying text explains that these artefacts (along with many others) were damaged when the museum was subject to attack during the civil war. The museum building stands on Beirut’s Green Line – the road dividing east (Christian) Beirut from the west (Muslim) Beirut (see Hakimian 2010; Silberman 2010; Tahan 2010). While a great deal of building renovation and construction has occurred since the civil war, many buildings with clearly evident conflict damage remain standing in this region, and along with the display in the museum, are tangible reminders of a part of Lebanon’s history – one that the majority of the population have no wish to repeat any time soon. While this aversion to further violence is completely understandable, if future generations are to appreciate their own history, and avoid history repeating itself, then they need to acknowledge and preserve (but not reify) reminders of horrific episodes, as well as the glorious and beautiful elements of heritage.

Conclusion

We hope this chapter has demonstrated that it is possible to obtain ‘useful’ information from sites that have been damaged in conflict – often to the extent that they have been dismissed as beyond the skill of archaeologists. In order to obtain information that is of academic value, the right research questions need to be posed and this may require some negotiation between an understanding of the physical remains and the questions themselves. In order for damaged
sites to engage local communities, a more complex set of processes needs to be initiated and managed, with communities involved in developing management plans and presentation plans for sites – ideally even involved in the site investigations. Also critical is a vigorous programme of heritage and historical education in schools at all levels, where sites are taught as both the history of the region and as the foundations of everyday life today. Lebanon can then begin to move away from a common understanding of archaeological sites as either propping up an over-arching narrative of an elite social strata descended from Phoenicians and therefore blessed with cultural exceptionalism, or as places to be looted.

Preservation of any heritage or archaeological site also brings with it concerns, not least about preservation being preferred to reconstruction, and that any preservation is sensitively carried out, using traditional skills and appropriate materials. There is also a great tension between preserving a site and making it safe for visitors, and domesticating it, thus losing what may be a strong element in its appeal. This is certainly true at Hosn Niha where the remote, beautiful setting, and the opportunity for all visitors to clamber over huge fallen stones, visit the temple and sanctuary, and roam through the destroyed village finding querns, pottery, doorways, and tombs, is a huge part of the character of the site. To fence it in, have permanent guards, make areas ‘no-go’ for either the protection of the public or of the site itself would be to change the whole experience of visiting this site in the present. While we cannot offer answers and solutions to all of these questions, we do think it is important that they are considered and discussed, particularly with local communities. Most of all, we hope that archaeologists and heritage professionals will take on the challenge of working with conflict-damaged sites.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the colleagues of their respective university departments for continued support in the fieldwork: Ruth Young – School of Archaeology and Ancient History, University of Leicester, UK, and ULAS; and Paul Newson – Department of History and Archaeology, American University of Beirut. We would also like to thank the Directorate General of Antiquities, Lebanon, and especially the Director General Sarkis El Khoury and Raffi Gerjian for their generous help, as well as the people of Niha and the students who worked on the project. The fieldwork mentioned in this chapter has been funded by generous grants from the University Research Board of AUB.

Bibliography


Part V

Community Building
11 In the Aftermath of Violence
Heritage and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland

Audrey Horning and Colin Breen

We in this country cannot safely refuse to make an honest attempt to understand our own past.

(J.C. Beckett 1963, 6)

Introduction

More often than not, contested histories and oppositional narratives provide the foundations for contemporary conflict, and as such, need to be addressed as part of efforts to establish stable post-conflict social structures. That said, much of the existing archaeological literature regarding conflict understandably pertains to the protection of material remains during war and the preservation of the resource following the cessation of violence (see Al Hassan and others, this volume), or to a lesser extent relates to conflict management in terms of heritage and development (e.g. Apoh and Gavua 2016). It is argued here that archaeological sites, and possibly more importantly archaeological practice, can play a significant role in post-conflict peacbuilding in divided societies. Northern Ireland is one such locale where dichotomous understandings of the past underpin contemporary conflict, with society still very much impacted by the 30 years of violence known as The Troubles (1968–1998), and a long history of sectarianism and division. Ongoing efforts to embed conflict transformation into the investigation and interpretation of contested archaeological sites are allowing for the development of a new form of praxis of relevance more broadly to post-conflict peacbuilding.

One of the underlying divisive factors of The Troubles of the twentieth century were the contested histories of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when England (later Britain) extended control over the island of Ireland via the twin mechanisms of warfare and Plantation (planting colonies of mainly Protestant settlers in an otherwise predominantly Catholic land). The narratives that underpin the dichotomous nature of contemporary Northern Irish society, broadly conceived as consisting of two oppositional communities: Catholic, Nationalist, Republican (CDR) versus Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist (PUL) are popularly understood to be rooted in the Plantation period, and as such The Troubles have been interpreted by political analysts as a fundamentally
Audrey Horning and Colin Breen

ethnic conflict (McGarry and O’Leary 2000, but see McGratton 2010 for a contrasting viewpoint). It is suggested here that the assignation of ethnicity as an underlying root cause of the conflict in Northern Ireland is very problematic. While contrasting sets of constructed identities have been created to justify place and lineage, assigning different ethnicities to the oppositional groups in the region has little validity. Monuments from the Plantation period are common in today’s landscape, from the Plantation towns themselves to fortified castles built by incoming Planters, with their meanings and associations renegotiated and reconsidered by each generation. Heritage, as acknowledged by Higueras (2013, 94), is fundamentally a social construction in that we decide and determine what has heritage value.

As visible markers of an unresolved past, Plantation-period sites provoke a range of responses depending upon the positionality of the viewer. For the most part, heritage sites in Northern Ireland have not been widely targeted as part of any strategy of cultural genocide. This may be because of a pragmatic recognition that they serve an economic purpose, but more likely it is because alternative readings of sites make them relevant to both communities. Many are clearly territorialised (Figure 11.1) whether it be through neglect, vandalism, or conversely, rehabilitation and interpretation depending upon the interests and identity of local communities and/or heritage bodies. One notable exception has been the targeting of Derry/Londonderry’s city walls. Erected in the seventeenth century around the newly rebuilt Plantation town, the walls have become a physical symbol of an entrenched Loyalist mentality, physically dominating the surrounding nationalist communities living in the former industrialised working-class housing areas below the walls. The walls have been targeted continually by Republican graffiti writers to carry messages of nationalist resistance against the British state and its policies in Northern Ireland. Despite extensive efforts by the government conservation authorities, the highly politicised messages continue to be updated. A second example is the placement of a Union flag on the crannóg (defended medieval island settlement) on Loughbrickland. This site is close to the border with the Republic and the north-south motorway passes directly adjacent to the lake. Traditionally it has been viewed as a site associated with medieval Gaelic resistance to English rule, but its appropriation as a flag site is symbolic given its proximity to the arterial connector between both jurisdictions.

Divisive as they may seem on the surface, however, Plantation-era sites actually contain within them evidence for a more complicated past, revealing the intertwined nature of the Gaelic world of the north of Ireland with that of the incoming Planters (Horning 2013b, 2013c). Plantation rhetoric of the time emphasised the replacement of a ‘medieval’ Gaelic world with that of a ‘modern’ colonising force, yet archaeology underscores the failure of the Plantation to attract sufficient numbers of British settlers, the reliance of the incomers on the indigenous population, and the active involvement of the Gaelic elite in the practices and politics of Plantation as well as the emergent capitalism of the early modern world (see, for example,
Seemingly one-sided sites therefore can serve as sites for contemporary discourse and a re-imagining of the past. A process of careful, sensitive, and inclusive exploration of these Plantation-period sites in the present provides a means for recasting narratives, with an eye towards a better future. Engaging communities in the discovery and interpretation of this more nuanced past therefore serves as a means to embed conflict transformation in the practices of archaeological fieldwork and material interpretation, as individuals confront for themselves physical evidence that contradicts accepted histories (Horning et al. 2015; Horning 2013a, 2013d). In contrast to places like Egypt, also continuing to struggle with conflict (Teijgeler 2013), local communities are aware of archaeological sites in their midst, express a generalised sense that there is merit in their preservation, and sometimes are highly motivated to learn more about them depending upon positionality. As we have discovered, however, local levels of knowledge can be limited, due in no small part to the nature of the history curriculae taught in Northern Irish schools, which in an effort to avoid often difficult conversations, have often chosen to focus on Egyptian and English history rather than the history of the island of Ireland. The complexity of addressing both the distant and immediate past was exemplified with the development of a Troubles gallery, at the main Belfast site of the National Museums and Galleries of Northern Ireland. It contains little analytical text, is effectively devoid of objects and essentially presents a general chronology of the period, wholly lacking explanation or interpretation. Any successful effort at advancing peace and transforming conflict in Northern Ireland rests upon finding new spaces for discourse that recognises the significant ways in which the histories of the two main communities not only overlap but are thoroughly entangled, and crucially that the very dichotomous character of contemporary historical understandings is not actually an immutable factor of the past 500 years.
The so-called ‘peace dividend’ has provided the opportunity to more overtly integrate archaeology and heritage practice into conflict transformation, aided in part by European Union peace and reconciliation funding and a growing willingness on the part of some (but by no means all) local authorities to engage in ‘riskier’ heritage-related programmes. It should probably be noted that these initiatives are driven by heritage professionals within the local authorities and rarely, if ever, come from the elected politicians or councillors. These projects aim to engage ‘hard to reach’ groups such as ex-combatants, victims of Troubles-related violence, and the economically marginalised, and emphasise peacebuilding, community development, and sustainability over more traditional heritage outcomes. Relevant projects include community-engaged archaeological work on Plantation-period sites and extensive community-based tours, talks, and workshops in tandem with a series of quadricentennial anniversaries marking Plantation milestones (see discussion of projects in Horning et al. 2015). More recently, programmes developed through a very productive collaborative partnership between university archaeologists, museum professionals, and the trained facilitators of the Corrymeela Community (a shared governance organisation formed in 1965 which is Ireland’s oldest peace and reconciliation body) rely upon an immersive model that brings people together in safe surroundings to directly confront and consider the physical evidence of the Plantation period in the form of sites, objects, and landscapes, and the manner by which oppositional historical narratives have been constructed. These programmes are conducted via a residential model developed by our Corrymeela partners, who maintain safe premises on the north coast of County Antrim that support residents and create comfortable living spaces where open conversation can thrive. Fundamental to our partnership are a series of guiding principles that prioritise respect for participants and their perspectives in order to foster honest dialogue (Pettis 2015).

Such work is aided by the reality that the Northern Ireland conflict has long been profoundly material in its expression, with murals, painted curb sides, flags, and the theatricality of parading, being the most well-known examples. Because the population is well versed in reading buildings, landscapes, and symbols, conversations about the meaning of sites and monuments are more easily comprehensible if no less contentious. People do not need to be educated in the importance of material things in a land where every place (city, town, townland, field, road, stone) possesses one, if not two names proclaiming association: the city of Derry/Londonderry exemplifies the very real contestation over names, territories, and materialities. Understanding that objects can hold multiple meanings does not require any fundamental leap of logic. As with many conflict zones around the world, people in Northern Ireland are keenly aware of their local geographies of power and place and, through necessity, are able to recognise the landscapes of their ‘Own’ and of the ‘Other’.
Background: The Northern Ireland Conflict

While ultimately rooted in the sixteenth-century strengthening of England’s grasp over Ireland which saw the 1603 incorporation of the island as a subordinate kingdom under the English Crown, The Troubles are more commonly explained in relation to events of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century, efforts to challenge British hegemony were expressed through a Home Rule movement initially supported by both an emergent Catholic and Protestant politicised intelligentsia, in common with similar European-wide movements. When Home Rule discussions were put on the back burner by the exigencies of the First World War, a small group of Irish Nationalists mounted a week-long armed rebellion in Dublin in 1916, known as the Easter Rising. Their action refocused nationalism from its previous reliance upon political debate towards militancy. A two-year War of Independence (1919–1921) ensued, the conclusion of which was a Treaty signed in December 1921 that allowed for the creation of the Irish Free State but retained six majority Protestant counties of Ulster within the United Kingdom, as well as a series of Treaty ports along the Atlantic seaboard. The political entity of Northern Ireland was created out of this compromise.

Following partition, the Unionist majority held political power in the newly created Northern Ireland, but at the same time the six counties were both marginalised by the rest of the UK and overshadowed by the newly independent Irish state just on the doorstep. Within Northern Ireland, institutional discrimination was rife throughout much of the twentieth century. In 1968, demands for greater civil rights by the expanding Catholic population tipped over into violence. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, henceforth IRA) employed violence initially in defence of its communities and subsequently in seeking the reunification of the island and the removal of British forces, opposed by Loyalist paramilitaries including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). In 1972, the Northern Irish Parliament was suspended, and Direct Rule imposed from London. Over the course of the next 30 years, intermittent violence took the lives of over 3,500 and injured more than 50,000 (Sutton 2001). While the numbers may seem low in comparison to the scale of human devastation in other conflict zones, Northern Ireland is a small place, with a population at the height of The Troubles hovering only around 1.4 million. This was a highly securitised society and the levels of political street violence were high. Given the length and reach of the conflict, it is unsurprising that very high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and elevated suicide rates in the present have been attributed to Troubles-related violence (Ferry et al. 2011; Tomlinson 2012).

By the 1990s, it was increasingly clear that violence had brought neither side victory. Theorists note hurting stalemates in conflict cycles and within this Northern Ireland had reached a stage where no side could ‘win’. This stalemate, coupled with an increase in ambitious bombing acts in England led to a secret dialogue. A slow shift from violence to politics was marked
A fundamental challenge to peace building lies in the structures of the peace process itself which prevent any successful transcendence of division. In short, the consociational model relies upon difference for its success. While arguably the only way in which the peace process could have taken place, it is difficult to see any possibility of a shared future if society continues to be structured along dichotomous lines. Yet many, if not most, conflict theorists examining
In the Aftermath of Violence

183

the Northern Ireland situation assume the primordial reality of divided identities through their focus solely upon the events of the twentieth century, and particularly the partitioning of the island, to interpret and understand The Troubles. The only way forward is to agree mutual tolerance of the Other, but each Other has to be recognisable and discernible, which often involves a mobilisation of cultural heritage. As observed by McQuaid (2017, 37) the compromise-based nature of the peace process “complicates the templates that sustained communities identities in conflict. The exclusive stories of ‘who we are, where we came from, where we are going’, and the commemorative practices that go with these do not fit the compromise mode”. Despite the foci of political analysts, popular historical narratives push the origins of the conflict and the divide much further back into time, opening up the potential to challenge assumptions about essentialised identities.

Recognition that the past has a role to play in structuring the future is widely accepted by theorists and politicians, but the past generally referenced in the conflict literature relates principally to the period of The Troubles and dealing with its immediate legacy. Some scholars such as Simpson (2009) argue for a Habermas-influenced process of truth and reconciliation in which all those who self-identify as victims (which can include those who also perpetrated violence) can express their perspectives and share their experiences. Others reject this approach outright because the granting of ‘moral equivalency’ to perpetrators and victims is seen as fundamentally unacceptable (Little 2012). Even if contemporary communities can eventually agree on a shared history of the twentieth-century conflict itself, derived either through some form of Simpson’s posited truth recovery or communicative justice, or just built upon principles of respect, as advocated by White et al. (2013, 239), there will remain unresolved legacies in relation to the Plantation and later history of the island and the manner in which each are employed in contemporary identity-making.

While the levels of violence seen during The Troubles have dissipated and Northern Ireland works to improve its economic standing and develops its role as a tourist destination, society is conversely more divided than it was in 1998. An early upsurge of interest in integrated and shared education has stagnated (Hughes et al. 2016). While a shared history curriculum has been in existence since 1991, theoretically providing a shared platform for teaching and learning, teachers rarely feel confident and empowered enough to teach to that curriculum (Fischer 2011; Kitson 2007; McCully and Barton 2009). Participants in all of our archaeological programmes, from excavation experience and site tours to our more immersive Corrymeela residency weekends acknowledge the importance of history learning, and for some, it was why they became involved. Others, however, felt it was too late for them, and that it was up to the next generation – in effect, devolving responsibility to the schools which themselves still struggle to provide adequate teaching of the past. There is also, as explored by Kitson (2007), a divide between those who see history teaching as intrinsically or extrinsically important: in other words,
important in its own right, or important as regards its instrumentalist relevance in creating a civil society. Furthermore, history teachers “working in conflict hot spots [are] less likely to tackle controversial and recent events head on” (Kitson 2007, 150). Even in integrated schools and under a shared education model where majority Protestant and majority Catholic schools come together a few times per week, the emphasis is understandably on mutual respect and tolerance of difference, rather than building commonalities (Hayes et al. 2006). Indicating that schooling can reinforce rather than erode division is the fact that younger voters overwhelmingly support the hard-line (DUP and Sinn Féin) parties and reject more centrist politics such as that espoused by the cross-community Alliance Party (Browne and Dwyer 2014; Evans and Tonge 2013; Tilley and Evans 2011).

Communities also remain geographically segregated. From a material perspective, perhaps most notable is a significant increase in the number of so-called peace lines, which are in actuality walls built to separate communities in conflict (Byrne et al. 2012). This increase in the overt symbology of division, and the visceral, material evidence for territorially underpins a growing Dark Tourism industry, an ambivalent practice (Cochrane 2015) that may bring much needed income but is unhelpfully dependent upon the continuity of conflict and the continued maintenance and regeneration of its material markers. At the same time, it is undeniable that the peace dividend has brought positive change. External economic assistance was, and remains, crucial to the turn from violence towards capacity building. European Union peace and reconciliation funding as well as the US-dominated International Fund for Ireland has supported a wide range of community development projects, although the bureaucratic nature of these programmes, with their emphasis upon accountability and demonstration of outcomes, present serious challenges given that the nature of conflict transformation is long term, uneven, and founded upon the intangibilities of attitudinal change often across generations (Skarlato et al. 2016). Increased international business investment and a growing tourist economy have brought welcome financial stability particularly for the middle and upper classes. Communities in interface areas, however, continue to suffer deprivation and division, and a lack of trust in institutions and society. As expressed by one community worker (quoted in Skarlato et al. 2016, 168), “It’s no coincidence that most of the Trouble is in the most deprived areas . . . the places where the paramilitaries are strongest are the most deprived areas. It’s not rocket science”. While the role played by poverty and class in The Troubles has long been acknowledged, the root causes have not been eliminated.

In the most deprived neighbourhoods, the notion that strengthening community relations will lead to a better future is not universally accepted. There is risk in the unknown, and stability in the status quo. That said, cross-community organisations have emerged, even in the worst affected areas such as North Belfast, where 577 were killed during The Troubles and where child poverty stands at 36 per cent (McQuaid 2017, 33). These groups function through a shared commitment to improving the future, and
through resolutely not looking backwards. This presents something of an ethical conundrum for efforts to engage such groups in an exploration of the past for the benefit of the future. One cross-community group from North Belfast that participated in a weekend heritage programme struggled with how to accommodate the content both individually and as a group. Their own cohesion was based upon a conscious decision to not examine the roots of conflict nor to directly address its expression, but to overcome its legacies through engaging in a range of shared projects and events and enjoying one another’s company. For them, heritage and archaeology at that particular stage in their group development held the potential to be harmful. This fear was reflected in the comments of other project participants who, on occasion, found that the basis of their historical belief systems were being challenged, and while they were accepting and appreciative of the new discourse there was also a degree of anger at past misinformation and the lack of access to more informed or more nuanced histories. As with all conflict-related work, practitioners must be aware of the potential for reawakening trauma and for causing indirect harm. For this very reason, follow-up meetings and activities are an essential element in the model for integrating archaeology and conflict transformation (Pettis 2016). Peacebuilding is the priority, which means accepting that the stories of the past as contained within archaeological sites, materials, and landscapes may on occasion have to take second place.

Identity and the Role of Heritage

Power is contingent upon identity, and identity must be materially marked and expressed to be recognised and to exert power. The phenomenon, or spectacle of parading, is one very material mechanism through which communities express and (re)construct identities; marking as well the retrenchment of older narratives. Despite, or perhaps because of, the establishment of a parades commission to police and monitor parades, the actual number of parades (4,000 for a population that now numbers circa 1.8 million) has doubled since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (McQuaid 2017, 24). Parades mark the expression of collective memory but also, crucially, serve to continually renew a sense of identity and by inevitable extension, separation. Events memorialised in Protestant parades stretch back into the seventeenth century and are dominated by imagery related to the victory of the Protestant King William over the Catholic King James in the 1680s. Others draw attention to the fate of Protestants in the conflict known as the 1641 Rising/Rebellion which saw many Plantation settlements attacked. The drowning of Protestant settlers (actual numbers are disputed) in the River Bann at Portadown by Catholic rebels in November 1641 is commemorated yearly by Orange Order parades which culminate in wreath-laying ceremonies in remembrance of those who drowned (Portadown Times 2015). Fundamentally linked to territorialisation as well, parades mark ownership not just of a particular locality (if only on the day) but also the manner of moving through the landscape. In interface areas,
such spectacles are unsurprisingly interpreted as triumphalist and aggressive, even while those parading can (as per the consociational model) legitimately claim their right to express their cultural heritage. Given the extent of geographical segregation in Northern Ireland, many such parades occur without contestation (see Figure 11.2) insofar as they take place within communities and zones that are broadly seen as supportive.

The June 2016 Brexit vote in which the UK as a whole narrowly voted in favour of leaving the European Union, has further increased levels of anxiety and uncertainty in Northern Ireland by precipitating the unexpected need to fundamentally reconsider the future identity(ies) of people in the north of Ireland. While the DUP advocated strongly for the leave vote, the majority of people in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European Union. Northern Ireland now faces uncertainties over the financial and political impact of strengthened border controls, the loss of EU peace and reconciliation funding which underpins cross-community initiatives (including efforts to integrate archaeology with conflict transformation) and of market access as well as agricultural subsidies for Northern Ireland’s farms (Hayward 2016). When the UK leaves the single market and customs union, border controls will have to be implemented in some form; most likely reinstating those either between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, or less likely, surrounding the whole of the island of Ireland, notwithstanding the Republic’s continued membership of the EU. In choosing to advocate for Brexit against the will of most of the Northern Irish electorate, the DUP has, it could be

Figure 11.2 Orange Order parade in a small rural community. (Photo: A. Horning).
argued, inadvertantly strengthened Sinn Féin’s political argument for unification of the island.

