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Introduction

This encyclopedia is based, in part, on the premise that an understanding of many of the most significant social and political developments and changes throughout much of human history – such as the ascendance of Christianity and Islam, the Reformation, and the American, French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, for example – is partly dependent on an understanding of the workings and influence of social movements. If anything, this observation seems even more relevant in the past two to three centuries, as well as in the last few years. Looking back at the various social and cultural landscapes across the world over the past 200 years, it is reasonable to wonder how very different things might be in the absence of the international antislavery movement, which led to the abolishment of slavery, the suffrage movement, which sought to enfranchise women, the labor movement, which sought to reduce the exploitation of workers of all ages, and the various civil and human rights movements, which sought, and continue to seek, to guarantee for all citizens of all countries the range of human rights that too many citizens have been and still are denied. All of these movements played an important role in the establishment and deepening of democracy and citizenship rights in some countries, and are still operative in other countries that have yet to guarantee such rights. Needless to say, the importance of social movements and protest is strikingly evident in the contemporary world, with the welling up of the politically consequential Tea Party movement in 2009 in the United States, the protest movements and attempted revolutions rolling across the Arab world in 2011 and 2012, the anti-austerity protests in Greece and other European countries in 2011, widespread protest over contested elections in a host of countries – including Iran in 2009 and Russia in 2011, and the Occupy Wall Street movement surfacing in New York City in 2011, and spreading rapidly across US and European cities.

The importance of these and other movements is recognized not just by social movement scholars within the academy but also by other chroniclers of the flow of history. *Time* magazine’s final issue of the twentieth century, for example, included among its three major candidates for the person of the century the inspirational leader of one of the more consequential movements of the past century, Mohandas Gandhi. Why Gandhi? Because, in *Time*’s words,

> He stamped his ideas on history, igniting three of the century’s great revolutions – against colonialism, racism, and violence. His concept of nonviolent resistance liberated one nation and sped the end of colonial empires around the world. His marches and fasts fired the imagination of oppressed people everywhere. (*Time*, Dec. 31, 1999: 123)

As Time added “his strategy of nonviolence … spawned generations of spiritual heirs around the world,” including Martin Luther King Jr, César Chávez, Lech Walesa, Benigno Aquino Jr, and Nelson Mandela – all prominent leaders of major, consequential social movements in their respective homelands of the United States,
Poland, the Philippines, and South Africa. And more recently, *Time* named as its 2011 Person of the Year “The PROTESTOR from the Arab Spring to Athens, From Occupy Wall Street to Moscow” (Dec. 26, 2011).

The aforementioned movements and names highlight the fact that some of the major events and figures of the past century, as well as before, are bound up with social movements and protest. Thus, the study of social movements is not only warranted in its own right, but it can also lead to a better and deeper understanding of the social worlds in which they emerge and operate; hence, the core rationale for this encyclopedia on social and political movements.

Even though social movements have been an important actor in the flow of human history, it would have been well-nigh impossible to compile an encyclopedia of this magnitude 50 years ago, say in the early 1960s. The reasons are twofold. First, it is arguable that social movements, as one of the principle forms through which collectivities give voice to their shared grievances and claims by engaging in various kinds of collection action or behavior, such as protesting in the streets, have escalated with the spread of democracy and the corresponding growth of civil society (see entry titled “Social movements” for conceptual elaboration). Indeed, it is arguable, to enlarge upon a claim of one set of scholars, that the societies in which a significant proportion of the world’s population live are, among other things, movement societies. It is also the case that social and political movements tend to cluster across time in “waves” or “cycles,” and that the events associated with the Arab Spring and the Occupy protests spreading across US and European cities at the time of this writing suggest that we may well be in the midst of such a cycle.

Yet, a cycle of social movement protest was clearly evident in the 1960s, perhaps even more so then than now, so why not an encyclopedia like this back in the 1960s? The answer to this question takes us to the second reason for the compilation of an encyclopedia on social and political movements now rather than in the 1960s or the 1970s or even the 1980s. Aside from the fact that the publication of various academic, discipline-based encyclopedias has been in fashion within the publishing industry over the past decade or so, the scholarly literature on social movements that existed in the 1950s and 1960s was relatively scant and limited conceptually and theoretically. Moreover, most scholarship was of the armchair variety, with little attention given to the collection of systematic empirical evidence regarding movement dynamics. What the social movements and protests of the 1960s did, among other things, was to jumpstart a more focused, empirical study of various aspects and dimensions of social movements, which has continued to the present. One of the consequences has been the proliferation of conceptual and theoretical advances, which is reflected in the number and range of conceptual and theoretical entries within this encyclopedia. Further illustration of the almost meteoric growth of the scholarly, empirical study of social movements within the social sciences, and particularly sociology, is provided by its recent development into one of the largest and most intellectually vibrant subfields in sociology, as well as by the recent publication of two international journals of
research and theory about social movements and protest (Mobilization published in the US, and Social Movement Studies published in the UK). Social movement studies have also been very pluralistic methodologically, thereby leading to a broadened and better understanding of citizen mobilization. Thus, there is far more conceptual and systematic empirical work on which to base an encyclopedia now than there was 50, 40, 30, or even 20 years ago.

Our objective in compiling this encyclopedia has been to provide a comprehensive, authoritative, interdisciplinary, up-to-date work on social and political movements that will be an invaluable reference volume for students and scholars of social movements worldwide. Thus, the coverage is broad-based such that major social and political movements and related collective phenomena throughout segments of history and across the globe are represented among the entries. Obviously, selectivity was involved, since there is no assembled worldwide population of social movements from which to sample. But the movements and related events included were not selected haphazardly. Rather, we selected some of our advisory editors with an eye to ensuring that there was regional representation of movements across the globe. In other words, we selected a number of advisory editors who have specialized knowledge of social movements and related activities in different regions of the world – for example, Africa, Eastern Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan), Europe, and Latin America. Additionally, we also wanted to include major theoretical perspectives, concepts and processes, and relevant research methodologies and procedures; so we also selected advisory editors who could ensure coverage of the major perspectives and concepts and different types of movements.

Consistent with the aim to produce a broad-based, comprehensive encyclopedia that will have interdisciplinary and international appeal, the team of 13 advisory editors we assembled is nationally and substantively diverse (see the list of advisory editors). When the four of us (the co-editors) are coupled with the 13 advisory editors, there is representation from ten countries (China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States), four disciplines (history, political science, social psychology, and sociology), as well as broad coverage of theoretical perspectives, substantive research topics, different methods of study and a broad range of social movements studied. In short, we tried to assemble a team of advisory editors that, in combination with us, ensured sufficient national diversity and scholarly research breadth to produce a top-flight encyclopedia that would meet our articulated objectives and aims.

We think we have been reasonably successful in realizing these objectives. However, we do have some misgivings about the finished product. The major one has to do with the daunting task of finding informed authors for all of the entries and then the difficult challenge of patiently pestering the would-be authors to write the promised entry. While the patient pestering paid off in most cases, a number of entries were never written, and this was particularly the case with entries on specific movements in some parts of the world. Thus, for example, we received fewer entries on social movements
in Africa than we had hoped. But such challenges notwithstanding, we still secured 434 entries on specific social movements, revolutions, and related events worldwide, and on a very broad range of theoretical perspectives, concepts, processes, and methods fundamental to the study and understanding of social and political movements. We are therefore hopeful that readers and scholars alike will find the encyclopedia helpful in extending their knowledge and understanding of social movements as well as inspiring further study of social movements of all kinds and their dynamics.
Timeline

This timeline provides a listing of some of the most influential events, figures, and publications in the history and study of social movements beginning in the eighteenth century, which has been referred to as the “Age of Reason and Change.” Understandably, the listing is not comprehensive; many important social movements and scholarly works from around the world during this period are missing. However, in indicating many of the major events, movements, and influential scholarly publications across this period, the timeline underscores the centrality and salience of social movements and related phenomena in the flow of history over the past 300+ years.

In order to facilitate identification of the three different clusters of listings, they are keyed accordingly: events and movements are in bold; selected figures/leaders are underlined; and publications are in regular font style and italics. Not all of the listings of events and figures have associated entries in the encyclopedia, but many do.

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1715 & 1745 Jacobite rebellions in Great Britain and Ireland
1773 Peasant uprisings in Russia
1773 Boston Tea Party
1775 American Revolution begins
1780 Gordon Riots in London
1780–1782 Tupac Amaru indigenous uprising against Spanish colonial rule in Peruvian and Bolivian highlands (culminating a century of indigenous rebellions in the Andes against colonial rule in the region)
1789 French Revolution begins
1791–1804 Haitian Revolution (defining moment in the history of Africans in the New World)
1792 Reign of Terror in France (ends in 1794)
1794 The Whiskey Rebellion tax revolt challenges federal authority in the fledgling United States
1818–1883 Marx, Karl
1820–1895 Engels, Frederick
1848 Marx and Engels inspire the masses and call for revolution with the Communist Manifesto
1848 First Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, NY
1848 Revolutions break out across Europe
1850–1864 Taiping Rebellion of China
1861 Fourteen Southern states secede from the United States, marking the onset of the Civil War
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866−1925</td>
<td>Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Marx publishes his critical analysis of capitalism with <em>Capital</em>, Vol. 1: <em>A Critique of Political Economy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Meiji Restoration. The top-down political reform movement led mostly by former lower-ranking samurais topples the Tokugawa Shogunate and establishes the foundation of modern bureaucratic state in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869−1948</td>
<td>Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870−1924</td>
<td>Lenin (Ylianov), V.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Paris Commune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>The Women’s Trade Union League established in Great Britain, followed by the US organization of the same name (1903–1950), which organized women to support women’s labor union organizing efforts and to eliminate sweatshop conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>May Day (International Workers’ Day). The Haymarket Riot and massacre in Chicago, IL is the origin of international May Day, which is a national holiday in more than 80 nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1887−1975</td>
<td>Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1888−1896</td>
<td>Ghost Dance Movement among Native American Indians in the West, especially the Lakota Sioux</td>
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<td>1890</td>
<td>Formation of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) out of the union of National Woman Suffrage Association and the American Woman Suffrage Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891−1937</td>
<td>Antonio Gramsci</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893−1976</td>
<td>Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Initial publication of Gustave Le Bon’s <em>The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1896−1898</td>
<td>Philippine Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>1898−1976</td>
<td>Zhou Enlai</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901−1945</td>
<td>International Federation of Trade Unions (then International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>V.I. Lenin’s <em>What Is To Be Done</em> is published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Robert Park’s <em>The Crowd and the Public</em> is an early contribution to the study of collective behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904−1997</td>
<td>Deng Xiaoping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Revolution in Russia (albeit abortive) and other countries dependent on the Russian Empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Beginning of the sequence of pro-democracy movements known as the Taisho Democracy in Japan (exact dates for its beginning and end still subject of debate, though often said to have begun in 1905 and ended sometime in the mid-1920s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1906 Gandhi develops the principle of Satyagraha, which he elaborated and applied to the Indian Independence Movement

1909–1972 Alinsky, Saul

1910–1920 Mexican Revolution

1911 China’s Republican Revolution that ends Machu rule

1912 Founding of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which marks the beginning of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa. SANNC changed its name to the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923

1912 Bread and Roses strike by immigrant women in Lawrence, MA

1916 Irish Republican Army (IRA) established

1917 Russian Revolution begins

1917–1947 Indian Independence Movement

1918– Mandela, Nelson

1919 Anti-Japanese May 4th Movement in China

1919 March First Movement in Korea against Japanese colonial occupation

1919 Establishment of prohibition in the United States with the ratification of the 18th amendment to the US Constitution. It followed on the heels of prohibition movements in other countries, and was repealed in 1933

1919 NSDAP German National Socialist Party established

1919 International Labor Organization

1919–1921 Irish revolution/War of Independence

1920 Passage of the US Women’s Suffrage Amendment

1921 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established

1921 Hitler seizes leadership of the NSDAP

1921–2006 Friedan, Betty

1922 Mussolini seizes leadership of Italian fascists

1926– Fidel Castro

1927 CCP split with Chinese Nationalist Party and communist revolution begins

1927–1993 Chávez, César Estrada

1928–1967 Guevara, Ernesto “Che”

1928–1968 King, Martin Luther

1930 Gandhi-led Salt March, also known as the Salt Satyagraha

1932 Leon Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution published in English

1934–1935 The long march of the CCP Red Army from south to north China

1935 December 9th student movement in China

1936 Publication of the English version of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia

1936 Spanish Civil War
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Herbert Blumer’s “The Field of Collective Behavior” published</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Reprinted in 1951)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943–1945</td>
<td>Partisan movements emerged during WWII all over Europe, fighting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nazism and Nazi occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Postwar strike wave in United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946–1949</td>
<td>Greek Civil War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946–1949</td>
<td>Chinese Civil War leading to the rise of communist China</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; merged with the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>World Confederation of Labor to form the International Trade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Union Confederation in 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Bolivian Revolution begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952–1955</td>
<td>The Mau Mau rebellion erupts in Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>July 17 protest in Eastern Germany repressed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953–1959</td>
<td>Cuban Revolution, culminating in Fidel Castro’s rise to power</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954/1955–1965</td>
<td>Civil rights movement in the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954–1962</td>
<td>Algerian FLN War of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Montgomery bus boycott in United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>The Hungarian Revolution challenges Soviet authority in Hungary</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Southern Christian Leadership Conference founded</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Anti-Rightist Campaign in China</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasune (Free Basque Country) ETA established</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Crane Brinton’s <em>The Anatomy of Revolution</em> published</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Publication of William Kornhauser’s <em>The Politics of Mass Society</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>First edition of Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian’s <em>Collective Behavior</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsequent editions published in 1972 and 1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>April Revolution in Korea ousted the dictator who ruled for 12 years</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>The Anti US–Japan Security Treaty movement, one of the largest</td>
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<td></td>
<td>leftist political mobilizations ever in modern Japanese history</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>The student sit-in movement in the southern United States revives the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>moribund civil rights movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960–1969</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) founded at the University of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Michigan in 1960, spread to other campuses in the mid-1960s, and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>dissolved in 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s–1970s</td>
<td>Emergence of liberation theology across Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>César Chávez co-founded, with Dolores Huerta, in the United States,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) which later became the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>United Farm Workers (UFW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Publication of Neil Smelser’s <em>Theory of Collective Behavior</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Betty Friedan’s <em>The Feminine Mystique</em> marks the beginning of the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second wave of feminism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1963 Publication of Joseph Gusfield’s *Symbolic Crusades*
1963/1964 Vietnam War protests occur in London and Denmark, and then New York
1963–1975 Vietnam War is target of worldwide protest and peace activism
1964 Freedom Summer in United States
1964 US Congress passes the Civil Rights Act
1964 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) emerges
1964/1965 Free Speech Movement on University of California, Berkeley campus, led informally by Mario Savio and others
1965 Publication of Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*
1965–1975 Italian protest cycle that Sidney Tarrow analyzed in *Democracy and Disorder* (1989)
1966 Publication of Tamotsu Shibutani’s *Improvised News: The Sociological Study of Rumor*
1966 Publication of John Lofland’s *Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Missionizing and Faith Maintenance*
1966 Founding of National Organization for Women
1968 American Indian Movement (AIM) founded in Minneapolis, Minnesota by urban Native Americans
1968 “Prague Spring” is crushed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
1968 Student revolts begin in Paris and spread throughout Europe and Mexico
1968 Student and New Left movements begin to mobilize on a widespread scale in Japan
1968/1969 Beginning of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland
1969 Provisional Irish Republican Army emerges
1969 The gay rights movement is launched during the Stonewall riots in New York City
1969 A large wave of strikes marks the beginning of the so-called “long autumn” in Italy
1970 Students protesting the American invasion of Cambodia are shot by National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, setting off a wave of student strikes across the United States
1970 Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Group founded in Germany
1970 Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse in Italian) emerged in Italy
1970 Ted Gurr’s *Why Men Rebel* is published
1972 Bloody Sunday (Derry, Northern Ireland), nonviolent protest repressed by the British Army

1973 Anthony Oberschall’s *Social Conflict and Social Movements* published

1973–1975 **Helsinki Conference on Human Rights**

1974 Robert Grant founds the American Christian Cause as an effort to institutionalize the Christian Right as a politically active social movement in the United States

1974 **Carnation Revolution in Portugal**

1975 William Gamson’s *The Strategy of Social Protest* provides the first major systematic examination of social movement outcomes


1977 Publication of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward’s *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*

1977 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald’s seminal essay on resource mobilization and social movements

1977 Charles Tilly coins the concept of “Repertoires of Contention”

1977 Alain Touraine publishes *The Self-Production of the Society*, devoted to the role of social movements in producing social changes

1978 Barrington Moore Jr’s *Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt* is published

1978 Publication of Charles Tilly’s seminal book on collective action and social movements, *From Mobilization to Revolution*

1978 **Mass suicide and murder of 913 Jim Jones communal movement members in Jonestown, Guyana**

1978–1979 **Xidan Democracy Movement in Beijing**

1979 **Iranian Islamic Revolution**

1979 The Sandinista Movement (FSLN), which emerged in 1961, overthrows the Somoza regime in Nicaragua

1979 Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* makes the case for the importance of the state in social revolutions

1980 **Solidarity movement formed at Gdansk Shipyard, Poland, to challenge the communist regime**

1980 Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) officially emerges in El Salvador

1980 Founding of the Collective Behavior and Social Movement (CBSM) section of the American Sociological Association with the initial leadership of John Lofland

1980 Publication of Todd Gitlin’s *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media and the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*
1980  David Snow, Louis Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson provide the first major network account of differential recruitment

1980  Nuclear Freeze initiated by Randall Forsberg

1980s  Nuclear disarmament movements around the world, especially in Europe

1981  Hunger strikes of IRA prisoners

1982  Doug McAdam formalizes a “political process” theory of social movements in his book, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–70

1983  Concept of “cycles of protest” developed by Sidney Tarrow

1984  Bert Klandermans provides a social psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory

1984  Aldon Morris’s The Origins of the Civil Right Movements published

1984  Founding of the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil

1986  First major European/US cross-Atlantic conference on social movements in Amsterdam, organized by Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow

1986  David Snow, Burke Rochford, Steve Worden, and Rob Benford introduce the concept of “frame alignment” and its various forms, which serves as the springboard for the development of social movement framing theory

1986  The “Yellow Revolution” succeeds in deposing Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines

1987  Publication of Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor’s Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women’s Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s. Concept of abeyance is developed

1987  Pat Robertson founds the Christian Coalition, which later becomes the most prominent voice in the Christian Right in the United States

1987  Founding of ACT UP (Aids Coalition to Unleash Power)

1987–1993  First Palestinian Intifada

1989  Student-led pro-democracy movement in Beijing (called “Beijing Spring”) associated with Tiananmen Square protest and massacre

1989  Berlin Wall falls after a wave of protests in Eastern Germany, as well as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and elsewhere.

1990  Founding of Queer Nation and rise of queer politics and activism

1990  Americans with Disabilities Act

1991  Clark McPhail’s The Myth of the Madding Crowd is published

1991  Suzanne Staggenborg’s The Pro-Choice Movement is published

1992  Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller publish Frontiers in Social Movement Theory

1992  China’s massive market-oriented reform begins, leading to China’s prosperity and new social problems and grievances

1994  Zapatista uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Following nearly four decades of struggle, apartheid ends in South Africa with Nelson Mandela taking over as president</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Publication of first edition of Sidney Tarrow’s <em>Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>First issue of <em>Mobilization</em>, the international journal of social movement research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Beginning of University of Minnesota Press book series on social movements, protest, and contention</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Publication of Hanspeter Kriesi, Rudd Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Guigni’s <em>New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Publication of Donatella della Porta’s <em>Political Violence and the State</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Alberto Melucci publishes <em>Challenging Codes</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1996–1997</td>
<td><em>Piqueteros</em> (unemployed workers’ movement) emerges in Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Publication of Bert Klandermans’ <em>The Social Psychology of Protest</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Publication of James Jasper’s <em>The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Publication of Leila Rupp’s <em>Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td><em>The Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century</em> is edited and published by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Publication of the first edition of <em>Social Movements</em>, a broad introduction to the topic by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Battle of Seattle – massive protest of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Emergence of the Global Justice Movement</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>The influential “electoral revolution” takes place in Yugoslavia, spurring a succession of “color revolutions” in other Eastern European and Central Asian countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000–2004</td>
<td>Second Palestinian Intifada</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Dingxin Zhao’s <em>The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement</em> is published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Emotion and passion are reintroduced to the study of social movements with the publication of <em>Passionate Politics</em>, edited by Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca Polletta</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Publication of Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s <em>Dynamics of Contention</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>G8 Summit Genoa protest, with one protestor killed</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>First World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, the largest gathering of social movement organizations from all over the world</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>First European Social Forum is held in Florence</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Myra Ferree, William Gamson, Jürgen Gerhards, and Diether Rucht publish their study of abortion discourse in Germany and the United States, titled <em>Shaping Abortion Discourse</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>First issue of <em>Social Movement Studies</em>, an international journal of social movement research published in the United Kingdom.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Worldwide Global Day of Action against the second Iraq War is the largest peace protest ever.</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>“Orange revolution” in Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Publication of the <em>Blackwell Companion to Social Movements</em>, co-edited by David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Cedar Revolution in Lebanon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Evo Morales, former head of the Bolivian coca growers’ union, is elected president with the support of an alliance of social movements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The role of narrative in studying social movements is highlighted in Francesca Polletta’s <em>It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Emergence of the Tea Party movement in the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Publication of Steven Buechler’s <em>Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present</em>.</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Arab Spring.</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>The movement of the Indignados, involving the occupation of city squares, emerges in Spain, spreading to Greece, Italy, among other places.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The Occupy Wall Street movement emerges in the United States in New York City and quickly diffuses across the country and around the world to hundreds of other cities.</td>
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</table>
Abeyance

Abeyance depicts a holding pattern in which a social movement manages to sustain itself and mount a challenge to authorities in a hostile political and cultural environment, thereby providing continuity from one stage of mobilization to another. Abeyance carries with it the connotation of movement decline, failure, and demobilization relative to peaks of mobilization. When a movement declines, it does not necessarily disappear. Rather, pockets of movement activity may continue to exist and can serve as starting points of a new cycle of the same or a new movement at a later point in time. During periods of abeyance, movements sustain themselves but develop distinct repertoires of contention that are different from the mobilizing structures and tactical repertoires of movements in a stage of mass mobilization. A social movement in abeyance may provide linkages to new rounds of mobilization through activist networks, an established repertoire of goals and tactics, and by constructing a collective identity that can serve as a symbolic resource for subsequent mobilization.

Verta Taylor (1989) introduced the abeyance formulation to understand the persistence of the American women’s movement. The concept of abeyance questioned the orthodoxy that the US women’s movement mobilized through two intense waves of protest and died in the interim, calling into question the prevailing view that movements have “births” and “deaths.” Factors that contribute to abeyance are both structural and cultural, as well as external and internal to a movement. Shifting political, cultural, and institutionalized environments lead social movement organizations and activist networks to change their repertoires of contention when a movement is in abeyance. Internal factors that promote movement abeyance are longevity of attachment to movement organizations, intense levels of individual commitment to movement goals and tactics, exclusiveness in terms of membership, centralization that ensures organizational stability and sustained action among a small cadre of highly committed activists, and a rich political culture that promotes solidarity, oppositional consciousness, and continued involvement in the movement. Externally, a lack of status opportunities for integrating intensely committed activists into the mainstream once a movement recedes creates conditions for abeyance. Abeyance structures, in turn, promote movement continuity by sustaining organizational remnants or “holdovers” of a protest wave that provide a resource infrastructure from which a new protest wave may emerge in a different political environment.

Rupp and Taylor’s initial work on abeyance focused on a scaled-down period of women’s movement activity in the United States in the 1950s and the 1960s when feminist organizations and activists retreated from protest and political engagement. Taylor and her collaborators (Taylor & Whittier 1992; Taylor & Rupp 1993; Taylor & Whittier 1997) subsequently examined the abeyance structures that sustained the women’s movement since the 1980s, arguing that the movement had become more decentralized, polycentric, and reticulate than ever before in order to survive a decline in recruitment and a political environment unresponsive to feminist claims. Sawyers and Meyer (1999) contend that abeyance brought about the absence of the women’s movement from policy domains, the polarization of its institutionalized and radical branches, and a shift toward cultural activities and alternative institutions away from political activities. Others argue that the culture of a social movement, including its collective emotions, beliefs, and rituals sustains organizational membership and enhances the abeyance function (Staggenborg & Taylor 2005).
The abeyance formulation has been used to examine the state of women’s movements in a wide range of developed democracies, including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and the United States (Bagguley 2002; Grey & Sawyer 2008). In most countries, women’s movements peaked in two cycles of protest but have persisted in a different form since the second wave of feminist protest ended in the 1970s. Cross-national and comparative research has led to a more developed model of abeyance by illuminating the variety of abeyance structures in addition to formal organizations through which movements sustain themselves during periods of quiescence.

The concept of abeyance has been influential in reorienting scholars away from a preoccupation with the emergence of movements to an understanding of movements as developing in cycles or waves of mobilization. Abeyance has been used to examine the survival and continuity of a wide variety of movements (Kendrick 2000; Holland & Cable 2002; Isaac & Christiansen 2002; Almeida 2003; Rojas 2007). The abeyance formulation challenges social movement scholars not only to consider the organizational, network, and ideological bridges that connect different phases of mobilization, but also to expand analyses of social movement outcomes beyond a narrow focus on short-term gains.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Commitment; Culture and social movements; Fascist movements; Protest cycles and waves; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Activism is, in many ways, the most important activity undertaken by social and political movements. In short, activism is the action that movements undertake in order to challenge some existing element of the social or political system and so help fulfill movements’ aims. Thus, activism includes a wide range of different actions, from participating in a forum to sabotaging property. Not only does activism vary according to the type of action chosen, but also depending upon the target or targets, which could be local citizens, corporations, local or national governments, international financial institutions, the capitalist system, and so on.

In general, scholars have distinguished between two main types of activism: the conventional and the unconventional. Conventional activism is related to party politics, and so involves standing for, working with, or belonging to a political party, or contacting a party official. Unconventional activism includes all other forms of political activity in which movements engage, including petitions, boycotts, marches, and even sabotage. However, this simple distinction between conventional and unconventional activism is now rather worn for a number of reasons. Firstly, the distinction has, historically at least, implied that unconventional forms of protest were irrational and disrespectful of the political order. For example, some early movement theorizing (such as Gurr 1970 and Kornhauser 1965) branded it as irrational spontaneous outbreaks fueled by frustration and aggression, contrasting with the respectable and rational realm of party politics. We have now seen a shift toward (at least some forms of) unconventional activism being regarded as rational and useful contributors to democracy and citizenship (e.g., Stoker et al. 2010).

Secondly, Norris (2007) argues that many forms of activism traditionally considered to have been unconventional, such as demonstrations and boycotts, have now become so common that it is wrong to label them “unconventional.” She illustrates this argument with data from the World Values Survey (WVS), which shows that in Western democracies, around 40 percent of the population have, at some point in their lives, participated in activism. However, the WVS tends to overestimate the popularity of activism by asking respondents whether they have ever engaged in it. The European Social Survey, which asks whether respondents have participated in a legal demonstration in the last 12 months, reveals a more accurate picture and reports much lower levels of activism. In 2005, only 2 percent of UK respondents claimed to have participated in a legal demonstration.

Despite this small glitch in Norris’s argument, it is certainly the case that there is a distinction to be made between the conventional-unconventional, such as legally approved and relatively contained protest marches, and the unconventional-unconventional, such as attacks on property or illegal international economic summit disruption. There are so many different types of nonconventional activism that it does not make sense to lump them all together in one category. Further distinction is also required not least because the category of conventional activism incorporates a much smaller range of activities than does unconventional activism. In a cross-European study of environmental activism, Rootes and colleagues (2003) resolved the conventional/nonconventional dichotomy by distinguishing between five different types of activism: conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, property damage, and violence. Demonstrative activism included rallies and marches, confrontational activism included blockades and sit-ins, property damage covered acts of...
ecotage (sabotage to protect the environment), and violence involved violence toward another human being.

A different, but equally compelling, distinction between types of activism comes from McAdam (1986) who distinguishes between high risk and cost and low risk and cost activism. High risk activism has anticipated dangers, perhaps arrest or personal injury (such as illegally blockading a nuclear weapons base) and high cost activism involves commitment of time, energy, and resources (such as running as a candidate in government elections). In contrast, low risk activism has few dangers and low cost activism takes little time or resources. The signing of a petition or voting for a political party would be good examples of low risk and cost activism.

More recently published literature on activism has begun to discuss forms of activism not explicitly covered by either the Rootes and colleagues or McAdam schemas. These include transnational activism (Tarrow 2005), “cyber-activism” (Pickerell 2003), and prefigurative activism (Epstein 1993). Transnational activism involves organizations and activists working together across different countries to tackle a range of issues. It has come to the fore of academic attention since the “Battle of Seattle” demonstrations against the World Trade Organisation Ministerial in 1999. Cyber-activism ranges from the sending of online postcards to coordinating netstrikes (coordinated visits to servers with the aim of causing them to crash), and prefigurative activism involves taking the political personally—either by engaging in lifestyle changes and hoping they will spread, or trying to create ideal organizational practices within one’s own activist group.

Activism, then, is at the heart of everything that social and political movements do. There is such a diverse array of types of activism that the simple dichotomy between conventional and nonconventional activism is no longer very helpful in giving academics a handle on activism’s processes and forms.

SEE ALSO: Barricades; Boycotts; Demonstrations; Direct action; Electronic protest; Hackers; High and low risk/cost activism; Prefigurative politics; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Advocacy networks
EMANUELA BOZZINI

Advocacy networks consist of individuals and organizations “who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchange of information and services” to defend the causes of others and/or advance a cause in the public interest (Keck & Sikkink 1998a). They organize around campaigns on issues related to a common good, or the defense of rights, and they are thus characterized by a centrality of principled beliefs, normative ideas, and values.

The emergence of advocacy networks has been understood in the context of structural changes in communication technologies, a rapid increase in contentious activities that has expanded the range of constituencies represented, and a shift toward the professionalization of activism. The concept is relevant to the analysis of local, national, and transnational contentious politics, although it has been most frequently employed by scholars working on transnational mobilization to signal the diffusion of ideas and activism beyond national borders. From an empirical point of view, research mainly focuses on transnational advocacy networks working on environmental issues (Dalton & Rohrschneider 2002), ethnic minorities, human rights, and women’s rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998b).

By stressing the centrality of principles, ideas, and discourses in mobilization and politics, the concept of advocacy networks is relevant to theories of social movements on the diffusion of frames, to the argumentative turn in public policy analysis (Fisher & Forrester 1993), and to the debate on the role of principles and norms in international relations. More specifically the concept of advocacy networks partially overlaps with epistemic communities – “networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas 1992: 3) – in its emphasis on information politics. In the context of the literature on policy processes, advocacy network overlaps with the concept of advocacy coalitions, which comprise experts, activists, journalists, and concerned policymakers who share core policy beliefs, interests, and specific preferences on policy instruments (Sabatier & Jenkins 1993; Sabatier 1998). It is of note that actors in advocacy networks and coalitions may include policymakers, governmental agencies, and state actors, alongside nongovernmental organizations, local social movements, foundations and charities, and the media. This suggests that advocacy networks may be distinct from social movements, since they are ad hoc, contingent alliances among social and institutional actors and are not expected to develop forms of long-term collective identity (Diani & Bison 2004).

In terms of actions, advocacy networks employ a wide repertoire, from petitions to lobbying to mass demonstrations; research shows that conventional forms of claims-making predominate. Advocacy networks rely mainly on their ability to gather relevant information and knowledge and to use this strategically in different political venues. Scholars refer to concepts developed in the social movements literature to highlight how advocacy networks seek influence through the construction, alignment, and bridging of cognitive frames. They put issues on the public agenda by providing policymakers and the general public with timely information and by collecting nonexpert, local, and traditional forms of knowledge, as well as testimonies and stories that help draw popular attention to, and make sense of, complex issues. In so doing transnational advocacy networks empower domestic social movements organizations,
enhance their visibility and leverage in the global arena, and put external pressure on national governments. A similar dynamic has been observed at the EU level, where advocates target EU institutions with the aim of influencing national decision-making processes (Wessels 2004). Finally, in the context of the debate on new forms of democratic governance, networks of activists and experts are expected to promote social accountability by monitoring institutional performance and making relevant information accessible to citizens (Bovens 2007).

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Networks and social movements; Repertoires of contention; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Age and social movements
OLIVIER FILLIEULE

FROM LIFE CYCLE TO LIFE-COURSE THEORIES

The notion of life cycle was first used in the social sciences in the 1930s and remained prominent until the end of the sixties in political behavior studies, despite its lack of empirical consistency. The basic idea is that stage-specific needs result in the adoption of particular political attitudes. Based largely on Freudian psychodynamic theory, the life cycle approach has mainly been interested in explaining adolescent rebellion (and, more rarely, the conservatism of the elderly) and attempted to attribute social protest in the sixties to young people’s life-cycle characteristics and needs, and to deep-seated emotional conflicts between youth and adults (Erikson 1968; Feuer 1969).

In a more structuro-functionalist perspective, life-cycle theory has given birth to a cohort-generational perspective, in which youth unrest is viewed as a product of a rapidly changing social order and unique growing-up experiences that exacerbate age-group relations, and may generate organized protest behaviors. However, contemporary research has found no clear diminution with age in the number of left-oriented attitudes nor any rush to conservatism more generally, as life cycle theories would suggest. Here, the main result is that social unrest is not causally linked to chronological age and that people do not seem to become more conservative with age (Glenn 1980; Binstock & Quadagno 2001).

If such an approach of the political effects of age still survives in some contemporary research, especially in psycho-sociology, it has now been superseded by the more powerful notion of life-course. The life-course refers to a sequence of age-graded events and social roles that are embedded in social structure and historical change. Political attitudes and preferences, interest and involvement in politics change over the adult life-span depending on one’s life experiences: primary socialization and reference groups, affective life, occupation, and the time in which the person lives. Such a perspective is directly in line with the lifelong openness model and the impressionable years models of socialization, which suggest that political behavior and attitudes have an approximately uniform potential for change at all ages, even if, because of the pile-up of role transitions, specific discontinuities occur most often in late adolescence and early adulthood (Sigel 1989; Visser & Krosnick 1998).

FROM CHRONOLOGICAL AGE TO SOCIAL AGE

In a life-course model, chronological age is a very imperfect indicator of the social roles individuals assume and the transitions they experience. As a matter of fact, not everybody does perform the same roles at the same age, because of their different structural location in terms of social class, status, and sex. Nor can we state that major events have the same effect on everyone who is of the same chronological age. For example, the military draft in France during the Algerian War of Independence affected young working class males very differently than it did university students or dropouts. As a result it is next to impossible to attribute political behavior and attitude changes exclusively to chronological age.

The focus here is on the sequence of roles associated with adult maturation and aging and the effects of the transition from one role to another. Hence the importance of taking into account, on one hand, the diversity of roles concerned in different “sub worlds” (Strauss 1959) and, on the other hand, the context...
in which these roles are differentially valued (Fillieule 2010). For example, disengagement and withdrawal from social involvement of the elders is certainly less a function of biological aging than of a loss of social responsibilities and meaningful roles, particularly in western societies where the most praised values are often youth-oriented.

However, in contemporary societies numerical age largely contributes to defining status and social roles (e.g., schooling, entry into and exit out of work, military service), even if in recent decades the boundaries between ages have blurred and new age categories have appeared such as the “young-old” or the “Third Age.” This is why it is not surprising that forms and intensity of political participation are correlated with (and not caused by) age variation. That is why conventional political participation follows a curvilinear path, with young adults the least involved and the middle-aged the most, older people tending to disengage progressively from civic life. So called nonconventional political participation follows a slightly different pattern with young adults being more prone to protest politics than the middle-aged and the aged being strongly disengaged. To take into account these different changes due to role transition at each age, one usually distinguishes three periods: young adulthood (usually 15 to 25), middle age, and old age (60 or 65 and over).

Young adulthood has been particularly singled out for attention. The unrest of the 1960s generation, and more generally the strength of youth movements, spawned interest in the politics of the 15–25 year olds. Questions were asked concerning their alleged idealism (Flacks 1971), their lack of commitment or their alienation (Keniston 1971), their general attachment to the political system and their post-materialism. Literature offers sociological explanations for the higher readiness of young adults to participate in social movements, such as the notion of “biographical availability” (McAdam 1989). However, a closer look reveals that direct political participation during periods of social unrest concerned primarily certain campuses and specific communities, without striking a responsive chord among young people in general, even being opposed by some youths. As a whole, it seems that the most common picture remains one of low involvement and a lack of trust in SMOs, as recent studies on the No Global movement tend to show (Sommer, Fillieule, & Agrikoliansky 2010; Teune 2010).

Old age, for obvious demographic reasons, has become the subject of many studies. Two main questions are addressed: First, the idea that as people age they hold more tenaciously to their views and are more resistant to change (Alwin 2002); and second, that older people’s attitudes are more stable than those of younger people (Krosnick & Alwin 1989). However, serious doubts have been cast on the notion that with old age comes political disengagement or growing conservatism on political issues. Moreover, one should note the emergence and development of interest groups for the aged, like the Townsend movement or the American Association of Retired People with its 24 million members, which automatically contribute to increasing occasions for mobilization and activism (Amenta 2008). Finally, recent work on age differences in learning and training, and on responses to major life transitions, provides evidence of the adaptability of older people to changes in social circumstances (Wang & Chen 2006).

Middle age certainly remains the least studied stage in terms of its link to politics. Are there specific age-related experiences unique to the various phases of middle age that might also give rise to political restructuring? For the most part, scholars have had little to say about political transformations during middle age. Exceptions include some research in the field of terrorism studies (Horgan 2009) and the feminist literature which has sought to reflect on the political implications of various stages in a woman’s life and relate macro structural changes to role changes (e.g., the lower fertility and higher longevity rates that make for a much prolonged empty-nest stage, which could have played a role in the growth of the women’s liberation movement in the last three decades).
CHALLENGES AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Literature on life-course and social movements is still a rather virgin territory. As such, more work needs to be done to build stronger theorizations and single out fundamental mechanisms. One can briefly point out three domains in which research should be developed in the future.

First, the task of linking early and later experiences in the life-course remains a challenge. Studies have traced the persistent effect of early events and experiences to subsequent outcomes, such as the effect of a teenage birth or military service, but the chain of linking mechanisms is largely understudied.

Second, interlocking trajectories, such as activism and work or family, or activism in one domain and activism in other domains, represent a basic distinction of life-course theory, but only recently have scholars attempted to fully articulate different life-spheres in a process model. This has occurred most commonly by using in-depth interviews and more rarely by having recourse to an increasing number of statistical techniques enabling researchers to assess this dynamic (Fillieule & Blanchard 2011).

Third, it seems that research has not been sensitive enough to national variations and subgroup variations (in terms of class, gender, and race), and how they may transform the relationship between chronological age and political outlook. In this respect, the development of intersectional perspectives in the field of social movement research pave the way for more fine-grained research.

SEE ALSO: Biographical availability; Biographical consequences of activism; Participation in social movements; Political generation; Political socialization and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Agents provocateurs
GARY T. MARX

When authorities or elites are challenged by a social movement, they may ignore it or respond with a variety of tools from cooptation to redirection to repression with many points in between. One extreme form of the latter is provocation. The idea of the agent provocateur entered popular consciousness in the nineteenth century as Europe experienced dislocation and conflicts associated with industrialization and urbanization. The concept initially referred to an activist secretly working with authorities who might provide information, sow suspicion and internal dissension, and/or provoke violent actions that would turn public opinion against a social movement and offer legal and moral grounds for its repression. The term has entered popular culture as the name of a lingerie brand and British electronica band.

There are many historical examples. Some of the most dramatic occurred in Russia where, lacking basic democratic rights, clandestine groups sought to overthrow the tsar. Police responded by infiltrating existing groups and, in a strategy that could backfire, creating their own. Roman Malinovsky, a highly paid agent of the Russian secret police (Okhrana), was an important Bolshevik leader. The English Cato Street conspiracy offers a classic case. Joseph Conrad’s novel The Secret Agent provides a fictional account. Social movements in the United States in the 1960s saw many examples of provocation, some in conformity with the FBI’s COINTELL program (Counter Intelligence) (Donner 1990; Cunningham 2005). A New York detective helped open and headed the Bronx chapter of the Black Panthers, and Malcolm X’s bodyguard, who tried to resuscitate him when he was shot, was an undercover police officer.

The phenomenon illustrates the often intricate interdependence between a social movement and its environment. While history and broad social structural variables create contexts of constraint and possibility, the daily events of a social movement and its career path are very much dependent on the contingencies of interaction within movements and between movements and authorities.

The topic fits within a number of areas of inquiry: social movement studies with an emphasis on the repression and facilitation of protest and the environmental engineering of behavior to preclude or direct behavior; the broader field of social control; criminal justice with an emphasis on undercover policing and legal restrictions; human rights protections and violations; and mass communication, censorship, surveillance, and public opinion.

Claims about agents provocateurs must be carefully assessed given the deception and secrecy surrounding the topic, and the vested interests of the parties involved (control agents do not wish to reveal operational tactics or behavior that might create bad public relations or harm a prosecution and activists generally have an interest in painting agents in a negative light). Yet, much is known about agents provocateurs as a result of government hearings and court records, first-person accounts from agents who publicly disavow their actions, leaks, Freedom of Information Act requests, archives, police training materials, and investigative journalists.

The classical image of the nineteenth-century European political or US labor union provocateur is today statistically atypical. In contemporary democratic societies, laws, policies, and the mass media are constraining and the more sophisticated control agents are aware of the challenges of controlling secret agents and the ever-present risks of backfire and blowback. Control in many ways has become more technical, mechanical, softer, diffuse, and less visible.

Yet specious activists have not disappeared. Following 9/11, national enforcement priorities
gave greater attention to terrorism than to traditional crime. Emphasis was placed on anticipatory control in which the goal is preventive rather than reactive after the fact. This requires information and budgets for more informants, and the number increased significantly. With this came a concomitant increase in opportunities and incentives for specious activism.

Social movements have much greater awareness of infiltration efforts and may take protective actions such as screening new members and even, as with the Black Panthers at one point, simply stop recruiting new members. It has even been suggested that movements use face-recognition technology to identify police, since police use this in crowd settings. The movement may engage in counterintelligence activities directed toward social control agents.

The reciprocal efforts of social movements to control those who wish to control them have rarely been studied. Rather than passive recipients, movements are better viewed as actors in a dynamic process. The playing fields are not level but new means of surveillance and communication such as the computer, cell phone, and video camera may help activists in defensive and offensive responses to social control efforts.

Contemporary movements, with a decentralized cell-like structure, and those based on tribal and religious affiliation (as is particularly the case in Africa and Asia), are more difficult to infiltrate than open mass movements with a more heterogeneous social base and universalistic ideology. Ironically the openness of democratic movements and their interest in broad communication with the public makes them vulnerable to infiltration and overt surveillance.

The provocateur is better seen as one extreme type of the much larger category of the faux activist. Such hidden-agenda activists are other than what they appear to be. They may engage in a wide variety of actions – from seeking to damage a social movement to helping it or redirecting it away from illegal actions (agents conformistes). At the level of abstract analysis a distinction must be made between the active participant (whether in legal and/or illegal behavior) and the more passive, observing bystander merely relaying information. However, given the need to establish their legitimacy and to learn anything in depth, it is difficult for a faux activist to simply remain an observer.

Faux activists may work for national or local police or the military, domestic or foreign governments, private interest groups, or rival social movements (whether those on the same side or those with opposing goals). They may work as freelancers such as investigative journalists, social scientists, and as individuals on an ideological mission or hoping to peddle what they discover. In recent years there appears to have been a significant increase in the use of faux activists by private corporations responding to challenges from globalization, environmental, antinuclear, and animal rights movements (Lubbers 2012). There are also new hybrid forms blurring the line between state and private control organizations.

However large the number of activists formally in specious roles, a far greater number of persons on the fringes or in the immediate environment of the movement (such as a bartender at a tavern favored by activists) serve as unofficial informants in the hip pockets of authorities passing on information.

Among other differentiating factors are whether the agent is a sworn police or military agent or a civilian (the most common form), whether they infiltrated a group or were recruited after being a member and then were pressured or came forward voluntarily, and type of motivation. Determining motives can be challenging – they are varied, may change over time, and the same behavior, such as encouraging militant action, can result from different motives.

Among the most common individual motivations for the police is that being an informant is sometimes simply a part of a police officer’s job. For non-police a distinction can be made between involuntary and voluntary participation. Common motivations for the former include coercive pressure, such as to avoid
prosecution or to gain a reduced sentence or help a family member, and for the latter, financial or other rewards, a counter ideology, or at least belief that a group poses a dangerous threat, disenchantment and/or personal reasons on the part of those who began as activists, and seeking strategic advantage for a competing or opposing movement or interest group. Less frequently, a committed activist may nonetheless cooperate with authorities as a form of self-protection, or in an effort to affect the knowledge and behavior of control agents.

Motivations and allegiances can be exquisitely complex and fluid, as the case of double and triple agents suggests. Consider the case of the legendary Russian Yevno Azef. He was a police agent for 15 years, five of which were spent as head of the most notorious terrorist organization in the pre-Soviet period. He betrayed many of his colleagues, but also arranged numerous assassinations, including the minister of the interior (his employer) and an attempt on the life of the tsar.

When activists are arrested for serious violations and a specious activist is identified, the defense may claim that those charged were entrapped – with the idea and resources for the action coming from the government agent. The prosecution will counter claim that the agent was passive, simply going along with the intentions of those arrested. New surveillance tools that generate a record, such as video and audio-taping and web and cell phone use, may be used to bolster authorities’ cases. However, such data can be ambiguous and require interpretation. However clear the image and sound, they will not reveal interaction that was not recorded, which might change the meaning of what was documented (e.g., the possibility that an activist was initially resistant to, or ambivalent about, an illegal action or threat made to the activist if he or she does not go along with a plan).

The secrecy of the setting can make it difficult to manage agents and to know if they are being truthful. They may have organizational, career, or ideological incentives to exaggerate the threat posed by a movement and to play a provocative role, and infrequently they make take on the role of the double agent. Whether intended or unintended, they may create what they were charged with controlling.

In democratic settings with basic civil liberties, the need to sustain the veneer of legality and legitimacy among citizens can be conducive to reliance on hidden trickery and strategic disruption of an organization’s ability to function. This can involve manipulating activists (particularly leaders) into illegal actions so they can be arrested – requiring that resources go to defensive needs and away from the pursuit of the broader goals; disrupting the flow of resources such as money and spaces to organize; creating paranoia and suspiciousness and harming morale and solidarity by creating the myth of surveillance which implies that watching is omnipresent (with respect to the student movement, a 1970 FBI memo, for example, encouraged creating the impression that “there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox”); spreading disinformation; encouraging internal schisms and external conflicts with other organizations; and inhibiting or sabotaging planned actions and communication. In settings where there are no protections for freedom of speech and association and with few limits on the state’s ability to search, detain, and use violence, activists may simply disappear or be locked away, without resort to the elaborate trickery and subterfuge seen in more democratic settings where law creates formal limits, particularly when cases come before the court.

There has sometimes been a curious overlap in the goals of authorities and activists with respect to daring acts, the former viewing provocation as a means of repression and the latter as a way of raising public consciousness. In a risky strategy some social movements have welcomed repression in the hope that it would raise public awareness and sympathy, create martyrs, and reveal the brutal face of the regime. There is little systematic research on the impact of such agents. Given the vast differences in historical periods and contexts, little can be concluded other than to note
a range of possible impacts and the ways in which they may vary depending on the time period. In establishing credibility and seeking to rise within an organization, agents can offer needed energy and resources. Trotsky was not much worried about agents, believing that they helped much more than they hurt. However, in conjunction with a broader array of control means, as Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl (2011) show for the antiglobalization organizations, movements in democratic societies may also be seriously impaired by such actions.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Co-optation; Democracy and social movements; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Repression and social movements; Social control; Social control errors.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Alienation and social movements
LAUREN LANGMAN and DEVORAH KALEKIN-FISHMAN

Domination, inequality, injustice, and tyranny have existed since the dawn of recorded history. But with capitalism, based on wage labor, alienation became an inherent aspect of society. And while on the one hand, workers were rendered powerless, at the same time, forces were set in motion to overcome alienation in that modern capitalism might foster revolutionary worker’s movements. History has given little support to Marx’s theory of revolutionary movements. Working-class revolutions generally failed, even the Paris Commune was short lived. The “successful” socialist revolutions were peasant revolutions such as in Russia or China, or anticolonial, peasant movements framed in Marxist rhetoric such those in as Cuba, Angola, or Vietnam. Nor did that theory specify the actual process by which grievances or strains foster recruitment into movements, leaders emerged, how issues become framed, what led to the “success” of movements, and the means by which mobilizations foster change.

Notwithstanding the actual history of Marxist revolutions, considerations of alienation provide us with important insights about social movements and mobilizations. Thus as we shall argue, following Castells (2000), while there may no longer be a Winter Palace to storm, the concept of alienation can help us understand some contemporary social movements and clarify issues such as recruitment into social movements, the motivations of the actors, and the dynamics of social movements, especially framing, articulating visions, and mobilizing action.

The concept of alienation harkens back to Roman commercial law, early psychiatry, and the Hegelian philosophy that influenced Marx. For Marx (1959), alienation was rooted in the structural conditions of capitalist society in which capitalists owned the means of production and goods produced for markets depended on the wage labor paid to workers. Workers neither owned nor controlled their tools and the products of their work. That in turn fostered alienation, objectification, and estrangement. The worker became powerless, she was controlled by external forces. She became an object in which her humanity was not recognized – she was more like a pack animal than a human being. She became more isolated, estranged from her community; at the same time she became estranged from her “natural” human potential, her “species being,” her life was devoid of any meaning beyond survival. Marx’s writings on alienation did not appear until the 1920s. They would have a major impact on the Frankfurt School which saw alienation as disposing fascist mobilizations. After World War II, the alienation of capitalist society was seen in mass society, consumerism, and “one dimensional thought” (Marcuse 1964). Some sociologists explored the role of alienation and work organizations (Blau 1964).

A number of sociologists attempted to operationalize alienation as a social psychological cluster of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement (Srole 1956; Seeman 1959; Dean 1961); aspects of the social structure were conceptualized as individual attitudes. Alienation was measured by scale items purporting to feelings and attitudes that were then correlated with job satisfaction, sexual satisfaction, political apathy or activism, and/or drug addiction. Many critics, however, have argued that alienation
is the condition of the worker, or perhaps consumer, in capitalist society and not a matter of her personal feelings. Whether or not these individual differences could be related to the larger social structure was hotly debated. Meanwhile, various Marxist and neo-Marxist writings on alienation of the 1960s and 1970s tended largely to be philosophical critiques of the concept. While such writings were useful, the works of Mészáros (1970), Israel (1971), or Ollman (1976) said very little about social movements per se.

Since that time, most of the theory and research on alienation has taken three directions. First, there has been less interest in overall social/philosophical critiques of capitalism or the human condition and more concern with specific instances and manifestations. Second, the foci of alienation has shifted from factory labor to various other sites, ranging from malls and the domination of mass media, consumerism, the body, the ambiguous situations of immigrant populations, and everyday life. And third, there has been more concern with the various means by which people seek to overcome alienation and/or seek realms and spaces apart from alienated conditions (Langman & Kalekin-Fishman 2006).

Just as society changes, so too do different social movements emerge or wane, and so too do the attempts to theorize these movements. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the winding down of the cold war and the eventual fall of the Soviet Union, with the ascent of postmodern/post-structural theories, sociological interests moved away from functionalisms, Marxisms, and neo-Marxist critiques. Frankfurt School theory then focused on crisis theory, civil society (the public sphere), and communication. For postmodern and post-structural theorists the primary concerns were semiotics, simulations, local knowledge, texts, discourses, and identities that might be fluid or inscribed by a gaze. At the same time, various social movements such as civil rights, anti-Vietnam mobilizations, feminism, gay rights ecology, and “identity politics” had moved from interests (labor, suffrage) to issues and identities. As college students and/or progressive activists organized and mobilized over civil rights, resource mobilization/political opportunity theories stressed the self-interested, rational behavior of actors, rather than their emotions, the importance of social movement entrepreneurs rather than structural strains, and finally the extent to which social or political movements might be encouraged, tolerated, or were violently repressed (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998).

More specifically, in the United States, while the civil rights and/or student movements were seen through the lens of resource mobilization theories, the European social movements, such as opposition to Russian domination in communist countries, the Paris Spring, and even some separatist movements, gave rise to new social movement theories pioneered by Touraine (1981), Melucci (1989), and Castells (2000). The NSM theories placed greater emphasis on emotions, culture (meanings), and identities. It is not surprising that these theories could be traced to the Frankfurt School, especially its Freudo-Marxist analysis of the rise of fascism in which it was argued that alienated, authoritarian characters typical of the lower middle classes, facing social or economic crisis, were disposed to “escaping freedom” through self-subordination to charismatic leaders who articulated their anger, embodied toughness, and promised retribution to those responsible. More specifically, NSM theories suggested that the newer social movements were indeed responses to the nature of society in which certain actors, typically members of submerged social networks, felt alienated from their contemporaries and/or the nature of contemporary society, and sought to create and negotiate new forms of identity to transform society and its culture to foster a better kind of world

OVERCOMING ALIENATION: FOUR EXAMPLES OF MOBILIZATION

Given these observations, it can be argued that alienation, considered structurally, is present in
many other realms of modern society besides factory work. As Hochschild (1983) has shown, the emotional labor of service work, subjected to “feeling rules” established by corporations, can be just as alienating as the physical labor of production. The various kinds of dead-end jobs can be quite alienating. As Marcuse (1964) suggested, the one-dimensional thought fostered by consumerism and advanced by the mass media might lead to the same kinds of alienation that truncated the self, and rendered the person isolated and devoid of meaning. Moreover, while alienation may very well be a structural condition, its consequences may elicit various emotions ranging from loneliness to fear and anxiety, and even to anger and disgust. But the important point here, actually quite controversial, is that people may very well be alienated, but may not necessarily feel it and/or express discontent. Indeed many social critics have noted how mass consumption and/or mass media have fostered various types of “cheerful robots” (a.k.a. couch potatoes).

How do people cope with alienation? We suggest that people in diverse social locations, not necessarily class positions, may or may not have emotional reactions to various social conditions. In general, people seek amelioration and often seek support by repressing the recognition of adversity and/or seeking gratifications. They may seek various kinds of information, from media and/or social networks, proximate or virtual, that provide information and interpretations; such experiences may be shared. Various groups, with or without specific leaders, may then attempt to develop frames which explain adversity and suggest courses of action informed by a vision of what might be possible. Some suggestive illustrations follow.

**From punk to heavy metal**

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the initial effects of deindustrialization were becoming evident in the manufacturing centers of the United States and the United Kingdom, there was a decided shift in popular culture, especially the transformation of the counterculture. While rock 'n roll extolled love, peace, and of course drugs and sex, increasing numbers of young working-class men were no longer able to find well-paid factory jobs, there was more and more unemployment and/or underemployment and, in turn, alienation and anger at the prospects of downward mobility. This was articulated in the anger and self-destructive nihilism of punk music, as for example in the Sex Pistols, Clash, or Iggy Pop and the Stooges. But these cultural movements were not simply responses to economic factors, but to cultural issues as well, and signaled the quest for recognition of identities and frameworks of meaning. As many working-class men faced more dismal economic futures, punk began to morph into heavy metal with its loud chords and black leather that extolled a compensatory hyper-masculinity, which, at least at the level of fantasy, partly assuaged the realities of economic stagnation and alienation.

**The Tea Party**

Right-wing populism (and often fascism) has long been the political expression of an alienated petit bourgeoisie, resentful, if not fearful of economic changes that threaten their livelihoods and in turn their social position. In many cases, their fears also rest on cultural changes, which they see as moral threats that challenge their conservative religious beliefs and values (pro-choice, gay rights, and sexuality in general typically elicit anger, disgust, and “moral panics” – intense fears and anxieties that the moral order is being undermined). These economic and/or cultural stresses often foster anger that is typically directed at government and/or economic elites, who are perhaps seen as traitors, as well as the “dangerous classes” below. For many rural or suburban church-going, white, Christian Americans, the economic, social, and cultural changes of the last several decades have undermined their social position within American society. They have seen threats to their wallets, while banks and automakers are bailed out. They witness assaults upon their conservative values.
and identities as feminism, hedonism, sexuality, and even pornography have entered the mainstream culture. The growing numbers of immigrants and the rising status of African-Americans have fostered “status anxiety” and a sense of alienation and anger. Finally, for many such people, the election of Obama, the first African-American president – itself a legacy of the civil rights movements of the 1960s – was seen as “unnatural,” a violation of the “natural order,” and thus constituted a threat to white privilege that had been an essential ingredient of the identity of many conservative whites. These alienating conditions for some Americans, it has been argued, gave rise to various Tea Party mobilizations that played a major role in the Republican victories in the 2010 elections.

Democratic mobilizations

For many of the enlightenment philosophers, and indeed the early founders of sociology, history was seen in terms of a series of social changes. With the rise of modernity that extolled freedom, democracy, equality, and brotherhood, a variety of social movements emerged that have attempted to realize these goals. Ever since the English Civil War, or perhaps the American and French revolutions, we have seen a number of contentious social movements in which large numbers of people have attempted to overthrow despotic governments and establish democratic governments with popularly elected leaders. Such governments would support the equality of all citizens, guarantee social, political, and human rights. Such movements and political struggles have not always been successful. But one of the common denominators of such movements has been the mounting alienation of heretofore powerless publics that attempt to overcome those conditions and determine their own political agendas and select their own representatives. Such movements toward democratization that would overcome the alienation of political powerlessness continue to this very day. In the last few decades (1990–2011), there have been major political shifts throughout Latin America, Asia, and even more recent struggles in Iran, Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, followed by Israeli Summer and the Occupy Wall Street mobilizations, each in their own way being attempts to overcome political, economic, and/or cultural alienation.

Global justice mobilizations

Perhaps the most important movements of today, little noted in mainstream American media, have been the various progressive social justice movements growing in number and power; some may be local, others are national, and indeed many are global. Throughout the contemporary world, often more visible given the Internet, there are vast populations of alienated, marginal people who face domination, oppression, often genocide, poverty, hunger, and disease. While many long-standing NGOs from the Red Cross to UN agencies have provided aid to such groups, more recently, more and more people in privileged positions have become aware of the injustices associated with sweat shops, sex trafficking, paramilitary death squads, and the like. Given the rise and spread of the Internet, and the emergence of “virtual public spheres,” we are also witnessing the emergence of “internetworked social movements” such as transnational feminist movements, antiwar movements, and environmentalists. Such movements may draw from widely dispersed populations in which small numbers may periodically meet, but are nevertheless electronically connected with groups across the globe. The World Social Forum brings 150 000 social justice activists, NGOs, and SMOs together to share ideas, strategies, and visions. One common theme is that the move from alienation and victimhood to empowerment gives rise to the collective hope that “a better world is possible.”

CONCLUSION

The place of alienation in sociology has ebbed and flowed since Marx first used the term to critique wage labor and its alienating
consequences. On the one hand, alienation has often been dismissed as “political,” while similar concepts such as dehumanization/de-mystification (Weber) or anomie (Durkheim) were seen as more “objective” – that is, less likely to imply that capitalism must be overthrown. The concept of alienation informed the Frankfurt School scholars who were as critical of economistic/authoritarian socialism as they were of capitalism. Following World War II and the explosion of consumerism and mass media, especially television, the concept was used by many scholars to critique “mass society” with its conformity, its celebration of kitsch, and mass production of “cheerful” robots. But the consumerist moment of late capitalism created spaces for postmodern theories that rejected “grand narratives” like Marxism, located the self within a matrix of signification, and the notion of alienation receded from sociological theory and research. But as this was happening, the initial signs of globalization, namely import substitution, de-industrialization, and rusted factories, and in turn growing expressions of discontent, led to the demise of postmodern theories – at least in sociology. Given the impacts of globalization, wage stagnation or decline, growing inequality, environmental despoliation, and migrations, there has been renewed interest in alienation.

We suggest that as society has changed since the rise of industrial capitalism, so too has the concept of alienation been debated and its meanings revised. While wage labor remains an essential part of global production, so too do we suspect to find alienated labor in many of the services now typical of global capitalism. Moreover, many of the same adversities can be seen in consumerism, in nationalisms (especially their reactionary forms), and in various realms of culture and identity. In addition, we have attempted to argue that alienation, and/or the overcoming of alienation, plays a central role in contemporary social movements. More specifically, while we see alienation as a consequence of social arrangements or conditions, it itself has consequences that may cultivate various grievances and emotions that in turn foster susceptibility to certain kinds of leadership, predispositions to certain kinds of explanations, and either participation in various social movements, or apathy and withdrawal.

We are not suggesting a theory of social mobilization. Indeed various perspectives on resource mobilization, the framing of reality and visions of amelioration, and political opportunities have provided valuable insights. But we also find that the concerns of NSMs with culture, meaning, and identity, emotions and submerged social networks, and most of all, moral visions, are essential for understanding the who, how, why, and fate of social movements. The concept of alienation may not only illuminate various kinds of social movements, but it may also be a bridging concept that provides linkages and syntheses of different theories of social mobilization.

SEE ALSO: Convergence/dispositional theory; Global Justice Movement; Identity politics; Internet and social movements; Marxism and social movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory; Social Forum, World; Strain and breakdown theories; Symbolic crusades; Tea Party movement (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Altruism and social movements
FLORENCE PASSY

What is altruism? Since the 1990s scholars have agreed to define altruism as acts that seek to increase another’s welfare. Those acts are performed voluntarily without external constraints or coercion, with the intention of helping someone else, and without expecting any rewards (Simmons 1991). These are the four components of altruistic acts.

Until recently, altruism was highly challenged. The utilitarian paradigm could hardly make sense of altruistic behavior. Relying on its universalist and monist understanding of human motives, conceiving that any action is driven by self-interest, it dismissed altruism. Altruism was explained either by hidden private psychological benefits or by deferred benefits. In other words, altruism could not exist. However, research in biology (e.g., Boyd & Richerson 2005), psychology (e.g., Baston 1991), and sociology (e.g., Oliner & Oliner 1988; Monroe 1996) stressed that acts of altruism, without rewards, with the intention of increasing others’ welfare, do exist. interestingly, rational choice scholars in economics and psychology have recently conducted numerous experiments that also clearly emphasize that altruistic behavior exists, and is definitely not composed of marginal actions (e.g., Ostrom 2000). After many experiments, Frey and Meier affirmed that: “the canonical model of the self-interested payoff maximization actor is systematically violated” (2004: 11). All these studies concluded that altruism is about as frequent as selfishness. Thus altruism, this highly contested concept, should finally not be disregarded.

Doing good unto others and contributing to the provision of common goods are not synonymous concepts but they show similarities in two respects. Firstly, both types of action are public-spirited, society-oriented, pro-social acts. Altruism enhances others’ welfare. Acting to promote common goods – such as public education, health care for all, environmental protection – increases the supply of collective goods for the whole of society. Secondly, individuals contributing either to increasing others’ welfare or the welfare of a whole society could easily free ride. Actors engaged in altruistic acts do not receive any direct benefit from their action. They could let other individuals contribute to improving others’ welfare. In contrast, actors committed to the provision of common goods directly benefit from their public-spirited action since no individual is excluded from common goods. But here again, those actors could leave it to others to pay the costs of their action. The difficulty of acting on behalf of others as well as contributing to the common good was made famous by Olson’s paradox of collective action (1965) and Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (1968). Both concepts are of interest for scholars studying political and social movements.

DOES ALTRUISM RELATE TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS?

Social movements and contentious politics bring to the fore (at least) two issues directly related to the concept of altruism. First, activists often mobilize on behalf of others. Mobilization in the antislavery movements in the nineteenth century, organizations defending migrants’ rights, associations promoting development aid, or human rights protests are good examples. Those contentions, labeled “distant issues movements” (Rucht 2000) or “political altruism” (Passy 2001), are not marginal protests. In addition, many protests

mobilize “conscience constituents” (McCarthy & Zald 1977), such as white students in the civil rights’ movement, or men in the women’s liberation movements. All these activists are not the direct beneficiaries of their political struggle.

Second, many protests are about the provision of common goods. Many collective actors and activists devote their political efforts to improving individual (or group) rights and welfare or to providing common goods to certain groups or the whole of society. Political struggles include protests for environmental protection or peace, against racism, or the emancipation of excluded minorities. As Mansbridge states: “How can human beings be induced to give their lives – even one minute of their lives – for their group?” (2001: 1). Following Mansbridge’s statement, we can add: “how can people mobilize to promote common goods for the whole of society?” Those people, weakly or strongly involved, could free ride and not collaborate in the provision of common goods.

Protest politics – of course not on all occasions, but not only occasionally, either – is about pro-social action. But what do we know about that behavior in the literature of social movements? Actually, very little. Altruism has been largely under-studied in our field. Scholars studying protests on behalf of others have not directly handled the question of altruism. Their studies focused on specific social mechanisms in order to better explain contention processes (e.g., diffusion, cultural factors), but they disregarded the others-directed-goals of the protests they analyzed. Other scholars raised the question of altruism but mainly to assess whether specific processes were at stake. Processes for joining altruistic contention do not differ from those for non-altruistic protest (Passy 2003). Similarly, Rucht (2000) finds structural resemblances between distant issues movements and other forms of protest. However, both studies leave aside the puzzling question of altruism: why do people protest on behalf of others? The wide range of studies examining contentious performances that enforce common goods do not raise the question of pro-social behavior, either. The question of why do some people mobilize for the provision of common goods remains unexplored.

ALTRUISM WILL DEEPEN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

Dealing with questions of both altruism and the provision of common goods will enrich our knowledge, specifically by responding to the question of what motivates actors to act politically on behalf of others, and to produce common goods. This question induces us to open up the black box of activists’ motives. It invites scholars to go back to the question of “why” that has been disregarded in the literature of social movements. Why are some human beings prone to joining movements, to giving their lives for their group, or to providing common goods for the whole society? It also invites scholars to study more carefully what we have achieved until now on the subjective aspects that form part of the explanation of contentious politics. It is time to go inside the subjective world of protestors, to investigate activists’ points of view, their cognitive map, the lenses through which they see the world, and their adherence to certain political and moral convictions.

Studies on incentives actually stressed two interesting findings. First, they emphasized the plurality of motives leading actors to take part in contentious politics (e.g., Knoke 1988). This paralleled theoretical insights concerning individuals’ plurality (Sorber & Wilson 1998) and self’s plurality (Elser 2007). Second, and even more interesting for our purpose, those studies revealed that purposive incentives – that is incentives linked to a political issue – are the main motives for action (Knoke 1988). It is time now to investigate this black box of public-goods concerns.

For example, preliminary results on activists’ motives in mobilizing to defend migrants’
right reveal two interesting findings (Passy & Monsch 2009). First, those protestors do not set cognitive barriers between themselves and others. They have an extending self that links them to others, and which clearly distinguishes them from the rest of the population. This finding supports Monroe’s cognitive-perceptual theory that actors’ perception of self in relation to others defines actors’ capacity to act for others (Monroe 1996). Second, the study emphasizes that those activists have a clear consciousness of what are common goods and how to live in interconnection with others. Self-extension and a clear sense of common goods explain, in part, “why” some individuals are involved in social movements defending migrants’ rights.

To open up the black box of activists’ motives by examining why they are doing good unto others and why protestors are engaged in promoting common goods will also encourage us to examine how activists’ motives are constructed over time. We must analyze how people develop a concern for others and for common goods, and trace social mechanisms that favor pro-social concerns. Individual processes are at stake. Socialization, actors’ embeddedness in particular social networks favoring communicative processes, and daily life experiences are certainly factors that lead individuals to construct cognitions that favor pro-social commitment. But external factors also contribute to pro-social concerns. Organizational aspects develop and strengthen pro-social inclinations as Healy (2004) stressed in his study of the procurement of organs. Structural and cultural aspects also offer opportunities to sustain or increase pro-social inclinations (Koopmans et al. 2005).

We need more research on activists’ motives, and on how pro-social motives emerge and develop in order to deepen our understanding of contentious politics. We specifically need to grasp the social mechanisms at stake that favor altruism and a concern for common goods. After all, is it not those concerns that are at the core of social movements and contentious politics?

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Participation in social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Social and solidary incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Anarchism refers to a tradition of social and political thought that in the 1860s emerged as an organized political force. Since then, anarchism has inspired protests, organizations, and movements, mainly in Europe, Russia, and the Americas, but also in other parts of the world. While it may be difficult to talk of “one” anarchist movement, a distinct anarchist current within the history of the labor movement can be identified as well as anarchist tendencies and groups within other social movements. The term “anarchy” comes from the Greek *an-arkhos*, meaning “without a leader or ruler.” It was first used in a positive sense, being identified as the ideal form of government, in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s (1809–1865) *What Is Property?* (1840). Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), and Pyotr Kropotkin (1842–1921) pioneered a broad tradition which has developed in a variety of forms. These range from varying interpretations of how to organize society in economic terms to the more basic distinction between social anarchism and currents farther removed from collective action (e.g., philosophical, individualist, and spiritual anarchism), as well as more specific variations around forms of organization, of action, and the use of violence. In spite of this rich variety, anarchism can be identified by its strong commitment to individual freedom and sovereignty; the opposition to any form of oppression, domination, and authority; the promotion of voluntary, decentralized, and non-hierarchical associations; and the use of forms of direct action that prefigure a freer society with more solidarity and respect for individual self-government.

**PROBLEMS, TARGETS, AND GOALS**

Historically, anarchists have seen the state as the origin of social problems, a form of centralized, hierarchical social organization which monopolizes violence to exploit workers for the benefit of the bureaucracy and the ruling elite. The state maintains a cruel prison system and requires individuals to fight each other in wars that serve only “the protection or aggrandizement of the state itself” (Miller 1984: 7). The state is seen as a solution worse than the problem of violence that it supposedly wants to eliminate, regardless of the form it may adopt, whether liberal or socialist. It produces authoritarian and self-preserving dynamics regardless of who runs it. Anarchists also challenge other institutional forms of authority and domination such as organized religion and the education system. Moreover, anarchists have attacked the state-regulated capitalism which prevails in the West as an oppressive and criminal economic system.

The responsibility for this corrupt state of affairs is seen as lying mainly with the representatives of the state and big capitalists but also with bureaucrats, the armed forces, police, and priests. Faced with a distinctive but heterogeneous body of enemies, anarchism has not focused on a single revolutionary subject, but rather on an equally heterogeneous social base consisting of industrial workers, peasants, professionals, disillusioned intellectuals, members of what Marx disparagingly called the *Lumpenproletariat* (city drop-outs, vagabonds, unemployed, and so on), and more recently by representatives of the middle class, students, and casual workers.