A further twist in the Brexit story for Northern Ireland relates to identity politics and the peace process, and the relationship between Northern Ireland and Scotland. As noted above, ‘parity of esteem’ has long been central to peacebuilding efforts, meaning as well that funding for the cultural activities of one tradition must be matched by that for the other. In the 1990s, the notion of an Ulster Scots culture and language was overtly “mobilized to broaden the spectrum of unionist culture and challenge Irish nationalist cultural assertion in Northern Ireland” (McCall 2002, 201); in short to provide a strong basis for a Protestant or Cultural Unionist identity as a foil against the strength of an internationally recognisable Catholic Irish ‘brand’ as expressed through the Irish language, dance, music, and iconic archaeological sites (Gardner 2016). The funding structures inherent to the Belfast Agreement provided a major financial stimulus for the evolution and articulation of this Ulster Scots identity, complete with what is termed its own official language. Thus the strongest cultural voice arguing for the Protestant community comes from those who promote the ties to Lowland Protestant Scotland, source of a considerable number of settlers in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (not part of the Ulster Plantation itself). The more extreme arm of this Ulster Scots movement claims that the Ulster Scots are the original Irish (and thus possess the pre-eminent claim to the province of Ulster) based upon a misleading and incorrect reading of evidence for Iron Age migration between the north of Ireland and Scotland (Adamson 1991). But the alignment of Northern Irish Protestants with Scotland now challenges the foundational identity of Ulster Protestants as loyal to Britain, as twenty-first century Scotland now seeks another referendum on Scottish independence on the back of the Brexit vote, in which the majority of Scots (like the Northern Irish) voted to remain within the European Union.

The archaeological record has plenty to say about the actual nature of relations between Scotland and Ulster, but invariably in a manner that undermines essentialist notions of both Scottishness and Protestantism. The site with the most potential to subvert the simplistic equation of Ulster Scots equals Protestant and to undermine the ahistorical polarisation of the two traditions model is Northern Ireland’s most iconic and photogenic heritage site, Dunluce Castle. Perched on a basalt cliff on the north Antrim coast and facing northwards towards Scotland, the site is primarily associated with the Highland Scottish Clan Donald, who from their base on the Scottish island of Islay sought to reclaim northeast Ulster as part of a wider maritime polity. The castle’s incumbent in the early seventeenth century, Randal MacDonnell, was an accomplished code shifter and transcultural actor. While he had fought against the English alongside the Ulster Gaelic lords late in the sixteenth century, he became an ostensibly devoted subject of the Scottish King James VI, who became England’s King James I, demonstrated through his energetic establishment of an independent early seventeenth-century Plantation settlement and
intended mercantile centre at Dunluce (Breen 2012a, 2012b). MacDonnell rebuilt a pre-existing church for the benefit of incoming Protestant settlers, yet at the same time financed the Counter-Reformation through supporting the Franciscan missionary activity into the Highlands and continuing himself to be a practising Roman Catholic. MacDonnell’s entrepôt ultimately failed, unable to compete with the more accessible, nearby English Plantation town of Coleraine.

The failure of Dunluce, however, provides a significant opportunity for conflict transformation in the present. The archaeology of Dunluce town is remarkably well preserved, and contains within its assemblages ample evidence to demonstrate that the population of the village was diverse in its origins and hybrid in its cultural activities (Breen 2012a; Breen et al. 2011; McAllister and Gault 2015). Community participants in excavations and immersive engagements with the site and its material remains (see Figure 11.3) were and are routinely astounded and fascinated by the revelations about MacDonnell and the realities of the mixed community that once populated what now appears only as a wind-swept hilltop (Breen et al. 2015).

The complexity of Dunluce and its material evidence cannot be accommodated within a narrowly contrived notion of an Ulster Scots identity. While there is no shortage of critics of the ‘authenticity’ of an Ulster Scots identity (e.g. Görlach 2000; Kirk 1998; Nic Craith 2001), it must also be acknowledged that aspects of Irish (CNR) identity in post-conflict Northern Ireland

![Figure 11.3 Examining Randal McDonnell’s ‘English’ style manor house at Dunluce. (Photo: S. Pettis).](image-url)
are similarly contrived in their construction insofar as they too are conceived in opposition. Dunluce challenges two key planks in nationalist grievance narratives: that the Irish were removed from lands by Planters, and that Plantation was carried out by Protestants against Catholics. Narratives of dispossession are fundamental to CNR identity, and the difficulty of accommodating evidence that complicates that fundamental belief is often clearly evident in the reactions of community participants from nationalist backgrounds. Interestingly, one of the insights that has been emerging from our Corrymeela based programmes is that groups from Loyalist backgrounds can sometimes be more open to the revelations from archaeological research. This may simply reflect one of the key difficulties facing Protestants demonstrating their right to belong in Northern Ireland and their claim to any role in its history. That the history as revealed through the earth seldom supports the traditional narrative of hard working Protestants transforming a ruined land into one that was fertile and productive, seems to be less controversial.

Dunluce is an exceptional site for immersive learning (Breen et al. 2015), but its full potential, and that of archaeological practice, in peacebuilding has yet to be tapped. Illustrative of the many small 'p' political challenges facing post-conflict Northern Ireland was the inexplicable failure of civil servants to successfully manage and complete an application process that would have leveraged millions of already earmarked pounds from the Heritage Lottery Fund, to create a community learning and engagement hub and improve access, develop interpretation, support research, and fund conservation works at Dunluce. Dunluce is understood as a key tourism asset for Northern Ireland, yet most visitors only experience it as a ‘drive by’ through the windows of the tourist coaches that are too big to park at the site. In addition to the value of the site’s archaeology to support our Northern Ireland-focused peacebuilding activities, Dunluce also has the potential to illuminate international understandings on and perspectives of the complicated history of the north of Ireland. Such a discourse can also contribute to conflict transformation, given the ongoing influence of often narrowly framed and naïve diasporic readings of Irish history on contemporary politics (Cochrane et al. 2009; Horning 2017).

While Dunluce is a remarkable site by any measure, it is far from the only locale where the archaeological record can serve to facilitate conflict transformation through encouraging dialogue. The archaeology associated with the Plantation settlements developed by the City of London has been well explored particularly in terms of comparisons with North American colonial settlements (Brannon 1999; Horning 2013b; Miller 1991; Noël Hume 1986, 234–39), and have been incorporated into our community engagement programmes. Despite proscriptions against Irish tenants and use of any Irish architectural forms, these sites routinely exhibit material culture drawn from Irish as well as English and Scottish origins, while the documents underscore the continued reliance on Irish labour as well as the demographic dominance of the Irish. Incoming Planters also adapted far more local practices than they necessarily admitted, as evidenced by their reliance upon Gaelic forms of cattle
pastoralism (Horning 2018). Elsewhere in the Ulster Plantation, Gaelic elites continued to hold lands and compete for political power (McDermott 2010), while even the landscapes associated with the unofficial Scottish Plantation settlements in the east of the province, long viewed as the most demographically successful of the early seventeenth-century Plantation efforts, exhibit continuities from the late medieval Gaelic world (O’Keefe 2008). Urban locales such as Carrickfergus possess a complex history which has been well explored archaeologically (Ó Baoill 2008; Tracey 2017). An English stronghold since the twelfth century, as materialised in the survival of its imposing fortress, Carrickfergus also was the centre of a dynamic entrepôt in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that was populated, according to archaeological, documentary, and cartographic data, by a mixed population of English, Irish, and Highland as well as Lowland Scots. While documented instances of unrest attest to the volatility of this mix, it contributed to rather than detracted from the role played by the settlement in the expanding mercantile networks of the early modern world. Material culture from as far away as the Ottoman Empire helps to place the north of Ireland into its broader context (Tracey 2017). Such evidence can often come as a surprise to project participants, who are accustomed to the marginalisation of the north of Ireland on the world stage.

**Conclusion**

What the future holds for post-Brexit Northern Ireland is unclear. Legacies of The Troubles remain unresolved, and the role played by older histories are not fully recognised in either political analyses or in mainstream top-down, conflict transformation projects. Heritage, as in so many other places, can often be dismissed as non-essential or economically secondary to other social needs. However, we contend that heritage should not only be incorporated into peacebuilding, but that it is fundamental for peacebuilding. We state this not merely as an aspiration or a guiding philosophy, or in some desperate need to demonstrate the relevance of archaeology. We make this claim based upon the evidence of our eyes, and the manner in which school children, community groups, and a diverse array of individuals, all of whom have been touched by The Troubles in some way, have responded to their own involvement in looking seriously at the evidence of the past. It is not easy for people to question the very foundations of their identities as well as the increasingly institutionalised divisions of the present. But the physicality of the past serves as a very useful mediating device as well as being harder to deny than yet another speech by a politician or impassioned lecture by an academic. As archaeologists we know that the evidence, and indeed the past itself, is ambiguous and capable of multiple readings. This recognition is not always shared outside of the profession, but when it is, it can be emancipatory. Further validation that this type of engagement is invaluable for conflict transformation at a grassroots level has come from our project partners at Corrymeela, who on the basis of their decades long experience in working across communities in Northern Ireland...
have embraced the potential of the past to facilitate contemporary dialogue with more enthusiasm than we had ever imagined possible. Their background, training, and outlook are indispensable as we develop together an effective practice of embedding archaeology in conflict transformation, a practice with relevance far beyond the island of Ireland.

Bibliography


Portadown Times. 2015. 12 July. *Orangemen and Bands to Converge for Mini-Twelfth*.


After Angkor

An Archaeological Perspective on Heritage and Capacity-Building in Cambodia

Miriam T. Stark and Heng Piphal

Introduction

Cambodia was already reeling from a decade of civil war by the time that the United States launched its multi-year secret carpet-bombing campaign in Kampong Cham Province on March 18, 1969. By 1973, approximately 500,000 tons of US bombs had fallen on Cambodia, killing up to half a million Cambodian civilians (High et al. 2013, 90–1). The United States viewed bombing in Cambodia as collateral damage to the war in Vietnam. For Cambodians, this bombing campaign shattered an already-fragile government and opened the door for the communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas. From their entry into Phnom Penh in April 1975 to their downfall in 1979 through Vietnam’s 1979 “invasion,” at least 1.7 million Cambodians lost their lives. Civil war continued into the early 1990s, when the United Nations brokered a peace agreement, sponsored democratic elections, and began a protracted and costly process of post-conflict reconstruction that continues to the present (Öjendal and Lilja 2009).

Post-conflict countries like Cambodia grapple with myriad forms of trauma: to their people (e.g. Arensen 2016, 24–5); their wildlife (e.g. Loucks et al. 2009); and their cultural heritage. Global conflict routinely ravages archaeological landscapes through bombing and land mines; heritage sites can be specific targets of aggression; and immovable heritage is at great risk (e.g. Higueras 2013; Kane 2015; Newson and Young 2015; Siehr 2014). Risk to Cambodia’s archaeological heritage was severe from direct warfare and looting (Davis and Mackenzie 2014, 292–3), but its impact on human resources was more profound: just two trained conservation architects and four archaeologists (only one with technical field experience) survived Cambodia’s civil war to begin the slow process of rebuilding its archaeological heritage in the mid-1990s. Cambodia’s unique archaeological heritage exerts a powerful centripetal force on Cambodia’s heritage management world for economic and also political reasons. In fact, the UNESCO World Heritage Center listed Angkor as a “best practice” case study in heritage management for several reasons, including its international coordination committee, community-based development, and community learning centers (ICC-Angkor 2013, 63).
This chapter focuses on Cambodia’s archaeological heritage and nearly 25 years of post-conflict capacity-building efforts. What lessons can we learn from Cambodia’s experience with post-conflict archaeology and cultural heritage? The next section of our chapter offers an historical perspective on heritage training in Cambodia through the colonial, post-colonial, and current eras. We conclude our chapter by discussing some “best practices” for archaeological heritage and capacity-building in Cambodia. The term “capacity-building” emerged in the international development vocabulary of the 1990s, when Cambodia was emerging from three decades of conflict. Capacity-building in archaeology and heritage management takes many forms, from conventional teaching (in workshops, at conferences, through in-country classrooms, and now more remotely) to domestic and international post-baccalaureate internships in archaeology, museums, or international heritage management. Capacity-building can also take place at the institutional level: through consultation in the construction of new heritage management organizational structures, drafting of new environmental protection legislation that includes cultural resources management and protection, and in supporting country-to-country initiatives to prevent looting and trafficking in illicit antiquities. Both co-authors have been involved in all of these activities in Cambodia, but here we focus on explicitly archaeological practices, including long-term investment in archaeological training (classroom, field, laboratory), collaboration to develop country-wide site inventories, and ongoing collaboration in both research programs and also heritage management initiatives.

Archaeological Heritage and Cambodian National Identity

Cambodia’s archaeological heritage is rich and has substantial time-depth, from its Pleistocene and early Holocene past (e.g. Heng et al. 2016) to its Neolithic and Bronze Age traditions (e.g. Ly 2001, 2002; Voeun 2013). Despite the abundant discoveries that Cambodia’s archaeological record now yields, none of these prehistoric sites compares with the spectacular temples of Angkor, located just north of the Tonle Sap Lake in Siem Reap Province. The ninth- through fifteenth-century Angkorian state was Southeast Asia’s largest preindustrial empire: at its apex, its borders stretched from southern Vietnam to southern Laos, to western Thailand, and perhaps even south into peninsular Siam.

The ninth- through fifteenth-century CE temples in the Siem Reap region (and particularly the Angkor Wat temple) that served as sequential capitals for the Angkorian state remained sacred to Khmers for centuries after the polity’s fifteenth-century collapse and the Angkorian court retreated south (e.g. Brotherson 2015; Stark et al. 2015). Khmers lived within and in the proximity of these temple complexes; Buddhist monks built monasteries on their grounds. The earliest evidence for the Khmer state’s use of an image of Angkor on their royal seal was 1843 (Khin Sok 1985); the Angkor temple has remained on Cambodia’s flags through six separate governments since 1863.
International political tensions surrounding the inscription of Preah Vihear as a World Heritage site, and the military conflicts at the temple and in Phnom Penh (e.g. Silverman 2011; Strate 2013), underscore the fact that Cambodian identity is inextricably bound up with its Angkorian heritage.

The notion of a national Khmer culture, separate from its Thai and Vietnamese neighbors, may have emerged in the 1930s as a colonial project (e.g. Edwards 2007), but Angkor has been iconically Khmer far longer. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the neighboring Thai monarchy claimed Angkor as part of its fourteenth-century Ayutthaya heritage (Keyes 1991: 263–7). Although Siam ceded the Angkor region back to Cambodia during the colonial period, even today, a scale model of Angkor sits in the Thai Royal Palace in Bangkok. Cambodia became a protectorate of France in 1863 to avoid absorption into either Thailand or Vietnam; the colonial French fell in love immediately with Cambodia’s Angkorian past through Louis Delaporte’s and Francis Garnier’s mid-nineteenth-century expeditions up the Mekong River (e.g. Edwards 2007, 157–9). Captain Edmond Lunet de Lajonquière’s subsequent and comprehensive site survey of portions of Indochina (Lunet de la Jonquière 1902–1911) and the first wave of scholars drew inspiration as much from oral tradition, ethnography, and epigraphy as they did from archaeology (e.g. Aymonier 1900–1904). Less than a year after Thailand returned control of Battambang and Siem Reap provinces to Cambodia in 1907, the French established Conservation d’Angkor to assume responsibility for the Angkorian ruins concentrated north of Siem Reap.

Cambodians and—since 1992, when Angkor Wat was inscribed as a World Heritage site—the greater global community value Cambodia’s archaeological heritage. World Heritage site listings are both a boon and a liability for developing countries, since World Heritage sites draw tourists and require intensive management by national agencies (Fletcher et al. 2007, 392). At the same time, cultural tourism to the Angkor Archaeological Park forms a major source of revenue for Cambodia’s national economy, many Cambodians now pursue postgraduate training in heritage management and allied fields, and more Cambodians currently work as heritage professionals than at any time in the past.

Teaching Heritage in Cambodia

Heritage Training before 1991

Cambodia’s traditional educational system had centered on Buddhist pagoda-based education for young boys, but early twentieth-century French colonial administrators introduced a multi-tiered public educational system that reached a broader segment of the country’s population (Edwards 2007, 74–7). This system included the teaching of traditional arts at the École des Arts Cambodgiens, established near the Royal Palace (1904) in Phnom Penh (and transformed into the École Cambodgienne in 1918). When Prince Norodom Sihanouk became Cambodia’s head of state in 1960, he further expanded the
country’s educational system to encourage the operation of private (Chinese-, Vietnamese-, and French-language) schools and universities.

One was the Royal University of Fine Arts (hereafter RUFA), whose doors opened in 1965 with largely French-educated Khmer nationals as instructors (Carter et al. 2014, 6059–60, 6062; Muan 2001, 319–30). RUFA blended arts, humanities, and some social sciences (Peycam 2011, 21) in its five faculties (Archaeology, Architecture, Plastic Arts, Music, and Dance) and emerged during a period of cultural heritage renaissance (Davis 2011, 168–9). Twenty-one Archaeology Faculty students graduated between 1970 and 1972; the 1967–1968 Archaeology Faculty Bulletin contained several articles on prehistory. One Khmer scholar, Chea Thay Seng listed Khmer archaeology and prehistory as his specialization (Government of the Khmer Republic and SEAMEO 1972, 297–305) and became the first Cambodian director of the National Museum and the first Dean of the Faculty of Archaeology (Abbe 2015, 139).

At this time Cambodia also signed the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Davis 2011, 168–9). In 1971, Cambodia joined the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), which launched the Applied Research Center for Archeology and Fine Arts (ARCAFA) in Phnom Penh (Government of the Khmer Republic and SEAMEO). Cambodia’s premier heritage management organization remained the École Française d’Extrême Orient (hereafter EFEO) until civil war ruptured the country in the early 1970s. Its mission was to study, preserve, and restore Cambodia’s archaeological heritage, particularly around the Angkor Park (Clémentin-Ojha and Manguin 2007, 60), not capacity-building (Muan 2001, 319, footnote 104; Thomson 2007, 377).

Cambodia was poised to become Southeast Asia’s regional center for heritage training and capacity-building until international geopolitics intervened. US bombing and a 1969 coup ousted Norodom Sihanouk to establish Lon Nol’s Democratic Kampuchea which fractured the country. French EFEO staff departed Cambodia in 1972, along with their Conservation d’Angkor staff; Cambodian Pich Keo became the first Cambodian archaeologist to assume responsibility for Conservation d’Angkor in 1972 (Falser 2015, 317). By 1973, US bomber planes had dropped at least 470,000 tons of bombs on southeastern and eastern Cambodia under Lyndon Johnson and then Richard Nixon. These sorties not only killed people (including civilians) and livestock, they drove North Vietnamese more deeply into Cambodia, and ultimately galvanized support for the communist insurgent Khmer Rouge (Kiernan 1989). Craters and unexploded ordnance from the bombing across Cambodia’s Mekong delta and up its Mekong River catchment rendered UXO-saturated farmland dangerous to farmers (Owen and Kiernan 2006, 62–5; 2010). Bombing also destroyed untold numbers of pre-Angkorian and prehistoric archaeological sites.

By 1973, SEAMEO pulled its ARCAFA center from Phnom Penh; two years later, both RUFA and the National Museum closed their doors
After Angkor

The three-and-a-half-year Khmer Rouge period, begun in April 1975, brought hostility toward traditional education. Khmer Rouge forces destroyed 90 per cent of the school buildings, and repurposed remaining buildings; up to 75 per cent of the country’s teachers (and some scholars who returned to Phnom Penh from France) died or were executed under the Khmer Rouge regime (Clayton 1998, 608; Peycam 2011, 19–21). Massive irrigation construction projects during the subsequent Khmer Rouge years also destroyed subsurface archaeological features. The Khmer Rouge doctrine dictated the desecration of nearly 3,000 Buddhist pagodas, which were converted into offices, training schools, arms depots, granaries, or stables; pagodas were used for interrogation and execution (Ehlert 2014, 181–3). Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia stopped the Khmer Rouge and inaugurated a decade of Vietnam-style education (Khlok 2003). When RUFA re-opened in 1980 with full university status (Carter et al. 2014, 6062), few trained scholars remained in the country. Cambodian heritage training remained in protracted hibernation until 1991, continuing the period of “tragic social disruptions” (Son 2011, 91).

Heritage Training after 1991

Damage to Cambodia’s heritage resources was profound by the time Vietnamese troops pulled out of Cambodia in 1989. Civil war raged between the Cambodian government and the deposed (now insurgent Khmer Rouge) even after the Paris Peace Agreement, signed in October 1991. The Angkor Archaeological Park is located in Siem Reap, 40 per cent of which was under government control by 1993 (Roberts and Williams 1995, 134). Both sides seeded contested areas with land mines until at least 1994, and demining organizations (notably the Cambodian Mine Action Center and the Halo Trust) continue their demining activities in north-western Cambodia.

demining company began demining areas around the temples in 1993 (Roberts and Williams 1995, 131), and a Special Heritage Police Force was trained to combat illegal excavations and looting. In 1996, the government passed the Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage. By the end of the twentieth century, more than 20 international organizations were working at Angkor (see Figure 12.1). Capacity-building for Cambodians, through the Royal University and through international collaboration at the Angkor Park, was intrinsic to this ambitious program.

**Heritage Training at Cambodian Institutions**

*Figure 12.1* APSARA Authority archaeologist Chhay Rachna explaining the stratigraphy during the Greater Angkor Project 2010 excavations at Angkor Wat, co-directed by Miriam T. Stark and Chhay Rachna. (Photograph courtesy of Nicholas Gani).
Three Cambodian institutions have offered in-country archaeology training since 1995: RUFA Archaeology Faculty, the Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC), and APSARA National Authority. RUFA remains the foremost training venue for Cambodia’s tangible and intangible heritage. Most educated Khmers (including all but five Cambodian archaeologists) had left the country or died by this time, including one archaeologist who died at the S21 Khmer Rouge interrogation center (Chuch Phoeyurn, personal communication, 2016). Chuch Phoeyurn, the Archaeology Faculty’s Dean, pursued UNESCO/Japan funds-in-trust support for multiple long-term training programs from 1993 through 2002 in collaboration with Professor Ang Chouléan and then-PhD candidate Ashley Thompson (Carter et al. 2014, 6062; Chapman 2013, 228–9). This funding supported international and national lecturers, Cambodian teaching assistants, administrators, and a librarian (Carter et al. 2014, 6062; Chapman 2013, 228–9). These Khmer teaching assistants were to continue as lecturers at the end of the UNESCO program.

The Japanese government began what has become an unrivalled capacity-building program in Cambodian archaeology at this time (Ishizawa 2002). Not only did Japan (and the Japan and Toyota Foundations) support the 1993–2002 UNESCO training program at RUFA, but also innumerable Cambodian archaeology students have spent time in Japan on short-term and long-term training projects, primarily at the Nara National Research Institute of Cultural Properties (which has also trained several archaeologists). Cambodia’s APSARA Authority has cooperated with Japanese governmental and academic organizations on in-country training (like at the Ta Nei temple [Thomson 2007, 387–8]) and study abroad opportunities. Between 1991 and 2013, Sophia University in Tokyo alone offered 250 lectures, incorporated c. 500 students in training programs, awarded 7 doctorates and 14 MA degrees in “cultural heritage education” (ICC-Angkor 2013). Other important funders have included the University of Palermo (Italy), which trained 20 archaeologists from Cambodian heritage agencies through its 2011–2014 program in cultural heritage preservation (ICC-Angkor 2013, 37–9).