Anarchism does not stop, however, at identifying problems and their origins but also sets targets for collective efforts articulated in social and political terms. And yet, it is possible
to discern a tension between the defense of individual autonomy and the effectiveness of political action (Arvon 1979). The recognition of a human nature—a common element of modern political thought—led the major anarchist theorists of the nineteenth century to develop alternative economic models to satisfy the needs of humanity. These are the mutualism of Proudhon, Bakunin's collectivism, and the anarcho-communism of Kropotkin. Their influence can be seen well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless, criticisms of their essentialism and historical linearity, especially after 1945, led many anarchists to address specific policy problems by replacing the longing for total revolution with a more concrete “problem-solving” approach (White 2007).

**FORMS OF ORGANIZATION**

Anarchists deploy decentralization, transversal communication, committed but voluntary participation, and deliberative democracy as organizing principles. They search for consensus solutions instead of relying on the “majority rule” system and replace representatives with delegates or spokespersons. Anarchism’s heterogeneous social base has prevented them from using Marxist-style class-based organizations. Instead, anarchism has found its basic unit of organization in the affinity group; a voluntary group, usually consisting of five to ten members connected by personal relationships and a strong commitment to the same ideological principles. The group’s small size allows easy coordination for specific actions, even in the context of state repression. Although radically autonomous, the groups may act in collaboration with one another.

Gordon (2008) places the affinity groups at the micro level of anarchist organization along with “collectives” (a more permanent group with a small membership that may exist for an ongoing task). The meso level is formed by local networks, typically in one city, coordinating non-confrontational activities and contacts with other actors while serving as platforms from which affinity groups and collectives may emerge. Finally, at the macro level we find broader anarchist networks (regional, national, continental, and global) for communication and coordination but without formal membership or fixed boundaries. It must be remembered that this macro level describes contemporary anarchist organization practices, rather than those of the past, when affinity groups were coordinated by national federations, often territorially organizing themselves into local and sub-national federations. Nor should we forget the role of the anarchists in the trade unions. For many, the union represents a small, defined space for grassroots activism (as opposed to the vast structure of the state). Anarchism’s influence on revolutionary trade union activity has been far from insignificant, and anarcho-syndicalism is the name given to the branch of anarchism arising from it.

**FORMS OF ACTION**

The antistate attitude of anarchists has led them to reject participation in its institutions, whether through democratic parliamentarism or a Marxist strategy of conquest of the state. In fact, tactics based on program are thoroughly disapproved of as they involve the submission of the individual to some degree. Instead, anarchists use direct action; a specific intervention often carried out by individuals but sometimes by groups, aimed at changing reality in a desired direction without reference to the authorities. Historically, it has been used as a trade union tactic as it involves the absence of intermediaries in dealing with employers. Sabotage, boycott, and the strike produced immediate pressure, but were also intended to pave the way for a revolutionary general strike that would overcome the state and capitalism. Probably better known is another version of direct action which first appeared in the late 1870s; “propaganda by the deed,” defined as dramatic interventions in the form of violent attacks on property and persons in order to make a major impact on public opinion and denounce a situation of misery and exploitation. Although
only sporadically employed, it has contributed
to a negative image of anarchists as “bomb-
throwers,” down to the present day.

In any case, it is important to stress that the
use of violence is a minority trend within anar-
chism, strongly rejected by many activists who
have chosen instead to participate in construct-
ive projects, such as land-based agricultural
communes, decentralized “free schools” and
independent platforms for information and
communication. In terms of theory, violence
also contradicts the tactical principle of con-
sistency between means and ends. A second
such principle concerns spontaneity. Both date
back to Bakunin and his followers, who saw
the Workers International as the embryo of
a future society, and appealed to the sponta-
neous forces of life against the abstractions of
scientific socialism. Spontaneity and “prefigu-
rativeness” are not obsolete as they have
been renewed with the revival of direct action,
initially in protests in the late 1960s and, more
recently, in the mobilizations against neoliberal
globalization. Even though there is no shortage
of affinity groups describing themselves as van-
guard movements, it would be fairer to say that
anarchist action has arisen mostly from below,
through spontaneous initiatives that seek to
raise awareness of the existing and problematic
state of affairs and the need for change.

HISTORICAL FORMS AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS

Numerous ideas and experiences have fueled
 anarchism, the form it takes varies widely
from country to country, and its historical
development is rather discontinuous. Its ori-
gin can be located in the aftermath of the
French Revolution, when the principal mod-
eran ideologies took shape and crystallized, but
it did not become a distinctive social force
until the late 1860s with the rise of a Bakunin-
ist position in conflict with that of Marx and
his followers within the First International,
a largely anarchist-inspired body founded in
London in 1864 under the name of the Inter-
national Workingmen’s Association (IWA),
whose statutes were drawn up on the basis
of an initiative by Proudhon’s mutualists.

However, the victory of Marxist positions
led to the final expulsion of the anarchists from
the IWA in 1872. They again tried to influ-
ence the Second International (Paris, 1889) and
were expelled once more in 1896. Between the
First and Second International anarchists went
through a period of ostracism, accompanied
by unsuccessful attempts to organize a purely
anarchist international. The second expulsion
coincided with the rise of revolutionary trade
unionism and the massive influx of anarchists
into unions, especially in France. This was a
period of visibility marked by the influence of
trade unions independent of political parties
(Charter of Amiens, 1906) and an antimili-
tarist position (Congress of Amsterdam, 1907)
(Woodcock 1986).

The end of World War I and the triumph of
the Revolution of 1917 marked the beginning of
a new period of a certain visibility, in this case
dominated by the anarcho-syndicalists, who
re-founded the IWA (Berlin, 1922). Among
the original member organizations, the most
important were those from Italy, Argentina,
Portugal, and Germany, soon joined by the
Spanish National Labor Confederation (CNT).
The latter became the beacon of international
 anarchism in the 1930s. During the early stages
of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), its
membership reached almost two million and
it engaged in the organization of a social
revolution in the form of industrial and agrar-
ian collectivization; the only experience of
a revolutionary anarchist society except the
ephemeral federated commune system built
in Ukraine in 1921. Both were dismantled by
state troops, by the Red Army in the case of
Ukraine and the Republican Army in Spain in
1937.

After 1945, anarchism failed to regain its
influence within the labor movement, but cer-
tainly did not disappear. In postwar Europe
and America, transnational networks opposed
the division of the world into two imperialist
blocs. Some intellectuals (e.g., Herbert Read,
Paul Goodman, Albert Camus, Daniel Guérin)
contributed to new ideas through dialogue and confrontation with socialism and liberalism. New protest movements (the Dutch Provos, Situationists, and the New Left) linked to the anarchist tradition while exploring opportunities for emancipation outside the world of work. Following the 1968 protests, anarchist tendencies developed within new social movements. For example, a new wave of anarcho-feminists linked their radical critique of everyday life to past historical activists and organizations, such as Emma Goldman (1869–1940) and the Spanish Mujeres Libres (created in 1937). Also, new anarchist theory influenced the development of new social movements, for example, Murray Bookchin’s (1921–2006) philosophy of “social ecology” in the environmental movement. More recently, anarchism has come to the fore with the Global Justice Movement, in part thanks to the popularity of a supposedly anarchist “black block” that uses confrontational and sometimes violent direct action in counter-summits. In any case, and despite the fact that many antiglobalization activists do not self-identify as anarchist, or do so as part of a multiple identity, their interest in nonviolent direct action, transversal forms of organization and communication, respect for internal diversity, and deliberative and participatory democracy has opened new opportunities for the renewal of anarchism in the twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO: Direct action; French Revolution; Global Justice Movement; Labor movement; Marxism and social movements; Participatory democracy in social movements; Prefigurative politics; Syndicalism; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Artistic currents and milieus and social movements
LILIAN MATHIEU and JUSTYNE BALASINSKI

ART AND PROTEST: SIMILAR BUT DIFFERENT FIELDS

Artistic currents and social protest have long been intertwined. One of the most paradigmatic examples of similarities and proximities between those fields is surrealism. It appeared in the early 1920s as a movement, as it gathered on a collective basis various artists (poets, painters, filmmakers, carvers, photographers, etc.) who shared the same aesthetic principles. Those principles were expressed in manifestos that had been written by a charismatic leader, André Breton, whose authoritative methods led to repeated internal challenges, exclusions, and secessions. Like protesters who seek change to the social or political structure, the surrealists sought for a regeneration of the aesthetic norms of their time. Posing as an artistic vanguard, they violently challenged the dominant artistic forms of academism using provocation, scandal, and disruption. But the surrealists did not restrict their criticism to the world of aesthetics; they also set out to challenge the political order by joining the communist movement and by participating in various mobilizations, for example, against colonial wars. Other artistic movements – such as Cobra or Situationism – have adopted the same form of a collective vanguard that intends to challenge both the aesthetic values and the political order.

Similarities between artistic and social movements have seldom been explored by analysts. This is all the more intriguing since studies of contentious politics often use artistic metaphors. Charles Tilly’s well-known concept of the repertoire of collective action refers to Commedia dell’arte and to jazz in order to stress that there is always some improvisation in the way challengers mobilize established ways of protesting, and he defined it in his last works as performances – a word that also designates happenings (often with a disruptive dimension) that are widely used in modern arts. These references to artistic production in describing contentious action have also been used in Jasper’s book, The Art of Moral Protest (1997), in which he insists on creativity and culture in contention.

Although they have much in common, art and protest are not the same thing. Reed refers to Bourdieu’s theory of the power and cultural fields to stress that the “logic of politics and the logic of aesthetic objects seldom, if ever, perfectly coincide,” and that “the field of power never exhausts the meaning of the work of art, and political meanings are always also in excess of aesthetic ones on their own terms” (2005: 303). Recognizing that the art world and the social movement sector form two different fields helps us understand the complex relations between art and contention (Balasinski & Mathieu 2006). These include artists’ commitment to movements, mobilization of arts in protest, and the way social movements produce cultural change.

ARTISTS’ COMMITMENT TO MOVEMENTS

The mobilizations of artists take a particular form when social movements appear within the art worlds. As any other worker and professional, an artist may join social movement organizations and unions in order to protect his or her professional interests, and sometimes mobilize in order to obtain better wages or working conditions; this was the case when thousands of US film, television, and radio writers joined in the 2007 strike, forcing some TV shows and series to stop. Artists also have
to mobilize in order to protect their creative freedom when the circulation of their works is threatened by censorship. This is the case in authoritative regimes around the world, and was especially so in Eastern and Central Europe under the Soviet regime (Glenn 1999; Balasinski & Mathieu 2006: ch. 4). Artists also mobilize when political elites attempt to control and define the arts, or when moral crusade entrepreneurs use judicial or disruptive means to preclude the circulation of aesthetic works they consider as outrageous and offending.

But the main figure is the committed artist, who is a traditional companion of social movements. Good examples are Bob Dylan and Joan Baez, who participated in the US civil rights movement, and more recently Sean Penn who showed his commitment against the US-lead war in Iraq. Artists can support movements by creating songs, poems, movies, or paintings that express the movements’ grievances in an aesthetic form, by providing them financial resources, by conferring on them the legitimacy and visibility of their fame, or by becoming public spokespersons for the cause. As such, a well-known artist’s support can be an important material and/or symbolic resource for a movement.

But an artist’s participation in social movements does not always happen without tensions and mutual misunderstandings. It may, at times, create more costs than benefits for the cause. Meyer and Gamson (1995) have listed some of the difficulties movements face when artists (or more commonly celebrities) join a cause. A well-known artist’s participation can help attract media attention, but it also carries the risk of overshadowing a movement, causing it to lose control of its self-definition and of its framing of the issue. In this view, an artist’s support can produce a “softening effect” on a movement. For example, in order to avoid disapprobation from an audience that does not share his or her political interests, an artist may choose to support consensual claims rather than more disruptive strategies. An artist’s commitment can also be viewed as superficial and insincere, designed to maintain personal fame and celebrity at the movement’s expense. If an artist has to be careful about the legitimacy of the cause, a movement’s credibility will also depend on how famous (or obscure or tacky) the artist is who accepts to support them. From a sociological point of view, understanding why and how an artist joins a movement requires knowing his or her position within the cultural field, because an artist’s professional identity will structure his or her political commitments just as much as occupational logics will shape the available forms of action (Roussel 2007).

ART AS A RESOURCE FOR PROTEST

Art itself is one of the various resources social movements use to mobilize: many movements use arts, and some even produce works of art themselves, as a strategy in its own right. Movements such as these often use art in order to gather material resources. The selling of art works that artists have produced specifically for the cause is a typical way to raise funds. “Band Aid” and “We are the World” concerts and records (Reed 2005), that gathered many pop stars in the mid-1980s in a mobilization against famine in Africa, are good examples of such popular fundraising operations. But money is not their sole raison d’être, as they also aim at raising consciousness amongst their public, and at recruiting new adherents and sympathizers. Following Olson, these artistic works can be seen as aesthetic selective incentives designed to sensitize and mobilize people. Often those who were at first attracted by the pleasure to listen to their favorite pop stars became supportive of the cause.

Taking this view, the nature and the content of an art work are closely related to its mobilizing potential. Art is a powerful vehicle for movement framing. It expresses grievances and appeals for mobilization in a symbolic and emotional language that may be more sensitizing and convincing than pure activist rhetoric. More widely, as stressed by Adams, “it is not just at a cognitive, intellectual level
that art mobilizes protest . . . Song and other art forms help to recruit individuals into a specific movement because they provide reassuring emotional messages . . . tap into the spirituality of potential recruits and activists . . . reinforce the value structure of individuals who are active supporters of social movements . . . and provide a renewed feeling that social and political change is possible” (Adams 2002: 27).

Adam’s own study of Chilean *arpilleras*—pictures in cloth depicting repression during the Pinochet regime that were sold in support to shantytown women who made them—stresses that movements produce art even if they do not count professional artists within their ranks. In some cases, the activist becomes an artist, and protest action becomes art work or performance. ACT UP, initiated by playwright Larry Kramer, dramatizes public actions that rely extensively on theatrical staging in order to express anger. ACT UP activists use sophisticated clothing, chants, and slogans to produce the group’s particular public image that enable it to draw media attention (Reed 2005). ACT UP benefited from the commitment of professional artists within its ranks (like the graphic collective Gran Fury that created its pink triangle image), but most social movements rely on their members’ amateur artistic skills to stage their public actions. Ordinary demonstrations often include poetic slogans, parody songs, painted banners, and disguise by which activists can express their own aesthetic.

**PROTEST, ART, AND CULTURAL CHANGE**

Art is not only a way for movements to communicate information toward a public they want to sensitize to their cause. Artistic expression within a movement can strengthen identity and cohesion, especially as a way to nurture movement ideology. It can help sustain personal commitment and reinforce mobilization potential within its constituency. Artistic events such as feminist music festivals (Staggenborg, Eder, & Sudderth 1993–1994) or punk concerts (Moore & Roberts 2009) gather movement activists and sympathizers for a short time, during which they can share experience and from which they leave with a greater sense of validation and internal power. Even if political mobilization is not their first motivation, they “create social networks and strengthen communities, which can be drawn upon as the organizational basis for movement action” (Staggenborg, Eder, & Sudderth 1993–1994: 44). Taking this view, art must not be seen as an alternative to politics, since both are so closely intertwined.

The idea that social movements produce not only political but also cultural change has been further developed by Eyerman and Jamison (1998). They argue for an enlarged perspective on social movements, and do not restrict their analysis to ideologies, strategies, and organizations. On the contrary, they consider social movements as clusters for cultural renewal. They cite as their main example the US civil rights movement, which provided a space for musical expression and creativity. In particular, it rejuvenated traditional slaves’ and workers’ songs into protest anthems sung by popular folksingers. Indeed, its music is what remained after the movement faded away as a political force. Movements can rework cultural resources, give new meanings to older artistic works and challenge aesthetic conventions. They create their own cultural tradition that can itself have a major impact on larger popular culture and inspire further mobilizations.

Whether it is lowbrow or highbrow, art is a major component of protest: it provides material and symbolic resources, contributes to movement framing, mobilizes constituencies, sensitizes the broader public, and produces social change by renewing cultural traditions. By bringing back culture into the analysis, the study of the role of art in social movements contributes to enrich the knowledge of collective protest.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; Moral shocks/outrage;
Music and social movements; Repertoires of contention; Resource mobilization theory; Selective incentives; Subcultures and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The accumulation of objects as an act or tactic of political protest makes its debut in history during the “Day of the Barricades” (Journée des barricades) of May 12, 1588. Cordonswere set up to protect Paris from social unrest and people barricaded themselves in, notably with hogheads (barriques). The same phenomenon plays itself out again on another “Day of Barricades” – August, 27 1648 – the first “Fronde” (insurrection) against the young Louis XIV (Descimon 1990). Subsequently, the practice of erecting barricades is not reported in France until the end of the French Revolution, during the days of Prairial year III (May 1795), when the French revolutionaries, who had exclusively used offensive tactics since 1789, deployed barricades as a defensive action.

It is during the nineteenth century that the barricade becomes, materially and symbolically, the representational staple of a Parisian revolutionary “journée.” From the first barricades of November 1827 to those of 1830, 1831, 1832, 1834, 1839 (very rapidly dismantled), and 1851 (shaky), to the very last fortified barricades of the Paris Commune, nineteenth-century street fighting was based upon a specific praxis and vision of social protest. The high point of this practice took place in 1848 when, from Palermo to Paris (February and June), to Berlin or Prague, the insurrection, although undergoing several reincarnations, presented shared traits uncontained by political environments and borders.

If it is easy today to sense the difference between a barricade, a highway blockade, a crossing gate, a checkpoint, an Israeli roadblock, or any other means used to impede or check circulation (by the official police or by rioters), but in the nineteenth century it proved difficult to define what a real barricade was.

The ideal description given by Blanqui in his Instructions pour une prise d’armes (Instruction for an insurrection) is both a criticism of past usages of the barricade and a manifestation of the obsessive character of the Blanquist way of thinking and preparing the revolution. Victor Hugo’s description, in Les Misérables, portrays a barricade that is improbably allegorized (Bouchet in Corbin & Mayeur 1997), while at the same time harking back to the actuality of its construction as an heteroclite accumulation of objects by which the people transform their misery into a barricade (Charles in Corbin & Mayeur 1997): “It was the collaboration of cobble-stones and rubble-stones, beams and iron bars, cloth, broken glass, burst chairs, cabbage cores, rags, tatters, malediction.”

According to Ross (1988), the barricade becomes the metaphor of Rimbaud’s poetic work. This new poetic is constructed, in the very literal sense of the term, like a handyman’s work, a barricade in which disparate objects are assembled. The barricade also becomes an object of pictorial art, notably in Delacroix’s “Liberty Leading the People” where, as in a well-thought-out allegory, the various characters of the popular insurrection are assembled.

In the nineteenth century, the barricade constitutes a known element of the repertory of riot (Traugott 1995). Habit, recourse to the familiar, practical, and symbolically possible, and apprehension of the show of force, all of these preferred forms of mobilization can be traced back to the barricade. The recourse to the familiar might also constitute, if not a desire to succeed, at least a type of suicidal behavior that, beyond postures and dramatizations, presents dying for one’s convictions or in the name of misery as a possibility or even as an ideal (Boudon in Corbin & Mayeur 1997) that is not a simple motto: just as was the case with the Canuts’ “to live working or to die fighting” of 1831 Lyons.

Barricade solidarity is first and foremost local. One stays in one place, even at the risk of ignoring what is happening in the immediate vicinity – “let’s each defend our position and we will be alright”; resources are found in situ – they are both material (notably cobble-stones, narrow streets, knowledge of the environment and of the line of fire) and human (interrelationships, solidarities), allowing for the deep-rootedness of the mobilization. This explains the extraordinary number of barricades erected during the major Parisian uprisings (a reported 4054 in July and 1512 in February 1848); their cartography corresponds to the militant workers’ quartiers (neighborhoods).

The mobilization fluctuates during the insurrection and, by persuasion or by force, the barricaders obtain the participation of the locals. Nonetheless, as proven by in-depth sociogeographic studies of nineteenth-century Parisians (Traugott 1995), the solidarity between the communities of each quartier is not the only mode of mobilization; during the whole century, workers frequently move within Paris to follow the large construction sites opened as an urbanistic response to the narrow-street fighting.

In 1898, echoing Victor Hugo, the front page of the newspaper Le Temps read: “Universal Suffrage Killed the Barricades.” Passions, recriminations, and interests were all focused on voting. The “Grand soir” had been a long-standing reachable objective for its partisans, who were now reformists “digested” by universal suffrage or who might have conceded that the revolution would not be proclaimed and that the disproportion between the two parties’ military resources had become too great; the National Guard, that militia at times numerous and popular, was disbanded after the Commune.

The Russian and the German insurgents of 1917–1918, the Spanish Civil War fighters, and the Parisian students rioting in May 1968 also erected barricades; so did the Mohawks in 1990, the Serbs and the Bosnians in 1992, and the Uzbeks and the Thais in 2010. But in those cases, the same word tells very different stories.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution; Paris Commune; Repertoires of contention; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
In the context of social activism, biographical availability refers to the “absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities” (McAdam 1986: 70). Individuals who have spouses, children, or less time-flexible occupations are expected to be less willing and likely to participate in collective action because familial and occupational commitments can reduce the amount of time and energy available for activism and increase the risks associated with it. Theoretically, biographical availability should be more significant in cases of costly or risky social activism, with costs referring to the time, money, and energy requirements of participation and risk referring to the anticipated dangers of participation, such as physical harm or social, financial, and legal repercussions (McAdam 1986). For example, while signing petitions does not involve significant time away from work or children, participating in protest events does, and because this activity could result in arrest, there is potentially an additional risk for those who are employed or who are primary caregivers of children.

Empirical studies have observed that age, marriage, parenthood, and employment—common proxies for biographical availability—have inconsistent effects on social activism. McAdam (1986) showed that while applicants to Mississippi Freedom Summer had much lower marriage and employment rates than the general population, participants were more likely to be older, married, or employed full-time than nonparticipants. In another case of high-cost/risk activism—the Sanctuary movement—Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) reported that age was negatively associated with costly activism, having children living at home was positively associated with risky activism, and marital status had no significant effects. Nepstad and Smith (1999) found that for applicants to volunteer in coffee harvest brigades in Nicaragua during the US Central America peace movement, those who eventually participated had the most demanding, least time-flexible occupations. Based on a nationally representative sample of US adults, Schussman and Soule (2005) found no significant effects for marriage or full-time employment on the probability of protest participation. However, they did observe that younger people were more likely to participate in protest and that, when accounting for other factors, parenthood decreased the probability of protest participation.

Across these studies, factors used to measure biographical availability increase participation in some cases, but have no effect or actually decrease participation in others. One possible explanation for the lack of consensus for biographical availability’s effects is that the impact of marital status, employment, children, and age on activism likely depends on broader factors. For instance, in societies where domestic work falls disproportionately on women, the time and energy constraints associated with marriage and children are expected to be greater for women than for men. In the United States, Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) demonstrated that while marriage significantly reduced protest willingness for women, this effect was not observed for men. Additionally, rather than being a barrier to participation, there are situations in which having children could be an asset. In the 2006 immigrant rights rallies, for example, teenagers used their English language skills and access to political information through schools and online media to inform and mobilize their parents (Bloemraad & Trost 2008). Lastly, while being employed might reduce the amount of time available to participate in collective action, these costs could
be offset by the skills and resources conducive to activism that workplaces often provide (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Nepstad & Smith 1999).

Another way to clarify the role that biographical availability plays in social activism is to assess its effects at different stages of participation. For example, those who are married are less likely to be willing to protest than those who are single, as are those who are working relative to individuals in school, which removes the married and employed from the pool of potential protest participants (Beyerlein & Hipp 2006). Biographical availability can also influence activist recruitment; for example, younger adults are more likely to be asked to participate in protest (Schussman & Soule 2005), and people without countervailing social ties are more likely to accept recruiters’ invitations to get involved (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson 1980).

In sum, the mixed empirical findings for the impact of biographical availability on activism suggests that it shapes the participation and mobilization process in complex ways. Further, biographical unavailability may not uniformly decrease participation, as apparent constraints may actually foster participation in some cases. To advance our understanding of the relationship between biographical availability and activism, it is important to identify and incorporate more of the contextual factors that affect this relationship. Moreover, because biographical availability has mainly been operationalized indirectly by age, marital status, employment, and parenthood, a fruitful direction for future research would be to develop and to test direct measures of this concept, such as free time, discretionary income, physical stamina, and the likelihood of job loss or disapproval from loved ones if social activism were pursued.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Participation in social movements; Social psychology of movement participation.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Biographical consequences of activism
MARCO GIUGNI

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Social and political movements have a wide range of effects. The biographical consequences of social movements are one of them. They can be defined as effects on the life-course of individuals who have participated in movement activities, effects that are at least in part due to involvement in those activities (see McAdam 1989; Goldstone & McAdam 2001; Giugni 2004 for reviews). Other types of effects include political and cultural outcomes. Political consequences are those effects of movement activities that alter in some way the movements’ political environment. Policy outcomes, a special category of political outcomes consisting of changes in legislation or other policy measures induced by social movements, are among the most often studied. Cultural outcomes are those effects of movement activities that alter in some way the movements’ cultural environment. They are perhaps the most difficult to study empirically as they are not easily identified, they depend on a wide range of other actors and events, and often they make themselves felt only in the long run. In addition, one can also imagine the existence of that which some have called spillover effects, that is, effects of movements on each other.

The study of the biographical consequences of activism crosses two major fields of investigation: (1) studies of life-course and the life-cycle and (2) work on processes of political socialization and participation. Focusing more specifically on scholarly work on the demographic and personal dimensions of contentious politics, Goldstone and McAdam (2001) have mapped the literature on demography, life-course, and contention, allowing us to better define our subject matter. They distinguish between four bodies of literature in this field depending on whether they thematically focus on movement emergence/development or decline/outcomes and whether they analytically focus on the macro or micro levels of analysis (see Table 1): (1) studies looking at the origin of contention from a macrosociological point of view; (2) studies looking at the biographical availability or other life-course factors that facilitate or prevent movement activism following a microsociological perspective; (3) studies analyzing contention as a force for aggregate change in life-course patterns at the macro level of analysis; and (4) studies focusing on the biographical consequences of individual activism at the micro level of analysis. Concerning our subject matter, this typology tells us that we should pay attention to two main types of consequences of activism: (1) the biographical consequences of individual activism and (2) the aggregate-level change in life-course patterns (see further McAdam 1999). While the former concerns the micro-level effects of sustained participation in social movements, the latter deals with the broader, macro-level consequences of activism.

THE STATE OF RESEARCH

Works on the biographical consequences of individual activism are much less numerous than the now quite substantial body of studies of the political and, more specifically, policy outcomes of social movements. In addition, a great deal of these studies have dealt with former activists of movements of the New Left in the United States, including participants in the civil rights movement (see Table 2). Works on Europe and on other movements are relatively scarce.

In general, these follow-up studies of New Left activists quite consistently point to a strong and durable impact on the political
and personal lives of activists. Specifically, on the one hand, they show that former activists had continued to espouse leftist political attitudes (e.g., Demerath, Marwell, & Aiken 1971; Fendrich & Tarleau 1973; Whalen & Flacks 1980; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath 1987; McAdam 1989), had continued to define themselves as “liberal” or “radical” in political orientation (e.g., Fendrich & Tarleau 1973), and had remained active in contemporary movements or other forms of political activity (e.g., Fendrich & Krauss 1978; Jennings & Niemi 1981; Fendrich & Lovoy 1988; McAdam 1989). On the other hand, they show that former activists had been concentrated in teaching or other “helping” professions (e.g., Fendrich 1974; McAdam 1989), had lower incomes than their age peers, were more likely than their age peers to have divorced, married later, or remained single (e.g., McAdam 1988, 1989), and were more likely than their age peers to have experienced an episodic or nontraditional work history (e.g., McAdam 1988, 1989).

The biographical consequences of involvement in movements other than those of the New Left wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s are less numerous. Furthermore, they do not form such a consistent and easily recognizable body of literature. Yet they have not been completely ignored. For example, just to mention a few, Klatch (1999) has studied the longstanding biographical consequences of both leftist and rightist movement participants; Taylor and Raeburn (1995) have looked at the career consequences of high-risk activism by lesbian, gay, and bisexual sociologists; Whittier (1995) has shown in her study of the radical women’s movement in Colombus, Ohio, that social movements may alter their social context, leading successive generations of participants to develop new perspectives; and Nagel (1995), in her study of the American Indian movement, has argued that Indian activism in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increased tendency of Indians to self-identify as such.

Still, most if not all of these studies are zoomed in on strongly committed movement participants (i.e., activists) or at least those who strongly identify with a movement and its cause or objectives. Some scholars, however, have inquired into the individual-level effects of involvement in social movements by not-so-committed participants. For example, Sherkat and Blocker (1997) have used panel survey data to show that ordinary involvement in antiwar and student protests of the late 1960s had both a short-term and a long-term impact on the lives of participants. Specifically, demonstrators held more liberal political orientations and were more aligned with liberal parties and actions, they selected occupations in the “new class,” were more educated, held less traditional religious orientations and were less attached to religious organizations, married later, and were less likely to have children than nonparticipants. In a similar fashion, McAdam and collaborators (Wilhelm 1998; McAdam 1999; Van Dyke, McAdam, & Wilhelm 2000) have inquired into the biographical consequences of participation in social movements by means of a randomized national survey of US residents born between 1943 and 1964. What they found is largely consistent with the

<table>
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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Silence and voice in the study of demography, life-course, and contention</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Emergence/development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Demographic pressures and the emergence of contention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land pressure and peasant rebellion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration and the rise of ethnic competition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micro</td>
<td>“Biographical availability” or other life-course factors mediating entrance into activism</td>
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</table>

Source: Goldstone and McAdam (2001)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Investigator(s)</th>
<th>Year of participation</th>
<th>Year of follow-up</th>
<th>Activists in sample</th>
<th>Control group?</th>
<th>Before and after data?</th>
<th>Selected resulting publications</th>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>Marwell et al. 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassi and Abramowitz</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15/30(^d)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Abramowitz &amp; Nassi 1981; Nassi &amp; Abramowitz 1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from McAdam (1989:747)

\(^a\)This table was originally adapted from DeMartini (1983: 198).

\(^b\)Fendrich’s 1977 article is based on comparative data on 28 white and 72 black activists.

\(^c\)Fendrich’s 1993 book summarizes the overall thrust of his work on this topic.

results of the follow-up studies of New Left activism mentioned earlier. Specifically, they found movement participants to be more likely to have been divorced, to have been married later, to have cohabited outside of marriage, and to have experienced an extended period of unemployment since completing their education, and conversely, less likely to have had children and to have ever married (see further Goldstone & McAdam 2001). Thus, they observed a strong biographical impact of movement participation. More broadly, they concluded that there is a close relationship between people’s political experiences and orientations during the 1960s and 1970s and their subsequent life-course choices.

These studies have shifted the focus of the analysis from a small group of strongly committed activists to the biographical consequences of more “routine,” low-risk forms of participation, making it possible to generalize the findings beyond the quite peculiar groups of activists included in the follow-up studies of New Left activists and also showing that people who have been involved in social movements in less committed forms carry the consequences of that involvement throughout their lives. In addition, they allow us to examine the broader implications of participation in social movements for the population at large and the aggregate patterns of life-course events, therefore providing more insights into the processes of political, cultural, and social change.

This is, for example, the thrust of the research by McAdam and collaborators (Wilhelm 1998; McAdam 1999; Van Dyke, McAdam, & Wilhelm 2000). They have looked at the aggregate-level change in life-course patterns due to involvement in social movements. Specifically, this research argues that participation in the movements of the 1960s is partly responsible for the broader cultural shift associated with people born during the period of the so-called “baby boom” after the end of World War II. McAdam (1999; see further Goldstone & McAdam 2001) suggests a three-stage process to explain the link between the movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the changes in life-course patterns associated with the baby boom cohorts. In the first stage, activists in the political and countercultural movements of the period rejected normal life-course trajectories in favor of newer alternatives (e.g., cohabitation, childlessness, and an episodic work track). In the second stage, these alternatives to traditional patterns became embedded in a number of geographic and subcultural locations (most notably college campuses and self-consciously countercultural neighborhoods) that were the principal centers of the “1960s experience” and of New Left activism, thus leading upper-middle-class suburbs to embody the new alternatives through socialization processes. Finally, in the third stage, these alternative life-course patterns spread to increasingly heterogeneous strata of young Americans through processes of diffusion and adaptation, and were largely stripped of their original political or countercultural content to be experienced simply as new life-course norms. Thus, in this perspective, the involvement of the few in social movements has much broader consequences on society at large.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

From a methodological point of view, students of social movements and political activism have employed a variety of approaches to account for the biographical consequences of activism. At the most general level, however, it is worth recalling the suggestion made some years ago by Charles Tilly to deal with the explanatory problems inherent in the study of all kinds of movement effects. According to him, only one repose will work:

1. to formulate clear theories of the causal process by which social movements produce their effects;
2. to limit the investigation to the effects made plausible by those theories;
3. to work upstream by identifying instances of the effects, then seeing whether the hypothesized causal chain was actually operating;
4. to work downstream by identifying instances of the causal chain in operation, then seeing whether and how
its hypothesized effects occurred; (5) to work mid-stream by examining whether the internal links of the causal chain operated as the theory requires; and (6) to rule out, to the extent possible, competing explanations of the effects. (Tilly 1999: 170)

The latter aspect has often been the Achilles’ tendon of research on the biographical consequences of activism. More specifically, as already pointed out by McAdam (1989, 1999) in reviewing work in this field (see further Giugni 2004), in particular the early follow-up studies of New Left activists have suffered from one or more of a number of methodological problems. Some of them pertain to timing and the cause–effect nexus. Firstly and most importantly, most of the studies reviewed above lack so-called “before/after” data on activists (but see the studies by Demerath, Marwell, & Aiken 1971; Jennings & Niemi 1981; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath 1987; McAdam 1988). The latter refer to information retrieved before people get involved in social movement activities as well as after such an involvement. In the absence of a research design that allows for obtaining data both before and after involvement, one needs to rely on retrospective data and make inferences based on individual recollections, which is obviously problematic from a methodological point of view. Secondly, most of the studies focus on the 1960s cycle of contention, that is, a particular period characterized by strong social movement mobilization. Such a specific focus makes it difficult to disentangle individual effects of participation in social movements from the characteristics of the period examined and prevents empirical generalizations. Thirdly, studies on New Left activists have often suffered from too short a time span separating activism from its consequences (but see the studies by Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath 1987; Fendrich & Lovoy 1988; McAdam 1999). If such a time span is not long enough, one cannot determine whether activism has had a durable influence on the activists’ life-course. Fourthly, a related weakness consists in having measured prior activism at a single point in time instead of repeated measures. The absence of such repeated observations weakens the explanation as one does not know whether activism had lasted for a fairly long period or was short-lived and the subjects were defined as activists only at the time the research was conducted. A panel design would be an important, although costly, improvement in this regard.

Further methodological shortcomings of work on New Left activists, in part related to the ones just mentioned, concern sampling and the generalization of empirical findings. Firstly and most importantly, most of these studies suffer from a lack of representativeness of the sample as subjects were often drawn from non-representative samples of the population. Not only do they deal only with people belonging to the New Left, but most works have focused on activists who are most strongly involved. In both cases, of course, generalizations are, to say the least, difficult, if not impossible. The use of survey data avoids this problem. Secondly, researchers often did not include a control group made up of people who did not participate in movement activities (but see the studies by Fendrich 1974, 1977; Jennings & Niemi 1981; Fendrich & Lovoy 1988; and McAdam 1988, 1989). This is an important shortcoming. A control group of nonactivists provide the research with a baseline against which one can assess the impact of activism. Without such a baseline, any conclusion about the biographical consequences of activism would be difficult to make and potentially spurious. Thirdly, most works have studied only a small number of subjects (but see the study by McAdam 1999). While not a problem in itself, this prevents the researcher from being able to generalize the findings beyond the subjects examined. Again, survey data can be of much help here. Fourthly, often subjects were drawn from narrow geographical areas, sometimes from a single city. Generalizations become obviously difficult in this case. Selecting the subjects from wider areas or from more than one area would certainly improve the generalizability of results.
SEE ALSO: Generational and cohort analysis; High and low risk/cost activism; Life history research and social movements; Outcomes, cultural; Outcomes, political; Participation in social movements; Political generation; Political socialization and social movements; Spillover, social movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Bloc recruitment

MARIO DIANI

Bloc recruitment refers to “the way in which social movement organizers often recruit members and participants among groups of individuals already organized for some other purpose” (Oberschall 1993: 24; see also Oberschall 1973). This is basically a reformulation of the classic argument about the role of networks in facilitating mobilization (Diani & McAdam 2003). The additional advantage offered by bloc recruitment is that the recruitment effort is considerably lower, inasmuch as it builds upon the trust relations, mutual obligations, and consolidated routines that exist between the members of an already established and operative group.

Although we lack a systematic empirical as well as conceptual exploration of patterns of bloc recruitment, it is possible to identify at least three basic types. The first consists of political organizations redirecting their issue focus and transforming their own identity to the point of turning eventually into another organization. One example comes from the relationship between left-wing organizations and the developing environmental movement in Italy between the 1970s and the 1980s. At times, groups of the disbanding “extra-parliamentary” left converted themselves into antinuclear organizations and eventually into political ecology groups. At other times it was branches of a fairly institutional organization like ARCI, close to the socialist and communist parties, that turned into environmental organizations (Diani 1995).

A second pattern sees nonpolitical organizations becoming political or at least playing an explicitly political role. A popular example of this model are the black churches in the developing civil rights movement in the United States between the 1950s and the 1960s (McAdam 1982). However, one of their major opponents adopted a very similar approach. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Ku Klux Klan revamped its structure by targeting for bloc recruitment various organizations, in particular fraternal lodges and Protestant churches. Protestant ministers were, for example, offered free membership and powerful Chaplain status within the organization (McVeigh 2009).

Still another pattern consists of recruitment attempts targeting a bloc of people, tightly bound to each other not by membership in another organization but by their strong involvement in some time of communal activity. For example, Ohlemacher (1996) showed how such ties accounted for the success or failure of local mobilizations against low-flying military jets; Hirsch (1986) described how a combination of this and the previous model enabled an association, operating at neighborhood level in Chicago’s West Side, to effectively mobilize clubs of residents organized at the block level.

While the possibility of recruiting cohesive sets of activists from already existing organizations is certainly an opportunity for developing movements, the same note of caution applies as the one brought against network accounts of mobilization; namely, that the really crucial process for mobilization, the transmission of cognitive cultural messages, often happens through channels other than networks such as, for example, the media (Jasper & Poulsen 1995). More generally, it is not always easy to transfer existing loyalties and identities to new goals and new collective actors. A complex work of adaptation and reframing of one group’s original profile is required, and not always achieved (Hirsch 1986: 383–384).

The recognition that bloc recruitment is not always possible has not prompted to date a systematic exploration of the conditions that may facilitate or discourage its development, comparable to what has been done in reference
to individual recruitment (Diani & McAdam 2003: pt. I). A deeper knowledge of the mechanisms through which groups may shift from one cause to another may actually improve our understanding of waves of protest. It has long been pointed out that phases of intense collective action do not imply only changes in the behavior of individuals but also in the size and profile of organizational populations, with rates of emergence of new organizations being particularly high at crucial times (Minkoff 1997). Taking into account the possibility of bloc recruitment processes on a significant scale should enable us to better evaluate the distinctiveness of specific phases of contention and also their connection to earlier campaigns and movements. To what extent are “new” organizations simply the outcome of the conversion of already existing actors? And to what extent are we instead witnessing the development of organizational actors that somehow cut across major movement families, suggesting some degree of realignment of previous organizational and ideological allegiances? The bulk of work around these issues remains to be done.

SEE ALSO: Catnets; Micro-meso mobilization; Networks and social movements; Recruitment.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Boycotts
FRANCESCA FORNO

In a boycott, one or more parties attempt to achieve certain goals by urging individuals to refrain from purchasing certain goods or using certain public services. Unlike other forms of action utilized by social movements, such as demonstrations and other unconventional activities, boycotts aim to activate the political agency embedded in consumption practices, by stimulating individuals to use marketplace means to achieve what may or may not be marketplace ends.

Although often used to serve the economic objectives of consumers, such as lower prices or higher quality goods, boycotts have also been widely employed to achieve political goals by social movements of different types. Boycotts have been launched by a wide variety of sponsoring groups, including consumer organizations, labor unions, organizations representing ethnic and racial minorities, religious groups, women’s rights groups, antiwar groups, and environmental groups.

Some highly publicized examples of historically significant boycotts are that of British goods in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia following the Stamp Act in 1765 during the American Revolution; the anti-Nazi boycott of German goods invoked by the American Jewish community in the 1930s and early 1940s; the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott during the US civil rights movement intended to oppose the city’s policy of racial segregation on its public transit system; and the United Farm Worker boycotts of grapes and lettuce in the late 1960s (see Friedman 1999 for a more detailed list).

The number of boycotts organized worldwide has been increasing over the last two decades. Today’s rise in boycotts is often explained by the shift taken by civic groups toward the global market as their political arena (Micheletti 2003). By targeting directly economic enterprises, boycotts appear to adapt to a situation in which national and supranational institutions are often recognized as unable, or unwilling, to regulate and solve the serious environmental and human rights issues associated with corporate globalization.

In the late 1990s more and more activists turned to nonstate actors in the search for new strategic pressure points. Boycotts became very popular within the Global Justice Movement (della Porta 2006). The underlying logic of many movement campaigns of this period was “naming and shaming.” These campaigns, especially when conducted against multinationals, aimed at spreading detailed information to make public opinion aware of particularly glaring cases of negligence of human rights, and called on people to punish the companies involved by boycotting their products.

Changes in technology have substantially reduced the costs of mobilizing support for these actions. A number of successful boycotts during these years were initiated via e-mail and the Internet. Some boycotts that were initiated at the turn of the new century were the one against Shell, criticized for polluting the North Sea and the Niger River; Nike, accused of subcontracting production to small enterprises in Indonesia and Vietnam that use child labor; Novartis, condemned for denying millions of poor people the life-saving treatments they so desperately needed; and McDonald’s, blamed for supposedly using the meat of animals raised extensively on antibiotics.

Through boycotts, transnational activists have publicized grievances and built new transnational awareness across borders to step up pressure on corporations. While globalization has stretched the distance between workers and consumers, boycotts have helped to build a broader sense of community by stimulating individuals to consider the
conditions under which goods are produced in an increasingly global market (Collins 2003; Micheletti, Follesdal, & Stolle 2006).

In response to boycotts, some major corporations have made real efforts to improve working conditions or their environmental standards, either because they feared that transnational campaigns might blemish their image and damage their sales, or because they recognized the validity of activists’ concerns (Spar & La Mure 2003). By the end of the 1990s, in part because of the rise of anti-sweatshop activism, business leaders were much more likely to accept some level of social responsibility in the communities where they did business. Firms such as Nike, Reebok, and Novartis have since developed codes of conduct and social auditing systems for their supply chains.

Although boycotts have managed to persuade some companies to acknowledge responsibility for the conditions in which their products are made, the impact of this tactic remains a long way from the activists’ real goals of changing global market mechanisms to protect labor and improve environmental standards (Seidman 2007). In general, boycotts tend to be more effective when applied to well-known logos, easily identifiable products, or goods produced in specific countries. Moreover, especially when successful, these efforts may run the risk of generating unwanted side effects by indirectly damaging third parties, such as the workers of boycotted firms or, in the cases of boycotts launched against a specific country, the economy of the local community.

Partly for these reasons, some movement activists see a much more promising alternative to boycotts in “buycotts” – campaigns aimed at exhorting people to buy, instead of not to buy, products or services produced respecting certain environmental standards and working conditions. Perhaps the most common example of buycotts is the effort made on the part of many civic groups to encourage individuals to buy goods with a fair trade or eco label. More recently, several movement organizations, such as Slow Food, have launched campaigns to encourage the consumption of local produce in an attempt to reduce food miles and stimulate new local economic activity.

SEE ALSO: Antiglobalization movements; Consumer movements; Global Justice Movement; Human rights movements; Internet and social movements; Slow Food movement; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Brokerage
MARIO DIANI

In its most basic terms, brokerage refers to the mechanism whereby an actor acts as an intermediary between two other actors that are not directly linked, thus creating a new line of communication and exchange. This premise has been shared widely across the social sciences, yet with different twists and emphases. On the one hand, some views of brokerage stress in particular the profits incurring to those occupying intermediate positions from their specific structural location. Filling “structural holes” (Burt 1992) enables some actors to secure privileged access to scarce resources (e.g., information or advice), as well as to affect other actors’ behavior through network-based mechanisms of dependence. One well-known instance of this dynamic is given by the so-called role of the tertium gaudens (Caplow 1968, in turn inspired by Simmel), who secures gains precisely by virtue of his/her capacity to play one of the other partners in the relation against the other. Another view of brokerage underlines first and foremost brokers’ ability to bridge different social milieus and different cultures (e.g., Marsden 1983; Gould & Fernandez 1989). Although the presence of personal interest aside other motives can never be ruled out, here the main emphasis is on the collective, rather than the individual, consequences of brokerage: for example, brokers are perceived as crucial to the emergence of new collective actors. This is the notion of brokerage that most social movement analysts primarily refer to, without necessarily pitching them explicitly one against the other (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Diani 2003).

The role of intermediaries and brokers is crucial because the very existence of social movements, and not just their success and influence, depends on movement actors’ capacity to forge broad coalitions. However, while coalitions may find it easier than individual organizations to launch campaigns with a broad scope, and to target higher-level political institutions, the creation and maintenance of inter-organizational alliances is often problematic. This depends in part on the scarcity of organizational resources, but also – and probably mostly – on the fact that social movement actors are often heterogeneous in their specific agendas and/or ideological orientations. Framing such diverse points of view into broader and more encompassing narratives, enabling a multiplicity of subjects to identify with a certain cause and a certain collective actor, is far from obvious. Moreover, social movement actors’ reliance on normative and/or ideological incentives to mobilize makes them particularly sensitive to needs for personal and group coherence and integrity. This may in turn facilitate schisms, factionalism, and mutual distrust, thus creating further obstacles to alliance building. Differences in specific goals, strategic and tactical options, and broader attitudes may often discourage communication and cooperation between SMOs. Accordingly, networks of “restricted access” (Marsden 1983: 690) may develop within social movement sectors.

Under these conditions, the capacity to develop linkages between organizations or individual activists that are not directly communicating constitutes an important asset. In particular, when pronounced differences linked to ideology, tactical and/or strategic options, the social background of activists, and so on, exist within a movement, actors placed in intermediary structural positions may be expected to be particularly influential, possibly more so than actors with the same or perhaps a higher number of ties, but which are, however, concentrated within specific movement factions. In other words, actors with brokerage skills, capable of spanning different social and political milieus, may be expected to be crucial in any mobilization process (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).
Brokerage roles may be played by organizations, in particular those that act as providers of services for movement sectors and their constituents, and/or are not easy to associate with any specific movement faction given their profile (think, e.g., of a media-focused organization such as Indymedia in the Global Justice Movement). They may also be played by individuals, whether activists who enjoy wide respect from different sectors of a movement, or persons in touch with a movement by virtue of their role/profession (e.g., academics, politicians, public servants, clergy, media operators, etc.). It should be noted that being a social movement broker does not necessarily imply the assumption of explicit leadership roles. In the case of social movements that are very much ridden by ideological disagreement if not explicit conflict, playing a public leadership role may actually lead to being strongly associated with one specific faction, and therefore hamper one’s chances to act as a mediator between the different components of a specific movement field. Leaders and brokers may instead be expected to overlap more substantially, when the overall levels of ideological strife are relatively low (Diani 2003).

Applications of the concept of broker to the investigation of specific social movement processes have stressed different aspects. Some studies have focused on the integration of movement organizational fields and on the brokerage roles played by movement actors themselves. Diani (2003) has in particular looked at the capacity of brokers to bridge political ecology and conservation sectors of Italian environmentalism (e.g., Diani 2003). In their global overhaul of social movement approaches, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) have assigned brokerage a crucial role among the social mechanisms that account for the emergence of collective actors and mobilization dynamics. They have also stressed how brokerage roles may be taken up by actors with quite different levels of proximity to the core of social movement fields.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Diffusion and scale shift; Factions/factionalism; Indymedia (the Independent Media Center); Mechanisms; Networks and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Bureaucratization and social movements
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG

Bureaucratization in social movements generally refers to the formalization of social movement organizations in terms of record keeping, decision-making procedures, and division of labor. Although movement organizations never become as complex in their structures as bureaucracies such as corporations or government agencies, movements often develop organizations that meet minimal standards of bureaucratic organization. In The Strategy of Social Protest (1990: 91), William Gamson defines a bureaucratic challenging group as having at least three elements: some type of written document that describes its purpose and operating procedures; a list of members; and three or more levels of internal divisions such as officers, committees, and rank and file members. Although centralization of power is often seen as a feature of bureaucracy, Gamson distinguishes the two as characteristics of challenging groups, noting that bureaucratic organizations may lack a single center of power.

Studies of the organizational evolution of social movements find that formalized organizations are increasingly important to modern social movements, although multiple forms of organizations coexist in modern social movements (Clemens 1993; Minkoff 1994, 1999). This research suggests that there are important advantages to formalized organizations in terms of survival, but does not suggest that bureaucratization is inevitable in movement organizations. Movement organizations may take bureaucratic, collectivist, or hybrid form (Rothschild-Whitt 1979; Bordt 1997). A number of studies examine the impacts of these different types of structures, assessing the merits of various forms of bureaucracies and other organizational arrangements in social movements.

Much of the debate regarding the effects of bureaucracy and centralization takes off from the provocative argument of Robert Michels in his classic work Political Parties (1962). Based on his analysis of the German Social Democratic Party, Michels came to the conclusion that democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible; mass organizations tend to become oligarchical, ruled by a small minority. While large oligarchies are not necessarily bureaucratic, Michels, following Max Weber’s work on bureaucracy, regarded technological division of labor as necessary in mass organizations. While recognizing the benefits of bureaucracy, including efficiency, Michels argued that leaders of large, bureaucratic organizations become separated from the rank-and-file and, because they seek to preserve their own positions, they become more concerned with maintenance of the organization than with the original goals of the movement. The growth and bureaucratization of political organizations results in the displacement of radical social change goals by more conservative goals because the leadership becomes more pragmatic, trying to accommodate the goals of the organization to the dominant society.

In Poor People’s Movements, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward 1977 employ Michels’s logic to analyze the consequences of creating large bureaucratic organizations. Piven and Cloward argue that movements of people who are “poor” relative to the standard of living of American society, such as welfare recipients, the working class, and blacks, can only succeed through mass insurgency. That is, only by engaging in disruptive tactics such as large protest marches and sit-ins can poor people compel political and economic elites to make concessions. According to Piven and Cloward, mass insurgency is only possible under extraordinary circumstances, and the
gains that can be achieved by poor people's movements in such times are limited, but they are real. Efforts to build mass organizations are counterproductive because they drain energy away from mass insurgency and do not help to win new advantages. Instead, organizations come to rely on elites for resources and become co-opted as elites reward less radical organizations. Moreover, many poor people's organizations dissolve with the decline of mass militancy, so they do not serve the purpose of keeping the movement alive during less extraordinary times.

Critics of Michels and his followers have argued that the process of internal transformation that he described is not inevitable – large and bureaucratic movement organizations do not always become more conservative, undemocratic, and concerned with organizational maintenance. Zald and Ash (1966) note that a variety of transformations in organizations may occur, including coalition formation among movement organizations, organizational decline, factional splits, and increased rather than decreased radicalism. They argue that external environmental factors, as well as internal organizational processes, influence organizational transformation and they urge attention to a variety of organizational structures. Numerous theorists have since taken up the challenge of analyzing how bureaucratization and other features of organizations influence organizational maintenance, strategies and tactics, goals and outcomes of protest.

In his study of 53 challenging groups, Gamson (1990) finds, in contrast to Piven and Cloward, that bureaucratic structure helps to keep challenging organizations “combat ready.” By distinguishing centralization and bureaucratization as two separate organizational characteristics, Gamson shows that each provide different advantages to challenging groups. Bureaucracy aids organizational maintenance, as the division of labor within bureaucratic structure helps to ensure that “certain necessary tasks will be routinely performed” (1990: 91). Centralization of power decreases internal division and factionalism. The combination of bureaucratization and centralization of power, Gamson finds, offers significant advantages to challenging groups.

Other studies support Gamson’s finding that bureaucratization aids organizational maintenance. Research on the American pro-choice movement shows that movement organizations became increasingly bureaucratic or formalized after the legalization of abortion in 1973 (Staggenborg 1988). Formally structured organizations, often staffed by professional leaders, helped keep the movement alive at a time when grassroots interest in abortion declined because the battle had seemingly been won. Later, when events such as the 1980 election of antiabortion president Ronald Reagan threatened movement gains, formalized organizations, including the National Abortion Rights Action League, were available to assist grassroots mobilization by providing local affiliates with resources such as leadership training. Thus, contrary to Michels, bureaucracy can be helpful to the maintenance of grassroots activism as well as large-scale organizations.

But does bureaucracy lead to more conservative strategies and goals or to co-optation by the state? In the case of the pro-choice movement, there did appear to be a tendency for more formalized organizations to engage in more institutionalized tactics such as legislative lobbying (Staggenborg 1988). And in the civil rights movement, the more bureaucratic NAACP was more likely to engage in institutional actions such as litigation and less able to participate in direct-action tactics than more informally organized groups such as SNCC, which could make decisions quickly and take advantage of opportunities for direct action (Morris 1984). Yet institutionalized tactics do not necessarily imply conservative goals, and formalized organizations often engage in institutionalized tactics at the same time that more informal groups employ direct-action tactics, sometimes with support from formalized organizations. While individual organizations may be limited by their structures, movements such
as the pro-choice and civil rights movements typically consist of multiple organizations and structures, capable of a range of strategies and tactics.

A number of studies suggest that even leaders with oligarchic control can take organizations in either a radical or conservative direction (Zald & Ash 1966; Jenkins 1977; Schwartz, Rosenthal, & Schwartz 1981; Barnes 1987; Voss & Sherman 2000). Moreover, bureaucratic organizations are not necessarily less democratic ones. In a comparison of the NAACP and CORE, Rudwick and Meier (1970) found that CORE endorsed black power as the leadership changed, whereas the NAACP’s bureaucratic structure prevented any leaders from altering the organization’s goals without going through organizational procedures. In other words, a more bureaucratic organization might require procedures such as membership votes, whereas a more informal organization might be taken over by leaders who are motivated to change organizational goals. Some movement organizations combine bureaucracy and professionalization with “regular competitive elections with organized factions and open communication” in a “polyarchy” (Jenkins 2006: 318). Nyden 1985 found in the case of local caucuses of the United Steelworkers of America that mechanisms such as elections, open decision-making processes, and communications with grassroots members helped to overcome oligarchic tendencies and create organizational democracy. Similarly, the National Organization for Women has democratically elected leaders and encourages much grassroots activism within a formalized organizational structure with a developed division of labor (Barakso 2004).

Most studies suggest that there are advantages and disadvantages to bureaucracy and other organizational structures. Jo Freeman (1977: 44) argues that bureaucratic structure aids organizational maintenance and helps channel energies into needed tasks, but that “too much structure can discourage participation and inhibit eagerness.” Yet movement organizations may also become exclusive, Freeman argues, if they require too much participation, such as attendance at endless meetings. Seemingly “structureless” groups can end up with unaccountable leaders and informal structures that exclude many participants (Freeman 1972). In a comparison of the more informally organized and decentralized Chicago Women’s Liberation Union (CWLU) with the more formalized and centralized Chicago NOW chapter, Staggenborg (1989) finds that the NOW chapter was better at organizational maintenance, while the CWLU was more innovative in its strategies and tactics. In a study of the New Left, Breines (1980) argues that activists in decentralized, grassroots organizations such as Students for a Democratic Society were deliberately eschewing bureaucratic organization in order to create a participatory democratic political movement; to appreciate the contribution of the New Left, we need to understand its “prefigurative politics.” Thus, different forms of organization serve different political ends. Beyond considering the effects of bureaucratization, social movement scholars continue to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of a wide range of organizational structures that affect participation, strategies, and outcomes in social movements (e.g., Ganz 2000).

SEE ALSO: Consensual decision-making; Institutionalization of social movements; Organizations and movements; Participatory democracy in social movements; Prefigurative politics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Bystander publics
NICK COULDRY

Bystander publics lack the longstanding political motivation of the engaged publics of political parties or social movements, and so are important for different reasons, depending on one’s direction of analysis. For those interested in expanded political agency, bystander publics are the standing reserve of political action, available for recruitment to parties and movements. For those concerned with apathy, bystander publics signal entropy in political systems: the temporarily mobilized lose interest and revert to the “bystander frame” which simply wants an end to conflict. These two contrasting scenarios make this difficult-to-define group of rich interest (Gamson 2004).

Some democratic theory assumes the naturalness of the bystander position, generating assumptions about the limited information people want about politics (Lupia & McCubbins 1998: 36–37) or a political culture’s balance between activity and passivity (Almond & Verba 1963: 474). The less powerful’s distinterest in politics was classically explained in terms of their isolation from processes of decision-making or the presumed ignorance of the private citizen who “lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to direct” (Lippman 1925: 13–14). But this image of the “naturally” passive bystander has been fiercely challenged by critics of liberal models of democracy. Whatever one’s model of democracy, the underlying distribution of education and other opportunities may make lack of involvement seem a natural response to inequality. As one analyst wrote of America, “the forces discouraging a sense of [political] agency among working people are overwhelming” (Gamson 1992: 59, cf. Croteau 1995). More equal societies arguably encourage greater political participation (Milner 2002). “Bystander publics” cannot then be detached from wider assessments of societies’ opportunity structures.

However we evaluate the figure of the “bystander,” media narratives and media’s “master arena” for portraying political action (Gamson 2004: 243) are vital in shaping bystander publics. First, it can be argued that in the United States and the United Kingdom mainstream media encourage people into bystander status by generally portraying ordinary citizens not as political actors but as passive reactors to government action (Lewis, Inthorn, & Wahl-Jorgensen 2005). Second, social movements and political parties through their communication strategies target bystanders as recruits. Such mobilization strategies draw on bystanders’ collective identities and latent loyalties. This requires attention to the “cultural resonances” (Gamson 2004: 255) of political actions and discourse, and their framing possibilities both positive (encouraging recruitment) and negative (leading to disfavor or, worse, support by bystanders for opponents). The multiple levels of media’s political coverage hugely complicate such strategies (Bennett & Edelman 1985), especially if media and political constituencies cross national borders.

Analyzing the bystander – Lippman’s distracted spectator in the back row – and his or her potential for action (or inaction) has always been difficult, but various recent factors complicate it still further. In the “third age of political communication” the range of political information sources has increased hugely even in the decade since Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) invented that term; the informational starting-point of the average bystander is harder to pin down now when prime-time news and a daily newspaper cannot be assumed as everyone’s basic reference-point and increasing numbers may choose to insulate themselves from all political news (Prior 2008).
The dynamics of political agency are also hugely disputed: do we live in an “uncivic culture” (Bennett 1998) where the individualization of lifestyles and uneven opportunities to talk politics (Eliasoph 1998) leave bystanders increasingly cut off from political action? Or are new forms of political agency flourishing outside mainstream politics (Dalton 1999)? Meanwhile bystanders’ potential for action has increased as individual political actors can become visible to each other and then mobilize (though Twitter, YouTube, and so on) at unprecedented new speeds and scales.

In the age of political communication via social networking, the bystander is the site of contradictory claims: an optimistic argument that the possibilities for political mobilization are expanding quite radically; or the cautious argument that exponentially expanding information flows make it all the more difficult to grasp the conditions under which temporary political mobilization can be sustained into wider processes of democratization.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Framing and social movements; Internet and social movements; Media and social movements; Public opinion and movements; Public sphere; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Catnets
MARIO DIANI

The expression “catnet” merges two distinct concepts, “categories” and “networks.” It was forged by Harrison White in the context of his attempt to develop an approach to the study of social structure that departed from the Parsonsian view of attitudes and values as the driving forces behind patterns in human behavior. Alternatively, and also distancing himself from purely interactionist views of structure, White proposed that the building blocks of social structure be collectivities constituted by the intersection of specific patterns of interaction and categorical traits, on which boundary definition could be founded (White 2008).

While the concept was not conceived with problems of collective action primarily in mind, it became popular in that particular field through Charles Tilly’s *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978). There, Tilly argued extensively, in explicit criticism of deterministic, macro-structural accounts of collective action, that the presence of specific social traits within a population, associated with specific types of inequality and discrimination, is not sufficient cause of collective action. To the contrary, this depends on the presence of dense flows of interaction between actors sharing specific categorical traits. Although this basic idea actually inspired a large part of Tilly’s work, it re-emerged most forcefully in the last phase of his life, when Tilly (2005) devoted considerable attention to the social mechanisms lying behind categorization processes. Whether articulated in relation to class, trade, gender, nationality, religion, and so on, the emergence of social boundaries is reflected in both social relations and social representations (the two mutually constituting each other). Social boundaries define specific patterns of relations between sites located on one or the other side of them. They also define a distinctive type of relation between the two categories defined by them, and they also correspond to distinctive social representations of the sites located on either side of the boundary: what connects them and what separates them. Social identities are defined basically by the same elements: on the one hand we have shared stories through which people collectively represent themselves and their targets of loyalty and enmity; on the other hand, we have the relational patterns that people are involved in. Again, the two mutually constitute each other.

Forty years after its elaboration, one could not claim that the concept of catnet ranks among the most popular ones in the study of collective action. Yet, its indirect intellectual influence should not be underestimated. The concept of catnet has indeed enabled analysts to better formulate questions linked to the conversion of structural potential for collective action into real action, in many senses paving the way to the development of a network approach to these issues (Diani & McAdam 2003). How is it that certain categorical traits become salient whereas others do not? Does this depend on the uneven presence of entrepreneurs with the appropriate resources, or on the opportunities offered by the system, for example, through institutional arrangements that encourage inter-organizational collaborations? These and related questions have been at the core of “the classic agenda” in social movement theory in the last decades.

It is also possible, however, to go one step further and acknowledge the contribution of less orthodox perspectives, in particular, that of a broader line of theoretical reflection devoted to the cultural dimension associated with social networks. This had developed in direct dialogue with Harrison White’s work, viewing social ties primarily as the reflection of ongoing processes of meaning construction (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; Mische 2003). This perspective
not only went beyond the notion that ideas have an independent explanatory role, but also challenged the assumption that ties somehow determine culture, whether at the collective or the individual level. To the contrary, ties are constituted through culture and culture shapes interactions as much as being shaped by them. Accordingly, the formation of ties upon which collectivities are based is inextricably linked to processes of social construction. It follows that, in order to understand the emergence of collectivities, we need to explore how social relations are forged. Drawing explicitly upon communication theory and conversation analysis, Mische (2003, 2008) has identified a number of mechanisms of relation formation in conversational settings. They enable us to show how the formal and apparently static configuration of structural relation is actually the result of innumerable, local interactions, each of which is in principle subject to multiple interpretations by the actors involved.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Discourse analysis and social movements; Networks and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Case studies and social movements
DAVID A. SNOW

A case study is one research strategy for studying social movements and movement-related processes. Other research strategies include ethnography, participant or organizational surveys, experimentation, life histories, and protest event research via newspaper and other media sources. This entry distinguishes the case study from these and other research strategies by sketching its defining characteristics, and then discussing the ways in which case studies can vary, with illustrations drawn from case studies of social movements.

DEFINING FEATURES OF THE CASE STUDY

There are three defining or distinguishing features of a case study. The first is that it is an investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some bounded social phenomenon. All studies of social movements, as well as other social phenomena, are bounded in time and place, thus making the results of any study temporally and spatially contingent. But case studies are bounded in another way: the social phenomenon investigated is a “member of a larger set of broadly defined objects” (Sjoberg et al. 1991; Ragin 1992: 2). What is studied, in other words, is a subset or species of some encompassing genre. So, for example, the object of study may be a particular analytic type or representative of a genre of movements, such as reform, religious, or revolutionary movements. This is important to know, because a study of a religious movement, such as the Hare Krishna movement in the US (Rochford 1985), may not speak so directly to a study of a political movement, and thus the implications may not be extended to movements that don’t fall within the genre of religious movements or some subset thereof. That is, of course, a matter for ongoing empirical investigation. However, the object of case studies among social movement scholars is not always a particular type of movement. Oftentimes, the focal topic of study is a social movement process or mechanism, such as recruitment, framing, tactical innovation, diffusion, emergence, or institutionalization. Examples include Lofland’s (1977) study of recruitment, conversion, and commitment to an early 1960s cult that was the forerunner of the Reverend Sung Yung Moon movement in the US, and McAdam’s study (1988) of the precipitants and consequences of participation in the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign. In each of these studies, the focal instance or variant of inquiry is of some theoretical process or concept, which is probably the focus of most movement case studies. Additionally, the focus of inquiry for other case studies may be “an intrinsically interesting historical or cultural entity in its own right” (Ragin 1992: 2; see also Sjoberg et al. 1991: 54–55), as illustrated by Klinenberg’s (2002) study of the 1995 Chicago heat wave. Whatever the substantive or theoretical focus of a case study, be it a social object, process, or event, such foci alone do not constitute a case study, as there are two other defining criteria.

The second defining feature of a case study is the generation of a richly detailed, “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon and the context in which it is embedded. This typically involves the elaboration of a system of action constituted by sets of interrelated activities and routines engaged in by one or more networks of actors within a social context bounded in time and space.

While the system of action may vary in scope and organization, as between an exclusive, communal movement or cult (e.g., Hare Krishna) and an inclusive, broad-based...
national movement (e.g., civil rights movement), and in other ways as well, the unit of analysis for the case study is typically some system of action rather than a cross-section of individuals, as in a survey, or a media-based sample of protest events examined in media-based protest event analysis. Auyero’s (2007) study of Argentina’s “gray zone” of politics and contentious violent action nicely illustrates the case study’s detailed elaboration of a system of action, in this case the furtive and collaborative connections between political agents and the perpetrators of collective violence – namely looting and property destruction – that occurred in Argentina in December 2001.

The third defining feature of the case study is the use and triangulation of multiple data sources and data-gathering procedures. Although survey data and quantitative procedures are sometimes used in case studies, there is typically greater reliance on qualitative data and procedures that may include ethnography and participant observation, various forms of qualitative interviewing ranging from semi-structure interviewing to unstructured, conversational interviewing, and the use of various documents and archives, particularly those that are indigenously generated, such as social movement fliers, pamphlets, and newsletters or -papers. The utility of such qualitative data and procedures for the case study is that they are grounded in real-life situations and settings, and are therefore more likely to generate the kinds of data that allow for the development of a richly detailed and contextual understanding of the phenomenon of interest.

Auyero’s study of the mentioned “gray zone” nicely illustrates this triangulation of data and procedures, as he culled data from national and local newspapers, journalists’ reports, video archives, and in-depth and informal conversational interviews with residents of two poor barrios. “The strategy,” he writes, “was to pile up evidence regarding the looting dynamics and the existence of the workings of the gray zone, triangulating as much as possible the available different sources of information with each other” (Auyero 2007: 25).

Inasmuch as data and procedural triangulation is a defining feature of the case study, it follows that a case study is not a method per se, as are ethnography and survey research, but rather a research strategy associated with a number of data-gathering methods or procedures.

WAYS IN WHICH CASE STUDIES VARY

In addition to variation in focus on a movement, process, or event, case studies can vary in two other ways. One form of variation is in the kinds of cases examined. Sjoberg et al. (1991) and Yin (2009) have suggested that cases are generally one of four kinds: they may be relatively typical or normal and thus constitute a representative case; they may be a critical case in that they constitute an ideal opportunity for observing a patterned or theorized principle; they may be a deviant or negative case in that they constitute an exception to the expected pattern; or they may be an extreme or unique case in the sense of not being fully comparable to other seemingly similar cases.

Case studies can also vary as to whether the study is based on detailed examination of a single case or a comparison of multiple cases within the same set or genre of phenomena. Analyses of single cases are exhibited in studies of single movements, and typically take one of two forms. The first is characterized by studies that provide a primarily descriptive overview of a single, usually national-level movement. The case is the movement as a whole, and the objective is to situate it in time and place, and to say something about its beliefs and ideology, its appeal and diffusion, and its spread. The second form of a single case study makes the analysis of major movement processes and issues the centerpiece of inquiry. A highly contextualized, descriptive understanding of the movement is still provided, but it is secondary to elaborating empirically how these focal processes operated within the context of the movement studied and how these more specific findings extend or refine the relevant theoretical or conceptual understandings.
within the field. Illustrative of this type of case analysis is Lofland’s (1977) mentioned study of a small religious movement, with an emphasis on the processes of proselytization and conversion, and Goodwin’s (1997) study of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, with its emphasis on affective ties and their implications for understanding the solidarity and discipline of the participants.

Case study analysis of multiple cases embedded within a larger, encompassing case also appear to take two forms in the study of social movements. In one form, the cases, typically social movement organizations (SMOs) or events, are taken to be “normal cases” that are representative of the broader movement. Staggenborg’s (1991) use of thirteen SMOs (six national and seven local organizations in Chicago and Illinois) as the basis for understanding the pro-choice movement in America is illustrative of this use of multiple cases. In the second form of multiple case analysis, the cases are examined in a comparative framework that allows for nuanced assessment of variation among the cases with respect to the broader movement and processes or conceptual issues examined. Cress and Snow’s (1996, 2000) qualitative segment of their study of homeless social movement mobilization is illustrative. Based on data gathered for each of fifteen homeless SMOs in eight US cities, and using the analytic techniques of qualitative comparative analysis, they found noteworthy differences in resource mobilization, benefactors, organizational viability, and outcomes that contributed not only to understanding the homeless movement in general, but to detailed understanding of local variations and to the factors that accounted for these variations.

**SUMMARY**
A case study is a research strategy, based on the triangulation of various data sources and data-gathering procedures, that seeks to generate rich, detailed, contextualized accounts of social phenomena that are interesting in their own right, as with the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the homeless movement, or that unpacks and elaborates various case-relevant social processes or events, such as recruitment, conversion, and resource mobilization. Attending to and fulfilling these objectives makes the case for conducting case studies. But there is another contribution that is generally unrecognized or glossed over: the capacity of case studies to engage in theoretical generalization. The relationship between any research procedure or method and generalizability is contingent on the kind of generalization in question. If the only form of generalization is statistical or enumerative, then clearly case studies fall short. But statistical generalization is not the only form of generalization. There is also analytic, or theoretical, generalization, which is the kind of generalization case studies are well-suited to pursue. As noted by a number of students of cases studies, one of their goals “is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” (Snow & Trom 2002; Yin 2009), which the movement case studies cited herein have done.

**SEE ALSO:** Comparative research; Conversion and new religious movements; Ethnography and social movements; Gray zone of politics and social movements; Protest event research; QCA and fuzzy set applications to social movement research; Survey research.

**REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS**


Cause lawyering
ERIC AGRIKOLIANSKY

All social movements have, at one point or another in their development, been confronted with the question of legality. This may come about either because the movement aims to change the law, or because it is itself facing legal repression. In addition, this could reflect that “the state usually acts through law, the state can be constrained by law” (Abel 1998: 69). However, the use of law, and the legal system, as tools of protest is not an easy task, and there are indeed a number of limits to legal strategies of protest. The field of critical legal studies has emphasized that the legal system has an underlying tendency to treat disadvantaged groups less fairly and, above all, that legal decisions are insufficient on their own to bring about changes in the economic and social order (see, for example, Rosenberg 1991). However, this position has been challenged in recent years by a number of pieces of work which have reconsidered the importance of contentious uses of law.

In this context, the analysis of “legal mobilizations” (McCann 1994, 2006) has shown that the most important aspect of court decisions may not be their direct effect but rather their indirect effect. This is first of all because having recourse to courts may have a significant dissuasive tactical effect. McCann (1994) shows how the threat of legal proceedings encouraged employers to prefer bargaining to confrontation in the context of the American equal pay movement. In addition, litigation strategies may constitute a resource for the development of social movements themselves. Courts can, in the first instance, act as public and political tribunals allowing public opinion to be questioned, demands to be disseminated, and support to be mobilized (Barkan 1980). Moreover, one of the main obstacles to collective action is that unequal treatment might be considered to be natural and inevitable by those who suffer from it. In this context, reclaiming one’s rights can change the perception of what is just and unjust and bring about a cognitive liberation making collective action feasible (McAdam 1982). The fight for the legalization of same-sex marriage entered into by gay movements in the USA in the 1970s illustrates this judicial empowerment effect which contributed to the challenge to the dominant heterosexual norms and to the later development of the gay movement (Barclay & Fischer 2006).

For social movements to be able to have recourse to these litigation strategies they nonetheless require access to the judicial system and need to benefit from the support of lawyers. Work on cause lawyering (Sarat & Scheingold 1998, 2006) has suggested that this is more likely to develop in countries with liberal democratic systems, in which citizens enjoy substantial political and legal rights. The emergence of international legal bodies may, however, provide additional opportunities for action against authoritarian regimes outside of the national legal space, although these bodies are most often used to punish crimes rather than to prevent them. The receptiveness of the judicial system to the demands of social movements varies considerably between democracies: in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s the development of a “rights-based constitutionalism” amongst judges and those in the legal administration who had begun to pay attention to claims in terms of equality helped minorities gain access to the court system. However, the 1980s were characterized by a change in the attitude of judges, who became less open to these kinds of demands, and a reduction in the legal opportunities of contention (McCann & Dudas 2006).

The support of lawyers is another key factor in understanding legal mobilizations. The professional structures are important. “Public-interest firms” or “legal services offices” in
the USA allow lawyers to work full time with groups suffering from discrimination who typically do not have access to the law. In France, on the contrary, cause lawyers practice mostly in small private law firms. They have to reconcile social justice or political lawyering with other kinds of litigations and rarely specialize in cause lawyering. The commitment and motivations of lawyers in social movements also reflects their own personal histories, as in the case of the lawyers in Philadelphia considered by Porter (1998), who were characterized by their own experience of discrimination and were constrained by their position in the local legal market to specialize in black working-class clients.

The participation of lawyers in social movements has sometimes been seen as dangerous, as the former may monopolize the leadership of the latter and engage them in costly legal strategies with uncertain outcomes (as, for example, in the case of the consumer movement: see Meili 2006). There are, however, numerous examples which contradict this position: lawyers paradoxically do not systematically favor litigation strategies, nor do they subordinate the political objectives of the movement to them (McCann & Silverstein 1998). Cause lawyering therefore neither implies the blind adhesion of social movements to the myth of rights, nor the abandon of confrontational strategies.

SEE ALSO: Cognitive liberation; Law and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Charisma was introduced as a social scientific concept by Max Weber, who used the term to identify one of three types of legitimate authority. In Weber’s framework, bureaucratic (or legal-rational) authority is based on respecting rational rules, traditional (or patriarchal) authority is based on following traditional ways, and charismatic authority is based on challenging existing rules and traditions. The first two, he wrote, are conservative in that they underpin existing institutions, while charismatic authority is revolutionary in that it challenges the legitimacy of existing institutions. Weber used social movements as examples of the power of charismatic authority and following his logic all social movements that challenge some aspect of the status quo must rely on charismatic authority.

Because Weber was concerned with sources of authority, he was particularly interested in movement leaders. Unlike bureaucratic and traditional authority, he reasoned, charismatic authority cannot rely on existing institutions, so it depends to a far greater extent on the personal traits of a leader. In order to be convinced to violate laws and traditions, movement participants have to believe their leaders have extraordinary knowledge and abilities. Moreover, Weber wrote, because charismatic movements pursue a mission that transcends existing institutions, they are averse to routine activities, especially rational, rule-bound economic pursuits, which distract from the charismatic mission. He did not, however, exclude material interests as a motivating concern: Among the examples he cites of charismatic leaders are pirate chieftains and radical populists who promise to redistribute wealth (Weber 1978).

Following Weber’s lead, many scholars have used the concept of charismatic authority to analyze movement leadership. Studies in this tradition have focused on the characteristics of charismatic leaders and their role in creating new belief systems, winning adherents, and developing emotional bonds with followers (Downton 1966; Willner 1984). Other scholars, dissatisfied with Weber’s focus on leaders, have shifted their attention to the social contexts that give rise to charismatic movements and the role of participants in selecting, shaping, and rejecting movement leaders. Successful charismatic movements, they stress, arise at moments of crisis, when large segments of the populace have come to question the legitimacy of existing institutions. At these moments, many would-be leaders contend for followers and they often articulate grievances and visions that are widely held in a broad insurgent milieu, even if they each elaborate their own particular version (Friedland 1964; Tucker 1968). Charismatic movements, then, are usually broader than the following of a single leader and allegiance to particular leaders is often fluid. Sometimes a single leader emerges at the head of a movement, but many movements are less centralized and some scholars have argued that decentralized charismatic movements are particularly resilient (Gerlach & Hine 1970).

Charismatic authority, Weber emphasized, is inherently transitory: As movements establish stable organizations and institutions, charismatic authority gradually becomes “routinized” in a traditional or a bureaucratic direction. Thus, his concept of authority is cyclical, with charismatic movements toppling traditional and bureaucratic institutions, only to establish new institutions, which are once again based on bureaucratic or traditional principles. With this cycle in mind, Weber drew attention to conflicts within political parties between founding leaders, who gather a following based on charismatic inspiration, and party officials, who increasingly depend on bureaucratic methods. Subsequent scholars have built on Weber’s themes to analyze the internal
workings and trajectories of social movement organizations. Some have distinguished between charismatic and bureaucratic organizational forms and mobilizing strategies in order to assess their consequences (Panebianco 1988; Andreas 2007). Many have highlighted the inherent tensions within modern social movements (and the regimes they create) between charismatic and bureaucratic authority, often embodied in the persons of visionary leaders and practically oriented movement cadres. Some have stressed the effectiveness of such a division of labor, while others have emphasized the conflicts engendered (Gerth 1940; Gonzalez 1974; Hiniker 1978). Weber’s cycle, involving the eruption and routinization of charisma, has been employed to explain the conservative trajectories of radical social movement organizations and the vulnerability of conservative organizations to charismatic upheavals (Zald & Ash 1966; Andreas 2007).

The concept of charisma played an important role in strain theories of collective behavior, which enjoyed great influence in the United States from the 1940s through the 1970s. In these theories, social movements were precipitated by structural strain that produced anxiety in individuals, with charisma providing the link between individual anxiety and collective action. A central concern of these theories was that the breakdown of traditional institutions was uprooting individuals, making them particularly susceptible to charismatic appeals. Talcott Parsons outlined this thesis when he introduced the concept of charisma to English-speaking readers in his translation of a compilation of Weber’s essays (Parsons 1947), and subsequent efforts to elaborate strain theories of collective action included charisma as an essential element (Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962). This tradition has generated a large number of books and articles on the topic of charismatic movements, as well as on particular movements and leaders (Madsen & Snow 1991; Rinehart 1997).

In contrast, charisma played little role in the theories that came to dominate the social movements field in the 1970s. These theories, populated with rational actors pursuing their interests, did not find much use for the concept of charisma, which Weber had defined as irrational because of its aversion to rules, and which previous theories of collective behavior had associated with psychological distress, emotional attachment, and fanatical belief. In recent decades, however, social movement theorists have again come to recognize the importance of identity formation, the crafting of collective action frames, and other cultural, cognitive, and psychological processes. As scholars have sought to explain how movement leaders reframe the world in ways that make the status quo seem unjust and how movement participants become convinced that hopeless causes are not only possible but necessary, there has been a renewed interest in charisma (Melucci 1996; Morris & Staggenborg 2004).

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratization and social movements; Framing and social movements; Leadership; Micro-meso mobilization; Radicalism; Revolutions; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Civil disobedience
SARA TESCIONE

Civil disobedience refers to a public, nonviolent, contentious yet political act contrary to law, usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of a government.

The origins of the modern notion and practice of CD are to be found in the 1848 essay “Resistance to Civil Government” (also known as “Civil Disobedience”) by the American naturalist Henry David Thoreau, which represents one of the first modern attempts to reflect on the existence of anything such as a legitimate duty to disobey state laws. In fact, in 1842 Thoreau refused to pay his poll taxes in objection to the ongoing Mexican–American War and the federal government’s support of slavery in the southern states, experiencing arrests and imprisonment as a consequence for his law-breaking behavior. Eminent theorists and practitioners of CD such as Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr all drew from Thoreau’s ideas.

Although there is some dispute among philosophers and social scientists on both the exact definition of CD and the conditions under which the act of disobedience is to be considered justified, John Rawls’ account of CD within the framework of liberal democracy remains the most widely accepted to date. From his perspective, CD is defined as a political act not only in the sense that it is addressed to those who hold the political power, but also because it is guided and justified by the principles of justice underlying the political order. Publicity is a second distinctive feature of CD: an act of CD can be considered such insofar as it is not covert or secretive, but rather done in public, with fair notice. The publicity of the act, together with its nonviolent nature, is intended to prove that CD is the expression of profound political convictions and the ultimate trust of the rule of law. As a consequence of CD, in fact, laws are broken but trust in the law is nonetheless expressed by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of the unlawful conduct. The ultimate goal of CD is to stigmatize and change unfair laws or policies by making an appeal to consciences – both those of the authorities and of the general public (Rawls 1999). Therefore, CD falls between legal protests, and conscientious refusal, revolutionary action, and organized forcible resistance.

CD can be defined “direct” when the law deliberately broken is itself the object of the protest; all the cases in which the violated law does not coincide with the political objective of the protest, but is somehow related to it, are examples of “indirect” CD.

There remain disputes over the very notion of CD, especially with regards to nonviolence. While many agree that CD is nonviolent by definition, there is no agreement on what constitutes violence, and some scholars do not exclude from the notion of CD minor acts of coercion (Morreall 1991; Smart 1991).

A further problem with Rawls’ notion is that it is designed only for the case of a “nearly just society,” raising questions over the criteria that would define and justify the use of CD as a mechanism for social and political change in an unjust and nondemocratic society.

FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE ACTION

If in Thoreau the main focus of CD remains the protection and safeguard of the moral autonomy of the individual, Gandhi’s approach, within the framework of his philosophy and practice of nonviolent resistance (satyagraha), marked the passage from individual to collective action, thus transforming the theory and practice of CD into a mass phenomenon.
Applied for the first time in 1906 in South Africa, during the years of Gandhi’s involvement with the struggle of Indian immigrant workers against Pretoria’s regime, in the 1930s mass CD became a successful tool in the struggle for Indian Independence from British colonial rule. The famous salt march in 1930 opened the way to a nationwide campaign of mass CD, which encompassed a rich repertoire of noncooperation methods and resulted in the arrest of an estimated 60,000 people.

The influence of Gandhian CD eventually crossed India’s borders, reaching religious pacifists and civil rights activists in the United States, who began to study and experiment forms of nonviolent resistance in the early 1940s. It is with the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 that CD became a distinctive feature of the African-American civil rights movement against racial segregation, under the charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King Jr. A decade of campaigns, from the 1960 Greensboro sit-ins to the 1961 Freedom Rides to the 1963 Birmingham campaign, to the 1966 Chicago Freedom Movement was in fact fundamental in publicly denouncing the unconstitutionality of local segregationist laws, contributing to the passage of the Civil Rights Acts in 1964 and 1968.

War and nuclear armament became targets of campaigns of indirect CD in the United States as well as in Western Europe. In the United Kingdom, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Committee of 100 animated large sit-in demonstrations at military bases to push the country toward unilateral nuclear disarmament. Despite some initial objections to unlawful methods within the CND, by the 1980s CD became a constitutive component of the British antinuclear movement.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, both in Europe and the United States, the right to draft refusal was often acquired thanks to direct actions of CD. In Italy, activists of the Radical Party were imprisoned for months as they affirmed the right to conscientious objection to military service; the resulting law was passed in 1972.

Over time, organized CD has been employed to target a great variety of laws or policies. Nor has this instrument of collective action been confined to political and social movements in Western democracies. From the 1986 people power revolution in the Philippines, to the 1989 “velvet” revolutions in Eastern Europe, to the most recent wave of “colored revolutions” against the corrupt regimes of the post-Soviet area, mass CD initiatives have recurred in the repertoire of numerous pro-democracy popular movements, together with the revival of nonviolent resistance theories.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Satyagraha; Velvet Revolution of 1989; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Civil society
MARIO DIANI

Until the late 1980s, the term “civil society” was largely absent from the political and social lexicon (Edwards 2004). The restart of interest in this idea has been spurred by a number of quite heterogeneous, if parallel, developments. In the crumbling socialist regimes of Eastern Europe in the 1980s, “civil society” was hailed, in a classic Lockean sense, as the locus of citizens’ autonomy and resistance to an authoritarian, invasive state (Seligman 1995). In Western neoliberal democracies, civil society has been seen as one possible alternative to the financial crisis of the welfare state, and as the embodiment of the virtues associated with cooperation and generalized trust and solidarity (Deakin 2001). The European Commission has repeatedly stressed the possible contribution of civil society to reducing its (real or perceived) “democratic deficit.” Its 2001 EU White Paper on Governance paid a lot of attention to the role of citizens and associations, although it remains an open issue whether significant increases in rates of active participation from the citizenry would actually be sustainable for the policy process.

The idea of civil society has also loomed large in explorations of the opportunities offered by globalization for the emergence of a genuinely transnational public sphere. The development since the 1990s of mobilizations grouped under the “Global Justice movements” heading has probably represented the most prominent case in which the renewed attention for citizens’ activism and for civil society have met in a distinctive intellectual and political agenda (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 2001). At the same time, attention to civil society organizations in reference to both political advocacy and service delivery has steadily grown in both Western and non-Western democracies, with special attention to the realm of local politics (Deakin 2001).

Unsurprisingly, the variety of empirical processes which the term has been used to explore matches the heterogeneity in the meanings attributed to the concept. We can identify at least three dominant conceptions of “civil society” (Edwards 2004: ch. 1). One has a strong normative component, and associates civil society to the notion of the “good society.” In this perspective, civil society is equated in the first place to principles of civility, tolerance, generalized trust, and cooperation, and to the behaviors that they inspire. The second version equates “civil society” to “public sphere.” It views civil society as a discursive arena where competing views on moral and ethical issues as well as on the running of public affairs may be brought up and submitted to public scrutiny. The third version of civil society focuses instead on the role of organizations as conducive to the development of political capacity and cooperative behaviors, essential for social cohesion and/or the quality of democratic life. Although some influential social thinkers are strongly associated with one of these versions (e.g., Habermas (1989) with the second, Putnam (1993) or Arato & Cohen (1992) with the third), each major instance of civil society theorizing attempts some integration of these three dimensions. For example, Alexander (2006) regards the civil sphere as the locus in which civil values are reinforced and common grounds between citizens holding diverging views are identified, but does not consider all types of voluntary associations as part of the civil sphere. “Non-civil” associations are those that do not attempt to identify general criteria of civility but instead limit themselves to the pursuit of special interests and agendas.

Although social movement and civil society research show limited amounts of communication and cross-fertilization (della Porta & Diani 2011; see, however, Edwards, Foley, & Diani 2001), the two fields share a few questions and empirical objects of analysis.
These include the mechanisms that facilitate or discourage citizens’ involvement in collective action, and the organizational dynamics taking place within “social movement organizations” (the term favored by movement analysts), “voluntary associations” and “public interest groups” (the terms favored by civil society analysts). There is indeed much common ground in considering how individuals overcome tendencies to free ride (Kitts 2000), how organizational forms combine a quest for efficacy with a commitment to decentralized, participatory structures, and how they coordinate resources (Kriesi 1996; Jordan & Maloney 1997).

At the same time, it is also important to recognize where these two fields of inquiry diverge. First, an emphasis on conflict is not so strong in reference to civil society research as it is to social movements. Social movement studies have for a long time stressed conflict as the key dynamic element of societies. In contrast, analysts of civil society often focus on non- or less-contentious forms of collective action that give priority to largely consensual issues and agendas (Alexander 2006). For example, campaigns promoting collective responses to pressing public issues that most people recognize as important (such as environmental degradation or the persistence of inequality between industrialized and developing countries) are surely akin to coalitions if not to full-fledged social movements, since they involve multiple organizations and may also generate long-term solidarities. Yet conflict is not necessarily central to them, since civil society often acts in pursuit of goals defined broadly enough to make them acceptable – if not top priority – to large sectors of public opinion. In an effort to bridge these two sectors of social life, social movement analysts have sometimes talked of “consensus movements” to identify instances of collective action in which conflict was either absent or peripheral.

Similar considerations apply to social movement practices, which are often defined as confrontational and/or unusual forms of political behavior. Many scholars pinpoint the fundamental distinction between movements and other political actors in the use by the former of protest as a form of exerting political pressure. While protest repertoires (at least in Western democracies) have probably spread to more diversified constituencies than it was the case in the 1960s or 1970s, analysts of civil society tend to emphasize its non-confrontational elements, and its non-confrontational repertoires (in particular the recourse to service delivery in place of protest as a major way to achieving public goals). The implied link here between reducing conflict and increasing social cohesion has been criticized by those who argue that the articulation and explicit management of social conflict is essential for the survival of democracy (Mouffe 2005).

SEE ALSO: Altruism and social movements; Democracy and social movements; Democratization and democratic transition; Interest groups and social movements; Multiorganizational fields; Nongovernmental organizations; Public sphere; Voluntary associations and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Claims-making
LASSE LINDEKILDE

Claims-making refers to the process of performing or articulating claims that bear on someone else’s interests. In its simplest form an instance of claims-making includes two actors—a subject (claimant) and an object (addressee)—and a verbal or physical action (demanding, protesting, criticizing, blaming etc.). In the context of social movement studies and contentious politics, claims-making has most often referred to the conscious articulation of political demands in the public sphere, thus leaving aside more private or hidden forms of political claims-making such as voting and lobbying.

CLAIMS-MAKING AS PERFORMANCE

Political claims-making has been conceived of as performances that air certain claims to an audience, involving governments as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (Tarrow & Tilly 2006: 4; Tilly 2008: 5). Understood in this way, political claims-making entails both the formulation of a political demand with a specific content (the claim), and the public staging of this demand (claims-making), giving the term a degree of semantic overlap with social movement core concepts such as framing, collective action, and action repertoires.

Political claims-making can take on many forms and be performed in many different arenas. It can be argued that the concept of claims-making has its origin in the legal system, where it refers to the assertion of a right or claim to money, property, freedoms, and so on, which is enforceable in court. Although social movements have often made use of court rooms as arenas of political claims-making, they have traditionally been characterized, or even defined, by the use of transgressive or extra-procedural claims-making targeting governments and public opinion through performances in the streets and/or the media. Mediatized claims-making—either mass media coverage of performances like demonstrations or media-dependent performances like interviews, press releases, text messaging campaigns, and so on—is increasingly essential for social movements in making their cause visible (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993).

EXPLAINING POLITICAL CLAIMS-MAKING

Explaining variance in political claims-making in terms of the “semantic triplet” (Franzosi 2004) of subject (who), object (whom), and action verb (what), across countries, political systems, issue fields, and time is in many respects at the core of social movement studies. Hence, political claims-making has often been treated as the dependent variable in comparative research designs (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995). The list of independent variables suggested as explaining variance in claims-making is long, including variance and/or development in political opportunity structures, political culture, state formation, and transnationalization (e.g., Tilly 1995). There have also been attempts to go beyond the semantic triplet of claims-making and focus on the more discursive content. Linking claims-making to concepts of “framing” and “discursive opportunity structures,” some research argues how issues, proposed solutions, and justifications of raised claims regarding, for example, immigration depend on national differences in conceptualizing cultural diversity and societal integration (Koopmans et al. 2005).
POLITICAL CLAIMS ANALYSIS

The concept of claims-making has in particular been applied to analyze and compare media debates on contested issues, including immigration/integration (Koopmans & Statham 2001; Lindekilde 2008) and Europeanization (della Porta & Caiani 2009).

Protest event analysis, where instances of (physical) claims-making reported in print media are coded systematically, has been the most common way to study variance in political claims-making empirically (see Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992). Building on this, Koopmans and Statham (1999) have developed political claims analysis, an approach that takes the strategy of event analysis further. First, they propose integrating elements of discourse analysis making the verbal aspect of a claim – its argumentative structure and discursive content – a part of the coding schema. This move entails paying attention to conventional speech acts (e.g., the articulation of blame, dissent, propositions, critique, affirmation, and viewpoints) as performances of political claims, when articulated in the media regarding a contested issue field. Second, political claims analysis extends the scope of relevant claimants from movement actors to other kinds of civil society actors as well as institutional actors and thus studies claims-making as an exchange of views in a “multi-organizational field” (Koopmans & Statham 1999: 3). In this perspective, the analysis of claims-making becomes relational, focusing on the public exchange of views, linking the approach to certain forms of network analysis (see Wada 2003). As a consequence, political claims analysis offers an opportunity to study the dynamics of contentious episodes (the sequentially ordered appearance of claims and counter-claims) as they unfold in the media.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Discourse analysis and social movements; Framing and social movements; Protest event research; Repertoires of contention.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Class consciousness: the Marxist conception

NICK CROSSLEY

Within the Marxist tradition “class consciousness” refers to the awareness of itself as a class which the dominated class within capitalism, the proletariat, is predicted to arrive at, historically. When the proletariat become aware of themselves as a class and of their collective strength, Marx claims, they will rise up in revolution and overthrow their bourgeois masters.

Writing in and about early industrial societies, Marx identifies two main social classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Each is defined by their relation to the other and to the means of production; that is, to the material infrastructure of the dominant form of economic activity of their society, in this case factories and mines. The bourgeoisie own and control the means of production. They are factory and mine owners. The proletariat own only their own labor, which they must sell to the bourgeoisie in return for a subsistence wage.

These two classes are interdependent and mutually constitutive. Neither can exist in the absence of the other. The bourgeoisie need workers to work in their factories and mines. They cannot exist, as a capitalist class, independently of a workforce. The proletariat, as a class who sell their labor, can only exist in relation to a bourgeois class whose members buy it. Interdependence and co-constitution do not equate to harmony, however. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat have juxtaposed interests, according to Marx. It is in the interests of the former to pay a little for a lot and of the latter to earn a lot for a little. Moreover, Marx argues that the relationship of the two is fundamentally exploitative of the proletariat, whose (subsistence) wages represent only a fraction of the value that they create by means of their labor. The bourgeoisie extract this “surplus value” in the form of profits.

The proletariat are not, in the first instance, aware of their position, however. Drawing upon a Hegelian distinction, Marx believes that classes exist, firstly, in themselves, which is to say objectively, as a matter of fact, and only later for themselves, which is to say (inter)subjectively, within the awareness and consciousness of their own members. Classes are class conscious when they exist for themselves. As noted, however, the significance of class consciousness, for Marxists, is that this awareness triggers and belongs to a revolutionary project. The class consciousness of the proletariat exists not only in their awareness of themselves as a class but also in their determination to bring about a revolutionary transformation of society which will improve their position, reconfiguring social relations and effectively thereby dissolving them as a class.

Marx is notoriously vague about the processes that bring about this awakening of class consciousness. The hints that he makes, however, all seem to point back to what he identifies as the crisis tendencies of capitalism. On one hand, he argues, there is a tendency for profit to decline within capitalism, as a consequence of competition between individual capitalists and the need for constant reinvestment in technology which this necessitates. Capitalists can only respond to this, he believed, by forcing down wages. In addition, because capitalist markets are essentially unregulated (Marx says anarchic) and rely upon the chance coincidence of levels of supply and demand, respectively, they are prone to periodic “overproduction” or “under consumption” crises; that is, capitalists produce more goods than they are able to sell. In the worst cases and particularly in relation to smaller firms, which cannot withstand losses, this leads to firms going bankrupt, making workers redundant, which can further reduce demand, leading to further overproduction,
and so on. The net effect of this is that big firms tend to buy out smaller firms, which go bust, generating a general tendency toward the concentration of capital in fewer hands.

These crisis tendencies, or at least their effect, might help to engender class consciousness in three ways. Firstly, they tend to polarize classes through the depression of wages and concentration of capital into fewer hands. The rich get richer, the poor get poorer, and the middle ground disappears.

Secondly, as workers are increasingly employed by the same limited and narrowing pool of employers it is easier for them to recognize their common position and interests. This is partly a subjective matter. It is easier for workers to see their common position when they all work for a small pool of capitalists. And this is greatly enhanced insofar as the concentration of capital and growth in the wealth of a few results in larger factories and industrial centers where large concentrations of workers rub shoulders and form solidaristic bonds. The process is also partly objective, however, in the respect that workers who work for the same employer do arguably have more similar interests than those who work for different employers. Workers in competing firms have at least some interest, at an individual level, in their firm doing better than the other. As they work for fewer and fewer bigger employers this conflict diminishes and their interests converge.

Finally, notwithstanding the considerable body of work on social movements which problematizes the idea that economic downturns necessarily have a radicalizing effect, Marx implies that the worsening of living conditions brought about by overproduction crises and wage depression will radicalize workers and make them more aware of both their interdependence with one another and their shared interdependence and antagonism with members of the capitalist class.

In *What is to be Done?* Lenin (1973) famously challenges Marx’s assumption that workers will arrive at a revolutionary consciousness under their own steam. Left to their own devices, he maintains, workers will only ever develop a “trade union consciousness”; that is, they will form groups (unions) to defend their interests but on a piecemeal basis and within the structure of capitalism. Workers will only become truly revolutionary, he maintains, through the mediation of a revolutionary party. This is one of several key disputes which have attached to the concept of class consciousness. Others center more squarely upon the issue of why revolutionary class consciousness has never developed in advanced capitalist societies, at least on any significant scale, and whether, in contemporary societies, subjective awareness of class is declining in both prevalence and significance.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Labor movement; Labor protest in the European Union; Marxism and social movements.

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Coalitions
NELLA VAN DYKE

Virtually all social movements involve organizations which sometimes work together on a common task, in what can be called a coalition. Coalitions take many forms; sometimes they are formal and endure for years, at other times they involve only temporary alliances that disband at the conclusion of an event. No matter what their form, coalitions are critically important for collective action, and a complete understanding of social movement dynamics is impossible without knowledge of organizational alliances and the factors that inspire or inhibit their formation.

Some of the largest protests in the world have been coordinated by organizational coalitions. In early 2003, as the United States prepared to go to war against Afghanistan, protests involving millions of people were staged by activists around the world on coordinated dates. Advances in communication and transportation technology facilitated these events, by allowing activists to form connections with one another at World Social Forums and elsewhere and continue interacting via the Internet. The common threat of a political administration’s planned war inspired their coordinated action. As this example illustrates, pre-existing social ties and a shared threat facilitated these massive global protests, and similar factors have influenced coalition formation around a variety of issues at different times. This entry will explore the social conditions that facilitate coalition formation, as well as the internal organizational factors that can inspire or inhibit collaboration.

Many factors influence an organization’s decision to participate in a coalition. Organizations may weigh the costs and benefits to collaboration, and if participating will bring needed resources, personnel, or mobilizing skills, they may decide to work in alliance. At other times collaboration may emerge less consciously, as groups with connections to one another decide to work together without much thought. However, cost–benefit analyses or ideological perspectives may inhibit coalition work. The decision to participate in a coalition is not without risks for a movement organization. Collaboration may drain critical resources from an organization, making organizational maintenance and survival difficult, if not impossible. Working with another organization may dilute a group’s collective identity, weakening the commitment of participants. An organization’s desired goals, tactics, and rhetorical frames may be changed as they attempt to find common ground with coalition partners. Thus, while the benefits to coalition work may seem obvious, the costs may also be great and inhibiting. Research on social movement coalitions is increasingly providing evidence on a number of factors that facilitate coalition formation, including social ties between organizational leaders, congruent ideologies and identities, and the presence of political opportunities or threats in the social environment. The literature on each of these topics is reviewed below.

SOCIAL TIES IN TIME AND SPACE

The research on individual protest participation has conclusively demonstrated that having ties to other activists or activist organizations is one of the strongest predictors of protest participation. Social networks provide people with information and often are an important source of social support. At the most fundamental level, individuals must know that a protest event is happening in order to attend it. Although this fact is often taken for granted, it is actually one of the strongest predictors of protest participation (Schussman & Soule 2005). Likewise, organizations must know of other organizations or else they are unlikely to ever connect with one
another for coalition work. Recent research (Obach 2010) demonstrates that social structures shape the organizational environment in profound ways, such that some organizations may never come into contact with others. Obach (2010) shows how the US government’s policy structure, wherein environmental issues are in a separate policy domain from labor issues, inhibits labor and environmental organizations from ever collaborating. Because of the structure of the organizational field, groups may never come into contact with each other, and may also come to frame the issues differently as they interact with policymakers and organizations focused on different issues. Thus, contact or at least knowledge of one another is probably the most fundamental facilitating condition for organizational collaboration.

Past contact and often collaboration between individual activists is an important facilitator of subsequent organizational coalitions. Corrigall-Brown and Meyer (2010) demonstrate that the organizers of the Win Without War coalition, opposing the recent American wars in the Gulf, had extensive ties to one another forged through their previous activist activities. The five founders of Win Without War had worked with one another previously on disarmament campaigns, and these five were in turn connected to another 24 of the organizations that ended up joining the coalition. Fully 71 percent of the organizations involved in the coalition were connected via these five individuals.

INTERNAL DYNAMICS

Organizations must share at least some common goals, consistent identities, and ideology in order to collaborate. We would never expect to see a pro-abortion organization working with one opposed to abortion rights. However, while a shared ideology may be critical to collaboration, many organizations share common goals and beliefs yet never come to work together. Research is only beginning to explore the ideological characteristics that facilitate coalition work. Assuming organizations share one basic goal, we can consider what elements of their ideology make them more likely coalition partners.

One ideological characteristic that makes an organization more likely to engage in coalition work is ideological breadth. Organizations with a broad, or multi-issue, focus are more likely to collaborate with others (Van Dyke 2003). Thus, the Students for a Democratic Society were a frequent collaborator on college campuses in the 1960s because of the organization’s broad focus and commitment to working on multiple issues, including the Vietnam War, civil rights, economic inequality, and so on.

However, even two chapters of the same organization, which thereby employ a very similar ideology and have consistent goals, may choose not to work with one another if group identities are incompatible. Thus, Reger (2002) shows how Cleveland-area NOW chapters had a history of not working together because class differences inhibited collaboration. Thus, status differences, whether they be based on gender, race or ethnicity, or some other social dimension, can get in the way of collaboration even in the face of almost exact issue foci and ideological orientations.

Roth (2010) shows how a failure to collaborate based on identity differences may be based on mobilizing philosophy rather than actual conflict or bias. In her examination of second-wave feminist organizing, she shows how women’s groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s failed to work together because they all shared an ideology of “organizing one’s own.” Black, white, and Chicana organizations chose not to pursue coalitions with women’s organizations from other racial and ethnic groups because each believed that women should organize on their own behalf, and that it was almost paternalistic for women to try to speak or take action on behalf of others. Lichterman (1995) similarly shows that an organizing philosophy that avoids outreach is unlikely to lead to cross-ethnic or racial collaboration. Thus, mobilizing philosophy is a critical ideological element that shapes coalition participation.
EXTERNAL FACILITATING FACTORS

While internal organizational characteristics, including ideology, identity, and the social ties of leadership, play a critical role in coalition formation, conditions in the external social environment also influence organizational collaboration. Both political opportunities and threats can play a critical role in coalition formation.

The literature on social movement emergence demonstrates that progressive movements are more likely to emerge when they enjoy political opportunities. When a group comes to enjoy a favorable political environment, including political allies or a decrease in repression, they are more likely to mobilize. At the same time, a growing body of literature demonstrates that political threats also inspire mobilization. For example, the threat of a new policy that is in opposition to a group’s goals may inspire mobilization, as can the threat or presence of a new antagonist or the actions of a countermovement. Just as the broader movements literature illustrates the mobilizing effect of political opportunities and threats, so too does the literature on coalition formation.

Staggenborg (1986), in her pioneering work on the abortion rights movement, shows that pro-choice groups sometimes formed coalitions when they felt that doing so would allow them to take advantage of a political opportunity. At other times, groups within the same movement would collaborate in order to gain strength in numbers to oppose some threatened antiabortion legislation.

McCammon and Campbell (2002), in their study of coalitions between suffragists and temperance activists, argue that threats may be especially mobilizing: “When movement actors are frustrated in attempts to achieve their goals . . . they will be more willing to seek out new strategies, including the strategy of collaboration with another movement.” Van Dyke (2003) similarly found that on American college campuses, student groups were more likely to work in coalition when faced with political threats than when faced with opportunities. Specifically, left-oriented student groups formed broad, cross-movement coalitions when facing a Republican in the White House, and within-movement coalitions formed in response to more local threats, including a hostile college administration or the activity of counterdemonstrators.

Almeida (2008) suggests that sometimes political opportunities and threats may combine to inspire coalition work. In his study of antiausterity mobilization in Latin America, he finds that the opening of political opportunities afforded by democratization combined with the threat of new economic austerity policies to inspire new alliances. He illustrates the power of coalitions by demonstrating that in Costa Rica, where movements formed coalitions with groups outside the public sector, the movements were better able to defeat the proposed austerity policy than in El Salvador, where movements failed to create broad coalitions. Thus, both political opportunities and threats can facilitate organizational collaboration, and sometimes it is a combination of both that inspires coalitions.

CONCLUSION

The modern era has seen some of the largest protests in world history, and these could not have occurred without the work of organizational coalitions. The research literature on social movement coalitions demonstrates that the coalitions that staged these events likely decided to work together through some combination of social ties, shared goals and facilitating ideologies, political opportunities to mobilize, and threatening political developments. We know well that organization is critical to mobilization, and that organizations provide one of the surest routes to participation. There is little question that organizational coalitions, therefore, play an important role in social mobilization. While the research literature has made great progress in illuminating the factors that give rise to coalitions, we need to further study how coalitions shape mobilization and the
outcomes of that mobilization. Contemporary events and coalitions will provide plenty of material to study.

SEE ALSO: Bloc recruitment; Collective identity; Ideology; Micro-meso mobilization; Multi-organizational fields; Networks and social movements; Organizations and movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory; Threat.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Cognitive liberation
DOUG MCADAM

The concept of cognitive liberation was introduced by McAdam (1982) as one of the three central causal factors in his formulation of "political process theory." The term refers to the process by which members of some aggrieved group fashion the specific combination of shared understandings that are thought to undergird emergent collective action. In particular, McAdam (1982:51) argues that "before collective [action] . . . can get under way, people must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action" (emphasis added). Thus it is the combination of perceived injustice and collective efficacy that is held to be the subjective linchpin of movement activity. Indeed, McAdam suggests that, notwithstanding the importance of the two more structural components of the model (e.g., political opportunities and established organizations), it is these shared understandings that are the key to movement emergence. As he writes: "while important, expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations do not, in any simple sense, produce a social movement . . . Together they only offer insurgents a certain objective 'structural potential' for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations" (1982: 48). So while the political process model has been roundly criticized for its "structural bias" (see, for example, Goodwin & Jasper 1999), in its original formulation, McAdam assigned central causal importance to processes of social construction and collective attribution. On the other hand, in using the term "cognitive liberation" to describe these processes, McAdam was clearly ignoring the emotional dimensions of collective action.

How does cognitive liberation compare to the more familiar concept of "collective action framing" (Snow et al. 1986; Snow & Benford 1988, 1992)? In general, scholars have equated framing with the conscious strategic efforts of activists to fashion shared interpretive frameworks that legitimate and motivate collective action. In other words, framing has been seen as an activity engaged in by groups that already define themselves as involved in struggle. One part of that struggle involves the group in conscious efforts to "frame" their activities in ways that resonate with various audiences (e.g., potential recruits, the media, policymakers, etc.) whom the group hopes to influence. The point is, for all their importance, these later framing efforts depend on earlier and far more contingent interpretive processes. Strategic framing implies adherence to a non-routine and conflictual definition of the situation. But this definition is itself a product of the logically prior processes of cognitive liberation described by McAdam.

Rather than the work on framing, the process of cognitive liberation is thus much closer in spirit and conception to work by scholars such as Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982), and Walsh and Worland (1983). In their ingenious study, Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina recruited groups of people to take part in what they were told were focus groups designed to establish "local standards of moral behavior" to be used in a fictitious suit brought by an oil company attempting to end their franchise agreement with a gas station owner accused of violating the morals clause of the agreement. In fact, the people in the groups were really subjects in a natural experiment designed to see whether, when confronted with a clearly unfair process, they would "revolt" against the "unjust authorities" responsible for the injustice. Instead of being objective in their efforts to determine "local standards," those running the "focus groups" sought to manipulate and badger the subjects into accepting a definition of standards clearly in the interest of the oil company.
Despite the transparent abuse of the process, only a minority of the groups managed to mobilize around an emergent definition of the situation as “unjust.” In effect, the researchers were studying the conditions under which some groups managed to achieve “cognitive liberation.”

In their work Walsh and Warland (1983) document a dramatic upsurge in antinuclear activism in the wake of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. They attribute the increase to what they term the “suddenly imposed grievances” generated by the near melt down of the reactor. But regardless of the term, their emphasis on the transformation of consciousness as a necessary prerequisite for movement activity bears a strong “family resemblance” to the process of cognitive liberation.

Examples of other transformations of consciousness linked to emergent collective action abound in the literature on social movements. In her account of the emergence of the women’s liberation movement, Evans (1979) documents an emerging sense of injustice on the part of women activists, shaped by their shared experience of discrimination in the male-dominated movements of the New Left. Historians of the embryonic women’s rights movement of the 1830s document a very similar process, in which female abolitionists, barred from full participation in movement activities, gradually came to see themselves as akin to slaves as a result of their second-class citizenship within the movement. This emergent consciousness fueled the rise of first wave feminism (Flexner 1959; Lerner 1971).

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Injustice frames; Political process theory; Precipitating events and flashpoints.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Collective action (collective behavior)
PAMELA OLIVER

Collective action is a fundamental to social movements. People in social movements do things that promote or resist social change, and the things they do are collective action. Social movements are made up of multiple collective actions. When we focus on collective action, we focus on how each individual march or rally or riot happened, and on the general principles about how they happened.

At its core, the concept of collective action means just what the words imply: anything people do in groups or with other people. Within this, some theoretical perspectives have emphasized a collective orientation or purpose of action, while others have emphasized its collective form (i.e., multiple people doing something together). Forms of collective action within social movements include spontaneous protests, lynchings, panics, riots, violent uprisings, public meetings, organized peaceful marches and demonstrations, vigils, fundraising campaigns, letter-writing campaigns, lobbying, charitable works such as providing meals at a soup kitchen or providing rides to women at night, spreading protest messages via Facebook or Twitter, holding meetings, giving press conferences, or twisting arms at city council meetings. Collective action can be done by spontaneous crowds and temporary gatherings, reform campaigns, charitable and voluntary organizations, institutionalized groups like labor unions or political parties, broad social change movements like civil rights, nationalist movements, ethnic conflict, religious groups ranging from institutionalized churches to small sects, and informal friendship groups or families. Actions with collective orientation or purpose can be individualized in form. Although some forms of collective action are more typically associated with social movements than others, there is no sharp disjuncture between the forms of collective action that occur within social movements and those that occur in other contexts.

To study collective action is to study the nuts and bolts of how people come to act together or for common purposes. This is the core stuff of the study of social movements. In a sense, all the other entries in this encyclopedia can be understood as speaking about collective action from different perspectives. This entry will focus on a few key issues that are most closely associated with the use of the term collective action. They are developed in this entry roughly in the order in which they developed in the sociological study of social movements:

• Collective action versus collective behavior
• Collective action as collective goods provision
• The key questions about collective action

COLLECTIVE ACTION VERSUS COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Although they are now understood as synonyms, the terms “collective behavior” and “collective action” were associated with different theoretical traditions and sometimes understood as referring to different empirical phenomena, especially from 1939 to the early 1970s. “Collective behavior” was associated with theories that stressed the emergence of behavior in spontaneous crowds, especially violent crowds, and was viewed as a topic within social psychology, while “collective action” was associated with theories emphasizing purposive or goal-oriented behavior in protests and social movements and was used in economics, political science, and political sociology.
In a full text keyword search of sociology articles in JSTOR published before 1930, the two terms were used interchangeably in theoretical discussions of the formation of a social order and concerted action. For example, Robert Park’s 1927 article “Human Nature and Collective Behavior” used only “collective action” within the text. “Collective action” was also in descriptions of unions, strikes, and protests and to refer to social solutions to problems like unemployment; “collective behavior” was not used in such contexts.

The special meaning of “collective behavior” as denoting emergent, nonroutine or non-normative action and as referring specifically to empirical phenomena such as panics, fads, riots, and collective violence dates from Blumer’s influential textbook chapter titled Collective Behavior (1939) which was widely circulated in reprint through the 1970s. Blumer elaborated on Robert Park’s distinctions between crowd and public which, in turn, were based on works of Le Bon and Tarde and contrasted the unthinking and reactive behavior characteristic of crowds with the reasoned discourse and rational decision-making characteristic of the public (McPhail 1989). Park emphasized “circular reaction” as the central dynamic of crowd behavior, but it was Blumer’s influence that led a generation of sociologists to treat “collective behavior” as a distinct empirical phenomenon. Even Blumer’s 1939 article referred to collective behavior as the basis of all social life. But Blumer also distinguished the “elementary collective behavior” in crowds as being fundamentally different from the collective behavior of routine social life, and the term “collective behavior” came to be defined as referring to the kind of behavior that happens in crowds or other spontaneous face-to-face gatherings which, in turn, was defined as being nonroutine, nonnormative, and emergent. Subsequent scholars working in this tradition often critiqued or modified Blumer’s arguments and varied greatly among themselves in their central definitions and theoretical accounts of core processes (Turner & Killian 1957; Smelser 1962; Turner & Killian 1972), but shared a core assumption that the object of study was behavior that was spontaneous, emergent, disconnected from “ordinary” routines and life, and characterized more by emotion or simplistic thinking than by reasoned discussion. Collective behavior was recognized as a distinct subfield of sociological social psychology in textbooks and curricula.

Meanwhile, the term “collective action” continued to be used in economics, political science, and political sociology to refer to specific actions like strikes or protests, to labor unions generally, and to the general matter of social versus individual solutions to social problems. Especially after the 1965 publication of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, which had a major impact on the thinking of political scientists and political sociologists, the term “collective action” often came to be understood as referring specifically to actions that led to the provision of public or collective goods, that is, goods that are inherently shared and cannot be restricted only to those who paid for them.

These two traditions came into conflict in the wake of the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s. A new generation of scholars identified positively with the 1960s movements and saw them as fundamentally rational attempts to pursue clear-cut policy goals and objected to portrayals of protests and even riots as “irrational” collective behavior, arguing that protesters and rioters were no less rational than the people studying them (Couch 1968; Currie & Skolnick 1970; McPhail 1989; McPhail 1991). In the 1970s, the new generation of resource mobilization scholars drew boundaries and distanced themselves from the term collective behavior and all it signified (McCarthy & Zald 1973; McCarthy & Zald 1977).

As the 1980s brought a new wave of scholars who criticized resource mobilization theory for its excessive emphasis on rational action and failure to engage issues of social construction and identity (e.g., Gamson 1992), the signification of contrasting collective behavior and collective action faded. It became well recognized
that there are important social construction processes involved in defining interests and goals as well as in defining collective identities and group boundaries. It became more acknowledged that not all collective actions are well-organized and orchestrated demonstrations, that there are processes of emergence in many collective actions, and that there were many insights into these processes in older works that deserved to be revisited by a newer generation of scholars. The terms once again were seen as synonyms but, consistent with older usage, with collective action being the dominant term for describing protest and collective behavior being used more by social psychologists and to describe apolitical behaviors like rumors and fads rather than protest.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AS THE PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS

As noted above, the term “collective action” has long been used in discussions of social policies and a tradition deriving from economics uses the term to refer specifically to the provision of a public or collective good. Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965) brought this tradition to sociology and political science with great impact on the study of social movements. Olson specifically called attention to the “free rider problem,” wherein individuals interested in a collective good are motivated to let others pay the price to provide it, and argued that all group action for any common goal inherently invokes the free rider problem. Olson argued that this problem could only be solved with selective incentives, private goods that could reward contributors or punish noncontributors. Although subsequent scholars criticized Olson’s specific analysis of the free rider problem, and Olson himself only addressed the issue of the disjuncture between individual and group interests, not the problems and costs of coordinating action, Olson’s arguments had the crucial impact of problematizing the matter of collective action itself. Prior to Olson, social scientists tended to assume that an awareness of group or common interests would lead relatively automatically to collective action around those interests. After Olson, social scientists paid attention to the gap between interest and action, to the process of motivating and coordinating the action itself. Olson’s discussion of selective incentives inspired theoretical consideration of the kinds of side benefits that could motivate participation in collective action.

Some use the term “collective action theory” to refer to formal theories following in this tradition. Focusing on the problem of individual contributions to a collective good led to further considerations and elaborations. Instead of the narrow but easily-answered question of whether people will voluntarily make individual contributions to collective goods—sometimes they will and sometimes they won’t, it depends on them and the conditions—sociological theorists have sought to answer increasingly complex questions about what conditions foster collective action. The line of work called critical mass theory focused attention on the dimensions of differences in collective action problems and the importance of organizers, role differentiation, and the complexities of multi-step mobilizations in which some people organize themselves to create a system that motivates other people to provide a collective good. Other lines of collective action theory incorporated more complex models of human decision-making, including models of adaptive learning and normative influence. Increasing attention was devoted to the structural, distributional, and network properties of groups to assess how they fostered or hindered collective action.

Although most of this work has been abstract and theoretical, there has been relevant empirical work. Experiments have tested the conditions under which experimental subjects will make individual contributions to collective goods, generating findings that suggest that most people operate under decision rules that will promote collective action when there is
some normative basis for expecting cooperation by others (de Rooij, Green, & Gerber 2009). Survey researchers have asked people specific questions about their perceptions of individual and collective costs and benefits, generally finding that people’s assessments of the value of the collective good and the efficacy of action for providing it are more important than their individualized cost/benefit calculations (e.g., Muller & Opp 1986; Opp 1988). A particularly important line of empirical and theoretical work focuses on the conditions that permit communities to effectively manage common resources and avoid environmental degradation (Ostrom 1999). Beyond these explicit traditions, there is a much broader body of research that takes for granted that collective action occurs in goal-oriented contexts and pays attention to the ways the goals motivate action or the ways action does or does not accomplish the goals. Sometimes consciously and sometimes implicitly, this tradition of thinking was essentially rationalist, in that it assumed the purpose of collective action was the achievement of some policy or social change goal, or the provision of some collective good.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AS A FOCUS OF RESEARCH

Collective action research seeks to identify the general principles or patterns of collective action. That is, it is focused on how a single collective action happens in general, the conditions that promote or hinder it, and the ways in which one collective action influences future actions. Within social movements research, this is often called the problem of mobilization: how do the people and the resources get together and coordinate their actions. This “how does it happen?” is the same question that animated collective behavior research between 1940 and 1970. Understanding collective action entails a number of key questions:

1. What actually happens in collective action? What do people do? What is the variability among people in what they do?

2. Why do people act? What motives or interests undergird collective action? What is the relation between individual interests and collective interests? What motives matter besides interests? Do people bring their motives and interests to collective action or are motives and interests created within the creation of the collective action?

3. What kinds of human collectivities or groups do collective action and how is collective action shaped by the type of group doing it? The different kinds of collectivities or groups include formal organizations and coalitions or networks of organizations, informal groups, diffuse networks of individual people, temporary gatherings, and virtual groups created through remote communication technologies.

4. Does collective action require that people have a group or collective identity, a sense of themselves as all being part of some collective entity? How does collective action build on collective identities? How are collective identities created and changed in the process of collective action?

5. How do people get connected with other people so they can act collectively? How do organizations, social networks, communication processes, and communication technologies undergird and shape collective action?

6. What is the role and significance of organizers, the people who focus their efforts on organizing and coordinating other people into collective action?

7. What are the important types or dimensions of difference among collective actions? One dimension of difference is the level of coordination required and the complexity of the action, for example, parallel actions like writing letters versus complex events requiring role differentiation and sequencing like a major demonstration. Another is the type of individual action or resource required, for example, giving money versus marching in a demonstration versus cooking food for the homeless versus going to meetings. Another is
the type of group that does the action, for example, formal organizations versus temporary gatherings. Another is the extent to which the actions are consistent with carrying on an ordinary life versus requiring a choice between ordinary life and the collective action.

These broad questions permeate the study of collective action in social movements and are addressed by many other entries in this encyclopedia. An introduction to them can be found in texts and resource books such as Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) and della Porta and Diani (2006). Different theories of collective action have focused on different parts of the problem, different forms of collective action, or different core assumptions about which aspects of collective action are problematic or unproblematic.

SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Collective identity; Contagion theory; Critical mass theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Free rider problem; Networks and social movements; Riots; Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Collective efficacy
BERT KLANDERMANS

Although it would be hard to deny that people who take part in protest activities are aggrieved, grievances do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in collective action. Resource mobilization theorists argue that grievances abound, whereas collective action does not. Therefore, they reason, the key question that needs to be addressed is not whether people are aggrieved, but why some aggrieved people become mobilized, while others do not. Resource mobilization and political process theorists have suggested respectively that the availability of resources and the presence of opportunities play a key role. Groups that have more resources and more opportunities are more likely to succeed in mobilizing collective action. Furthermore, Klandermans (1997) has shown that people are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe that this will help to redress their grievances at affordable costs. Simon and colleagues (1998) have labeled this the instrumental pathway to movement participation. For the instrumental pathway the key component is collective efficacy – an individual’s expectation that collective action participation can make a difference and bring about the desired changes. The more effective an individual believes collective action participation to be, the more likely s/he is to participate.

In his classic 1984 American Sociological Review article Klandermans breaks collective efficacy down into three different expectations: expectations about the behavior of others; the expectation that the action goal will be reached if many others participate; and, the expectation that one’s own participation will increase the likelihood of success. Such expectations are formed in interactions within social networks and micro-mobilization structures. A spectacular example of how success expectations are formed is reported by Zhao (1998) in his description of the mobilization for a student demonstration in Beijing. On campus, looking from their dorm windows down into the streets, students could literally see the demonstration building up. In their 2008 American Sociological Review article Klandermans et al. demonstrated the crucial role of social embeddedness in the formation of success expectations. In a way, this is nothing new. As early as 1965, Almond and Verba observed a positive correlation between active engagement in voluntary associations and subjective political competence. They argued that by engaging in voluntary associations people learn about the working of political institutions. This became known as social capital, defined by Lin (1999:35) as “resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions.” McClurg (2003) showed that the effect of interaction in social networks on the propensity to participate in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result. This provides support for Almond and Verba’s initial observation that people learn about politics from participation in voluntary associations. The question of whether the influence of participation in civil society also holds for unconventional political participation (demonstrating, boycotting, protesting) remained to be answered. Paxton (2002) explored this question at an aggregate level. She argued that associational life accumulates social capital, which “provides space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of the present government, and it provides a way for active opposition to the regime to grow” (257). In other words, civil society provides the resources necessary for opposition movements and collective action. This argument was supported by results from two studies of associational life, conducted among
different samples from countries around the world. This leads to the conclusion that embeddedness in social networks fosters conventional and unconventional political participation.

What Paxton demonstrated at an aggregate level, Klandermans et al. (2008) showed at the individual level. In a study among immigrants, social embeddedness and efficacy appeared to maintain a tight reciprocal relationship, such that immigrants who felt more efficacious were also more embedded in social networks, and vice versa. At the same time, the link between efficacy and participation was moderated by social embeddedness: efficacy translated into participation only among immigrants who were involved in civil society. In addition, the authors reported findings supporting McClurg’s assumption that discussions about politics make people more aware of the working of political processes and therefore made people feel efficacious. This is the more interesting because feelings of efficacy seem to control whether grievances generate fear or anger. Immigrants who felt discriminated against because of their ethnic background displayed anger if they felt politically efficacious, and displayed fear if they did not feel efficacious. This is in line with prior research showing that efficacy was associated with anger but not fear, while lack of efficacy is associated with fear but not anger. Hence, anger and efficacy appear to mutually reinforce the relationship with collective action participation. All this suggests that whether grievances translate into collective action depends on the extent to which people feel efficacious. Depending on such feelings grievances generate fear or anger. Grievances are discussed in people’s social networks and the feelings of efficacy of the people who take part in the discussion influence what emotions they display. The more efficacious they feel, the angrier they will be – both efficacy and anger will strengthen people’s motivation to take part in collective action.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Emotion and social movements; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Outcomes, cultural; Outcomes, political; Social capital and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Collective identity
JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG

From the 1980s onward movement scholars have increasingly emphasized the significance of collective identity as a factor stimulating protest participation. Sociologists were among the first to emphasize the importance of collective identity in protest participation. They argued that the generation of a collective identity is crucial for a movement to emerge (Taylor & Whittier 1992). Similarly, social psychological studies report consistently that the more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf of that group (e.g., Reicher 1996; Simon et al. 1998). Apparently, identification with a group is an important reason why people participate in protest on behalf of that group. In order to understand why, we must elaborate the identity concept.

Identity is our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, reciprocally other people’s understanding of themselves and others. As for “understanding who we are” Klandermans and de Weerd (2000) distinguish an individual personal level and a collective group level. For the individual level they rely on the distinction made by Tajfel and Turner (1979), who argue that a person has one personal and several social identities whereby a personal identity refers to self-definition in terms of personal attributes, and social identity refers to self-definition in terms of social category memberships. Collective identity at the collective group level concerns “the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (Taylor & Whittier 1992). According to Klandermans and de Weerd, group identification forms the link between collective and social identity, and thus forms the bridge between the individual and collective level of identity. Different levels of identity require different levels of analyses. A group’s collective identity can be studied by examining such phenomena as the group’s symbols, rituals, beliefs, and the values its members share. An individual’s identification with a group can be studied in its own right as well as by examining the individual’s beliefs, sentiments, commitment to the group, use of symbols, participation in rituals, and so on.

The literature on collective identity and social movements is extensive; this contribution therefore only touches upon a few movement dynamics in which identity may operate (for overviews see Stryker et al. 2000; and more recently Snow 2013; Taylor 2013). The first section focuses on the identity–protest link, followed by the influence of the sociopolitical context on the politicization of identities, and finally a section on “identities of the future,” that is, how more “liquid” identities in contrast to the traditionally more “solid” identities “work” and affect social change.

IDENTITY AND PROTEST

Social movements are built on identities and they are populated by people who identify with the collectivity and the movement. Identity is thus simultaneously a characteristic of collectivities and people. There exists a division of labor between movement scholars of identities. Sociologists tend to study identity at the collective level on the supply side of contentious politics, while social psychologists typically focus on the individual level of social identity and group identification at the demand side of politics. This division of labor affects the study of this phenomenon conceptually and empirically (see the entry on Politicized identity for a similar argument regarding politicized identity).

Collective identity. Collective identity is conceived as an emergent group phenomenon. Melucci (1989: 793) refers to the process of collective identity: “Collective identity is an interactive, shared definition of the field of
opportunities and constraints offered to collective action produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups." Hence, identity is not a given fact; identity is a practical accomplishment, a process. Identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation (Jenkins 2004). Taylor and Whittier (1992) show how strong bonds existing in social networks contribute to the formation and politicization of collective identities. Within these networks individuals come to see themselves as part of a group when some shared characteristic becomes salient and is defined as important. As a result, boundaries are drawn between “a challenging and a dominant group” (175). These boundaries are not clear-cut, stable, and objectively given, but exist in the shared meaning attributed to group membership by group members. The second component is consciousness. Consciousness consists of both raising awareness of group membership and the realization of the group’s position within society, in comparison to other groups. This position must be perceived as illegitimate or unjust to make group membership politically relevant. The third component is negotiation. Within their networks, people negotiate in order to change symbolic meanings of daily life’s thinking and acting “the politicization of daily life.” The politicization of identities unfolds as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment. Hence, collective action can be an important instrument to change collective identities. As the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Reicher 1996) holds: “identities should be understood not simply as a set of cognitions but as practical projects.” In this account, identities and practice are in reciprocal interaction, each mutually enabling and constraining the other. In other words, collective identities are constantly “under construction” and collective action is one of the factors that shape collective identity. Taylor (2013) therefore conceives of social movements as discursive communities held together not only by common action and bonds of solidarity, but by identities, symbols, shared identity discourse, and practices of everyday life that attribute participants’ experiences to particular forms of social injustice. In movements that frame injustice in terms of identity politics, identity strategies provide a crucial link between individual and collective identity (Taylor 2013). Identity strategies include “individual or group disclosure of identity with the aim of producing change in how individuals understand and feel about their identity, in how the group is defined in the larger culture, or in the politics of state and other institutions” (Whittier 2011: 4, in Taylor 2013).

Social identity. In the late seventies, a social psychological identity perspective on protest emerged in the form of social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Social identity is seen as a cognitive entity; if social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, then people see themselves less as unique individuals and more as the prototypical representatives of their in-group. When social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people think, feel, and act as members of their group. Hence, the notion of identity involves two criteria of comparison between people: “sameness” and “distinctiveness.” Tajfel and Turner (1979) showed that social categorization according to some trivial criterion such as the “blue” or the “red” group suffices to make people feel, think, and act as a group member. SIT proposes that people generally strive for and benefit from positive social identities associated with their groups. The only way for participants in minimal group studies to obtain a positive social identity is by identifying with the groups into which they are categorized, and then ensuring that their group comes off best in the only available comparison between the groups (i.e., giving more rewards to the in-group than the out-group). Compared to this “minimal group paradigm,” real-world intergroup conflicts with histories
and the high emotional intensity attached to them, and sociopolitical consequences can be seen as “maximal group paradigms” that bring group membership powerfully to mind. Why would people identify with groups that reflect negatively on them (e.g., disadvantaged or low-status groups)? SIT’s answer is that three social structural characteristics affect how people manage their identity threats. The first characteristic is permeability of the group boundaries. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvantaged group members to leave their group for a higher status group, whereas impermeable boundaries offer no such “exit.” When people do not perceive possibilities to join a higher status group, they might feel commitment to the lower status group. The second characteristic is stability. People who conceive status positions as variable see protest as a possible method to heighten group status, especially when the low group status is perceived as illegitimate. Members of a low-status group who perceive the dominant group’s position as illegitimate and unstable can use a variety of strategies to obtain a more positive social identity. They may, for instance, redefine characteristics of their own group previously seen as negative (Black is beautiful!), or they may engage in social competition of which protest is the clearest expression.

Group identification. Group identification links social identity to collective identity and is the social psychological answer to the question of what drives people to participate in protest. Because it bridges individual and collective identity processes, the stronger the group identification, the more shared beliefs and fate are incorporated in the individual’s social identity and the more people are prepared to take action on behalf of the group. However, individuals do not incorporate the complete picture but rather a selection of what a collective identity encompasses. These idiosyncratic remakes of collective beliefs at the individual level create variety in the content of the social identity. Indeed, not all Muslims have identical social identities, yet they do feel like Muslims. The same holds for Hispanics, workers, and women, for example. Huddy (2003) argues that it is not group identification per se but the strength of such identification that influences group members’ readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership. She criticizes social identity literature for neglecting the fact that real-world identities vary in strength; identifying more or less strongly with a group, she argues, may make a real difference, especially in political contexts. Related to this point is the fact that identity strength is related to identity choice. Huddy distinguishes between ascribed and acquired group membership, ascribed identities are “quite difficult to change, and acquired identities are adopted by choice” (2003: 536). Group identification tends to increase in strength when it is voluntary. Membership in a social movement organization can be seen as a prototypical example of a voluntarily acquired, hence strong, identity. Social movement participation may help people to change their stigmatized or “spoiled” imposed identities into strong and empowered social movement identities.

Dual and multiple identities. Work on multiple identities moves beyond attention to singular identities and emphasizes that people can hold many different identities at the same time, which may come into conflict or may push in the same direction. The intersectional approach emphasizes the conflictual side of multiple identities at the group level. This approach argues that when activists work to create solidarity among diverse constituencies and struggle to represent themselves as similar to or different from those they oppose or seek to influence, there is always the potential for disagreement and conflict, and the construction of collective identity becomes challenging. Cross-pressure means identity conflict at the individual level; when two of the groups people identify with end up on opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are faced with the decision to strike against their company), people might find themselves under cross-pressure. Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being
disloyal to the company or the country. Advocates of multiple identities, on the other hand, have high hopes for the social and political relevance of dual identities (González & Brown 2003). They hold that a “dual identity” is the desirable configuration as it implies sufficient identification with one’s own group to experience some basic security and sufficient identification with the overarching identity to preclude divisiveness. Multiple identities are thus – in the words of González and Brown – potentially highly conducive to democratic politics. There is evidence that immigrants who display a dual identity are more inclined to take to the streets on behalf of their group. Immigrants who display a dual identification tend to be more satisfied with their situation than those who do not display such identity, but if they are dissatisfied they will be more likely to participate in protest (Klandermans et al. 2008).

COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND CLEAVAGES

The fact that people have many collective identities raises the question of why some collective identities become central to mobilization while others do not. People have many identities that remain latent most of the time. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) hypothesizes that, depending on contextual circumstances, the transition from an “I” to a “we” as locus of self-definition occurs, and thus a social identity becomes salient. A particular identity is said to be salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior” (Turner et al. 1987: 118). What makes a dormant identity salient and spurs action on behalf of that identity? Besides contextual factors and direct reminders, the presence of other in-group members can be a potent reminder of someone’s social identity, the more so if the members are aiming at a common goal. The presence of an out-group will also remind people of their in-group identity. Another effective prompt is being treated as a member of a minority. Although all these reminders can make a social identity salient, probably the most powerful factor that brings group membership to mind is conflict or rivalry between groups. Sociopolitical conflicts don’t emerge randomly, but in the context of ongoing, unequal power relations rooted in structural and cultural cleavages in society. These cleavages operate as fault lines along which opposing identities emerge and organizational fields break up, and thus create a demand and supply for politics. Why do sociopolitical conflicts emerge in the context of social cleavages? This can be explained in terms of salience, embeddedness and shared fate, and movement–countermovement dynamics.

Salience. The more salient a cleavage the denser the multi-organizational field linked to that cleavage, and the more “ready” its mobilization potential is to act in response to that cleavage. In fact, the salience of a cleavage reflects a strongly elaborated supply and a well-defined demand of protest. Hence, identities rooted in cleavages are often organized identities and organized identities are more likely to mobilize than unorganized identities. According to Klandermans and de Weerd (2000), this makes sense because being organized implies communication networks, access to resources, interpersonal control, information about opportunities when, where, and how to act, and all those other things that make it more likely that intentions materialize, facilitated by a collective memory on who “we” are, what “we” are prepared to fight for, and, perhaps most important, how “we” usually take arms. That is why anarchists fight the police during summit protests while unionists strike in the face of factory closings and mass redundancies (Taylor 2013).

Embeddedness and shared fate. Simon and colleagues (1998) describe identity as a place in society. A place is a metaphorical expression and concerns people’s social embeddedness, that is the networks, organizations, associations, groups, and categories of which they are members. People are not randomly embedded in society; cleavages affect the formal and
informal networks in which people are embedded (cf. Klandermans, van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg 2008), and nowadays this process is complemented by embeddedness in virtual networks (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi 2013) which reflect traditional and new cleavages of the physical world. Social cleavages may give rise to shared fate, because cleavages determine people’s place in society; a place shared with others, which leads to shared experiences and grievances. People share interests and identify and associate almost exclusively with other members of “their” group. Hence, cleavages create “communities of shared fate” and “sameness” within cleavages and “distinctiveness” between cleavages, and as such create identities and opposing identities. The more salient a cleavage, the more organizations will attempt to politicize the shared fate of people embedded in that cleavage. Organizers play a crucial role in this transformation of “readiness” into action. In order to mobilize potential constituencies, organizers must develop master frames that link a conflict to “their” cleavage. Hence, organizers may frame the same conflict in different terms. Inequality, for instance, can be framed in terms of “class” or “ethnicity.” The more salient a cleavage and the better organizers align the conflict to “their” cleavage – the more their frames “resonate” – the more successful their mobilization attempts. Traditionally, mobilization emerged around social divisions between class, religion, and region; separate collective identities emerged and divided sections of political and social organizations developed. But Western societies have undergone far-reaching social and cultural transformations. In contemporary Western societies, traditional cleavages are replaced, complemented or cut across by new cleavages such as post-materialism versus materialism and the “winners” versus the “losers” of modernity. In addition to the “old” cleavages, new identities and grievances evolved around these new cleavages and politicized into new social movements.

Movement–countermovement dynamics. There is substantial evidence that cleavages alter conflict behavior via increased ease of mobilization. The argument is typically given as follows. If conflicts flare up, the locus of self-definition shifts from “I” to “we” (Tajfel & Turner 1979). The opposing groups develop their ideas and actions in reaction to each other and the perceived opposition. Both groups assert that what “we” stand for is threatened by “them,” tribute is been paid to in-group symbols and values, and the out-group is derogated. In such conflicts group members define themselves in (an opposing) relation to other conflicting groups. Take for instance the pro-life and the pro-choice movement and how they have “kept each other alive.” Movement–countermovement dynamics can shape a movement’s collective identity (Einwohner 2002). First of all, the presence of powerful opponents makes identities more salient for activists. Second, polarization induces a strategic reformulation of “who we are.” Einwohner (2002), for instance, shows how animal rights activists responded to opponents’ claims that they were overly emotional by presenting alternate identity characteristics to the public, while in private they often embraced the “emotional” characterization. Thus, the more salient a cleavage the more polarized the multiple organizational fields and the more strongly politicized its related collective identities.

IDENTITIES OF THE FUTURE

The foregoing has demonstrated the role of identity in spurring social movement participation. Indeed, collective action is contingent upon seeing the self as part of a group, while acting collectively requires some collective identity or consciousness (Klandermans & de Weerd 2000). The role of identification in movement participation is not simply a matter of on/off. Indeed, the influence of identity strength, identity salience, multiple identities, and sociopolitical context reveal that the role of identity on collective action participation is dynamic and multifaceted.

However, the pace and global character of social change force us to be more reflexive
about processes of action and identity. In late modern societies people are becoming increasingly connected as *individuals* rather than as members of a community or group, they operate their own personal – physical and virtual – networks. Traditional “greedy” institutions such as political parties, trade unions, and churches which made significant demands on members’ time, loyalty, and energy are replaced by “light” groups and associations that are less demanding, easy to join, and easy to leave. It is thus arguable that society is becoming increasingly organized around networked individuals rather than groups or local solidarities, and connections are more flexible than fixed. Despite this process of individualization, people in late modern societies are still committed to collective causes. Underlying this, is what Lichterman (1996) calls “personalism”: people feel a personal sense of political responsibility rather than feeling restricted or obliged to a community or group. Personalism affects the “greediness” of organizations or groups, because the individual rather than an organization or network determines the level of “greediness.” Hence, concepts such as “traditional” vs. “new”, and “formal” vs. “informal” do not automatically align with being either less demanding or greedy. In fact, some informal groups such as anarchist subcultures can be greedy, while membership of some formal traditional groups such as “checkbook membership” of political parties can be less demanding. So, what matters is the strength of the identity rather than whether a group is traditional or “new,” or formal or informal (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi 2013). Although our understanding of the traditional collective identity–protest link is rather elaborated, it is unclear whether researchers should revise their understanding of collective identity to meet these challenges. Indeed, how contemporary fluid identities “work” and affect social change and to what extent our traditional “collective identity models” are able to capture these identity processes is a question yet to be answered.

SEE ALSO: Dual identity; Identity fields; Identity politics; Identity work processes; Master frame; Politicized identity; Resonance, frame.

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Collective memory and social movements
LORENZO ZAMPONI

The widespread interest in the processes of construction of collective identities, typical of the most recent scholarship on social movements (Polletta & Jasper 2001), focusing on the symbolic dimension of collective action, has been the bridge across which collective memory entered the study of social movements.

In this context, memory studies, and in particular the sociology of memory based on the seminal work of Maurice Halbwachs, have become a fundamental tool for the development of research on social movements. This relationship also works the other way around: scholarship on contentious politics has been a model for the study of contention in the memory field (Jansen 2007).

The definition of collective memory as the set of symbols and practices referring to the past which are shared by a community of people, commonly used by most scholars (Kansteiner 2002; Aguilar 2008), has required researchers to face the problem of pluralism: different communities refer to different sets of symbols and practices, and the same individual can belong to more than one group, developing a multi-level identity based on different mnemonic practices. This line of work has challenged the common-sense idea of a unique shared memory linked to national identity, and has put together a set of definitions able to account for the intrinsic pluralism of memory. Thus, collective memory is now defined as the memory shared by a community or a group, social memory as the memory spread across the entire society, and public memory as that part of the latter which refers to the public sphere (Jedlowski 2007).

The study of collective memory has been characterized by two main approaches: the individualistic perspective, based on psychology, that considers collective memory to be an “aggregation of socially framed individual memories” and focuses on “neurological and cognitive factors,” and the collectivistic perspective, rooted in the Durkheimian sociological tradition, that “refers to collective phenomena sui generis” and emphasizes “the social and cultural patterns of public and personal memory” (Olick 1999: 333).

This distinction between collected and collective memory is based on “two radically different concepts of culture”: “one that sees culture as a subjective category of meanings contained in people’s minds versus one that sees culture as patterns of publicly available symbols objectified in society” (Olick 1999: 336).

The contemporary sociology of memory is, for the most part, rooted in the Durkheimian perspective started by Halbwachs, focusing on “public discourses about the past as wholes” and on “narratives and images of the past that speak in the name of collectivities,” in order to resist the temptation of methodological individualism and “sociobiological reductionism” and to defend the relevance of the historical context (Olick 1999: 345). Nevertheless, there is an increasing interest in the effort to combine the two approaches in the construction of a new “historical sociology of mnemonic practices” (Olick & Robbins 1998: 105), able to take into account both public and private contexts and factors.