Beginning in 1994, RUFA Archaeology has also benefited from University of Hawai’i/East-West Center collaboration (Griffin et al. 1999), which has involved both in-country training during field projects and the passage of Cambodian students to the University of Hawai’i at Manoa. This cooperation has continued through the Lower Mekong Archaeological Project (hereafter LOMAP). The period 1996–2002 saw University of Tübingen archaeologists coordinate an intensive archaeology capacity-building program at RUFA that trained a single cohort of Cambodian students using European instructors at RUFA, field schools, and European archaeological research trips (Haidle et al. 2000). The RAC in Phnom Penh launched its first MA programs in 2000 and PhD programs in 2007 including Cambodian archaeologists. Two RAC Cambodian graduate students are earning Archaeology PhD degrees and now direct their own field projects and are entering the upper echelons of the country’s heritage management agencies (Figure 12.2). Such field projects tend
to occur beyond the boundaries of the Angkor Archaeological Park, a World Heritage location in which foreign heritage organizations vie for projects.

Most international projects at Angkor have incorporated archaeological conservation training into their work since 1996, when the ICC-Angkor recommended allocating at least 1 per cent of all project funding to capacity-building. The Archaeological Survey of India initiated training activities through a six-year project at Angkor Wat, which absorbed c. 200,000 person hours of work, cost nearly US$3 million (Thomson 2007, 377–80; UNESCO Tokyo Declaration Proceedings 1993, 108). Japanese, German, and Italian teams have invested great efforts in conservation-oriented capacity-building, which focuses on staff in the Department of Culture and Monuments (Winter 2008, 533) and has involved many dimensions of heritage management: community education, tourism management, museum management, site guard and park ranger training, and “training for support of cultural practices” (ICC-Angkor 2013).

The quality and efficacy of particular training programs varies by institution: Chinese-sponsored work at both Chau Say Tevoda (1998–2008) and Ta Keo (2006–present) temples, for example, has trained technical workers in architectural conservation implementation, but not Khmer archaeologists who could then assume responsibility for the architectural and archaeological
After Angkor 203

conservation work. Germany’s multi-decade Koh Ker project has trained 54 conservators, while the Archaeology and Development Foundation Phnom Kulen Program has trained nearly as many archaeology students (Figure 12.3; ICC-Angkor 2013). EFEO training efforts until recently have focused primarily on research rather than on training Cambodian archaeologists, although Cambodian archaeological students have participated increasingly in EFEO research projects (Thomson 2007, 381). In contrast, however, is EFEO’s extraordinary support for sculpture conservation training at the National Museum (now in its 27th year). Despite exemplary efforts by the international community to address Angkor’s urgent conservation needs, few organizations have supported long-term archaeological training programs, which are essential for Cambodians to become stewards of their cultural heritage.

Best Practices in Cambodian Heritage Capacity-Building

Cambodia’s uniquely famous archaeological heritage, and the attention devoted to its reconstruction, makes the country a useful case study for archaeologists globally who work in conflict-damaged sites and countries. More than three decades have passed since the first-generation BA Archaeology class graduated from RUFA in the 1970s. Dozens of teachers from more than 15 countries have invested in Cambodia’s heritage; these efforts have
begun to yield results. Increased numbers of trained Khmer professionals now teach younger generations of Cambodian archaeologists, and supervise the country’s museums and heritage management organizations. Their varied archaeological, museum, and conservation experiences bring perspective and insights to activities as varied as developing new heritage organizations (the National Authority for Preah Vihear), designing new legislation (a current project to develop a national Environmental Code), and developing an international code of researcher ethics. This section summarizes some lessons we have learned from our work in Cambodian archaeology that may help those working in other post-conflict settings.

*Archaeological Training, Inventories, Collaboration*

Archaeologists and heritage managers in post-conflict countries have few physical and administrative resources available; frequently the most experienced professionals have fled the country or perished (O’Reilly 2014). We advocate using a combination of short-term and long-term training programs, constructed in consultation with local stakeholders, undertaken in different settings, for decades. Short-term in-country training is a useful complement to long-term international research training programs in the field and in the classroom. So is funding local scholars to run their in-country training programs, support their teaching, and their participation in international academic conferences. Such programs can be successful at a variety of scales, from country-driven initiatives to small-scale (project-specific) programs, both of which have aided Cambodia’s archaeological community. Three US-based organizations actively support heritage training and fund Cambodian-led archaeological projects: the Center for Khmer Studies (an American Overseas Research Center, founded in 1998), Friends of Khmer Culture, Inc. (a non-profit arts organization, founded in 2000), and Heritage Watch (a non-profit organization dedicated to heritage protection, founded in 2003). Cambodian scholars have become increasingly successful in procuring their own funding for projects from these and other organizations.

Foreign archaeologists have also incorporated archaeological training into their research programs. The LOMAP (Stark *et al.* 1999; Stark and Bong 2001), for example, worked with the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts to bring Cambodian interns and RUFA Archaeology field school students to southern Cambodia for eight field seasons between 1996 and 2009 (Figure 12.4). When the project director (Prof Miriam T. Stark) transitioned to the Greater Angkor Project in 2010 to collaborate with APSARA Authority, she brought the training program; some former field school students and interns became supervisors who trained new field school students.

One-time training programs, like the 2013 Luce Foundation-funded Torp Chey archaeological field training course (Hein *et al.* 2013) also provide invaluable technical instruction. But long-term training programs are essential to building local heritage management resources. Jean-Baptiste
Chevance’s Archaeology & Development Foundation’s Phnom Kulen Program (hereafter ADF), is an excellent example. Begun in 2008 as a non-profit organization, ADF combines archaeological research, environmental protection, and economic development on Phnom Kulen (Figure 12.5). Its annual archaeological field seasons have trained more than 55 Cambodian students, some of whom have subsequently attained positions within Cambodia’s culture ministries.

The EFEO’s collaboration with Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts to build a country-wide archaeological inventory is another long-term contribution toward post-conflict reconstruction. Dr. Bruno Bruguier launched a 15-year inventory in 1995 to produce an online database (i.e. the Carte Interactive des Sites Archéologiques Khmers or CISARK) and publish multiple volumes of the Carte Archéologique de Cambodge. This inventory, housed in the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, is the foundation for the country’s heritage management system. These efforts have only succeeded because foreigners have worked directly with Cambodian professionals in the country’s culture ministries.

Simply doing conventional fieldwork in post-conflict countries does not help those countries. Archaeologists must also engage in other heritage management activities to help the country back on its feet. In Cambodia this has
involved many heritage advocacy activities, including launching an NGO to combat trafficking in illicit antiquities (Heritage Watch [O’Reilly 2014]), testifying at each renewal point of Memorandum of Understanding agreements between the United States and Cambodia to uphold the 1970s UNESCO convention, providing grant-writing support to junior Khmer colleagues, reviewing drafts of an Environmental Code, promoting Khmer colleagues for international training opportunities to colleagues through the discipline, editing manuscripts for publication, and writing innumerable reference letters for young Cambodians who seek postgraduate education and training. Such work

Figure 12.5 Archaeology & Development Foundation’s (ADF) archaeologist Sakada Sakhoeun supervises an excavation atop Phnom Kulen National Park. Siem Reap, Cambodia. April 4, 2016. (© Erika Pineros).
Archaeological engagement in post-conflict countries brings its challenges; for one, reconstruction frequently involves economic development. Construction activities in urban areas often entails the loss of historical architecture (Son 2011, 94), and peri-urban expansion around capital cities destroys archaeological sites, like the eighth- through thirteenth-century CE Cheung Ek earthenware and stoneware ceramic production site situated south of Phnom Penh (Phon 2011). Land development, road construction, and land concession agro-business clearance all bring needed infrastructure and threaten the archaeological record. Cambodia’s subsurface resources technically belong to the state (Son 2011, 95) and its archaeological sites deserve protection, but inadequate law enforcement outside of Angkor leaves sites throughout the country vulnerable to predation and unintentional site destruction (e.g. Chan 2011; Phon 2011).

Iconic archaeological sites that draw international support for conservation may also attract more tourists than can be managed. Cambodia opened its doors for tourism in the mid-1990s; as tourist numbers crept up annually, so, too, did uncontrolled development in and around Angkor to support the burgeoning tourist industry (Gaughan et al. 2009). By 2005, more than 830,000 international tourists visited Angkor, a 10,000 per cent increase in just over a decade (Winter 2008, 532). Local communities in the vicinities of monuments are also affected (Miura 2011a). Many of the c. 100,000 residents of the Angkor Archaeological Park lived within its boundaries before Angkor became a World Heritage site, and are now constrained by World Heritage protection regulations (e.g. Gillespie 2013). These regulations have affected house construction, field expansion, and forest use for local residents. Preserving Angkor requires more attention to its ‘living heritage’ (i.e. interactions between these residents and the temples) than has yet been given (Fletcher et al. 2007, 387).

Ongoing consultation with local residents (before, during, and after a particular project) is key. So is attending to the needs of the local population in the area under APSARA jurisdiction. Current APSARA restrictions (imposed with the ICC blessing) restrict Angkor Park residents to a range of construction projects, while providing few income-generating opportunities.

Developing community-based projects with APSARA Authority that bring tangible benefits to residents is one strategy, and could easily involve archaeological education. Efforts by the Archaeology and Development Foundation (ADF) with communities on Phnom Kulen provide a good model. Working from both ends—the top-down (with culture ministries) and the bottom-up (with local communities which should be stewards of their archaeological resources)—is essential for long-term protection of the archaeological record. Obtaining official permission from the national culture ministry and provincial and local governments should only be the first step in conducting archaeological fieldwork. Making the effort to consult local community leaders after official permissions are obtained is just as important.
The 2003–2009 LOMAP field survey field protocol, for example, involved meetings with the district, commune, and village heads prior to conducting fieldwork in each community. Such consultation is essential to fruitful interaction with the very residents whose daily decisions impact the archaeological resources where they live (Figure 12.6).

Cambodians’ final challenge in protecting their archaeological record involves looting and illicit antiquities trafficking, so common in post-conflict settings. Cambodia is a signatory on the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Decades of political instability made antiquities’ looting a lucrative pastime for poor rural Cambodians. Davis and Mackenzie (2014) document the history of complex trafficking networks involving the post-1979 Khmer Rouge (Davis and Mackenzie 2014) and, more recently, Cambodian and
Thai militaries (French 1999; Mackenzie and Davis 2014). Between 1988 and 2010, the Sotheby’s auction house’s Department of Indian and Southeast Asian Art listed 368 individual Khmer antiquities attributed to Cambodia (Davis 2011, 162, footnote 22); Davis’s analysis suggests that Khmer antiquities flooded the art market between 1989 and 1993. Chhay (2011, 104–5) reported the explosion of looting on Phnom Kulen in the early 1990s that damaged archaeological sites. Jean-Baptiste’s ADF and the still-longer running Heritage Watch organization blend community outreach with capacity-building to stem looting (O’Reilly 2007, 2014). So do excavation projects elsewhere in the country. Cambodia, sadly, lacks resources to protect the rest of its precious archaeological record with this remarkable level of care.

Final Thoughts

Twenty years of intensive capacity-building in Cambodian heritage management has produced a large cohort of trained Cambodian professionals who graduated from RUFA’s Archaeology Faculty. Many now staff upper-level heritage management positions in the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, APSARA Authority, National Authority for Preah Vihear, and the RAC (Figure 12.7).

Figure 12.7 Royal Academy of Cambodian 2016 excavations at Cheung Ek stoneware kilns: field crew with Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts and Heritage Protection Police (Phnom Penh municipality), directed by Phon Kaseka with funding from the National Geographic Society. (Photograph courtesy of Phon Kaseka).
These agencies have carried out preservation and conservation projects across the country, with domestic funding (e.g. Prasat Andet, Phum Prasat, Baset, Banteay Toap, Spean Toap, and Phnom Trap) and external support from foreign governments and foundations. The US Embassy, for example, awarded an Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation to support the restoration of Han Chey and the Kok Treas excavations (US Embassy n.d.). Cambodia’s provincial museums have also been revitalized (and, in many cases, rebuilt) through a blend of public-private funding that the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts negotiated. APSARA Authority’s work, on the other hand, relies on both entrance revenues and international assistance for maintenance, restoration, and rescue excavation in the Angkor region.

The top-down management strategy that has undergirded Cambodia’s heritage reconstruction program (e.g. Peycam 2016), in which the government has had to respond to global initiatives (Gillespie 2016, 406), may explain why so few Cambodian heritage professionals lead projects within the Angkor Archaeological Park. Cambodia has a rich archaeological heritage, and Khmer archaeologists have initiated small heritage management projects in several provinces outside of Angkor in conjunction with field-based research. Land reclamation and associated site looting activities after the mid-1990s stimulated the establishment of local site museums like the Angkor Borei Museum, the Memot Center, Sre Ampil Museum, and Kok Patri Museum. Each museum was envisioned as a self-sustaining tourism location and education center for local teachers to integrate into their school curricula, and institutions for forming strong bonds with the local communities to raise heritage awareness. Each building would also serve as a collections repository for archaeologists conducting research in the area (Heng Sophady, personal communication).

Most of these local museums, regrettably, and others initiated by non-archaeologists (like the Wat Bo Museum in Siem Reap [Calthorpe 2009]) have not met their preservation or visitation goals. One factor that explains their lack of success lies in the western focus of the museum exhibits, rather than on Khmer-speaking and Khmer-reading visitors. Exhibit materials, for example, tend to be written in western languages rather than the Khmer language. Another factor lies in contrasting ways of experiencing heritage. Westerners commonly experience heritage through visiting museums or visiting standing monuments. Many Cambodians, in contrast, prefer a living context. In Siem Reap, they routinely patronize the 52-acre cultural theme park that is the Cambodian Cultural Village, where people walk through recreated Cham, Chinese, and Kreung villages (replete with homes and residents), visit miniaturized architectural landmarks like the Royal Palace, attend (and occasionally take part in) a traditional Khmer wedding ceremony, and enjoy traditional dances.

Khmers also appreciate their built heritage, including temples scattered throughout the Angkor Archaeological Park. Just as many Khmers visit Buddhist pagodas to pray and make offerings, so they also visit Angkorian (and pre-Angkorian) temples: not simply to admire architectural details, but
also to experience them physically. Some statues in these temples are tended by older Khmer women (and occasionally men), and visitors pause at such statues to pray, make offerings, and seek blessings. Like their western tourist counterparts, they also photograph monuments. These are living landscapes: during annual holidays (and also throughout the year), Khmer families picnic in the shade of ancient temples and stroll the grounds. Making archaeological monuments accessible to local visitors and to foreign tourists is a challenge that requires attention to a diversity of visitation needs.

Cambodia’s recent history of heritage reconstruction holds lessons and cautionary tales for heritage managers who are faced with rebuilding heritage in countries currently—or just emerging from—geopolitical conflict. What works best depends on the country, but paying closer attention to local cultural values is essential to each initiative’s success. So does working closely with local archaeologists and heritage managers, who may come from source fields as diverse as urban planning to environmental studies. Understanding and incorporating aspects of local heritage consumption into heritage education produces better results than simply adopting conventional strategies used elsewhere in the world. So does long-term commitment to particular research projects, institutions, and particular archaeologists, all done with respect for local values.

The Angkor Archaeological Park still bears the physical memory of its great French scholar and EFEO Angkor conservator Bernard Philippe Groslier (1926–1986). His field notebooks illustrate his greatest concern in the early 1970s as Cambodia’s civil war intensified: Khmers who took refuge in the Angkor temples to avoid gun battles. Yet it is also his vision of Angkor as a tree-filled park, designed for tourist visitation that dictated heritage preservation decisions in the park for more than half a century. Greater Angkor, during its ‘life’, was the world’s largest preindustrial urban center (Evans et al. 2013). It may have housed more than 500,000 inhabitants: five times the number of Khmer people now allowed to live in the park. Its preservationists now advocate more values-based participatory planning that involves a full range of stakeholders, including Greater Angkor’s current residents, to ensure both heritage preservation and sustainable development into the future (Hang et al. 2016; Miura 2011a). Cambodian archaeologists are now training the next generation of archaeologists; they must also be integral to future heritage planning in their country.

Bibliography


Fals, M. 2015. Epilogue: Clearing the path towards civilization: 150 years of “Saving Angkor.” In: M. Fals (ed.), *Cultural Heritage as Civilizing Mission: From Decay...


Introduction

On 4 September 2007 I did not know that this would be my last fieldwork day before a long halt of 24 months. A few days later, the Taliban tried to destroy a gigantic rock-carved Buddha and a huge Buddhist rock-relief at Jahanabad: both were severely damaged. In February 2008, the Swat Archaeological Museum was partly destroyed in one of the most devastating blasts of the Swat insurgency period, with a death toll of 70 innocents. Two years later, after the Taliban were defeated by the army, the Italian Archaeological Mission in Pakistan was called upon for an extraordinary recovery exercise of Swat archaeological heritage, which was denoted as the ACT-Field School project. The first part of this contribution will show how deeply the roots of the project are connected to the methodological framework of the mission. The second part is dedicated to an illustration of the project itself.

The Italian Archaeological Mission in Pakistan was the first dedicated research unit of the IsMEO (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, the Italian Institute for the Far and Middle East), constituted in Pakistan in 1955 by Giuseppe Tucci (Callieri 2006; Olivieri 2006; Tucci 1958). IsMEO itself was established in 1933, and in 1996 merged with the Italian-African Institute. The new body (IsIAO: Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, Italian Institute for African and Oriental Studies) – notwithstanding its vast field of expertise, and its internationally acknowledged role (see IsIAO 2008) – progressively underwent drastic and unplanned budget cuts, which eventually resulted in a budgetary deadlock, and in the Italian Government’s decision to close it in 2011 (Panaino 2016). The majority of the former IsIAO members decided then to create a new body, named symbolically ISMEO (International Association of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies), which inherited the aims and legacies of both the previous institutes (see www.ismeo.edu).

The decision taken by the Italian Government in 2011 left the IsIAO research units abroad in a difficult situation, especially the Italian Archaeological Mission in Pakistan. This mission was, and still is, a permanent institution with permanent headquarters and staff in Swat at Saidu Sharif, and with full responsibility for exploring, preserving and managing several archaeological sites on
behalf of the Pakistani authorities. Moreover, in 2011, the mission was also the leading implementing partner of a large and multifaceted development cooperation program in the field of heritage in Pakistan; the Archaeology-Community-Tourism or ACT-Field School.

**Against All Odds**

In 2007, Swat, which was only just recovering from the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, became the target of an insurgency strategy. The insurgency started initially under the umbrella of the TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi), which was a militant party fighting for the imposition of the *sharia*, led by Maulana Fazlullah, the head of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). In 2009, after a dramatic escalation of terror attacks against military and police forces, and civilians, Swat de facto fell under the rule of a self-declared Taliban Emirate headed by Maulana Fazlullah. In June 2009, the Pakistan army then launched a massive ground operation. The latter caused an unprecedented exodus of more than 2 million people from the valley, the biggest in the recent history of South Asia. The military campaign was concluded in early summer 2009, but nearly one year later, Swat was hit by one of the worst natural disasters in the recent history of Pakistan, a flood that destroyed crucial infrastructures and devastated more than 70 percent of the agricultural land.

The new ACT project was conceived in 2007, before the Swat crisis exploded, and was then thoroughly discussed and elaborated with the donors (the ‘Pakistan-Italian Debt Swap Agreement’ between Italy and Pakistan, PIDSA) during the insurgency and the early post-crisis stages. ACT had just been launched in March 2011, when at the end of the same month, the co-implementing partner (the Department of Archaeology and Museums, Ministry of Culture, Government of Pakistan) was wiped out by one of the quickest implementations of a devolution process ever seen in the history of a modern state. Under the effect of the 18th Amendment of the Pakistani Constitution, the Ministry of Culture was abolished, which thus automatically deprived the Federal Department of Archaeology and Museums of its legal role as a central regulatory body, in favor of the provincial authorities. Not all the Provinces were equally equipped, or prepared for this historic event. Luckily, in the province Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP, the former North West Frontier Province), where the Swat district is located, there was already a provincial Directorate of Archaeology and Museums (DOAM), which was immediately ready to take the baton.

In short, the mission was called upon to implement a three-year, 2 million euro project with a national partner that after one month was declared defunct, and having its own parent institute in Italy (IsIAO) put into liquidation just eight months after the project had started. Nevertheless, both mission and project survived, owing to a combination of fortunate factors. The first one was the mutual availability of both the Federal Department and the KP Directorate...
to hand over and to take over the project respectively. The second factor was that the administration of the project (whose budget was in Pakistani rupees) had been set up in Islamabad, and not at the IsIAO headquarters in Rome.

After the end of Phase 1 of ACT in September 2014, a 17-month Phase 2 of ACT (with funding of c. 450,000 euros) was launched in May 2015, again implemented by the mission, but this time under the umbrella of ISMEO. The ACT-Field School project (Phases 1 and 2) ended in October 2016. In total, the activity of the project covered the period from March 2011 to October 2016, with a gap of seven months between October 2014 and April 2015. As a direct outcome of the project, DOAM KP managed to protect and acquire all the archaeological lands formerly managed by ACT with a post-project investment of more than 2.6 million euros.

The Italian Archaeological Mission (1955–2006)

Legal Issues

ACT was a project entirely based on the results and structure of the pre-existing Italian Archaeological Mission in Pakistan. The latter was conceived from the outset as a permanent body, and consequently had to face and solve certain problems which generally are not perceived as part of an archaeologist’s remit. I am referring to the legal aspects which set the framework within which the archaeological activities could be implemented. At the time Giuseppe Tucci was active in 1955, the law in force in India was still the 1904 Ancient Monument Protection Act, established by the British. Since 1919, Swat had been a princely state formally separated from British India, and it remained separate from the newly formed Pakistan until 1969. Swat State (the “Yusufzai State of Swat”) was founded in 1919 by its Wali (ruler), Miangul Abdul Wadud, and was recognized as a state entity by the British Government in India in 1926. As a consequence, it was declared that none of the laws, rules, and regulations valid in British India were applicable in the Swat State where an administration based on the *sharia* was exercised by the ruler and his *Wazirs* (ministers).

In 1955 Tucci obtained a licence from the Pakistani Department of Archaeology and Museums, which had inherited the functions of the British India Archaeological Service post-partition. Though Swat was a princely state, and was dependent on Pakistan for some matters, archaeology in Swat was not regulated by Pakistan or even a provincial government. From the Italian standpoint, each excavation required a legal framework and this was embodied in the right of possession of the excavated items, i.e. by their deposition in a state repository, a museum. In 1956, as attested by archival records, Tucci succeeded in getting the new ruler to accept that the Ancient Monument Protection Act could be extended to Swat (Tanweer 2011). In 1958 the first nucleus of what was to become the Swat Museum was set up in Saidu Sharif, which represented one of the first public Pakistani buildings in the Yusufzai
State of Swat. Only then could Tucci legally set up the excavation activities and put the Pakistani licence in a clear context.