This debate, situated in the so-called “new political culture” perspective, which calls for a new interest in the role of culture in politics and in particular in the “symbolic structuring of political discourse” (Olick 1999: 337), echoes the topics of the cultural turn in social movement studies, and the interest in the symbolic construction of conflict. Some scholars, for example, have recently pointed out the role of external cultural factors in structuring the symbolic environment in which the collective
identity-building process takes place. Among these factors, collective memories (Polletta 2004: 100–101) and protest traditions (Morris 2004: 243–245) are particularly relevant. As Polletta pointed out, explaining the cultural dimension of structural opportunities, “these traditions, principles, codes and arrangements cannot easily be ‘thought away’ by insurgents. They are supra-individual and constrain individual action” (Polletta 2004: 101). This last point is often underestimated: memory can help collective action by drawing on symbolic material from the past, but at the same time can constrain people’s ability to mobilize, imposing proscriptions (taboos and prohibitions) and prescriptions (duties and requirements) (Olick & Levy 1997).

The contentious nature of memory and the dynamic definition of identity are now recognized by most of the scholarship. Memory, as identity, is a pluralistic field, continually reproduced in a social process involving a plurality of actors, none of which, usually, can completely control the results of the process, and each of which must deal with the “existing cultural material” (Tonello 2003: 118).

The field of public memory is structured by the conflict between different narratives of the past, each one struggling for a group’s position inside the public sphere. If memory is strategic for setting the criteria of plausibility and relevance, then the narrative which succeeds in imposing itself can grant legitimacy and symbolic power in the public sphere to the group to which it belongs. From this point of view, the common notion of “distortion” does not make any sense: “Memory is distortion since memory is invariably and inevitably selective. . . . memory is a process of encoding information, storing information, and strategically retrieving information, and there are social, psychological, and historical influences at each point” (Schudson 1995: 348).

The goal of the social researcher, therefore, is to analyze the processes of distortion that constitute memory, in order to identify recurrent mechanisms and agents involved in them. This distortion is sometimes part of a specific cultural and political project, that may or may not succeed, but often is the result of a complex casual interaction between different factors, involving diverse agents carrying their own interests and goals. Collective memory is “as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption and it is always mediated” (Kansteiner 2002: 180).

Social movements provide a good example for pointing out what is missing in collective memory studies: while there exists a strong and developed literature on official state-controlled memory and on resisting popular memory, there is little on what happens in the middle of these two extremes. How does the process of memory building work? Which actors are likely to be successful in the attempt to impose their narrative? Which mechanisms determine their outcomes, and why, or, at least, under which conditions? And how does this process influence the identity-building process of contemporary actors in the same field? At the same time, social movements act in a symbolically constructed world, of which public memory forms an important part. They are, therefore, a somewhat peculiar social actor, whose relationship with memory can be examined in both directions: social movements can be analyzed as mnemonic agents in the arena of public memory and collective memories can be studied as a strategic feature in the building of a group’s identity.

The media, and in particular the discursive material that it produces, is relevant to the analysis of public memory for similar reasons to those that make it relevant to social movement studies. The role of the media, in fact, is fundamental in framing and shaping the identity of a movement (Gamson 2004), often using a narrative format, that is considered the most natural format of contemporary media (Bird & Dardenne 1988). Therefore, the capacity to adapt to a narrative format is a central resource for success in the field of public memory for a mnemonic project as well as for accessing the audience of a social movement. This format is not arbitrarily created by the media, but
comes from a tradition of narrative conventions. In turn, “such media-shaped perceptions may then become part of the common cultural framework, to be drawn on again by journalists in a continuing dialectical process” (Bird & Dardenne 1988: 82). Thus, the practices of remembrance need to be placed in a mediatized public space, in which the media, as “a master arena” of public discourse (Gamson 2004: 243) is the main repertoire of social representations of the past which people draw on when they need to (Zelizer 2008).

The use of the past in order to contextualize present events by the media has been acknowledged by many scholars (Edy 2006; Zelizer 2008), while more work needs to be done in order to more fully understand how the mnemonic repertoires to which the media refers are constructed, how the media reshapes the memory it uses, and how these processes influence and constrain the public action of present social actors. Scholars have acknowledged memory among the factors involved in social contention (Harris 2006; Meyer 2006; Polletta 2006), but more work needs to be done, in particular with regard to the influence of the representation of past social movements in the collective identities developed by contemporary movements.

This process involves movements with both a passive and an active role: the past, in particular the memory of past social movements, is the lens used by the media to analyze and represent every movement (Edy 2006), and the movements participate in the construction of this lens, choosing strategically the representation of the past more useful to their goals.

Memory is at the same time an outcome of protest and a tool in constructing new mobilizations, and in the last few years the active role of social movements in the processes that lead to the construction of public memory as a symbolic environment has been acknowledged: an event, to become relevant in the field of public memory, needs “social appropriation” (Harris 2006: 19). Collective memory is not an automatic outcome of protest, but the result of a specific “memory work” (Jansen 2007: 953), depending on different factors: Armstrong and Crage (2006: 726–727) identified, among these factors, the “commemorability” of an event, the “mnemonic capacity” of a movement, the “resonance” in the audience produced by the chosen “commemorative form” and the potential for “institutionalization” of this form (Armstrong & Crage 2006: 726–727), providing the bases for an analytical model aiming to explain why and how a specific event has success in being socially remembered.

Movements can challenge the hegemonic representation of their antecedents, as reported by the media, or distance themselves from them. A movement can adopt old symbols, traditionally far from its identity, and charge them with new meanings (Fantasia & Hirsch 1995). Likewise, an episode from the past can become part of a new narrative (Jansens 2007). The contemporary debate in the field is focused, among other topics, on the limits of this memory work. How manipulable is the past? Recent studies have challenged the most radically constructionist assumptions, underlining the path-dependency of memory work and the limited malleability of the historical material (Spillman 1998), while calling for a strategic approach, able to take into account the “limited set of symbolic conditions that both constrain and enable particular options for memory work” (Jansen 2007: 993). An analysis of these mechanisms could be very useful for understanding how the relationship between social movements and collective memory works, showing the results of the movements’ work as mnemonic agents and the consequence of this process on the symbolic construction of contemporary conflict.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Discursive opportunity structure; Media and social movements; Narratives.

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Commitment
SHARON ERICKSON NEPSTAD

Once individuals have been recruited into a social movement, their ongoing engagement is dependent on a number of factors, including the strength of their commitment. Movement commitment is shaped by individual-level factors as well as movement practices.

COMPONENTS OF COMMITMENT

Drawing upon research from organizational psychology, Bert Klandermans (1997) has argued that there are three elements of social movement commitment. First, there is an affective component, referring to the degree of emotional attachment to the movement. Affective commitment forms when people receive material or cultural rewards from participation. It can also develop through close friendship ties to other activists (Taylor 1989; Nepstad 2004a) and to movement leaders (Barkan, Cohn, & Whitaker 1993). Second, there is a continuance component that reflects the potential costs incurred by leaving a movement; these costs may persuade individuals to remain engaged. Continuance commitment can develop when people take extraordinary measures to further movement goals—such as serving prison terms, giving up careers or valued personal possessions, or jeopardizing their own physical safety (Kanter 1968; della Porta 1992). This strengthens commitment since activists do not want their sacrifices to be in vain should the movement fail. Third, there is a normative component that refers to the moral obligation to continue fighting for a movement’s cause. Normative commitment develops by framing ongoing movement participation as consistent with ideological or religious imperatives.

FACTORS THAT UNDERMINE COMMITMENT

Even when all three components of commitment are robust, certain circumstances can weaken recruits’ engagement. These circumstances include increasing life responsibilities, such as full-time employment and family obligations, which may limit the amount of time that people can devote to activism (Downton & Wehr 1997). Additionally, some recruits drop out if their significant others oppose their activism (Aho 1994) or if they lose a sense of efficacy, no longer believing that the movement can achieve its goals (Zald & Ash 1966). Commitment can also dissipate as activists experience burn out, which occurs when movement participation generates high levels of psychological tension or incurs significant costs (Klandermans 1997). Still others may shift their engagement to different causes due to competition from new movements and voluntary associations (Cress, McPherson, & Rotolo 1997).

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PERSISTENT MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION

There are several individual-level factors associated with persistent movement commitment, even in the face of countervailing forces such as those described above. Several studies indicate that participants will likely remain engaged if they consider the movement to be effective and if they perceive movement leadership as legitimate and trustworthy (Zald & Ash 1966; Hirsch 1990; Barkan, Cohn, & Whitaker 1993). Additionally, those who maintain long-term movement commitments often arrange their lives to accommodate their activism (Lichterman 1996; Downton & Wehr 1997). For example, many persistent activists choose jobs with flexible schedules that allow time for movement
activities while others seek employment in social movement organizations so they can earn a livelihood through activist work.

Movement organizations can also strengthen recruits’ commitment. They can incorporate cultural practices – such as rituals, narratives, and consciousness-raising discussions – that reinforce normative beliefs and commitment (Hirsch 1990; Nepstad 2004a, 2004b). They can build local chapters and regularly hold retreats or celebrations that increase relational ties to other activists, thereby strengthening affective commitment (Nepstad 2004a). In fact, in a study of the American women’s rights movement from 1945 to the 1960s, Verta Taylor found that strong cultural practices, combined with close friendship ties, enabled a small cadre of activists to remain deeply committed despite the virtual disappearance of the feminist movement during this period. Finally, social movement organizations can implement democratic group decision-making practices that give participants a greater sense of investment in the movement and thus a greater willingness to stay engaged (Polletta 2004). While none of these practices will guarantee ongoing commitment to the cause, they can decrease the chances that recruits will drop out.

SEE ALSO: Disengagement in social movements; Participation in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Comparative research
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

While all research is to a certain extent comparative, the concept of comparative research usually refers to studies that compare more than one unit of analysis or, in less inclusive definitions, more than one country. Even though comparative sociology starts to spread, it is especially in political science – with its focus on political institutions – that comparative research became at the same time a broadly used method and also gave the name to a established discipline.

The field of comparative politics, as the branch of political science concerned with comparing nations (Verba 1991), has developed particularly since the 1960s on the bases of broader concerns with an accelerated interdependence among countries, that made knowledge of various regimes all the more necessary. In this period, development theory dominated the field, proposing specific interpretations of democracy (and its preconditions).

During and after the Vietnam War, not only the pretence to apply developmental theory’s assumptions through (more or less belligerent) plans to export democracy, but also the attempt to impose Western models of modernization as the only game in town, came under heavy criticism within the discipline, as well as in public opinion. The attempt at building all-encompassing theories also lost ground, with more attention given to area studies (that focused on specific geographical areas such as Latin America or Southern Europe), based upon a small number of cases, and aiming at middle-range explanations that focused on specific political systems (Mair 1996).

This evolution had the positive effect of increasing awareness of the risks of imposing cultural-specific categories to historically different realities, and sensitizing to the importance of contextual analysis (Tilly & Goodwin 2006). It, however, had the short-coming of favoring a separation between a large majority of political scientists working on democracies and “area” specialists who addressed the analysis of nondemocratic countries. Not only have there been few interactions between the two groups, but also their methodological perspectives developed along separate lines, with comparatists more interested in building models, and area study specialists concerned instead with thick descriptions (Dutton 2005).

Especially since the 1990s, the revival of a neopositivist epistemology in search of invariant causes, as well as the availability of some data bases (even if of debated quality) brought attention back to comparison based on a large number of countries, with attempts at increasing the potential for generalizing the results by including different geographical areas and political regimes. At the same time, attention to comparative research as cross-national comparison also spread in other disciplines such as sociology (e.g., through the debates on the welfare states, or the varieties of capitalism) and even history.

COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES

A similar evolution can be traced in social movement studies. Especially in the sixties, within the so-called breakdown approach, comparisons of large number of cases aimed at a general explanation of phenomena such as political violence. A most influential example is Ted Gurr’s (1970) analysis of 114 polities between 1961 and 1965 that explained the intensity of civil strife as deriving from high
levels of relative deprivation (defined as the perceived discrepancy between a person’s value expectations and her value capability), and consequent aggressive reactions. With what critics consider as a typical illustration of an ecological fallacy, the empirical research collected data on both the dependent variables (strife) and the independent ones (socioeconomic indicators) at the country level, but the explanation was offered at the individual level. Moreover, frustration was just assumed, but not proved, to be a consequence of deprivation and, therefore, discontent.

Also in social movement studies, an effect of the criticism of developmental theories, and of relative deprivation as a specific variance, was a decline in comparative analysis, and a focus on case studies. Instead, especially since the 1980s, when the fields of social movement studies spread to enclose not only sociologists, but also political scientists, a revival of comparative research can be observed. As in the broader field of political science, research projects covered mainly a small number of cases (typically, two to four), comparing similar types of political systems (democracy) and aiming at middle-range theories, with a limited aspiration at generalization. The first series of cross-national comparisons of this kind developed on the antinuclear movement, including Nelkin and Pollack’s (1981) research on France and Germany, Herbert Kitschelt’s (1986) seminal work on Germany, France, Sweden, and the United States, Christian Joppke’s (1993) on Germany and the United States, as well as the project directed by Helena Flam (1994) on Austria, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. In the same years, Tom Rochon (1988) compared the peace movement in France, Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands; Dieter Rucht (1994) the environmental movement in Germany, France, and the United States; Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators (1995) the new social movements on Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands; and Donatella della Porta (1995) the development of left-wing political violence in Italy and Germany.

Most of these studies addressed the environmental constraints and resources for social movements, looking in particular at the political systems. Particularly, but not only, European scholars built on widespread interpretations in their discipline, focusing attention on the different mix of opportunities and constraints for protest offered by the majoritarian versus consensual models of democracy or inclusive versus exclusive political cultures, as well as on the legacy of the different historical paths to democracy (for a review see Kriesi 2004). In line with their relevance in European politics and political science, political parties have been considered as particularly important allies for social movements, all the more so where political opportunities are more closed (for instance, on the women’s movement in Southern Europe, della Porta, Valiente, & Kousis forthcoming; on the labor movement, Marks 1989). Attention to citizenship regimes and welfare state comparison was also reflected in social movement studies. In an attempt to link specific institutional opportunities to specific movements, differences in the characteristics of national citizenship regimes have been considered as related with the forms and intensity of conflicts around immigration politics (Koopmans & Statham 1999), and national welfare regimes in the contentious politics of unemployment (Berclaz, Fueglister, and Giugni 2004).

RECENT TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

The most widespread use of comparative research in the field has been based upon a case-oriented logic of comparison, taking into account complex historical units, rather than variable-oriented (della Porta 2008). As Dieter Rucht wrote (1994), justifying the selection of countries for his cross-national comparison, “theory building in the social sciences is historical. It remains linked to the spatial and temporal boundaries of its object of study.” In several cases, research designs included
not only cross-country, but also longitudinal, comparison, addressing the evolution of movements and/or protest in the long term. Charles Tilly’s influence in the field, as well as European political science’s sensitivity to history converge in explaining this choice.

While comparison of a small number of cases remained dominant in research on social movements, also in this field large, statistical cross-national comparisons have reemerged in recent years especially in research on political violence. Using the existing data base or constructing new ones, scholars have in particular looked at the onset as well as forms and end of civil wars (see Sambanis 2002 for a review).

In social movement studies as elsewhere, comparative research had the merit of contributing to conceptualization as well as the elaboration and testing of hypotheses about the impact of macro, environmental conditions (such as the type of democracy or political culture) on the development of social movements. Comparative research also helped to bridge the gap between European scholars, who conceptualized and theorized (new) social movements as an historical development from the labor movement, and US scholars, who tended to see social movements as specific forms of voluntary association.

A main limit of the way in which comparative research developed in social movement studies has been, however, a focus on the global North, as well as on specific (left-libertarian) movements. Comparative research in social movements privileged in fact a “most similar” research design, according to which broadly similar cases are selected in order to explain different outcomes (e.g., forms of action or policy impact) on the bases of some specific contextual differences. Additionally, in a more and more global world, the focus on cross-national comparison has tended to hypostatize the nation-state as independent unit of analysis (della Porta 2002).

Some recent trends started addressing these limits. First, comparative studies developed beyond Europe and the United States, including research on the impact of nondemocratic contexts on protest (e.g., Tilly 2006; Boudreau 2004 on Southeast Asia; Wiktorowicz 2004 on the Middle East). This research has the merit not only of shedding light on little-known cases, but also of helping to reflect on the specific adaptation of the hypotheses built upon democratic contexts for nondemocratic ones, where potential opportunities for the opponents tend to be more informal and forms of protest happen in different spheres. Additionally, the “dynamic of contention” project (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001) not only broadens attention from social movements, active mainly in democracies, to other phenomena of contentious politics (such as democratization or revolutions), but also experiments with paired comparison, based upon “most different research design.” This means that very different cases are compared in order to single out similar causal mechanisms, with the objective of avoiding mistaking specific features of democratic contexts for general features of contention. Second, research on the Global Justice movements developed more complex explanations of the interactions between transnational influences on national opportunities and constraints. A comparative analysis of France, Italy, and Spain on the one hand, and Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom on the other has also pointed at the presence of different social movement constellations, through which similar transnational impacts are filtered (della Porta 2007).

SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Democracy and social movements; Historical research and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Protest cycles and waves; Science and social movements; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest

SUSAN OLZAK

Competition theory of race and ethnic conflict specifies three mechanisms under which racial/ethnic conflict and protest occurs. The first reflects a familiar “racial threat” argument, suggesting that the magnitude of response by dominant groups depends on the timing and size of the incoming group and on the clarity of ethnic distinctions made between newcomers and residents (Blalock 1967). Thus, particularly large and concentrated waves of newcomers perceived as ethnically or racially distinct are especially likely to receive a hostile response. Furthermore, as migration and immigration of distinct ethnic and racial populations surge, the potential for protest or violence directed against ethnically distinct newcomers becomes more likely (Koopmans & Olzak 2004).

The literature has also identified other strategies for containing ethnic/racial competition. For example, Lieberson (1982) and Massey and Denton (1994) analyze residential and occupational segregation as alternative strategies for constraining competition and maintaining racial dominance (see also Bonacich 1972). In this view, the magnitude of response – in the form of violence, repression, or residential discrimination directed toward a racial minority – depends upon the pace of change and the relative size of the populations characterizing these demographic shifts.

The second dimension of competition theory emphasizes forces of economic competition among ethnic and racial populations. Scholars who emphasize the economic aspects of competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict express these ideas in terms of the interplay between two types of boundaries: ethnic boundaries and productive niches (Barth 1969). As ethnic and racial groups enter a population, competition for limited resources ought to increase (all else being equal). Economic contraction further intensifies competition over increasingly scarce resources, raising the potential that dominant groups will restrain or exclude less powerful competitors (Olzak 1992). This argument also implies that marketplace competition will raise perceptions that unfair competition is occurring (Bobo & Hutchings 1996), increasing the chances that tensions will spill over into violence.

Specification of economic competition processes that spark ethnic conflict depend upon the distribution of members of different ethnic and racial groups into productive niches (Hannan 1979). Economic competition rises to the extent that niche overlap occurs. This happens when new groups invade another’s niche, which can be fueled by in-migration, economic contraction, or upward mobility of a disadvantaged group. Conflict arises when members resist the entry of members of an ethnically distinct group into their niche.

A third mechanism by which competition processes spark protest and conflict concerns the political/power domain. This line of argument from competition theory emphasizes that mobilization arises when newcomers pose threats to the power balance and political control by dominant groups. In this view, powerful ethnic groups mobilize collective action in response to a potential loss in political control (Olzak 1992; Tolnay & Beck 1995). Such power-threats may be instigated by a recent arrival of a racially or ethnically distinct population (to a city, state, or country) that threatens the political balance, or by a sudden shift in political opportunities afforded by new or expanded voting rights. In this view, politically threatened groups will mobilize against such changes in an effort to restore the status quo. Using this perspective, lynching and ethnic violence, anti-immigration protest,
disenfranchisement, racial gaps in arrests and incarceration can all be understood as a response to real or perceived threats activated by a minority population’s increased political leverage.

While distinguishing the demographic, economic, and political features of competition is analytically useful, in practice they often occur together and are mutually reinforcing. Thus, the economic and power-threat dimensions of ethnic competition are likely to escalate when the surges of immigrants or migrants are large in proportion to the size of the native-born population. Furthermore, it appears that even small changes in levels of neighborhood homogeneity have substantial impacts on perceptions of racial threat. Residential desegregation also ignites racial violence, especially in situations where racial homogeneity was initially high (Olzak, Shanahan, & West 1994).

Of course, the impact of competition on protest and conflict is also shaped by human capital factors, such as training, skills, and education that newcomers bring with them. And the nature of citizenship status and voting rights of a population will greatly influence perceptions of political threats to a dominant ethnic population, creating a heightened sense of political competition where political challenges are more credible (Koopmans & Statham 2000). Finally, there are likely to be threshold effects of increasing the size of the minority population, above which additions to a minority population are no longer perceived as threatening (Keen & Jacobs 2009).

Forces of racial/ethnic competition have the capacity to expand and contract group boundaries that can effectively redefine race/ethnic identities. For example, Olzak and Shanahan (2003) find that the rate of attacks on African-Americans around the turn of the nineteenth century in US cities systematically rose when major court decisions increasingly rested upon the court’s ability to draw distinctions between white versus black identities. Gullickson (2010) has also documented how occupational differences (and racial threats from declining differences) help to explain variation in the salience of the mulatto–black boundary lines during this same period. Others have explored how the dynamics of pan-ethnic boundaries may be related to competition processes (e.g., Kim & White 2010).

Competition theories have also explored the conditions under which ethnic and racial protest occurs. For example, competition theory has been used to analyze anti-busing protests (Olzak, Shanahan, & West 1994) and race riots (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney 1996), which have often been characterized as protest. These studies draw on resource mobilization arguments to suggest that disadvantaged ethnic or racial populations will mobilize when their access to resources rises substantially. Competition theory also provides an explanation for backlash movements that arise in the wake of social movements for expanded civil rights. In this view, dominant groups whose power is threatened will mobilize against disadvantaged groups. If successful, such practices maintain existing apartheid conditions, which heighten the salience of ethnic boundaries and further aggravate ethnic tension.

Forces embedded in globalization have also been linked to ethnic competition and conflict. As a result of the uneven exposure to globalization (including increase trade flows, foreign direct investment, exposure to the Internet and other information and social technologies), competition among ethnic groups rises, as does the salience of ethnic boundaries. Existing violations in the form of ethnic exclusion from educational or political opportunities likely encourages ethnic protest challenging state authorities (Olzak 2006; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min 2009; Olzak 2011). Whether real or perceived, ethnic inequalities in exposure to globalization ought to generate ethnic discontent, which in turn increases the likelihood that violent insurgent movements will become organized along ethnic lines.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic movements; Globalization and movements; Racist social movements; Riots.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Community organizing (United States)
HEIDI SWARTS

Community organizing is the process of mobilizing people in the same geographic area to advocate for themselves in enduring organizations. While social movements are usually issue-based, community organizing (CO) is geographic constituency-based. It typically addresses multiple issues such as housing, jobs, public safety, healthcare, and community reinvestment. While affluent communities organize also, the term generally refers to organizing residents of poor and working-class communities into lasting organizations to gain power. Tactics vary from unruly disruption to more conventional methods of rewarding and punishing elected officials through mobilizing voters. While most social movements have geographically organized mobilization, “community organizing” has a more specific meaning. Likewise, while organizing disempowered individuals in communities has occurred worldwide, this review focuses on the United States, where “community organizing” refers to specific traditions with US roots.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Fisher (1997) has traced modern CO to multiple roots. Since 1886, Progressive-era settlement houses and social workers provided services such as classes for immigrants and health clinics. Ward organizations of political machines were another model for those who sought tightly organized working-class groups who built power not for a political boss, but for themselves and their neighborhoods. The Depression gave rise to energetic Communist Party organizing but also to radical reformist Saul Alinsky, who rejected Marxism but insisted on “rubbing raw the sores of discontent” (1971) in order to mobilize a passive, disempowered majority. Alinsky popularized CO more than any other American organizer. He worked with labor leader John L. Lewis organizing the Chicago stockyards, and began his first community organization in the workers’ neighborhood (Back of the Yards) in 1939. The labor movement and CO continued as sources of mutual influence. In the South, the Highlander Center, founded by Miles Horton, was a training center for civil rights organizers such as Rosa Parks, who helped organize the movement initially through geographically specific local campaigns. In the 1960s generations of community organizers began their careers in successive waves of organizations within the civil rights movement, and also the United Farmworkers Union.

SAUL ALINSKY AND THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS FOUNDATION

Alinsky supported his work and trained organizers through his Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). The sixties social movement cycle regenerated Alinsky’s organizing, which included predominantly black organizations that were invigorated by and contributed to the civil rights movement in the North. In response to black insurgency, President Johnson’s War on Poverty funded inner city organizing; however, many organizing leaders then and now eschew government funding because of the risk of cooptation. Sixties’ movements were conflictual and confrontational, so Alinsky and his conflict-based organizing had a resurgent popularity. However, as the political climate shifted, Alinsky had a visionary fear that a disillusioned middle class would be susceptible to right-wing appeals. Indeed, blaming crime on blacks and attacking student activists...
and “big-government liberals” became a staple of Republican strategy beginning with Nixon, and fueled a resurgent conservative movement. This, along with a more tenuous economy, ushered in a decline of resources and opportunity for liberals and the Left.

Community organizers responded in several ways. Rather than continuing to form contentious pressure groups, some entrepreneurs turned to community development corporations (CDCs). In keeping with both the conservative ideology of private sector self-help and traditional CO self-empowerment, CDCs provided economic development, jobs, housing, and other neighborhood revitalization themselves rather than challenge the public sector to do it. They were funded by private foundations such as Ford, and federal sources as well. In the 1980s, federal support was drastically cut, and these funding arms were dismantled under Reagan.

NATIONAL PEOPLE’S ACTION

Led by Shel Trapp, this national network of local groups was perhaps the first to organize nationally. It used Alinsky-style direct action tactics to confront elites. NPA won national legislation mandating that all banks disclose lending data. The group used this data to document “redlining,” the redistribution of urban bank deposits to suburban mortgages. This led to a national CO effort to win the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which gave citizen groups leverage to force banks to invest in distressed neighborhoods. As of 2010, the NPA continued to work on similar issues such as preventing foreclosures during the “Great Recession” following 2008.

FAITH-BASED COMMUNITY ORGANIZING

After Saul Alinsky’s death in 1972, Ed Chambers became director of what he called the “modern IAF.” In 1973, IAF organizer Ernesto Cortes began to develop the current faith-based method in San Antonio, Texas. COPS (Communities Organized for Public Service) won more than a billion dollars in improvements, brought together middle-class whites and poor Hispanics, helped win city council elections by district, and significantly shifted the balance of power in San Antonio (Warren 2001).

By the mid-1980s, despite declining resources, thousands of neighborhood organizations had sprung up in response to urban blight. The IAF’s strategy developed in Texas capitalized on one of the few remaining institutions in poor urban neighborhoods: churches. Faith-based community organizing (FBCO), known also as “congregation-based,” “broad-based,” and “institution-based,” provided respected community leaders (pastors), organized members, resources, legitimacy, and a shared language and culture of fundamental values that neighborhood organizations lacked. Technically, their members are organizations (congregations), which pay institutional dues – enough to fund only a percentage of the annual budget, but they demonstrate local commitment which in turn helps win foundation grants.

Unlike CDCs, these organizations aim to build powerful organizations and launch redistributive campaigns. Most local FBCOs are interfaith independent nonprofit federations of 20–80 congregations that contract with a national organizing “network” of affiliates for membership training and supervised, experienced organizers. Some also include labor unions, schools, and neighborhood associations.

This approach views organizing as a highly disciplined craft, and organizers as career professionals. However, it also emphasizes in-depth member “ownership” of the group, democratic decision-making, and constant cultivation of new grassroots leaders. Congregations have local organizing teams that elect a city federation board of directors, which usually hires the chief organizer. Organizers are dually accountable to this board and the
national network that trains them. FBCO tactics are usually more decorous than other COs: typically civil, formal meetings with officials in which they exert power through mass numbers in attendance and through control of all aspects of the meeting, where members make demands on the officials. US FBCO networks have steadily expanded, and are organizing in Great Britain, Germany, Rwanda, Latin America, and South Africa.

ACORN

Another major organizing model was ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now), active from 1970 to 2009. ACORN was founded by former National Welfare Rights Organization staffers, notably Wade Rathke (“Chief Organizer” for ACORN’s entire 39 years), who believed winning gains for the poor would require a broader base than welfare recipients – “low- to moderate-income” Americans. ACORN began in Arkansas, spread quickly, had periods of decline, but always experimented with new methods and issues and grew. Unlike FBCOs, ACORN organizers knocked on doors to recruit people to form neighborhood groups, which together made up city organizations. Also, its membership (by family) was predominantly low-income, African-American, and Latino. It was known for dramatic direct action protests, which helped compensate for smaller numbers and won extensive media coverage. From 2000 to 2009, ACORN had 70–80 city affiliates and some effective state-level organizations. Besides its mass base, its greatest resource was senior organizers, often Ivy League graduates (or dropouts), who excelled at innovative tactics to extract resources from corporate targets, foundations, and even government bureaucracies, and win major victories and national campaigns. ACORN’s strategic innovation allowed it to run regular and successful national-level campaigns. This success was made possible by its centralized structure as one national organization with a unified national strategy; a long-term strategy that included electoral politics and an alliance with labor; and constant tactical and organizational experimentation.

ACORN’s centralized structure and willingness to experiment helped it survive the conservative resurgence and even thrive. However, it collapsed due both to its success and failures – internal flaws such as secrecy and excessive control by top staff, which caused internal conflict. More critically, since Barack Obama was a former community organizer, in 2008 CO became a target of the McCain presidential campaign, the Republican Party, and Fox News network. ACORN’s national electoral work made it both visible and vulnerable. The New Organizing Institute reported in 2009 that ACORN’s affiliate Project Vote registered and mobilized the largest number of new minority and low-income voters in 2008 (432, 440, or 43 percent of similar campaigns combined); added to 2004’s total, the number was 746,000 new likely Democratic voters in tightly contested 2008 campaigns. ACORN was subject to constant media attacks that exploited and distorted their flaws (Dreier & Martin 2010). Congress cut off funding (a small proportion of their budget), but this signaled private foundations to do the same, resulting in ACORN’s bankruptcy. Some of ACORN’s large state-level organizations reorganized under different names.

SCHOLARSHIP ON COMMUNITY ORGANIZING

Because it was traditionally locally dispersed, social movement scholars largely ignored CO. However, both FBCOs and ACORN achieved a scale sufficient to gain scholars’ attention in the 1990s. Research on organizing is predominantly single or comparative case studies. The neo-Tocquevillian turn in the 1990s helped faith-based organizing capture the imagination of scholars concerned with civic engagement, participation, and democracy. They noted its effectiveness in uniting Americans across lines
of race, class, and religion. Scholars studied links between democratic practice in FBCOs, their roots in communities, shared values, and major policy reforms won for poor and working Americans. Warren’s study of the IAF’s Texas Interfaith (2001) examines this process closely. Shirley (2002) examines education reform campaigns. Hart (2001), Wood (2002), and others analyzed how effective principles of organizing combine with deeply held values (here, religious). Some scholars came to the topic from urban politics, as they discovered some organizations’ role in urban power structures (Orr 2007).

As US economic inequality steadily increased, progressives questioned how a strategy historically rooted in localism could adequately respond. By 2000, FBCO and ACORN had achieved the scale to undertake national campaigns, but needed to overcome traditional sectarianism among different approaches. Joint efforts increased between ACORN and faith-based networks, ironically at ACORN’s peak but just before attacks destroyed it. The PICO Network began organizing nationally in about 2000; its first major campaigns mobilized locals to support national health care reform. In 2009 the IAF began a flexible, international “anti-usury” campaign in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. These efforts are fruitful subjects for scholars interested in barriers and facilitators to coalitions. As they increasingly organize nationally, the need to form alliances with staff-led public interest groups challenges COs that have a mass base and culture of broad, democratic decision-making.

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972); Organizations and movements; Social capital and social movements; Social movement organization (SMO); Urban movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Confessional protest

MICHAEL P. YOUNG

The social movement term “confessional protest” originates in Michael P. Young’s work on the rise of national social movements in the United States in the 1830s (Young 2002; Young & Cherry 2005; Young 2007). Young argues that the first sustained and interregional social movements in US history were shaped by a particular form of protest that called Americans to bear witness against particular sins such as slavery and intemperance. He terms this form of religious and political dissent confessional protest, and argues that religious forces, not political institutions, were decisive in the emergence of the national social movement in the United States. Arguing against Tilly’s state-centered explanation of the rise of the national social movement, Young presents a cultural explanation that hinges on the combination of the intensive and extensive evangelical schemas of public confession and special sins (Tilly 1986, 1995; Young 2002). In Bearing Witness Against Sin, Young demonstrates how temperance, antislavery, and the beginning of the women’s rights movements emerged as evangelicals joined together in this particular form of religious dissent fusing intensive projects of personal redemption with extensive projects of particular national reform. This interlacing of intimate responsibility and far-flung social problems fueled the first national wave of social movements in the United States. These confessional protests emerged as two religious movements driving the Second Great Awakening started to interact: the “new measure” religious revivals associated most closely with Charles Grandison Finney and an emerging network of national benevolent societies including the American Tract Society and the American Home Missionary Society. Evangelicals closely associated with new measure revivals and the increasingly rationalized work of organized benevolence spearheaded the wave of protest. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, the popular religious revivals of the upstart or populist sects and those influenced by them came into contact with the agencies of benevolent societies centered in the northeastern cities (Hatch 1989). The combination proved radical. As public confessions, the dramatic centerpiece of the populist revival, became central to the specialized campaigns of organized benevolence, a wave of social movements independent of ecclesiastical order broke across the United States. This unprecedented national wave of social movements emerged as hundreds of thousands of Americans joined together bear witness against special sins. Although religious in origin, these movements quickly became secular forces pushing for political reform (Young & Cherry 2005).

The antebellum reformer’s connection of the intimate and the far-flung, her fusion of personal reform and social change, stemmed from an evangelical sense of the dynamic of sin, repentance, and reformation. This evangelical sensibility projected personal sins onto national problems and introjected national evils into personal affairs. It made sense of national struggles by making them axial to personal reform. In these confessional protests, antebellum moral reformers anticipated the “life politics” of contemporary protest (Giddens 1991). This fusion of inward-looking struggles of personal change and movements to transform society not only shaped the wave of movements emerging in the United States in the 1830s but a surprisingly wide range of social movements in modern history. A strikingly similar form of religious dissent is described by Walzer in The Revolution of the Saints as shaping the radical politics of the English Civil War and by Rossinow in Politics of Authenticity as shaping the rise of prairie
radicals in the New Left. A number of radically secular forms of protest also share a clear family resemblance with confessional protest. “Coming out” in the gay liberation movement and “consciousness raising” in the women’s liberation movement both share with confessional protest the powerful interlacing of individual and social change, fusing the personal and the political in moral protest. Secular or religious, confessional protest remains a powerful form of dissent because of its intensive and extensive power.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Culture and social movements; Religion and social movements; Symbolic crusades.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Consensus and action mobilization
BERT KLANDERMANS

Much social movement research concerns processes of mobilization. Understandably, because mobilization is the mechanism that brings demand and supply of protest together. Without mobilization there will be no action even in circumstances of high demand. The study of mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of persuasive communication, the mobilization channels, the influence of social networks, and the perceived costs and benefits of participation. As for the effectiveness of communication, organizers must solve a crucial problem, namely, which are the people in demand of protest and how can they be reached. Sometimes this problem is easy to solve, if for example, it regards the inhabitants of a neighborhood or the workers in a company, but most of the time there are no such easy solutions to the problem. Under stark repression mobilization is extremely difficult and indeed dangerous. Censorship makes newspapers, radio and television unusable, while organizers and movement activists run the risk of being imprisoned or worse. Oppressive societies offer examples of people high on demand but low on supply of protest and failing mobilization. Once protest movements come in the open and mobilization can no longer be oppressed, the system quickly collapses.

Social networks are part of the solution to the problem of how to reach and mobilize potential participants. People are involved in all kinds of organizations and social networks: labor unions, neighborhood organizations, but also churches, sports clubs, and so on. In addition to such formal organizations they are embedded in interpersonal networks: friendship networks, networks of relatives, family, and so on. Such networks are of crucial significance in mobilization campaigns. They serve as a communication network and fuel the motivators of participation by controlling some of the costs and benefits of participation. Participation in collective action can be costly but also rewarding and obviously, the balance of costs and benefits influence people’s motivation to participate.

Consensus mobilization versus action mobilization. Mobilization can be distinguished into the processes of convincing and activating. A movement’s attempts to convince people I call consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1988). These attempts embrace grievance interpretation, causal attribution, possible measures to be taken, protest activities to be staged, and so on. Consensus mobilization is a long-term enterprise. It takes time – sometimes years – to convince people of the plausibility of a movement’s points of view. However, the possible success in activating people is limited by the degree of success of consensus mobilization. Action mobilization concerns the transformation of consensus into action. Indeed, activating sympathizers is difficult enough let alone turning people into sympathizers. Therefore, action mobilization campaigns tend to concentrate on transforming sympathizers into participants.

Steps toward participation. Action mobilization is a process that evolves in various steps that each has its own explanation (see figure). As action mobilization concerns the transformation of sympathizers into participants, the process as it is conceived of in the figure starts with that part of the population that sympathizes with the movement’s cause; in social movement literature often depicted as the mobilization potential of a social movement. As mentioned, the size of the mobilization potential reflects the success or failure of the consensus mobilization efforts. The first problem to solve is targeting the sympathizers. This step seems obvious but its significance is often overlooked, both by organizers and researchers. Formal
and informal networks, strong and weak ties to movement organizations, and all kinds of communication channels are important vehicles of mobilization at this stage.

The next step involves motivating people to participate (see the entries on Motivation and Political psychology and movements for further elaboration of the motivational dynamics of participation). For here it suffices to reiterate that the fact that someone sympathizes with the cause of a movement does not guarantee that he or she is prepared to participate. Moreover, being motivated for the one activity – let’s say signing a petition – does not necessary mean being motivated for another activity – for instance, joining a site occupation. Motivation is to say the motivation to take part in the specific activity that is mobilized for. In the final step those who are motivated to participate must actually be persuaded to take part. This is still a significant step to take. For example, in a study we conducted of the mobilization campaign for a demonstration 60 percent of those who said that they were prepared to take part in the demonstration the next day eventually did not go (Klandermans & Oegema 1987). Indeed, this is a complicated step for organizers. What is an organizer to do? People have been targeted, their motivation has been aroused, what more can an organizer do to make sure that someone participates? At this final stage the strength of the motivation, the height of remaining barriers, and the influence of friends are making the difference. It is your friends who make you live up to your promises. This is understandable. If two friends decide to take part in an event, each of them will make sure that the other will not defect.

SEE ALSO: Demand and supply of protest; Micro-meso mobilization; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Networks and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Consensual decision-making
FRANCESCA POLLETTA

Consensual decision-making requires that all participants agree on an option before it is adopted. Consensual decision-making can be contrasted with nonparticipatory forms of decision-making (i.e., by representatives or experts) and with majority voting. In a typical consensus process, an issue is introduced and discussed and a proposal is formulated; then the facilitator or a participant calls for consensus. Participants may signal their agreement with the proposal, may “stand aside” if they do not agree but do not want to block the proposal’s adoption, or may voice objections to the proposal. Participants discuss dissenters’ concerns and may amend the proposal before calling for consensus once again. The process may continue until participants reach consensus or decide to table the issue. In some processes, a single veto may prevent the adoption of a proposal; in others, near but not complete unanimity is required.

Organizations relying on consensus have been a prominent feature of pre- and post-World War II pacifism, the American civil rights movement, antiwar, antinuclear, and environmental movements, gay and lesbian activism, and the Global Justice Movement. Organizations using consensus tend to be more radical, less mainstream, and often smaller than those that do not, and they tend to espouse broader commitments to radical democracy, nonviolence, and direct action (although none of these is always true).

Organizations vary, however, not only in how they practice consensus, but also in why they do so. Although Quakers, who have been active in a number of movements, understand consensual decision-making as an expression of their religious faith, many activists see it rather as a prefigurative commitment to enacting a radically egalitarian society in the here and now. For still other activists, the instrumental purposes of consensual decision-making have been more salient. For example, proponents of civil disobedience have relied on consensus to increase each participant’s commitment to follow through on the course of action they decided on. The Southern black student sit-inners who formed the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in 1960 insisted that their organization operate by consensus as a way to discourage Northern students from using parliamentary maneuvers to gain control of the organization. Later, when the SNCC moved into political organizing in the Deep South, it used consensual decision-making as a way to train local black residents to evaluate political strategies collectively. This pedagogical rationale for consensus continues today in faith-based community organizing, where citizens’ assemblies make decisions about program and leadership by consensus. In contrast with late-1960s conceptions of consensus, this version of consensual decision-making is not at odds with the existence of leaders. To the contrary, it is intended to develop leaders, as well as to develop the habits of dialogue that will keep leaders accountable.

Differences in purposes thus account for some of the variation in activists’ practice of consensual decision-making. In addition, broad processes of organizational learning have transformed the practice. Activists today are indisputably more comfortable with rules than they were in the 1960s. Many have taken to heart feminist Jo Freeman’s (1973) charge that consensus processes could easily produce a “tyranny of structurelessness” in which informal cliques made decisions in spite of their egalitarian ethos. Roles of vibes-watcher, facilitator, spokescouncils, and affinity groups have formalized the consensus process in a way
that minimizes unacknowledged disparities in influence.

Activists have responded to another frequent criticism of consensual decision-making, that it is inherently inefficient, by showing that it can work even in situations such as mass demonstrations, where there are large numbers of people, multiple organizations, and little time for deliberation. At the same time, organizations that have been pressed to adopt more conventional organizational structures, in particular by federal funding agencies, have found that they could effectively combine consensual decision-making with other ways of making decisions without sacrificing their democratic commitments. For example, feminist organizations have sometimes reserved consensual decision-making for issues deemed critical rather than routine or have combined majority voting with the informal consultation of all members. These arrangements have preserved consensual decision-making’s capacity to elicit a range of ideas and to ensure that decisions, once made, are implemented.

Creating mechanisms to switch from consensus to majority or supermajority vote responds to a third frequent criticism of consensual decision-making: that it depends on a commonality of interests that is rare in most groups. In this view, consensus processes provide no means for adjudicating fundamental conflicts of interests. The alternative, which many organizations have adopted, is to shift to majority or supermajority voting when decisions cannot be made by consensus nor can they be postponed.

A quite different response to the foregoing criticism has been to resist consensus altogether. Some global justice activists today believe that bids to achieve consensus invariably require a coercive unity. Accordingly, participants in the World Social Forum are barred from adopting unified positions. Instead, the Forum provides activists with an opportunity to share experiences, analyses, and strategies; and to undertake collaborative projects among themselves. Although critics charge that Forum organizers have thereby surrendered opportunities to craft an organized challenge to neoliberalism, organizers insist that respecting difference is more important than forging an inevitably constrained consensus.

These trends suggest that consensual decision-making will continue to be associated with progressive movements, even as the forms it takes continue to change.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Co-operative movement; Countercultures; Democracy inside social movements; Direct democracy; Participatory democracy in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Contagion theory
DAVID A. SNOW

Scholars of collective gatherings or crowds, such as riots, protest events, and collective celebrations, have long been interested in accounting for the coordination that makes collective behavior truly collective rather than the aggregation of parallel individual behaviors. For about 75 years, from at least the time of Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd (1897) until the 1970s, one of the dominant explanations was provided by what Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1972) called “contagion theory” (see also the entries on Convergence/dispositional theory and Emergent norm theory). The idea of contagion conjures up the imagery of some behavioral, emotional, or ideational phenomenon spreading rapidly, uncritically, and uniformly within a collectivity, from one participant to another. People in collective gatherings or crowds, many of which are sponsored by social movements, are portrayed as behaving uniformly, intensely, and often in a fashion at odds with their usual normative behavioral patterns.

Proponents of contagion theory have posited various social psychological mechanisms thought to account for the presumed rapid dissemination of a common impulse, sentiment, or behavior among participants. For example, Le Bon (1960) emphasized the heightened “suggestibility” of crowd participants, contending that participants adhere to the mood and temper of the crowd and/or follow the exhortations of leaders; Tarde (1903) accented “imitation,” portraying the collective gathering as an undifferentiated collection of persons imitating each other or a leader; Allport (1924) highlighted “social facilitation” – the observation of others doing what one wanted to do – as the trigger that activated learned dispositions; Freud (1959) proposed “identification” as the mechanism accounting for behavioral uniformity, arguing that it developed out of affection for a leader wherein the participant renounces her own superego and relegates it to the leader; and Blumer (1972) introduced “circular reaction” as a type of interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the behavior or sentiment communicated by another individual and is reflected back to this individual, reinforcing and intensifying the original behavior and/or sentiment. These various mechanisms are theorized as being activated in situations of social unrest, ambiguity, and uncertainty which function to reduce the individual’s critical faculty by short-circuiting the usual interpretive process between stimulus and response. This reduction of critical faculty, coupled with the supposed anonymity provided by the crowd is hypothesized to neutralize ordinary behavioral inclinations and renders the individual susceptible to uncritical acceptance of the emotions, ideas, and behaviors being communicated or called forth. Clark McPhail (1991) calls this the “transformation hypothesis” because of the presumed diminished ability of participants to control their behavior.

In time, more careful theorizing and empirically grounded assessments of the behaviors within collective gatherings, particularly within riots, protest events, and celebrations, indicated that the classical contagion thesis was seriously misguided. Among the various flaws now associated with the theory, cataloged primarily by Turner and Killian (1972) and McPhail (1991), the following are foremost: the assumption of a degree of uniformity in collective gatherings that is often the exception rather than the rule; the failure to specify both the limits of contagion and its socio-spatial boundaries; it provides little understanding of the kinds of shifts which occur in course of collective gatherings, from, for example, active, assertive behavior to more subdued behaviors, and vice versa; the emphasis on emotional
arousal and spiraling excitement makes it less applicable to quiet and more subdued moments or gatherings; it offers little understanding of the social organization of collective gatherings, such as the common differentiation of roles among the participants; it overemphasizes the significance of anonymity, especially since many participants are accompanied by friends or relatives; it perpetuates the image of crowds as highly irrational, emotional, and inclined toward violent or objectionable behavior, thereby implying everyday behavior is quite the contrary—rational and controlled.

The upshot of these critical observations and the increasingly sophisticated examination of diffusion processes in relation to social movements and protest (see Soule 2004) is that the long-standing contagion perspective has been pushed aside, as the contagion concept is now seldom used by students of collective behavior and social movements. Instead, the term diffusion has become the operative, umbrella concept for considering the spread or flow of social behaviors, moods, or sentiments, and various cognitions or cognitive clusters or perspectives among individuals, organizations, and even nations and nationalities.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Convergence/dispositional theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Diffusion and scale shift; Emergent norm theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Contentious politics
SIDNEY TARROW

“Contentious politics” means episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when: (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants or objects of claims. Roughly translated, the definition refers to collective political struggle. Contentious politics, in the sense of this entry, includes social movements, but it also includes less sustained forms of contention – like riots and strike waves – and more extensive ones – like civil wars, revolutions, and episodes of democratization – and it intersects with routine political processes – like elections and interest group politics.

Of course, each term in the definition cries out for further stipulations. The term “episodic,” for example, excludes regularly scheduled events such as votes, parliamentary elections, and associational meetings. The term “public” excludes claim making that occurs entirely within well-bounded organizations, including churches and firms. Contention of course occurs both inside and outside of public politics, but political contention involves government, however peripherally, and thereby increases the likelihood of intervention of coercive agents such as police and, on the average, increases the stakes of the outcome.

Are not all forms of politics “contentious?” Not really. Much of politics consists of ceremony, consultation, bureaucratic process, collection of information, registration of events, educational activities, and the like; these actions usually involve little if any collective contention. This does not imply that all forms of contention conform to a single general model. This becomes clear when we think of the differences among three major forms of contention:

1. social movements: sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment;
2. civil wars: sustained large-scale reciprocal armed conflict between two or more social actors in a population, however defined, over control of a state or over the demand of one of the actors to establish its own state;
3. revolutions: attempted transfers of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population is mobilized on behalf of the claims of each bloc.

These sustained forms of contention have different dynamics, involve different combinations of performances, and produce different levels of violence. Although they can overlap empirically and easily shift from one to another, we will only begin to understand them if we begin from what they have in common: contentious interaction between makers of claims and others, claims that are recognized by those others as bearing on their interests and bring in governments as mediators, targets, or claimants.

Underlying this broad approach is the claim that different forms of contentious politics involve similar causal processes. Think of mobilization, a central process in civil wars, revolutions, and social movements as well as in electoral campaigns, strikes, and warfare. Mobilization involves interaction between challenging actors and their targets, based on combinations of well-known and innovative forms of contention, around claims that are framed in ways that both attract support and communicate messages to both targets and significant others. As long as the same...
mechanisms and processes can be identified in different forms of contention, they can be studied together irrespective of the boundaries that scholars have established between these forms.

Social movements and lethal conflicts. This is not to claim that there are no empirical differences between social movements, which are mostly peaceful, and civil wars and revolutions, which generally involve large-scale violence. Two features in particular make a difference. First, killing, wounding, and damaging affect the survival of participants well after the immediate struggle has ended. Second, creating and maintaining armed force requires extensive resources. Large-scale lethal conflicts include interstate wars, civil wars, revolutions, and genocides as well as a significant subset of struggles across religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional boundaries. All of them involve high stakes and disciplined military organizations.

Even so, there are significant commonalities between lethal conflicts and social movements. As in more pacific conflicts, existing political opportunity structure interacts with established repertoires of contention to shape what sorts and degrees of large-scale violence occur within a given regime. When we compare large-scale lethal contention with social movements, we also see similar mechanisms and processes: environmental mechanisms, like resource extraction or depletion; dispositional mechanisms, like the hardening of boundaries between ethnic groups that formerly lived together; relational mechanisms like the brokerage of new connections between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites.

In contrast with social movements, which concentrate in high capacity democratic or democratizing states, lethal conflicts concentrate in low capacity authoritarian states. High capacity states reduce the threat from challengers both by offering routine opportunities for making low-level claims and by making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive means within their territories. Low capacity states fear that making concessions to low-level claims will trigger broader ones. They also more often face the threat that some rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use it to topple existing rulers.

Considering these different forms of contention within the same framework helps to understand three important properties of contentious politics: first, the rapid formation and transformation of different forms of contention (i.e., the “repertoire of contention”); second, the interactions between actors that form across institutional boundaries; and, third, transitions between different forms of contention and between contentious and conventional forms of interaction.

Repertoires of contention. Considering different forms of contention in the same framework helps to understand how the sets of performances that people habitually use in mounting contention both emerge and develop. Repertoires represent not only how people make claims but what they know about making claims and the reception by targets of their claims. Performances can be either linked to specific sites of contention – as the grain seizure is linked to famine and to little else – but they can also be “modular” – transferable from one axis of contention to another – like the strike, which was invented on the docks of London when seamen “struck” the sails of their ships but was adapted to the factory, the office, or the airplane.

Repertoires can be rigid or flexible, weak or strong. Historical studies of long periods of contentious politics reveal that strong repertoires are those that whose performances are strong enough to evolve without losing their essential properties. Such a performances is the demonstration, which evolved out of the religious procession to a patterned march and assembly in a public place, ending in speeches and sometimes in the presentation of petitions to officials. In general, since repertoires depend on structures of public order control and on cultural acceptance, they evolve slowly, but repertoire change is hastened in major episodes of contention, like the cycles of protest that marked the 1960s.
Movements and institutional boundaries. How does contentious politics relate to institutions? An earlier research tradition saw all political contention aimed against institutions. But properly seen, contention in the sense defined above can occur outside of, within, and on the boundaries of institutions. Boundaries between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics are hard to draw with precision. More important, the two sorts of politics involve similar causal processes. For example, the study of coalitions has almost always been operationalized within legislative institutions, but coalitions occur widely in the disruptions of rebellions, strikes, and social movements. As long as the same mechanisms and processes can be identified in institutional and non-institutional politics, they can be studied together irrespective of institutional boundaries.

Of course, institutions both constrain and enable contentious politics and that means that different kinds of regimes produce different configurations of contention. These connections among contention, political power, and institutions appear in both turbulent periods and in the more routine politics of both authoritarian regimes and settled democracies. But it is in weak authoritarian regimes and “anocracies” (so termed by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in a 2003 article), that the more violent forms of contention are most likely to develop.

Within the liberal states of the West and increasingly in the global South, contentious routines intersect with elections. The anti-authoritarian movements of the first decade of the twenty-first century in Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia were all touched off by charges of electoral corruption. Conversely, the anti-Iraq war movement in the United States contributed to the Democratic party’s takeover of Congress in 2006 and to the election of Barack Obama in 2008. More violently, the charges of electoral fraud in Kenya in 2007 led to bloody clashes between different ethnic groups and the destabilization of that country’s fragile democracy.

Contentious transitions. Changes in repertoires accompany changes in the overall forms of contention and, to some extent, help to explain them. Although many of the same routines are found in different forms of contention, transitions between these forms can be traced through changes in the combination and the intensity of different performances. Thus, the strike can touch off a revolution, set off ethnic violence, or end in institutionalized collective bargaining. Social movements can transform into institutionalized interest groups or produce a revolution, as the Islamist movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini led to the Iranian Revolution. The contentious transition we know as “democratization” frequently combines elite pacts at the summit with the pressure of strikes and social movements at the base of society.

Open questions. As in any evolving field, a number of contested issues score the surface of the study of contentious politics. Space limitations make it possible to provide only a brief sketch of the most important of these:

1. What about social movements that do not target the state? Do they fall outside the range of “contentious politics?”
2. What are the major outcomes of contentious politics: are they limited to the policy terrain or do they also involve cultural change and biographical impacts?
3. Do new forms of collective action – particularly Internet-based campaigns – challenge existing approaches to contentious politics, or will they eventually be absorbed into the repertoire of contention, much as the newspaper and television were?
4. What of globalization? Does it shift the targets of contention from national states to something beyond the state, or does it simply add the possibility of “forum shopping” to the strategies of claims-makers?

SEE ALSO: Anti-World Bank and IMF riots; Collective action (collective behavior); Revolutions; Riots; Social movements; Strikes within the European context; Strikes in US history.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Convergence/dispositional theory

DAVID A. SNOW and DEANA ROHLINGER

Convergence, or dispositional, approaches to crowds and social movements focus on various psychological traits and states that hypothetically render individuals more or less susceptible to participation. The underlying assumption is that specifiable personality characteristics and/or cognitive or emotional states are likely to make the appeal of some movements especially attractive, thereby predisposing some individuals to participation. Rather than focusing on the material basis or socially constructed character of grievances, attention is focused on the psychological manifestation of or responses to grievances. Thus, crowd and social movement participants are seen as a relatively undifferentiated and unrepresentative grouping of individuals because of the dispositional or tendencies they share. Hence the idea of convergence: the assemblage of “like-minded” or similarly disposed individuals, as represented in Eric Hoffer’s *The True Believer*. Especially prominent among the psychological and personality factors thought to account for this dispositional vulnerability to movement appeals are heightened frustration, a sense of relative deprivation, alienation, spoiled or stigmatized identities, and authoritarianism.

Convergence/dispositional accounts for the appeal and growth of social movements and mass gatherings were particularly popular during the 1940s and 1950s, in large part as an attempt to account for the appeal and growth of fascist and/or extremist movements such as Nazism and McCarthyism. However, these explanations were largely abandoned in the 1970s because of a number of intersecting critical observations (most of which are cataloged in McPhail 1991, and Turner & Killian 1987). First, there was a lack of compelling empirical support for the hypothesized causal link between individual predispositions and participation in riots and other mass gatherings. Second, convergence/dispositional arguments leave unexplained how it is that similarly disposed individuals manage to coalesce in the first place. In other words, they do not account for physical/spatial convergence. Third, the convergence thesis presumes a uniformity and continuity of participant behavior in crowds and social movements that is contradicted by the range and complexity in behavior revealed by more systematic observation. Fourth, the presumption of generalized dispositions, like intense frustration and/or relative deprivation, contradicts the observation that participation in crowds and social movements is often prompted by a variety of motives. Fifth, beginning in the 1970s there was a paradigmatic shift in theorizing about social movements that rendered the convergence/dispositional thesis even more suspect. Not only were participants increasingly regarded as being much more rational than previously thought, but social movement scholars became more sensitive to the interactive characteristics of mobilization and participation, which shifted attention to the socially embedded character of social movements and how social and political structures shaped and channeled mobilization and participation. Sixth, the growing recognition of the socially embedded character of social movement mobilization also made meaning-making processes and emotion more central to understanding mobilization and participation. Whereas the convergence/dispositional approach circumvented the need for meaning-making and conflated irrationality and emotion, social movement scholars increasingly became aware of the importance of both to understanding the dynamics of social movements (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2004; Snow 2004). Additionally, these meaning-making processes
and affective dimensions were found to be of importance to understanding the generation of grievances, mobilization, and participation. These critical observations and paradigm shifts notwithstanding, concern with some psychological predispositions and personality characteristics is not without some merit. If individuals get involved in social movements and related collective gatherings that express their interests and sentiments, then social psychological and personality factors that affect the level and type of participation may be important.

SEE ALSO: Contagion theory; Emergent norm theory; Frustration-agression; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Mass society theory; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Participation in social movements; Relative deprivation; Riots; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Conversion and new religious movements

JAMES T. RICHARDSON

Conversion, as the concept is used in the social sciences, is usually applied to joining a religious group, although the concept has considerable overlap with issues concerning recruitment and participation in other types of social movements. Recent conversion research in the area of sociology of religion has focused mainly on the question of how and why thousands of young people joined New Religious Movements (NRMs), even if temporarily. (Contrary to popular belief, defection or disaffiliation rates have always been quite high for NRMs, and most NRMs are small as a result.)

From the late 1960s through the 1980s seemingly large (in absolute terms) numbers of young people were choosing to participate in NRMs. Mass media focused on this phenomenon, which was in sharp contrast to participation in antiwar and other political movements of the time. Journalists posed the question of why this was happening with members of the most affluent and well-educated generation in American history. Scholars also became interested and began researching this intriguing question concerning NRMs, as well as other interesting issues concerning the new movements.

The early conversion research on NRMs usually was informed by traditional models of conversion that were quite individualistic, psychological, and deterministic in orientation. Such approaches assumed that something was wrong with a person if they converted to a religious group, and the approach also ignored historical and sociological considerations, as well as any notion of active agency and volition on the part of the individual choosing to participate in a religious group. Those applying these deprivation or psychopathological models quickly found them wanting, however, just as occurred with research on participation in political movements of the same time period.

An important way out of this conundrum was furnished by John Lofland, a doctoral student at UC Berkeley working under Rodney Stark. Lofland did ground-breaking research on the early beginnings of the Unification Church for his doctoral dissertation, and he published one of the first monographs about one of the controversial NRMs, Doomsday Cult. He and Stark also published a seminal article in the American Sociological Review in 1965 (“Becoming a World-Saver”) that has become the most-cited conversion/recruitment model in all of the social sciences. Included in the model are elements that are combined in a “value-added” manner, but not strictly chronologically. The first three elements are “predisposing characteristics,” while the last four are designated “situational factors.”

1. Long-term felt tension or strain by the individual
2. Possession of a “religious” rhetoric and problem-solving perspective by the individual
3. Self-definition by the person as a religious seeker
4. “Turning point” reached
5. Development of affective bonds between preconvert and group members
6. Weakened affective bonds with those outside the group
7. Intensive (usually communal) interaction with group members, making the convert a “deployable agent”

The model combined a psychological/individualistic perspective (first three elements) with a social psychological one (last three elements) that also is cognizant of sociological or structural considerations. The model integrates deterministic assumptions (elements 1 and 2).
concerning human beings with more agency-oriented ones as well (elements 3 and 4). Therefore, the model was attractive to researchers from several different persuasions and who adopted different philosophical approaches to the phenomenon of study.

The model was applied, most often in a post-hoc fashion, to many studies of conversion and recruitment, with mixed results. Several of the elements of the model that were more deterministic did not gain support with follow-up research, while the ones that did were more agency-oriented and social psychological in approach. Indeed, the importance of interaction with group members to conversion has stood the test of time, while most other elements of the model have lost favor. More sociological concepts such as pre-existing social networks also have come to the fore in conversion research.

It is noteworthy that Lofland himself changed his perspective considerably over the years, and began to direct his students, such as Roger Straus, to study “how individuals go about changing themselves” using NRMs as vehicles of change. Straus and others, including this author, have attempted to develop more full explanations of the conversion process that assumes the convert is an individual with volition who has decided to experiment with a new belief system and ethic, even if only for a short period of time, as they develop a “conversion career.”

This “conversion career” perspective has raised an issue of why so many contemporary young people have difficulty making longer term commitments to any set of beliefs or practices, and has led some scholars to question popular assumptions that NRM leaders have some powerful psychological techniques that overcome free will and force people to convert. Some scholars have referred to this latter view as the “myth of the omniscient leader,” a view that, while quite popular with the general public, has little support in the vast NRM research literature.

One major issue that arose in conjunction with this myth about why people join NRMs concerned the pseudo-scientific concept of “brainwashing.” Those opposed to the development and spread of NRMs included parents of some participants, representatives of some religious traditions who feared the loss of youth to the NRMs, and a few representatives of scholarly disciplines, particularly clinical psychology and psychiatry, some of whom (but not all) believed that participation in NRMs was a mental health problem that should be addressed by public policy changes and by the helping professions.

Those opposed to the NRMs coalesced into what came to be called the Anti-Cult Movement (ACM). This amorphous movement promoted the concept of “brainwashing” as a counter to the developing volition and social psychological perspective on why and how young people choose to participate in NRMs. This “Manchurian Candidate”-like concept was derived from a narrow and ideologically based interpretation of some early research on the resocialization techniques used by the communists in China in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the Chinese operating prison camps in Korea during the Korean War. The brainwashing concept as applied to NRM recruitment achieved near hegemonic status within the United States general public and even with political leaders, leading to efforts to pass laws against NRM conversion and legal cases against the movements because of the alleged damage caused by such groups. The concept also has diffused around the world, and undergirds public perceptions and public policy concerning recruitment to NRMs in a number of other nations.

Another issue that arose, in part because the “brainwashing” perspective became dominant in public discourse about conversion to NRMs, concerns what happens to the alleged convert in terms of personality. Popular perceptions that rely on the brainwashing motif as an explanation also often assume that some thoroughgoing personality change takes place when a leader or recruiter engages with a potential recruit and convinces them to join the group. However, considerable research has revealed that
there is no basic personality change associated with joining an NRM, but that there can be profound changes of belief and behavior associated with such actions. Further, some scholars have noted that such changes can be viewed as quite positive in terms of deterring more destructive lifestyles and promoting activities that improve one’s mental state and life situation. Indeed, one psychiatrist (Marc Galanter) has even written about the “relief effect” brought about by participation in NRMs.

The scholarly conversion literature has advanced greatly over the past few decades, but not without controversy, given that the bulk of research and scholarship associated with conversion to NRMs has evolved to a more agency-oriented view of this phenomenon, whereas much public opinion has been quite negative about what leads many young people to join new religious groups or cults. And it is worth noting that this more agency-oriented and social psychological/sociological perspective also has infused studies of conversion to more traditional religious groups as well.

SEE ALSO: Convergence/dispositional theory; Cults; Disengagement in social movements; Participation in social movements; Political socialization and social movements; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Co-optation
PATRICK G. COY

As social and political movements gain enough strength to seriously challenge the more powerful forces that legitimate and protect status quo arrangements in a country, a society, an institution, an agency, an organization, or other social system, those in authority who are being challenged may reach out to and attempt to bring the challengers into the system as participants. This formalized inclusion of challengers into the authority system that they are challenging is the essence of co-optation. An early and influential work on understanding co-optation is Philip Selznik’s (1949) study of how the Tennessee Valley Authority targeted and eventually absorbed local elites and community activists into its administrative structure in order to transform local opposition to TVA policies into support for those policies. Gamson’s (1990) analysis of 53 challenging groups, in which he defined co-optation as challengers gaining access to the public policy process but without achieving actual policy changes, is also important.

Those in authority may extend participation to challengers simply in order to turn back, channel, or at least moderate the threat faced by the authority system. Conversely, or even at the same time, they may genuinely wish to share power, create better practices and policies, and improve decision making within the authority system. In any case, the legitimacy of the challenger’s demands is recognized and some challengers are formally included at the germane decision-making tables. Co-optation includes institutionalizing and channeling communications between the authority system and its challengers in ways that tend to be conducive to the preservation of the authority system and its existing and preferred future policies. Inclusion does not necessarily result in power sharing. For example, in the TVA case Selznik showed that the co-opted leaders of local opposition groups often had to share the burdens associated with TVA administrative power without their having bona fide access to the agency’s power.

Co-optation also serves to blunt the radical demands and far-reaching changes advocated by challenging groups. It may have diluting, demobilizing, depoliticizing, and disempowering effects on the movement, its organizations, and on its leadership and key activists. For example, once a group gains access and a seat at the decision-making table, ongoing participation may become a primary goal of the formerly outsider challenging group, usurping its other goals. Equally important is the fact that inclusion and genuine participation in a decision-making or policy process often results in identification and ownership of its results for the participants, including the challengers. Thus co-optation of challenging groups contributes to the hegemony of the existing system and intensifies existing practices of social control.

Coy and Hedeen (2005) developed a four-stage model of social movement co-optation in their analysis of both the degrees and the dimensions of co-optation of the community mediation movement in the United States by the court system and the broader legal establishment. Each stage includes multiple steps and various manifestations of the co-optive process, including: the appropriation and harnessing of challenger discourse and techniques without their underlying values; the redefinition of movement terms and their application to antithetical practices; salience control; legitimation of challengers; assimilation of challenging group leadership; transformation of movement goals; establishing regulations that impact and control challengers in the future; and various resistant responses by the challenging group to these and other co-optation pressures. This model was later used as an interpretive framework in a study of the co-optation...
of family mediation in Israel by legal professionals. Finally, the co-optation pressures experienced by contemporary movements advocating for an international fair trade system, for organic foods and labeling, and for community health standards have each received significant scholarly attention in recent years.

SEE ALSO: Institutionalization of social movements; Outcomes, political; Social control.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Co-operative movement

FRANCESCA FORNO

The co-operative movement first emerged in Europe during the nineteenth century. Although scholarly research remains in disagreement about exactly where the movement began, many trace its origins back to a number of cooperative experiences that developed in Britain and France in the eighteenth century, especially in the farming industry and consumer organizations (Holyoake 1908).

During the years of the industrial revolution, co-ops spread across all Western countries as a reaction to the negative side-effects of industrialization. At that time, cooperatives became a means of economic organization for workers. Regardless of their type, size, geographical location, or purpose, cooperatives provided a tool by which to achieve one or more economic goals, such as improving bargaining power when dealing with other businesses, bulk purchasing to guarantee lower prices, obtaining products or services otherwise unavailable, gaining market access or broadening market opportunities, improving product or service quality, securing credit from financial institutions, and increasing income.

Although the first cooperatives appeared in the eighteenth century, it was from the Equitable Pioneers of Rochdale Society that the steadily spreading co-operative movement first began to gain ground. The Rochdale Society, generally recognized as the founding father of the modern cooperative movement, was established by a group of 28 weavers and other craftsmen in Rochdale, England, who decided in 1844 to band together to open their own store selling food items they could not otherwise afford (Digby 1948). The idea behind the Rochdale Pioneers – who between 1850 and 1855 also established a flourmill, a shoe factory, and a textile plant – was to reorganize industry from the consumption end, on the basis of production for use instead of production for exchange (Webb & Webb 1921).

This successful example was quickly emulated throughout Britain and elsewhere. By 1863, more than 400 British cooperative associations, modeled on the Rochdale Society, were in operation (Seth & Randal 1999). Thereafter, the number of societies and their members grew steadily and the British co-operative movement became the model for similar movements worldwide. Notable among the European countries in which workers’ cooperatives were soon to gain grassroots support were France, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

In the United States, the cooperative movement became widespread later than in Europe. The first co-ops were formed by farmers, either to help them buy necessities at lower cost or to help them market their produce more efficiently and at higher prices. Although a few large associations existed before World War I – such as the California Fruit Growers’ Exchange and the Eastern Shore of Virginia Produce Exchange – US cooperative societies remained mainly local and independent from one another for many decades (Hibbard 1929). It was in fact not until the early 1900s that the co-op societies began to increase in number and coordination, both as associations of producers and of consumers.

In 1895, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), a nongovernmental organization, was established as an umbrella organization designed to promote amicable economic relations between cooperative organizations of all kinds, both nationally and internationally. The major objective of the ICA was to promote and strengthen “the autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise” throughout the world (ICA 2011).
By the 1930s, the ICA had become an extensive organization claiming to represent the interests of 100 million cooperators in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and beyond (Hilson 2011).

Although the nature of ownership rules may vary greatly between individual cooperative societies, the general idea behind these kinds of association is that members should share the economic burden of producing or buying goods, and divide any financial surplus amongst them at the end of the year. As well as in farming and retailing, cooperative societies are also present in almost every sector, including banking, insurance, housing, transport, and so on.

While earlier interpretations of the cooperative movement tended to describe it as devoid of ideological aspiration, more recent works have underlined how its role went well beyond the provision of groceries and other necessities (Hilson 2009, 2011). Through their educational work, social life (expressed through activities ranging from dance and billiard halls, libraries, and women’s and men’s guilds, to children’s summer camps) and internationalism, cooperative societies were fundamental for the spread of a culture of cooperation and the formation of social ties among their members, which in several cases led to collective actions undertaken by specific social groups (Gurney 1996). In this respect, the role of cooperation in mobilizing consumer interest among working-class housewives, especially during World War I, is of particular interest. The Women’s Cooperative Guild, for example, has been acknowledged as one of the most radical and influential working-class women’s organizations in early twentieth-century Britain (Scott 1998).

The history of the cooperative movement has been a cyclical one. The number of cooperative societies tends to grow in times of economic crisis. After the emergence of the movement during the nineteenth century, a surge in the number of co-ops coincided with the Great War. High inflation, war profiteering, and food shortages contributed to the shift toward alternative solutions.

The Great Depression triggered another wave of co-ops. In all Western countries, cooperatives organized in cities and rural areas produced a variety of goods for trade and self-use, and organized exchanges between laborers and farmers in which people would work for a share of the produce. During these years, the movement gained support from many national governments, which in some cases provided major assistance to rural and farmer cooperatives. This was the case for example of Roosevelt’s New Deal programs in the 1930s (Conkin 1959).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, a new generation rediscovered cooperation, collectivity, and communalism and a “new wave” of co-ops emerged out of sixties counterculture to promote economic participation. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, cooperative ideologies and organizations gained many new supporters and promoters in civil society, including antiapartheid campaigners, pro-development NGOs, and alternative trading organizations aiming to help producers in developing countries.

However, despite considerable pressure from their members, most established cooperative societies – such as the British CWS (Co-operative Wholesale Society) – failed to connect with the new initiatives demanding greater social justice and fairer trade. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the major cooperatives’ priorities remained those of securing a consistent supply of produce and maintaining a relevant market share. Increasing competition from supermarkets and multinational corporations during these years led to most ethical concerns being dropped from the agenda of major cooperative organizations (Anderson 2009).

Things started to change once more in the mid-1990s. On one hand, the increasing desires among Western citizens for eco-friendly and ethical products pushed many cooperative societies to rethink their trade policies, adopting a more clearly ethical stance. On the other hand, faced with increasing environmental and financial challenges, new forms
of cooperation between consumer–producer groups – such as community-supported agri-
culture and other forms of alternative trade networks – also started to regain momentum
in Europe and North America, to some extent reappraising the nineteenth-century Rochdale
Pioneers’ original ideas on the need to reorganize economic life on the basis of human and
social needs, not just accumulation (e.g., the degrowth discourse, Latouche 2010).

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Civil society; Ideology; Labor movement;
Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Countercultures
ROSS HAENFLER

The term counterculture describes a variety of social subgroups possessing distinctive norms and values in opposition to the widely accepted beliefs and practices of the dominant culture. Countercultures espouse primarily a cultural, rather than explicitly political, challenge commonly enacted through alternative lifestyles rather than direct challenges to institutional authority structures such as governments or corporations. While the term is widely used in both scholarly and pop culture contexts, its usage is imprecise. In the context of social movement studies, countercultures may be considered as a type of social movement (e.g., forms of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender movements), part of a social movement (e.g., cultural feminism), separate from but overlapping with social movements (e.g., hippies and the New Left), or more distinct from movements and conceptually closer to subcultures (e.g., punk). Contemporary definitions of social movements are broad enough to include the sorts of collective behavior typically labeled countercultural, sometimes called countercultural movements. Specifically, countercultures are extra-institutional challenges to cultural (rather than institutional) authority structures, generally informally organized yet having some degree of continuity (see Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004).

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND THE COUNTERCULTURE

The contemporary concept of counterculture emerged from J. Milton Yinger’s (1960) notion of “contracultures.” Yinger distinguishes central/countercultures from subcultures; the former emerge from conflict with and within the larger society, while the latter constitute any variety of groups distinguished by their own norms, whether or not in opposition to dominant norms. Importantly, then, countercultures must be understood in relation to the larger culture.

Theodore Roszak (1995) popularized the concept “counter culture,” describing the variety of 1960s youth cultural rebellions of Europe and the United States that came to be known as the Counterculture. Descended from the “Beats” but most associated with the hippies, the Counterculture encompassed a broad cultural resistance primarily of alienated youth against a “technocratic society” that privileges “experts,” rational planning, and scientific thinking at the expense of creativity and human fulfillment. More than a system of power relations and inequalities, technocracy “is the expression of a grand cultural imperative, a veritable mystique that is deeply endorsed by the populace” (Roszak 1995: xiv).

Such broad criticism or rejection of cultural imperatives – conformity, consumerism, sexual mores, gender roles, religious doctrine – are common to contemporary countercultures as well, whether progressive or conservative. For example, the “slow food” and “locovore” countercultures resist nearly every aspect of the modern “McDonaldized” food system by avoiding chain restaurants, cooking meals with fresh ingredients, shopping at farmers’ markets, making mealtime sacred, and gardening or engaging in community-supported agriculture.

CONCEPTUAL LOCATION:
COUNTERCULTURES, SUBCULTURES,
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

While the Counterculture initially embraced a broad, generalized rejection of major sociocultural norms – gender, racial, sexual, economic, religious, and so on – it later splintered
into a variety of identity-based movements with segments engaged in: political confrontation (e.g., Black Power, nuclear freeze, peace movements); creating cultural refuges (e.g., gay communities, communes, New Age religions and other new religious movements); or both (e.g., feminist consciousness raising circles, “green” movements, anarchist punks). While the Counterculture included political activists, the “flower children” were in some ways empirically distinct from the New Left’s civil rights and antiwar activists. The former focused on creating and living alternatives to hegemonic culture, separate, to a lesser or greater degree, from dominant institutions, while the latter confronted those institutions directly. While overemphasizing the conceptual boundaries between countercultures, subcultures, and social movements is unproductive, the focus and emphasis of each form of collective behavior is worth noting.

Countercultures share characteristics of both subcultures and social movements. Like participants in social movements, counterculturists construct grievances and profess a desire for change. They foster collective identities as well as encouraging personal “identity work.” Similar to subcultures, countercultures often involve intentional lifestyle choices, pursuit of esoteric interests, and alternative daily routines rather than protest activity and conflict with the state (see Haenfler 2006). Yet countercultures are typically less organized than movements and more change-oriented than subcultures. Subcultures, while certainly critical of the “parent” culture, tend to be more narrowly focused on style, leisure, and youth, while countercultures often formulate a more coherent and actionable opposition. Thus while goth, rave, heavy metal, and other youth groupings certainly have political elements, they primarily serve as leisure spaces where youth can (often temporarily) experiment with deviant identities and fashions. Countercultures “often challenge and seek to challenge and change existing cultural understandings that function in an authoritative manner” (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004: 8), and their structure consists more of diffuse networks bonded via shared cultural materials and events (e.g., music festivals, periodic seminars, zines, blogs, and websites) than social movement organizations.

RELEVANCE TO SM STUDIES

The concept of counterculture is relevant to social movement studies in several ways. First, countercultures may be examined as a form of prefigurative politics, sowing the seeds of change and facilitating movement emergence and mobilization. Likewise, social movements inspire countercultures, as the civil rights movement did for the sixties Counterculture by encouraging “egalitarian contact between black civil rights activists and the white student left” (McAdam 2000: 266). Countercultures often share members with a variety of movements and are ripe for recruitment to contentious politics. They may also be considered free spaces and abeyance structures, serving as staging grounds for consciousness raising, collective identity formation, or movement strategizing, and sustaining commitment between protest cycles. Countercultures may be part of movement “legacies”; the American Jewish havurah (fellowship groups) carried on after the Jewish student movement’s 1968–1972 peak, providing space for both spiritual exploration and continued political criticism (Friedman 1993).

Second, countercultures have much in common with new social movements (NSMs), the variety of identity-based, post-labor movements focused on postmaterialist values such as human rights, peace, and environmental sustainability. Kriesi (1996) places “countercultural movements” as one of three types of new social movements. Instrumental NSMs, such as peace movements, are goal-oriented and not overly concerned with fostering collective identity; subcultural NSMs, such as gay and lesbian movements, “aim at the (re)production of a collective identity that is primarily constituted in within-group interaction, but which depends on authority-oriented action as well”;

2 COUNTERCULTURES
and countercultural NSMs, while also identity-oriented, create, and enact identities primarily in conflict with authorities (Kriesi 1996: 158). Countercultures, then, are less institutionalized, less instrumental, and more expressive than the collective behavior most commonly understood as social movements (“new” or not). Counterculturists’ efforts toward social change entail both collective and individual elements, but similar to new social movements, most action occurs at the individual level: “many contemporary movements are ‘acted out’ in individual actions rather than through or among mobilized groups” (Johnston, Larana, & Gusfield 1994: 7). Despite constituting communities of like-minded people, countercultures place a premium on individuality – of thought, style, and expression (Goffman & Joy 2004). As an example, anarchist punks may eschew careers, squat in vacant buildings, and adopt “anti-fashion” styles to resist capitalist culture, but tend to frame their involvement as an expression of individualism in conflict with what they view as conformist culture.

Third, countercultures highlight the growing scholarly interest in expanding theories of movement strategy and participation beyond the political process paradigm. The image of strategic, mobilized activists belonging to social movement organizations engaged in collective, public protest targeted toward the state or other institutional authority structures does not, as others have pointed out, capture all avenues of social change action. Countercultures, like NSMs, utilize strategies of both social and personal transformation and participation is as much individual as it is collective. For example, the voluntary simplicity movement encourages adherents to reject consumerism, workaholism, and disposability in order to advance an ethic of environmental sustainability by reducing consumption and waste, but also to lead more fulfilling, intentional personal lives, spend more time with friends and family, or pursue spiritual goals. Such a movement’s participation requires changes in personal behavior in the (relatively) private sphere versus collective action in the public domain. Yet voluntary simplifiers share a collective identity, a sense of community (however diffuse), and a belief that their individual choices add up to a collective cultural challenge.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The concept of countercultures is underutilized in contemporary research, perhaps because the theorizing of new social movements and the critique of political process and organizational models has widened movement definitions to include collective behavior that may have once been labeled countercultural. Still, there are several questions worthy of study.

First, how do countercultures and protest cycles overlap? For example, how does the growth of the “green living” counterculture coincide with contemporary environmental activism? Does a shift to “everyday activism” blunt, spark, or supplement political protest? Are countercultures (like subcultures) more vulnerable to co-optation and commodification than are social movements? Or are they better able to persist because they are less tied to the political opportunities of the moment?

Second, and related, what are the connections between contentious politics, countercultures, and electoral politics? Conservative Christian countercultures, for example, cultivate homogenous, value-based communities in defiance of perceived moral decline. As part of that counterculture, virginity pledge groups focus primarily on personal abstinence framed as resistance to a pornographic culture (rather than pushing for abstinence-only public policies), creating cultural spaces within which to reject dominant sexual practices. Yet clearly conservative Christian movements have also engaged in contentious and electoral politics. What are the connections? What role do countercultures play in the larger social movement sector?

Finally, studying countercultures in relation to movements may shed new light on many of the same theoretical topics related to the study
of contentious politics – movement emergence, framing, emotion, decline, and so on. Examining the differences – in structure, focus, goals, tactics, and participation – between countercultures and social movements, might give new insights into how, for example, framing and grievance mobilization occur in diffuse, lifestyle-centered groups.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Everyday activism; Free spaces; Identity politics; New social movements and new social movement theory; Outcomes, cultural; Prefigurative politics; Subcultures and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Critical mass theory
PAMELA OLIVER

“Critical mass theory” in social movements refers loosely to any formal theory about how interdependent decisions accumulate into collective action or more narrowly to work in the tradition of Marwell and Oliver (1993). The term “critical mass” originates in nuclear physics, as the smallest amount of fissile material needed to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. As analogy or metaphor the term has diffused into popular culture and social science and is widely used to refer to any context in which things change after a certain number of people get together or enter a setting. The term has been especially important in research and court cases about racial/ethnic or gender diversity in college admissions or employment (Addis 2007). Social movement activists and scholars often use “critical mass” in a loose metaphorical way to refer to an initial group of protesters or actors that is big enough to accomplish social change. Critical Mass Bulletin was the name given to the 1970s newsletter for scholars of collective behavior and social movements. An article written in the early 1970s bemoaned the lack of critical mass of scholars studying collective behavior (Quarantelili & Weller 1974).

SIMPLE CRITICAL MASS MODELS

In Granovetter’s (1978) influential paper on threshold models of collective behavior, individuals are assumed to attend to the number of others who act in a certain way and vary in the threshold number of others whose actions change their own choice. Whether a cascade of action occurs or not is highly sensitive to the presence of gaps in a distribution and the degree of group heterogeneity which, as Oliver (1993) shows, affects the proportion of a group who are self-starters (i.e., have thresholds of zero). Granovetter and Soong (1983) provide further elaborations. Macy (1991) reworks Granovetter’s models in stochastic learning terms, finding similar results. The image in these models is that collective action happens not from coordination and planning, but spontaneously through local interactional influence.

CRITICAL MASS THEORY

In social movements, the critical mass is often understood not just as a spontaneous consequence of individual decisions, but as self-conscious cadres of actors who are intentionally trying to “make something happen” in pursuit of a social change goal. In a series of articles titled “a theory of the critical mass,” later collected into a book (Marwell & Oliver 1993), Oliver and Marwell developed a variety of models for the provision of collective goods which emphasized the different roles of a relatively small group of intentional actors in promoting social change. “Critical mass theory” will be used in this section to refer to this specific line of theory. In it the desired social change is conceptualized as the rational choice concept of a collective good. Following Olson (1965), collective goods have two dimensions: nonexcludability (the extent to which a good provided to one group member cannot be withheld from other group members) and jointness of supply (the extent to which a good can be provided to more people without increasing its cost). Group heterogeneity and interdependent action are taken as givens. A central concept in the theory is the production function, that is, a mathematical expression of the form \( y = f(x) \) that gives the relation between outputs of the collective good (\( y \)) and inputs of participation or contribution (\( x \)). Unlike other approaches, critical mass theory treats the form of the production function itself as a factor that defines different types of collective action situations.
with different dynamics. A central claim of critical mass theory is that “there is no unitary phenomenon of ‘collective action’ that can be described by a simple set of theoretical propositions” and that it is futile to pose “general questions such as ‘Is collective action rational?’ or ‘Do people free-ride?’” (Marwell & Oliver 1993: 3). Instead, the goal is to use theoretical concepts to define specific sub-types of collective action and explore how their dynamics vary as parameters describing them vary.

In their foundational paper (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira 1985), Oliver and Marwell distinguish between decelerating and accelerating production functions for goods that are both fully nonexcludable and have perfect jointness of supply. In both the accelerating and decelerating cases, a relatively small group of highly interested and resourceful actors play a critical role in collective action, but the character of their role varies. In the accelerating case, the marginal increase in $y$ is greater for later contributions of $x$ and collective actions exhibit threshold effects and the “exploding” dynamics typically envisioned in the critical mass metaphor. In the accelerating case, the central problem of collective action is efficacy: can a large-enough group of potential contributors be mobilized to pass the critical mass threshold? By contrast, in the decelerating case where the marginal increase in $y$ is smaller for later contributions of $x$, earlier contributors provide enough of the collective good for everyone that other potential contributors are satisfied and thus motivated to “free ride” on the efforts of others. In the decelerating case, strategic gaming and free riding are potential issues, and original contributors are motivated to try to persuade less-interested people to help share the costs of collective action. Theoretical results are complex and often incorrectly oversimplified in citations. Their simplest paper on the “group size” effect (Oliver & Marwell 1988; also Marwell & Oliver 1993: ch. 3) argues that heterogeneity and group size interact to produce a smaller critical mass (number of people whose contributions add up to enough to provide a jointly supplied collective good) when the mean level of interest or resources would be too low to make people willing to contribute to a jointly supplied collective good.

Work has moved in different directions from their initial insights. Marwell and Oliver themselves primarily focused on the effects of group heterogeneity and networks in the second-order mobilization problem, in which a relatively small group of initial activists or organizers expend resources to recruit others to participate. In this work, the “critical mass” refers to organizers. In one analysis (Marwell, Oliver, & Prahl 1988; also Marwell & Oliver 1993: ch. 5), they model an organizer-centered mobilization of an all-or-none contract in an accelerating case, finding a simple negative effect of organizing costs, a simple positive effect of network density, and a complex effect in which more centralized networks are more beneficial in highly heterogeneous groups. In another (Marwell & Oliver 1993: ch. 6) they model a situation in which both mobilization and information-gathering involve costs and organizers choose between mobilizing more people unselectively or paying the information cost to target mobilization on fewer larger contributors, finding that information is worth more as group heterogeneity increases. In a third (Prahl, Marwell, & Oliver 1991; also Marwell & Oliver 1993: ch. 7) they use a different model for the trade-offs between reach and selectivity in organizer-centered recruitment campaigns with accelerating production functions, finding that all factors exhibit multidimensional thresholds that must be exceeded before collective action can occur and then approach asymptotes.

THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS AND ELABORATIONS

Macy (1990) reformulated the original Oliver–Marwell (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira 1985) “critical mass” model using backward-looking adaptive learning instead of forward-looking rational decisions and replacing the production function with an
S-shaped logistic function that combines an early accelerating phase and a later decelerating phase. In a rational-action model like that of Oliver and Marwell, actors only act if they expect benefits to exceed costs. In an adaptive learning model, actors respond to their absolute level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction: actors in an unhappy situation will randomly experiment with alternate behavior. If enough happen to experiment at the same time, in Macy’s models, the critical mass can be exceeded and the action cascade proceeds to the second cooperative equilibrium, where the production function becomes decelerating. Macy also argues that solidarity and cooperative action can be a consequence of crisis (i.e., a bad initial situation).

Gould (1993) builds on both the Granovetter and Oliver–Marwell work to consider situations in which people are most influenced by the contribution levels of those near them. Gould assumes this works through a fairness norm in which most people want to make contributions similar to those adjacent to them, although there is a subset of unconditional contributors. In this work, the location of unconditional contributors in a network makes a substantial difference in the impact of network density and size. As in earlier work, results are often nonlinear and exhibit thresholds and interactions among independent variables, once again finding that different mobilization contexts yield different dynamics.

Heckathorn (1996) synthesizes critical mass theory with several other strands of work to define a composite game in which actors make choices at three levels: (1) in the first-order game, they can contribute or not to a collective good; (2) in the second-order game (Oliver 1980), they can contribute to a selective incentive system to promote contribution to the collective good, incur costs to oppose the incentive system, or do nothing in the second-order game; (3) in a third-order game, they either incur an information cost to make their actions conditioned upon others’ actions, or they can make theirs unconditional. Using a representation of the production function that distinguishes between accelerating and decelerating functions, Heckathorn shows that the shape of the production function and the ratio of the value of the collective good to the cost of using an incentive jointly define a space in which different regions have different strategic dilemmas. In a subsequent article, Heckathorn (1998) argues that five distinct ideologies for reconciling potential conflicts between individual and collective interests can be identified, each corresponding to a distinct form of social dilemma.

RELEVANCE FOR UNDERSTANDING REAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Critical mass theory and other formal models are not directly relevant to the complexities of real social movements, but do provide insights into the dynamics and dilemmas that underlie movements. As several authors stress, (e.g., Marwell & Oliver 1993; Heckathorn 1996), activists often make conscious strategic choices that are essentially choices between different production functions or games. For example, activists might choose an informational lobbying campaign with a decelerating production function or they might adopt a second-order recruitment and incentive strategy to persuade people to join together in a mass campaign with an accelerating production function. Formal critical mass analysis offers tools for understanding these choices.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Collective efficacy; Collective (public) goods; Contagion theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Experimental methods; Free rider problem; Networks and social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Cults
ROBERT W. BALCH

A cult is a religious movement whose beliefs and/or practices are regarded as highly unconventional. Beyond that, scholars disagree about the meaning of the term and the significance of the phenomenon.

Until the 1970s, sociologists generally regarded the cult as an inconsequential, ephemeral form of religious organization. Most often it was described as a small, loosely knit group with unorthodox beliefs and usually a charismatic leader, but which lacked a coherent doctrine and required little or nothing from its members. Cults were distinguished from sects, which were seen as highly cohesive communities that require strict adherence to doctrine, make great demands on their members, and often live separately from society. Wallis (1974) attributed the organizational differences between cults and sects to differences in their epistemological foundations. He argued that the sect is “epistemologically authoritarian,” meaning it claims a single Truth, whereas the cult is “epistemologically individualistic,” leaving matters of Truth and salvation up to each individual.

However, even as Wallis was writing in the 1970s, the cult–sect dichotomy was being challenged by the unexpected proliferation of radical religious movements in Western societies, particularly the United States. The most visible groups (e.g., the Unification Church and Children of God) had features of both cults and sects. They had highly unorthodox beliefs and charismatic leaders, but they were also closed, tightly knit, doctrinaire communities. Because they were epistemologically authoritarian, Wallis referred to them as sects, but other scholars defined them cults because of their deviant beliefs and practices. More significantly, they were labeled as cults in the mass media and by an emerging anticult movement (ACM).

During the 1970s, media depictions of cults became overwhelmingly negative and relied heavily on expert opinions provided by the ACM, which claimed that cults were psychologically harmful and potentially dangerous. ACM experts saw cults as high-demand organizations distinguished by charismatic leadership, rigid group boundaries, strict control over daily life, and the use of powerful influence processes, popularly known as “brainwashing.”

The anticult perspective was quickly challenged by social scientists who were studying these movements. Labeled “cult apologists” by the ACM, these scholars rejected the brainwashing hypothesis, claiming that converts are willing participants in their own conversions, and that, in any event, brainwashing does not work very well, as demonstrated by high rates of defection from even the most notorious cults. The ACM lost momentum in the 1990s, but the role of social influence in conversion remains a contentious issue.

The apologists also accused the ACM of stereotyping cults based on a few sensational but atypical cases (e.g., the Peoples Temple mass suicide). In fact, the movements branded as cults by the ACM varied so widely that they had almost nothing in common except that their beliefs and practices were perceived as deviant. By the end of the 1970s, the matter of what constitutes a cult was more confused than ever.

Stark and Bainbridge (1985) tried to clear up the ambiguity by defining both cults and sects in terms of their relationship to the dominant religious culture, represented by mainstream religious organizations known as churches. Although both cults and sects deviate from religious norms, sects are schismatic movements (usually fundamentalist) that attempt to revitalize an existing faith, whereas cults are genuinely new in that they inject novel ideas into a society’s religious culture. Some cults represent religions transplanted from other societies (e.g.,...
Buddhism), while others are true cultural innovations (e.g., Mormonism and Scientology).

Stark and Bainbridge further classified cults by their degree of organization. “Audience cults” are least organized and require no commitment beyond reading a web page or attending occasional lectures. Somewhat more organized are “client cults” that provide spiritual services in exchange for money. Audience and client cults appear equivalent to the ephemeral cults described by Wallis. Most organized, but least common, are “cult movements,” which are true religions that provide a total way of life and demand major commitments, including severing all ties to other religious organizations. Cult movements would be sects under Wallis’s rubric, and would include most of the high-profile new religions of the 1970s. In contrast to most scholars, Stark and Bainbridge gave cults a leading role in the drama of religious change. Cults introduce new ideas, inspire social action, start new traditions, and, in rare cases (most recently, the Mormon Church) evolve into world religions.

Nevertheless, by the end of the twentieth century, the term “cult” was used in such diverse ways and had acquired so many negative connotations that most social scientists had abandoned it in favor of “new religious movement” (NRM). Yet “NRM” has proved equally problematic. Sects, for example, are also new, but the term NRM is customarily reserved for movements that used to be called cults. Newness itself is ambiguous, sometimes referring to recency of origin and other times to cultural distinctiveness.

Despite continued terminological confusion, cult scholars have amassed a vast amount of data on topics directly related to social movement studies, for example: movement origins, charisma, recruitment, conversion, commitment, defection, and factors related to movement growth and decline. Though studies of North American NRMs dominated during the twentieth century, the emphasis has shifted to religious movements in other societies, enabling cross-cultural tests of Western-based theories. Yet the NRM literature has been virtually ignored by social movement scholars, and cult researchers have responded in kind. Both fields could benefit from cross-fertilization.

SEE ALSO: Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Charisma; Conversion and new religious movements; Extremism; Falun Gong (China); Japanese “new” religious movements (1930—present); Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Decolonization and social movements
VINCE BOUDREAU

In their influence on state and social structures, colonial processes established some of the basic parameters for the social movements that contested imperial rule, and for those that rose to confront the independent governments of the newly postcolonial world. For decades, the study of decolonization was mainly the purview of area specialists, who approached these events with the interdisciplinary inclinations of men and women wanting deeply to understand the specific dynamics of particular places. For theorists of social movements, decolonization and contention posed analytic puzzles, because such processes seldom followed the patterns inscribed by political reform movements on which most of the early literature was rooted. More recently, analysts have made more concerted efforts to think theoretically about contention in the colonial and postcolonial worlds, even as new theoretical developments, such as the Dynamics of Contention program, have provided new ways to approach these struggles (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).

In assessing decolonization and contention, the analyst must often adjust key conceptual tools to capture new ranges of variation. What shaped the range of opportunities and alliances available to movement activists? How did different colonial arrangements – some of which imposed draconian restrictions of assembly or organization – influence mobilization patterns? What forms of resistance, including armed insurgency, confronted colonial regimes, and what legacies did these struggles leave? To answer, we are drawn to consider concepts that have been generally central to the analysis of social movements – political opportunity structures, repertoires of contention, mobilizing structures, and collective action frames – in a new light. In colonial and decolonizing contexts, these concepts often unfold in relationship to distinct empirical realities: political opportunity may have less to do with an election or a policy cycle, and more with a military coup or demonetization. The repertoire of contention may range from millenarian risings to the appropriation of the legal arena. Mobilizing structures may need to contain elites with degrees from some of Europe’s finest universities and village residents whose traditions remain rooted in local ideas of authority, justice, and citizenship. Moreover, histories of colonial domination, nationalist emergence and struggle, and postcolonial state- and regime-building form a path-dependent chain, with the legacies of earlier forms of struggle and domination setting the tone for much of what follows – because rather more than in settled political regimes, decolonization struggles often play out over years and decades, and participants in those struggles often remain in the political field, as authorities and challengers, for years after independence.

As Young (1994) reminds us, while colonial regimes had the framework and technology for modern state-building and domination, they were often limited in the resources they commanded. Most imperial projects set out to secure what was imagined to be vast economic opportunities in national resources and trade – and even the later Berlin-conference-era rush for African colonies was conceived as a relative advance, if only in terms of blocking rivals’ access to territory. In virtually all cases, however, lacking the capacities to directly administer the state apparatus, colonial states enlisted and trained local forces to collaborate on the project. While the power structure in these arrangements varied to reflect the interaction of colonial plans and existing local arrangements, in all cases, colonial administrations
strongly influenced where rivalry, resentment, and resistance to colonialism would most likely emerge, and so provide the crucible in which many modes of contention were first forged.

Four elements of the colonial context are most important in establishing the contours of contention: First, how directly did the colonial apparatus attempt to govern colonial society? Second, what was the geographic scope of colonial rule? Third, what spaces did the colonial system open up, even via its repressive apparatus, for members of colonial society to develop bonds of solidarity with one another? And, finally, how did international influences, including anticolonial norms or factors that may weaken the imperial power, influence patterns of anticolonial struggle?

THE DIRECTNESS OF COLONIAL RULE

The colonial administrator and writer, John Furnival, aptly divided colonial domination projects into regimes that are directly ruled and those that worked more indirectly, through local leaders (Furnival 1948). Directly ruled administrations tended to unseat local authority structures, and in their place, create and train a cadre of officials specially designed to carry forth the colonial mission. The singular institution of the directly ruled colony was the colonial school, in which young and promising men learned the rules of governmental administration. Armies and colonial militia were often also created from the whole community, and frequently recruited from among the ranks of populations ethnically distinct and physically distant from lowland centers of traditional and colonial power. In these different respects, colonial forces created their own social and administrative foundations, often calling forth significant tension with whatever older elites existed. Indirectly ruled administrations, in contrast, drew existing elites and more traditional authorities into the colonial administration, overlaying established functions and powers with new tasks. Outside the administrative context, among the ranks of traders, writers, and nongovernmental schools, nationalism often emerges at least in part as contestation with “collaborating” elites.

In either case, relationships between power, capacity, and status deserve close examination, because they signal where and how nationalism will emerge and the kinds of mobilization it will likely inspire. Hence, if and when the colonial administration has (in the minds of administrators) recruited sufficient local talent, the administrative schools will begin to graduate young men (always young men!) who were less and less likely to find gainful employment with the colonial regime. Across the colonial world, the existence of educated local people living outside the colony has virtually always presented a habitat for the emergence of nationalist resistance. In other places, the new status of populations traditionally marginal to local power arrangements — one thinks of the various hill tribes that formed the backbone of many colonial levies — will engender or enflame ethnic rivalries, as has the common colonial practice of recording and ossifying what had been fluid or less salient ethnic differences. Because it depends on a structure of internal boundaries demarcating different rights and privileges among races, colonial status structures inevitably set up moments in which educated and skilled colonial subjects are subordinate to less skilled, less educated colonists. The fact that nationalist movements often do not emerge among the most repressed, but rather among those who have been the most involved in colonial administrations or schools, demonstrates the tremendous power of the juxtaposition of talent and limited opportunities in generating nationalist movements.

THE SCOPE OF COLONIALISM

Second, apart from the directness of colonial rule, colonialism’s geographic scope also matters, both in relationship to nationalist movements and more generally. Some colonial powers sink down deep roots in cosmopolitan colonial centers, and project a far
weaker presence into the countryside. Others, typically associated more with plantation or other extractive economic activities, elaborate a pattern of rule and penetration across broader geographic expanses. The sheer magnitude of the administrative tasks associated with this more expansive colonial domination suggests that colonists in them will often govern indirectly, via local functionaries. But the matter is worth independent investigation, because particularly in the postcolonial era, contention will in some large measure reflect how differently patterned states, at least initially inherited from the colonial era, interact with newly national societies. The scope of colonial rule helps establish both the contours of anticolonial resistance and the character of struggles that will likely follow. Colonialism elaborated across vast territory may be expected to call forth patterns of geographically broad resistance as well, and may influence how integrated the idea of the emergent political community may be. Where colonialism settles into central enclaves, even successful movements of independence may set up subsequent struggles in which central states must work to incorporate potentially resistant national peripheries – often sparking new rounds of struggle and contention.

SOLIDARITY AND CONNECTION UNDER COLONIAL RULE

A third consequential element of the colonial setting is the ways in which interactions between colonial rule and local society produce contexts that could support solidarity and rivalry among what had been more separated peoples. In some cases, new solidarities emerged in colonial-era schools, or in the military, or as a result of the efforts of local people to construct shadow martial or educational institutions because they are barred from those the state had established. Elsewhere, state efforts to check subversion – and especially the construction of penal colonies – created institutions in which nationalist leaders met and learned from one another. Hence, the “prison as school” is an important and widespread idiom in nationalist movements. Travel between the colonies and the metropolitan power, sometimes for education and sometimes for business, often provided emerging nationalists with opportunities to meet one another and to make contact with cosmopolitan political currents. Perhaps most important of all, travel to Europe, the United States, Japan, and China often provided perspectives that exploded the racial and political myths on which colonialism depended. But while colonialism established and strengthened some solidarities, it also initiated or sharpened rivalries. Mamdani (1996) describes colonial practice in Africa as depending on a kind of apartheid across the continent that established permanent differences between urban and rural society. Elsewhere, colonial policies established borders that cross-cut pre-existing ethnic divisions, or took fluid identity categories and, by dint of administrative practice, made them more permanent, in the process setting the stage for future contention.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND ANTICOLONIAL RESISTANCE

Finally, international factors also influence contention under colonialism in several ways. In important measure, colonial practice evolved over time, and different administrations reflect the spirit of their age, and often the politics of metropolitan societies. Early colonialism, driven by the powerful Dutch and British merchant companies, sparked resistance among merchants and traders – one thinks of the Sepoy mutiny in India or the leading role that Muslim traders played in Indonesian nationalism. Sharply different conflict emerged under settlement colonialism, which sought to eliminate indigenous populations, or incorporate them as servants and laborers in what was imagined as a fully articulated European or American society and governing system (largely realized in places like the United States and Australia; less so in places
like Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa). The aristocratic character of Latin American nationalist movements, and the regimes they produced, reflects international influences as well: war-weakened Spain surrendered its colonial possessions a full century ahead of transitions in Asia or Africa – at a time before working classes were incorporated or modern states had developed the technology to incorporate their peripheries. Without access to either liberal or Marxist idioms to guide politics, local elites replaced colonial elites, but established a pattern of rule that embraced and indigenized the aristocratic entitlements of colonial practice.

Near the turn of the twentieth century, questions of citizenship and rights provided a new locus of contention, partly reflecting imperialism’s newly prominent nation-building concerns. This rights-based discourse sprang in part from colonists’ need to reconcile their practice with political trends at home, particularly as liberalizing currents swept Europe. America’s later external colonialism (as distinct from the bloody domestic manifestations of its destiny) emerged entirely within that current and was more liberal in both its rhetoric and the prospects it opened for local political participation (something that shouldn’t eclipse the decimation of the Philippine population during the American conquest). The more prominently questions of rights loomed in the colonies, the more contention clustered around demands for participation and voice in the colonial edifice – although, often, such settings also raised sharp conflict over whether to engage or overthrow the colonial order. Outside that liberal orbit, the distinctive character of Japanese colonialism also had much to do with world time, reflecting both the sharp economic needs of a late-developing modernizer and a missionary devotion to modernity itself; no wonder that this more closed approach to colonial subjects produced some of the sharpest and most enduring nationalist resistance, particularly in places like Korea.

International warfare involving imperial powers also strongly influenced the opportunities available on the ground in colonial settings, sometimes by merely weakening colonial authority, but sometimes by providing a chance for local leaders – even nationalist leaders – to bargain for independence. On the ground, great power alliances provided a context within which nationalist movements sided with or against their colonial rulers. To understand these politics, it is important to recall that by the middle of the twentieth century, two kinds of international networks had been inspired by colonialism – one among colonial powers themselves, connecting colony and metropole but increasingly also linking colonists from different countries in a transnational community that shared information about best practices. The second network emerged in opposition to colonialism, and reflected the efforts of Comintern agents (among others) to establish a network of anticolonial forces that would defend socialism and the Soviet Revolution by resisting the expansion of capitalism and Western power. When Japan expanded across what it called the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it triggered some sharp tactical dilemmas among forces resisting colonialism. Where Comintern-allied nationalists were comparatively strong (one thinks of the Viet Minh) those defending socialism argued for a tactical alliance with colonists and their allies. Hence, American paratroopers received important logistical information for use against the Japanese by the man later known as Ho Chi Minh. Where Comintern forces were weaker, nationalists often sided with the Japanese to throw off a newly weakened colonial administration – as happened in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma. In other places, European powers made deals with nationalists that exchanged support against Axis or Allied powers for eventual independence – and the independence that followed in places like India reflected those deals.
ANTICOLONIAL CONTENTION

These four considerations inform answers to some of the key questions one asks about political contention. They influence, for instance, patterns of political opportunity in colonial settings: how isolated and vulnerable was the colonial regime? (Patterns of rule could either unite colonial society against the state, or produce significant and powerful local collaboration that divided and weakened anti-colonial mobilization.) Local power brokers who were incorporated into the colonial apparatus could pre-empt or undercut political contention, but alienated traditional authorities or elites were often powerful anti-colonial leaders. Colonial regimes needed to appear invincible to local society, but their power depended on factors that included standing in the international arena and support from the metropole. Alliances and solidarities — the mobilizing structures and micro-mobilization contexts of struggle — also reflect colonial practice: who went to school, to jail, to Europe, into exile, or into Comintern organizations all influenced the contours of struggle. They also influenced the ideas and tactics that activists would use; the more one reads the memoirs and letters of anticolonial activists, the more clear it becomes that ideas about independence and techniques of resistance played important roles in colonial-era contention. Assessing these factors helps analysts to understand contention under colonialism — when it arose, who its participants were, and what adversaries or tactics it was likely to meet.

But the character of nationalist mobilization is consequent in another way: new and independent regimes build on the legacies of these struggles, both in terms of the governing apparatus they set up, and the kinds of social challenges they will, in turn, confront (Boudreau 2004). For instance, did independence, in the end, require a massive mobilization and revolution? If so, that struggle in all likelihood also triggered processes of social mobilization, and perhaps the creation of a security force that either controls the new administration, or sits restively on the sidelines, nursing resentment about the inefficiencies of civilian rule. A mass-mobilizing struggle may also ossify and politicize ethnic, regional, or other divisions in a country — particularly when colonial policy recruited local participants in their militia from specific ethnic groups. Finally, some of the most resilient and successful Marxist insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s established themselves by playing key roles in a national democratic coalition. Conversely, negotiated transitions to independence tended to tamp down the need for mass mobilization. Particularly resilient elite class and caste structures may emerge precisely because the new leaders of the independent nation had no real need of mass participation in a nationalism movement, or were able to take the final steps toward independence through negotiation with colonists. Needing less, they often promise less, and were less compelled to accommodate mass society in the new arrangement. For subsequent politics, this may mean that social movements may initially lack an organizational structure, or a tradition of orienting claims toward the new structures of government. It may also mean that the ramparts of power are higher and more protective of elite privilege, and that contention will be more explosive when it rises.

Like all path-dependent approaches to complex social phenomena, the links between particular patterns of colonial domination and patterns of social movement are complex, and reflect both the stable structural influences discussed, and the legacies of specific cycles of protest and struggle. Communist parties acquire standing in a postcolonial regime, or are eliminated in sectarian fighting. Interstate warfare can help lodge a nationalist movement closer to real power, affect a transition to independence, or help root colonialism more firmly in any given setting. In all cases, however, the analysis of any particular episode of contention must reflect patterns of power and the lessons that citizens learn about how to struggle, who their natural allies might be, and
how power should operate in a postcolonial setting.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Geography and social movements; Historical research and social movements; Nationalist movements; Revolutions; State building and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Demand and supply of protest

BERT KLANDERMANS

The demand and supply of protest concerns the mobilizing context of participation. The “demand and supply” metaphor is borrowed from economics. Demand refers to the potential in a society for protest; supply refers to the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. Mobilization brings a demand for political protest that exists in a society together with a supply of opportunities to take part in such protest. The demand side of participation requires studies of such phenomena as socialization, grievance formation, causal attribution, and the formation of collective identity. The study of the supply side of participation concerns such matters as action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the frames and ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer. Mobilization is the process that brings demand and supply together. Mobilization is the marketing mechanism of the social movement domain, and thus, the study of mobilization concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, and the perceived costs and benefits of participation.

The demand side of protest refers to the proportion of the population in a society that sympathizes with the cause. The supply side of protest refers to the opportunities for protest offered to people. If there is no supply of protest, the demand might be high but nothing will happen. If, on the other hand, there is no demand there is no point in offering opportunities to protest. Mobilization is the mechanism that brings demand and supply together. It must be communicated to people who want to protest that there will be opportunities to protest. Without mobilization a high demand and a strong supply would get nowhere.

The demand side of protest concerns the characteristics of a social movement’s mobilization potential. A movement’s mobilization potential can be characterized in terms of its demographic composition (gender, age, social class, level of education, ethnicity, etc.) and its political composition (left-right, liberal-conservative); in terms of collective identities, shared grievances, and shared emotions; in terms of its internal organization; and in terms of its embeddedness in society at large. Internal organizational structures and embeddedness relate to the social capital accumulated in a movement’s mobilization potential. The dynamics of demand refer to the formation of mobilization potential: grievances and identities must politicize and emotions must be aroused.

Social movement organizations are more or less successful in satisfying demands for collective political participation and we may assume that movements that are successfully supplying what potential participants demand gain more support than movements that fail to do so. Movements and movement organizations can be compared in terms of their effectiveness in this regard.

The supply side of participation concerns characteristics of the social movement sector in society. How contentious is the social movement sector and how dense? It regards such matters as the composition of a movement’s multiorganizational field, its allies, and its opponents. Are traditional organizations such as churches, parties, or unions involved in the movement, or any other societal organization? The supply side also concerns action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer. How well is the opposition in a society organized? What kinds of activities are they staging and are those activities effective one way
or the other? What is the ideological position of these organizations? Do organizations have charismatic leaders people can identify with? Movement organizations are not isolated structures. On the contrary, they engage in coalition formation – negotiations with other movement organizations in order to stage collective action.

Studies of participation tend to concentrate on mobilization and to neglect the development of demand and supply factors. Yet, there is no reason to take either for granted. To be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean that there is no reason to explain how grievances develop and how they are transformed into a demand for protest. Nor does the presence of social movement organizations in a society mean that there is no need to understand their formation and to investigate how they stage opportunities to protest and how these opportunities are seized by aggrieved people.

Scholarly attention to the dynamics of demand has been limited. Similarly, little is known about the formation of the social movement sector and how its make-up impacts on social movement activity.

Perhaps social movement scholars do not bother too much about how mobilization potential and the social movement sector is formed, as they tend to study contention when it takes place and mobilization potential and social movements are formed and mobilized already. Hence, little is known about the formation of mobilization potential and the movement sector in the ebb and flow of contentious politics. Basic questions remain unanswered, questions such as how consensus is formed, how individuals come to feel, think, and act in concert; why and how some grievances turn into claims, while others don’t; why and how some identities politicize, while others don’t. Similarly, we lack fundamental insight into how movement organizations come into being; how are they formed, how does their leadership work; are they competing with other organizations; and so on.

SEE ALSO: Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Multiorganizational fields; Participation in social movements; Social capital and social movements; Social movement sector.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Demobilization
OLIVIER FILLIEULE

We know little about the mechanisms governing the decline of social movements and the varied forms of individual or collective demobilization that prompt this decline or end it. Indeed, as Verta Taylor emphasizes, “scholars generally are more interested in movements undergoing cycles of mass mobilization and have done little research on movements in decline or equilibrium” (1989: 772; see also McAdam 2005: 67). Yet, the logical counterpart of the initial recruitment and mobilization processes is clearly collective demobilization and individual disengagement.

The notion of demobilization brings us back to a plurality of phenomena ranging from individual disengagement (Fillieule 2005) to the political demobilization of an entire society, the sum of individual behavior producing macrosocial cycles of involvement or, conversely, withdrawal to the private sphere (Hirschman 1983). More precisely, beyond cycles of political attention, analysis reveals four other distinct types of situations. First, there is the demobilization phenomenon in a multiorganizational field, that is, of an entire social movement industry, with its formal organizations, its support networks and those involved along the way. The brutal ending of the 1956 protest movement in Poland due to harsh repression (Osa 2003), the generalized decline of leftist movements in developed countries in the aftermath of the May 68 crisis (e.g., Whalen & Flacks 1989), and the movement of de-unionization and disintegration of workers’ struggles in Europe (Klandermans 1997) are several such examples. Second, demobilization may relate less to a specific sector than to the slow collapse of a mobilization campaign, as a result of its success or, conversely, its failure. The history of antinuclear struggles in the 1970s and 1980s provides an illustration of this. At the mesosociological level, demobilization may affect a specific social movement organization, whether due to its voluntarily disbanding, rare though it is (Gottraux 1997), or a general decline in a cause, or even the effect of repression (e.g., the banning or removal of the leadership), as seen with numerous clandestine or semi-clandestine extreme leftist groups at the end of the 1970s in Japan and the United States (Zwerman & Steinhoff 2005), as well as in Europe (della Porta 1995). Finally, at the microsociological level, individual disengagement may figure in all these cases but may also stem from idiosyncratic trajectories. From this perspective, individual demobilization is not always voluntary. It may also result from a collective decision to dissolve an organization; from the decline of an ideology, as Taylor illustrates (1989) with regards to American postwar feminism; from exclusion; from deprogramming; or from being sidelined due to forced exile or a prison sentence.

The cost of the individual departure is related first to the way in which organizations impose various constraints on defections. The psychological or material cost of the defection and, therefore, its probability, are traceable to many factors. These include the extent of the sacrifices accepted to join the group (initiation rites, tests, hierarchization and the compartmentalization of groups); the degree of socialization within the group, which reinforces emotional attachment, related to the extent of renunciation of social relations outside of the group (networks of families and friends); and, finally, the rules governing defection, sometimes made impossible by material dependence or the threat of being hunted down as a traitor (Bennani-Chraibi & Fillieule 2003). To these barriers, we must also add the existence of opportunities to reconvert acquired resources, the possibility of reconnecting with alternative sociability networks and, finally, the social legitimacy of...
defection. This is linked to the social acceptance of departure, as well as to society’s readiness to grant those who leave an alternative social identity. Similarly, the modalities of individual defection vary. It may be isolated or collective, on the occasion, for example, of an organizational split, or when groups with a certain affinity leave together. Introvigne distinguishes defectors, who leave in a negotiated manner, apostates, who become professional enemies of their organization, and ordinary leavers, who disappear without their withdrawal representing a significant cost, for either themselves or the organization (1999). This is a typology which needs to be completed by adding all forms of passive defection, but also all the cases in which withdrawal is followed, and sometimes provoked, by joining another organization.

A certain number of recent studies have focused on the processes leading to withdrawal (Björgo & Horgan 2009; Fillieule 2010; Maalki 2010), rather than on its determinants or what happens to those who withdraw. From this perspective, withdrawal is seen as resulting from three interdependent factors: exhaustion of the rewards of involvement, the loss of ideological meaning, and the transformation of relations of sociability.

Attention to the variability of rewards involves examining the reasons for which, at a particular stage of the life-course, involvement in protest activity becomes problematic, and determining under which conditions the benefits experienced from involvement are maintained or exhausted. This leads to identification, in different life spheres, of the “succession[s] of phases, of changes in individual behavior and perspectives” (Becker 1966). These critical moments prompt a fresh assessment of the rewards, knowing that their value in a given sphere is correlated to the value they are accorded in all other spheres. Examples abound of occasions when involvement in a cause, or withdrawal from it, corresponds almost exactly to the collapse or rise of new perspectives in the professional or affective sphere.

The impetus for individuals to re-evaluate the associated rewards must be examined. In addition to immediate reasons, such as the loss of a job or the end of a relationship, joining the workforce or entering a new serious relationship, we must also add a whole array of factors not directly related to the individual. Indeed, the price accorded to the rewards in a given universe is indexed to the value that other beneficiaries and the entire society accord it. In a context of political turmoil, for example in the 1960s, the rewards of involvement were very likely to be greater than those offered at a time of a loss of interest in politics.

Finally, we must attempt to understand how individuals seek to weigh the exhaustion experienced and the rewards, through turning back, distancing themselves from the role, and trying to transform the role or defect from it. It is at this point that the degree of dependence on the role and the existence of lateral possibilities, determined notably by the extent of compartmentalization of various spheres of life, constitute a universe of constraints making defection more or less difficult. It is as much the socializing power of the role that one is leaving as the manner in which one departs that explains the changing trajectory, once the individual has left and sometimes much later.

Withdrawal may also be observed in the erosion of acquired beliefs within groups, which may lessen the sacrifices one is willing to make for the cause. Here, we may discern two levels of possible determination. On one hand, the strength of beliefs may vary, depending on a change in political climate, whether from the perspective of a theory of social cycles (Hirschman 1983), the historical exhaustion of a commitment model (e.g., Fuchs-Ebaugh 1988), or even a backlash and return to order. This is what Whalen and Flacks (1989), for example, show in their work on what became of American students opposed to the Vietnam War. According to them, the primary cause of the decline of the 1960s was related to a change in the zeitgeist. The Vietnam War was coming to an end while the repression of leftist
movements was intensifying. Such a context led to a re-evaluation of the revolution’s chances for success, as well as of the cost of involvement. Specifically, it became more and more difficult for young activists to sacrifice their professional future to the increasingly remote possibility of reforming society. The question of the personal versus the political carried the day. In the same way, the success, rather than the decline, of a movement may erode convictions. Indeed, the satisfaction of demands, along with the eventual institutionalization of movements as they are integrated into the state’s decision-making processes, may lead to a rethinking of priorities and demobilization. Examples are the demobilization of gay movements at the end of the 1970s and the emergence of state feminism.

On the other hand, the loss of ideological conviction may also stem from a rupture of the consensus within the movement, the appearance of factions or splinter groups. Social psychology, notably based on the study of small groups, shows under what conditions loyalty to the group can be maintained. For example, Kanter (1972) proposes a typology of elements likely to encourage attachment, constructed around the two mechanisms of sacrifice and investment: the more sacrifices required to enter a group and remain, the higher the cost of defection. Here, Kanter is inspired by the concept of cognitive dissonance to stress the psychological dimension of the cost: the more intense the efforts, the more difficult it is to acknowledge the futility of these efforts. The notion of disinvestment, for its part, is linked to the existence of alternatives. The more individuals are caught in a system which is the only one distributing rewards and costs, the more they remain involved.

Finally, disengagement may be interpreted in terms of the transformation of relations of sociability within groupings. Indeed, the manner in which groups support these relations both inside and outside the groups reveals an array of significant factors affecting withdrawal. For example, McPherson and his colleagues produced interesting results on networks of sociability, their role in maintaining commitment and the importance of intragroup relations in the decision to defect (McPherson, Popielarz, & Drobnic 1992; Cress, McPherson, & Rotolo 1997). In particular, they show that when individuals are part of multiple networks, they are more likely to leave the organizations (niche overlap hypothesis). They also show that voluntary associations lose atypical members faster than more typical volunteers (niche edge hypothesis). This finding is consistent with Kanter’s observations that, when groups are underrepresented in an organization, they experience tensions and are generally excluded from informal friendship networks created in the course of their activism. So, overall, individual withdrawal is often inseparable from tensions observable amongst generations of activists.

While research has certainly made progress in understanding the mechanisms of individual demobilization, a certain number of avenues remain insufficiently explored. Thus, for example, at the meso-sociological level, we still lack a reliable typology of the diversity of routes chosen by social movement organizations that are undergoing a process of demobilization. Certain cases are clearly identifiable, starting with those of bureaucratization, institutionalization, and assimilation by the state or, on the contrary, of radicalization, to which we add the periods of abeyance, highlighted by Taylor (1989) and perfectly illustrated by Osa (2003). Yet this is still insufficient.

In addition, research could more systematically study the way in which some macrosocial contexts discourage or encourage certain paths to demobilization. The existence or availability (most often via the state) of possibilities of reconversion is an example of this. From this point of view, the literature on so-called terrorist movements or on leaving armed conflicts, especially around the issue of rehabilitation programs, as well as that dealing with public policies to end crises and to encourage disarmament of armed groups, constitutes a valuable tool. This helps in understanding what impedes and what accelerates the phenomena of demobilization at both the meso-
and microsociological level (Björgo & Horgan 2009). Finally, the consequences of phenomena of political demobilization over the short and long term also raise a series of fascinating questions which the literature has largely ignored, except with respect to the biographical consequences of involvement. Thus, for example, and to conclude, while there is considerable questioning on the spread of social movements from a positive perspective, it would also be interesting to explore the effects across time and space of the failure of a movement, a campaign, or an organization on other movements or campaigns, whether in an alliance network or a conflict network. Thus, to give only three examples, we would gain a more thorough understanding of the consequences of the crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871, the revolutions of 1848, or even the Tiananmen student movement in 1989.

SEE ALSO: Biographical availability; Biographical consequences of activism; Commitment; Mechanisms; Participation in social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Democracy and social movements
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

Democracy is usually defined as a specific method of decision making, in which elected representatives are accountable to the citizens through regular elections. Social movements have always been concerned with democracy, keeping governors accountable, but also in many cases advocating and practicing alternative conceptions of democracy than the dominant, representative ones.

Several studies have indicated that the increasing challenges to representative democracy are accompanied by the (re)emergence of other conceptions and practices of democracy. Empirical research on political participation has stressed that, while some more conventional forms of participation (such as voting or party-linked activities) are declining, protest is increasingly used. While some traditional types of associations are decreasing in popularity, social movement organizations are growing in resources, legitimacy, and members.

What is more, historical and normative research has pointed at the presence of different conceptions of democracy, which pose different emphases on different democratic qualities. According to Pierre Rosanvallon’s influential volume on Counterdemocracy (2006), while the dominant conception of democracy focuses on a set of rules oriented to implement electoral accountability, in the historical evolution of democratic regimes, a circuit of surveillance, anchored outside of state institutions, has developed side by side with representative institutions. Citizens’ attentive vigilance upon powerholders is thus defined as a specific, political modality of action, a “particular form of political intervention,” different from decision making, but still a fundamental aspect of the democratic process (Rosanvallon 2006: 40).

Actors such as independent authorities and judges, but also mass media, experts, and social movements, have traditionally exercised this function of surveillance. Control from below is all the more important given the crisis of representative, electoral democracy.

In another influential theorization, Bernard Manin observed that the “democracy of the moderns” – that is, contemporary democracy as a system that governs territories of large dimensions – is fundamentally representative democracy: decisions are made by representatives, through standardized procedures, that are supposed to guarantee equality among citizen-voters and (electoral) accountability of those who represent them. Participation beyond elections is, however, essential also for modern democracies that gain legitimacy not only through the principle of majority decision-making, but also through their ability to submit decisions to the “test of the discussion” (Manin 1995). The main actors that perform this function of control change in time: while in party democracy, participation happened mainly within and throughout political parties (Manin 1995), in a contemporary democracy of the public, social movements acquire increasing relevance as actors of democratic participation.

Empirical research has indicated that social movement organizations take the democratic function of control seriously, mobilizing to put pressure on decision-makers, as well as developing counterknowledge and open public spaces. If electoral accountability has long been privileged over the power of control in the historical evolution of representative democracy, social movements contribute to stress the importance of extra-electoral forms of accountability. While stressing the need for more public and less private, more state and less market, they define themselves especially as autonomous from institutions and as performing democratic control of the
governors. By creating public spaces, they contribute to the development of ideas and practices of democracy (della Porta 2009a).

Democratic control acquires a special meaning given the perceived challenge of adapting democratic conceptions and practices to the increasing shift of competence toward the transnational level. In this respect, social movement organizations contribute to the debate on global democracy, not only by criticizing the lack of democratic accountability and even transparency of many existing at local, national, and transnational level, but also by asking for a globalization of democracy and actually constructing a global public sphere that could hold IGOs accountability (Marchetti 2008; della Porta 2009b).

Social movements, however, do not only ask to increase transparency; they also ask for more participation. Normative theorists of democracy (especially, Pateman 1970) have suggested that if institutional decision making is mainly controlled by a restricted class of professional politicians, the healthy functioning of democracy is linked to the presence of multiple arenas that allow for the participation of citizen. While theories of representative democracy have focused on electoral arenas, theories of participatory democracy have stressed the importance of involving citizens beyond elections. In this vision, citizens should be provided with as many opportunities to participate as there are spheres of decision making. In these conceptions, the actors of participatory democracy are mainly outside the public institutions.

Research on social movements has in fact stressed that, as highly reflexive actors, far from limiting themselves to presenting demands to decision-makers, they in fact address a meta-political critique to representative democracy (Offe 1985). The alternative they propose has usually been conceptualized in terms of participatory democracy, referring to an “ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy” (Kitschelt 1993: 15). At least since the 1960s, new social movements have in fact criticized delegation as well as oligarchic and centralized power, and instead supported forms of direct participation and grassroots, horizontal, egalitarian organizational models.

Recent studies observed that participation acquires different meanings in different social movements (Polletta 2002; Reiter 2009). In the Old Left, participation and delegation are seen as highly compatible, and the stress on participation appears as a recovery of the original values of democratic centralism. For the New Left, the emphasis is on direct democracy and self-organization, while the solidarity groups and new social movement organizations stress the prefigurative role of participation as a “school of democracy.” Similarly, searching for coherence between their criticism of existing democratic institutions and their internal practices, the organizations emerging with the Global Justice Movement elaborate counter-models that combine concrete proposals of reform with a utopian orientation to build alternative, free spaces. At the same time, social movement organizations interact with public institutions at various territorial levels. In many cases, especially but not only at the local level, they collaborate with public institutions, both on specific problems and in broader campaigns.

Participation is a value also in conceptions of deliberative democracy that acquired support in contemporary social movements. Although representative procedural democracy is mainly based on principles of delegation and majority votes, conceptions of democracy have always balanced such principles with respect for high-quality debate oriented toward the public good. With some different emphasis, in normative political theory, deliberative democracy refers to decisional processes in which, under conditions of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, a communicative process based on reason (the strength of a good argument) is able to transform individual preferences, leading to decisions oriented to the public good.
In the conception of deliberative democracy, particular attention is given to the discursive quality of democracy with an emphasis on four elements: the transformation of preferences, the orientation to the public good, the use of arguments, and the development of consensus.

While representative democracy is based upon the aggregation (through vote or negotiation) of exogenously generated preferences, deliberative democracy is defined as oriented to preference (trans)formation. In deliberative processes, initial preferences are transformed during the confrontation with the points of view of others in order to reach a common understanding of the public good (Young 1996). This requires the deliberative process to take place under conditions of plurality of values, where people have different perspectives but face common problems. This should be achieved through rational argumentation, based on the exchange of reasons: people should be convinced not by the use of hard power, but by the force of the better argument (Elster 1998). In particular, deliberation should be facilitated by horizontal flows of communication, multiple contributors to discussion, wide opportunities for interactivity, confrontation on the basis of rational argumentation, and attitude to reciprocal listening (Habermas 1996). Recognition of others’ reasons allows for the building of consensus, so that decisions can be reached by convincing others of one’s own argument. They are therefore legitimate in as far as they are approvable by all participants – in contrast with majority-rule democracy, where decisions are legitimated by votes.

Also in this perspective, democracy develops (also or mainly) outside of public institutions in voluntary groups and social movement organizations, presented as enclaves, free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996). Sometimes explicitly but more often not, many social movement organizations have adopted deliberative norms (della Porta 2009a, 2009b). First of all, they stress that, given a complex reality, no easy solution is at hand or can be derived from big ideologies. Many conflicts must therefore be approached by reliance on the potential for mutual understanding that might develop in an open, high-quality debate. The notion of a “common good” is often recalled (for example, water as a common good), but also democracy should be constructed through communication, exchanges of ideas, and knowledge sharing. The value of discussion among “free and equal” citizens is mirrored in the positive emphasis on diversity and inclusion, but also in the attention paid to the development of structured arenas for the exchange of ideas, with the experimentation with some rules that should allow for horizontal flows of communication and reciprocal listening. In particular, consensus is increasingly mentioned as a general value as well as an organizational principle in internal decision making (della Porta 2009a). In fact, even though social movements have stressed conflict as a dynamic element in society, they tend increasingly to balance it with a commitment to values such as respect for diversity, dialogue, and mutual understanding. Consensus is presented as an alternative to majoritarian decision making, which is accused of repressing and/or alienating the minorities. Through consensual decision making, instead, not only would legitimacy increase with participants’ contributions to decisions, but the awareness of different points of view would also help in “working on what unites,” constructing a shared vision while respecting diversity.

In particular in the Global Justice Movement, consensus spread transnationally, thanks to the symbolic impact and concrete networks built around the Zapatistas’ experience, and the successive adoption of consensual principles and practices in the Social Forum process (Smith et al. 2007; della Porta 2009b). Dedicated publications, workshops, and training courses helped the diffusion of consensual practices. Here as well, multiple meanings attached to consensus. In particular, when coupled with an assemblary, horizontal tradition, consensual decision making is perceived as a way to reach a collective agreement that reflects
a strong communitarian identity. This vision, particularly widespread among small and often local groups within the autonomous tradition, resonates with an anti-authoritarian emphasis and an egalitarian view. Group life assumes here mainly a prefigurative value. An alternative, more pragmatic view is spread in the emerging networks. Here, consensual decision making is accompanied especially by an emphasis on diversity and the need to respect it, but also to improve mutual understanding through good communication.

SEE ALSO: Democracy inside social movements; Democratization and democratic transition; Direct democracy; Free spaces; Global Justice Movement; Participatory democracy in social movements.

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Democratization and democratic transition
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA and FEDERICO M. ROSSI

Social movements are increasingly considered as relevant actors in theorizations about democracy. Recently, an empirical linkage between movements and democratization processes has also been established. On the one hand, many of the processes that cause democratization generally promote social movements and “democratization as such further encourages people to form social movements” (Tilly 2004: 131). On the other, “under some conditions and in a more limited way, social movements themselves promote democratization” (Tilly 2004: 131). When looking at the impact of movements on democracy, the evidence is however mixed. First, some social movements support democracy, but some do not. Second, their relevance in democratization processes is discussed: while a “populist” approach to democracy emphasizes participation from below, with movements as important actors in the creation of democratic public spheres, the “elitist” approach considers democratization as mainly a top-down process.

Social movements support democracy and contribute to democratization only under certain conditions. Mobilization has frequently contributed to a destabilization of authoritarian regimes, but it has also led to an intensification of repression or the collapse of weak democratic regimes, particularly when movements do not stick to democratic conceptions. Labor, student, and nationalist movements brought about a crisis in the Franco regime in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, but the worker and peasant movements and the fascist countermovements contributed to the failure of the process of democratization in Italy in the 1920s and 1930s (Tarrow 1995). Beyond a movement’s propensity to support democracy, democratization processes might follow different paths, being more or less influenced by social movements. As the relationship between social movements and democratization is not simple, two main questions for research are: When, how, and why do movements promote democratization? And, what are the consequences of their participation in the different stages of democratization processes?

These questions could be addressed by bridging social movement studies and democratization studies. Notwithstanding the practical and theoretical relevance of the topic, the interactions between movements and democratization have rarely been addressed in a systematic way. Additionally, even though social movements are increasingly recognized, in political and scientific debates, as important actors in democracies, interactions between the two fields have been rare. On the one hand, movements have been far from prominent in the literature on democratization, which has mainly focused on either socioeconomic pre-conditions or elite behavior. On the other hand, social movement scholars, until recently, have paid little attention to democratization processes, mostly concentrating their interest on democratic countries (especially on the Western European and North American experiences), where conditions for mobilization are more favorable.

THE ROLE OF MOVEMENTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES

Studies on democratization have traditionally assigned a limited role to social movements and protest. Democratization studies developed within a structuralist approach. Within modernization theory, Lipset (1959) associated the chances for the emergence of a democratic
regime with economic development. Although powerful in explaining the survival of established democracies, modernization theory tended to ignore the role of social actors and movements in *crafting* democracy, leaving the timing and tempo of democratization processes unexplained. When they did examine the role of organized and mobilized actors in society, they tended—as in Huntington (1991)—to consider mobilization, in particular of the working class, as a risk more than an asset.

A different vision dominated some of the main works in *historical sociology*, which linked democratization to class relations. Among others, Bendix (1964) and Marshall (1992) recognized the impact of class struggles in early democratization. More recently, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) have pointed to the role of the working class in promoting democratization in the last two waves of democratization in Southern Europe, South America, and the Caribbean; and Collier (1999) confirmed their important impact in recent waves of democratization in Southern Europe and South America. Although recognizing a path of democratization from below, these studies still tended to explain these mainly on the basis of structural conditions.

The “structuralist bias” is criticized by the *transitologist approach*, which stresses agency, as well as a dynamic and processual vision of democratization, focusing on elite strategies and behavior (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). While protests and movements are supposed to play an important role at the beginning of the transition process, this so-called “resurrection of civil society” is seen as a short disruptive moment when movements, unions, and society in general push for the initial liberalization of a nondemocratic regime into a transition toward democracy. Although this is a moment of great expectations, “regardless of its intensity and of the background from which it emerges, this popular upsurge is always ephemeral” (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 55–56). As in this wave of reflection the “*reforma/ruptura pactada*” in Spain was considered (explicitly or implicitly) as the model for successful democratization, the ephemeral life of a mobilized society tended to be perceived as not only inevitable, given the re-channeling of participation through political parties and the electoral system, but also desirable, in order to avoid frightening authoritarian soft-liners into abandoning the negotiation process with pro-democracy moderates. Several studies, however, have demonstrated the crucial role played by mobilized actors in the Spanish transition (cf. Maravall 1982; Tarrow 1995; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).

Within transitology, more systematic attention to civil society in democratization processes can be found in Linz and Stepan’s (1996) model of extended transition, which addresses South American, and Southern and Eastern European cases. Contrasting it with a “political society” composed of elites and institutionalized actors, “A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 9). Although they recognize its role in theory, these authors do not give much empirical space to civil society.

Linz and Stepan (1996), though, hypothesize that the type of nondemocratic regime influences the potential for the emergence of movements and protests that precede liberalization, and accompany democratization. *Totalitarian* regimes are those that, by eliminating any pluralism, jeopardize the development of autonomous organizations and networks that could then be the promoters of democracy. *Sultanistic* regimes, due to the high personalization of power, include the manipulative use of mobilization for ceremonial purposes and through para-state groups, discourage and repress any kind of autonomous organization that could sustain resistance networks. *Authoritarian* regimes, that were mainly installed in countries with previous (semi-)
democratization and democratic transition

democratic experience, are those which generally experience the most massive mobilizations, and the best organized underground resistance based on several networks that either pre-dated the regime or were formed later thanks to higher degrees of pluralism. Adding to this argument, within authoritarian regimes, we may expect mobilization opportunities to be different for bureaucratic-authoritarianism, where a technocratic civic–military elite commands the depoliticization of a mobilized society for capital accumulation (O’Donnell 1973), and populist-authoritarianism, where the elites mobilize the society from above for the legitimation of the regime while incorporating the lower classes (cf. Hinnebusch 2007). Mobilization during democratic consolidation also seems to be more difficult the longer the life of the authoritarian regime (cf. Ulfelder 2005).

Different transition paths can also offer different opportunities to social movements. Linz and Stepan (1996) singled out the specific challenges of multiple simultaneous transitions, where regime changes are accompanied by changes in the economic system and/or in the nation-state arrangement. It is important not only whether the previous regime was authoritarian or totalitarian, but also whether it was a capitalist or a communist one. In particular, when there is a triple transition, the problem of nation-state building is reflected in the emergence of nationalist movements mobilizing in the name of contending visions of what the demos of the future democracy should be (Beissinger 2002). The moderation versus radicalization of claims for autonomy/independence has been mentioned as favoring or jeopardizing the transition to democracy.

Even though the dynamic, agency-focused approach of transitology allowed for some interest in the role played by movements in democratization to develop, transitology tends to consider movements as manipulated by elites. Transitology stresses the contingent and dynamic nature of the democratization process, but tends to reduce it to bargaining among political elites in a context of uncertainty. In addition to their “elitist bias,” transitologists have been criticized for emphasizing the role of individuals over collective actors, thereby reducing the process to strategic instrumental thinking, for ignoring class-defined actors such as unions and labor/left-wing parties, and for being state-centric, subordinating social actors to state actors (Collier 1999).

THE ROLE OF MOVEMENTS FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS STUDIES

Within the social movement approach, attempts to look at social movements in democratization phases have been very rare (Rossi & della Porta 2009). Especially in Latin America, the new social movement approach, which addressed the emergence of a new actor in post-industrial society, was widely applied in the 1980s and 1990s to single out the cultural and social democratization produced by movements (Escobar & Álvarez 1992). The political process approach – that highlights the interrelationship between governmental actors, parties, movements, and protest – was instead sometimes applied to explain regime transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002). Yet this approach has also been criticized as overly structuralist.

Even if the systematic analysis of processes of transition from below is scarce, there has been some fresh research on movements and democratization. The emergence of the Global Justice Movement pushed some social movement scholars to pay more attention to issues of democracy, as well as to movements in the Global South. Some pioneering research aimed at applying social movement studies to authoritarian regimes, from the Middle East (Wiktorowicz 2004) to Asia (Boudreau 2004). More generally, recognizing the structuralist bias of the political process approach, a more dynamic vision of protest has been promoted, with attention paid to the social mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and macro-effects.
(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001). Recently, some scholars within this approach proposed the reformulation of the transitology perspective, taking into account the role played by contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; Tilly 2004; Schock 2005). Similarly to the transitology approach, they have stressed agency as well as the importance of looking at democratization as a dynamic process.

Some reflections have pointed to the democratizing role of civil society – theoretically located between the state and the market – with diminishing confidence in the role played by political parties as carriers of democratization. The global civil society perspective emphasizes the democratizing role played by a worldwide organized civil society in democratization on a supra-national scale. In some of these interpretations, civil society is conceptualized as almost synonymous with social movements.

MOVEMENTS IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES

Case studies have indicated that democratization is often linked to two contentious dynamics, which could affect different steps of the democratization process: (a) a pro-democratic cycle of protest, and (b) an increasingly massive and nonsyndical wave of strikes (cf. Foweraker & Landman 1997; Collier 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001). In Spain, Brazil, and Peru, for instance, strike waves were very important during the whole or part of the democratization process (Collier 1999). While Peru’s democratization is very much associated with a strike wave (1977–1980) against a highly unpopular authoritarian regime (Collier 1999), Brazil experienced a strike wave (1974–1979), followed by a cycle of protest (1978–1982) mainly mobilized by urban movements. Sometimes cycles of protest and strike waves converge. On many other occasions strike waves are stronger in the first resistance stages, decline later, and then reemerge during liberalization and transition in coordination with the upsurge of a cycle of protest originating from underground resistance networks. An attempt to identify a sequence of stages where movements play different roles in democratization processes can be carried out following the literature on movements (Rossi & della Porta 2009).

First, underground networks of resistance often undermine the legitimacy and the (national and international) support for authoritarian regimes. Human rights movements, unions, and churches promote the delegitimation of the authoritarian regime in international forums such as the United Nations, and in clandestine or open resistance to the authoritarian regime at the national level. The resilience of resistance networks under the impact of repression can lead to splits in the ruling authoritarian elites (Schock 2005). Among those organizations that have played a pro-democratic role are church-related actors (Osa 2003), and human rights networks, sometimes in transnational alliances (Keck & Sikkink 1998), as well as, very often, the labor movement (Collier 1999). Social networks of various types have emerged as fundamental, especially for some paths of mobilization under authoritarian regimes (Osa 2003).

Second, the increased open mobilization for a regime change during liberalization pushes the process to a transition notwithstanding some elites’ resistance. Protests or strikes often constitute precipitating events that start liberalization, spreading the perception among the authoritarian elites that there is no choice other than opening the regime if they want to avoid an imminent or potential civil war or violent takeover of power by democratic and/or revolutionary actors (e.g., Bermeo 1997; Wood 2000). During liberalization, social and political organizations publicly (re)emerge in a much more visible fashion (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986): unions, labor/left-wing parties, and urban movements, mainly in shantytowns and industrial districts, have often pushed for democracy (Collier 1999), sometimes in alliance with transnational actors (Keck & Sikkink 1998). During the transition
to democracy, old (labor, ethnic) movements and new (women’s, urban) movements have often participated in large coalitions asking for democratic rights as well as social justice (Tarrow 1995).

Third, the consolidation of a procedural democracy is related to the struggle among sectors pushing for an authoritarian return and the (re)mobilization of social and political organizations for sustaining and expanding democracy. In transition literature, consolidation is generally linked to the end of the democratization process as signaled by the first free and open elections, the end of the uncertainty period, and/or the implementation of a minimum quality of substantive democracy (Linz & Stepan 1996). In some cases, this is accompanied by a demobilization of some organizations as energies are channeled into party politics; in others, however, demobilization does not occur (e.g., on Argentina, Bolivia, and the Andean region). In fact, social movement organizations (SMOs) mobilized during liberalization and transition rarely totally disband. On the contrary, democratization often facilitates the development of SMOs (e.g., the women’s movement in Southern Europe). The presence of a tradition of mobilization, as well as movements that are supported by parties, unions, and/or religious institutions, can facilitate the maintenance of a high level of protest, as in the Communist Party’s promotion of shantytown dwellers’ protests in Chile, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and part of the Roman Catholic Church working with rural workers’ movements and unions in Brazil, or the environmental movements in Eastern Europe (Flam 2001). In this stage, movements might claim the rights of those who are excluded by “low intensity democracies” and ask for a more inclusive democracy (i.e., land reform, employment, indigenous and women’s movements) and the end of authoritarian legacies (Eckstein 2001). Movements’ alternative practices and values help to sustain and expand democracy. Furthermore, movements’ networks play an important role in mobilizing against persistent exclusionary patterns and authoritarian legacies. Keeping elites under continuous popular pressure after transition can facilitate a successful consolidation.

Finally, there are major transnational influences that play out during the whole process of democratization and which are linked to the evolving interstate rules that define the global normative context for action by states as well as linking states and social organizations against human rights violations. All of these aspects have an indirect or direct impact on movements’ participation in democratization processes (cf. Keck & Sikkink 1998), with particular tensions between the conceptions of democracy expressed by local SMOs and the Western conceptions promoted by transnational actors.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization and social movements; Democracy and social movements; Human rights movements; “Orange” and “colored” revolutions in former Soviet Union; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Tiananmen student movement (China); Velvet Revolution of 1989.