**The Italian Archaeology Legacy**

The first Italian reconnaissance in Swat (Tucci 1958) was followed by a plan drafted by Domenico Faccenna, where the fundamental lines of the mission’s work were finalized (Olivieri 2006). Since the beginning the mission was set up as an actual “body for the promotion of tourism and cultural assets” within the State of Swat. Its activities included tourism and education as well as archaeology (ibid.). One of the most significant aspects introduced was a meticulous excavation methodology, brought to Swat through Tucci’s collaborators, all young but experienced classical archaeologists of the Italian Archaeological Superintendencies (regional or thematic branches of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage). They brought a completely new approach to South Asian archaeology, which remained valid for decades. Domenico Faccenna was appointed Director of the newly created Centro Scavi e Ricerche Archeologiche in Asia, the IsMEO agency to which all the Italian missions belonged. Faccenna, on the basis of his archaeological experience in Italy, carefully defined all the aspects of the archaeological activities: the rules governing stratigraphic excavation, graphic and photographic documentation, restoration, analysis, publications, and disseminations, and so forth. Training courses were organized by the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale in Rome (just created by Tucci) for the members of the IsMEO Missions.

The establishment of the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale in Rome (1958) and its counterpart in Swat, the Swat Museum (1963), was part of the methodology of the project. Faccenna’s brand new idea was to create a “regional” museum in Saidu Sharif which would house an initial collection donated by the ruler of the Swat State, and then the materials resulting from scientific excavations of the mission. This material would be catalogued following a very advanced protocol for the time (the very same one as adopted in the Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale). These twin museums, along with the Taxila Museum, are still the only ones in the world in which Gandhara collections are accompanied by a complete and reliable archaeological record. The other famous collections in Asia, Europe, and North America, notwithstanding their artistic importance, come mostly from colonial military collections, from the antiquary market, or from non-scientifically based excavations, and lack significant context.


One of the major cultural trends in an osmotic environment such as the Swat valley, one of the frontiers between the Sub-Continent and Central Asia, is the interaction between dominance and subalternity, displayed in both social and ethnic forms. For instance, the mainstream cultural history of the valley is
characterized by a series of cultural macro-phenomena, all of which have been amply documented archeologically and do not need to be detailed here. All these macro-phenomena had an evident and recognizable impact on the social history of the Swat valley and represent phases of acculturation. Acculturation phases were interspersed with phases of cultural marginality (or the late persistence of earlier cultural forms), which coexisted with the former in remote areas of Swat (see Olivieri 2015c, 107–122). The developmental trends of the valley in the past are particularly interesting when considered in the light of the recent changes in its traditional societies within the framework of a rapid urbanization process and the turmoil of the Afghan conflict and the Taliban insurgency and rule (Hopkins and Marsden 2012, 2013; Inam-ur-rahim and Viaro 2002; Majeed 2016).

The most fertile agricultural lands in Swat are owned by ethnic Yusufzai Pashto-speaking landlords (khans). Khans and their affiliated farmers (tenants) were traditionally linked to each other by a social bond. The traditional contract in Swat featured a simple deed, a mutual exchange that may be synthetized as work and respect of the contract in exchange for protection (of which there is a long study tradition: see, e.g. Ahmad 1980; Barth 1959). When the Taliban phenomenon emerged in the region as early as 1994–1998, it found a favourable terrain in the sorts of class struggle that give rise to resentment of the traditional land-owning patrons by the tenants. Land disputes and court litigations reached their peak just as Pakistani civil law was introduced in the 1990s, when Swat became a “settled district” (i.e. no longer a princely state that had been separate from the Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or PATA). The lengthy and costly new legal system was perceived as an imposition by the less-affluent part of the population. This feeling was exacerbated by the linguistic barrier (laws are written in English, judicial and administrative hearings are conducted in Urdu), and a lack of transparency. All this contributed to the uprising of the latter demanding the re-introduction of the sharia. At least in the beginning it was simply a request “to go back to something like the time of Wali Saheb”, which in Swati jargon means “to a clear and understandable administration like the one of the former Swat State”.

The Taliban managed to steer what was at the beginning a conservative demand against the challenges of the modernization of the Swat society, into a totally new narrative that eventually led them to play the role of self-proclaimed advocates of the lowest segments of Swat society (as was acutely noted by Jane Perlez in her reports for The New York Times). The social status quo was suddenly shattered in the guise of the “class struggle” agenda implemented by the Taliban (see also Vidale and Olivieri 2014).

When the Taliban started targeting the landlords, many of them decided to leave Swat. And this was exactly when the traditional bonds were broken, forever. No protection, no work, no further respect of the status quo. The lands left behind by the fleeing landlords were initially occupied by tenants with the support of the Taliban. But the majority of the tenants supported the army during the operations, with some taking on key roles in the Peace Committees,
and many claimed the right to own the lands that they had ‘defended’ during the war. The new situation brought new players into the political and social arena, and although this represents a largely positive challenge for Swat society, it posed and still poses many serious issues for heritage management, such as the increased number of individuals, landowners, and interlocutors involved in the process of protection of a heritage site.

The Italian Mission stood shoulder to shoulder with their watchkeepers or tenants all through the tragic 24 months between 2007 and 2009. The mission acted as a pakka zamindar “a good landlord”, and when the mission started the ACT project it was not faced with any particular problems linked to the struggles around land and class. The ACT was the first foreign project directly implemented on the ground by foreign technical assistance in Swat.

The ACT-Field School Project (2011–2016)

The Conceptual Backbone

After a compulsory shutdown between 2007 and 2010 due to the Taliban insurgency, the mission fieldwork resumed in 2011 thanks to funding from the ‘Pakistan-Italian Debt Swap Agreement’ between Italy and Pakistan (PIDSA) for the joint Italian-Pakistani ‘Archaeology – Community – Tourism Field School’ (ACT–Field School) project, led by the mission, and directed by the present author. Several Italian universities and institutions have contributed to the project by ‘lending’ their experts and sharing expertise. All the contributing institutions are mentioned in the acknowledgements at the end of the chapter.

In recent years, the Italian Development Cooperation has added a special meaning to the concept of ‘debt swap’ by implementing a series of initiatives involving cultural development intended as a direct or indirect economic driving force. Here Italy is a world leader as its integrated ‘debt swap’ projects were the first to be tried out in this sector, first in Latin America, then Yemen, Egypt, and now in Pakistan (see, for instance, Buckley 2009, 2011). The case of Swat is particularly important, as tourism (with archaeology playing a central role) is, or at least was prior to 2010, the second most important source of income here. The aim of the ACT project then, was to set up a model for action based on economic values linked to the resumption of archaeological tourism and the involvement of the local communities in archaeology, heritage, and tourism.

The ACT project in Swat was based on urgent practical needs, which initially left little room for theoretical elaboration. There was a museum, damaged and empty; there was a collection to bring back; and there were archaeological sites at risk. The museum and sites had either suffered damage or were neglected during the insurgency and the military operations. Part of the collection, which – luckily – had been moved to the safety of the Taxila Museum’s storehouses in Punjab by Federal DOAM staff a few months before the museum was damaged, had to be sent back in its entirety
to avoid the risk of being split between different institutions. These tasks were achieved in a relatively short period of time and with relatively limited funds (c. 700,000 euros, including planning, technical assistance, international flights, and administrative costs). Therefore, the core of the first phase of the ACT project revolved around the new Swat Museum created by the architects Ivano Marati and Candida Vassallo, in collaboration with the engineer Claudio Cristilli (AIRES–Federico II University of Naples) and the engineers of the University of Engineering and Technology in Peshawar. The old museum, built with an Italian contribution in 1958–1963, was at risk of partial collapse as revealed by an independent static analysis (UET, Peshawar). Damage to the structure occurred as collateral damage from a massive bomb blast aimed at the building opposite the museum, the Mingora Hostel of the Jahanzeb College, which was used as lodgings by military and paramilitary forces. More than 70 people lost their lives in this explosion in 2008, including civilians.

Starting in spring 2011 and lasting for 30 months, the building was partly demolished and reconstructed, and partly reinforced and incorporated in the new construction. The new museum has been designed according to new anti-seismic principles, which make it, from the structural standpoint, one of the most advanced buildings of its kind in Pakistan. The museum is also designed to cope with the local endemic shortage of electricity, as natural light plays a special role in the architecture. It is also designed as a potential social hub with a large independent auditorium right at the centre of the building that can be used for public events (Figure 13.1).

Figure 13.1 The new Swat Museum (2014). (Photo: Aurangzeib Khan. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).
The new 1,486 m² museum embodies the core aims of a multifaceted project, where archaeology, heritage management, and education work side-by-side, with and within the local society (Marati and Vassallo 2013). The new display was designed chronology-wise along nine galleries, beginning with a summary of the history of archaeological research in the valley, and then moving from prehistory to the ethnological galleries. Within this chronological framework, which also includes generally neglected historical periods such as the post-Gandharan and pre-Islamic periods, the objects are grouped by site, which means that the emphasis was placed on their archaeological context.

Large pictures are displayed all along the galleries to visually indicate the provenance locations, and are of sites that may easily be visited and are located within a radius of 15 km from the museum premises. The museum can actually be used as the beginning or the end of an archaeological journey around Swat. A Guide for the museum was published in English in 2013, and we expect that soon the DOAM will translate it into Urdu. The scarcity of Urdu information facilities and tools is clearly a weak point for the museum, and ACT has so far failed to correct this. In Pakistani archaeology circles, despite isolated initiatives and attempts, written Urdu is very rarely used. Urdu should be revitalized in my view: there should be research journals in Urdu, there should be Urdu terms for ‘stratigraphic unit,’ ‘interface,’ ‘matrix,’ ‘figurated frieze,’ or ‘pediment,’ and also for terms like ‘debt swap’ and so forth. I argue there are basically two reasons for this: the growing demand for archaeological information from the general public, and the need to create a linguistic front in a country where students grow up speaking Pashto or Balochi or Seraiki, etc., speak Urdu at secondary school level, and are forced to use English at university.

The first Swat Museum was inaugurated on November 10, 1963 with a message from the President of the Italian Republic Antonio Segni being read. On November 11, 2013, the new museum was inaugurated with a message of President Giorgio Napolitano being read, exactly 50 years later.

Archaeology from Below

The uninterrupted presence of the mission, its responsibility for most of the archaeological areas of Swat on behalf of the Pakistani authorities, and the continuity of the work force over several generations has enabled a unique working experience in the field. This experience was transformed into an action model which in turn forms the conceptual framework of the ACT project.

The ACT project was directly implemented by the mission in the field. Initially the local staff both at the headquarters (the historical “Mission House” in Saidu Sharif) and in the field were the same people who had been working with the mission for the last 15–20 years. Recruitment of voluntary trainees was based on three simple principles: membership of the same village where the field activity was carried out, having an IDP background (which means being one of the 2 million people who left Swat on the eve of the army land
intervention in 2009), and – ça va sans dire – with no kind of involvement whatsoever in past insurgency activity. Amongst the trainees, during the first year of the field school, the site keepers (chowkidars), restorers, and the future local trainers were selected on the basis of merit and capacity. No one was asked to leave the school and more than 300 people received a pretty good daily wage – by local standards – plus technical training on a seasonal basis for five years. People were paid directly by the ACT. The government (at provincial and federal level) and the army were simply responsible for logistics: to facilitate travel permits and NOCs (no-objection certificates) for entering and staying in Swat, for supporting ACT initiatives at district level, and for supporting scientific work with the DOAM archaeologists and technical staff.

One initial key aspect was the relationship between rural communities and archaeological sites. This relationship is particularly important for the ‘self-protection’ of the sites. Although initially viewed by the local community as a source of income, by means of participating in and observing the archaeological work on a site this relationship was transformed into a sense of belonging, of shared responsibility. The archaeological areas placed under the control of the communities by the mission were the only ones not to be damaged during the period of Taliban rule. The work of the ACT project added some longer-term incentives such as the hiring of caretakers, training of restorers and excavators, archaeological guides to the traditional incentive of daily wages for labourers, and so forth.

The archaeological sites were conceived as “field schools” serviced by Italian archaeologists as trainers. The archaeologists and Pakistani university students were gradually augmented by the most able of the workmen that is, a hard-core of 10–15 workmen with already 15–20 years’ experience working on the sites excavated by the Italian Mission. The methodology adopted is of particular interest. Excavation by grids or trial trenches, still practiced in Pakistan today, calls for a post-excavation interpretation of the stratigraphy section cut by the archaeologist (according to the dictum that “the workmen dig and the archaeologist interprets”). Extensive stratigraphic excavation on the other hand requires a relative degree of sharing of skills and decisions.

One of the major ACT activities was performed for five years at the Barikot training campsite. Barikot is a multiphase urban site, which is considered a key site for the understanding of the late protohistory and early-historic phases (Figures 13.2 and 13.3). An urban site was established at Barikot around the fifth to fourth centuries BCE (Olivieri and Iori, forthcoming) with an uninterrupted sequence to the late third century CE. The city was abandoned in the aftermath of two destructive earthquakes and the collapse of the Kushana political system under the advance of the Sasanians. Later phases are documented in the acropolis of the city with monumental evidence of the Sasanian, Shahi, and Ghaznavid periods (from fifth to eleventh centuries). In 2011–2016 we managed to expose the entire south-western quarters of the city as an integral part of the training project (Olivieri 2014d). The successful Barikot experience entailed the horizontal sequence excavation of all the coeval phases over nearly
one hectare of urban area. Once the entire area had been exposed, action planning was shared amongst the archaeologists and excavators based on what was visible, and thus became a process involving evaluation and discussion.

The understanding of the workmen grew as they dug for they could fully appreciate the dynamic nature of the stratigraphic succession and the impacts of deposition and post-depositional events and processes. The workmen’s pre-existing skills were exploited in the methodology adopted and this allowed them to be incorporated into the working process in an increasingly active and autonomous role (a brief description of this procedure is contained in a recent handbook of field archaeology for beginners published by the ACT-Field School [Olivieri 2014c]). This type of involvement and autonomy is significant and enhances the awareness and self-awareness of the excavator and creates a feeling of belonging with regard to the archaeological assets experienced by the local community itself. According to Giovanni Leonardi, one of the leading Italian authorities in stratigraphy and formation processes, the new methodology was “an evolution, but also an important change, of the methods and theoretical background of Mortimer Wheeler’s fieldschool. This change involves a shift from a strongly hierarchical management of the yard to participation and shared discussion” (Leonardi in Olivieri 2014c) (Figures 13.4 to 13.6).
As far as maintenance and conservation are concerned, one further step of great potential significance has been achieved. The approach to conservation and restoration has followed a similar path and is focused on materials and trainee skills. In practical terms we started from what the typical Swati worker, who is basically a farmer, already knows. We taught him how to correctly and safely cut stones or slake quicklime (slaked lime is not locally available on the market), and enhanced his skills on straw-and-clay mortar and plaster technique, while the usage of chemicals (not easily available in Pakistan) was limited. Protective gear was introduced as compulsory in the training camps and classes on occupational safety (OSHA) were carried out. In this way we trained a significant number of restorers, and put all of this into practice at several campsites: the Buddhist monuments of Gumbat, the
Figure 13.4 Digging at the Udegram graveyard (2012). (Photo: Michele Cupitò. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).

Figure 13.5 Excavation and conservation in progress at Amluk-Dara (2012). (Photo: Luca M. Olivieri. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).
stupa at Saidu Sharif I, the mosque of Udegram, and finally at the gigantic Buddha at Jahanabad. The need was felt to adopt a low-cost action model based on clear-cut methodological concepts that in future would allow government agencies to plan serial maintenance and restoration action. It also needed to be on a large-scale to address the order of magnitude that has to be faced in the administration of cultural assets in Swat and in Pakistan. The basic concept of this kind of shared intervention can be synthetized as “community practice” (Figures 13.7 to 13.9; see Olivieri 2009, 2015d).

**Subalterns, Subalternity, and the Role of Tourism**

One point of special interest in the experience of the ACT-Field School project was the attention paid to minority Hindko-speaking communities living in the mountains surrounding the main valley. This attention was expressed through the elaboration of several activities focused on the living area of these communities, and aimed at connecting these groups with those (mostly Pashto-speaking) living in the major centres, for example at Barikot. In this sense, during the major excavation and conservation activities carried out in the areas south of Barikot, e.g. at Amluk-dara and Gumbat/Balo Kale, we performed a substantial and continuous exchange of expertise and staff between the various fieldcamps and the major campsite at Barikot. Moreover, the caretakers of the archaeological areas were trained to be guides and encouraged to join together
Figure 13.7 Men at work at the Main Stupa, Saidu Sharif I (2013). (Photo: Fabio Colombo. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).

Figure 13.8 Restoration in progress at the Mission House’s godowns (2014). (Photo: Francesco Martore. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).
in a private association (SAGA) in which they could develop their skills, passing from a subordinate role to a more active entrepreneurial one. This was a quantum leap in the face of such “Copernican revolution”, the results of which will be felt in the next generation.

Besides the job opportunities ACT represented a great social opportunity and a tool for the social upgrading of the lowest segment of the local society. Former tenants, during their training, had the opportunity to interact on equal terms with university students and Pakistani archaeology officers. In most cases, both the latter were the recipients of the technical know-how of the ACT trainees. It was particularly interesting to see well-off students and

Figure 13.9 Restoration in progress at the colossal Buddha of Jahanabad (2016). (Photo: Giuseppe Salemi. Courtesy ACT project/ISMEO Italian Archaeological Mission).
archaeology officers crouching side-by-side with farmers, listening and following their instructions on how to use a trowel or a pick, how to collect charcoal examples, take measurements, write a label with the layer’s metadata, and how to distinguish the limits of an archaeological layer. Former tenants, when promoted to the position of site supervisors, were given full responsibility to interact with district administration and police officers on sensitive issues like land acquisition and encroachments. They were called upon every day to interact with tour operators and tourist groups, sometimes with foreign visitors and delegations. All this afforded them an unexpectedly higher social reputation, although their social status remained the same.

SAGA, the Swat Archaeological Guides Association was created by former trainees from the ACT project. SAGA aims at providing assistance and logistical aid to tourists visiting not only the mainstream archaeological sites, but especially those that are located off-site, partly accessible by road, and reachable in a two- to six-hour walk. Practically, SAGA, the first association of its kind in Pakistan, can act with the same characteristics as an alpine guide team in the Alps. SAGA is now associated not only with the All-Malakand Associations, but also with the Sustainable Tourism Foundation Pakistan (STFP), a pilot organization in the country, which is providing it with organizational and marketing assistance.

A Bridge for the Future

As an ideal training ground for SAGA, the project created the space for an archaeological mountain trail park in the valleys of Kandak and Kotah (currently part of an approximately 20-kilometre circuit). The trail park was created as a new tool to further integrate archaeology, landscape, and tourism, but also to mitigate the potentially negative impact of tourism, and the protection of a living and natural landscape by involving local communities in the process. The trail is equipped with signposts, water points, rest areas, and overnight stay facilities. This activity was received with great enthusiasm by the local communities as the paths greatly shortened the time taken by adults and children to reach the shops and schools situated on the valley floor (Biagioli et al. 2014, 2016).

In 2016, when ACT was about to be concluded, the project made an agreement with the community of the village of Balo Kale, a vital gateway to the Gumbat site and to the trail park, an important hub for local archaeology tourism. There, the only bridge connecting the village with the main road network was destroyed by a flood in 2015, and as late as August 2016 no initiatives had been undertaken by the local or district governments for the reconstruction of this vital infrastructure. Therefore, the project decided to undertake an initiative to rectify this situation based at the same time on the best community practice of modern development projects, as well as on the customary practice traditional in Swat of the social status quo. ACT launched a public tender for the procurement of building materials, and the community provided the labour.
In October 2016 the new bridge was inaugurated. Its cost – thanks to the exclusion of intermediaries and contractors – was more than 50 per cent lower than the best estimate.

For the time being the impact of tourism is relatively soft, although the ACT sites are currently receiving a share of approximately 5–7 per cent of the current tourism capacity in the Swat valley (data May 2015–May 2016). However, the trend is growing, especially in the field of religious/archaeological tourism from Buddhist and Buddhist-culture Asian countries, such as China, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan.

Conclusions

The ACT project represents the first case in Pakistan of the “evolving heritage concept”, including archaeology and sustainable development. It was after ACT that the focus on heritage appeared in the mission statements of all the major international donors in Pakistan (including the EU, World Bank, and UN Agencies other than UNESCO). The background to the project’s success lies in the Italian Mission’s 60 years of constant presence in the field. This continuity has resulted in a unique working experience, and an immensely strong relationship with local communities, which transformed into a new model of intervention. As far as strategy and methodology are concerned, restoration and excavation training camps were organized at different sites at the same time, a fact that called for an enormous logistical effort, but guaranteed a large impact on the ground. The working methodology, which included the sharing of skills and decision-making, proved to be both economically sustainable and socially creative as local farmers worked side-by-side with experts and students, sharing participation and discussions. The more interested workers founded a recognized association of Archaeological Guides. The relationship between rural communities and archaeological sites has been of fundamental importance for the protection of the sites. Labourers participated in the direct management of site conservation, gaining consideration and esteem at a social level.

The main target successfully achieved by the project vis-à-vis the sustainability issue is the acquisition of the archaeological sites by the provincial authorities. The acquisition program includes also the enrollment of the site caretakers trained by ACT. In terms of assets, in addition to the various civil works executed by the project, there is the successful story of the Swat Museum. In 30 months, the new Swat Museum was architecturally reshaped by the project and handed over to the provincial authorities. The limited cost of the operation represents a rare case of a complex project being realized with sustainable costs. The new Swat Museum has 2,040 objects on display: 90 per cent from regular excavations carried out in Swat from 1956 to 2012, the remaining 10 per cent being formed by ethnological material, including 105 objects donated by the Italian Archaeological Mission in 2013. In addition, 2,595 major archaeological artefacts were excavated by ACT from 2011 to 2016, and handed over to the Swat Museum Reserve Collection.
In addition to the vital involvement and training of local personnel, the project has a series of other major achievements. These include opening to tourists one of the largest archaeological sites in Pakistan, the south-western quarters of the ancient urban site at Barikot. In this area (c. 1 ha) are exposed structures from fifteenth century BCE to fourth century CE, which have been preserved and interpreted through information boards in Urdu and English. The site has also been included by Federal archaeological authorities in their agenda for the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List (updated 2016). The project has also achieved the restoration of the colossal rock-carving of Buddha at Jahanabad, one of the largest of its kind in South Asia, which was deliberately attacked by the Taliban in 2007. The project has carried out the excavation and conservation/restoration of three major Buddhist sites, now accessible and open to the public (Saidu Sharif I, Amluk-dara, and Gumbat/Balo Kale). While Buddhist sites tend to dominate archaeology and heritage in Swat, the project has also focused on the conservation and restoration of the third oldest Mosque in Pakistan (eleventh century), now accessible and open to the public, as well as its inclusion in the Federal agenda for the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List (updated 2016). Critically, the contribution made by the project to the post-devolution federal/provincial dialogue on heritage matters, as well as to the provincial guidelines on both tourism and heritage management, not only provides a model of sustainability and knowledge transfer, but has also influenced legislation and future policies, as proved for instance by the new 2016 Antiquity Act approved by provincial government, and the provincial plan to expand to future initiatives the approach positively fostered by the ACT. Moreover, six of the archaeological sites managed by ACT (Barikot, Udegram, Jahanabad, Amluk-dara, Gumbat, and Abbasheb-china, for a total of 13.1 ha) were acquired by DOAM KP in 2016 within the framework of a post-project governmental investment of 287 Million Pakistani rupees (equal to 104.6 per cent of the funds utilized by ACT-Field School in its two phases). Overall, the acquisition program concerns 12 archaeological sites in Swat for a total of 15.35 ha.