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Democracy inside social movements
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Although social movements have been said to propose alternative visions of democracy, social movement studies have only rarely addressed the issue of democracy in movements, from either the empirical or the normative point of view.

Internal democratic procedures have been analyzed mainly in research on social movement organizations, that have been however conceptualized in different ways. Attention to the instrumental relevance of social movement organizations has been at the core of the resource mobilization approach. However, social movement organizations have been seen also as sources of identity for their constituencies. In the first approach, decision making inside the organization tends to be analyzed in terms of efficient allocation of resources under environmental constraints. In the second, social movement organizations are considered as arenas for political conversations, characterized by specific etiquettes (Eliasoph 1998: 21): internal democracy is here linked with the normative positions within them.

For a long time, the mainly empirical orientation of social movement studies has deflected attention from normative reflections on democracy, and the focus on the behavior (protest, lobbying, etc.) of social movement organizations vis-à-vis institutional politics has discouraged research on their prefigurative politics (Leach & Haunss 2009). As Clemens and Minkoff (2004: 156) have recently noted, with the development of the resource mobilization perspective, “Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction. As organizations were understood instrumentally, the cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were marginalized as topic for inquiry.”

Attention to democracy inside movements increased, however, with the “cultural turn” in social movement studies that pushed toward a recognition of the symbolic and emotional dimension of social movement politics. This did not imply a denial of the instrumental role social movements play in normal politics, or the importance of concerns for efficiency in their choice of internal forms of organization as well as external strategies of protest. However, it opened the way to considering the “passionate” and normative dimension of social movement politics. At the same time, especially in normative theory, the debate on deliberative forms of democracy offered conceptual instruments for a fresh look at the visions of democracy inside and outside social movements.

More and more, internal democracy is recognized as particularly important for social movement organizations. First, as they have few material incentives to distribute, they must gain and keep the commitment of their members on the basis of shared beliefs. Second, the rules for making collective decisions are especially challenging for a base of activists that appear as very demanding. Social movements are in fact self-reflexive actors that tend to debate the issue of democracy as it applies to their internal lives (Melucci 1989; della Porta 2005). Past experiences are reflected upon, showing learning processes. Although no satisfactory solution has yet emerged to address the main organizational dilemmas – between, among others, participation versus efficacy, equality versus specialization, and so on – experiments develop, innovating on the old, and unsatisfactory, models.
DEMOCRACY IN MOVEMENTS: WHICH MODELS?

With particular attention to left-wing social movements, research has stressed their role in promoting alternatives to representative democracy. Not only do they express criticism of real, existing democracies, but they also experiment with different democratic practices within their own organizational life. In different historical moments, social movements have contributed to the debate on democracy.

Developing during the phases of first democratization, the labor movement criticized the then dominant conception of democracy as based upon (limited) electoral representation, developing alternative visions and practices. While struggling for universal enfranchisement, labor movement organizations also contested the representative model, asking for direct forms of democracy and limits upon the delegation of power. As historians such as E.P. Thompson (1991) and William Sewell (1980) have observed, the ideas of direct democracy remained alive in the labor movement in Europe, with frequent contestation of the increasing bureaucratization of left-wing political parties and trade unions.

Direct democracy remained central in the visions and practices of the new social movements that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, criticizing, among others, the institutionalization of the Old Left and proposing more participatory democratic practices. The student movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental movements expressed not only specific claims, but also a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavors from politics itself to metapolitics (Offe 1985). These movements have been said to represent important innovations vis-à-vis the conceptions then dominant in the labor movement: among them are decentralized and participatory organizational structures; defense of interpersonal solidarity against state and corporate bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces (Offe 1985).

In contemporary social movements, in particular in the Global Justice movements, the values of deliberative (or discursive) democracy, with particular emphasis on consensus building, have been linked with participatory ones (della Porta 2009b). As Francesca Polletta has observed, in grassroots social movement organizations activists “expected each other to provide legitimate reasons for preferring one option to another. They strove to recognize the merits of each other’s reasons for favouring a particular option . . . the goal was not unanimity, so much as discourse. But it was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect” (Polletta 2002: 7). Resonating with the novel debates in political theory, these values and related practices are seen as partial solutions to the limits of participatory (especially direct) democracy, such as the “tyranny of the majority,” the closedness of small groups to newcomers, and the risks of a “hidden” leadership (among others, Freeman 1974; Breines 1989).

INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN GLOBAL NETWORKS

Recently, attention to internal democracy has developed around contemporary social movements that are said to have undergone relevant transformations, among which are the development of intense and innovating forms of networking; the related emergence of tolerant identities, with acknowledgment of diversity and subjectivity as positive elements; the presence of multiple repertoires, with a pragmatic acceptance of both protest and lobbying, but also a focus on the experimentation of “possible utopias” (della Porta 2009a, 2009b).

Research on democracy inside the Global Justice Movement pointed at the growing attention to values related with communication in an open space, networking, respect for diversity, equal participation, and inclusiveness. The importance of conceiving social movement organizations as spaces for networking, with a positive emphasis on diversity, is present in
particular in the World Social Forum, as well as in the macro-regional and local social forums. In their normative self-conception as an inclusive public sphere, the main organizational challenge is seen in the capacity to address the tension between the need for coordination and the respect for the autonomy of the various organizations and activists that participate in various networks, forums, and coalitions.

Networking involves in fact different and diverse actors, particularly at the transnational level. In contemporary social movements, this has been nurtured under the conception of an “open space method” of internal democracy, that should produce strength from diversity. Common to the Global Justice Movement is a positive understanding of diversity, including its own internal diversity, based on recognition of the history of the different organizations that converge in it.

The networking logic reflects, and at the same time contributes to, the spreading of embedded sets of values oriented toward the building of horizontal ties and decentralized coordination of autonomous units (Juris 2004). Horizontality, or lack of vertical power, is in fact a founding value of several recent movement organizations.

The degree to which these norms are implemented in practice is however debated in the movements themselves, as diversity is itself a source of tensions (Pleysers 2005: 512). Transnational social movement organizations emerged in fact as plural and contested spaces, in which “ideological differences were largely coded as disagreement over organizational process and form” (Juris 2004: 257). The broadest convergence spaces, including the social forums, involve a complex amalgam of diverse organizational forms.” Research on the European Social Forums has observed the presence of different democratic forms of internal decision making, with various equilibria between participation versus delegation of power and deliberation versus majority voting in internal decision making (della Porta 2009a, 2009b). Crossing these two dimensions, four democratic models have been singled out: an associational model, with a high degree of delegation and majority votes; deliberative representation, with delegation coupled with decision-making based on a consensual basis; assembleary model, when decisions are taken by majority in open assemblies; and deliberative participation, when decisions are made in open assembly on the basis of consensual decision-making. The associational model emerged as quite widespread when looking at the formal structure of social movement organizations, as emerged in their own written documents; the representatives of the organizations stressed, in interviews, the presence of consensual decision making; participatory models (both assembleary and of deliberative participation) emerged as still preferred by the rank-and-file members. At the organizational level, the organizational age, the size of membership, and the availability of material resources explain the spread of the associational model, but normative positions played an even more
important role, with new social movement organizations more oriented toward participation, and those founded within the Global Justice Movement stressing deliberative values (della Porta 2009a). Consistent results emerged at the individual level from a survey with the participants in the Fourth European Social Forum (della Porta 2009b), indicating a predominant importance of past and present experiences of political socialization. Members of parties and large NGOs tended to have lower levels of participation; those of informal social movement organizations defended more participatory and consensual vision of democracy. However, conceptions of consensus and participation emerged as widespread among all organizational types and ideologies.

SEE ALSO: Democracy and social movements; Direct democracy; Free spaces; Global Justice Movement; Labor movement; New social movements and new social movement theory; Participatory democracy in social movements.

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Demography and social movements and revolutions
RALPH I. HOSOKI

Originating with the strain and breakdown theories of the classical collective behavior tradition that dominated in the 1960s, the analytical repertoires for understanding contentious politics expanded to include structuralist (political opportunity) and post-Marxist approaches as well as resource mobilization theories in the 1970s and 1980s, and constructivist and cultural approaches in the 1980s and 1990s (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2009). This progression entailed a general shift from deterministic collective behavior paradigms that focused on external causal explanations of movement emergence to more agency-oriented resource mobilization paradigms that emphasized the importance of internal movement dynamics and rational, agentic, and interest-based decisions of movement actors and collectives (Buechler 2004). Furthermore, collective action—originally understood by strain and breakdown theorists as irrational, disruptive, and spontaneous behavior stemming from social breakdown—was gradually cast in a more positive light with the emergence of empirical studies in the 1970s that pointed to organizational solidarity and not social malintegration as the necessary condition for collective action (Useem 1998; Buechler 2004). Somewhat lost in this transition, however, was the emphasis placed on what Goldstone and McAdam (2001) term, the *macro determinants of contention*. With the demise of strain and breakdown theories, the emphases placed on opportunities (over threats), and the conceptualization of contentious actors as rational entities, contemporary studies on social movements and revolutions have largely undervalued systematic efforts to understand how social and demographic factors might affect the emergence and development of political contention.

A multidisciplinary survey of the literature on contentious politics, however, reveals that specific attention to demographic factors—often through the lenses of variants of strain and breakdown approaches—has persisted in various forms through the works of scholars who argue that macro demographic factors can provide more nuanced understandings of the processes and contexts in which contentions arise. For instance, Goldstone (1991) presents a demographic/structural model of state breakdown and argues that state breakdown—and in many cases, ensuing revolutions—in early modern societies between the sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries can be explained by a single basic process that is rooted in population growth. Through population growth and pressures on resources, a chain of interrelated destabilizing events precipitated in societies with inflexible social and political structures. According to this model, (1) state fiscal distress, (2) the polarization of social wealth and rising intra-elite factionalization, (3) the heightening of popular mobilization potential through popular unrest caused by urban migration, unemployment, land competition, and increases in a population’s youthfulness, and (4) the increased salience of folk and elite ideologies of rectification and transformation have often been the critical results of population growth that combined to ultimately unfold in state breakdown.

Although an argument aimed at understanding the emergence of revolutionary crises, Goldstone’s model resonates with Snow et al.’s (1998) reconceptualization of the classical breakdown argument in social movement literature. In an attempt to reassess the conceptual utility of strain and breakdown theories through a demonstration of the complementarity of the seemingly
Table 1  Major social revolutions

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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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*Note: The listed dates are conventional markers that refer to the year in which revolutionaries initially overthrew extant political authorities. Revolutions, however, are best conceptualized not as events, but as processes that typically span many years.

Some recent empirical studies have addressed – from multiple disciplinary angles – how structural social and demographic change may spark contentious action. For example, in their study on patriot and militia organizing in the United States, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) found that at the county level (but not on the state level), an increase in the ethnic minority population was significantly associated with a higher number of patriot and militia groups, thereby indicating that reactive social movements may mobilize in response to perceived threats by actors outside of the institutional political arena. Additionally, Goldstone and McAdam (2001) argue that the rise of the New Left in the 1960s and early 1970s was, in part, made possible by important economic, social organizational, and social psychological processes that were triggered by the advent of the highly educated and optimistic postwar “baby boomer” generation.

In terms of violent conflict, Urdal’s (2008) study on the effects of population pressure and resource scarcity on political unrest in India revealed that youth bulges within subnational regions were associated with armed conflicts, political violent events, and riots. Ostby et al. (2011) also found that population pressure and horizontal intergroup material inequalities had an interactive effect on routine political violence in Indonesian provinces. Furthermore, with regard to mobile populations, Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001) have raised multiple ways in which immigration, demographic change, social order, and state security are interlinked. Finally, Ware’s (2005) study on the Pacific Island countries illustrates how continuous emigration can serve as a safety valve to help prevent population pressures and communal tensions from precipitating into high levels of unemployment and civil unrest.

With the paucity of interdisciplinary dialogue and the inherent complexity of the relationship between structural social and demographic change and the emergence of various forms of contentious action, much of the extant literature remains fragmented with tentative or mixed results emerging from antithetical breakdown and solidarity models, Snow et al. present the concept of *quotidian disruption*. Their argument posits that it is the dislocations that disrupt or threaten to disrupt the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life that are most likely to precipitate into collective action. More specifically, the quotidian is disrupted when, with all other things being equal, claimant demands increase while resources remain constant, claimant demands remain constant while resources decrease, and claimant demands increase as resources decrease. Goldstone’s model resonates with the first condition in which the quotidian is disrupted as population increases while resources remain relatively constant. Such theorization on the demographic roots of popular unrest therefore underscores Goldstone and Tilly’s (2001) assertion that the mere existence of opportunities does not always suffice to explain why collective action materializes, and that threats – whether ecological or internal to movements – *interact* with opportunities to produce variation in patterns of protest and contention.
variations in levels of analysis and the selection criteria of intervening variables. However, fragmented as they are, the aforementioned studies, inter alia, suggest that there may still be much to gain from further attempts to revisit the utility of theorization on the demographic determinants of contentious action.

SEE ALSO: Quotidian disruption; Revolutions; State breakdown and social movements; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Demonstrations

STEFAAN WALGRAVE

Demonstrations are legal or illegal gatherings of people in the public domain (squares or streets) voicing economic, social, or political claims. When these people move from point A to B in the public space we call this a demonstration; when they are static we instead call them “rallies.”

When people think about movements they think about protest. And when they think about protest they think about demonstrations. Indeed, in many countries, demonstrations are the most visible face of social movements. They form the key ingredient of many social movements’ action repertoire (Tilly 1996). In some countries, such as France and Belgium, more than a third of the population claims to have participated at least once in a demonstration, in other countries participation is much lower (e.g., United Kingdom, United States), but everywhere demonstration participation appears to be on the rise (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst 2005). In many Western capitals, demonstrations are daily and routinized events. Demonstration participation, at least participation in its legal variant, has normalized. What used to be a radical and out of the ordinary type of political behavior has become a mainstream and normal instrument to gain political leverage in which people from all walks of life take part (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001).

Demonstrations may have major consequences, mark the end of regimes, and lead to democratic or other regime transitions (e.g., Ukraine 2004–2005, Egypt 2011). Demonstrations also reflect the birth, or death, of specific social movements (e.g., the so-called “Battle of Seattle” in 1999, marking the coming-of-age of the global social justice movement). The largest demonstration wave on record was the worldwide protest against the imminent war on Iraq on February 15, 2003. An estimated six to ten million people took to the streets in 60 different countries (Walgrave & Rucht 2010). The demonstration in Rome (Italy) that day, with three million participants, is one of the largest demonstrations ever recorded.

According to Charles Tilly, demonstrations (just like many other types of protest) are what he calls “WUNC-displays.” WUNC is an acronym which stands for Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment. The more “WUNC” a protest, the larger its impact (Tilly 2006). Demonstrators need to be worthy, which means that they should show that they are a respectable crowd deserving the claimed resources or change. They should display their unity and show that they share the same claim and are not internally divided. They need to be comprised of many participants to be able to threaten the power holders with sanctions (electoral or economic). And, they need to be committed, which means that they really care about the issue and are prepared to go to great lengths to get what they want. Whether the “WUNCness” of protest really matters for the power of present-day demonstrations has never been established empirically.

Extant social movement work on demonstrations has mainly focused on four topics and employed different research strategies. The incidence and properties of demonstrations, first, have been systematically dealt with based on so-called protest event analyses. Drawing on police archives or content analysis of media coverage, scholars create databases of protest events that enable analysis of protest waves, the mobilization dynamics of social movements, and the reaction of power holders (see, e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995). Next, there has been considerable corresponding investigation, based on archive research but also on field observations, of the way the police deal with street protest in general and demonstrations in particular (della Porta & Reiter 1998). Third, media coverage of demonstrations has also been of interest to
movement scholars, leading to the conclusion that there are several biases in the coverage of demonstrations, among which “selection bias” and “description bias” are most prominent (Smith et al. 2001). Finally, more recent research has tackled the question of who the people are who participate in demonstrations, why they do so, and how they were mobilized. These scholars draw on the protest survey methodology to draw samples of participants and use postal or face-to-face interviews to gauge participants’ sociodemographics, motives, and behavior (Walgrave & Verhulst 2011).

SEE ALSO: Direct action; Marches; Media and social movements; Modular protest forms; Policing protest; Protest event research; Repertoires of contention; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Direct democracy

NICOLE DOERR

Direct democracy describes a theory of democracy and a form of collective decision-making in which sovereignty is directly exercised by the people. Democracy is direct if it is characterized by citizens making all decisions together with a maximum of equal participation. Direct democracy can be distinguished from representative democracy, which is indirect and centralized, and in which citizens elect representatives for executive offices and parliament.

Early historical examples of direct democracies are the Athenian democracy (461 BC), and the Swiss Confederation (1291 AD). The Athenian democracy was a city polity the inhabitants of which made all decisions in an assembly of 500 male citizens rotating annually and selected by lot. Women, slaves, and the foreign born were excluded (Polletta 2002: vii). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social and political movements were important in the trend toward more direct democratic access to decision making within modern nation-states. Such states today function as representative democratic systems with instruments of limited direct democracy such as referenda, initiatives, and recalls. Referenda allow citizens to either accept or reject a law, a recall of an elected representative, or a new constitution. Initiatives grant the opportunity to collect signatures in order to propose new laws or amendments without the consent of the elected government. Recalls provide a strong direct democratic instrument by allowing for the removal from office of incumbent representatives.

In response to the alleged crisis of representative democracy in past decades (Manin 1995), many countries have introduced more direct democratic instruments, including consultative referenda, participatory budgeting, citizen juries, and wisdom councils. These instruments vary widely in their impact and place-specific implementation. Arguing that top-down reforms have not been sufficient, social movements in the past and present have pushed for more radical forms of direct, participatory, and consensus-based democracy as opposed to decision making in institutions defined as representative, elitist, hierarchical, republican, and distant from the people (Kitschelt 1993: 15). In different periods of the twentieth century, pacifists and civil rights movements, New Left groups, students’ and women’s movements, community organizers, and direct action groups in the United States have thus experimented with new forms of radical democracy (Polletta 2002).

In theoretical terms, a first argument for why policymakers should adopt direct democracy procedures is the claim that they will enhance direct governance by the people, increasing the transparency of decisions and making political office holders accountable to their constituents. Thus, direct democracy holds the potential to prevent apathy and raise voter turnout, key symptoms of the modern crisis of representative democracy (Kriesi 2005: 112). A pragmatic argument against direct democratic processes is their time-consuming character. They also make unpopular but necessary decisions hard to implement. Enthusiasts of direct democracy, conversely, argue that cases such as Switzerland provide an example of time-effective decision making. They also draw attention to efficient methods of electronic democracy via the Internet (Trechsel & Mendez 2005).

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A theoretical perspective that tries to combine representative and direct democratic elements is the deliberative approach to democracy (Gutman & Thompson 2004). The claim is that direct, deliberative processes of public debate will produce informed decision making and make elected decision-makers more accountable to their constituents. An initial deliberative process will broaden consensus for

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eventual representative decision making, build civic reason, and increase trust in the legitimacy of institutions through a joint debate among all concerned citizens. However, critiques suggest that the deliberative process may increase existing cultural, social and gender-based inequalities and be open to manipulation by influential groups. Another problem is that consensus-oriented deliberation restricts opposition, depoliticizes decision making, and leads to deadlock in settings of lasting differences of interest (Mansbridge 1983).

In terms of civic education, the deliberative process within direct democracy aims ideally to transform self-interested individuals into responsible, informed, and consensus-oriented citizens. In the practice of policymaking, however, innovative forms of participatory public policymaking adopted from new social movements remain limited in their capacity to enhance deliberation and democratize decision-making structures (Sintomer & De Maillard 2007: 55). Empirical evidence suggests that citizens’ direct democratic participation is lower than enthusiasts of participatory democracy would like and de facto excludes socially disadvantaged groups and linguistic minorities despite the willingness of these groups to participate actively (Kriesi 2005: 134). A key condition for enhancing participation in the deliberative process, then, is public campaigns by social movements, which can create awareness for issues neglected by political elites (Kriesi 2005).

Yet, the public character of direct democracy itself touches upon another theoretical concern: namely that direct democratic decisions following public debate may impose the rights of majorities against minorities. More generally put, the fear of representative democratic theorists is that citizen deliberation will not lead to more informed political decisions. Right-wing political parties in the Weimar Republic, anti-immigrant organizations, religious groups, and nationalist parties today have all made use of referenda to campaign against social, political, ethnic, or religious minorities. However, democratically elected representatives also use polemic media debates to agitate majorities against minorities. This shows the need to further compare the institutional settings and power relationships within direct democratic forms, where referenda campaigns are also used by economic interest groups to impede political reforms. Another open question regards the conditions that make direct democratic debates in social movements reach out to broader public arenas to challenge and change political decision-making effectively.

Social movements’ aim of putting on the agenda unpopular issues ignored by policymakers has led to the increasing politicization of decision making in international institutions. Due to new communication technologies activists within current social movements have extended their demands for democracy to the transnational level. Feeling ignored by international and EU policymakers, activists in the recent waves of protest in the Global Justice Movement have also united physically in global democracy experiments such as the World Social Forum. First held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001, the World Social Forum brings together groups that seek global justice while contesting the closed nature of decision making by states representative in the World Economic Forum, the G8 summits, or the meetings of the International Monetary Fund. The Porto Alegre experiment of consensus-based democracy in an “open space” is built on experiences of radical democracy in different parts of the world, notably, in countries of the Global South (Smith et al. 2007). Porto Alegre’s local participatory budgeting model, in turn, has spread to city councils and local policymakers around the world.

The global diffusion of direct democratic political forms has strengthened activists’ call to promote a transnational citizenship in supranational polities such as the European Union (EU). The large public debate on the question of a European Constitution shows how the Europeanization of social movements contributes to democratization of EU politics through engagement for transnational citizenship and social rights (della Porta & Caiani 2009). Responding
to criticism of its “democratic deficit,” the European Union introduced the opportunity for citizens from different EU countries to participate in local democratic elections (see also Trechsel & Mendez 2005). Excluded from these reforms are immigrants from third-world countries, resident immigrant workers, and refugees. Some EU member states also introduced the opportunity for citizens to participate in national referenda on a future European Constitution, while other member states deny such opportunities, fearing populist campaigns by anti-European and antidemocratic movements.

Another important question regards the role of linguistic difference in the context of global social movements and the rapid diffusion of direct democracy instruments involving geographically distant or ethnically diverse populations in polities such as the European Union. Most democratic theorists still conceive of linguistic barriers as obstacles to communication between policymakers and citizens. Some evidence on democracy in the World Social Forum process, however, highlights a new model of multilingual face-to-face translation that includes traditionally disadvantaged groups in direct democracy (Doerr 2008). However, we know relatively little about the mobilization of linguistic barriers as a trigger for new cultural cleavages in direct democratic procedures relying on referenda or voting. By comparing the interactions between protest for new direct democratic forms, on the one hand, and institutional responses and their effects on the other, we should be able to understand how and when movement groups effectively promote democratic change.

SEE ALSO: Consensual decision-making; Democracy inside social movements; Participatory democracy in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Discourse analysis and social movements
HANK JOHNSTON

The discourse of a social group or community is the whole of its verbal and textual production. It represents its communicative repertoire and the symbolic space and structure of that repertoire. Regarding social movements, it is common that oppositional discourse draws upon the conflicts, struggles, and divisions of the broader social, political, and cultural environment, and articulates these elements to make the ideas it expresses both challenging to opponents and familiar to potential supporters. Analysts sometimes use the plural form, discourses, to emphasize that what is being discussed and acted upon is never unanimous, but often challenged and negated by opposing groups. These researchers sometimes stress the emergent and agentic character of textual production, variably called the rhetorical approach (Billig 1995), the rhetorical turn (Simon 1990), or the dialogic perspective (Steinberg 2001). These approaches treat meaning as context-specific, multifaceted, ever evolving, and contested, which is widely recognized to be true. The operative question, however, is if these qualities make traditional social-science analysis that focuses on the measurement of causal variables and relationships suspect.

Discourse analysis originated in the field of linguistics in response to what was perceived as an overemphasis on grammatical analysis at the level of the sentence. Harris (1952) was among the first to recognize that a great deal of meaning was conveyed by textual materials located beyond the single sentence, making it necessary to consider those occurring nearby in order to make full and accurate interpretations. Beyond proximate sentences, consideration of entire speech or textual episodes may be necessary, where themes and ideas are fully developed and brought to closure. This represents the basic discursive principle that the holistic text is the proper unit of analysis, a view that has been embraced by historians, literary theorists, and social and political scientists of the “discursive turn” (or narrative turn, Somers 1992). Some strands of cultural analysis extend the field of analysis to contextual factors residing in the social conditions and the broader culture. This brand of macro-level discourse analysis concentrates on the global meaning of texts, on their interpretation, and deconstruction according to social factors such as status, politics, economic interests, and cultural trends.

In the study of social movements, data sources for discourse analysis can include pamphlets, manifestos, minutes or recollections of meetings and strategy sessions, slogans, speeches, media coverage, public statements of leaders, or actions of political demonstrators. In other words, discourse analysis looks at the textual production of a movement. Some cultural scholars propose that behavioral repertoires can be read as text, but this is a focus that shifts from concrete spoken or written texts and relies more on interpretation, and has not been widely applied in the analysis of social movements. In practice, organizational documents, newsletters, newspaper articles, and interviews with social movement participants and leaders which are audio-recorded and transcribed, are the most common data sources. Examining a movement’s discourse and sounding its members’ narratives are important research strategies to examine its culture.

LEVELS OF DISCOURSE

Applied to social movements, there are different levels of discourse. The broadest are world-historical discourses (or mentalités) of the Reformation, Enlightenment, Islamism,
neoliberalism, that span national and transnational levels. These are expansive cultural trends and ideologies that are particularly important when considering influences of change-oriented movements, and are often related to more movement-specific discourses, such as gay rights, liberation theology, or ecology. A common strategy to analyze these discourses is to focus on texts that are representative, such as documents that are widely recognized as seminal or definitive of a movement – the Port Huron statement, for example, as a text for the US student movement, or Luther’s Invocavit sermon of 1522 for the Reformation (Wuthnow 1989).

At a more specific level is the discourse of a social movement organization (SMO). When a movement is structured according to different SMOs, their textual production forms part of the polyphonic voice of a movement’s discourse. The producers of organizational discourse are its activists, committeees, and functionaries at various levels of the SMO. It is common that the discourse produced by intellectuals and movement leaders is taken as representative of organizational discourse. Rochon (1998) points out that this level often reflects discursive elements that resonate among the larger populace, akin to processes of frame alignment and frame bridging. Demonstrating this nesting phenomenon, that subordinate levels draw upon and reflect the essential elements of broader discourses, is a common research goal in discourse studies.

At the most micro level, the researcher analyzes the individual production of text and speech by participants and activists. This micro focus is in line with traditional linguistic discourse analysis or narrative analysis (Johnston 2005). It seeks to explain what is said by expanding the analysis to broader textual units such as the speech episode for spoken language and the complete text or story for written language. Both are defined by the development and resolution of themes, and by their own internal structures. This level of analysis is important because there is a relationship between it and more general levels because individuals – not organizations or movements – produce texts. Even when a group of activists take part in crafting a statement or manifesto, the individual contributions may be crucial for interpretation. Key texts are partly shaped by writers’ biographies, the roles occupied within the organization, and individual goals that may vary from organizational goals. Accurate interpretation of macro-level organizational or world-historical texts may require micro-level data about the writer/speaker.

APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The concepts of discursive opportunities (e.g., Koopmans & Statham 1999) and discursive fields (Steinberg 1999) refer broadly to the cultural climate of a movement’s messages, mobilizing frames, or aspects of them, and whether there is support in culture’s prevailing schemas of what is good, appropriate, and desirable. These ideas refer to favorable cultural environments and trends – intellectual, legal, or popular – which movements may draw upon and link with to enhance their support. Presumably, these cultural patterns are represented in texts as well, but some studies that explore discursive opportunity structures rely on “interpretative readings” of movement texts and larger cultural trends, rather than the textual empiricism of discursive analysis. Narratives and stories are ways of approaching elements of discourse. Narratives are recapitulations of past experiences and events that are organized according to temporal order (Ricoeur 1981), in which a change of conditions occurs (Barthes 1977). These elements give narratives a conflictive or dilemmatic quality. Sequencing occurs according to certain principles of “story grammar” that provide a global schematic form (Abbot 1995). Events are presented teleologically in that a narrative’s ending clarifies its sequencing and selection of events. Up until that point, understanding is tentative without the story’s culmination (White 1981). Successful narratives presume a degree of identification between the teller and the audience,
and one often finds assumptions of shared normative orientations (Klimova 2009). Also, they build upon presuppositions held by the audience that allow the teller to lead them to intended conclusions. These structural and functional elements of narratives help the social movement analysis determine what makes a compelling story, which is part of the task of mobilizing participants.

There is an established body of research that explains language production and understanding through “story grammars,” schematic forms by which stories, tales, accounts, and histories are organized and remembered (Rumelhart 1975; Thorndyke 1977). According to Thorndyke (1977), simple stories have deep structures, beginning with the setting (characters, location, and time period), then the central theme (one or several events are described, and the goals of the characters are specified), then plot – with substructures consisting of several episodes, and episodes being ordered according to subgoals, attempts, and outcomes. The result is a hierarchically organized story grammar that describes the action, who is doing it, and to whom.

Discourse analysis brings culture and language to the study of social movements. It focuses on the complexity of textual data, which is often taken for granted in the research process. Because discourse analysis is based on interpretation, theoretical concepts should be linked with empirical observation in a clear and convincing way if they are to make sense to the broader community of scholars who may be less persuaded about the utility of cultural analysis. Discourse analysis must not journey too far from the original texts on which interpretations are based. Also, the criteria for selection of texts, either written or spoken, should be specified. These criteria include an understanding of how the texts are produced, either by the movement or by movement participants, and how these texts are related to the movement development and participation. Full disclosure of sampling procedures at all levels imparts greater confidence about the accuracy and generality of the findings.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Discursive fields; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Narratives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
discourse analysis and social movements

Discursive fields
DAVID A. SNOW

The concept of “discursive fields” is used to conceptualize an aspect of the context in which discourse and meaning-making processes, such as framing and narration, are generally embedded. Discursive fields, like the kindred concepts of multiorganizational fields and identity fields, are constitutive of the genre of concepts in the social sciences that can be thought of as “embedding” concepts in that they reference broader enveloping contexts in which discussions, decisions, and actions take place. Discursive fields evolve during the course of discussion and debate, sometimes but not always contested, about relevant events and issues, and encompass cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies, myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors (e.g., targeted authorities, social control agents, countermovements, media) whose interests are aligned, albeit differently, with the issues or events in question, and who thus have a stake in how those events and issues are framed and/or narrated.

The concept of discursive fields gained a measure of currency in the social sciences with the “cultural turn” of the 1990s and has been formulated and used in overlapping ways to advance understanding of various phenomena relevant to the study of culture and social movements. For example, in Communities of Discourse (1989), Wuthnow examines the ways in which the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the ascent of Marxist socialism were influenced by the contexts in which they arose, the ways in which they became institutionalized, and the ways in which their associated “ideologies were shaped by and yet succeeded in transcending their specific environments of origin” (1989: 5). For Wuthnow, discursive fields constitute not only “a space ... within which discourse can be framed” (1989: 555), but also provide “the foundational categories in which thinking can take place” and “establishes the limits of discussion and defines the range of problems that can be addressed” (1989: 13). Also writing within the sociology of culture, and tussling with the structure/culture connection, Spillman (1995) proffers the discursive field as the mediating link between the two – that is, “between structure and meaningful action” (139). Like Wuthnow, Spillman regards discursive fields as the site or locale of “creative cultural work” but also extends Wuthnow’s analysis by bringing social structure into her conceptualization by contending that “discursive fields express structured constellations of social relations” (142) that are “presupposed in interaction” and thus limit or constrain meaning making or cultural work (143–144).

Overlapping with these treatments of discursive fields is Steinberg’s examination of repertoires of discourse among nineteenth-century English cotton spinners. Steinberg draws on Spillman’s treatment by conceptualizing discursive fields as “dynamic terrain in which meaning contests occur” (1999: 748), and agreeing that fields both constrain and enable in the sense of limiting meaning construction as well as providing the tools for meaning work. But Steinberg parts company a bit with Wuthnow in terms of the clarity of field boundaries, arguing “that the boundaries of a discursive field are never entirely fixed or clear” (749).

Taken together, these three treatments suggest that discursive fields are the contexts in which meaning-making activities, like framing, are embedded; that the ideational stuff that gets discussed and the rules or grammar for the discourse are contained within the field; that the field is also constituted by a set of patterned relations imported from the outside; and field boundaries, while not fully transparent or fixed, are skewed in the direction of fixity and clarity.

To get a handle on the way in which discursive fields are structured, and thus the
participants engaged in the discursive dialogue, Snow (2008) draws on the concept of organizational fields, as originally propounded by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and suggests that the degree of field organization or the system of relations among the actors can vary on a continuum from unstable or unsettled to stable or settled. Unstable fields exist when the actors or participants and the system of relations among them are emergent or just evolving, or when the system of relations is dissolving due to a shift in attention to a more recent, noteworthy event or to contestation among the actors. Stable, or highly structured fields, on the other hand, exist when there is an ordered and legitimated system of relations among the various actors, such that there is an understanding of the decision-making process and the relative influence of the different actors in that process.

Incorporating these observations into an expanded understanding of discursive fields suggests a conceptualization that includes not only relevant cultural materials that constrain and facilitate argumentation, but also the range of actors participating in the discussion and the system of relations among them, whether it be emergent and unstable or highly ordered and structured. This suggests, then, that discursive fields can vary on a continuum ranging from emergent and relatively unstructured and unstable at one end to highly structured and stable at the other end.

Since discursive fields are constituted when two or more individual or collective actors discuss some relevant event or issue, and since there can be considerable variation in the extent of agreement or disagreement regarding the focal event or issue, it is also clear that discursive fields can vary on a continuum ranging from consensus to heated contestation.

The cross-classification of the emergent/structured and consensual/contested continua yields a four-fold typology of discursive fields, which is schematically summarized in the figure. Cell 1 contains emergent discursive fields in which there is considerable agreement or near consensus about framing the event either diagnostically or prognostically. The discursive field that emerged in response to the December 26, 2004, earthquake-triggered Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian tsunamis is illustrative. Not only was there immediate, near diagnostic consensus about the causes of the disaster—a 9.1 to 9.3 magnitude earthquake—but it prompted, as well, a huge worldwide effort to help victims of the tragedy, with billions of dollars being raised for disaster relief. In time, prognostic debates began to percolate as to the timeliness and sufficiency of the response, and the disaster response field became more structured as well. But these observations bring into play temporal considerations, which contribute to the dynamic character of discursive fields.

Cell 2 includes emergent fields in which there is heated contestation among the actors. Examples include the contested and unstable fields that emerged in response to the 2005 hurricane Katrina disaster and the Paris riots that began on October 27 and ended on November 17, 2005 (see Snow, Vliegenhart, & Corrigall-Brown 2007).

Equally contested, but somewhat more structured, was the discursive field that emerged in response to the documentary, *The March of the Penguins*. It was emergent in the sense of being unanticipated because the contested interpretation of the documentary’s deep meaning caught people off-guard, but the field was initially more structured than the Katrina or Paris riots fields because the contested framings were in accord with the fields that were already organized around the creationist and intelligent design movement and the antigay marriage countermovement.

Cell 3 encompasses discursive fields in which there is considerable consensus among actors who are situated in relation to each other in a structured and relatively stable fashion. An illustration is provided by the July 7, 2005, suicide bombings of London’s public transport system during the morning rush-hour. Three bombs exploded within less than a minute of each other on three underground trains and in a bus about an hour later. All told, 56 were killed and around 700 injured. Since
it was an unanticipated event, the discursive field that emerged with it as an object of discussion is positioned almost in the middle of the continuum, but skewed slightly toward the structured end because the discussion was highly orchestrated and strongly consensual, suggesting rapid frame crystallization (convergence around or toward a proffered framing).

Cell 4 is the last type or category of discursive fields schematized in the figure. It includes discursive fields that are structured in varying degrees but in which various issues, events, or practices are not merely debated but hotly contested. Examples include the fractionated but structured discursive fields associated with the build-up to sectarian splits, whether resulting in large-scale ones such as the Protestant Reformation (Wuthnow 1989) or smaller scale ones such as the factionalism and defection that occurred within the Hare Krishna movement in the late 1980s (Rochford 1989), with the Iraq War, and with the ongoing creationist/intelligent design and evolution debate. In each of these cases, and others like them, the discursive field consists of the various actors on different sides of the issue, practice, or event in question and is thus fragmented into what social movement scholars have theorized as conflict and alliance systems (Klandermans 1992; Rucht 2004). But the system of relations among these fragmented or contentious actors is still structured inasmuch as it is organizationally or institutionally embedded, and patterned or relatively stable, as is typically the case with divergent political parties.

This typology indicates that discursive fields are not all of the same cloth or form but can vary along at least two dimensions that, when cross-classified, yield four types into which real-life discursive fields can be categorized. But actual discursive fields, like organizational fields, are not static or fixed entities, but dynamic terrain. However, not all fields are equally dynamic, thus raising questions for future inquiry: What other factors or variables, other than the consensual/contested and emergent/structured dimensions, affect the extent of dynamism or turbulence or stability of a

![Figure 1](image-url)
discursive field? In other words, what additional factors account for variation in discursive fields and associated framing and narrative activity?

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Identity fields; Multiorganizational fields; Narratives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Discursive opportunity structure
HOLLY MCCAMMON

In 1999, Koopmans and Statham introduced the term “discursive opportunity structure” (DOS) to identify ideas in the broader political culture believed to be “sensible,” “realistic,” and “legitimate” and whose presence would thus facilitate reception of specific forms of collective action framing—forms, that is, that would align well with these pre-existing ideational elements (1999: 228). The notion of DOS, therefore, provides social movement scholars with a conceptual tool to understand which social movement frames are likely to have the greatest capacity to mobilize existing and new recruits, to convince the public of a movement’s demands, and to persuade authorities to alter policy and practices in line with the movement’s agenda. The conceptualization of discursive opportunities synthesizes theories of social movement framing and political opportunity structure. Framing theory by itself is limited in its ability to explain why some collective action frames are more successful than others. Political opportunity theory, while drawing our attention to political-institutional opportunities for successful movement mobilization, tends to neglect cultural dynamics that also play a pivotal role in movement outcomes. Discursive opportunity structures reveal that cultural elements in the broader environment facilitate and constrain successful social movement framing.

While the term, “discursive opportunity structure,” was introduced in the late 1990s, the idea behind it has been around for some time. Snow and Benford (1988) describe various circumstances that influence whether a frame will resonate with target audiences, such as the centrality of the frame’s values or beliefs for its recipients or the fit of a frame to its audience’s real-world experiences. Similarly, McAdam (1994) discusses “expanding cultural opportunities” that can elicit specific types of framing efforts among activists. Noonan (1995), in a study of Chilean women’s mobilization, shows that activists seized a cultural opportunity, relying successfully on a maternalist frame that mirrored the dominant discourse of the authoritarian Pinochet regime. Gamson and Meyer (1996) remind us that opportunity structures have a cultural side, and Steinberg’s (1999) “discursive fields” draws our attention to the privileged role of hegemonic beliefs and values in the broader context.

Researchers continue to refine our understanding of DOSs. Ferree and colleagues (2002) delineate both the cultural and institutional components of DOS. While activists must consider the alignment of their framing efforts with widespread beliefs and core values in the broader population (the cultural component), they must also navigate the structured terrain of key institutions that help define discourse in the public arena, an arena which most activists must access in order to add their claims to the public discourse. Koopmans and Olzak (2004) point to the pivotal role of the mass media and the gatekeeping functions of editors and journalists. Gamson (2004: 249) conjures a vivid image of the DOS of the media by saying that it “is not the flat, orderly and well-marked field in a soccer stadium but one full of hills and valleys, sinkholes, promontories, and impenetrable jungles.” Ferree (2003) highlights another aspect of the DOS by pointing to the importance of public debates over law and legal rights and the ways in which movement actors must often invoke legal constructs and negotiate legal institutions in their collective discursive work. McCammon and her collaborators (2007) alert us to both stability and volatility in discursive opportunities, as well as the fact that challengers must often contend with...
Multiple dominant public discourses, which sometimes carry conflicting and competing messages about how activists might frame their claims for social change. Bröer and Duyvendak (2009) point out that some discourses are prominently used by activists because they tap into powerful emotional undercurrents. Thus, the DOS, at least in part, is configured by emotional themes as well.

Increasingly, scholars examine the empirical effects of DOSs, particularly their impact on framing strategies, tactical choices, and movement political and economic gains. A number of studies demonstrate that DOSs shape movement framing (e.g., Guigni et al. 2005). King and Husting (2003), in a study of the French antiabortion movement, find that not only did cultural openings influence activist claims making, but the discursive environment also affected the movement’s willingness to utilize “rescue” strategies. Wahlstrom and Peterson (2006) investigate the animal rights movement to explore the combined circumstance of an “open” discursive environment, one in which broad receptivity for the activists’ demands existed, but a “closed” economic opportunity structure, where corporations vigorously resisted the movement’s demands. In addition, Holzer’s (2008) study of a critical ruling in the European Court of Justice shows that women’s activism in Europe has succeeded in institutionalizing a women’s rights frame in the legal system, thereby significantly altering the discursive opportunity structure for future women’s activism.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Culture and social movements; Discursive fields; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Disengagement in social movements
CATHERINE CORRIGALL-BROWN

Social movement participation is widespread in most modern industrial democracies. To illustrate, the World Values Survey finds that 37.5 percent of the French, 30.8 percent of Germans, 26.3 percent of Canadians, and 15.1 percent of Americans report having participated in a protest (2010). While this is a large proportion of these countries’ populations, what happens to these individuals after they have been initially mobilized? While some remain active and involved over time, not all activism is sustained. In this entry, I propose that there are multiple trajectories that participation can follow once an individual engages with a social movement; persistent participation, transfer, individual abeyance, or disengagement. Below, I outline these trajectories and explore the factors which lead to disengagement from movements over time.

How do we understand the participation of individuals in social movements over time? We can begin with Bert Klandermans’ theoretical model of movement participation outlined in The Social Psychology of Protest (1997). In this book, Klandermans delineates three stages of engagement – initial engagement, sustained participation, and disengagement. These three stages of participation are intended to illuminate the process whereby an individual joins and then leaves a specific social movement organization (SMO). Yet, many participants engage in this process several times over the course of their lives, joining and leaving many different groups or campaigns. Understanding social movement participation as following one of a variety of trajectories, of which disengagement is only one option, enables us to examine participation over the life-course as individuals move in and out of not only organizations but activism more generally.

I propose four prototypical trajectories that individual participants can follow after their initial engagement in social movements. First, individuals can persist by remaining in their initial SMO or continue participating in protest activities over time. Second, individuals can transfer by disengaging from their organization or protest activities, but becoming active in another SMO or cause. These individuals disengage from the original movement organization, but not from contentious political participation. Third, activists can follow a pattern of individual abeyance by disengaging from their SMO or protest activities, but returning to participation later in life. Finally, individuals can disengage from their organization and from participation permanently.

Persistence and transfer are similar to the processes described by McAdam in his influential study of the Freedom Summer campaign. In this campaign, elite white college students traveled from the Northern American states to Mississippi to register African-Americans to vote during the summer of 1964. This was a transformative experience, inspiring many of the volunteers to remain politically active over their life-course (1988).

While the term persistence refers to the process of staying in the same social movement organization over time, the transfer trajectory describes shifting from one social movement organization to another. There are many reasons why an individual might do this. These reasons fall into three categories: the group may change, the individual and their interests may change, or the context may change. First, a group may disband or begin focusing on different issues. Second, an individual may move to a new city or town or, due to changing circumstances or maturation, develop interests in new groups or activities. Finally, the political and social context may change, making certain...
issues and groups more or less salient. (For a discussion of activists who moved from one peace organization to another, see Downton & Wehr 1997.)

The concept of social movement “spillover” is partly based on the observation that individuals often transfer their participation from group to group as shared personnel move from one group to another or cooperate across groups (Meyer & Whittier 1994). One of the results of these shifting involvements and cooperative coalitions is that a range of movement characteristics, including frames, collective identities, tactics, and elements of movement culture, can spill over from one group or campaign to another (Meyer & Whittier 1994). This process can also facilitate the movement of individual activists from one organization to another over time.

To these possibilities I add the concept of individual abeyance, which is intended to capture the often intermittent and undulating nature of contentious political participation over time. Taylor (1989) offers the concept of movement abeyance structures in order to highlight the continuity in SMOs and movements as a whole. When examining the feminist movement, for example, it appears there were distinct movements for suffrage, jury rights, and equal pay. However, Taylor argues that these were not discrete or isolated movements; rather, they were tied together by overlapping networks of individuals, ideologies, goals, and tactics known as abeyance structures. These structures work to sustain movements under circumstances that are unfavorable to mass mobilization and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another (Taylor 1989; see also Melucci, Keane, & Mier 1989).

In a similar way, episodes of participation for individuals are not always discrete or isolated; they are often tied together by individual abeyance structures over the life-course. These structures consist of networks of friends, repertoires of tactics, and ideological commitments. At a general level, examining participation over the life-course can help to illuminate the ways that individuals disengage from a particular social movement organization, but perhaps not from participation as a whole, and how one episode of participation is related to later episodes.

Individuals can also disengage permanently from a SMO or contentious political activity. At its core, disengagement arises because of a loss of commitment on the part of individuals to a movement or its goals. There are three types of commitment: affective, continuance, and normative. Affective commitment is based on how gratifying the relationship is between a movement and a participant and is based on interactions with the organization. Continuance commitment is the investment that someone has in a movement and the attractiveness of alternatives. And, normative commitment is the congruence between a person’s values and the ideals of the movement (Klandermans 1997).

Individuals join movements assuming that the benefits will outweigh the costs. If these expectations are met and interactions with the group are satisfying, commitment to the group develops. On the other hand, disappointing participatory experiences can weaken commitment and this weaker commitment can lead to less active participation. This can create a self-perpetuating cycle, as less active participation can further reduce commitment and can precipitate disengagement.

Downton and Wehr (1991) argue that social bonds are the key to maintaining an individual’s commitment to a movement over time. These bonds can be fostered in five main ways: through leadership, ideology, organization, rituals, and/or social relations. The most effective bonding comes when organizations use a combination of these five key elements. Sandell’s (1999) work on the Swedish temperance movement also highlights the significance of social ties in protecting against dropout from movements and finds that individuals tend to leave movements when their close friends do, creating what he calls a negative bandwagon effect.

Empirical studies also emphasize the role of identity in supporting activism over time.
Passy and Giugni (2000) examine the process of disengagement and argue that one of the critical factors accounting for continued participation is the connectedness of an individual’s “life-spheres.” Specifically Passy and Giugni argue that the more connected the central life-spheres of an activist to her sphere of political engagement, the more stable her commitment to a movement over time. Conversely, an isolated political sphere is likely to lead to diminished activism or disengagement. This work indicates that activism must be a salient part of an individual’s identity for participation to be sustained over time.

Our understanding of the processes of disengagement from social movements and contentious politics can be enriched by examining it through a more general lens of role exiting. All roles are sets of social expectations attached to particular statuses or social positions. Individuals simultaneously perform a variety of roles and move in and out of roles over time. Being a participant in social movements and contentious political activity can be seen as one role an individual can perform and this lens can give us some leverage on the process of engaging and disengaging in contentious politics.

Leaving jobs or career changes can be seen as processes of role exit. In fact, it is in the study of occupations that Albert O. Hirschman (1970) posited his model of exit and voice which can be very useful for understanding general processes of disengagement. Hirschman hypothesized that the consequences of commitment can produce four types of responses which can be either active or passive. First, individuals can exit or actively destroy the relationship or the link with an organization. Second, they can neglect their commitment by passively allowing their relationship or the link with the organization to deteriorate. Third, individuals can exercise voice by actively and constructively attempting to improve conditions. Finally, Hirschman posits that individuals can display loyalty by passively but optimistically waiting for conditions to improve. High levels of commitment produce constructive responses (voice or loyalty) whereas low levels of commitment produce destructive responses (exit or neglect). This way of thinking about role exit has been influential in studies of labor unions which find that exit behavior is more likely when commitment is low (Van Der Veen & Klandermans 1989).

In her influential work, Becoming an Ex (1988), Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh discusses the concept of role exit, which she describes as the process of disengaging from a role that is central to one’s self-identity and reestablishing a new identity in a new role. She posits that the processes whereby individuals leave roles are similar in certain ways, regardless of the substance of the role being left. For Erving Goffman, disengagement is a mutual process between the individual and other group members with whom he interacted as part of his previous role (1952). As the person begins to remove themselves from the social expectations of a previous role, he in turn begins to withdraw from other individuals in the group both emotionally and physically. Like the work of Sandell on social movement engagement, Goffman focuses on the importance of social ties in the role exiting process.

In my examination of a nationally representative panel study that followed 1669 Americans from 1965 until 1997, I find that about 40 percent of individuals who had ever participated in a social movement disengaged after a period of participation (Corrigall-Brown 2010). This type of turnover is difficult for organizations. When members leave groups, new members need to be found to replace them—a costly activity for the organization both in terms of time and energy. In addition, new recruits have to be socialized into the group. At some point, if too many members leave or too few new members join, organizations may cease to exist. Organizers can, however, adapt to facilitate the continued engagement of members over time. By helping members create social ties within the group and fostering identities supportive of continued engagement, organizations can maintain the commitment and, as a result, the participation of their members over time.
SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Commitment; Demobilization; Participation in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Dramaturgy and social movements
ROBERT D. BENFORD

Social movements are replete with drama. Indeed, some observers have suggested that social movements are dramas. Benford and Hunt (1992) define social movements as dramas in which protagonists and antagonists clash as they seek to affect audiences’ interpretations of power relations in various institutional domains (e.g., religion, politics, economy, etc.). Drawing on Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical perspective in which the theater provides a metaphor for analyzing everyday life, social movement scholars have examined how movement activists construct and communicate grievances in a fashion that maximizes their potential impact on social change. Often that entails deploying dramatic tactics that capture the attention of media, targets of change, bystander publics, and potential recruits. The US civil rights movement, for example, consistently employed a variety of nonviolent direct action tactics including lunch-counter sit-ins, boycotts, freedom rides, marches, and other forms of civil disobedience in defiant protest of racial segregation. As the civil rights leaders intended, many of these tactics elicited a violent response from their opponents (McAdam 1996). The movement’s disruptive actions and the repressive actions of local authorities yielded dramatic news coverage and hence increased popular and political support for their cause.

Social movement dramas are dynamic and emergent. Yet there are patterns associated with the dramatic techniques movement activists employ. Benford and Hunt (1992) identified four broad techniques: scripting, staging, performing, and interpreting. Scripting refers to the creation of a set of directions that define the scene, identify the actors involved, and outline participants’ expected actions. It entails various framing activities including developing diagnoses, prognoses, and compelling rationales for change as well as outlining strategic and tactical direction. Scripting also involves developing dramatis personae, the cast of movement characters. Activists help construct identities and roles for protagonists, antagonists, victims, supporting cast members, and audiences. Finally, scripting provides direction for appropriate performances such as the orchestration of emotions at a protest.

Staging refers to the tasks of appropriating, managing, and directing materials, audiences, and performing regions. These activities involve mobilizing the necessary resources needed to put on a movement performance. Beyond such obvious but essential logistical matters, staging also entails developing and manipulating symbols or props (e.g., a peace sign, a clenched fist, a burning flag, a mock coffin, etc.) for media and other audience members’ consumption. Social movement staging tasks further include the various promotional and publicity activities associated with rounding up an audience for an event. Finally, consistent with one of Goffman’s (1959) primary focal concerns, those staging a movement drama must attend to the interrelated issues of audience segregation and backstage control.

Performing refers to social movement actors’ collective actions that seek to persuade others to support their cause, to encourage those who hold the keys to change to act in accordance with the movement’s script, and to elicit a scripted response from, or counter and demobilize, their antagonists. Engaging in a movement action can be empowering in itself and frequently enhances the development of esprit de corps and thus collective identity. Movement performers seek to maintain dramaturgical loyalty, by remaining true to the movement’s scripts and emergent norms. Those who lack the dramaturgical discipline to sustain the
movement’s party line or the dramaturgical circumspection to adjust their actions in reaction to unforeseen contingencies, run the risk of undermining the movement’s performance and are thus subject to internal sanctions by their fellow movement actors.

Interpreting is the ongoing social activity that makes movement scripting, staging, and performing possible. For each dramatic technique, movement actors seek to develop a line of action consonant with their collectively negotiated interpretations of reality, their idealistic visions for the future, and their readings of the audiences’ interpretations of the movement’s performances. This interpretive work entails a continuous collective framing and reframing of their understandings of others’ interpretations and appropriate adjustments to subsequent scripting, staging, and performing activities.

Despite the close affinity between theater and collective action, dramaturgical approaches to studying social movements have been fairly rare. Rather than extending the metaphor or theater lens widely, social movement scholars have tended to focus on specific dramaturgical dimensions of mobilization such as protagonist and antagonist identity attributions, movement public spectacles, and “carnivalized politics” (St John 2008), and the generation of deeply felt emotions (Cadena-Roa 2002; Juris 2008). While these studies contribute to extant understanding of the dramaturgy of social movements, a more holistic approach is needed – one that identifies and analyzes the dynamic relationships among various dramaturgic processes encompassing the plethora of unfolding dramas across time and space that constitute a social movement.

SEE ALSO: Bystander publics; Collective identity; Framing and social movements; Identity fields; Movement/countermovement dynamics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Dual identity

BERT KLANDERMANS

The concept of dual identity originates in the identity family of theories. Identity, more specifically collective identity, became an important concept in the social movement literature during the last decade of the previous century. Cohen (1985) and Melucci (1985) were among the first to emphasize the significance of collective identity formation in social movements, and the concept gained importance in the years after (see Stryker, Owens, & White 2000 for an overview). Coming from a social psychological perspective, Simon and his colleagues (1998) proposed the existence of an identity pathway to collective action in addition to the instrumental pathway. These authors reasoned that people do not participate in social movements for instrumental reasons only, but also for fulfilling identity needs. Meanwhile, social psychologists had begun to explore the role of group identification in movement participation (Simon & Klandermans 2001 for an overview) and concluded that the more one identifies with the group that is involved in a protest activity, the more likely one is to take part in that activity. Applied in the context of identity theories of social movement participation the concept of dual identity introduces a dynamic element in that it recognizes that individuals hold multiple identities at the same time that do not necessarily work in the same direction.

Recent work on multiple identities (cf. Kurtz 2002) shows that people simultaneously hold several identities, which may come into conflict and guide behavior in different directions. People might find themselves under cross-pressure when two of the groups they identify with find themselves on opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are faced with the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. This problem is especially relevant in the case of protest participation by minority groups or immigrants, specifically Muslim immigrants, which is easily (mis)interpreted as disloyalty to the country of residence. González and Brown (2003) coined the term “dual identity” to point to the concurrent workings of identities. These authors argued that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g., ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g., national identity). In fact, they claimed that a so-called “dual identity” is the desirable configuration, as it implies having sufficient identification with one’s subgroup to experience basic security and sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude intergroup conflict. In the context of cultural adaptation by immigrants González and Brown’s concept of dual identity is akin to what Berry (1984) defines as integration. Berry distinguishes between four types of cultural adaptation, depending on the degree of identification with the culture of the country of origin and the culture of the country of immigration. The possible resulting forms of adaptation are integration (identification with both cultures), assimilation (sole identification with the culture of the country of immigration), separation (sole identification with the culture of the country of origin), and marginalization (identification with neither culture). There is evidence suggesting that integration, that is, holding a dual identity, comes with more satisfaction with one’s situation than the other forms of cultural adaptation (González & Brown 2003; Sam & Berry 2006). Furthermore, studies among Spanish and Dutch farmers and among South African citizens (Klandermans, Roefs, & Olivier 2001; Klandermans, Sabucedo, & Rodriguez 2004) suggest that integration or holding a dual identity, rather than
separation, assimilation, or marginalization, stimulates subgroup mobilization, suggesting that some degree of identification with the nation is needed in order to mobilize for political action. This makes us expect that, overall, citizens who report holding a dual identity will be more satisfied with their social and political situation than those who do not hold a dual identity. However, if they are dissatisfied, we expect that citizens holding a dual identity are more likely to participate in collective action.

This is indeed, what Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008) found – perceived unfairness particularly influences political participation among immigrants who display a dual identity. The authors suggest two possible explanations for this finding. Immigrants who display a dual identity may expect to be treated in a fair and respectful manner, due to having a stronger identification with the host nation. If, then, they are disappointed in government they react in a stronger fashion. Moreover, because of their national identification they may be more inclined to believe that collective action makes a difference.

This reasoning regarding dual identity also concurs with Hirschman’s (1970) classical analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty in firms, organizations, and states. Hirschman stresses that loyalty to the firm, organization, or state is an important psychological prerequisite for any attempt on the part of dissatisfied customers, members, or citizens to change (voice option) rather than escape (exit option), the objectionable state of affairs in the firm, organization, or state.

Simon (2009) suggests a connection between politicized collective identities and dual identities. He proposes that a dual identity has a pacifying effect on politicization and associated collective action in that it prioritizes normative claims and actions (i.e., claims and actions that stay within the limits of normative acceptance in the larger polity). In contrast, collective identities lacking this pacifying effect, such as separatist identities based on more exclusive cultural, ethnic, or religious allegiances, should be more prone to non-normative escalation and radicalization.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Immigration, protest, and social movements; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Participation in social movements; Politicized identity.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Ecological conditions/determinants

DINGXIN ZHAO

Human activities are always undertaken in certain places. The natures and the spatial configurations of those places, either as built or natural environments, will shape the ways in which the places are used and understood. More specifically, they shape the spatial activities of the people who live in or use the place, pattern the ways in which information is transmitted and people are encountered, and affect the feeling and understanding of people toward the places. We may call the patterns of interaction between humans and the physical (built or natural) environment, as well as the patterns of interactions among humans under a certain physical environment, ecological determinants.

The ways in which the natures and spatial configurations of a place have shaped humans’ spatial activities, social networks, and place-based identity have been a research topic in many scholarly fields, including but not limited to small group ecology, human geography, and environmental psychology. For those who have studied riots, social movements, and revolutions, ecological determinants have also been commonplace knowledge from very early on. For instance, Feagin and Hahn (1973) and Fogelson (1971) have demonstrated how the large-scale black riots in Southern US cities were facilitated by the densely populated black ghettos and by the fact that the residents of those ghettos spent a great deal of time on the street. Heirich (1971: 59–65) has described quite convincingly how the change of Berkeley’s built environment in the 1950s made Berkeley students more available for political mobilization during the stormy 1960s. Chow (1967) has noticed how the congested living conditions on early twentieth-century Beijing campuses facilitated the student mobilization during the May Fourth Movement. Tilly and Schweitzer (1982) have analyzed how the redistribution of economic activities, administrative activities, and residential patterns in pre-Victorian London shaped people’s spatial routines and consequently the geographic locations of contentious collective actions.

Research on the roles of ecological determinants in social movements did not see major developments in the United States before the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s, most social movement scholars in the United States were studying those home-grown social movements which had emerged in the 1960s. Most of these social movements were well organized and had clearly defined goals. These features of American social movements led scholars of that generation to identify the resources, interests/strategic choices, and organizations/networks as the only keys to explaining the dynamics of social movement. Starting in the 1990s, ecological determinants in social movements began to receive more attention, in part because more and more scholars became interested in social movements that had happened in the past and in non-Western countries. In his studies of the contentious mobilization in nineteenth-century Paris, Gould (1995) finds that while working class consciousness had played a significant role in the 1848 Parisian uprising, the base of mobilization for the 1871 Paris Commune was not class consciousness but neighborhood solidarity. Gould attributes this difference to the change in the built environment of Paris in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of the Haussmann projects, and argues that the new residential patterns had not only shaped how the Parisians were mobilized but also the solidarities and fighting capacities of the battalions during the insurrection. Stillerman (2003) shows how the characteristics of the built environment and everyday spatial routines of the metal workers and coal miners...
in Chile influenced the tactical repertoires and mobilizing structures of strikers. Sewell (2001) compares the roles of what he calls "concrete space" in both the 1989 Tiananmen student movement and the French Revolution, and argues for the general significance of ecological determinants in movement mobilization. It is, however, Zhao’s (1998) study of student mobilization during the 1989 Tiananmen student movement that pushed the study of ecological determinants to a new level of detail.

Zhao finds that the university students were living in a built environment that can be briefly summarized as follows. At the time Beijing had 67 universities that hosted a total of 162,576 boarding students. By far the majority of these universities were located in the Haidian district in close proximity to each other, and each of these universities was separated from the outside world by a brick wall. The students at these universities lived in dormitories; with six to eight undergraduates in each room, each dormitory building accommodated up to several hundred students. In most universities, these dormitory buildings were also clustered to form a student living quarter as opposed to the administrative quarter, teaching quarter, recreational quarter, commercial quarter, and so on. Zhao finds that the campus ecology affected student mobilization during the 1989 movement in at least the following ways: (1) It facilitated the spread of dissident ideas before the movement started and the transmission of news and rumors during the movement; (2) it nurtured many dormitory-based student networks. These networks were the basis of mutual influence, even coercion among the students and, therefore, sustained a rate of student participation that went as high as 90 percent on certain occasions; (3) it compelled the students to frequently bump into, or hear noises of, various protesting events and other movement activities, thereby attracting some of them into the movement; (4) it patterned students’ spatial routine on the campus, and created a few places that most students had to pass or frequent on a daily basis. These places became centers of student mobilization; (5) the concentration of many universities in one district encouraged mutual imitation and interuniversity competition for activism among students of different universities; (6) it also patterned students’ mobilization strategies as well as the routes of student demonstrations in ways that facilitated mobilization and nullified the control strategies of the police forces and the government.

The nature of the built or natural environment can also shape people’s understanding of a place, which will also have a significant impact on social movement mobilization. What made Tiananmen Square such a politically sensitive place, for example, is not just that it is a large space ideal for staging a protest, but more importantly because it embodies numerous political symbols that have been associated with it in twentieth-century China. China’s first modern student movement, that is, the May Fourth Movement, started in the square, as did many other major student movements of the twentieth century. Most of these student movements were then reinterpreted to the benefit of the communist rule and sanctified in China. The communist government also added the Monument to the People’s Heroes and a few other symbolic architectures in the square after it took power. Finally, since the communist takeover, but particularly during Mao’s era, Tiananmen Square has been used by the Chinese government to stage all sorts of political events with loaded meanings. The preceding characteristics of Tiananmen Square have made it China’s most sacred place for the government to showcase its power and legitimacy and for the aggrieved to usurp it and challenge the government. Nevertheless, while the impact of people’s memory and understanding of a place on movement mobilization is a commonsense to most scholars, few rich and systematic studies have been done on the topic, which could be a possible direction for future research (Tilly 2000: 152–153).

Ecological condition is an important factor affecting social movement mobilization, but it is not a mechanism in the sense that the
The role of an ecological condition in social movement mobilization is likely to change when it is associated with different structural conditions. The campus ecology, for example, greatly facilitated the student mobilization during the 1989 Beijing protests. Yet, the same campus ecology had made it impossible for the development of antigovernment student protest during Mao's era. This was because most Beijing students during the Mao era believed in the communist propaganda and were likely to act voluntarily as government agents and report the other students' "wrongdoings" to the university authorities (Zhao 1997). In studying the structure of student mobilization during the 1999 anti-US student protests triggered by the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Zhao (2008) also finds that the level of student activists' reliance on the campus built environment in the mobilization was highly correlated with the involvement of organizations in the student mobilization. The campus built environment was crucial only when the mobilization process was more spontaneously initiated in ways similar to the student mobilization during the 1989 Tiananmen student movement. In other words, the impact of the same ecological condition on social movement mobilization can differ under different structural conditions.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Networks and social movements; Organizations and movements; Paris Commune; Riots; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Elections and social movements
MICHEL T. HEANEY

Social movements are organized efforts to bring about change in public policies and/or society. Elections are a mechanism whereby citizens decide collectively who occupies positions of responsibility in government. These two phenomena are reciprocally interrelated with one another (McAdam & Tarrow 2010). By affecting who wins elections, social movements may be able to influence changes in public policies and/or society. The outcomes of elections may affect the motivations of individuals to devote their time and energy to social movements. The interactions between electoral actors and movement activists are sometimes cooperative, and at other times conflictual, depending on the strategies employed by these actors (Schwartz 2010).

MOVEMENTS AFFECT ELECTIONS

 Movements have the potential to affect elections in a variety of ways. First, social movements may play a vital role in pressuring non-democratic governments to allow democratic elections. Indeed, movements to legitimize democratic participation in government have been among history’s most successful movements. For example, during Mexico’s transition from an authoritarian political system to a more fully democratic system in the 1980s and 1990s, social movement organizations (such as pro-Zapatista organizations in Chiapas) helped to support minority parties that would eventually challenge the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) successfully (Cadena-Roa 2003). Such movements generally do not settle all questions of legitimate participation, but they do promise to amplify citizens’ voices within the halls of government.

Second, social movement strategies may make a difference in extending voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups. Social movements have long fought to incorporate women, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, and other excluded groups into the electoral process. Banaszak (1996) demonstrates that the actions of movement groups help to explain why the United States granted universal voting rights to women in 1920, while Switzerland delayed extending the franchise to all women until 1990. In particular, the confrontational tactics employed by women’s groups in the United States promoted movement success, while Swiss women’s groups were relatively stymied by their unwillingness to resort to confrontational tactics. What social movements do or fail to do makes a difference in accessing the franchise.

Third, over time, social movements may grow into political parties that become challengers in elections. Goldstone (2003) points out that the Republican Party in the United States, the Nazi Party in Germany, and the Democratic Russian Party were all outgrowths of social movements that eventually became governing parties. Electoral systems are more likely to accommodate a role for movements as parties if they allow relatively proportional representation in the legislature than if they have majoritarian rules for selecting representatives (Kriesi et al. 1995). For example, Germany’s proportional electoral rules accommodated the environmental movement’s participation in the federal government through the Green Party more easily than did the United States, where majoritarian electoral rules were a major factor preventing the Green Party from electing its members to federal offices.

Fourth, social movements may affect the outcomes of elections by influencing the balance of support received by different electoral coalitions. Movements may have these effects because they influence the salience of issues,
encourage changes in parties’ platforms, or cultivate a readily mobilizable constituency that can influence the outcome. For example, the coordinated worldwide protests against the invasion of Iraq on February 15, 2003, affected the distribution of support among electoral coalitions in nations where the Iraq War was a highly salient issue (Rudig 2010). This effect was felt most strongly in Spain, where the Socialist Party’s 2004 electoral victory was facilitated by its alignment with the antiwar movement, the realignment of issues around the Iraq War, and the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Even if movements are not decisive in determining the victor of an election, they may matter for the distribution of vote shares among parties.

Fifth, social movements may shape the personal identities of activists and their orientations toward the political system, thus altering the terrain in which elections take place. In her study of Brazilian youth movements, Mische (2008) documents how movements educated activists about political parties and partisanship, which encouraged their participation in demonstrations for direct elections, the impeachment drive against President Collor, and election campaigns. If movements are able to mold the ways in which activists think of their place in the political world, then movements’ impacts may be felt for years after collective action dissipates.

Finally, movements may introduce new forms of collective action, which may be used by candidates in elections. In the United States, Democratic Party candidates for President (most notably, Howard Dean and Barack Obama) adopted social movement styles of campaigning in the 2004 and 2008 Democratic primaries. In the 2000 presidential election in the United States, online activists created trading schemes to allow voters to exchange votes for Al Gore and Ralph Nader across states. Internet technology was used to match voters, who would make mutual commitments to one another, so that Nader supporters could see that votes were cast for their preferred candidate without increasing the likelihood that the conservative candidate, George W. Bush, would prevail. By helping to transform how election campaigns work, movements may redirect what they do.

ELECTIONS AFFECT MOVEMENTS

On the other side of the reciprocal relationship, elections have the potential to affect movements in several ways. First, the timing of elections alters the opportunity structure of movements. In an ethnographic study of social movement groups in Pittsburgh before and after the 2004 presidential election in the United States, Blee and Currier (2006) found that most groups had little interest in participating in elections at the beginning of the study. However, as the date of the election neared, the groups were presented with opportunities to use the election as a platform for their issues. Thus, the groups and their members sometimes jumped into the electoral process. Elections generate events, shape issues, and direct citizens’ attention in ways that social movements may not be able to ignore.

Second, the decision to participate or not in electoral activities may cause conflict within social movements. In the context of the antiwar movement in the United States of the 2000s, Heaney and Rojas (2007) point to substantial divisions between partisans – who wanted the antiwar movement to engage in electoral politics – and nonpartisans – who wanted the antiwar movement to avoid electoral politics. Partisans argued that participation in elections is the only way to have any real influence on the outcomes that social movements care about. However, nonpartisans argued that participation in elections forces movements to make unacceptable compromises on their core values. These divisions complicate the abilities of social movement actors to reach decisions on the structure of coalitions, the framing of issues, the endorsement of events, and other strategic choices.

Third, participation in the electoral process may cause movements to moderate their positions. Since social movements rarely comprise
a majority in a democratic society, obtaining the numerical support needed to win elections requires that movements attract other interested groups to their cause, which requires them to broaden their positions. In a study of electoral socialism in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) found that the inability to gain majorities through the votes of working-class citizens alone forced socialist parties to reach out to broader segments of their electorates, thus changing the issue focus and principles of the socialist movement. Movements may no longer be what they once were after engaging with elections.

Fourth, the outcomes of elections may affect the motivations of citizens to participate in social movements. In a study of 17 democracies around the world, Anderson and Mendes (2005) demonstrate that groups that are in the minority after an election are more likely to be mobilized to protest than are groups that are in the majority, with minorities in emerging democracies more likely to protest than minorities in established democracies. Heaney and Rojas (2007) show how the antiwar movement in the United States demobilized after the election of President Barack Obama, despite the fact that President Obama continued many of the war policies of his predecessor, President George W. Bush. Conversely, the election of Obama prompted the mobilization of a conservative countermovement, known as the Tea Party, which took a strong stand against excessive government spending and debt, despite the fact that its participants had ignored spending and debt during the administration of President Bush (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin 2011). These results are consistent with the proposition that losers turn to protest as a way to regain their political voice when their opponents win elections.