An effective communication strategy has been vital to the educational role of the project. Popularization encouraged the interest of local intellectuals and civil society forums. All the results of the fieldwork (including the museum masterplan) were published in printed format by a leading publishing house in Pakistan (Sang-e-Meel): Bagnera 2015; Biagioli et al. 2016; Faccenna and Spagnesi 2014; Marati and Vassallo 2013; Olivieri 2014c, 2014d, 2015b, 2015c; Vidale et al. 2016. So far, the first two volumes are available also as e-books (as free resources, see http://brady pus.net). Besides the volumes of the ACT series, books, articles, and social media forums independently disseminated the ACT project’s results and issues (amongst the various publications, Rafiullah Khan 2013, Khaliq 2014 and Ali Khan 2014 are worth mentioning). As a further result, the archaeological sites of Swat are seeing an unmatched popularity, showing the huge potential of local, national, and international tourism. At the archaeological sites of Barikot,
Udegram, Amluk-dara, and Gumbat/Balo Kale, ACT has registered on average 30,000 visitors per year in the last three years (37,000 in 2015–2016).

In conclusion, the ACT project started its work in Swat in a moment of unprecedented instability for the region, which resulted in historically significant social changes. This was also the very time that Pakistan was approaching one of the most radical instances of the devolution of power from the centre to the provinces. We would argue in light of the very successful results that it was the right project at the right time.

Acknowledgements

In addition to IsIAO (and later ISMEO) and DOAM KP, mention must be made of the invaluable contribution in the form of human resources made by the Istituto Superiore per la Conservazione e il Restauro (Ministry for Cultural Activities and Tourism, MIBACT), the MIBACT itself through the General Direction for Architettura e Paesaggio (old wording) and the Archaeological Superintendence of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and then the Universities of Padua (Cultural Heritage Department), Bologna (Department of Cultural Heritage, seat of Ravenna), Florence (Architecture; Agrarian and Forestry Systems), Naples (‘L’Orientale’; CIRCE – Napoli 2; Federico II University), and Roma 1 (‘La Sapienza’, Anthropology). Foreign collaborations were launched at different levels with the University of Pennsylvania (Department of History of Art), Drexel University, Harvard Medical School, Oxford University (Research Laboratory for Archaeology and the History of Art)/Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History (Jena), Institut National de Langues et Civilizations Orientales, CNRS (Paris), the Raymond Lemaire International Centre for Conservation (Leuven), etc. In Pakistan, contributions were made by the students and teaching staff of the Universities of Peshawar (UET, University of Engineering and Technology), University of Swat, University of Hazara (Manshera), Quaid-e Azam, Taxila Institute of Asian Civilizations (Islamabad), and Jahanzeb College (Saidu Sharif), and by Sustainable Tourism Foundation Pakistan (STFP).

Bibliography


Part VI

Contingent Solutions
The Archaeologist’s Role
Introduction

We arrived in El Salvador late in December 1993, driving through Chiapas, Mexico, on the way, just days before the Zapatistas issued their First Declaration. It was the beginning of three years of archaeological fieldwork and laboratory analyses amidst the reconfiguration of a country and its priorities, and that reorganization was in dialogue with a wider world of questioning relationships among residents, the land, international relations, and rights and responsibilities of the nation to its citizens. This chapter presents the impacts that the Salvadoran civil war and immediate post-war reconstruction had on cultural resources, challenges to fieldwork, and efforts at crafting policies within the first few years after the end of the war. Part of this story is the shift in U.S.–Salvadoran relations that played an unusually prominent role in Salvadoran archaeology in particular. As U.S. citizens funded by U.S. private institutions and the federal government, our experiences were U.S.-centric, but also almost inevitably so, even if we had hailed from another part of the world, as the development of professional and government-administered archaeology in El Salvador had much to do with U.S. expatriates working there before and after the civil war. Although establishing peace might invoke stability, in fact, the exigencies of military combat fostered some practices that became entrenched and had to be destabilized. The overall sentiment of Salvadoran citizens was that much needed to change, a sea change that at times swept away as many good as bad practices. This highly volatile political and social environment presented many opportunities for productive archaeological work and stands as an example that destabilization, rather than creating inevitable chaos, fosters creative synergy. Survival of these new ways depends upon whether stakeholders encourage them to adapt and grow, a process that continues today.

The Civil War in El Salvador

Scholars and political analysts have greatly debated the roots of the Salvadoran civil war, a subject worthy of several volumes (Lauria-Santiago 1999; Moodie 2010; Tilley 2005). For the purposes of this chapter, a very brief summary is
sufficient to provide the broad brushstrokes of the social, political, and economic environment of archaeology and cultural heritage management during the worst of the conflict.

The twentieth century witnessed increasing concentration of wealth and control of land in the hands of a few wealthy families; much of the rest of the populace was highly impoverished through a period of economic calamities and regional and international political tensions (Lauria-Santiago and Binford 2004). Uprising, protest, and its repression pitted on one side generally leftist, populist rebels against an often military-led government. The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was a coalition of five left-wing guerrilla groups, while in some cases community or social groups such as unionists, clergy, independent farmers, and university officials within a less formally organized framework resisted government policies and repression through both nonviolent protest and violent means. The government-supported military as well as paramilitary groups targeted individuals, groups, and entire communities in an effort to purge resistance (Erlick 2004). The civil war of El Salvador lasted for more than 12 brutal years, from 1979 to 1992. The United Nation reports that more than 75,000 died in the extreme violence and still more were terrorized and suffered violations of human rights (see Figure 14.1; Belisario Betancur et al. 1993). The most devastating military activity—bombing, land mines, strafing, shelling—largely took place in one of the country’s richest archaeological zones, in the Departments of Cabañas, Chalatenango, and Morazán. Places that had seen archaeological

Figure 14.1 ‘Back to the Farm’. A casualty of the Salvadoran Civil War is carried back to his farm for burial (1982). (Photo: Gary Mark Smith; Wikimedia Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0).
work in the early twentieth century and had been developed into public parks, such as the complex of sites related to Chalchuapa in the western Department of Santa Ana, the archaeological parks of San Andrés and Joya de Cerén in the Department of La Libertad, and Cihuatán, in the Department of Custcatlán in north-central El Salvador, mostly remained open, though renovations and maintenance were negatively impacted. In short, those sites that were not directly in the line of fire still suffered from the exigencies of wartime.

One of the most devastating effects to sites not typically subject to shelling or bombing was looting. Artifacts were a source of revenue, and the challenges of wartime made preventing looting difficult. Egregious cases triggered efforts by collaborative teams of foreign and national professionals to create and enact legal protections. For example, in the 1980s, the coastal region of the Department of Ahuachapán in western El Salvador was well known to be a source of unusual and prized jaguar sculptures as well as spectacular polychrome ceramics. The investigations by Guatemalan, expatriate U.S., and National Museum staff, particularly Manuel López, found that hundreds of people, even entire families, had an active business of daily looting at places including the major site of Cara Sucia, leaving behind a pockmarked, devastated landscape (FUNDAR, n.d.). Paul Amaroli, a U.S. expatriate archaeologist, worked for CONCULTURA in 1994 when he aided in El Salvador’s request for a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) for the imposition of U.S. import restrictions on a wide range of archaeological materials, implemented on March 10, 1995.

As was often the case in U.S.–Latin American policy during these Cold War decades, the United States provided considerable military aid to the government of El Salvador. The level of support beginning in 1979 was immediately substantial and grew in amount, scope, and institutional investment up until the end of hostilities in 1992. By the end of the war, the U.S. embassy in El Salvador was the largest U.S. embassy in the world. It was a white fortress on a hill in a middle to upper middle class neighborhood of San Salvador, an area called Nuevo Cuscatlán. As archaeologists have long known, the investment in substantial architecture is a metric of an investment of power and political value. The U.S. sought to prevent a secure foothold of any government that leaned too far left and certainly prevent the establishment of a communist regime on the American mainland. One example was U.S. support given to the regime of the civil–military Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) established after deposing President General Carlos Humberto Romero in a coup on October 15, 1979 (Government of El Salvador 1981). This early example of U.S. military aid was strategic, likely to have much larger, longer-term effects than say, a single strike: the U.S. sent a six-man Mobile Training Team (MTT) in November 1979 who could then train Salvadorans in military strategy and in effective use of weapons. This on-the-ground support was backed up with a substantial monetary investment: the U.S. also provisioned $5.7 million in military aid for Fiscal Year 1980 (Riding 1980).
The Junta, however, undermined this buttressing by the U.S. through enacting ultimately unpopular policies. The JRG land reform program, an effort to curry populist favor, restricted landholdings to a 100 ha. maximum. Reforms also included nationalizing the most powerful economic sectors in the country: the banking, coffee, and sugar industries. On November 6, 1979, the JRG also publicly disbanded a paramilitary private death squad. El Salvador’s military and economic elites opposed these policies and sabotaged their implementation through public and covert means.

The late 1970s and early 1980s was a period of increasing violence in an already extremely violent, volatile environment. One of the more notorious events occurred in February 1980, when Archbishop Óscar Romero, an advocate of Liberation Theology and therefore at odds with the bureaucracy of the Catholic Church, published an open letter begging U.S. President Jimmy Carter to suspend U.S. military financial and logistical aid to the Salvadoran regime. About a month later and one day after calling upon Salvadoran soldiers and security force members to refuse to act upon orders to kill Salvadoran civilians, Romero was assassinated while celebrating mass in a church in a suburb of San Salvador.

The terms of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement signed January 16, 1992 included dissolving the El Salvadorian military government as well as the National and Treasury Police, restructuring Salvadorian Armed Forces, the acceptance of the FMLN as a political party, and the exoneration of FMLN combatants (United Nations Security Council 1992). U.S. post-war aid was an effort to help rebuild shattered or neglected infrastructure as well as support educational and civic initiatives. Each facet of wartime and early peacetime had repercussions for archaeological method and practice. Our personal experiences provide just one perspective; several other U.S. archaeologists, such as Payson Sheets and William Fowler, encountered similar difficulties and opportunities, and some that we did not, and despite tremendous challenges, Salvadorans such as Manuel López, a staff member of the National Museum and the Cultural Patrimony Division (Dirección de Patrimonio Cultural), and María Isaura Araúz, Director within the Ministry of Education, continued to work curating materials in the museum collection, mitigating impacts of modern construction and wartime disturbances on archaeological sites, and continuing investigations on long-term projects, such as at Joya de Cerén. Despite the idiosyncrasies of our particular experiences, they speak to larger issues of archaeology’s place within post-conflict environments.

Cultural Resources during Wartime

My late husband, Howard H. Earnest, Jr., did his dissertation fieldwork in the Department of Chalatenango in central El Salvador in the late 1970s, in what became a hotspot during the civil war because it became a stronghold of the FMLN. Much archaeological work then, as now, involved creating working arrangements with two of the critical populations involved in the uprising and
its resistance: poor, often landless laborers and wealthy, powerful landowners. Even though the directive of archaeological work was to discover remains of the past, a necessary part of archaeological work was dealing with the key players and contexts related to recent hostilities. The location or archaeological sites—usually rural farms (haciendas)—was also a political and military battleground. On the one hand, the people who usually made up the archaeological crew were laboring class, usually rural Salvadorans, while on the other, the landowners themselves were usually of the elite “14 families” who despite land reform, still owned most of the land and were in staunch opposition to leftist developments. Earnest was in the place not just to observe, but experience the rising tensions and the precipitation of the civil war.

Earnest conducted excavations of several Late Preclassic (400 BCE–CE 200) sites in the Department of Chalatenango as part of salvage work for the Cerrón Grande Dam Project (see Figure 14.2). The Cerrón Grande Dam is the largest hydroelectric dam in the country. It was a modernization project designed to give the nation much greater potential for delivering electric services and

Figure 14.2 Map of El Salvador, based on the United Nations map, showing two areas of archaeological projects, the Cerrón Grande in central El Salvador and the Izalcos region in western El Salvador.
long-term stability in satisfying energy needs. All of the places where Earnest conducted test excavations eventually became inundated once the dam was operable. He witnessed the relocation of rural residents from the dam-affected zone, a 6,000 ha. area. In 1975, all residents of flooded areas were relocated, often with the “aid” of National Police, to the camp El Dorado, more appropriately known as Relocation Colony 1, with Relocation Colonies 2 and 3 becoming settled starting in 1977. These were designed communities, with a circular urban plan divided by 16 streets that radiate outward from the circle’s center, an oddity compared to other settlements in the region, even throughout the country. None of the relocated people Earnest met were glad to be there; it was the twentieth-century iteration of the Spanish colonial policy of *congregación*, forced resettlement done to control rural populations and civilize them by bringing them into planned (but still experimental) urban environments. Discontent was palpable.

Earnest was invited to do his archaeological research by Stanley Boggs. Boggs’ middle name was Harding, and he was indeed the grandson of U.S. President Warren G. Harding. Boggs attended graduate school at Harvard University and participated in several important archaeological projects in the Maya area, first arriving in El Salvador in 1939. He met and married a Salvadoran, Inés Sagrera, and settled in El Salvador, working as the Director for Archaeology for the National Museum “David J. Guzman.” Boggs devoted his long career to archaeological research in El Salvador and supported the work of many (for example, Andrews 1976; Sharer 1978) as well as working to establish cultural heritage programs, national policies, and institutions (Boggs 1966, 1973, 1977). Boggs was often referred to as the “father of Salvadoran archaeology” by both Salvadoran heritage professionals and advocates as well as archaeologists in the U.S. Sagrera’s family circulated in the same social circles as José Napoleon Duarte, the President of El Salvador from 1984 to 1989, during the worst of Salvadoran security force and paramilitary death squad abuse and massacre of Salvadoran civilians. Archaeology, family, and politics have never been very far apart in El Salvador.

Earnest was able to complete a number of excavations and a great deal of artifact analysis during the 1970s, but by 1979, the turbulent time of the inception of the civil war, he left El Salvador and returned to the U.S. Given the dramatically violent events of 1979 and 1980, such as the assassination of Romero, he had worked in El Salvador as long as was feasible. It was the beginning of a long period of exile, during which he made progress on completing his dissertation, wrote individual and joint articles for scholarly journals, and worked as an archaeologist for the U.S.D.A. Forest Service (Earnest 1977; Fowler and Earnest 1985). He maintained ties with other colleagues who also worked on the Cerrón Grande project or were in El Salvador during the same time, especially Arthur Demarest (1986) and William Fowler (1989). Both Demarest and Fowler, as well as Payson Sheets (1979, 1983; see also Sharer *et al.* 1978) completed substantial contributions to Mesoamerican archaeology during this time. Working in El Salvador
during the rising tide of tension created an even deeper bond than the often-times strong ties formed in regular archaeological fieldwork situations (see Figure 14.3). Wartime, however, also instilled both lassitude and anxiety. Why continue to work on something that could not be completed so long as the hostilities continued? To whom did it matter?

**Challenges to Fieldwork in a Time of Peace**

The first foray to evaluate feasibility of a post-war field project was during the summer of 1992, when the signing of the peace accords was still fresh. A Tinker Foundation Grant with supplementary support from the Middle American Research Institute funded about a month of work on collections in the National Museum in metropolitan San Salvador. The museum staff,
including Manuel López, greeted us warmly, many of whom fondly recalled Earnest from his time there in the 1970s. William Fowler generously provided access to materials from recent excavations in the Department of Sonsonate, an area replete with historical documentation yet little archaeological investigation; his was some of the first (Fowler 1995). The working conditions and positive attitude of officials and other colleagues made this opportunity attractive. El Salvador’s newly minted state of peace was vibrant and hopeful.

The lack of metropolitan police in 1992 led to some ingenious solutions to basic problems: who could or should direct traffic in busy intersections without traffic signals? Entrepreneurs dressed up as clowns and did the job with the hope of getting paid cash tips from motorists, and it worked. The clown costume let motorists distinguish them from regular pedestrians. They were such an odd sight one could not help but pay attention! These payasos were welcomed, with people gladly tossing coins to them as they drove by. The payasos seemed to enjoy themselves, as well. Such improvisations were a temporary norm for many common problems.

Although the peace agreement had been signed in 1992, many of its provisions were just being implemented in 1994. The feeling in the country at that point was a mix of deep fatigue, relief, and determination to find peace with the past. As part of the peace accords, all of the police force had been disbanded. Our border crossing from Guatemala into El Salvador in a truck filled with equipment went by the book. Salvadoran inspectors made no insinuations for bribes, no special treatment one way or the other. It meant that guards reviewed most of our equipment and carefully read the paperwork and we had to explain their importance and permissions. Unlike the other border crossings from Texas to Guatemala, this was done without any insinuation that a little cash would make the whole thing go faster. It was professional, and serious. A benefit of newly found peace was a careful regard for rules and to follow those rules that people would be treated fairly. Corruption and favoritism did not have to have the upper hand.

Likewise, the regular protocols to obtain permissions for archaeological fieldwork, especially with the fairly recent death of Stanley Boggs, were a little uncertain, if not on paper, then in practice. The passing of Boggs meant that management of archaeological activities was fully in Salvadoran national hands, from staff members such as Evelin Sánchez, Fabio Amador, and Roberto Gallardo, to most of the managers and directors of the staff. The series of officials occupying Boggs’s former post did their best to help archaeological research to continue. The rapid turnover in personnel and reconfiguration of the duties and responsibilities of different offices and departments related to cultural heritage management—three different people, in two different offices, in three short years—meant that exactly who could decide what, was a negotiated process. Our Fulbrights did not guarantee anything, even though we had letters from the main department overseeing cultural activities (CONCULTURA) inviting us to come to work on our proposed projects.
Howard and I both had Fulbrights to help with heritage preservation as a part of the post-war world. Our American citizenship and sponsorship triggered positive and negative reactions, sometimes in the same person. People, particularly private landowners, occasionally asked outright if we were U.S. spies. Others thought that the Fulbright was finally a wise investment of U.S. dollars. In many cases, cooperation happened in spite of our U.S. citizenship and support rather than because of it. The wounds of U.S. policy did not heal in the matter of a few years.

We were in an unusual situation of being able to contrast the changes in tenor of the patronage and bravura of archaeological work before and after the war. The stability of the Boggs era and the indulgence or at times benign neglect of some governmental officials before and during the hostilities allowed many of the same cultural heritage management people to continue in similar posts and roles after the war. This tenaciousness was possible because cultural heritage was not usually in the political spotlight. So a continuation of pre-war patron–client relationships in archaeological research was possible, but the climate of rebuilding inhibited procedures from following well-worn paths. Obtaining permits, filing reports, and participating in other support of cultural preservation endeavors was at times improvised and therefore erratic, but in general served to get the job done and meet evolving standards.

A key issue was that El Salvador’s cultural heritage laws, particularly the mandates and procedures for compliance, underwent a major overhaul to become more stable, thorough, and effective. The in-between state of having new laws in place, but without the regulations to comply meant that officials had to do their best to come up with reasonable ways to meet the requirements of the laws. They were establishing precedents, but with further tinkering with regulations, those precedents became obsolete. The post-war situation was far more dynamic than before and during hostilities; the contrast was between social agility—interpreting client networks—before and during the war and strategic improvisation in interpreting newly passed law during peacetime. The legal framework relating to archaeology before the war was less ample, buttressed by powerful social agents, and afterwards, the relative power was the inverse, with the legal architecture more robust but initially less stable because it relied less on the strength of political and social connections.

A distinct neoliberal shift in managing public services fostered more involvement of non-governmental foundations in the caretaking of archaeological parks, archaeological sites which included facilities such as museums and full public access. Archaeological research in those parks meant negotiating with the regular national permitting process as well as the review boards of these foundations, some of them newly formed. Structural replication was one effect of new post-war policies.

One example of this sort of neoliberal partnership was between FUNDAR, an NGO to promote and conserve archaeological sites, and national cultural heritage managers. From 2005 to 2009, FUNDAR managed conservation activities and substantial improvements in the museum at the archaeological
park of the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Joya de Cerén, a village that like Pompeii or Herculaneum, was remarkably well-preserved by ash from a volcanic eruption of the Laguna Caldera in the early seventh century (Sheets 2006). Among other activities, FUNDAR organized a Round Table on conservation practices for the fragile site in 2005 that included Héctor Ismael Sermeño, the National Director of Cultural Heritage, CONCULTURA, Gregorio Bello Suazo, Archaeologist and Director of the National Museum of Anthropology, CONCULTURA, Irma Flores, Coordinator of Historic Zones and Sites, CONCULTURA, Fabricio Valdivieso, Archaeologist, Head of the Departament of Archaeology, CONCULTURA, and Fabio Amador, Archaeologist, National University of El Salvador. The Round Table resulted in new, more effective practices, and was done in coordination with several branches of government and conservation professionals.

The vibrant energy of the time and hope to re-make the present by frankly confronting the past was a rare moment of opportunity to craft new policies for archaeology and the place of heritage management in the nation. The most forceful ripple effect of change came from above, with cabinet-level reorganization, and collaterally, with funding for rebuilding crumbling infrastructure eventually being applied to museum facilities. Day-to-day challenges, though, had long-term effects on policies, the most important of which involved how to manage collections, the role of archaeology in citizenship, and archaeology as a relationship among different countries.

Heritage Management Policies in the Reconfigured State

No matter the salvage project or research topic, post-conflict Salvadoran archaeology was as much about recent devastation as it was of the colonial past. Habits from the long period of conflict came out in surprisingly simple ways. One day while surveying a sugar cane field with the crew, a passing car backfired loudly. I was the only one still standing a fraction of a second later. All of the Salvadoran crew members were lying flat on the ground, a reaction honed from years of surviving gunfire. Infrastructure was a curious mix of sophisticated technology (that related to military interests) and rudimentary to nonexistent for services important to daily life, the most notable being roads. Roads in areas of combat were either intentionally destroyed or became decrepit because neither the state nor local residents maintained them. In this way, areas that were not combat zones suffered, too. Lack of road maintenance as a sign of hostility has a long history in this area, including the first account by the Spanish conquistador Pedro de Alvarado (1924, 75) of his invasion in 1524 (see also Polo Sifontes 1979, 45). Manipulating mobility was a military strategy, the after effects of which were profound for archaeological work and resources.

The intentional and collateral lack of development in some regions in fact did much to preserve archaeological resources. Some places were undisturbed because they were hard to reach. Other more easily accessed areas were fairly stable because the economy was stagnant. In other cases, some destructive
activities went unchecked. For example, a large Early Classic pyramid made of adobes near the modern town of Izalco was nearly entirely obliterated. It was on private land, and the landowner mined the structure to make bricks. The ancient adobes were a perfect mix of soils and aggregate, and making bricks was a steady source of income in an unpredictable economy. The new laws and regulations came into effect too late to affect this cottage industry.

With peace, the housing market boomed, which meant that the selling of small parcels for homes, *lotificación*, started happening in both suburban and rural areas. It was a sign of healthy growth, but severely impacted archaeological resources. Unfortunately, the population of professional archaeologists in the country during this boom was small, inadequate to monitor every development in every department of the country. The most notable cases came to the attention of responsible officials, while less obvious cases did not.

Not long after we arrived in El Salvador in 1994, William Fowler invited us to help mitigate the effects of a housing development in and around the outskirts of the town of Caluco. Caluco was one of the most important settlements of the Izalcos area in the sixteenth century and had never been investigated archaeologically. Luckily, the landowners were amenable to the archaeological investigation. The work of that season of intensive excavations and survey provided the foundation for several graduate theses (Hodges 2015; Verhagen 1997), a book (Fowler 1995), and several articles (Sampeck 2010b, 2014) (see Figure 14.4).

![Figure 14.4 Excavations in 1994 in the area of a *lotificación* on the outskirts of Caluco. (Photo: Howard Earnest, Jr.).](image-url)
The different project members focused on different facets of the resilience and creativity of the Salvadoran people during the brutality and loss of colonial endeavors in the sixteenth century. This focus was a haunting echo of the struggles recent past. Our work in the Department of Sonsonate investigated the cultural landscape of people who called their polity the Izalcos and their ethnicity Pipil (see Figure 14.2; Fowler 1989). The Izalcos polity was a network of settlements and affiliated agricultural lands populated by people who spoke Nahuat, a sister language to the Nahuatl of the Aztecs (Sampeck 2010b). The archaeological evidence indicates that these Nahuat speakers first settled in the region at about CE 1200, around the time that their cultural kin, the Mexica, first entered the Valley of Mexico. Like the Aztecs, the Izalcos had a hierarchical political system that was based on hereditary lordship (Fowler 1989). It was not a social paradise; inequality was very much part of the ancient world, with some people having little access to crucial resources except through the administration of powerful people.

Many other details of Pipil political economy, aesthetics, and social organization followed Nahua tenets, making Izalqueños fully part of the Nahua world, though never politically subject to the Aztec empire. Iconography on polychrome pottery and evidence of pre-Columbian writing refer to Nahua deities and ritual practices, and in general a Nahua aesthetic (Sampeck 2015b). This artistic expression is a point of pride for many Salvadorans (cf. Tilley 2005). It is fierce, beautiful, and uniquely Salvadoran.

Much later, in 1996, during my first Fulbright, officials from the National Museum and CONCULTURA encouraged Earnest to direct a salvage project in the San Salvador suburb of Ciudad Nuevo Cuscatlán. The main excavations investigated a pristinely preserved settlement that was one of the first resettlements in the area devastated by the eruption of the Ilopango volcano in the fifth century CE. The volcanic ash preserved numerous domestic structures and associated burials replete with hundreds of ceramic vessels (see Figure 14.5). This work inspired Earnest to complete his dissertation. In both cases, the housing development severely impacted well-preserved but underappreciated or unknown archaeological remains. The willingness of the time led to collaborative efforts that made an enduring contribution to understanding the Salvadoran past.

The attention of governmental officials at times prompted cooperation and support of archaeology. CONCULTURA and Museum officials asked us to devote part of our research focus to the construction area for a new highway, a bypass from Izalco to just south of Sonsonate. The new highway passed through the area of research interest, so mitigating its effects on cultural resources dovetailed perfectly with my Fulbright project’s research plan. By the time we arrived at the work site, some of the area had already been bulldozed and leveled. To our benefit, our crew was often supplemented by laborers from the national public works office. Part of the mitigation plan involved assessing impacts in the areas adjacent to the highway, so we had unchallenged access to survey these areas, which might have been more difficult otherwise. Negotiations with landowners and residents had already happened.
Another case of working under the aegis of a governmental program was affiliation with the system of agricultural cooperatives that gained strength just after hostilities ceased. During the 1970s and 1990s, land reforms attempted to redistribute land in a more equitable manner by keeping individual private holdings to a relatively small size. First established in 1975, Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation (Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria, ISTA) managed the large tracts held by cooperatives in much of the country, and in the Department of Sonsonate region, cooperatives held extensive zones of prime lands. The provisions of the land reform allowed owners to retain 100–150 ha. The landowners got to choose what they kept, which was often the best land or processing facilities. Some landowners decapitalized their farms, removing livestock and machinery or slaughtering cattle to keep them out of the hands of the newly created cooperatives. Furthermore, for their loss of property, landowners were compensated from earnings from the cooperative. Farming on cooperatives was managed through a production cooperative established by a committee elected by the workers and a co-manager provided by the government, creating a hierarchy of skilled managers and unskilled laborers. Vargas (2003) observed that “in many cases, the same administrators, who still had strong ties with previous landlords and their interests, gave the same orders to the same workers, who saw little evidence of change in their day-to-day

Figure 14.5 Excavations in 1996 in the deep ash that buried a large Classic period (ca. 550 ce) settlement in the zone of a housing development in Ciudad Nuevo Cuscatlán. (Photo: Howard Earnest, Jr.).
situation.” In terms of archaeological survey, however, a letter from the head of ISTA gave my survey crew unfettered access to cooperative lands. In contrast, entry to privately held estates (*haciendas, estancias*) depended on the whim of the manager, as many times the landowner was difficult to contact.

Another later phase of land reform encouraged small parcels and private ownership. Decree 207 and the “voluntary transfers” of Decree 839 upheld the ethic voiced most strongly by José Mariátegui (2007): ownership of leased, rented, or sharecropped land was to be transferred to those who worked it (Strasma and University of Wisconsin-Madison 1989). Much like the colonial process of *composición moderado*, wherein residents could file legal claims to acquire clear title to lands they claimed ownership of, the twentieth-century land tenure laws and policies inspired deep debate, even worse blurring of who owned what, and value-depressing testimony about land prices (Hill and Monaghan 1987). These small holdings created a mosaic of mostly subsistence farming. Gaining access for archaeological survey or excavation depended entirely on the good will of the landowner, but they usually were on or near their property and in that sense accessible.

Land reform, in the end, did not alter unequal relationships to any great degree: one-tenth of the population (490,000 people) received benefits in the form of one-fifth (280,000 hectares) of the total agricultural land. By the early 1990s, “about 330,000 (54% of the country’s labor force) remained landless, land-poor or unemployed” (Vargas 2003). A situation exacerbated by insigience in management relationships and depleted resources also impeded cooperative productivity and the ability to pay property taxes. As early as 1987, 22 of the original 317 cooperatives were abandoned. The boom in the housing market put additional pressures on failing cooperatives because developers wanted access to valuable land. This dynamic situation meant that at times it was not very clear who should give permission for archaeological work on a piece of land.

Oddly enough, our archaeological research showed that the political organization of the Pipil did not create an ancient version of *latifundia* (large estates), but instead a settlement pattern of fairly even distribution of similarly spaced settlements across the landscape, implying territorial control that had the appearance of the land reform that was at best partially implemented in the 1970s to 1980s—no one group had dominance at least in terms of the amount of territory surrounding settlements. Nevertheless, separate, larger buildings and a highly regular hierarchy in structure size and location indicated other ways of exercising power through the built environment (Sampeck 2013).

**Managing Collections: Difficult Choices**

The scars of terror, neglect, and destruction were all around, affecting museums, archives, collections facilities as well as diverse kinds of archaeological remains and colonial and other historic buildings (see Figure 14.6). The National Museum opened up a new exhibit space and remodeled office and
curatorial facilities. This reorganization meant that some things moved that had not been touched in quite a long time. It was clear that the provenience of some collections of sherds and other artifacts had been lost due to rotting bags, illegible tags, and plastic bags with scuffed or faded labels. While some artifact collections stood the test of time—notably the ceramic type collection from Quelepa—others did not. In the 1960s, E. Wyllis Andrews V (1976) excavated large public structures and extensive and complicated features at Quelepa, one of the most impressive pre-Columbian settlements in eastern El Salvador. Andrews had a sturdy wooden cabinet custom built with specially made shelving to accommodate sherds in a single layer. When he completed his work at Quelepa, he gave the cabinet, full of the ceramic type collection, to the National Museum. Because the piece of furniture was so well made and designed for that single purpose—to house sherds—it was not moved or repurposed, and the type collections remained in the careful order that he left them in nearly 30 years earlier. The collections that suffered the worst were ones stored only in cloth bags, which deteriorated in sometimes humid conditions and tore or wore through when moved.

The variable state of the collection also highlighted that paperwork identifying materials was not always complete or in enough detail. The museum collection was large and complex, and different investigators used different methods for recording information. The first step in standardizing and better
controlling the collection was to create inventories, but other more urgent matters often took precedence. One bodega in central El Salvador, the closest storage facility to the Cerrón Grande area, suffered extreme deterioration during the war. The situation was dire enough to cause Earnest to decide to change the focus of his Fulbright. Instead of conducting new research in an area adjacent to my region of study in western El Salvador, he devoted his fellowship activities to cleaning, creating an inventory, and organizing the bodega in central El Salvador. The structure had been in part a research lab and living space for investigators in the 1970s. When we saw the place in the 1990s, all of the rooms save one were filled with bags of artifacts from different projects. The difficulty in maintaining the structure during the hostilities (it was located in a zone of frequent combat) led to deterioration in the roof. Bats took up residence and deposited impressive amounts of guano on everything. Rodents gnawed the more delicious bags, and even some of the sherds, and made nests with shredded identification tags. It was a toxic mess, yet the place housed some of the most important collections in the country, including the type collection from Chalchuapa and much of the Cerrón Grande project materials. The loss in the collection was substantial. After sorting through all of the examples that could be positively identified, perhaps about one-third, museum staff buried the rest in a large pit adjacent to the bodega. It will be a dramatic feature for another archaeologist to discover one day.

The Role of Archaeology in Citizenship

The challenges during the first couple of years of peacetime in El Salvador focused on what many saw as the basics: rebuilding infrastructure such as roads, making literacy and public education in general more available and effective, fostering short- and long-term growth in the economy, and creating a responsive and representative political system (Wolf 2011). Where did archaeology fit in these efforts? Many saw archaeology as a way to move forward, by paying attention to national heritage and making cultural resources more available to more of the public. Archaeology and its insights offered ways of understanding and valuing the past not because it was distant, precious, and esoteric, but because archaeology reveals things, people, and events that every Salvadoran can claim with pride, a common heritage despite the differences of the present. The past was common ground, which gave hope for a common future.

Evidence of tremendous abuse and violence, but also the enduring and uniquely Salvadoran contributions in the past to the present were crucial discoveries in our archaeological work during this time. Strong evidence indicates that pre-Columbian and early colonial residents in western El Salvador were superproducers of cacao, the tree whose seed people use to make chocolate (Fowler 1987). Cacao was a pre–Columbian means of sustenance, and indeed fueled the state through tribute demands in cacao. Cacao was part of ritual practice including foods and drinks for ceremonies important to most people, such as marriages. Cacao created both social difference and similarity. Within a system
Archaeology in Post-War El Salvador

of state-supported inequality supported by collective agricultural production, Izalqueños produced phenomenal amounts of cacao (Sampeck 2010a).

To be the homeland of cacao, however, meant that colonial experience was anything but sweet. In fact, the Izalcos was a shining example of extreme abuse and depredation in the sixteenth century, shown in severe depopulation, prison-like systems to manage cacao producers, and other forms of state-sponsored collective violence (Fowler 1995). Regional archaeological survey results indicated severe depopulation during the sixteenth century (Fowler and Sampeck 2015; Sampeck 2014), and tellingly, these once densely populated zones are today those very sparsely, highly controlled private properties, haciendas, that were such a challenge to gain access to for research.

Forced resettlement into Spanish-style towns directly controlled people’s mobility, segregating them into containable units, much like the forced resettlement in the 1970s of residents in the Cerrón Grande Dam area. The few indigenous residents who survived war and epidemics in the Izalcos paid astronomical levels of tribute in cacao to Spanish overlords (Fowler 1993, 2009). The legacies of colonial precedents in dangerous, often deadly work conditions, lack of access to basic resources, and high demands for production lived on in the conditions that precipitated the civil war.

Despite these extreme conditions, Izalqueños managed to continue to produce, and to subvert oppressive economic policies through contraband trade. The resilience and creativity of the native people of El Salvador is a positive legacy that is vibrant today. The Nahuat name for their local version of a cacao beverage, “chocolate,” became the way the rest of the world came to know of and refer to the substance (Sampeck 2010a). The Pipil gave the gift of chocolate to the rest of the world (Sampeck 2015a).

Protecting and better understanding Salvadoran heritage meant sorting through just what the greatest priorities were. What emerged was a complementary emphasis on conservation and accessibility. Preserving what had not been destroyed by the war was a far-reaching ethic that supported archaeological endeavors. Transparency and education—what had happened, when, and reasons why—also created a hospitable environment for delving into difficult periods in the more distant past, such as colonial abuses, pre-Columbian disasters (particularly volcanic eruptions), warfare, and violence. The national priority on transparency and education meant that funding became available to improve museums and make them more accessible to schools and the general public. It also meant that visitors, museum staff, and officials often carefully scrutinized the narratives and content of the exhibits. What were the lessons of the past?

Another national priority was to reorient El Salvador’s role in Central America and internationally. No one wanted to be too beholden to the U.S., especially, but they did want a positive place in the international arena. Being pushed to the margins by violence and war had gone on long enough. The limited number of Salvadoran professional archaeologists meant that foreigners did a significant amount of investigation rather than Salvadorans having a
national monopoly on archaeological research. In this way, archaeology was (and still is) a relationship among different countries. This exercise in foreign relations was complicated by the post-war reshuffling or high overturn in Salvadoran officials who oversaw cultural heritage matters.

Archaeology assumed a heightened role as a way to enhance citizenship. In some regards, the long view of a deep past fostered a sense that the tumult of the last couple of decades was another phase to pass through. Furthermore, archaeology provided not just examples, but the enactment of the most valued principles in the post-conflict world.

**Archaeology in Post-Conflict El Salvador**

El Salvador now ranks as one of the most violent countries in the world. The hope and restraint that the first flush of peace inspired was not enough to prevent the growth of networks of violent gangs as well as less organized, and therefore unpredictable, acts of assault, rape, and murder. One wealthy Salvadoran once reminisced during a conversation with me that things were better during the war, because no street crime was permitted. From that person’s perspective, things were orderly and predictable, and therefore as they should be. At the same time, field crew members described the violence and chaos of exactly those years, when it was dangerous to walk the city streets or even go fishing, and that for them peace meant some chance of conducting

*Figure 14.7* Archaeological field crew, 1994–1996. (Photo: Howard Earnest, Jr.).
a normal daily life, perhaps to get a better job in a rebuilding economy. The unusual opportunity to do archaeological work seemed a sign that things could change (see Figure 14.7). The resurgence of violence, some state-sponsored and much of it not, calls into question whether violence and disruption will always be a Salvadoran fact of life (Benavides 2009; Chavez 2004). While violence impedes the doing of archaeology today, and archaeological evidence of violence in the Salvadoran past is substantial, evidence of resilience and creative solutions for maintaining communities is even greater. Exciting work of recording and documenting the richness of the archaeological record, through projects such as the Archaeological Atlas of Eastern El Salvador (Amador 2007), a vigorous maritime and underwater archaeology program headed by Roberto Gallardo of the Department of Archaeology of the Directorate of Cultural Patrimony, and blossoming of larger and smaller conservation and research projects presents a hopeful path for the future. Post-conflict El Salvador is not quite post-conflict; archaeological understanding can aid in the endeavor to create a more peaceable present.

Acknowledgments

A Tinker grant through the Roger Thayer Stone Center for Latin American Studies at Tulane University funded the feasibility study for this research. Years of archaeological research were made possible by several grants from the Middle American Research Institute at Tulane University, as well as dissertation research grants from Fulbright-Hays, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Social Science Research Council, and the National Science Foundation (dissertation improvement grant #9521749). A grant from the Mesoamerican Ethnohistory Fund of Tulane University made the transcription of the Caluco archive possible.

Bibliography


Sampeck, K. E. 2010b. Late postclassic to colonial transformations of the landscape in the Izalcos region of Western El Salvador. *Ancient Mesoamerica* 21,2: 261–82.


Mes Aynak (Afghanistan), Global Standards, and Local Practices

Hans H. Curvers

Introduction

Mes Aynak, 40 km south of Kabul, is a complex site where the potential for economic growth, the risk of environmental catastrophe, and the management of archaeological heritage seem to collide.

In virtually all post-conflict situations, international development agencies have established units which act as complements to their long-standing humanitarian and emergency response programs to address post-conflict transitions and socioeconomic rehabilitation. It is necessary to establish new institutions or reconstruct heavily weakened ones and there is a sense of urgency around this work. Archaeologists have generated substantial knowledge and experience around building governance in countries with functioning governments; however, the state of knowledge and practice regarding the establishment and/or reconstitution of effective governance through archaeology and heritage in post-conflict and war-torn societies is still in its infancy. An evaluation of the progress of the Mes Aynak Archaeology Project (MAAP) in Afghanistan aims at helping to fill this gap in knowledge and experience. Mes Aynak is a complex Buddhist mining site where the potential for economic growth, the risk of environmental catastrophe, and the management of archaeological heritage seem to collide. In this Chapter I will explore several aspects of the project: the implications of policies and agendas, the roles of the various stakeholders, and the success of potentially promising strategies and approaches. This is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the issues, but rather a contribution to the debate of archaeological heritage management in post-conflict conditions.

On May 25, 2008, Ibrahim Adel, Minister of Mines, and Shen Heting, General Manager of MCC (Chinese Metallurgical Group Corporation, the majority stakeholder), signed the Mes Aynak mining contract. The contract described the conditions for the first major mining project and biggest foreign investment in Afghanistan. Never before had an Afghan government developed a strategy to exploit these resources. In 2011, the Afghan government continued its commitment to the private sector with a prominent Indian role in mining at Hajigak.
A country in a formative stage of development is in need of a plan—either fully operational or being developed. The World Bank offered a program for the Sustainable Development of Mineral Resources including the tendering of the mineral projects, and archaeological heritage management became an integral part of these projects. The reports available for the MAAP (MAAP Reports) show how and which of the policies and procedures—regardless of the efforts of the World Bank—were implemented and also what is missing. It is clear that a fair number of the decisions made at various levels did not deliver the planned objectives, and MAAP has hit a number of delays. Moreover, the government has been reduced to a marginal role in regulation and planning, instead of playing a proactive part in archaeological heritage management. Lastly, it is unclear who is in charge of MAAP. The archaeologists of the Archeological Department of the Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC) seem to be at war with all stakeholders in the project (cf. Huffman 2014), while the Ministry itself legally has the final say in what will happen to the exposed remains (MoIC 2013). All available reports, articles in the media, and the dramatic scenes in the documentary Saving Mes Aynak (Huffman 2014) suggest mismanagement of all stakeholders (cf. Benard 2012; Benard et al. 2012; Curvers 2013; Lawler 2015). The archaeologists fail to see the necessity of defining programs with engineers, and the subsequent juggling of time and budgets to achieve the agreed aims is a clear sign that Afghan archaeologists did not follow their government’s commitment to work with the private sector.
Rhetoric of the Mes Ayank Archaeology Project

Management of the archaeological project has been described for the period 2011–2012, the short time for which I was the coordinator (Curvers 2013). Four years later, the reports, the stories in the press, and conversations with archaeologists about the project, call out for an assessment, here provided from an objective distance. Following the concept of ‘heritage rhetoric’ as outlined by Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels (2015), I will show how the stakeholders in MAAP have translated ‘global standards’ into local ‘best practices’. A good point of departure is the rhetoric used in the report of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank (Inspection Panel 2013a), and I will critically review the archaeological strategies, intentions, and actions on the ground up to the present (Inspection Panel 2013b).

A brief summary is needed to put this report into context. The continued instability in Afghanistan is part of a prolonged conflict in which the focus of the international community has fluctuated, leading to different players taking center stage based on global politics and prevailing geopolitical agendas. The war has resulted in massive population displacement, casualties in excess of one million, and an overall deterioration of the living conditions of the Afghan population. The events of September 11, 2001, led to the recent dramatic changes in Afghanistan, including the Emergency Loya Jirga and other constitutional developments envisaged in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001. Since 2001, national development strategies have included the Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward (2004), Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals (2005), and the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS)—a strategy for security, governance, economic growth, and poverty reduction. The international community affirmed its commitment to support Afghanistan beyond the Bonn Agreement and pledged $10.5 billion to reach the agreed economic, social, and security goals.

In this period, the World Bank initiated the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project (Afghanistan) (SDNRP I). The first loan of $30 million was agreed in 2006, with an additional $10 million for the project in 2010. In 2011, the World Bank approved a $52 million grant from the International Development Association to help with the efficient and transparent management of mineral resources in Afghanistan (World Bank 2011). In 2014, additional financing of the Second Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project (SDNRP II) was given. It is in this second project that the archaeological heritage management of Mes Ayank is explicitly mentioned in the goals, along with the transparency and regulatory framework for the mining and hydrocarbon sectors.

Some of the expected results from SDNRP II were covered in the press release and include:

(a) increased capacity at the Ministry of Mines . . . (b) increased capacity at the National Environmental Protection Agency to ensure appropriate environmental, social and cultural protection at the mining sites, along
with strengthened mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, (c) [to] contribute to the prompt recovery and restoration of archeological artifacts from the Mes Aynak archaeological site.

(World Bank 2011)

The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) continues to implement the project. I will assess the “prompt recovery and restoration” between 2012 and 2016 in the area to become the future mine pit (“Red Zone”) which became the focal point of the archaeological project (The World Bank Group in Afghanistan 2016, 16).

With the end of the SDNRP II grant on June 30, 2016 (Inspection Panel 2013, Annex II, par. 14), the World Bank has taken a step forward and included Mes Aynak in a new project: The Afghanistan Heritage and Extractive Industries Development Initiative (AHEIDI). The impact of the projected mines throughout Afghanistan is included in the project, which aims at finding a balance between social and economic progress and the protection of cultural heritage, both in the legal domain and management on the ground (AHEIDI 2015). In a period of ten years, $92 million was assigned to SNDRP I and II. However, how much of this money was assigned to the Mes Aynak Archaeology Project is not clear. Based on my experiences with the proposed budgets and the

Figure 15.2 Local men at work on Kuh-e Aynak (Copper Mountain), looking North. (Photo: H. Curvers).
reported difficulties of getting the required staff, equipment, and other materials to the project, it is fair to say that it has been too little and always too late.