Finally, elections may shape the identities of citizens, which may open opportunities and erect barriers to social movements’ efforts to mobilize constituencies. Aminzade’s (1993) analysis of the French presidential election of 1848 showed how the Republican Party helped to construct working-class solidarities by forging bonds among workers. These party-based identities would provide a foundation for the French socialist movement for years to come. By defining the conflicts that help to forge identities, elections may set the parameters within which social movements must navigate.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH**

A substantial body of research has accumulated on the relationship between elections and social movements. The emphasis of this research has been on one direction or the other of this relationship, rather than on its reciprocal nature (but see McAdam & Tarrow 2010; Schwartz 2010). Greater attention could be devoted to analyzing feedback effects between these phenomena. One avenue for evaluating this dynamic would be to investigate the biographies of activists who move back and forth between movements and elections over the course of their political careers. Another avenue would be to trace the diffusion of innovations between movements and elections. Examining the emergence of social networking technologies, and other interactive Internet technologies, may be an especially fruitful way to observe the co-evolution between elections and movements.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Antiwar and peace movements; Identity politics; Internet and social movements; Outcomes, political; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure.

**REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS**


4 ELECTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Electronic protest

VICTORIA CARTY

Over the past decade there has been an explosion of user-friendly, high-speed, and low cost opportunities for electronic protest via new technologies. E-mail, web sites, chat rooms, blogs, and bulletin boards enable efficient new forms of communication, organization, and mobilization, and low operating costs enable people to support causes they may not be willing or able to do offline (Bimber 1998; Earl & Kimport 2008). Electronic activism, sometimes referred to as cyberactivism or e-activism, assists in the mobilization of social movement actors to either sustain efforts of ongoing groups or to create new groups and/or campaigns. In some cases the purpose is to promote activism exclusively online (e-movements), in others it is to encourage locally based disruptive tactics on the ground, and in others to enhance social movement organizations (SMOs) with an online presence through consciousness raising and advocacy (Veigh 2003).

Often SMOs adapt existing modes of contention to an online environment. These include online petitions, boycotts, letter writing campaigns, fundraising, and designing and maintaining web pages (instead of flyers) to disseminate information about protest activities (Rheingold 2002; Earl 2006). To facilitate many of these tactics there are a number of web sites that host or link online actions, such as PetitionOnline.com which offers a free service through which visitors can create and maintain online petitions for any cause (Earl & Kimport 2008). Other sites feature action centers that allow citizens to choose from a menu consisting of a variety of actions such as boycotts, signing an online petition, or sending an e-mail or fax about a cause of concern (Earl 2010). There are also easily and quickly assembled self-organizing online groups that operate in horizontal forums such as “meet ups” and viral e-mail lists that quickly and organically coordinate protest activities (Bimber & Davis 2005; Garrett 2006). The software tool Meetup allows activists to find each other in cyberspace and then organize to meet in their own local communities to organize offline events.

One of the best-known online organizations and among the first born in cyberspace (through an online petition) is MoveOn.org, which combines e-activism with meaningful offline engagement. Online tactics include e-mail petitions, fundraising for progressive candidates and causes (it has set records for raising money in short periods of time through small donations), and readymade letters to editors or congressional representatives. It also strongly encourages offline contentions and electoral politics including participation in protests, vigils, voting, lobbying, canvassing, and house parties. In February of 2003 it held one of its most prominent acts of online civil disobedience in a virtual march to protest the imminent invasion of Iraq – 200,000 individuals signed up and made more than 400,000 phone calls and sent 100,000 faxes to every senate office in the United States. Every member of the US Senate also received a stream of e-mails clogging up virtual mailboxes in Washington. Some refer to this as “flash activism” because it is quick and involves massive participation for a short duration of time, and then subsides (Earl 2010). MoveOn’s pioneering efforts have been replicated by other SMOs and set a model for other exclusively virtual progressive groups such as GetUp.org., ColorofChange.org, and ProgressNow.org.

Hacktivism is another form of online activism and distinct from other types because those who participate tend to hide their identities due to the illegal nature of many of the practices. These can include electronic forms of civil disobedience such as virtual...
sit-ins, whereby occupation/blockading takes place in the virtual sphere rather than a particular building or public space (Wray 1999). By repeatedly reloading a web site at the same time activists generate a vast amount of traffic and cause technical problems for the server and can ultimately crash a target’s web site. Unlike traditional forms of civil disobedience, anyone can partake in virtual blockades from wherever they have access to a computer, and the target may be located anywhere. FloodNet is an engine that uses software that automates the repeated simultaneous multiple keystrokes, effectively blocking a web site. This was first used during the 1994 Zapatista struggle when the indigenous Mayan population of Chiapas, Mexico declared war on the government on the eve of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Wray 1999). Various web sites of the Mexican government as well as the US Pentagon were swarmed for days. FloodNet was also successfully used during the Battle of Seattle demonstrations in 1999 (which also effectively shut down the meetings in the streets) when activists coordinated efforts on a global scale to oppose the World Trade Organization meetings (Jordan & Taylor 2004).

Other more aggressive forms of hacktivism include e-mail spamming and virtual attacks on computer networks. Spam refers to the illegal use of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages. These are often sent through zombie networks – meaning the networks are infected with a virus that originated with a particular computer and can spread rapidly (Veigh 2003). E-mail bombing is another tactic which refers to sending e-mails with large file attachments to the target’s e-mail address to flood the server (Chamberlain 2004). Hacktivists also create fake web sites (or web site parodies) which often consist of copies of a certain site which graphically replicates the original but alters the content. In other instances hacktivists create URLs to cause confusion among people legitimately trying to access the initial site.

Cyberterrorism (the most destructive form of hacktivism) consists of illegal attacks and/or threats of sabotage against computers, networks and data stored to intimidate or coerce a government, business, or individual to further a political or social objective. Under the guise of cyberterrorism hacktivists break into computer systems, steal personal data, vandalize and/or alter web sites through defacement, disrupt, deny, or re-direct service, sabotage data and systems, launch computer viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, and conduct fraudulent transactions. This is facilitated through user-friendly software tools that are readily available for free from thousands of web sites.

OPPOSITIONAL MEDIA AND ELECTRONIC ACTIVISM

Social movements rarely succeed without media coverage and web sites allow activists and SMOs to control their own image and relay information to viewers without the filter of mainstream media (Rogerson 2009). In addition to web sites, alternative forms of media used by activists include culture jamming, alternative computing, mediated mobilization, and Indymedia. Indymedia refers to an umbrella structure through which the IMC (Independent Media Center) operates. This is a worldwide network of Internet activist sites that serves as both news media and a forum for grassroots mobilization (Kidd 2003). It enables the rapid dissemination of text images, video, audio, and regular updates about situations related to contentious politics as they unravel in real time, and is designed so that anyone can post information directly online without moderation or limitation. This has set the model for a many-to-many use of the media that is frequently used among activists. There are now over 130 Indymedia web sites that are constantly activated for local and global protests.

Culture jamming is another oppositional form of media that increasingly relies on virtual disruptive activities. In the traditional sense,
Jammers engaged in media hoaxes, information warfare, and guerilla semiotics mainly in the form of billboard alterations and fake ads. In the new media and communication landscape this has shifted toward the creation of fake websites, the hijacking of URLs, and virtual media hoaxes. The main agenda is to disrupt the language of control, subverting images and ideas of mainstream media through co-opting, hacking, and re-contextualizing meanings while using irony, humor, and subversion for political ends.

One of the most widely renowned instances of culture jamming involved an e-mail exchange between MIT graduate student Jonah Peretti and Nike Corporation (Carty 2001). Responding to the service offered on Nike's web site for consumers to personalize their shoes, Peretti requested the word “sweatshop” be stitched onto his shoes. At the time Nike was besieged by accusations of using sweatshop labor among activist groups. An awkward exchange of e-mails ensued as Nike offered a number of invalid reasons (such as the word “sweatshop” being slang) for its refusal to grant the request. In the end the corporation conceded that it would not fulfill the proposal because it was damaging to the company's image. Peretti e-mailed the thread to a few friends, and in a couple of weeks it reached millions of people on all seven continents. The news filtered up from the micromedia to mainstream press as it was covered in Time Magazine, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, Business Week, and the news show NBC Today. This demonstrates that forms of electronic protest, even on an individual level, can have an exponential effect in terms of information exposure.

While there is a lot of enthusiasm about cyberactivism, its potential to enhance democracy and inspire political participation has come into question. The difficulty of establishing strong ties and sustained commitment, in addition to the consequences of opt-in opt-out dynamic of Internet activism may in fact inhibit participation in civic life. There is also the issue of elite control of cyberspace, surveillance, and repression to stifle information and conversation, as well as the digital divide, which may in fact exacerbate inequality. The effect of “cyberbalkanization,” as put forth by Putnam (2000), can also lead to polarization among Internet users.

THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC PROTEST

New media technologies are developing rapidly among social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube among dozens of others. Similar to Internet technology, they include blogs, chat rooms, and new social software sites. These support not only networked interpersonal interaction but also have sites that allow for the arrangement of informal “live meetings” which are similar to tools like Meetup that have been used extensively by groups like MoveOn. Also, social networking sites are making e-activist tools increasingly available, and given the popularity of this technology among youth, this may serve as a good recruitment tool. How these new media platforms are being used and to what ends, as well as the implications that they may have for social movements, offers an emerging field of inquiry that needs further exploration.

SEE ALSO: Culture jamming; Hackers; Indymedia (the Independent Media Center); Internet and social movements; Media activism; Social movement organization (SMO); Technology and social movements; Transnational Zapatism.

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Emotion work

DUNYA M.M. VAN TROOST

Emotion work has been defined as “the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or a feeling” (Hochschild 1979). The concept, first coined by sociologist Arlie Hochschild, describes the efforts people make in their private lives to manage and control their emotions in agreement with the social situation in which they are expressed. Hochschild’s theory of feeling rules and emotion work puts forward the notion that social rules apply to the experience of emotion. These feeling rules are “guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation” (Hochschild 1979), meaning that cultural and social aspects influence the appropriateness of emotions we feel. In Hochschild’s words: “Emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself” (Hochschild 1979). Important to note is that emotion work refers to the effort of trying to change an emotion or feeling, not whether this effort was successful and the emotion actually changed (Hochschild 1979).

Within social movement research, emotion work is mentioned as a process between members, through interpersonal contact, and as a top-down process, for instance through framing efforts. Examples of emotion work between members can be found in research on discussion groups for women dealing with postpartum depression. Women are encouraged to express emotions they experience but which do not line up with the “script for American motherhood” of self-sacrificing love (Taylor 1996). This builds on work done by the feminist movement to create a free space for women to express emotions such as anger, and to transform feelings of hopelessness and frustration when confronted with gender inequality (Reger 2004). Both Taylor and Reger mention that women struggle with cultural norms dictating that anger is predominantly a masculine emotion. Other examples of social movements where emotion work is geared at changing and transforming the emotions of individuals, via support groups and interpersonal contact, can be found in research on transgender movements and movements against child sexual abuse (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001).

Emotion work is also described as a top-down process taking place to inspire action and by transforming feeling rules for society at large. Emotions can motivate people into action or stall mobilization due to the type of motivation associated with emotions. Social movements will benefit if their members experience emotions such as pride and anger that invoke approach motivation. Feelings such as shame or fear, however, trigger avoidance motivation, leading to inactive and passive adherents (Britt & Heise 2000). The civil rights movement in the United States and East Germany therefore tried to manage the fears of the high risks involved with movement participation. Intimate networks and mass gatherings were used to help adherents overcome their fears (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001).

Social movements work to change social and cultural norms both unintentionally and strategically (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001). Strategic formation of alternative feeling rules will often coincide with the use of extrinsic emotion work. Movement leaders have been found to try to change cultural rules through the use of emotional framing, attempting to mobilize hope, shame or anger to recruit members, pride or guilt to maintain commitments, and sympathy or empathy to attract bystander publics (Aminzade & McAdam 2001). Other forms of strategically used emotion work can be found among the animal rights movement, where activists favor a “rational” approach to dealing with animal cruelty. The movement’s claims were at risk of
being classified as emotional, which might be interpreted as irrational. Activists recognized that feeling rules are gender related. “Men are praised for being both emotional and rational. But women are criticized if they are not rational all of the time” (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001: 226). Therefore they strategically enlisted men to advocate their cause even though most of the activists were women (Jasper 1999; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001).

The creation of alternative feeling rules is part of the strategy social movements use to change public discourse, influence politics, and change policies. The ideology of an organization provides the basis for these alternative feeling rules. Hochschild poses that we can “think of ideology as an interpretive framework consisting of framing rules and feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979). In order to change society movements may offer feeling rules that are aligned with the ideology of the movement but disaligned with dominant feeling rules in society. Movement leaders thereby attempt to create room for adherents and bystanders alike to alter their affective disposition toward a social problem. Dominant cultural norms in the United States about homosexuality (think for instance of the word “faggot” used to indicate a flaky vacuous person) triggered feelings of shame and immobilized the gay movement in their fight against AIDS in the early 1980s. AIDS activists started realizing that in order to be successful in this battle they had to create countercultural rules on what it meant to be gay. Emotions such as fear and shame had to give way; grief needed to be transformed into anger. Gay men and lesbian women needed to have a sense of pride instilled in them to spur them into action (Britt & Heise 2000; Gould 2009).

Remember that emotion work refers to the effort of trying to change an emotion. A factor that influences whether social movements are successful in this attempt is emotional resonance; that is, does the invoked emotion line up with the emotional lives of adherents (Robnett 2004). Overall we can conclude that emotions and the meaning of emotion work for social movements have become an established aspect of the study of social movements and contentious politics. For social movements emotion work consists of a twist of highly personal feelings, political aims, and the mobilization of emotions. Emotion work is a “necessary and exceedingly important component of any significant instance of collective action” (Aminzade & McAdam 2001).

SEE ALSO: Emotion and social movements; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Entrepreneurs, movement
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG

The notion of a social movement entrepreneur was introduced by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1973, 1977) in their seminal essays on resource mobilization theory. McCarthy and Zald’s treatment of the movement entrepreneur was part of their analysis of the rise of “professional social movements.” In contrast to the “classical model” of movements, which focused on common grievances that give rise to social movements and emergent leaders, McCarthy and Zald argued that modern social movements are increasingly professionalized, characterized by full-time leadership, a largely paper membership, and a reliance on conscience constituents who “do not stand to benefit directly from its success in goal accomplishment” (1977: 1222). While grievances play a role in movements, they receive second billing to entrepreneurial leaders who take the initiative to organize movements. In extreme cases, “grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (1977: 1215).

This perspective on the importance of entrepreneurial activity is reminiscent of the earlier focus on moral entrepreneurs in the labeling theory of deviance (Becker 1963). Howard Becker argued that moral rules, and our views about what is deviant or acceptable behavior, do not follow automatically from the nature of the behavior, but are the result of labeling activities by moral entrepreneurs. Moral entrepreneurs, in Becker’s view, might be motivated by deep-seated ideological beliefs and genuine outrage, or they might be self-interested actors. In the social constructionist approach to social problems that builds on labeling theory, social problems are not objective conditions, but are produced by the entrepreneurial activities of claims-makers (Spector & Kitsuse 1977). Issue entrepreneurs, including movement leaders, politicians, and journalists among others, define issues for various audiences and bring them to public attention; if successful, they increase the pool of people concerned about an issue who can potentially be recruited to a social movement (McCarthy & Zald 2002: 536).

The ways in which movement entrepreneurs and social problems claims-makers package or frame issues are critical to both the mobilization of movements and the social construction of social problems. There is now an extensive literature on collective action framing, which examines the ways in which grievances and issues are defined in order to motivate collective action (Benford & Snow 2000). Although the framing perspective was not yet developed when McCarthy and Zald wrote their early essays on resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald 2002: 536 fn) – or when Spector and Kitsuse first wrote about social problems claims-making – framing activities are clearly central to the work of movement entrepreneurs and other claims-makers. Movement leaders need to frame issues in ways that attract followers and, to form coalitions across organizations and movements, they must bridge the concerns of multiple audiences (Gerhards & Rucht 1992).

Some analysts have attended to the processes by which movement and moral entrepreneurs are created and the means by which they develop effective frames. Importantly, issue entrepreneurs often operate within organizations and institutions, and they employ and alter preexisting frames associated with those organizations and institutions. In the civil rights movement, the community institution of the black church provided the “freedom and justice” frame that ministers and other leaders adapted for the purposes of the movement (Morris & Staggenborg 2004: 184–186).
The interests of preexisting organizations may also shape the rise of entrepreneurship. For instance, Robert Chauncey (1980) analyzes how “new careers for moral entrepreneurs” were created within the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, an agency with an interest in promoting the problem of teenage alcoholism. Jerome Himmelstein (1983: 11–12) notes that organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, may engage in moral entrepreneurship on particular concerns during one period of time, but not another, and a variety of issue entrepreneurs with different amounts of power may compete with one another. Thus, analysts of entrepreneurship need to examine how political and cultural environments and organizational dynamics, as well as motivations such as moral outrage or economic interest, affect the emergence and actions of movement entrepreneurs.

Although McCarthy and Zald associate movement entrepreneurs with movement professionals, the two types of leaders may be distinct, and the nature of leadership in social movement organizations may change over time. In the abortion rights movement, entrepreneurs played a critical role in initiating movement organizations, but professional leaders took over as SMOs became institutionalized (Staggenborg 1988). Entrepreneurial leaders may be attracted to less formalized structures, which give them more room for initiative; as organizations become more bureaucratic or formal, they may turn to leaders who are more accustomed to working within such structures. When organizational structures are informal and decentralized, movement entrepreneurs are likely to be essential. In the case of online organizations, Earl and Schussman (2003) find that movement entrepreneurs substituted for social movement organizations in organizing the strategic voting movement.

In addition to their role in mobilizing movements and collective action, movement entrepreneurs influence the structures, strategies, and goals of movement organizations. Informal and decentralized organizations led by movement entrepreneurs are more likely to choose direct-action tactics than are formalized organizations led by professionals (Staggenborg 1988). In the “e-movements” led by entrepreneurs, “membership” declines in importance and decision-making becomes more discretionary (Earl & Schussman 2003). In institutional settings, entrepreneurs are often “ideological activists” who change institutions by exploiting political opportunities to engage in successful framing activities (Rao & Giorgi 2006). As these examples indicate, scholars are examining the impacts of movement entrepreneurs in a wide range of movements and organizational contexts.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Employers’ collective action; Framing and social movements; Leadership; Micro-meso mobilization; Organizations and movements.

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entrepreneurs, movement


Ethnography and social movements
PAUL LICHTERMAN

Ethnography is a powerful research method for understanding how people turn grievances into public claims, organize collective action, and sustain collective action over time. During the past quarter-century, scholars of social movements have called repeatedly for research on the social and symbolic processes that ethnography is particularly well-suited to investigate. It is a promising and curiously under-employed method in this field.

Ethnography here refers to research in which the researcher observes and to some degree participates in action as the action is happening. In sociology, “participant-observation” names this mode of research more precisely. Given the sometimes loose uses of the terminology, it is important to clarify that ethnography (participant-observation) and the sometimes closely associated interview research method are different methods that produce different kinds of evidence useful for addressing different though occasionally intersecting questions. Ethnographic research, unlike other research methods, investigates action in the setting of the actor, in the time of the actor. Much of what is distinctive as well as intellectually and logistically challenging about the method derives from these two features.

To carry out ethnographic research, the investigator takes extensive descriptive notes on the people, places, actions, and interactions under study. The ethnographer codes those notes systematically, develops new hypotheses or refines initial ones, chooses new settings or people for further observation, and continues the process, following one or more logics of ethnographic inquiry, all of which differ from the conventional hypothesis-testing logic of social science (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Burawoy 1998). Followed in a disciplined, self-reflexive way, this coding-and-observing process produces a well-supported, social-scientific argument. Ethnographic research may synthesize new observations with pre-existing or emergent academic concepts in different ways; there is more than one logic of inquiry for sociological ethnography. These conceptual issues in ethnographic research have been discussed extensively (see, e.g., Lichterman 2002; Snow & Trom 2002). The discussion here will limit itself to ethnography’s role in advancing our understanding of social movements.

Some now-classic ethnographic studies of collective action appeared when social, religious, and other kinds of “movements” were considered kindred forms of “collective behavior” and a lot of the current terminology of social movements scholarship was only beginning to appear. John Lofland’s study (1966) of the Unification Church in the United States, and John Hall’s later work (1978) on utopian communes are good examples. In different ways these studies represent a kind of sociology that interprets nonmainstream social worlds, recuperating their shared meanings, worldviews, or moral order. Similar curiosities about subcultures of collective action turned other researchers to ethnographic research on abortion protestors (Ginsburg 1989). Still others used ethnography to observe local, pivotal moments, as when Fantasia (1988) followed the moment-by-moment decisions that add up to collective labor action.

New conceptual developments further widened social movement scholars’ appreciation of ethnography. By the end of the 1980s, many researchers were no longer content with determining social movements in terms of underlying social-structural conditions, and more interested in understanding how vague private grievances become strident public claims and collective identities. In that spirit, contemporary social movement researchers...
are more likely to address social structure by investigating the social networks that religious congregations, college campuses, or other organizations potentially make available to social movements, instead of inquiring into the social class or other social-structural bases of grievances (Diani & McAdam 2003). Ethnographic research helps us see how activist leaders rally people around dissenting claims and identities with innovative rhetoric and networking savvy. Ethnography also reveals that social ties mean different things in different settings, and the differences affect collective action. In the United States, Green movement activists had a difficult time allying with activists from the more accessible and much more widely publicized antitoxics movement in the 1980s and 1990s because these two environmental movements built social ties on the basis of different meanings of membership and political obligation. Greens, like antinuclear activists, radical women, and other grassroots movements directly preceding them thought that serious activists should practice personalized politics and create deeply individualized, life-changing ties to a movement, while antitoxics activists in community-organizing projects assumed that serious members participate in a tightly bound collective and fight for “the community” (Lichterman 1995). In Brazil, youth activists during the tumultuous transition to democracy bracketed some of their social connections and conveyed different social identities in different settings, depending on who they were collaborating or arguing with (Mische 2008).

The cultural turn in American social movement research since the 1990s similarly encourages, as well as benefits, the ethnographic ear and eye. Quite often ethnographic findings can challenge received understandings of how meanings work in social movements. Ethnographic research often has been associated with the study of emergent meanings and new kinds of group action, partly because of the symbolic interactionist orientation of some of the most accomplished practitioners. Ethnographic research apprehends collective meanings too fleeting, slippery, or unconventional to reflect easily in opinion surveys or solidify into historical documents. Participant-observation shows better than other methods, for instance, how protest suddenly flares up, how a critical sensibility sometimes sneaks into mundane routines of work and play, or how institutionalized social settings suddenly become informal public spheres of lively political debate. Ethnography shows how activists create new kinds of social movement, as when alternative globalization activists innovate new forms of participation and new kinds of collective communication in the course of organizing their conferences (Juris 2008).

Ethnographic research also may investigate the ways that activists recycle or refine long-standing cultural forms, and with what consequences. It shows us how and why grassroots environmentalist, feminist, and peace activists at the end of the twentieth century drew heavily on a kind of personal growth-centered individualism with long roots in nineteenth-century American Romanticism (Lichterman 1996). Doing so, they appealed to highly schooled, affluent, and youthful publics more than others despite their explicit wishes to represent a more diverse constituency. Participant-observation shows how and when biblical language of social justice helps religious congregation-based community organizers energize collective action against local governments and corporations on behalf of more public services and better schools. This research shows that religious activists have built more effective local movements than have activists who use a rhetoric of racial minority struggle toward similar ends, but are more effective with Catholic than conservative Protestant congregations (Wood 2002).

Probing the symbolic dimensions of movements, many scholars have used a concept of “framing” to investigate activists’ public claims-making. Originally used by Erving Goffman to denote the implicit assumptions about the meaning of action in a particular setting, the concept now often refers to ideological theme or worldview, the picture of the
world that activists try to agree upon and then strategize to make appealing to new activists and broader publics (Snow et al. 1986). The initial statement of this framing perspective drew on ethnographic studies of religious and social movements. Ethnographic work shows, too, that framing varies by setting: Antitoxics activists articulate themselves with more conventional frames in front of the mass media than in other settings (Eliasoph 1998). Other activists eschew strategic framing even at the risk of scaring off people who might otherwise join the collective effort. In the 1990s, liberal church activists in a midwestern US city argued that federal welfare policy reform benefited big business interests who wanted to lower their tax burden, and not the poor. Their strident style of communicating social criticism alienated potential supporters who actually agreed with their critique (Lichterman 2005).

As this example implies, ethnography invites us to view the everyday negotiations of meaning, the ongoing reality tests that can put concepts such as frame or collective identity in motion. We see how activists communicate and coordinate action around their dissenting beliefs. These ways of communicating and coordinating often follow patterns and are not simply random or always emergent: Like other public entities, social movement organizations draw boundaries with other groups in a wider field, sustain distinctive bonds between members, and observe speech norms that privilege some kinds of communication over others. These three elements of organizational style are often enduring and shape the way a social movement organization publicizes claims and organizes action (Eliasoph & Lichterman 2003).

Finally, by helping us view social movements in terms of communication processes and styles of action, ethnography also helps scholars investigate the shifting, sometimes ambiguous boundaries between social movements, governing agencies, and commercial enterprises. Social movement action often is nested inside of larger civic organizations that address public problems without necessarily challenging governments or using nonroutine means (Sampson et al. 2005). Affordable housing developers, for instance, hire community organizers who need to decide when to act as social movement activists on behalf of low-income housing, when to work as partners with municipal agencies, and when to avoid activism in order to remain on good terms with builders (Lichterman, Eliasoph, & Cefai forthcoming). By taking everyday communication and action into account, ethnographic research may avoid hypostatizing the category of “social movement” itself.

SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Everyday activism; Framing and social movements; Situational analysis and social movements; Subcultures and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Europeanization and social movements
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: DEFINITIONS

Europeanization indicates not only the construction of the institutions of the European Union (EU), but also the changes in the politics and policies of the member states. Studies of Europeanization look at the impact of the European Union on the national systems of the member states, addressing processes of resistance, transformation, and adaptation to EU policies and norms in member states, shifting attention from the supranational level to multilevel governance. Linked to this is the notion that public policies are produced in a complex system where several norms and implementing agencies interact.

Notwithstanding the increasing relevance of European institutions, research into the effects of the construction of European institutions on social movements is still underdeveloped. As in other areas of Europeanization studies, the empirically observed objects have often influenced the emerging images. Thus, research on protest events reported in the (national) press has supported the vision of the European Union as an intergovernmental organization, with the nation-state in a still-dominant role and remaining the target of most protest. Research on the activities of public interest groups in the European institutions has pointed, instead, at the emergence of a new polity.

A prevailing image of low Europeanization of social movements fits well with some widespread hypotheses in social movement studies. According to the political process approach, social movements should be discouraged by some characteristics of the European Union. First of all, the European governance is more open to conventional lobbying than to contentious and disruptive actions (Marks & McAdam 1999: 103–104). Additionally, the types of opportunities available at the EU level allow for a selective access of the collective actors better endowed with some type of material and symbolic resources. The high transaction cost of transnational organizing also privileges richer organizations and in fact a lack of material resources has been seen as responsible for the weakness of public interest groups and social movement organizations at the EU level (Chabanet 2002; Giugni & Passy 2002; Rootes 2002).

If these considerations lead scholars to expect low levels of transnational social movement activities, others instead point at more EU-level protest. First, there is the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where decisions are taken. If the construction of the nation-state produced the building of national social movements, we might expect that the growing relevance of European institutions is reflected in the growing focusing of conflicts around Europe. Additionally, computer-mediated communication, as well as low-cost flights, have certainly reduced the transaction costs for organizing transnationally (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). We might expect that as social movements frame the European union as a relevant level of decision-making, protest will more often target the European level. Cultural traditions also play an important role in facilitating or jeopardizing the development of transnational strategies. From this point of view, social movement organizations seem more motivated to develop transnational organizational networks and frames than are, for instance, political parties (della Porta & Kriesi 1999; Imig & Tarrow 2001a, 2001b) or trade unions, which are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation-states (Marks & McAdam 1999).

While at the beginning research on the Europeanization of social movements seemed to
assume that protest at the European level had to reproduce the national pattern, with European challengers targeting a European polity, more recently it has started to take into account the structure of multilevel governance. If Europeanization produces more layers of decision making, social movements may adapt themselves following different paths.

DOMESTICATION

A first path, which had already emerged in the first research on social movements and Europeanization, is *domestication*: social movements might target EU decisions by putting pressure upon national governments in order to push them to negotiate better arrangements at supranational levels.

Protest event analysis has repeatedly concluded that concerns about EU decisions have been mainly expressed at the national level, where elected political institutions are considered more accountable to the citizen-electors. Relying upon Reuters World News Service and the Reuters Textline, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001b) found a very limited number of such protests. In protest event analysis based on national newspapers, Dieter Rucht (2002) observed in Germany a low (and declining) proportion of protests targeting international organizations, Giugni and Passy (2002) noted that only rarely did protests on migrant rights target the EU, and the same emerged on environmental protest in several European countries (Rootes 2002). Since protest grows when institutions are accountable to the electorate, the relative inaccessibility of the supranational level to protest and the weakness of the European public sphere has been mentioned in these studies to explain why the target of social movements continues to be predominantly national governments.

However, research indicated that, exploiting the complexity of EU governance, social movements do challenge EU policies through multiple, crossed pressures. In their analysis of protest in Europe, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001b) observed indeed that most of the EU-related events they coded were cases of domestication. In particular, domestication is used by social movements that want to put pressure on the European Union in favor of national interests, especially if in direct competition with other national interests represented in other member states, as is in particular in the case of several protest campaigns by European farmers.

EXTERNALIZATION

The European Union has also been seen as an additional arena for the mobilization of resources that may then be used at the national level. A path of *externalization* (Chabanet 2002) characterizes the mobilization of national actors targeting the European Union in attempts to put pressure on their own governments. Social movements that feel weak at home attempt at mobilizing allies at the supranational level, addressing the EU institutions in order to push them to intervene upon domestic governments. This strategy has been used above all by movements that perceive the challenges as supranational, and have in fact appealed to the kinds of discourse and identity legitimized at the European level, as is the case for environmental movement (Rootes 2002).

Several previous studies have indicated the difficulties that civil society organizations encounter when they want to act at EU level (for most recent accounts, Schmidt 2006; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2007). Channels of access at the EU level are in fact constrained by institutional characteristics such as their limited (even though increasing) electoral accountability, the selective tradition of consultation of representatives of different interests, as well as the emphasis on expertise (Ruzza 2004; Kohler-Koch & Rittenberg 2007; Balme & Chabanet 2008). In fact, research on representation at EU level confirmed that, for social movement organizations, access is limited. First, business found it much easier...
than civil society organizations “to go European,” while social movement organizations active at the EU level – such as Platform of the European Social NGOs, European Anti-Poverty Network, Human Rights Contact Group, European Migrant Forum, United (against racism), and the European Network of Women – are usually loose and poorly staffed networks. Inclusion has also been selective: only the organizations that adapt to the rules of the game obtain routine access, though usually of an informal nature, to EU institutions (Marks & McAdam 1999). In fact only a few, larger, moderate and well-structured civil society organizations have obtained some routine access, usually of an informal nature, to supranational organizations (among others, see Balme & Chabanet 2002; Ruzza 2004; della Porta 2007).

These difficulties notwithstanding, some characteristics and changes in the European institutions seem to have facilitated access by social movement organizations. Even though selectively, as mentioned, (some) social movement organizations have recently been granted increasing participation in return for expertise and legitimacy. If the building of the European Community, and then of the European Union, as oriented to the creation of a common market has been mentioned to explain the dominance of producers’ interests, with the progression of market-making legislation (from the Commission, the Council, but also the Court), there was also an increase in organized demands for market-correcting policies (with mobilizations of consumers, environmentalists, etc.). Research indicates in fact a growth in the number of citizens’ interest groups, which accounted for 20 percent of all interest actors active in Brussels in 2000. Since the 1990s, EU institutions have in fact made attempts at expanding consultation with representatives of organized interests of civil society, also enhanced via online consultations (Kohler-Koch 2007: 259–260). Research based on interviews with social movement organizations indicated that they tend to share the criticism of the EU institutions as formally closed, selective, and unaccountable. At the same time, however, they use the available channels of access to the European public sphere as well as promoting new ones (della Porta & Caiani 2009).

THE BUILDING OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Paths of domestication and externalization seem to have facilitated Europeanization in the form of the development of European social movements that target different levels of governance at the same time, involving loose networks of national (often local) and transnational groups. The objectives of their protests tend to be more and more general, with the participation of national and supranational collective actors that turn simultaneously to various governmental levels. Their mobilization involves loosely structured networks of European activists that address different polities.

Even when they mainly target their national governments, social movements that contest EU decisions tend to adapt their frames and organization. Domestication, which has been seen as proof of the persistent relevance of the nation-state as the target for protest and of the related permanent weakness of EU institutions, has the side effect of producing European identities and structures; the effects of national protests do not stop however at national borders. In fact, recent research singled out, in the course of “domesticated” protest, innovations both in the organizational structure and in the frames of the protest, with the development of European networks and European identities. Domestication pushes national social movements to build transnational coalitions, that tend to stabilize into transnational organizations. At the same time, targeting EU institutions has the cognitive effect of pushing to frame claims in a European perspective (della Porta 2007).

Also externalization tends to produce a development of supranational organizational structures and identities. The European arenas offer
to social movement organizations from different EU countries the opportunity to meet each other, build organizational networks, coordinate activity, and construct supranational discourses. Growing interaction facilitates the development of common, more or less European, identity. While research on SMOs active in EU policies had stressed their preference for lobbying, a centralized structure, and focus on single issues, more and more often protest campaigns targeting the EU have mixed conventional and unconventional means, build informal networks linking local, national, and transnational groups, and use more and more political and cross-issue frames (della Porta & Caiani 2009).

Especially during the nineties, a series of steps in European integration (including the treaties signed in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon) have been the targets of supranational protest campaigns, during which national SMOs and NGOs started to network at the European level. By governing, the EU institutions attracted conflicts and contestation – as the nation-state institutions had done. As a by-product, they also helped in forming supranational nets and norms. The formation of European identities seems indeed to develop not on the bases of abstract norms, but through the continuous and contentious interactions of various political and social actors around EU institutions (Imig & Tarrow 2001a: 23). European mobilization helps, then, in a process of transnational diffusion and networking that goes beyond merely instrumental aims. Additionally, the development of the Global Justice Movement increased the occasions for encounters and collaboration by various and different movements.

As with other international institutions (Tarrow 2005), the European Union has worked as a sort of “coral reef” favoring the construction of supranational organizations by offering in some cases material and symbolic (legitimacy) resources, in others a target for common mobilizations. From a neo-functionalist perspective, social movements’ Europeanization could be defined as a spillover effect of European integration. Advocating power and competences at the supranational level, EU institutions are less and less able to call for a “legitimation through output,” based upon trust in an efficient and apolitical governance. As EU decisions increasingly do affect the lives of citizens on the most delicate (and political) policy fields such as the welfare state, pensions, migration, or education, the paths of political contestation in Europe seem in fact to become more and more multilevel.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement; Globalization and movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Protest event research; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Event history analysis

J. TOBIN GRANT

Event history analysis examines whether and when phenomena occur. Also known as survival, duration, or failure-time analysis, event history analysis has proven useful in a wide range of disciplines because it allows researchers to make inferences about when an event happens and the duration until the event occurs (Raferty 2001; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). Some view event history analysis as time series analysis for dichotomous dependent variables; others approach it as an extension of limited dependent variable analysis for panel data. Regardless, event history analysis provides a method of inference for longitudinal data common in social movement research.

There are three key concepts in event history analysis. Because event history analysis has its roots in medicine and engineering, it uses a variety of terms, some of whose meanings may be apparent in social science applications.

1. **“Event” or “Failure.”** The occurrence of a phenomenon. This is an indicator variable. In engineering and medical applications, this is referred to as a “failure” because the phenomenon is often the breakdown of a machine, disease relapse, or death.

2. **“Duration,” “Survival,” or “Spell.”** The length of time until an event occurs. The duration has a well-defined beginning, which may or may not be the same as the start of the observation period. As with “failure,” “survival” is a term carried over from early applications where the duration was measuring the time until a breakdown or death.

3. **“Hazard Rate” or “Risk.”** The probability that an event will occur conditional on the event not occurring already. For example, the hazard rate for death is the probability of someone dying at age \( t \) given that the person has already lived \( t - 1 \). Growing older does not change the probability of a person dying (the probability of death is, unfortunately, always equal to 1.0), but growing older does increase the risk or hazard rate of death. Hazard rates are inherently linked with durations. Events with higher hazard rates have shorter durations; those with lower hazard rates have longer durations.

There are two broad classes of event history models: duration models and hazard models. The former are parametric models that estimate the effect of explanatory variables on the time until an event occurs. Because early applications were in bio-statistics, these models are sometimes referred to as “survival models” because they model how long until death. These models are similar to ordinary least squares regression, but duration models usually assume a distribution such as the Weibull distribution (Kiefer 1988; Zorn 2000). In addition, event history data is often censored and truncated. On the “left side” durations cannot be negative. Durations are also censored or truncated on the “right side.” Researchers may end observation before all of the events occur. Event history analysis assumes that the data is left-truncated and allows researchers to indicate if the durations are right-censored or not.

Soule’s (1997) study of antiapartheid protests on US college campuses in the late 1980s provides an illustration of this type data. The event in Soule’s study was the shantytown. This new type of protest began at Columbia University, where students literally camped out on campus in order to protest the university’s investments in South Africa. Soule measured whether or not other colleges and universities had shantytown protests on their campuses. Those that did not were coded as
right-censored. Soule found that shantytown protests were more likely to spread amongst colleges that were similar to each other; students took their cues from colleges with similar wealth, mission, and academic prestige. Shantytown events were more likely (had a higher risk of occurring) on elite liberal arts campuses with few African-Americans.

Hazard models (or alternatively proportional hazard models) estimate the effect of explanatory variables on the hazard rate. Unlike duration models, hazard models have a dependent variable indicating whether an event has occurred or not. The data for any case is divided into temporal units. For example, Andrews and Biggs (2006) looked at sit-in protests in the American south during the spring of 1960. They examined 334 urban areas from February 1 through April 14, 1960. The event was the occurrence of a city’s first sit-in. The data was organized as date-city observations. For each date-city observation, the dependent variable would indicate whether a sit-in occurred or not. There would be additional data, some that would also vary each day (e.g., the number of other cities with sit-ins in the previous week) and some that do not vary over time (e.g., the percentage of the population that was black). The hazard model would estimate the relative probability of a sit-in occurring conditional on the time since the observation began.

The most commonly used approach to estimate a hazard model is the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). This is a nonparametric modeling approach that estimates the effect of covariates on hazard rate. The Cox model is very flexible. It can incorporate durations that are left-censored because they begin before the observation period, discontinuous risk intervals, and repeated events (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). These and other event history models can be estimated using commonly used software including Stata, SAS, and S-Plus.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Protest event research.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Everyday activism

JANE MANSBRIDGE

Everyday activism is talk and action in everyday life that is not consciously coordinated with the actions of others but is (1) to some degree caused (inspired, encouraged) by a social movement and (2) consciously intended to change others’ ideas or behavior in directions advocated by the movement.

A woman refuses to get her husband’s plate at a big family dinner and says later that she “ended up liberating the other women in the family,” who stopped serving their husbands too. Her word “liberating” in a focus group of African-Americans who all identify as feminists suggests that the feminist movement affected her action, although she had no other connections to the movement. She also intended to effect change in a direction advocated by the movement.

Organized activists and other individuals committed to coordinated collective action almost always engage in everyday activism along with their consciously coordinated activities. In addition, individuals whose opportunities and identification with the movement are insufficient to lead them to engage in coordinated collective action can still function as everyday activists when they pick up ideas from the movement and, as micro change agents, use them to change another person’s behavior, perhaps taking small risks in the process.

In everyday activism, the often spontaneous actions of many individuals become the interactive base for the parts of social movements that form “emergent” phenomena in the sense of complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory (e.g., Holland 1998; Sawyer 2005). In an emergent phenomenon, unplanned, dynamic, feedback-driven micro-level interactions among proximate individuals create, without central coordination, macro-level outcomes far beyond their additive effects. A flock of birds and a school of fish are good examples among nonhuman animals, as are market prices among humans or a hurricane in the physical world. In the CAS understanding of emergence, “it is simultaneously true to say that the actions of the parts cause the overall behavior and that the overall behavior guides the action of the parts” (Clark 1997). This technical meaning adds specificity and the reflexive action of the whole upon the parts to the meaning, in early symbolic interactionism, of emergence as the unplanned appearance of novel behavior (e.g., Turner 1964).

Because everyday activism is not consciously coordinated and because each action is small enough to require only a small motivation often supplied by the emotion of the moment, the resulting emergent phenomena largely avoid the free-rider problems of collective action (Olson 1965).

Local actors engaging in everyday activism do not simply diffuse (Soule 2004) the concepts devised by the “critical communities” (Rochon 1998) or enclaves of the movement; they are themselves active agents of change. In a process of enclave variation and everyday selection (Campbell 1965; Mansbridge & Flaster 2007), they select from enclave-generated ideas and frames those that they can apply in their own situations, where they are relatively vulnerable to retaliation. They may also adapt innovatively, producing emergent local frames. Unlike “emergent norms,” these frames, conceptually based in CAS theory, do not stress a precipitating crisis, pressures for conformity, crowds, or relatively short periods of interaction.

Although everyday activism could be considered a form of overt resistance (Hollander & Einwohner 2004), it differs from standard “everyday acts of resistance” such as foot-dragging, pilfering, sabotage, dissimulation, and gossip (e.g., Hall & Jefferson 1975/2006; Scott 1985) in being often visible and even confrontational rather than concealed, silent,
avoidant, diversionary, secret, hidden, or underground. Everyday activism is also cumulative and forward-looking, as part of its implication in a social movement, in contrast to Foucault’s (1982) avoidance of any “positive” understanding of resistance.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Emergent norm theory; Framing and social movements; Resistance.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Experimental methods
PAMELA OLIVER

Although “experiments” are popularly understood as research done in a laboratory, for social scientists the key element of an experiment is at least one manipulated independent variable. A variable is manipulated if the researcher can determine who experiences each category (or treatment) of the variable. A “true” experiment is one in which the researcher randomly assigns subjects to different categories (treatments) of the independent variable. This random assignment (randomization) can yield high internal validity in assessing the causal effect of the independent variable on the dependent (outcome) variable. There have been important randomized field experiments in policy areas such as education, welfare provision, population control, or medical treatments. Market researchers may use randomized field experiments to test the impact of different advertising campaigns and some professionalized social movement organizations have used this kind of field experiment to test the impact of various ways of “marketing” their issues. Smaller voluntary groups might also find it valuable to use rigorous experimental methods to test their persuasive tactics, although they rarely do.

Randomized field experiments are rare in academic studies of social movements because researchers cannot manipulate the independent variables of interest. One exception is in studies of collective action and social dilemmas, where researchers create artificial situations in which people must choose between doing something that benefits themselves only or doing something that benefits others. These experiments typically involve relatively small groups. The independent variables include such things as the balance between the individual payoff and the group payoff, whether and how people can communicate, or whether and how people can reward or punish each other for their behavior. Such experiments have demonstrated that many people do contribute to collective goods and that their contributions are strongly affected by the social features of the situation.

There have been some academic field experiments of individual contributions to collective goods. Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980) invited randomly selected high school students to participate in an exchange where they were given tokens that could be “spent” on an individual benefit or contribute to a group exchange where the points were worth more but had to be shared with others and total payoffs to everyone would be higher if everyone contributed to the group exchange. Independent variables included whether the students shared equally or unequally in the group exchange and the size of the group they thought they were dealing with. Alfano and Marwell (1980) conducted a similar experiment with incoming freshman college students who would be on the same floor of a dorm to test the effect of whether the “group good” was divisible (each individual got his or her share of the contributions to the group exchange) or indivisible (the “group exchange” money could only be spent by the dorm floor as a whole on something that would benefit all of them).

In perhaps the most unusual field experiment conducted by scholars of social movements, Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982) rented motel rooms and created a situation in which a group of ordinary citizens faced an ambiguous case of possible injustice. The dependent variable was whether the participants refused to cooperate with the injustice. The crucial independent variable turned out to be whether someone labeled the situation as unjust and urged others to act.
SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Critical mass theory; Free rider problem; Injustice frames; Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Extremism
MANUELA CAIANI

Extremism has become a very common term nowadays, both in social science and outside the academic sphere. However, its usage is rather awkward: nobody has arrived at a satisfactorily comprehensive definition. The concept refers to individuals or groups who advocate or resort to measures that lie beyond the moral and political center of society (Eatwell & Goodwin 2010: 8). It can be associated with ideologies (values systems) or behaviors. Historically, it has been also used to indicate totalitarian regimes such as communism and fascism. When applied to politics, extremism is commonly defined by the elements anti-constitutionalism and antidemocracy; it is the rejection of the fundamental values, procedures, and institutions of the democratic state (Carter 2005). In this sense some scholars, taking into account an action-based and a values-based form of extremism, also distinguish it as consisting of three components: extraordinary, excessive, and intolerant political opinion, belief, or activity; violent political activity; and activity aimed against the democratic constitutional state (Downs, Manning, & Engstrom 2009).

One of the difficulties regarding the definition of extremism is that the real meaning of the concept is ultimately attributed by others to a group rather than by a group labeling itself. Indeed, it is not a value-neutral term, but it is adopted in a pejorative way, as “a term of damnation” (Eatwell & Goodwin 2010: 7). Some go even further, stressing that extremism can be also used “to criminalise protest, discredit any form of ‘radical thinking’ and label political dissent as potentially dangerous” (Neumann 2008: 3). Furthermore, approaching the notion of extremism, one is confronted with several different synonyms such as fanaticism, zealotry, bigotry, immoderation, terrorism, and revolution; some of them, as for example radicalism, are often used interchangeably with extremism. However, a differentiation between these two terms (although still debated in literature, e.g., Mudde 2000) is necessary. Radicalism involves the advocacy of, and commitment to, far-reaching changes in social and political institutions, which might constitute a challenge to the legitimacy of established norms and policies but does not necessarily, in itself, lead to violence (European Commission’s Expert Group 2008: 5). On the contrary, extremism involves the active subversion of democratic values and the rule of law and implies the implicit or overt acceptance of violence as legitimate (Eatwell & Goodwin 2010: 9). This distinction is clear for example in the German Constitution that differentiates between “radicals” (who oppose some of the principles of the liberal democratic system) and “extremists” (who are hostile to the constitution) and persecutes legally only the latter.

Extremism can take several forms which vary across countries and groups and can be divided into at least four types: left wing, right wing, nationalist, or religious. Left-wing extremism includes a range of Marxist–Leninist, environmental, animal rights, anarchical, and antiglobalization groups. Right-wing extremism includes racist and fascist groups. Right-wing extremism is said to be against human equality, whereas left-wing extremism is said to be against individual freedom. Nationalist extremism includes groups inspired by a desire for independence, territorial control, or autonomy because of ethnic or other affiliations. Religious extremists act to comply with a religious mandate or to force others to follow that mandate (Jones & Libicki 2008). These different analytical categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can be
found in combination in the empirical reality. However, one common feature of extremism is interpreting the world through “black or white” or “all-or-none” categories (Mandel 2002). Extremists divide the world between friends (those who support their cause) and enemies (those who oppose it), without seeking a common ground among contending parties, nor does extremism seek common perspectives, as liberalism does (Downs, Manning, & Engstrom 2009: 153). The “in-group” is usually seen as treated unfairly, humiliated, or deprived of what they otherwise deserve, whereas the “out-group” is considered to be benefiting directly by this injustice (Mandel 2002). Therefore, feelings of anger and revenge, as well as the dehumanization of the enemy are considered the main mechanisms which prompt extremists to use violence.

Nevertheless, there is still an open debate in academic literature concerning the most important causes favoring extremism (for an overview, Borum 2004). There are those explanations underlining, at an individual level, the psychological characteristics of extremists and their values and motivations (e.g., psycho-pathologies and mental illness research until the mid-1980s, feeling of humiliation, Richardson 2004; history of injustice and abuse, Juergensmeyer 2000; identity and belonging, Horgan 2005); those, at a context level, that focus on the social and political conditions that lead to extremism (e.g., relative deprivation, Gurr 1970; social, ethnic, or political fragmentation within a state, oppressive regimes, Pape 2005; repressive police, della Porta 1995; social support, Paz 2004); and finally, those, insisting on ideologies, organizations, and leaders as crucial determinants (e.g., organizational processes, Goodwin 2006; leadership and network dynamics, Sageman 2006; recruitment, socialization, and training, Gupta 2005). These factors have long been studied in isolation, however there is now a common agreement among scholars that there is not a single explanation of extremism and that in order to shed light on the phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the context of both structural and group dynamics as well as the psychological conditions of extremism (e.g., della Porta 1995).

SEE ALSO: Ideology; Radicalism; Right-wing movements; Terrorist movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Factions/factionalism
KELSY KRETSCHEMER

A faction is a subgroup within a larger organization that is in conflict with other members of that organization. Factions occur when a subset of organizational members begin to develop a distinct collective identity that is at least partially at odds with other members. Factionalism refers to this conflict between an organizational faction and other members, or between competing organizational factions. Strictly speaking, factionalism refers to this intra-organizational conflict. However, many social movement scholars have used the concept of factionalism to understand inter-organizational conflict within a broader social movement. In other words, we can use the language of factions to understand a wider range of phenomena, including how different branches of a social movement form and interact. Scholars have paid attention to the ways factions originate, to how they disperse or strengthen over time, to the different outcomes of factionalism, and the consequences of factionalism for social movements generally.

There are varying perspectives on why factions develop. Many of the social movement studies on factionalism found that it is the result of poor organizational leadership and management, and that it signals the impeding death of the organization (Zald & Ash 1966; Gamson 1975; Balser 1997). In this vein of research, social movement scholars have paid attention to how the structure of some organizations encourages factionalism and affects its intensity. While all organizations are vulnerable to factionalism, some types may be better able to withstand factionalism and some are more vulnerable. For example, Zald and Ash (1966) argue that exclusive organizations – those with stricter membership requirements – are more likely to suffer from factionalism and schism than are inclusive organizations. In this view, inclusive organizations offer greater flexibility in dealing with internal conflict, meaning the organization can withstand greater internal conflict (see also King 2008). Others have found that there is no great difference between inclusive and exclusive organizations in terms of factionalism (Gamson 1975).

In a different vein, social psychologists and small-group sociologists have paid attention to the process through which factions emerge and evolve. These studies have found that factions do not randomly form, but are shaped in ways that reflect social divisions in the broader world. Social psychologists studying this phenomenon refer to the preexisting social “fault lines” within organizations (Stark & Bainbridge 1985; Lau & Murnighan 1998; Hart & Van Vugt 2006). Social fault lines refer to meaningful diversity within the organization, including race, gender, and class differences among members. These fault lines may not be initially important to the members of the organization, but the fault lines can be triggered by an event or crisis that makes them relevant. For example, changes in affirmative action policy can cause factions to form along race and gender lines within an organization.

By examining factions after their initial emergence, other scholars have focused on the subsequent stages of factionalism and on how the boundaries around factions change over time. The specific stages vary across the literature, but they often include a preliminary stage, where there is not yet any conflict; the formation of subgroups, where members begin to align themselves more with some co-members than with others; an escalation of conflict, when the sub-groups begin to compete with other members; and then a final exit stage, where one faction chooses to leave the organization (Pondy 1967; Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman 1992; Worchel
Factionalism does not have to escalate however, and under certain conditions it can be ratcheted up or down by the members involved. Lau and Murninghan (1998) found that the level of factionalism is intensified when factions meet independently of other organizational members, institute organizational changes based on the subgroup’s views, compete with members not associated with the faction, and when the faction has a more cohesive collective identity than members of the broader organization have. Factionalism can be dampened under certain circumstances, including the appearance of an external threat to the broader organization and when there is opportunity and pressure to work with members outside of the faction. Dyck and Starke (1999) echo these findings, stating that in the cases where episodes of factionalism were successfully resolved, the organization experienced a “harmonizing event,” where all members came together and declared their commitment to maintaining a unified organization.

While most factionalism theory and research emphasizes how the internal composition and structure of organizations leads to conflict, a new promising direction in the field focuses on the effect of an organization’s environment in producing factionalism. Deborah Balser (1997), for example, argues that a variety of external challenges can create or exacerbate friction between members of an organization. These challenges include changes in the political opportunity structure, increased social control by authorities, increasing resources, and changing relationships with other organizations in the social movement. Each of these challenges forces members to renegotiate established ways of managing the organization, and can lead to factionalism. These findings were echoed by Shriver and Messer (2009) in their study of the Czech environmental movement. They found that as the political opportunities shrank, the largest environmental organization in the country, the Rainbow Movement, experienced intense factionalism. Members struggled over how to best respond; some became militant anarchists while others wanted the organization to professionalize in order to attract more funding. As a result, the organization experienced a schism when a core group of members left to form a new organization, Neschnuti.

Along with the debates over what causes factionalism (internal versus external factors), there is also debate over the consequences of factions for social movements. Factionalism is often painted as a destructive force for social movements and social movement organizations. Miller (1983) for example, argues that factionalism is harmful to social movements because it channels resources and energy away from the movement’s target and instead focuses it on the internal conflict. This pattern was found by Cable and Shriver (2010) in their study of the Gulf War illness movement. They argue that the activists’ arguments over the government’s responsibility diverted pressure from authorities to respond to the veterans’ claims. Cable and Shriver argue that the movement should have had a far bigger impact than it actually achieved, and that the factionalism is to be blamed for this disappointing outcome.

On the other side of the debate, scholars argue that factionalism and conflict can have important benefits for social movements. Through factionalism, new ideas and perspectives are brought to the forefront in social movement organizations. It can shed light on organizational inequalities that might otherwise go unnoticed. One infamous example of this kind of factionalism occurred within the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), when female members of the organization produced the Waveland Memo. In this memo, the women argued that despite their importance in SNCC’s operations, they were blocked from leadership positions and compelled to serve in traditional female roles (Breines 2006). In cases like this, factionalism works to ameliorate organizational problems like the systematic inequality of some members.
Factionalism and schism can also have a positive outcome when they expand the boundaries around a social movement and give more people room to participate. When factionalism causes the exit of some organizational members who then create new organizations, these new organizations offer additional venues for new potential activists to join. For example, the National Organization for Women (NOW) experienced intense factionalism early in its history, and these factions often left NOW to create organizations that provided new definitions of feminism and activism. This includes both organizations that were more politically conservative than NOW and organizations that were more radical than NOW. All of these factions broadened the reach and power of the feminist movement (Davis 1999).

Factions and factionalism remain fertile topics in social movement studies. Because much of the work on factionalism is done with a single case study or small number of cases, it remains unclear how the broader political and economic environment affects factionalism across the population of social movement organizations. Specifically, is factionalism more likely in prosperous economic times because there are more resources to fight over? Or is factionalism more likely in difficult economic times because there are fewer resources to meet members’ needs? Research also points in conflicting directions about the role of political repression and factionalism. Small-group research indicates that the presence of an external threat decreases factionalism as all members band together. Balser’s (1997) case studies indicate that political repression can increase factionalism. Understanding which environmental conditions exacerbate factionalism and which conditions dampen internal organization conflict can provide us with a better understanding of how social movement fields evolve over time.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Movements within institutions/organizations; National Organization for Women (NOW) (United States); Organizations and movements; Resource mobilization theory; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Feminist movements, in the broadest sense, are collective efforts to improve the situation of women, and they have emerged in most parts of the world, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and continuing into the present. Feminism has also influenced other social movements, such as the peace, environmental, global justice, reproductive rights, and gay/lesbian movements, through its ideologies, collective identities, tactics, and organizational forms. Scholarship on feminist movements has focused on their origins; different waves or cycles; feminist ideologies, collective identities, tactics, and organizational forms across time and place; and the impact of feminism on other social movements.

Scholars do not all agree about what movements qualify as feminist or even as women’s movements, a broader term. The word “feminism” originated in France at the end of the nineteenth century and then spread to other languages and parts of the world, leading sometimes to the association of feminism with Western importation. Originally feminism referred to the move to emancipate women from restrictions on their legal rights. In the transnational women’s movement in the years before World War I, the term had come to connote, quite specifically, support for identical laws for women and men, particularly opposition to special—what was known as “protective”—labor legislation for women. For some scholars, a feminist movement must specifically embrace that label, so that only modern movements qualify as feminist. Freedman, taking a historical and global view of feminism, defines it as a belief that women and men are “inherently of equal worth” and that “social movements are necessary to achieve equality … with the understanding that gender always intersects with other social hierarchies” (2002: 7).

ORIGINS OF FEMINIST MOVEMENTS

From a social movement perspective, women have always had sufficient grievances to serve as a basis for feminist activity, but only in certain circumstances have they mobilized in their own interests. Historically, collective action on the part of women directed toward improving their situation has flourished primarily in periods of generalized social upheaval. The first feminist movements emerged in the mid-nineteenth century—particularly around the European revolutions of 1848—in connection with socialism, liberalism, and, in the United States, the movement to abolish slavery.

Structural conditions, in addition, underlie the emergence of feminist protest. In the Western world, changes in patterns of female labor-force participation, increased access to education, and shifts in fertility rates and reproductive roles have been associated with the emergence of feminist movements. Outside the West feminist movements tended to emerge from nationalist and anti-imperialist impulses rather than processes of economic development.

Although the early feminist movements in Europe and the United States have influenced movements elsewhere that developed later, there are also indigenous roots of feminist movements around the globe. Women in most regions of the world have, in modern times, organized collectively against the injustice and oppression in their communities. Gender oppression for many third-world feminists cannot be divorced from issues and histories of colonization, immigration, racism, and imperialism, so that feminist activism is often organized around a constellation of oppressions rather than exclusively around gender.
The political contexts of different countries have been critical in shaping feminist movements and facilitating or constraining success in achieving feminist goals. In Western Europe and the United States, feminist movements have had the greatest success in policymaking where the political left has been either very strong, as in Sweden, or very weak, as in the United States.

Since the 1970s, regional, interregional, and transnational networking among feminist groups has grown enormously, although the origins of transnational organizing date back to the end of the nineteenth century. The United Nations’ International Women’s Year in 1975 and Decade for Women (1975–1985), originating with the Soviet-bloc-sponsored Women’s International Democratic Federation, fostered global feminist dialogues and stimulated the growth of feminist activism around the globe. Four official UN world conferences of governmental representatives devoted to women’s issues, with associated unofficial forums of women’s groups, have focused global attention on feminist questions and fostered connections among feminist activists. Although the official conferences and the affiliated forums have proven extremely contentious, grappling with questions of politics, religion, sexuality, and social custom, they have also sometimes bridged global North–South differences.

WAVES OR CYCLES OF PROTEST

Traditionally, scholarship on feminist movements, based on the US and European experience, has depicted their emergence in two waves: the first in the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, culminating in the struggle to win the right to vote, and the second since the late 1960s. Late-twentieth-century and twenty-first-century developments, particularly among young women, have come to be considered a third wave.

After a lull, at least in the countries where the right to vote was won by the early twentieth century, feminist movements burst forth with renewed vigor in connection with the social movements of the long 1960s: civil rights in the United States, student and left-wing movements throughout the Western world, and national liberation movements in the third world. In the United States and Western Europe, women came together in consciousness-raising groups and took to the streets with all kinds of protests designed to challenge public assumptions, alter institutions, and create political change. Often divided on questions of ideology, strategy, goals, and membership, these late-twentieth-century movements mobilized around a broad range of issues, from reproductive rights to sexual and economic exploitation to violence against women. These feminist movements conceptualized women as sharing common experiences of oppression, asserting that “sisterhood is global,” but increasingly, in response to critiques from women of color and women in the third world, came to emphasize differences among women on the basis of class, race/ethnicity, sexuality, and nation.

This “second wave” of feminism encountered criticism as prudish, dogmatic, and lacking in diversity from a younger generation in the 1990s. Third-wave feminism in the United States mobilized around such issues as sexuality, body image, gender identity, the environment, globalization, and popular media. Especially important is an emphasis on the intersections of class, race/ethnicity, and sexuality. Yet scholars have increasingly challenged the notion that the resurgence of feminism in the 1960s was entirely a white and middle-class phenomenon, pointing to organizing among African-American and Chicana women and in labor unions and the welfare rights movement.

Recent scholarship makes clear that there is more continuity than the wave model suggests. Movements grew outside the Euro-American arena precisely when feminism went into decline there after World War I and, in addition, feminist movements did not die out between the early twentieth century and the resurgence of feminism in the last
quarter of the twentieth century or in the 1980s, when media reports of the death of feminism became commonplace. Instead, in periods of less visible and dramatic protest, the feminist movement has gone into what Taylor (1989) calls abeyance. Feminist organizations have continued to form and grow across the globe, while feminists have also moved into traditional institutions, including government bureaucracies, giving rise to the term “femocrats.” Research on US feminism within labor unions, the military, the Catholic Church, and liberal organizations and foundations shows its perseverance even when dramatic protest died down. As a result, scholars increasingly critique the wave metaphor in favor of recognizing continuity, albeit with changing forms over time.

**FEMINIST IDEOLOGIES, COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES, AND TACTICAL REPERTOIRES**

Feminist movements are by no means monolithic, encompassing as they do numerous ideological strands that differ in the scope of change sought, the extent to which gender inequality is linked to other systems of domination, and the significance attributed to gender differences. Offen (1988) distinguishes historically between individualist feminism, which emphasizes human rights and personal autonomy, and relational feminism, which advocates equity for women in their traditional roles as wives and mothers. At bottom, the basic divide in these categories is between those who emphasize the sameness of women and men and those who focus on difference. This ideological distinction has its counterpart in the goals of movements, some of which work to win identical treatment for women and men and some of which advocate different treatment as the proper route to equality in outcome.

With the resurgence of feminism in the late 1960s, scholars distinguished among liberal feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism. Liberal feminism, most characteristic of the mainstream US women’s movement, seeks equality for women within the existing social structure, working for equal opportunity in male-dominated economic and political arenas. Socialist feminism, with a strong tradition in European movements, sees class and gender as mutually responsible for creating inequality and calls for a transformation of both capitalism and patriarchy. Radical feminism considers women a “sex class” and seeks a fundamental transformation of society based on “female values” of nurturing, egalitarianism, pacifism, and cooperation. Categories of feminism have proliferated to include black feminism, lesbian feminism, Islamic feminism, and ecofeminism, to name just a few. Increasingly the plural, “feminisms,” captures the diversity of feminist ideologies.

Scholars increasingly view feminism as a socially constructed collective identity that emerges out of the interactions and accomplishments of participants in networks and organizations engaged in efforts to improve women’s status and opportunities. A collective-identity approach to feminism shows how feminist culture and the maintenance of a feminist collective identity contribute to the continued vitality of women’s movements.

Feminist movements have employed a variety of tactical repertoires in different times and places, sometimes dramatic public protests such as marches, demonstrations, and rallies, and sometimes consciousness-raising, self-help, or cultural and discursive forms of resistance oriented to cultural and social change. Not all tactical repertoires are aimed at the state. On the global level, feminists are organizing around such issues as health, housing, education, population, human rights, genetic engineering, trafficking, migration, militarism, and debt, developing new tactical repertoires to meet the challenges of an increasingly globalized world.

**FEMINISM WITHIN OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

Feminist movements have roots in leftist, racial/ethnic, and nationalist movements, and
feminists have continued to participate in a range of other movements, including peace, global justice, environmental, reproductive rights, and gay and lesbian movements. Feminists have also been heavily involved in the Global Justice Movement, which brings together activists from labor, environmental, peace, and consumer movements as well as the women’s movement. Feminists have contributed numerous tactics to such public protest events, as well as to less visible cultural venues, helping to perpetuate the women’s movement and shape movement outcomes.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Friedan, Betty (1921–2006); Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Protest cycles and waves; Transgender movement; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Fields of contention
NICK CROSSLEY

Contentious politics, in Tilly’s sense, involves multiple relays of interaction (Tilly & Tarrow 2008). Activists interact amongst themselves, both within and between “social movement organizations” (SMOs); they interact with opponents and elites; with police and other security forces; and often also with journalists and even academics. The outcome of contentious politics is generated by these interactions and the concept of “fields of contention,” as coined by Crossley (2003, 2006), is intended to capture the network which they form.

Any field of contention comprises multiple sets of actors party to a given conflict (or set of connected conflicts), sets of various relations and interactions between those actors, and a culture of contention that emerges within and by way of these interactions. Fields are always in-process, changing “shape” as an effect of the dynamics of continuous contentious interaction which both drives and constitutes them.

The intellectual sources of the concept are various. In part it builds upon Zald and McCarthy’s (2003) modeling of the interaction between SMOs within movement industries and the wider movement sector. Zald and McCarthy suggest that SMOs emerge to service demands for change in society, effectively exchanging their efforts for the material and symbolic rewards they can demand in return. However, they add that several SMOs might emerge in relation to the same demand, fueling competition. This competition is often further amplified on account of the many diverse issues that prompt movement activity. SMOs compete within movement industries but industries also compete within a movement sector. And the movement sector itself must compete with private, public, and voluntary sector activities which all make demands upon and seek to lure the wider public.

The economic, resource mobilization aspect of Zald and McCarthy’s account is very useful and appropriate but also somewhat limited. Although it gestures toward the symbolic and cultural dimension of social movement sectors and industries it does no more than gesture, failing to illuminate the cultural elements that are both generated by and embed contentious politics. Furthermore, it tends to conceive of actors (both activists and SMOs) in an overly materialistic-utilitarian fashion, failing to consider the significance of symbolic and moral goals, identity, habit and expressive action, and of the rather looser forms of association (than formal organization) that are common in many forms of contentious politics. Other more recent contributions to the study of social movements and contentious politics have made this point and sought to fill the gap but in doing so they have tended to lose sight of both the economic dimension and the sense of a structured field of interaction that we find in Zald and McCarthy. “Fields of contention” is an attempt to draw these elements together by way of a substantial reworking of Zald and McCarthy’s model which incorporates many of the more recent insights.

Although the significance of networks is raised in the resource mobilization literature, this isn’t picked up in Zald and McCarthy’s model. As in much of the economic literature that they draw from, Zald and McCarthy tend to suggest a rather atomized picture of political contention, with actors making decisions and acting largely independently of one another. Again “fields of contention” is intended to correct this. A second source for the concept is the growing body of literature focused upon social networks in contentious politics and on the techniques of formal social network analysis (Diani & McAdam 2003; Crossley 2008). If contentious politics consists of multiple relays
of interaction then these relays collectively form a network of both interactions and the more durable relationships that emerge by way of it. These networks are important because they generate both opportunities and constraints for those involved in them. Moreover, social network analysis affords us a variety of techniques for mapping these networks and identifying their most salient properties. Fields of contention are networks, therefore, both of individual human actors and of the various corporate actors, including SMOs and other organizations, that become involved in struggle.

Formal social network analysis (SNA) allows for an empirically sophisticated approach to fields of contention which is able to draw out salient aspects of their structure, and increasingly network analysis is attuned to the dynamics of network evolution. Fields of contention are not just networks, however. As noted above, they equally entail cultures of contention and distributions of resources. Furthermore, they incorporate antagonistic interactions and relations as well as the more cooperative ties more usually focused upon when SNA is applied to contentious politics.

The final intellectual source of inspiration behind “fields of contention” is Bourdieu’s conception of “fields” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu is most often associated with the analysis of “reproduction” rather than the transformation which contentious political actors seek to bring about. Much that he says can be applied to emerging fields of contention, however (Crossley 2003). More importantly, his work alerts us to the various ways in which contention might be shaped, culturally, by its past, taking on conventional forms, and by both domination and the unequal distribution of resources (including cultural resources) within it. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s use of the techniques of multiple correspondence analysis, to map fields, suggests a further (to SNA) way of operationalizing the notion of fields, empirically, and analyzing them.

Bourdieu was the key inspiration behind the early development of “fields of contention.” More recently, however, the author has become more aware of the limits of his version of “fields” and, indeed, of his wider framework. In particular Bourdieu pitches his analysis at a level of abstraction which ignores empirical social interactions and networks, and he suggests that such phenomena are secondary, if relevant at all, to a modeling of fields. His model of fields is focused rather upon the distribution of different social capitals (Crossley 2010). This is problematic in general terms and a fortiori in relation to contentious politics, which, as noted, consists in networked interactions. For these reasons, whilst Bourdieu remains important, we must be careful to distinguish “fields of contention” from Bourdieu’s “fields.” The former must be analyzed in more concrete terms, focusing upon empirical interactions, relations, and networks.

The concept of fields of contention can be widely applied. It is not formulated with any single example of contentious politics in mind and it does not require that potential empirical foci meet strict criteria. It is, as much as anything else, a tool for thinking through the parties to any given struggle and their various relations and interactions, albeit a tool informed theoretically by the belief that such relations and interactions are the very “stuff” of contentious politics and should be central to any analysis of it. One area in particular where the concept has been picked up, however, is the area of health-related struggles. It has been argued, in this context, that the concept is of particular use because it provides a framework for analyzing the structural and cultural context of struggles that are not centered specifically upon government (Taylor & Zald 2010). This reflects the above-mentioned openness of the concept. It is not prescriptive in relation to the agents involved in a struggle but rather asks of the researcher that they address this as a question.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Multiorganizational fields; Networks and social movements; Organizations and movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement sector.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Frame disputes
ROBERT D. BENFORD

Frame disputes refer to differences of opinion or preference regarding claims associated with framing activities that social movement actors fashion. Frame disputes are a pervasive dynamic within social movements, one of several contested discursive processes within the movement arena (Benford & Snow 2000). The concept derives from Erving Goffman’s observations in *Frame Analysis* that interpretations of what’s going on in a particular circumstance are subject to disagreement. On such occasions “reality” must be negotiated. In the context of social movements, frame disputes erupt within a movement organization (intraorganizational dispute) and/or between representatives of two or more SMOs within a social movement (interorganizational dispute). Frame disputes in the wider political arena, such as those that often arise between social movements and their opponents (e.g., countermovements, targets of change, media, etc.), have been referred to as “framing contests” (Ryan 1991). The focus of this entry is on interpretive and discursive disagreements that occur within a social movement.

FORMS OF FRAME DISPUTES

Social movement actors spend considerable time constructing particular versions of reality, developing and proffering alternative visions of that reality, seeking to affect various audiences’ understandings of the movement and its claims, and managing the impressions people form about their cause (Benford 1993: 678). All of these interpretive matters are subject to dispute. Social movement frame disputes tend to take three forms. Most fundamental are those disputes that pertain to *diagnostic framing*, what’s wrong and who or what’s to blame for the problem. Because these disputes are over “reality” (what actually happened), they most closely resemble Goffman’s (1974) notion of frame disputes. A second form of disputes entails disagreements regarding *prognoses* – what is to be done to correct the current injustice or social problem that the movement seeks to address. Finally, social movement participants frequently disagree about how the movement should portray the movement’s grievances and solutions. This form of frame dispute concerns which frame alignment strategies are most likely to resonate among specific audiences and thus yield successful mobilization. Hence, researchers refer to these disputes as “frame resonance disputes” or framing disputes (Benford 1993).