It also seems opportune to outline the global and archaeological context of the first large-scale archaeological heritage management challenge, which is associated with the 2008 contract for the right to mine at Mes Aynak. I will consider the challenges that archaeologists needed to address in order to match the goals that the Afghan government set itself within the World Bank program. Finally, I will address current archaeological plans in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and outline a number of critical dilemmas facing those involved in their implementation.

The rhetoric used in the World Bank documents is “Help to recover and preserve some of the artifacts and antiquities . . . by supporting the implementation of the Archaeological Recovery and Preservation Plan for the Aynak antiques” (World Bank 2011). Translated into archaeological practices, this means: implement an archaeological heritage plan for Mes Aynak, excavate, record, and partially conserve what is unearthed. To achieve these goals a team of international archaeologists was hired. Being responsible for some of the work strategies and their execution, I can say that either this message was not conveyed clearly to the Afghan archaeologists of the MoIC, or it was conveyed but not accepted.
Principles and Practices

Archaeological practices have been described and analyzed by a variety of archaeologists (Lucas 2001; Thomas 2004; Wheeler 1954), and of course archaeological traditions vary from country to country. The tradition in Afghanistan started with the foundation of DAFA (Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan) in 1922, resulting in the Franco-Afghan domination of archaeology for three decades (Bendezu-Sarmiento and Marquis 2015). Over time, DAFA has become a partner assisting Afghanistan in its efforts to manage its heritage (Sultan 2015). At the request of the World Bank, DAFA delivered the first assessment of the archaeological sites at Mes Aynak (DAFA 2009). UNESCO and ICOMOS have translated international norms into a codification of heritage concepts, global conventions, and recommendations (cf. Ahmed 2006; Leask and Fyall 2006; Singh 2010; Yusuf 2007), and MAAP presents a case study into the translation of global ‘best practices’ into national standards.

In 2009, the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan directed the first excavations. In 2011, the Department of Archaeology of the MoIC took over and expanded the project with invitations to a team from Tajikistan and an international team; the presence of three teams presented a major challenge for coordinating the investigations. Results have been published in English and Dari (Cockin 2013; Engel 2013; Engel and Massoudi 2011; Faticconi 2014; Filigenzi 2013; Filigenzi and Giunta 2015; Islamic Government of Afghanistan 2013; Khairzada 2015; Unger 2013). Archaeological coordination of MAAP needs regular and timely quality control, and work review and inspection, both in the office and in the field. A team of coordinators should take or recommend corrective actions where necessary. However, the establishment of such a team has been impossible due to the different perspectives on archaeological methods and goals.

Omar Sultan summarizes MAAP local practices best: “The work that needed three or four years to be done is already done by our archaeologists. They finished it in eight months” (Meharry and Akbar 2011). The work concentrated on the recovery of ‘statues’ and attempts by the international team to shift the focus towards documentation were futile (cf. MAAP report January 2014). In other instances, Sultan commits to global standards: “The preservation of the tangible and intangible cultural history of Afghanistan—museums, monuments, archaeological sites, music, art and traditional crafts—is a crucial part of the effort to strengthen a sense of cultural identity and national unity” (Sultan 2015, 32). However, what Afghanistan needs even more urgently than spending time on conservation of its material heritage is a national dialogue about historical fears and resentments aimed at working towards greater mutual understanding. In a similar sense, albeit more limited, Mohammed Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan, has taken up a recommendation of Nancy Dupree (an archaeologist and long-time cultural activist, and currently director of the Afghanistan Center at Kabul University), for a National
Council on Cultural Creativity (Ghani 2015, 11). Reconciliation and forgiveness may be needed to address the issues of heritage and culture to avoid scenarios of heritage abuse (Bernhardsson 2007, 201; Graham and Howard 2008; Howard 2003, 166–73).

As for the organization and management of MAAP, as set out in a Memorandum of Understanding, the MoIC is responsible for the recovery program and the MoMP is working in close consultation with them (Aynak Compliance Monitoring Project 2012; Inspection Panel 2013a). The PMU, embedded in the MoMP, has obtained funding from the World Bank and has established a fully staffed and equipped logistical support unit for the archaeological work of the national and international teams at the site. Part of the funding is being used to provide specialized equipment, technology, and consumables required for the recovery work (Lawler 2015, 35; Marquis 2013, 15).

A wide range of institutes, donors, and contractors provided assistance to MAAP. Personal interests rather than the needs of the archaeologists initiated these actions, and the wide range of organizations and contractors characterizes the disjointed organization of MAAP. In post-conflict conditions this is difficult to avoid. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, contributed to MAAP with the construction of large temporary storage facilities for material removed from the excavated sites. In times of conflict, this storage facility in Logar Province, south of Kabul, risks becoming a supermarket for antiquities. DAFA has been supervising excavations at Mes Aynak since April 2009 at the request of the MoIC and has provided technical support to MAAP since 2011. DAFA’s supervision consists of regular one-day visits to the site (Inspection Panel 2013a, Annex 5: Overview of supervision missions and field visits), finding specialists for restoration and conservation as well as research and publication (Inspection Panel 2013a, Annex 6: Summary of Procurement by DAFA). DAFA has been able to adjust to the complicated and ever-changing conditions (Bendezu-Sarmiento and Marquis 2015, 110). Consultants from the private digital recording company Iconem were contracted to record the excavated results in aerial images with the support of a drone. This has yielded stunning presentations, overflights, and detailed documentation of stupas and statues (Iconem 2017). Meanwhile, the Afghan archaeologists were seeking desperately for funds to repair their survey equipment, and the wooden bookshelves provided by the Czech embassy were burnt in one winter season to keep the technical staff of the project warm in their site hut.

The Local Community of Mes Aynak

In 2004 the National Institute of Archaeology (Afghanistan) visited the site and confiscated a collection of statues illegally excavated at the site. Until that date, members of the local community had assisted in the retrieval of statues and other objects for sale. In 2009 Gol Hamid (MES 001) was the first site at Mes Aynak to be legally investigated, and one year later Tepe Kafiriat
(MES 003) became the focus of excavations. Since 2009, the local community has participated in the excavation of the ruins, in contrast to their previous role of ‘assistant looters’. The archaeologists have also involved the local community in the protection and management of the archaeological resources. Wooden structures were erected over the fragile features, and in some cases roofed mud-brick structures were built.

The question of ownership of archaeological materials is not an issue, as the government is the owner of the mineral resources and the archaeological remains. If we consider the long-term presence of the mine and the groups of people who laid claim to the resources, one could ask whether the local communities should have the right to control and exploit them, rather than the central government. The archaeological institutions, however, pursue a more distant and alienating stance and opt for collaboration with the World Bank and foreign investors, such as the state-owned Chinese MCC. As a compromise, the local community is hired for manual labor. At the height of the excavations 550 workers were engaged (Cockin 2013, 7; MAAP Reports 2012–2015). Other sources of income and employment in MAAP through the implementation of the conservation plan may become available in the near future. Colleen Morgan

Figure 15.4 Areas to be investigated in the Mes Aynak ‘red zone’, based on MAAP Report February 2014. (H. Curvers).
praised the photographs used in an article by Jerome Starkey as expressing a worker-centered view, but concluded that:

Starkey also includes a photograph of the workmen being searched each day as they leave site. While there may be an on-site intimacy of shared endeavor, the workmen still remain separate and untrusted . . . His photographs highlight a tension in archaeological practice that goes unmentioned both in our academic literature and in popular news stories about gold and treasure.

(Morgan 2012a; cf. Morgan 2012b)

Another shocking experience was the explosion of a mine in MES 050, in which two workers were injured, one seriously. The worker with serious wounds was taken to three hospitals in Kabul, and was finally admitted to the Italian Hospital. After the accident, the Deputy Minister of Mines promised to take care of the worker. Much to my surprise, a delegation of the family visited us one month later while we were working on the documentation of the stupas in MES 003 to
inquire about the compensations promised by the Deputy Minister. The Afghan archaeologists invited the delegation into their quarters for further deliberations. Again I was disappointed by the attitude of the Ministry towards the local community. Timely payment of salaries was a problem from the beginning of the project, as was following up on promises to the workers.

Can MAAP aid local communities in articulating their own frameworks of heritage management? I think yes, if the rhetoric leaves out culturally, ethnically, and historically specific designations such as Kushan, Buddhist, and Hephtalite from the labels attached to the material culture at Mes Aynak. The material remains at Mes Aynak should instead be labeled ‘human engagement with mineral resources through the ages’. The community living around the mountain would then accept the presence of foreign experts managing the large-scale and final exploitation of the resources. These foreign experts, more specifically the international and Afghan archaeologists, become collaborators with the local community to bring wealth to the region, instead of being excavators of another ‘distant and foreign’ ancient culture. The landscape around Mes Aynak carries the traces of ancient mining, and the foreign experts should be seeking to recollect this story, a story that will become a reality again for the communities around Mes Aynak, most likely the whole country. The rhetoric of “an environment . . . pregnant with the past” (Ingold 1993, 152–3) can bring the stakeholders together in the Mes Aynak Copper Project. This rhetoric of pregnancy suggests that the archaeological site contains traces which seem to have been forgotten, maybe repressed by collective memory, but can be brought back and transmitted into a new story of mineral resource management through the ages.

In general, heritage is thought to contribute to identity formation and the quality of places, as it may have significance for people in the present and meaning for people in the future. However, this significance itself may be subjected to a dynamic process of changing values. Heritage, therefore, only has meaning when it is recognized as such and valued by a group of people. Mes Aynak labeled as a Kushan and Buddhist mining site city may not work in the Logar Province. In this case cultural heritage as a driver for identity formation is too general, and also alien to the current population.

Since archaeological objects can represent considerable monetary and cultural capital, they stand a significant chance of becoming a focus of attention in local power relations. This became apparent during interactions with local and regional powers, such as the police chief of the contingent protecting Mes Aynak and the governor of Logar Province. In a conversation about the storage facility sponsored by ISAF, it became clear that the contractor was very closely related to the authorities in Logar, and the latter were associated with the looting of statues pre-2004. My informant assumed that the storage of statues in the hangar would benefit the organized looters in the long run, in case of a collapse of government influence. Similar concerns about the safety of field storage were expressed by Michael Stanley at the World Bank (Lawler 2015, 35).

When the mining site of Mes Aynak closes, the protected remains will become part of the wider landscape, and this could be an opportunity for local
authorities to incorporate the cultural heritage in the spatial design of the mining landscape. When the mine does close, the cultural heritage element could have the potential to contribute to the identity of the modern mining site. The presence of the archaeological site may even stimulate the economic position of the area as a tourist target. If the archaeologists refrain from excavation of these remains, together with other exposed and consolidated remains, the Mes Aynak mining project could become an example of sustainable mining within a historic landscape, in contrast to, for example, Berkeley Pit, Montana (Marcus 2000). For when the extraction of resources at Berkeley Pit became economically unfeasible, the site was just abandoned leading to the development of a highly toxic lake: an environmental disaster. In contrast, Mes Aynak could become an exemplary monument of sustainable mining through the ages.

ARCH International

ARCH International, the Alliance for the Restoration of Cultural Heritage, is a Washington-based non-profit organization dedicated to the protection of cultural heritage affected by crises and war, and as such, has become intimately connected to the site. Indeed, the president of ARCH expressed her enthusiasm about Mes Aynak, by comparing the site with Pompeii (Benard 2012). Philippe Marquis, as DAFA director, compared the site with Machu Picchu (Baker 2011). This rhetoric draws attention to the value of the site as a potential World Heritage Site, and a lot of media attention has already contributed to the fame of the site as part of the Silk Road. It would be up to the archaeologists to support the Afghan government with plans and technical data about the preservation of the site and the possibilities to conserve it in situ. Unfortunately, providing the plans and data for the conservation process, in which the government submits a request for inclusion of the site on the tentative World Heritage list (cf. Curvers and Stuart 2016), has not been on the agenda.

A great deal of work has focused on finding the right balance between development and archaeological heritage, what is often called a win-win situation. However, the lack of archaeological expertise on the side of the mining company, the Program Management Unit of the MoMP, and the World Bank, does not allow for a proper dialogue. To try to create a platform for a dialogue on Mes Aynak, ARCH International organized a workshop for a range of experts on mining and archaeology. The participants advocated the “(1) development of a master plan for the site; (2) no further action” until this plan has been agreed upon; “(3) Next, a technical and engineering committee” together with archaeologists should develop:

[o]ptions for mining that allow for the preservation of the site or the most important portions of the site. (4) A joint group consisting of members of the above two committees should oversee the mining project during all phases and be available for advice and consultation.

(Benard et al. 2012, 43–44)
All of this indicates considerable will and good intentions, but achieving such objectives on the ground has been considerably harder (if not impossible), due to the many issues noted in this chapter.

**Global Players**

The Inspection Panel presents the World Bank as a global player relying on DAFA and UNESCO. I do not doubt the competence and dedication of these stakeholders, but their leverage on the Afghan government is limited, and as this chapter shows experts engaged as consultants to MAAP, DAFA, UNESCO may publicly acknowledge the global principles but are unable to implement them in the Afghan context.

Is it acceptable to end up with a fragmentary archaeological documentation and a highly advanced digital model of the site, i.e. the one privately produced by Iconem? Overlooking the actions, reports, and rhetoric of the stakeholders of the MAAP, it seems this might be the best we can hope for, allowing the Afghan government and the World Bank their fantasy of sustainable development of mineral resources, MCC the prospect of mining in the distant future, and UNESCO-Kabul and DAFA the illusion of being relevant to the conservation of Afghan cultural heritage. Archaeologists, after involvement in MAAP, will continue to spin their narratives of ancient civilizations and trade routes around the ruins of yet another site. However, in reality, the archaeological potential of Mes Aynak has suffered from the inability to translate global standards into local practices: still, the global players maintain high hopes, and aim to continue analyses and publication (AHEIDI 2015).

**MAAP Reports**

A review of the reports published on the website of the MoMP provides insight into the progress of MAAP. The reports were compiled with the assistance of the international coordinator and describe the efforts of the international team to implement an archaeological plan focusing on excavation, documentation, consolidation, and evaluation of the archaeological features. The reports show that the leverage of the international archaeologists to introduce global best practices was limited.

The first phase (2011–2012) was hampered by the lack of readiness of the Afghani ministries to allow DAFA and the international coordinator to implement the plan, agreed by all stakeholders, without attaching the appropriate budget. The coordinator and a large part of the team quit the project in February 2012, and excavation resumed towards the end of April 2012 with a new coordinator. At this point a nine-month work plan was issued. In the plan, a link between available resources and the success of the plan was explicitly mentioned. Since September 2011, the monthly payment of salaries to international and national archaeologists and local workers had been an issue. Again in 2014 delays in payment culminated in a strike
by the Afghan archaeologists, which resulted in closure of the site (MAAP Report June 2014). In the period 2012–2013, considerable progress was made and 75,000 square meters of the site were considered void of archaeological features (Cockin 2013). Marek Lemiesz, who succeeded Guy Cockin as coordinator in 2013, estimated the area void of archaeological features at only 20,000–30,000 square meters, meaning that there is still a lot of work to be done (MAAP report January 2014), and considerable disjuncture between different assessments of the site, with considerable implications for any planning.

Another concern was the standard of documentation for the excavated sites used by the three teams (MAAP report January 2014). In the MAAP August 2014 report, the issue of poor documentation was rephrased in typical expert jargon and there was mention of setting up a commission or task force to deal with the problem. Unfortunately, the archaeological matrix had already been removed, which made the documentation overhaul archaeologically impossible, but the rhetoric of the experts then called for a new project and expressed hope for the future.

The MAAP clearly shows the struggle of archaeologists working within the context of global institutions that claim to support approved standards and recommendations aiming at best practices, versus governments too weak to implement global standards. We have to ask ourselves what is most needed for the archaeologists to become acknowledged professionals, so essential if the profession is to successfully confront other entities and convince them to modify their ways accordingly. The archaeological profession needs to guide global institutions, and I do not mean the archaeologists who have grown accustomed to the bureaucracy of these organizations, but professionals known for seeking to implement ‘best practices’ in the field of archaeology and conservation. Evaluations of World Bank projects and UNESCO programs and the actions on the ground could provide analysis and discussion and observations from which many lessons can be learned to improve archaeological heritage management (cf. Bloemers et al. 2010a).

The usual approach is local capacity-building, which is a nice ideal but remains thin on the ground. International archaeologists, conservators, and surveyors are offered salaries that dwarf what the Afghan and other local governments can pay: the result is an atmosphere in which the actions of international archaeologists are monitored distrustfully and sometimes resentfully by Afghan archaeologists. An example is shown in the documentary Saving Mes Aynak, when the head of the MoIC archaeologists, Abdel Qadir Timori, expresses his doubts about the qualifications of foreign archaeologists (Huffman 2014, 31:00–32:11). Similar doubts were also stated during the winter months of 2011–12 over the procedure of delineating mud-bricks for detailed documentation of walls in MES 033 and MES 006. These incidents show that it is difficult to obtain good working relations between the teams and the exchange of methods and techniques for documentation. In the eyes of local archaeologists, the expertise of the foreign archaeologists did not always deserve the salaries they were paid. Relations between project stakeholders are crucial elements of the actual practices that
influence results of the projects. Practices such as top-down design or globally developed standards and goals can be excessive and can potentially harm the archaeologists’ autonomy. When project practices on the ground constrain opportunities and the perceived competence of individuals is suspect, the goal of projects is not sustainable (cf. Ellerman 2006).

The MCC-Jiangxi Copper MJAM Consortium

The other component involved at the site, the mining consortium, also claims to respect the Afghan government’s efforts to manage its cultural heritage at Mes Aynak. In the earlier stages of the project, MJAM provided facilities and tools for the workers engaged in the archaeological excavations, and in a later
stage they made available containers, water reservoirs, a generator, and communication equipment. The company also built and managed accommodation, a kitchen, and a dining room for the Afghan and International teams.

The consortium of two Chinese companies at Mes Aynak (MCC-Jiangxi Copper MJAM) and a conglomerate of seven Indian companies led by Steel Authority of India Ltd bidding for the Hajigak mining project are companies without a long record of working with local communities and national governments on issues of employment and heritage (cf. Bradshaw et al. 2011). It is impossible to place the ‘burden of expectations’ on the mining company, but there needs to be a great deal of cooperation among all the stakeholders to ensure that programs are being delivered and that they are the right programs. An immediate concern was that there were no archaeologists working for the mining companies. There is also a great need to develop the skill base of Afghan archaeologists to ensure that Afghans can fill the large majority of the jobs in the projects preceding mine development and in firms providing these services. Given the archaeological activities throughout the country in the last decade and a half, there is reason to be optimistic about the existence of basic skills needed for heritage management. Looking at the progress reports, however, it seems that the cooperation between international and national archaeologists has not yielded results that support this optimism.

From Archaeological Recovery and Preservation Plans to a Management Plan

The World Bank has set the goal for MAAP to recover and preserve some of the sites and features. DAFA and the three archaeological coordinators have tried to implement procedures for recovery, proper documentation, and discussions around conservation (Cockin 2013; Curvers 2013; Lemiesz in MAAP Report January 2014). It seems that the goal was set, the finances provided, but on the ground the archaeologists were unable to deliver. In 2015, the project was reinvigorated through the ‘Extraction Industry Initiative’. Work at Mes Aynak continued at a slow pace: the documentation issue was addressed by searching for a translator for the Dari and Russian field notes, while drone and laser documentation is much praised and is supposed to cover the lack of proper archaeological documentation. As the link between excavators and documentation has been severed, we must fear that—with regard to academic publication—the project is doomed.

Thomas Lorain, assistant director of DAFA, confirms the failure of Mes Aynak to date in his claims that the partners want to avoid a ‘new Mes Aynak’ (Bruges 2016, 5:20–5:30). Patricia Phillips (UNESCO, Kabul Office) explains the new official approach with the expert mantra: “This project is a strategic partnership between UNESCO and the World Bank in support of the Afghan government to strike a balance between economic development and protecting the cultural heritage of the country” (Bruges 2016, 1:16–1:29). The surveys of the areas impacted by the Hajigak mines will provide the Afghan government
with data which will allow them to design and implement a management plan for those sites (Bruges 2016, 3:54–4:21). Five years of the MAAP have shown that the efforts of the partners sometimes fall to their deaths on the steep and perilous slopes of the Afghan bureaucracy.

Concerns about the archaeological investigations at Mes Aynak have been discussed in the Request for Inspection issued on behalf of the residents of Logar and Afghans in diaspora (Inspection Panel 2013, Annex I). The MAAP practices have been discussed by its archaeological coordinators (Cockin 2013; Curvers 2013; Lemiesz in MAAP Report January 2014), and the documentary Saving Mes Aynak provides dramatic images and scenes (Huffman 2014).

Abdel Qadir Timori, Head of the Department of Archaeology of the Ministry of Information and Culture, is one archaeologist in a leading role presented in the documentary who expresses quite personal and emotional messages. The absence of an Archaeological Management Plan for MAAP allows him to express his own ideas and feelings. It can only be hoped that the Afghan Heritage and Extractive Industry Initiative will be of value in itself and will be executed within the framework of a plan with achievable goals and deliverables. International archaeology is more than adventurous fieldwork in distant regions, or a bandage for national policies without respect for environment or culture. Neither is it about keeping the myth alive that World Bank policies and projects are technocratic ventures as long as nominal projects are executed, outside the real world of politics, culture, or more generally “outside the history of imperial relations” (Goldman 2006, 184–5).

**Conclusion**

To what extent can we know the past of Mes Aynak? How we can use the many hidden features for actual site management and how can we define its historical value? The overall experience in other projects is that heritage management is increasingly about management of change rather than protection.

As Tom Bloemers and his co-editors (Bloemers 2010; Bloemers et al. 2010b) have indicated, this confronts us with a paradox: to preserve our historic environment we have to collaborate with those who wish to transform it and, in order to apply our expert knowledge, we have to make it suitable for politics and society.

Instead of reformulating or devising new programs and disguising failures of previous plans and projects (which Timothy Mitchell describes as the rule of experts, 2002), maybe it is time for archaeologists to map every stage in the project-planning and delivery process, detecting the points at which funds leak, and fine-tuning the project system to foster compliance and increase opportunities. The danger, however, will always be that the archaeologists conduct themselves as experts who know how others should excavate, document, and conserve. They collect and arrange their data and diagnose deficiencies; subsequently, they devise elaborate interventions to bring about improvement and build capacity.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan is being reduced to a country of mineral resources with their archaeological treasures defined as one of the first obstacles to be dealt with. Exhibitions travel the world, museum collections are ordered and made accessible, the new Afghan economy and identity and the archaeological resources become interdependent. A risky path.

UNESCO relies on diplomatic tools (conventions, stimulating awareness through the use of modern media) and coordinating bodies. The World Bank has leverage through its loans within the framework of their operational policies. But the efficiency of these international institutions is limited as they use a rhetoric that may be understood by a small group of states, but not by all. In weak or failed states, additional obstacles appear on the horizon. In Beirut, a private enterprise took over the lead from UNESCO in finding a balance between building a new city while also striving for a substantial conservation of its material heritage after the civil war (1975–1990) (Curvers and Stuart 2016). At Mes Aynak, close collaboration with civil society might be a solution to have more partners at the table. The suggestions of ARCH International should, therefore, be inserted in the MAAP documentation (Benard et al. 2012). ARCH International is recognized by a large group of Afghans, local and diaspora, and offers opportunities for communities to participate in heritage management, which is important for civil society (Chechi 2015; Van der Auwera and Schramme 2011). The World Bank agrees with many conditions brought forward by ARCH International (Inspection Panel 2013b, 35), but their implementation is pending.

Bibliography


Index

Note: References in *italics* are to figures, those in **bold** to tables.

Abu Dhabi Declaration (2016) 26
ACT-Field School project, Pakistan (2011–2016) 217, 218–19, 222–33; Abbahaseb-china 234; Anluk-Dara 228, 229, 234; archaeology from below 224–9; Barikot 225–6, 226, 227, 230, 234; bridge for the future 232–3; Buddha of Jahanabad 229, 231, 234; community practice 229–33, 230–1; conceptual backbone 222–4; evolving heritage 233; Gumbat/Balo Kale 227, 229, 232, 234; language 224; Mission House 230; Saidu Sharif 222–4; Swat Museum 223, 223–4, 223; tourism 232, 233, 234–5; Udegram 228, 229, 234; conclusions 233–5
aerial archaeological approach 126–7, 134
Aerial Photographic Archive of the Middle East (APAAME) 123, 125, 126
Afghanistan: Academy of Sciences 268; Bagh-e-Jehan Nama Palace 66–7; Bamian Buddhas 5, 23, 34, 100, 108; capacity-building 66, 265, 275, 277; cultural communication, Herat 68, 68–9; DAFA (Délégation Archéologique Française en Afghanistan) 268, 269, 273, 274, 277; gardens 66–7; Gardens of Babur, Kabul 67; Ghazni archaeological survey 67–8; National Council on Cultural Creativity 268–9; National Institute of Archaeology 269; post-conflict reconstruction 36; Shorabak (CampBastion) 66; UNESCO 23; see also Mes Aynak Archaeology Project
Afghanistan Heritage and Extractive Industries Development Initiative (AHEIDI) 266–7, 278
Aga Khan Trust for Culture 67
agriculture, intensification of 131
AIA *see* Archaeological Institute of America
Akbar, S. 268
Al-Abbeed, Qahtan 60, 61
Allied Forces Monument, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) 42
Alvaredo, Pedro de 250
Amador, Fabio 248, 250
Amaroli, Paul 243
American Civil War 42, 43, 44
American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) 8, 124
AMUDANAN 128
Andrews, E. Wyllys V. 255
Ang Chouléan 201
anthropology 74
APAAME *see* Aerial Photographic Archive of the Middle East
Araúz, María Isaura 244
Arcadia Fund 123
ARCH International 273–4, 279
Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) 8, 49; Cultural Heritage by Archaeology and Military Panel (CHAMP) 49, 50
archaeological property protection 61–4
Archaeological Survey of India 202
ARCHES software 129
Armenia 139; *see also* Nagorno-Karabakh
ASOR *see* American Schools of Oriental Research
Assad family 92–4
Austria: cultural property protection 58
Austrian Society of Colonization Abroad 86
Avalon Project (2016) 45
Azerbaijan 138–9, 140, 142, 146, 148; *see also* Nagorno-Karabakh
community engagement 4, 7, 16, 148, 180, 184–5, 229–33, 269–73
conflict 3–4
Cook, S. 111
Corona Atlas of the Middle East 126
Cotes, H. 45–6
Criado Boado, F. 76
Cristilli, Claudio 223
Croci, Dr. Elena 68–9
cultural atrocities 99–100
Cultural Heritage Initiative (ASOR) 124
cultural property protection (CPP) see pre-conflict planning for cultural property protection
Cyprus 13

Daily Mail 59
Davis, T. 208–9
De Vattel, Emmerich 44
Defence Estate 48
Delaporte, Louis 197
Demarest, Arthur 246
Democratic Republic of Congo 23
Duarte, José Napoleon 246
Dupree, Nancy 268

EAMENA (endangered archaeology in Middle East and North Africa) 15, 123–4; database 129–30, 132; disturbance 131; education and training 133; methodology and approach 124–9; post-conflict damage 133; results 129–33; threats 131; conclusions 133–4
Earnest, Howard H., Jr. 244, 245–6, 247, 248, 251
École Française d’Extrême Orient (EFEO) 198, 203, 205, 211
economic development 65, 85, 86, 205, 207

education and heritage training 7, 38, 168; Afghanistan 68; Brazil 87; Cambodia 197–203, 204, 205; Iraq 31, 69; Italy 61; Jordan 31, 133; Lebanon 31, 133, 168–9; Libya 31, 33, 133; Middle East 37, 130, 133; in military operations 57; Northern Ireland 179, 180, 183–4; Pakistan 234; Syria 92, 133; Yemen 31
Egypt 28, 125, 179, 222
Eisenhower, General 45–6
El Salvador 15–16, 241, 245; agricultural cooperatives 253–4; cacao 256–7; Caluco 251, 251–2; Cerro Grande Dam 245, 245–6, 256, 257; Chalchuapa 256; Chapultepec Peace Agreement 244; Ciudad Nuevo Cuscatlán 252, 253; civil war 241–4, 242; CONCULTURA 243, 248, 250, 252; cultural resources during wartime 244–7; Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 242, 244; fieldwork challenges in time of peace 247–50, 258; FUNDAR 243, 249–50; Iztalcos region 245, 251–2, 257; Joya de Cerén 250; land reform 254; looting 243; managing collections 254–6; Nahal 257; National Museum 243, 244, 246, 247–8, 252, 254–5; Perquín 255; Pipil people 252, 254, 257; post-conflict archaeology 258–9; post-conflict heritage management policies 250–4; Quelepa 255; Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) 243–4; role of archaeology in citizenship 256–8; Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation (ISTA) 253, 254; Sonsonate 248, 252, 253; U.S.–Salvadoran relations 241, 243–4
Eltringham, N. 111–12
Ethiopia: Aksum Obelisk 34
European Parliament 25
European Union 180, 184, 186, 187
Faccenna, Domenico 220
Faqir, General 66
Farah Chakh Bajjaly, J. 167
Federal University of Fronteira Sul (UFFS) 75
Felisbino, P. 76
Flores, Irma 250
Fontein, J. 108
Fowler, William 244, 246, 247, 248, 251
Funari, P. 74–5
Furstenhofer, General B. 58
Gallardo, Roberto 248, 259
Garnier, Francis 197
Gazlullah, Maulana 218
Genbaku Peace Dome 14
General Order 100 (Lieber Code) 42, 43, 44–5
Geneva law 43
German Archaeological Institute 67
Germany 201, 202, 203
Ghani, Mohammed Ashraf 268
Giblin, J. 107
Goldman, M. 278
Gourevitch, P. 112
Great Zimbabwe 107, 108
Groslier, Bernard Philippe 211
Grotius, Hugo 44

Habyarimana, Juvénal 115
Hague Conventions (1899; 1907) 43, 44, 45
Hague law 43
Haj Saleh, Y. 35
Hamdani, Abdul Amir 63
Hangzhou Congress (2013) 37
Harmanşah, Ö. 3, 5
Hartley, J. 59
Hartt, F. 58
Heng Sophady 263
Higueras, A. 178
Hiroshima 14
Historic Environments Records (HERs) 129
history 74
Hollande, F. 26
Hume, J. 182
Hussein, Saddam 14, 65

ICBS see International Committee of the Blue Shield
ICC see International Criminal Court
ICCROM 37, 102
ICOM see International Council of Museums
ICOMOS 33, 37, 268
Iconem 269, 274
ICRC see Red Cross
IHL see International Humanitarian Law
India, Archaeological Survey of 202
Ingold, T. 272
Instituto do Património Histórico e Artístico Nacional (Brazil; IPHAN) 75
International Association for Mediterranean and Oriental Studies (ISMEO) 217, 219, 220
International Committee of the Blue Shield (ICBS) 47, 47
International Council of Museums (ICOM) 28, 102
International Criminal Court (ICC) 26, 35
International Development Association 265
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 42–3, 44
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 272
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 269
Interpol Tracking Task Force (ITTF) 62
IPHAN (Instituto do Património Histórico e Artístico Nacional, Brazil) 75
Iraq: Aqar Quf ziggurat 64, 64–5; Baghdad Museum 63; Basra Museum 9–10, 60–1; British Field Army 60; damage to cultural heritage 28, 49, 131; destruction of religious sites 100, 101; Dhi Qar 63; Hatra 99; heritage preservation 61–3; heritage training 31, 69; Iraq Conservation Institute, Erbil 69; ISIS (ISIL, Daesh) 25; Khorsabad 34; looting of museums and sites 8, 28, 61–2, 63; Mar Elia Monastery 65–6; Mosul 31, 34, 99, 100; Nasiriyah (Operation Antica Babilonia) 62, 63–4; Nimrud 30, 32, 34; Nineveh 31, 99, 100; Operations Heritage and Bell, Basra 60–1; planning 9–10; remote assessment and monitoring 33; Saddam’s palaces 59–60; UN Security Council Resolutions 25; ‘Unite for Heritage’ campaign 27; Virtual Museum of Iraq 63; Zubair 60–1
Iraqi Kurdistan: Amna Surka, Sulimaniyah 14; Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 13
ISAF see International Security Assistance Force
IslaIo (Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente) 217, 218
ISIS (ISIL, Daesh): cultural atrocities 99–100; destruction of religious sites 100–1; heritage damage 3, 5, 25, 65, 96, 98–9; looting 98, 99, 131; oil refining 98, 100
ISMEO (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente) 217; see also International Association for Mediterranean and Oriental Studies
Israel: AMUDANAN 128
Italian Archaeological Mission, Swat 16, 217–18, 219–20, 222, 233; see also ACT-Field School project, Pakistan (2011–2016)
Italy: Calabrita earthquake 58; Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (TPC) 28, 29, 62–4; debt swap projects 222; heritage preservation 28,
Index

29, 58, 61, 62–4, 68–9; Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (ISMEO) 217; Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente (IsIAO) 217, 218; Museo Nazionale d’Arte Orientale, Rome 220; Pieve Santo Stefano 58; University of Palermo 201; YOCOCU 140, 142, 146, 148, 150–1

ITTF (Interpol Tracking Task Force) 62

James VI, King 187

Japan: capacity-building programs 201; cultural heritage education 201; Nara National Research Institute of Cultural Properties 201; Sophia University, Tokyo 201, 202

Johnson, Lyndon 198

Jordan: aerial imagery 125, 126; heritage training 31, 133; Madaba 128, 128–9; MEGA-J 127–8; site protection 125; tourism 133

jus ad bellum (Just War) 43
jus in bello 43

Kagame, P. 112

Kennedy, D. 123

Kenya 108

Kitson, A. 183–4

Kosovo: Decani Monastery 61

Krencker, D. 159

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 13

landscape archaeology 76

Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 43, 44

Lebanon 14–15, 91, 154–5, 156; Baalbek 157; Beirut 154–5, 168, 169; Bekaa Valley 155, 156, 158, 165, 166; Byblos 157; civil war and conflicts 154, 157, 158–9; Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) 156–7, 158, 160, 165; heritage training 31, 133; historical ambivalence 166–8; historical context 156–8; Hosn Niha as post-conflict site 164–6, 165, 168–9; Hosn Niha: site rehabilitation/resurrection 7, 155, 156, 158–64, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163; Kamid el-Loz 157, 158, 166–7; Law on Antiquities 156; Nahr al-Bared 167; National Museum 157, 169; Niha 156, 158, 165, 166; post-conflict reconstruction 36; rural sites 155; and Syria 166; Tyre 157; UNESCO 23, 279; future needs 168–9; conclusion 169–70

legal frameworks 12–13; see also Middle East: UNESCO

Lemiesz, Marek 275

Leonardi, Giovanni 226

Liberia 108

Libya: damage to cultural heritage 28; fogara 131; heritage training 31, 33, 133; site protection 125, 127, 130

Lieber Code see General Order 100

Lieber, Dr. Francis 44

Lino, J. 75

Little, A. 183

LOAC see Law of Armed Conflict

local, practical, context-based solutions 11–12

Lon Nol 198

Long, C. 14

looting 41; Afghanistan 269–70, 272; Brazil 83; Cambodia 208–9; El Salvador 243; Iraq 8, 28, 61–2, 63; Lebanon 155, 157, 159, 164, 166; Middle East 28, 31, 131, 132; Syria 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 104, 131

López, Manuel 243, 244, 248

Lorain, Thomas 277

Lower Mekong Archaeological Project (LOMAP) 201, 204, 205, 208, 208

Luce Foundation 204

Lunet de Lajonquière, É.-E. 197

McCall, C. 187

MacDonnell, Randal 187–8, 188

McGuinness, M. 182

Mackenzie, S. 208–9

McQuaid, S. 183

Mali 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 36

Mallon, S. 182

Maratì, Ivano 223

Mariátegui, José 254

Marquis, Philippe 273

MARS (Military Archaeological Resources Stewardship) 49

Marsiglia, Capitano Giuseppe 63

material culture 57, 72, 75

Mattingly, D. 123

Mbeki, President 108

MCC see Chinese Metallurgical Group Corporation

MEGA-J 127–8

Meharry, J. 268

memorialization 13–14

Mes Aynak Archaeology Project (MAAP) 15, 263–4, 264; ARCH International 273–4, 279; clay shrines 276; global players 274; Gol Hamid 269; Kuh-e
Aynak 266; local community 269–73; MAAP Reports 264, 274–6, 279; management plan 277–8; MCC-Jiangxi Copper MJAM Consortium 276–7; MES 033 271, 275; Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC) 264, 268, 269, 275; Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) 266, 269, 273, 274; principles and practices 268–9; project rhetoric 265–7; ‘Red Zone’ 266, 270; regional impact 267; Saving Mes Aynak 264, 275, 278; Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project (SDNRP I & II) 264, 265–6; Tepe Kafiriat 269–70; conclusion 278–9
Mes Aynak Copper Project 272
Meskell, L. 108
Middle American Research Institute 247
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 123; see also EAMENA (endangered archaeology in Middle East and North Africa)
Middle East: UNESCO 6, 23–4; diplomatic level 24–7; operational level 29–33; post-conflict reconstruction 33–7; statutory level 27–9; conclusions 37–8
military: and cultural property protection 31, 42–4, 45–6, 48–50, 51, 133; heritage projects 57–8; see also post-conflict heritage and recovery
Mini, Generale Fabio 61
Mitchell, T. 278
‘Monuments Men’ (MFAA officers) 42
Morgan, C. 270, 271
Morocco 13, 125
Nagorno-Karabakh 13, 138–41, 139, 140; challenges 148–9; development of the NKDP 143–6; documentation and monitoring 138; Documentation Project (NKDP) 139, 140–3; Govhar Agha Mosque 144, 145, 149; logistics and phases of the NKDP 146–8; pillars of post-conflict strategies 141; Shusha 143, 144, 145, 148; stakeholders and community engagement 148; future management plan 149–51
Namibia 108
Napoleonic Wars 44
Napolitano, Giorgio 224
NATO 58
Netherlands: Centre for International Heritage Activities 66

New York Times 66
Nixon, Richard 198
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 46
non-state actors 12–13, 41–2, 52
Norodom Sihanouk 197–8
North Africa see Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Northern Ireland 13, 177–80; Alliance Party 184; Brexit 186–7; Carrickfergus 189; community relations 180, 184–5; conflict 181–5; Corrymeela Community 180, 183, 189, 190–1; Dark Tourism 184; Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 182, 184, 186–7; Derry/Londonderry 178, 179, 180; Direct Rule (2002–2007) 182; Dunluce 187–9, 188; Easter Rising (1916) 181; ethnicity 177–8; Good Friday Agreement (1998) 182; heritage-related programmes 180; history teaching 179, 183–4; identity and role of heritage 185–90; International Fun for Ireland 184; Irish (CNR) identity 182, 188–9; Loughbrickland crannóg 178; National Museums and Galleries 179; Northern Ireland Assembly 182; parades 185–6, 186; peace dividend 180, 184; peace lines 184; peace process 182–3, 187; Plantation 177–8, 179, 180, 187–8, 189–90; Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 181; Sinn Féin 182, 184, 187; The Troubles (1968–1998) 177–8, 181–2, 183, 184; Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 181; Ulster Scots identity 187–8; Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 181; War of Independence (1919–1921) 181; conclusion 190–1

Ntaryamira, Cyprien 115

Olivieri, L. 226
Paisley, I. 182
Pakistan-Italian Debt Swap Agreement (PIDSA) 218, 222
Index

(Swat Archaeological Guides Association) 231, 232; Sustainable Tourism Foundation Pakistan (STEP) 232; Swat Museum 219–20, 223, 223–4, 233; Taliban 218, 221; Taxila Museum 220, 222; TNSM 218; tourism 222, 232, 233, 234–5; University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar 223; see also ACT-Field School project
Palestine 36, 133, 167
Perlez, Jane 221
Phillips, Patricia 277
Phon Kaseka 202, 209
Pich Keo 198
places of memory 79, 81, 86, 87
Poland: Ghazni archaeological survey 67
Poli, J. 85
post-conflict archaeology 4–5, 10–11
post-conflict heritage and recovery 9, 15, 57; Afghanistan 66–9; global standard 61–4; Iraq 9–10, 59–66, 69; Italy 58; military heritage projects 57–8; planning 9–10; conclusion 69–70
post-conflict preparation 7–9
post-conflict reconstruction: UNESCO 23, 33–7
Pottier, J. 116
pre-conflict planning for cultural property protection (CPP) 41–2; CPP history 44–7; defining cultural property 50–1; Hague Convention 41–2; and the military 31, 42–4, 45–6, 48–50, 51, 133; non-state actors 12–13, 41–2, 52; opportunities for individuals 47–51; conclusion 51–2
prehistory 74
quotidian sites 5–6, 7
Radin, J. C. 85
Red Cross (ICRC) 27, 42
Reeves, K. 14
remote assessment and monitoring 33, 126, 127
Renfrew, C. 41
Renk, A. 86
Roberts, B. 65
Roberts, G. 65
Roerich Pact (Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments) 45, 46
Romero, Carlos Humberto 243
Romero, Óscar, Archbishop 244
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) 106, 107, 115
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 106–7, 115, 116, 117
SAA (Society for American Archaeology) 49
Sagre, Inés 246
Sakada Sakhoeun 206
Salah Al-Din 93
Samuels, K. L. 265
Sánchez, Evelin 248
Sandes, C. 168
satellite imagery 33, 124, 126, 134, 141
Saudi Arabia 125, 130
Scotland 187
Seeden, H. 166–7
Segni, Antonio 224
Seng Chantha 205
Seng Komphake 205
Sermeño, Hector Ismael 250
Shanghai Expo 107, 108
Sheets, Payson 244, 246
SHIRIN International 130
Sierre Leone 108
Silva, A. de 76
Simpson, K. 183
Sion, B. 116–17
Skarlato, O. et al. 184
Society for American Archaeology (SAA) 49; Military Archaeological Resources Stewardship (MARS) 49
Sodaro, A. 113
Son, S. 199
South Africa 108
Stanley, Michael 272
Stark, Miriam 200, 204, 208
Starkey, Jerome 271
Steel Authority of India Ltd 277
Stone, E. 8
Stone, P. 123
Suazo, Gregorio Bello 250
Sultan, Omar 268
Syria 13, 15, 91; Aleppo 30, 31, 34, 35, 36–7, 94, 95, 101; Apamea 94, 95, 103; Bosra 8, 93, 94, 101; Crac des Chevaliers 31; damage to cultural heritage 28, 94–101, 131; Damascus 31, 94, 95; Dead Cities, Idlib 94, 96, 101, 102, 104; destruction of religious sites 100–1; Dura-Europos 94, 131, 132, 141; emergency safeguarding 33, 102–4; heritage training 133; Homs 34; Krak des Chevaliers 94, 95; and Lebanon 166; Ma’arra Museum 96, 97, 102–3, 103, 104; Mar Elian 100; Meskene 98, 100; national identity and cultural heritage 91–4; national site database 130; Observatory of Syrian Cultural Heritage 30; Palmyra 5, 30, 30, 31, 32, 34, 94, 98, 102; post-conflict preparation 7–8, 9; Project for the Emergency Safeguarding of Syrian Cultural Heritage (2014–2017) 31; Qala’t Ja’bar 98; remote assessment and monitoring 33; Resafa 98; role of non-state actors 101–4; Silk Road Festival 93; site protection 125; TDA-HPI 102–4; UN Security Council Resolutions 25; Urbicide Syria 8; World Heritage sites 5, 31, 94, 101; conclusion 104–5

Thailand 196, 197
Thaler, T. 86
The Day After (TDA) 102
themes 12–13
Thompson, A. 201
Timori, Abdel Qadir 275, 278
Tinker Foundation 247
tourism 9, 11, 133; Brazil 75, 80; Cambodia 207, 210–11; Dark Tourism 110, 184; Great Zimbabwe 108; Iraq 61; Jordan 133; Northern Ireland 184; Pakistan 222, 232, 233, 234–5; Rwanda 109, 110; UK 133
trafficking 28, 31
Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact) 45, 46
Trimble, D. 182
Tucci, Giuseppe 217, 219–20
Tunisia 125, 133
Turkey: heritage training 31
UFFS (Federal University of Fronteira Sul) 75
Uganda 108, 117
UN: 2030 Agenda 37; Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972) 23, 27; Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 37; Security Council Resolutions 25, 26, 28, 29, 35; Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 37
UNHCR 27
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 26
United Kingdom (UK): Ministry of Defence 43; tourism 133
University of Tübingen 201

Valdivieso, Fabricio 250
Vargas, A. 253–4
Vassallo, Candida 223
Veca, Maria Lina 61
Vietnam 199

Wadud, Miangul Abdul 219
Wahabism 101
war crimes 26
Weinberg, A. 45–6
Western Sahara 13
Wheeler, Mortimer 226
Index

White-Spunner, Lt. Gen. 59
White, T. *et al.* 182, 183
Winter, T. 108
World Archaeological Inter-Congress (2010) 58
World Bank 264, 265–6, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279
World Heritage sites 6, 25, 27; Afghanistan 5; Cambodia 195, 197, 199, 207; ICOMOS *Guidance* 33; Syria 31, 94, 250; Tentative List 27, 110, 143, 234, 273; World Heritage in Danger 27, 35
World War Two: ‘military necessity’ 45–6; ‘Monuments Men’ 42; post-war reconstruction 26, 36, 38, 58

Ya Da 205, 208
Yasmine, J. 159
Yates, F. A. 87
Yemen 129; damage to cultural heritage 28, 131; General Organisation of Antiquities and Museums (GOAM) 129–30; heritage training 31; Italian debt swap project 222; remote assessment and monitoring 33; Sana’a 34
Yugoslavia: cultural property protection 69

Zenobia, Queen 93
Zschoetzschmann, W. 159