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF FRAME DISPUTES

Recent research has sought to specify the conditions most likely to yield frame disputes. Haines’ (2006) comparison of internal disputes resulting from Amnesty International’s expansion of its human rights agenda to include the death penalty and the American Civil Liberties Union’s endorsement of drug legalization are attributable to contrasting organizational cultures, framing vocabularies, and membership profiles in the two SMOs. In a study of disputes pertaining to pro-life pharmacists who refuse to fill birth control prescriptions, Chiarello (2006) found that frame disputes are caused by divided loyalties, definitional differences, and misinterpretation of frames. More often than not frame disputes erupt between ideologically diverse wings of a movement. At one extreme are those moderates who prefer to build bridges and establish allies with the targets of change. At the other extreme are those who prefer to dethrone the current elites and to build an entirely new system. In such cases, rhetorical differences tend to reflect ideological differences.
While numerous social movement scholars have analyzed the causes and subjects of frame disputes within various contemporary social movements, only a few have sought to determine the effects of such intramural conflicts. A study of the nuclear disarmament movement of the 1980s suggested both positive and negative effects resulting from frame disputes including mobilization and demobilization, resource depletion and resource concentration, factionalism and cohesiveness, and chasms and a division of interpretive labor (Benford 1993). Jessup’s (1997) study of the Ku Klux Klan indicates that frame disputes tend to increase a movement’s efficiency as long as the disputes do not reach such a rancorous level so as to delegitimate the movement. In those instances where the movement loses legitimacy, frame disputes tend to yield identity divergence and factionalism. A study of a transnational movement’s framing rifts notes that frame disputes can be strategically beneficial by allowing an issue to resonate among multiple audiences (Resnick 2009). Successful movements learn from these disputes and adapt to changes in their discursive opportunity structure (McCammon et al. 2008). Additional research needs to illuminate the conditions under which frame disputes tend to be facilitative of or detrimental to the achievement of SMO and social movement goals as well as to the longevity of SMOs and social movements.

SEE ALSO: Discursive opportunity structure; Factions/factionalism; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Free rider problem
PAMELA OLIVER

A free rider is someone who gains the benefit of a collective or public good without contributing to the cost of its provision. The term was introduced to social scientists by Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action,* which argued that the problem of motivating collective action is equivalent to the problem of motivating private contributions to a public or shared good. Olson’s use of the term is structural: a person is a free rider if they benefit from a public good without contributing to it, regardless of their awareness of the possibility of contributing. A more restricted meaning refers to conscious free-riding, in which a person prefers to benefit from the actions of others.

Although the term “free riding” is sometimes used for any failure of collective action, a more accurate usage distinguishes the free riding problem from the feasibility or startup problem. The free riding problem is strategic gaming between people who would be willing and able to contribute to the collective good but can hope to obtain its benefits without contributing. The group has the resources needed to provide the good but needs to solve the coordination problem of who will pay. Because individuals find it individually rational to contribute to the good if they know others will not contribute, true “free riding” dilemmas are often resolved by the most interested people paying for the good. Free riding dilemmas can also be resolved by side payments or cost sharing. By contrast, the feasibility or startup problem arises when no single individual can make a large enough difference in the collective good to make their individual contribution rational, even though concerted action by many people at once would be a net benefit to everyone. The most interested actors in groups facing feasibility or startup problems cannot provide the good themselves and can only solve the problem through investing in organizing others to simultaneous action (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira 1985; Marwell & Oliver 1993).

There has been a debate about the impact of group size on free riding. Free riding is generally a larger problem in larger groups where it is more difficult to coordinate action and bring social pressure to bear on each other. But the problem of free riding is not restricted to large groups, as anyone who has ever shared a residence and argued over housework can attest. The small group problems of free riding are sometimes of central importance in the dynamics of real social movement organizations. Of particular importance is the dynamic Olson called “the exploitation of the great by the small,” more accurately called “the exploitation of the more interested by the less interested.” In many groups, the most enthusiastic and interested members of a group do most of the work and find it difficult and frustrating to pull in smaller contributions from other group members.

Free riding is an instance of a more general concept of a social dilemma or mixed-motive situation, in which individuals have both individual and common interests. Experimental research on conscious free riding finds that it is common but not universal, and that the average or typical person faced the choice between benefiting only herself and benefiting the group will try to split the difference and make some contributions to the group along with some contributions to individual benefit. There are many strategies that can produce cooperative outcomes if people are allowed to communicate or are in ongoing interaction with each other.

Similarly, empirical research in social movements finds that both structural free riding and participation that cannot be accounted for by individual payoffs are common. Many structural free riders are not conscious free riders. In Walsh and Warland’s (1983) study of
community residents in the Three Mile Island area after the nuclear reactor accident, only 5 percent of the people who were “objective” free riders reported conscious free-riding (i.e., letting other people make the effort on their behalf). The most common reason given for not participating despite supporting the issue was not having heard of the groups working on the issue (26%); the second most common was family or personal preoccupations (18%). Other common reasons were opposition to joining any groups (9%), never invited to join (8%), economic or job pressures (7%), and criticism of the group’s policies or actions (6%).

SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Critical mass theory; Experimental methods; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Participation in social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives; Social and solidarity incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Free spaces
FRANCESCA POLLETTA and KELSY KRETSCHMER

Free spaces are small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political mobilization. Since the term became popular in studies of movements in the 1980s, scholars have sought to better identify the features of particular institutional sites that equip them to spur political challenges. They have also probed the role of free spaces in authoritarian regimes, in right-wing movements, and in relation to new digital technologies.

Historians Sara Evans and Harry Boyte used the term “free spaces” in their 1986 book of that title (both Evans and Boyte had separately used the term in earlier work): “Free spaces are settings between private lives and large scale institutions where ordinary citizens can act with dignity, independence and vision” (1986: 17). In the dense interactive networks of community-based institutions like churches, fraternal organizations, and cultural groups, people envision alternative futures and plot strategies for realizing them. Free spaces supply the activist networks, skills, and solidarity that assist in launching a movement. They also provide the conceptual space in which dominated groups are able to penetrate the prevailing common sense that keeps most people passive in the face of injustice. In that sense, they are crucial to the very formation of the identities and interests that precede mobilization. Thus the Southern black church, removed from white control and central to the life of black communities, provided the emerging civil rights movement meeting places to develop strategy and commitment, a network of charismatic movement leaders, and an idiom that persuasively joined constitutional ideals with Christian ones.

For Evans and Boyte and many authors who followed them, the free-space concept reflected the insight that the oppressed are not without resources to combat their oppression. Undermining the well-worn opposition between tradition and radical change, it showed that normally conservative or nonpolitical institutions such as churches, literary circles, families, and working-class bars could become seedbeds of political challenge. Undermining another familiar opposition, that between structure and culture, the concept also pointed to the specifically cultural dimensions of mobilizing networks.

The list of free spaces (and analogous sites such as “havens,” “spatial preserves,” “free social spaces,” “sequestered social sites,” “spheres of cultural autonomy,” and “protected spaces”) that have played key roles in spurring counterhegemonic challenge is now long, and includes such varied sites as literary circles for Eastern European nationalist movements, progressive churches for the Central American Solidarity movement, and music festivals for the White Power movement. Beginning with Evans and Boyte, scholars have also seen free spaces as operating within movements: for example, the “autonomous zones” of European new social movements, the “women’s only spaces” of 1970s radical feminism, the block clubs created by tenant organizers to mobilize an urban constituency, the alternative food coops, health clinics, credit unions, and schools that flourished in the late 1960s and 1970s. By giving people the freedom and warrant to enact relationships that differ from those characterizing mainstream society, such spaces are intended to prefigure alternative societies.

The early appeal of the free-space concept, however, obscured inconsistencies in its use. Free spaces created by movements clearly played different roles in mobilization than did the free spaces that preceded mobilization, yet
the differences were not well specified. While many scholars treated free spaces as physical sites, others maintained that free spaces could exist in print, practice, or the Internet. While some saw freedom from the surveillance of authorities as a crucial feature of a free space, others pointed out that federal prison served as a free space for the development of post-World War II radical pacifism. Scholars were undecided, too, about whether all societies possessed free spaces, as well as whether free spaces only became the seedbeds for revolt in contexts of economic and political instability or whether they could help to create that instability.

Behind the dissensus over free spaces’ referents and their role in mobilization, Polletta (1999) argued, was a tendency to elide free spaces’ structural distance from sites of power with their supposed freedom from hegemonic ideas. Free spaces were treated as, in a sense, empty, and as mobilizing for that reason alone. That view begged the question of just why some institutional settings were able to preserve or produce challenging ideas. It also minimized the extent to which all social settings are characterized by complex dynamics of deference and challenge.

Scholarship in recent years has tackled these issues. One clear finding in the diverse empirical studies is that although people do need some freedom from government surveillance in order to formulate, plan, and organize opposition, they are usually able to find it. Protest has been organized in prisons, in public parks and markets in authoritarian regimes, in the midst of official commemorations and festivals. All regimes and societies have free spaces. But different settings facilitate distinct mobilization tasks and play different roles in more and less repressive regimes. In Eastern European Leninist regimes, the ubiquity of secret police, spies, and informers sometimes restricted the expression of dissent to intimate discussions among friends (Johnston & Mueller 2001). In contemporary China, by contrast, a regime that is both liberalizing and overburdened has failed to stop evangelical Christians from recruiting in public places like busy streets and public Christmas performances (Vala & O’Brien 2007).

A second clear finding in recent scholarship is that what makes some settings generative of protest is not that they are empty of hegemonic ideas but that they are full of counter-hegemonic or potentially counter-hegemonic ones. Churches, schools, art and theater groups, and intellectual institutions have preserved or nurtured traditions of dissent in part because they have enjoyed some autonomy from the state. They are often permitted to operate without direct surveillance; they control certain aspects of daily life; and they may have moral authority on issues that are within the purview of the state.

Such institutions’ autonomy is never complete, of course, and degrees of freedom are won and lost through hard-fought political battles. Challenges to the state must usually be made obliquely, moreover, in an idiom that is not directly political. But the fact that such institutions possess a nonpolitical idiom for formulating challenge is as important a resource as is their political independence. Cultural institutions often provide moral schemas that can be transposed to political issues. For example, Poles drew on a moral idiom from Catholicism to challenge the communist regime. Estonian choral groups preserved a nationalist impulse in a repertoire of folk songs and Czech theater groups voiced dissent in a language that was understandable to all but government censors (Johnston & Mueller 2001). Free spaces in this sense provide not so much a space as an idiom for formulating opposition.

Scholars have long linked free spaces to the creation of collective identities that can later command much wider mobilization. While past research emphasized the importance of forging tight bonds in intimate settings, more recent scholarship has focused on the fact that groups must become visible to themselves as a collective actor. Converging with work on subaltern publics, this perspective looks to settings in which people become both performers of and audience for a new collective identity. The Internet has become important, in this sense, by
lowering the costs of co-presence in a way that makes it easier to form collective identities. Not only do Internet sites allow people to communicate across geographical distance. People also see that there are others like themselves, who are similarly invested in, and potentially willing to act on behalf of a cause. This is probably especially important where people face stigma in their daily lives: an Internet-based free space allows people to “out” themselves with fewer fears of sanction. Internet-based free spaces may also foster ties among more diverse people and allow them to experiment with new forms of association and relationship (della Porta & Mosca 2005).

Finally, if researchers have shown that public, dispersed, and virtual spaces can nurture dissent, they have also emphasized the limitations of the densely networked and physically bounded settings that we often associate with the concept of free spaces. Most obviously, for opposition to become full-scale mobilization, people within a free space must connect with people outside it. But external links may be important even earlier. Outsiders or relative outsiders may counter pressures to accommodation that come with an institution’s relative autonomy. Links to more explicitly political groups may help to identify the shifts in political alignments that signal opportunities for mobilization. Interestingly, contact with opponents may also be necessary. For example, when imprisoned IRA activists were reclassified as ordinary criminals rather than political prisoners, they were forced into daily confrontations with prison authorities, confrontations that strengthened their commitment both to group and to cause. At the same time, the information they smuggled out to supporters about their plight made them a focal point for a much broader collective identity (O’Hearn 2009).

Understanding the links between free spaces and broader publics and between cultures of resistance and full-scale mobilization remain pressing tasks. Do such links consist primarily of people, institutions, or events? When do they come into play? In addition, we know little about the free spaces that are created by movements. Collectivist organizations, cultural festivals, and cooperative institutions are intended to prefigure alternative ways of acting and interacting. Do they? What effects do free spaces have on behaviors and institutions outside the free space? Answering questions like these will advance our understanding of the cultural preconditions for and effects of social movements.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Cognitive liberation; Collective identity; Internet and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Prefigurative politics; Subcultures and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Frustration-aggression theory is one of the classic grievance theories in social psychology. It was first formulated by a group of researchers at Yale University. In 1939 Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears published their book *Frustration and Aggression*. In the 70 years that have passed since then, the frustration-aggression hypothesis has been the subject of much debate. Through the years, the original sweeping statements have been replaced by more modest claims (Berkowitz 1989).

**ORIGINAL FORMULATION**

In its original formulation the theory advanced a few basic propositions to explain the origin and consequences of all human aggression. Dollard et al. built their theory on one core assumption: “Aggression is always a consequence of frustration” (1). In other words, aggressive behavior always presupposes frustration and frustration always leads to some sort of aggression. The one exception the authors made concerned situations where open aggression may bring punishment.

Part of the debate on the frustration-aggression hypothesis concerns the definition of frustration itself. Some refer to it as an external instigating condition and some as the organism’s reaction to this event. Dollard et al. speak about frustration only in the former sense. For them frustration is an obstacle blocking the attainment of an expected gratification. Aggression they define straightforwardly as an action having one definite objective: the infliction of injury on the source of the frustration.

**REVISED FORMULATION**

The revised formulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is very much associated with the work of Leonard Berkowitz. In 1989 he wrote a review article and formulated a revision of the original frustration-aggression hypothesis. Berkowitz argued that frustrations give rise to aggression because they are aversive. They produce an instigation to aggression only to the extent that they are unpleasant to those affected. Berkowitz suggested that the thwarting-generated instigation to aggression can be thought of as anger. He subscribed to the core proposition of Dollard et al. but also offered a fundamental modification. Frustrations are aversive events and generate aggressive inclinations only to the extent that they produce negative effect. An unanticipated failure to obtain an attractive goal is more unpleasant than an expected failure, and it is the greater displeasure in the former case that gives rise to stronger instigation to aggression. Similarly, the thwarted persons’ appraisals and attributions presumably determine how bad they feel at not getting what they had wanted so that they are most aggressively inclined when they experience strong negative effect. Attributional interpretations of aggression- or anger-provoking situations are what make the difference between situations that do and do not provoke anger. People become angry and aggressive on being kept from reaching a desired goal to the extent that they think that someone has intentionally and unfairly produced this interference and wrongly tried to hurt them.

**FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION AND THE DEMAND SIDE OF PROTEST**

The frustration-aggression hypothesis clearly features at the demand-side of protest.
It specifies people’s reaction to blocked aspirations. Berkowitz’s formulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis differentiates between deliberate blockades and unintended interferences. Obviously, the former generates more aggression than the latter. The emotion literature reveals a similar mechanism where it alludes to the causes of anger. Indeed, anger is the affective reaction to frustration that leads people to aggressive reactions. In its turn anger is known in the literature on social movements and emotions as the emotion that spurs collective action participation. Note that the frustration-aggression hypothesis refers to individual feelings and behavior. Indeed, under specific circumstances frustrations turn into aggressive action, but remember that this is an individual response not yet collective action. We still need mobilization processes that bring such demand for retaliation together with a persuasive supply of collective action.

FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION AND PROTEST DYNAMICS

There is yet another setting in which the frustration-aggression hypothesis is relevant for movement dynamics. People in the act of protesting who are blocked on their way to their protest targets tend to react with anger and aggression against the police, who are usually the source of frustration. Particularly when the thwarting is deemed illegitimate and arbitrary, people react in an aggressive manner. Sophisticated crowd management can prevent this from turning into violent confrontations, but all-too-easily so-called police riots are the result.

SEE ALSO: Emotion and social movements; Framing and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Geography and social movements
PAUL ROUTLEDGE

During the 1970s, and drawing from Marxism and feminism, the discipline of geography inquired into socio-spatially constituted inequalities and injustices. However, it was not until the early 1990s that a direct and sustained engagement with the geographies of social movements began (e.g., Routledge 1993; Miller 2000; Nicholls 2007). Although engaging with the theoretical traditions of resource mobilization and political process (e.g., Miller 2000; Nicholls 2007), and new social movements (e.g., Routledge 2000), geographers have been concerned with the lack of engagement with geography in social movement studies, arguing that geographical (spatial) understandings of social movement practice are crucial to the interpretation of contentious action. Movements act from space, politically mobilizing from the material conditions of their (local) spaces; movements act on space appropriating it with a group identity; movements act in space, such as taking to the streets for protests, or occupying land; and movements make space: creating conditions to expand public political involvement, for example through the creation of solidaristic alliances (Dikeç 2001). As I will discuss below, social movements negotiate multiple spatialities in their prosecution of conflict. These include the politics of place and socio-spatial positionality, spatial inequalities, the politics of scale and networking (Nicholls 2007; Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto 2008).

SOCIO-SPATIAL POSITIONALITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE

Differently positioned subjects have distinct identities, experiences, and perspectives that shape their understanding of, and engagement with, the world. These emerge relationally through connections and interactions with differently positioned subjects, and are shot through with unequal power relations. Through people’s geographically situated practices and imaginaries, power relations are contested, frequently through social movements (Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto 2008).

This is because different social groups endow space with an amalgam of different meanings and values. Hence, particular places frequently become sites of conflict where the social structures and relations of power, domination, and resistance intersect. This is most evident in instances where different ethnic or nationalist groups contest the same political space (e.g., Israel/Palestine). Collective action is often focused upon cultural codes which are themselves spatially specific, since culture and ethnicity influence a community’s sense of place, that is, the subjective orientation that can be engendered by living in a place. This plays a distinct role in shaping both the political claims of actors and the perception of political opportunities (Martin 2003). The ideology that emanates from this articulates a process of positive assertion (of local values, beliefs, and lifestyles) and resistance to intervening values of domination.

Sensitivity to such processes when considering particular practices of contentious action acknowledges the subjective nature of people’s perceptions, imaginations, and experiences when they are involved in political action. It locates such action in dynamic spatial contexts, as it sheds light upon how geographic spaces are transformed into places redolent with cultural meaning, memory, and identity under conditions of conflict. For example, the Zapatista insurgency was informed by the place-specific political and cultural economy of indigenous people in the Mexican state of Chiapas. Place has a central role in shaping the
claims, identities, and capacities of mobilized political agents, helping to explain why social movements occur where they do, how the particularities of specific places influence the character and emergence of various forms of contentious action, and the context within which movement agency interpolates the social structure. Such a context-based analysis of social movements seeks to understand how the geographically uneven modes of exercising state and economic power intersect with people’s everyday lives, combining to generate particular “terrains of resistance” (Routledge 1993).

Spatial proximity enables strong social and cultural ties to be established (e.g., through trust and kinship networks, ethnic and religious affiliations, common history, shared language and traditions, etc.) which can then be drawn on to enable collective action (Miller 2000; Tarrow & McAdam 2005; Nicholls 2007). Moreover, social movements frequently draw upon local knowledges, cultural practices, and vernacular languages to articulate their resistances. Songs, poems, stories, myths, metaphors, and symbols are used to inform and inspire collective action evoking a sense of place, history, and community. Such cultural expressions of contentious action frequently form a place-specific discourse of dissent which motivates and informs social movement agency, and articulates a movement’s resistance identity. The poetics that emerges from such place-based resistance – that is, the geopoetics – are deployed in order to mobilize, to educate, to propagandize, to teach tactics and explain strategies (Routledge 2000).

Spatial imaginaries – that is, individual and collective cognitive frameworks constituted through the lived experiences, perceptions, and conceptions of space – mediate how actors evaluate the potential risks and opportunities of joining social movements. For example, in the context of agricultural restructuring, political openings, and religious mobilization in southern Brazil, landless farmers used and reformulated their spatial imaginaries to embrace land occupation through Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), or Landless Workers’ Movement; while in the northeast, unemployed rural workers overcame the spatial imaginaries put in place by the local sugarcane economy to join the movement (Wolford 2004).

Finally, places are internally multiple with pluralistic exchanges between actors within these areas and the possibility for relational interactions across different sites: places are connected to extensive economic, political, and cultural networks with varying geographical reach (Massey 2004; Nicholls 2007). Therefore, movement interests and identities are formed through relational exchanges between multiple actors within and between different sites (Featherstone 2008). As a result, movements must negotiate constructing alliances between folk with diverse socio-spatial identities, interests, and imaginaries – both in their own particular struggles, and when participating with other movements in broader networks (Leitner, Sheppard, & Zsiarto 2008).

However, while social movements may be increasingly made up of extensive and pluralistic relational flows, a number of factors continue to require their territorialization. Research on transnational social movements has shown how they must negotiate political power primarily institutionalized through discrete territorial boundaries despite increased interdependencies and relational exchanges across state spaces. Hence territorially intensive and geographically extensive relations contribute distinct yet complementary resources to social movements (Beaumont & Nicholls 2007).

SPATIAL INEQUALITIES

Economic and political processes are articulated in geographically uneven ways that produce variations in the grievances and development trajectories of social movements (Miller 2000). The uneven nature of capitalism both differentiates grievance structures across space, and concentrates and disperses the resources
needed to make social movements possible (Nicholls 2007). For example, the urbanization process within the southern states of the United States resulted in the concentration of organizational resources of black Americans (e.g., churches, people, money, social networks) in a handful of urban centers (McAdam 1982). Conversely, the increased mobility of people and resources can diffuse the resource base available to movements, weaken important social networks between potential collaborators (hence limiting the usefulness of networks for procuring key resources), and place movements into territorial competition with one another (Nicholls 2007).

The uneven character of economic cycles creates differential conditions of social movement mobilization (Miller 2000). Rapid economic growth in one location may create conditions of environmental degradation, gentrification, or urban redevelopment, while economic decline in another location may generate conditions of unemployment, factory closures, or inner city decline. Hence, the uneven articulation of economic and state power – at the macro-level – geographically differentiates the grievance structures of social movements and presents different sets of political opportunities for actors in different locations (Nicholls 2007).

Between states and within them, geographical variations in the relationship between states and civil society actors are important in understanding the context from which social movements emerge. For example, trade unions are still accepted as legitimate “social partners” in much of Western Europe, though they have been under attack in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia and are heavily censored or often state-dominated in parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Social movements are confronted by a range of more or less democratic political systems, and hence must operate within political spaces that are more, or less, coercive which may increase the barriers to cooperation. In addition, the degree of political opportunities available to movements differs profoundly across political regimes (Nicholls 2007). The coercive powers of the state are deployed differentially across space, which creates an uneven pattern of regulatory and repressive controls to contain those places where social and political contention is articulated (Nelson 2006). At the sub-national level, variations are also evident in the relations between local state actors and civil society. For example, in the United States, the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO) has faced a more favorable organizing environment in northern states than unions in the southern states (Herod 1998).

**THE POLITICS OF SCALE**

Social movements mostly operate at the intersection of a series of overlapping scales – from more local municipalities, through regions, to the nation-state and, increasingly international forums. These different politics of scale provide movements with a range of opportunities and constraints (Nicholls 2007). For example, subsuming national labor regulations to international conventions reduces the opportunities for social movements to use electoral threats to pressure national political leaders. Also, devolving welfare policies to local government diffuses resistance because social movements must make claims in countless local bodies rather than a single national one (Nicholls 2007).

Movements that are local or national in character derive their principal strength from acting at these scales rather than at the global level. For example, transnational corporations such as Nestlé, McDonalds, and Nike have usually been disrupted primarily due to the efficacy of local campaigns (Klein 2000). Where international campaigns are organized, local and national scales of action can be as important as international ones. For example, the Liverpool dock workers international campaign was grassroots-instigated and coordinated (by Liverpool dock workers) and operationalized by dock workers beyond the United Kingdom working within established union frameworks (Castree 2000). However, Kathryn Sikkink (2005) has argued that political opportunities
for transnational social movements differ markedly between national and international scales depending on the political character of countries, international institutions, and the nature of the political issues at stake. Movements often utilize political opportunities at one scale to create opportunities at other scales.

The persecution of multi-scalar strategies is also an interactive and relational process that requires the development and reorganization of social networks across geographical and social boundaries (Nicholls 2007). In their work on the American civil rights movement, Tarrow and McAdam (2005) term this process “scale shift” achieved through “relational diffusion,” that is, the spatial extension of a movement through pre-existing relational ties containing trust and shared identities; and “brokerage,” that is, the spread of social movement mobilization (through various brokers) resulting from linking two or more social movement actors who were previously unconnected.

NETWORKS

When place-based struggles develop, or become part of, geographically flexible networks, they become embedded in different places at a variety of spatial scales. These different geographic scales (local, national, regional, global) are mutually constitutive parts, becoming links of various lengths in the network. Networks of agents act across various distances and through diverse intermediaries (Dicken et al. 2001).

Networks can create cultural and spatial configurations that connect places with each other (Escobar 2001). Moreover, particular places can also be important within the workings of those networks. For example, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, protested in different places across space (e.g., the public meetings of madres in plazas across Argentina) that enabled the sustainability of different movement communities and movement identities. By reinforcing moral commitments and group solidarity, activist identities were maintained both within particular groups and between movements and activists in wider solidarity networks (Bosco 2001).

The identification with particular places can be of strategic importance for the mobilization strategies of movements. Activists may deploy symbolic images of places to match the interests and collective identities of other groups and thereby mobilize others along common cause or grounds. Hence the ties to particular places can be mobile, appealing to, and mobilizing, different groups in different localities (Bosco 2001). However, international alliances have to negotiate between action that is deeply embedded in place, that is, local experiences, social relations, and power conditions, and action that facilitates more transnational coalitions. For example, People’s Global Action Asia, a network of Asian peasant movements, had to negotiate the different power (e.g., caste, class, and gender) relationships within Indian, Nepali, and Bangladeshi movements while attempting to forge an effective alliance against the processes of neoliberal globalization (Routledge 2003).

Geographically, social movement networks can be conceived as “convergence spaces” (Routledge 2003; Routledge & Cumbers 2009) defined by the following characteristics. First, they comprise place-based, but not place-restricted movements. Second, they articulate certain “collective visions” (e.g., unifying values and organizational principles) that generate common ground between participants. Third, they involve a practical relational politics of solidarity, bound up in five forms of interaction and facilitation: communication, information sharing, solidarity actions, network coordination, and resource mobilization. Fourth, they facilitate spatially extensive political action by participant movements. Fifth, they require “networking vectors,” activists that intervene in the work of translation by which networks are formed and developed, conducting ideational work and acting across space to further the process of communication, information sharing, and interaction within and between a network’s participant movements and the
communities in which they operate. Sixth, they are characterized by a range of different operational logics, spanning from more horizontal (decentered, nonhierarchical) to more vertical (hierarchical, centralized) operational logics. Finally, they are sites of contested social and power relations, because the diversity of groups that comprise them articulate a variety of potentially conflicting goals (concerning the forms of social change), ideologies (e.g., concerning gender, class, and ethnicity), and strategies (e.g., institutional (legal) and extra-institutional (illegal) forms of protest).

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Ecological conditions/determinants; Free spaces; Networks and social movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Generational and cohort analysis

Nancy Whittier

The study of generations and cohorts in social movements examines waves of protest that originate from particular age-groups and differences between participants of different ages or movement eras. These studies assume that individuals' experiences are shaped by their historical context, producing distinctive perspectives on society and social movements. Mannheim (1952) first identified the problem of political generations, arguing that, when age groups enter social life in youth, they form distinct perspectives shaped by the social and political events of their era. In Mannheim's view, age groups contain multiple “generation units,” which interpret events in different ways, forming distinct ideological or cultural movements. In the Mannheimian view, these generational perspectives endure over the life-course, and members of different political generations thus have different perspectives. Modifying this approach, some scholars of social movements define political generations not by common age, but by common time of entry into a social movement. In this view, it is the historical and social movement context when individuals begin activism that defines lasting political understandings, which may be shared by non-agemates who enter the social movement at the same time. Studies show that political views formed in youth or initial participation in activism persist over the life-course, but that individuals practice their politics differently as they age, shaping work choices and family relationships (McAdam 1988). Scholars have studied a variety of cohort sizes within social movements, from “micro-cohorts,” which may consist of those who enter a movement within as short as a one-year timeframe, to multi-year or even decade-long cohorts (Whittier 1997).

Generational effects are important in understanding social movement origins, change over time, and decline or demise.

Origins. Social movements can arise out of distinctive generational experiences. For example, the sixties wave of protest in the United States and Western Europe emerged in part as a consequence of the large number of young people whose experiences differed from their predecessors. In the United States, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and early 1960s shaped the political perspectives of young activists who peopled the civil rights, antiwar, feminist, and lesbian/gay movements. The political perspectives these activists formed during their peak movement involvement persisted over time, creating a political generation that has ongoing impact on social and political life. In keeping with Mannheim's notion of generation units, Baby Boomers on the Right also shaped a distinct conservative perspective (Klatch 1988).

Change over time. Cohort differences produce multiple perspectives within long-lasting social movements, contributing to internal conflict and change over time (Whittier 1997). The concept of “waves” of social movements refers not only to varying levels of mobilization, but also to generational differences in goals, frames, collective identities, and strategy. These differences are a product of the changing political and cultural contexts that shape the issues activists see as important and their outlook on the world. When multiple cohorts are active in the same movement, their differences can produce internal conflict over movement priorities, tactics, or even presentation of self. Conversely, cohort differences can be an engine of change, as incoming cohorts bring new priorities and strategies to a longstanding movement. The way that cohort differences are managed depends on both movements' internal characteristics and their political and cultural opportunities.

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Decline. Generational effects can also contribute to movement decline. An issue or strategy that originates in a particular context may lose appeal over time; even as longtime activists remain committed, new entrants are scarce, leading to movement decline. The women’s movement after suffrage exemplifies this.

A number of methodological and theoretical issues remain to be addressed. Longitudinal studies of political generations are relatively scarce, and there are few studies of multiple cohorts within the same movement. Further, the bulk of the scholarship on political generations focuses on the sixties generation. Less is known about how this cohort is distinct and how its characteristics may have shaped scholarship on the topic.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Age and social movements; Biographical consequences of activism; Collective memory and social movements; Spillover, social movement.

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Globalization and movements
ERIC AGRIKOLIANSKY

Has globalization revolutionized contentious politics? Starting in the 1990s, a number of researchers announced that the growing internationalization of economic, cultural, and political exchanges, combined with nations’ growing loss of control over these flows, had led, or would lead in the near future, to profound changes in social movements. The emergence of “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck & Sikkink 1998) and “transnational social movement organizations” (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco 1997) foreshadowed the rise of the “global public sphere” (Guidry, Kennedy, & Zald 2000) and the “transnational civil society” (Florini 2000). These global social movements had seemingly moreover invented a third repertoire of actions (Cohen & Rai 2000), defined by its transnational character and solidarity. In the same way as the growth of market capitalism and liberal ideology, and the rise of the nation-state, had reconfigured national protest movements in the nineteenth century (Tilly 1986), economic globalization and the free-enterprise culture that accompanied it, together with the forecast decline of nation-states, had apparently produced another substantial transformation in contentious politics at a global level.

Ten years later, and with the benefit of hindsight, we can take stock. Were these transformations as violent and coherent as first intuition had suggested? Changes in social movements have certainly taken place: globalization has introduced both constraints and opportunities. However, these changes, which reflect the combination of different mechanisms at both the local and global scale, rather than one single trend, should be analyzed not so much in terms of a revolution as a change of scale.

GLOBALIZATION AS A CONSTRAINT AND AN OPPORTUNITY

The different processes that make up what we call globalization have affected social movements in a variety of ways. This is firstly because globalization has facilitated the global diffusion of common themes of protest and the subjects of dispute. Globalization reflects structural affinities in different countries which reveal themselves by the convergence of both social and cultural cleavages and public policies, and by the institutional environments in which these protests occur (Meyer 2000; Giugni 2002). Confronted by increasingly similar threats and public policies, social movements thus share increasingly similar objectives and stakes. In addition, the development of fast and cheap forms of communication and transport has encouraged new forms of network organization which transcend national boundaries (Bennet 2005) and allow the coordination of international protest movements (countersummits, and simultaneous demonstrations as in the case of the antiwar demonstrations of February 2003).

The capacity to act collectively on the international scene also reflects the transformation of international politics in the 1990s, and in particular what della Porta and Tarrow (2005) call the “complex internationalism” in which state authorities have lost their monopoly over international politics and have had to come to terms with both supra-national powers and nongovernmental organizations. This, which sometimes goes by the loose name of “multilevel governance,” has contributed to what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call the “boomerang effect,” in which activists build up international alliances to put pressure on their own
governments (notably by invoking the norms and values put forward by United Nations agencies or international NGOs). The growing activity of IGOs (international governmental organizations) has also contributed to the development of “coral reefs” (Tarrow 2005: 27) around which protest activities have developed (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco 1997). For example, the global conferences organized by the United Nations have led to increasing cooperation between activists who did not know each other beforehand, the identification of common enemies, and the framing of local demands in transnational terms.

The effects of globalization on social movements thus constitute both a constraint and an opportunity. It is the former because globalization brings about new threats and modifies the environments in which protest movements are in the habit of operating. It is also an opportunity as it opens new possibilities of expression for these social movements. The development of the antiglobalization movement at the end of the 1990s is an excellent example. This movement emerged to fight against the effects of free-market globalization but at the same time profited from the opportunities that this globalization produced. IGOs (such as the IMF or the WTO) have also served as targets, giving structure to protests which first started within large international conferences, and then during countersummits (the meeting of the WTO at Seattle in 1999 was notably one of the defining moments in this sense). The theme of global justice has also allowed a diverse set of protests to be framed in transnational language and brought NGO-centered issues together around criticisms of capitalism, the free market, and the decline in the power of nation-states.

THE HISTORY, RESOURCES, AND STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

The analysis of the effects of globalization cannot however be restricted to the identification of structural opportunities which would lead directly to a radically new and uniform movement of transnational collective action.

Globalization is neither a homogenous movement, nor a unique causal determinant (Yashar 2002; Siméant 2005). What is called internationalization actually refers to a set of heterogeneous tactics and actions, of which the degree of internationalization is itself variable: the international circulation of ideas and tactics, the internalization of international goals in national debates, with the detour via the international arena aiming to influence national governments on its return, and last the transnational coordination of protests relative to international stakes (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). These processes are not as new as they are sometimes made out to be. Both diffusion and internalization can be found throughout the twentieth century. Transnationalization is not exclusively contemporary either, as the example of the international workers’ movements at the end of the nineteenth century shows, and continues to play an important, but sometimes neglected, role in the structuration of anticapitalist movements today. From the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War to the role of Cuban refugees in American postwar foreign policy, the history of contentious politics in the twentieth century is punctuated by moments in which national and international politics coincide. In this way, the effects of globalization cannot be understood as a radical shift from the national to the transnational level, but should rather be considered as a series of “scale shifts” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001) affecting the issues, collective action frames, and subjects of contention. While the end of the twentieth century was certainly a key moment, it did not reflect one sole phenomenon (globalization). These changes of scale are rather the product of multiple processes which echo the continuing importance of the national context and the resources to which protest movements have access.

One of the paradoxes of globalization is exactly that the propensity to transnationalization depends on the internal logic of nation-states. Domestic structures always
mediate global protests. First, because the access of NGOs to the international space depends on the attitude of the individual countries: the support (in particular logistic and financial) provided for participation in international summits constitutes for example a considerable asset for European and North American NGOs. In addition, as the example of the anticapitalist movement in Europe shows (Sommier, Fillieule, & Agrikoliansky 2008), internationalization is not a synonym for uniformity: there is no “one” movement protesting against globalization, but rather a mosaic of protests which still remain very largely structured by national processes, in their goals, tactics, and ideological references. Last, the perception of globalization as threat or opportunity still depends to a great extent on state–society relations (Yashar 2007). Transnationalization strategies in particular reflect different logics of competition which are specific to militant groups within each country. International action is thus often perceived as an opportunity by outsiders who seek to outdistance powerful rivals in a new space. This is, for example, the case of the European unions of workers or peasants (such as the well-known Confédération Paysanne of José Bové) who have only limited influence nationally, but who have found new openings in contesting globalization.

Second, we need to take into consideration the resources which are necessary to profit from the opportunities for transnational action. Transnationalization is not free: on the contrary, it is expensive (in terms of travel, coordination, and so on) and demands scarce resources, not only financial but also in terms of translation and mastery of different languages, inclusion in international networks, and the understanding of international institutions and the stakes which are at play in this context. The use of communication technologies such as the Internet changes rather than reduces the costs of internationalization (in terms of access to the technology, notably), in particular for activists from southern countries. The sociological analysis of anticapitalist militants in Europe (Agrikoliansky & Sommier 2005) has shown that these movements tend to recruit in national elites that are educated and with considerable experience of national politics. There is a certain similarity here to the “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow 2005), who mix strongly rooted nationalism, and the resources which result from it, with a capacity to travel, both physically and cognitively, beyond the limits of their national space.

In summary, the relationship between the different processes associated with globalization and contentious politics is complex. Transnational politics represents a new constraint for protest movements, but at the same time a new opportunity from which some of them will be able to profit. While transnational relations are becoming increasingly important, state–society relations remain the framework which shapes the resources and the perceptions of activists and organizations. Last, the causal relationship is also ambiguous: while we imagine that the economic and political developments linked to globalization influence contentious politics, the reverse relationship is also possible. By setting up international networks, pushing for universal standards, and questioning IGOs, social movements themselves help to shape what we call globalization.

SEE ALSO: Europeanization and social movements; Global Justice Movement; Global Justice Movement in Europe; Labor movement; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Grievances, individual and mobilizing
DAVID A. SNOW

When individuals collectively challenge authorities via social movements, they typically do so over matters about which they are deeply troubled, have considerable concern, and feel passionately. These troublesome matters or conditions, and the feelings associated with them – such as dissatisfaction, fear, indignation, resentment, and moral shock – can be thought of as grievances. They provide the primary motivational impetus for organizing social movement campaigns and for engaging in social movement activities. Although there are various sets of conditions that contribute to the emergence and operation of social movements – such as some degree of perceived political opportunity, organization, and resource acquisition, none of these factors is more important than the generation of mobilizing grievances. After all, it is difficult to imagine most individuals engaging in social movement activity without feeling deeply aggrieved about some condition that is regarded as contrary to the interests, rights, moral principles, or well-being of themselves or others. Consider the adherents of the pro-choice and pro-life movements, and of those advocating for and against same-sex marriages in the United States or immigration and tighter border control throughout much of the developed world. Not only are the adherents of one movement deeply aggrieved by the prospect of the other movement achieving its goals, but their passions about their movement are often palpable and thus worn, metaphorically, on their sleeves. Certainly other motivational factors – such as curiosity, the desire for approval, and peer pressure – may come into play when considering why people align themselves with a particular movement, but these usually are secondary and largely irrelevant in the absence of deeply felt grievances.

In thinking about the importance of grievances to movement emergence, it is analytically useful to distinguish between individual and mobilizing grievances because the latter are associated with the emergence and operation of social movements. So what is the difference? Individual grievances are experienced individually rather than collectively. They typically encompass the kinds of discontents and aggravations experienced on a regular basis by most people, such as dissatisfaction with a raise, office procedures, or one’s boss, or having to wait too long for a scheduled physician’s appointment or in lines at the bank, the grocery store, the gas station, or on the freeway. These kinds of aggravations are commonplace, and perhaps even ubiquitous, in the modern world. But for most people they are typically regarded as unpleasant aspects of everyday life about which little can be done, or for which the payoffs of doing something are generally thought to be minuscule. Additionally, they rarely congeal into collectively shared grievances that spur collective intervention. Mobilizing grievances, on the other hand, are grievances that are shared among some number of actors, be they individuals or organizations, and that are felt to be sufficiently serious to warrant not only collective complaint but also some kind of corrective, collective action. Thus, it is mobilizing grievances, rather than individual grievances, that provide the primary motivational impetus for organizing social movement campaigns and for engaging in social movement activities. But unlike individual grievances, mobilizing grievances are not everyday phenomena that materialize on a regular basis. Put metaphorically, mobilizing grievances are more like mushrooms after a spring rainfall than weeds; they don’t flourish
continuously and everywhere, but only under specifiable conditions (Snow & Soule 2010).

So what are those conditions and/or processes that account for the generation of mobilizing grievances? A review of the relevant theorizing and empirical research suggests the following interlocking observations: (1) Structural or material conditions – such as social arrangements that stratify aggregations of individuals unequally, immiserating life circumstances, or quotidian disruptions – may be necessary for the generation of mobilizing grievances, but they alone are not sufficient conditions. In other words, such conditions fertilize the ground for mobilizing grievances, but they do not generate them (Snow et al. 1998; Snow & Soule 2010). (2) Certain social psychological processes – particularly comparison processes, assessments of procedural justice, and weighing the prospect of loss – contribute importantly to the generation of mobilizing grievances because they constitute the intervening mechanisms that may ignite the fertilized conditions (Klandermans, Roefs, & Oliver 2001). (3) The formation of mobilizing grievances, including the character of the intervening psychological processes, is highly contingent on the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations. The key, in other words, is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the process of grievance interpretation, which has been theorized and analyzed empirically in terms of framing processes (Snow et al. 1986; Snow & Soule 2010).

Taken together, these observations suggest that the generation of mobilizing grievances can be best understood as a function of the confluence and interaction of structural or material conditions, social psychological factors, and interpretive or framing processes, rather than in terms of a single perspective or line of argument.

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Injustice frames; Moral shocks/outrage; Participation in social movements; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Quotidian disruption; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


High and low risk/cost activism
DOUG MCADAM

Lost in the generic concept “social movement” is the extraordinary diversity of types of movements (e.g., revolution, terrorism, religious revivals, peasant insurrections, cults, etc.). Similarly movement activism comes in a dizzying variety of forms. While the term “movement activist” tends to conjure up images of marchers in the street or maybe even suicide bombers, the concept applies equally well to someone who signs an online petition in support of a movement initiative or makes a $10 donation to the Sierra Club.

How are we to think about this variation? McAdam (1986) used two broad distinctions – high and low risk and cost – to begin to map this variation. For the author, cost referred to “the expenditures of time, money and energy that are required of a person engaged in any particular form of activism,” while risk had to do with “the anticipated dangers – whether legal, social, physical, financial . . . of engaging in a particular type of activity” (67). Combining the two dimensions yields the following four-fold typology of distinct categories of activism: low risk, low cost; low risk, high cost; high risk, low cost; and high risk, high cost. So signing an online petition is virtually costless and generally risk free. At the other extreme – high cost, high risk – is participation in a hunger strike. Then there are the two “mixed” cases. Participating in a one-hour vigil on the same day each week for several years is low risk, but quite costly in terms of time expended. And during the Vietnam War era in the United States turning in one’s draft card entailed serious legal risks, but little or no cost.

So what? Is this simple typology of types of activism only useful as a descriptive heuristic? McAdam thought otherwise, arguing that it made no sense to assume that the dynamics of movement recruitment were the same for all forms of activism. As he asked rhetorically, “would anyone really want to argue that the same mix of factors that explain riot participation accounts for the signing of a nuclear freeze petition?” (67). Analytically then McAdam uses these distinctions to formulate separate theories of recruitment to high and low risk/cost activism. He argues that low risk/cost activism requires little more than “receptive political attitudes” and facilitative contact with someone in the movement. High risk/cost activism, on the other hand, is generally reserved for those who are both “biographically available” and whose initial forays into low risk/cost activism help to set in motion a cyclical process by which increasing integration into the activist community leads to both a greater identification with the aims and collective identity of the movement and ever riskier and/or costlier forms of activism. In short, one is rarely if ever recruited directly into high risk/cost activism; it is instead the byproduct of a gradual process of integration and resocialization through which the individual becomes an activist in the same way he or she learns and internalizes any new role.

Consistent with this account, McAdam found that relative to the “no shows,” those who took part in the decidedly high risk/cost 1964 Freedom Summer project, had (a) much higher levels of prior civil rights activity, (b) were affiliated with more social movement organizations, and (c) had stronger and more extensive ties to others involved in the project. All of these differences suggest that, in the aggregate, the volunteers were already well integrated into the movement community and indeed, already thought of themselves as civil rights activists.

Unfortunately, few subsequent studies have built on the initial conceptual and empirical work done on the topic by McAdam. Three which did are Wiltfang and McAdam (1991),
Nepstad and Smith (1999), and Tindall (2002). Using survey data on 141 participants in the Tucson-based Sanctuary movement, Wiltfang and McAdam sought to extend work on the topic in two ways. First, they tried to empirically differentiate the behavioral correlates of cost and risk. Second, they, in turn, sought to relate these behavioral differences to various theories of individual activism. Their central finding was that “biographical availability” (e.g., being relatively free of other major life responsibilities) predicted high-cost sanctuary activism (operationalized as devoting a large number of hours to the movement) while deep value commitments and longstanding integration into the movement predicted high-risk activism (defined as having direct responsibility for transporting and safeguarding Central American refugees).

In an important 1999 article, Nepstad and Smith reported the results of their research on participation in a high risk/cost campaign mobilized by Nicaragua Exchange in the 1980s as part of the broader US–Central America peace movement. Consistent with earlier work, the authors once again found that strong prior ties to others in the movement predicted participation in the campaign. Participation, on the other hand, did not seem to bear the imprint of “biographical ability.” That is, a good many of those involved in the campaign were “burdened” by the kind of life-course constraints thought to discourage participation in high risk/cost activism (i.e., full-time employment, parental responsibilities). Based on their findings, the authors concluded that “constraint management skills’ may be more important than biographical availability in high risk/cost campaigns” (1999: 39).

Finally, concerned that all previous work on the topic had focused on high risk/cost activism, Tindall focused his 2002 study of participation on low–medium risk/cost activism among participants in British Columbia’s “wilderness preservation movement.” His central contribution was to show that while all prior studies had consistently stressed a link between high risk/cost activism and strong ties to other activists, low–medium risk/cost activism appeared to depend more on weak ties to other activists and, in general, did not require anything like the intensive integration into a movement community that we normally see with high risk/cost activists.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Biographical availability; Freedom Summer (United States); Networks and social movements; Participation in social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Recruitment; Social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Historical research and social movements
MATHIEU DEFLEM and APRIL LEE DOVE

The use of historical research methods in modern sociology has been largely conditioned by the relative popularity of the specialty area of (comparative-)historical sociology, despite the relative autonomy of methodological orientation and substantive research themes. Any discussion of historical research, whether in the specialty area of social movements’ research or in sociology more generally, must therefore proceed from the place of history in sociology and embark on an always difficult quest, for intellectual and institutional reasons alike, to delineate the boundaries between the scholarly tradition of history, on the one hand, and sociology, on the other (Burke 1980; Tilly 1981).

HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY

The science of sociology has historically emanated from the European traditions of social philosophy that, during the classical period built on the ideals of the Enlightenment, relied upon history to move away from speculative thought toward substantiate normative prescriptions on the basis of historical accounts of the evolution of social life. Until the late nineteenth century, these historically based social philosophies were typically framed in terms of an evolutionary framework denoting increasing complexity, linked up to the growth of industry, individualism, and related manifestations of modernization. Evolutionism in social philosophy found its sharpest expression in the historical materialism of Karl Marx.

In classical sociology, evolutionary models stretched the spectrum of thought from Ferdinand Tönnies to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Tönnies (1940) suggested a societal development from small-scale agricultural communities (Gemeinschaft) to the complex industrial societies of his days (Gesellschaft). Durkheim (1984) transformed the Marxian sketch of an increasing division of labor from a narrow economic focus to a more encompassing social development that was primarily shaped by cultural changes concerning the relation between individual and society. And Weber (1978) characterized the modern age in terms of an increasing reliance on purposive-rational models of thought that were preoccupied with considerations of efficiency.

Despite the centrality of history in classical sociology, modern sociology was initially not receptive to the use of historical research. Among the reasons, sociology was understood to be a science of the present, while history was the study of the past. Sociologists themselves, more importantly, understood some of the European building blocks of sociology as implying a static view. The work of Durkheim was misunderstood on the basis of its orientation toward functional analysis (Tilly 1981), rather than its more comprehensive attention toward function as well as cause (Durkheim 1982).

Whereas the classics argued implicitly or explicitly that all sociology is by necessity of a (comparative-)historical nature, it was not until the growing popularity of Marxist sociology, especially by the generation of sociologists that came of age during the 1960s, that a (re)turn toward historical sociology became possible (Adams, Clemens, & Orloff 2005). Rejecting the evolutionism of old, this second wave of historical sociology focused on the contradictions of the modern political economy and the centrality of the state. Ironically, this development overlooked the historical fact that virtually all of the important classic scholars worked in an essential (comparative-)historical framework. Yet, whatever its roots, the development of historical research in sociology has
Since been subject to developments not uncharacteristic of other movements.

HISTORICAL METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY

From a methodological viewpoint, the rigid separation of history as idiographic (particularizing) and sociology as nomothetic (generalizing) disciplines has serious consequences that can be, and have been, overcome by premising that all topics of inquiry, whether historical or sociological, can only be presented within analytically relevant models that posit those topics as relatively unique or, conversely, representative of broader patterns. The very conception of history as the descriptive analysis of concrete events is antithetical to sociology as a theoretically driven social science. The most central insight remains that historical sociology is not a mere study of the past but an intrinsic part of a sociology of the present: in order to explain the structures of contemporary societies, one must investigate their historical origins and development.

Arguably as a result of the march of survey research and the advance of techniques of statistical data analysis, the antimodernization and antiquantification tendencies of modern (and contemporary) historical sociology have been methodologically attacked because of their reliance on the study of a limited number of cases (small-N research) and the logical limitations associated with comparisons of variables associated with real-life events. Nevertheless, the methodology of historical sociology can be systematized in terms of both its strategies and data collection techniques.

Various strategies can be used in historical research to link theory and research questions with an appropriate methodology (Skocpol & Somers 1980). In the parallel investigation of a particular sociological theory, propositions can be examined in various historical contexts in order to demonstrate or falsify that various cases are to be conceived as different modalities of a more general process. By interpreting contrasting events, alternatively, it is endeavored to analyze specific historical events in terms of their unique composition and meaning, such as is associated with the sociological perspective in the Weberian tradition of Verstehen (understanding). By analyzing causalities at the macro level, the Millean method of difference and of agreement can be relied upon, not as an explanatory model, but to systematically present cases subject to further exploration.

The methods of data collection and investigation in historical research involve the empirical examination of the traces the past has left behind in the present, including material artifacts, written and/or otherwise recorded sources (both primary and secondary), and oral history. In a most ideal and systematic case, the procedure of historical inquiry involves at least four stages. First, relevant sources have to be identified, found, and selected. Special problems are thereby posed in terms of availability, when materials are lost, and access, when available sources cannot be accessed because of physical or social obstacles (e.g., classified government documents). Second, on the basis of formal and substantive criteria related to research needs, sources are registered and classified in preparation of further analysis. Third, the collected sources are subjected to critique and confrontation to determine their authenticity and accuracy in portraying social events. Fourth, as indicated by the variety of strategies that exists in historical sociology, analysis can proceed in multiple directions, involving qualitative or quantitative methods, interpretive or explanatory perspectives, in a structured or unstructured framework with deductive (theory-testing) or inductive (theory-construction) objectives.

HISTORICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The very term “movement” presumes the relevance of history, involving change and/or continuity. It would therefore alone seem indispensable for sociologists of social movements to engage in historical research. Yet, as one manifestation of the relative specialization of
historical sociology, the modern sociology of social movements is also subject to the trends that have shaped the discipline in general, leading to much research on what movements are and do, rather than where they come from and what they have done. Nonetheless, it is also true that historical research has been put to good use in the study of social movements (Marx & McAdam 1994; Clemens & Hughes 2002).

A useful distinction can be made between the internal and the external history of social movements. An examination of the internal history of a social movement concerns the development over time of the movement itself. At least two components are thereby important to consider. First, with respect to movement institutionalization and planning, social movements can be distinguished from more informal manifestations of collective behavior by a variety of formal characters such as the formulation of membership criteria and the routinization of activities. With respect to movement emergence, a focus on internal history includes questions concerning members, activities, and outcomes. Second, as distinct from more ephemeral episodes of collective behavior, social movements are also more structured to enable a more prolonged, ideally permanent existence as an established and recognized entity. Relevant questions pertain to movement maturation, transformation, and possible dissolution. Attention can go to both relatively short intervals of time (e.g., weekend versus working days) and longer periods of historical time (e.g., before, during, and after a period of war).

The external history of social movements refers to the surrounding societal conditions in which they formed and transformed. In this respect, minimal attention should go to the economic, political, cultural, and normative contexts in which social movements emerged and have evolved. It can be safely assumed that those contexts are important in accounting for questions of movement formation and transformation, although it should also be addressed if and how movements in turn have affected their surrounding environments. It is also important to recognize that aspects of a movement’s internal and external history may be mutually influential.

The data sources to be investigated to answer relevant questions of movement history can be derived from organizations as well as individuals. Organizations can provide useful data because social movements exhibit at least some degree of institutionalization and invoke responses from other organizations, such as countermovements, media, and government agencies. Individual-level data can come from members of a movement and its various proponents and opponents.

SUMMARY

The main limitation of historical research, most obviously, is that the past can be revealed only inasmuch as, and in the manner in which, it is still present today, thus posing important problems of validity. Sociologists interested primarily in the testing of their theories, rather than in the analysis of important social events, will therefore favor other methodologies whereby data can be generated. Alternatively, the unobtrusive nature of historical research may be seen as the main advantage of the methodology, as the research enterprise itself cannot affect its subject matter.

However, apart from questions of methodological rigor, the relevance of historical research to our knowledge of social events is easily demonstrated. Suppose that at a given moment in time a particular social community exhibits a particular level of commitment from its members in the cause advocated by a social movement. What can be known about such a commitment without knowledge of its development over time is severely limited, as its level may have decreased sharply or, on the contrary, increased dramatically from before, with all kinds of variations in between. Only historical research can unravel such sociological questions that ponder on the conditions of society as emanating from a historical process of change and continuity.
SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Comparative research; Life history research and social movements; QCA and fuzzy set applications to social movement research; Social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Identity fields
ROBERT D. BENFORD

The term identity fields merges two influential social movement concepts: movement framing processes and collective identities. A fundamental and ubiquitous aspect of social movement framing processes involves the avowal and imputation of characteristics relevant to at least three generic sets of actors within the *multiorganizational field* that comprises a particular social movement arena: protagonists, antagonists, and audiences. Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) refer to the clustering of these socially constructed movement actor categories as *identity fields*. Identity fields are constructed throughout the life-course of a social movement as its participants identify a problem and attribute blame or causality (Snow & Benford 1988), as they seek to mobilize support for their cause by employing various frame alignment strategies (Snow et al. 1986), as they respond to criticisms and other attacks from countermovements, the media, and targets of change (Benford & Hunt 2003), and as they talk with one another to reflect on and redefine movement successes and failures (Hunt & Benford 1994).

**Protagonist identity fields** are constellations of identity attributions about individuals and groups constructed as those capable of overcoming injustice or solving the problem the movement has identified. They include collective identity claims about the movement and its allies and typically involve identity attributions such as “heroes” and “heroines,” “innocent victims,” “aggrieved populations,” and “future generations.” Protagonists include not only the ardent activists and charismatic leaders; they also include the rank-and-file followers and ordinary peasants.

**Antagonist identity fields** are constellations of identity attributions about individuals and groups constructed to be the movement’s opponents or “enemies.” Antagonists are either blamed for causing the problem(s) the movement seeks to overcome or for standing in the way of the changes the movement seeks. Movement protagonists often vilify their opponents, referring to them by caustic labels such as “baby killers,” “fascists,” “warmongers,” “capitalist pigs,” “gun grabbers,” and the like (Benford & Hunt 1992). Such attacks on the collective character of an opponent serve to demarcate boundaries between “us” and “them,” good and evil, and right and wrong, as well as seeking to discredit a movement’s opponents. Social movement actors employ various framing processes in making identity claims about antagonists, most notably by representing antagonist identities as conflicting with protagonists’ identities, values, and character traits.

**Audience identity fields** are constellations of identity attributions about individuals and groups assumed to be neutral or uncommitted observers who are in a position to react to, report, and even eventually support the movement’s activities. Audiences include allied and potential allied SMOs, the media, powerful elites, marginal supporters, sympathizers, and bystander publics. Audiences are assumed to be capable of and interested in receiving and assessing protagonist messages in a favorable light and thus being persuaded to support, perhaps even contribute significant resources to the movement. A great deal of social movement framing activities are directed at such audiences. This makes the protagonists’ framing of their own identities and those of their opponents all the more critical. By the same token, movement protagonists take care in how they frame the targeted audience’s identity, frequently casting them in the role of those who are fair, just, and humane and whose values, beliefs, and interests are aligned with those of the protagonists (Snow et al. 1986).

Scholars employing the identity fields concept have tended to focus attention on the
boundary marking activities of protagonists and antagonists. While this is conceived as a somewhat dynamic process, it might be more fluid than was originally assumed. Recent research suggests that protagonists and antagonists constantly adjust their framings in response to their opponents’ counterframings (Benford & Hunt 2003), which in turn yields reconstructions in the movement’s and their opponents’ collective identities (Chowdhury 2006). Further research on the relationships between and among various social movement framing and identity construction processes should be fruitful.

SEE ALSO: Bystander publics; Collective identity; Contentious politics; Discursive fields; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Multiorganizational fields.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Identity politics
MARY BERNSTEIN and VERTA TAYLOR

The term “identity politics” refers to activism engaged in by status-based social movements organized around such categories as gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality, in contrast to class-based movements. The term also applies to any mobilization related to politics, culture, and identity. It is sometimes used in a derogatory manner to criticize movements as exclusionary and focused on individual rather than societal change. Debates about the validity of identity politics reveal competing theoretical ways to understand the relationships among experience, culture, identity, politics, and power.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON
IDENTITY POLITICS

There is substantial disagreement in the scholarly literature about the nature of identity politics. Neo-Marxist approaches view class inequality as the only real source of oppression and activists working to challenge the class structure as the major agents of social change. As a result, activists engaged in claim making in other arenas are viewed as doing cultural or psychological, not political, work. Because such accounts do not see class as an identity with cultural and psychological components, or identities based on social status as having economic implications, identity politics is set apart from real political activism. Any focus on self-transformation, from a neo-Marxist perspective, is self-indulgent and nonpolitical. Furthermore, critics of identity politics view a focus on cultural difference as both essentialist and divisive, undermining the possibility of a broad-based social justice movement.

Neo-Marxist analyses of identity politics have been challenged on a number of grounds. Rather than identity-based movements destroying the New Left, some scholars argue, the Left’s inability to address gender, race, and sexual inequality led to its demise and the rise of identity-based movements. Others point out that the separation of culture from class and the political economy ignores the ways that cultural dimensions and meanings are linked to concrete structural and material locations.

European new social movement theorists, in contrast to neo-Marxist theory, attend to the range of nonclass movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, although they also differentiate identity-based from class-based movements. New social movement theory views movements organized around values and ideology as different from traditional labor and socialist movements of the past, a response to modernity and the rise of a post-industrial society. Most importantly, new social movement theory pioneered in seeking to understand the role of identity in social movements, provoking resource mobilization and political process theorists to pay attention to identity and culture. According to Melucci (1996), new social movements challenge dominant cultural codes and raise the question of how societies deal with difference. As a result, identity politics is not viewed as merely cultural, symbolic, or psychological. Critics of new social movement theory question the claim that postindustrial society gave rise to the new movements, pointing to the similarities in the origins and dynamics of status-based movements and older labor and socialist movements.

Social constructionist, postmodernist, and poststructuralist approaches to identity politics are based on an entirely different view of power than neo-Marxist or new social movement approaches. The status categories around which identity politics is organized are, in this view, a form of regulation, so movements based on identity contribute to the hardening
Identity politics is often seen as essentialist, narrow, and state-centered, in contrast to the neo-Marxist view, which sees them as too political and not cultural enough because they lack a broad view of the cultural basis of power. This perspective emerged out of both queer theory and queer politics, particularly the emergence of Queer Nation, which eschewed identity politics as privileging white middle-class gay men. Queer became an anti-identity. From this perspective, what looks like purely expressive action from neo-Marxist and new social movement approaches is understood as a fundamental challenge to power. Social constructionist, postmodernist, and poststructuralist perspectives criticize the essentializing of identity and point to the failure of identity politics to challenge the social construction of status categories, to attend to the intersection of identities, and to come to grips with diversity within groups. These criticisms have evoked the response that claims of essentialism may be strategic, that eliminating social categories as a political strategy is extremely difficult, and that identity politics has not been shown to be responsible for the negative outcomes, such as fragmentation of movements, to which it is linked.

INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES

The challenges to neo-Marxist, new social movement, and postmodern approaches to identity politics make clear that identity plays a role in all movements. Bernstein (1997) argues that the concept of identity in social movements has at least three distinct analytical levels. First, a collective identity is necessary for the mobilization of any social movement, including the classic labor and socialist movements. Second, expressions of identity can be deployed at the collective level as a political strategy, which can be aimed at what are traditionally thought of as cultural and/or political goals. Third, identity can be a goal of social movement activism, either gaining acceptance for a stigmatized identity or deconstructing categories of identities.

Taylor and Whittier (1992) argue that all social movements develop and maintain a collective identity characterized by boundaries between group members and nonmembers, a shared consciousness that defines and analyzes interests, and negotiation of symbols and actions as strategies of personalized resistance. Movements organized on the basis of a lesbian/gay identity, a concern for the environment, or a class identity all share a similar process for constructing and maintaining identities.

In some movements, identities are invoked or felt as if they were essentialist. The mobilization of essentialized identities is related to the political context and the devaluation of certain identities by the dominant discourse. In addition, some identities are both internally defined and externally imposed, as in the case of lesbian and gay identities. The feminist literature on standpoint theory conceptualizes identity politics as a way to produce knowledge that derives from the material conditions, lived experience, and social location of participants. Naples (2003) argues that people do not translate personal experience into political action in an unreflective, essentialist manner, but instead arrive at political analyses through collective interpretation. In this view, self-definition and the creation of knowledge through the development of a standpoint is a form of political activism and does not rely on false universal understandings of categories such as race, gender, sexuality, or class. Thus organizing around an identity represented as essential can be strategic.

Social movements also engage in identity politics with the goal of altering the self-conceptions of participants and challenging negative representations of the group. Identity politics can be a form of emotion work, translating isolation, fear, and shame into anger, solidarity, pride, and action (Taylor & Leitz 2010). The concept of identity deployment (Bernstein 1997) captures the strategic processes that explain how activists deploy their identities for political change. Activists alternately emphasize similarities to or differences
from the norm because of the interactions among social movement organizations, state actors, and opposing movements. Identities can be deployed strategically as a form of collective action to change institutions, to transform mainstream culture, to change participants, or to educate lawmakers or the public.

When the identity around which a movement is organized is also the basis for grievances movements face a strategic dilemma. Movements that seek to erase boundaries must first recognize them, which ultimately results in confirming them. Movements that deconstruct social categories run the risk of undermining their own existence. Gamson (1995) calls this the "queer dilemma." However Bernstein and De La Cruz (2009) find that the multiracial Hapa movement deconstructs traditional understandings of (mono)racial identities while simultaneously claiming recognition for a new multiracial identity, thus overcoming the queer dilemma.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONALIZED POWER

Identity politics does not necessarily represent a retreat into culture that does not engage with institutionalized structures of power. Cultural expressions and events can support conventional political activities and constitute strategic collective action. Demands for recognition are intertwined with material concerns and can alter social relations that are institutionally based. Social movement scholarship increasingly contests the separation of the political economy from the realms of culture and identity, challenging the separation of movements into expressive, cultural, and identity-based, on the one hand, and political, instrumental, and strategic, on the other (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008).

CONCLUSION

Identity politics is not a theory of social movements in the same sense as resource mobilization or political process theories because it does not attempt to explain the emergence and development of social movements. Because of the divergent notions of power derived from competing theoretical traditions in the field of social movements, analyses of identity politics often carry normative political evaluations about what constitutes worthwhile collective action for social change.

Scholarship on identity politics has led to the collective identity approach to social movements that examines the role of identity in all movements in terms of mobilization, strategies, and goals. Movements can strategically deploy identities that are both internally embraced and externally imposed. Such identities can be translated into political action, yet movements face strategic dilemmas when the identity on which they are based is also the basis for oppression. When movements appear to rest on essentialist identities, essentialism may be strategic, influenced by social, political, and cultural factors. Finally, identities can be deployed to challenge institutionalized relations of power, challenging the division between what is cultural and what is political. By taking seriously how conceptions of power inform collective action, social movement scholars can show how activist concerns with representation and recognition are related to both institutional structures and the political economy.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Identity fields; Identity work processes; New social movements and new social movement theory; Politicized identity.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Identity work processes
RACHEL L. EINWOHNER

The study of identity and social movements has been heavily influenced by the symbolic interactionist perspective, which stresses the active construction of meaning in human interaction. Thus, scholars recognize that the identities that are relevant to social movements are not simply pre-existing sets of characteristics that individuals bring with them to the mass march or meeting hall; instead, these identities are actively created, debated, and sometimes even unmade and established anew in the course of collective action. Of course, all of this activity takes work. The concept of identity work in social movements therefore refers to all the work involved in creating, displaying, and managing the identities that are relevant to collective action. The term is borrowed from Snow and Anderson’s (1987) discussion of identity work among the homeless, which demonstrates the ways in which homeless people construct and maintain positive personal identities that are distinct from the negative labels assigned to them by the public. It is also related to Hochschild’s (1979, 1983) concept of “emotion work,” which references the management of emotion in accordance with social norms about the situationally appropriate display of feelings.

Identity work is directed both internally and externally. Internally, activists must construct and maintain a coherent collective identity that helps sustain individuals’ participation in the movement; externally, the task is to present the movement to opponents and third parties in a particular light in order to gain support and achieve goals. Perhaps the most developed, and therefore best understood, identity work processes are internal in nature and focus on collective identity construction and identity convergence. The former term refers to the dynamics involved in the creation of a shared sense of “we,” such as boundaries, consciousness, and negotiation (Taylor & Whittier 1992), while the latter describes the process by which individual identities become congruent with a movement’s collective identity (Snow & McAdam 2000).

A more recent focus addresses the challenges associated with identity work. Many of these challenges result from diversity within movements (Reger, Myers, & Einwohner 2008). There can be different ways to present a group strategically (Bernstein 1997), which can lead to disagreements about who “we” are. In such situations, some activists may feel only a partial convergence between their individual identity and the movement’s collective identity, and may therefore need to engage in identity justification work in order to maintain their participation (Robnett 2005). Further, the construction and maintenance of a group’s identity can be complicated by differences among activists, such as those based on race, class, or generation (Whittier 1995; Reger 2002). Other challenges stem from the broader context in which identity work takes place, which shapes both the types of identity work in which activists engage and the difficulties involved. For instance, in repressive contexts the dangers associated with activism may force activists to pass, thereby hiding rather than celebrating a valued identity (Einwohner 2006). Despite the difficulties involved, however, identity work is thought to be important, and possibly necessary, for sustained activism: if not done successfully, movements can splinter or die out entirely (Glass 2009).

As well explored as this topic is, there are still areas that deserve further inquiry. One topic that is potentially rich for continued theoretical development is transnational activism. As Hertel (2006) and others have shown, activists working across borders to solve a problem in a particular country or region can face difficulties stemming from differences in the way issues are
framed and groups are understood, differences that can be exacerbated by global inequalities and assumptions of privilege. Global identity work, then, may face distinct challenges, and may therefore follow different processes than those that have been identified by the extant literature, perhaps because of the relative lack of face-to-face interaction among all activists. Relatedly, another area that is ripe for future work is the role of technology in identity work, such as the use of social networking sites in bridging divides across different groups and potentially minimizing the costs of identity work. Thus, further work on a variety of cases, in different settings and at all points along the political spectrum, should prove to be useful.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Identity fields; Identity politics; Participation in social movements; Solidarity and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Ideology
COLIN J. BECK

Ideology is an important aspect of social and political movements. The most basic and commonly held view of ideology is that it is a system of multiple beliefs, ideas, values, principles, ethic, morals, goals, and so on, that overlap, shape, and reinforce one another. In Swidler’s (1986: 279) influential terms, ideology is “a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action.”

Ideology is often an implicit and assumed feature of movements. Without an ideology that articulates and identifies a mobilization’s beliefs and goals, it would be difficult to speak of this as a movement at all. Rather, collective action without ideology would appear disorganized and temporary. In contrast, movements are generally held to be relatively organized and relatively sustained over a period of time. Ideology can be one such feature of organization and a marker of sustained collective action.

There is little consensus of how ideology can be best conceptualized or empirically researched. This may be due to the implicit, but understudied, assumption of ideology as a feature of movements or perhaps the legacy, particularly in Marxist thought, of the pejorative use of the term (see Oliver & Johnston 2000). Yet, since the broad “cultural turn” of the latter twentieth century, particularly through the framing and new social movements approaches, ideology has re-entered the study of collective action. This has yielded common recognition of ideology’s import for understanding movements, numerous conceptualizations, and prominent debates (e.g., Sewell 1985 and Skocpol 1985; Oliver & Johnston 2000 and Snow & Benford 2000; Zald 2000, Diani 2000, and Klandermans 2000). Four primary perspectives on ideology are outlined below: cognition and social psychology; emergence and interaction; action and strategy; and social order and structure.

IDEOLOGY AS COGNITION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

One of the most prominent approaches to ideology has been to stress it as a cognitive or social psychological process. Since ideology is held to provide a systematization and articulation of underlying beliefs, it can be said that ideology is one method that actors use to make sense of the social world. Thus, ideology differs from culture in that it is a “tool kit” (Swidler 1986) of hermeneutic, interpretative, and sense-making strategies. Rather than being mere ideas, ideology is distinguished by its active use and its import for shaping and creating certain types of action. This process is theorized to occur most crucially when pre-existing cognitive strategies and normative routines are stressed by new realities. From this view, ideology may have its most important role during unsettled times, akin to theories of social strain that featured so prominently in collective behavior approaches to movements.

Beyond the level of individual cognition, ideology also exists in social psychological approaches to movements. Ideology is not just a rational sense-making strategy for an individual. Rather, ideology is distinguished by its social feature – its systematization is usually shared by multiple actors and is thus a feature of groups more so than individuals. In fact, commonly held systems of beliefs and values, that is, ideologies, provide meaning and identity for movement participants as stressed by new social movement theorists. Many identity statements are actually statements of ideological affiliation, for example, Marxists who follow Marxism, environmentalists who subscribe to environmentalism, feminists who identify with feminism, and so on. Thus, ideology can be seen as more than
just a cognitive tool that suggests actions or beliefs for an individual; it is also a shared social psychological process that can create group affiliations and help stitch together a movement of like-minded actors. In short, ideology plays a role in both individual and group understandings, actions, and formation.

IDEOLOGY AS EMERGENCE AND INTERACTION

If ideology is the cognitive and social psychological scaffold on which shared beliefs, actions, and identities are built, then another approach is to consider how this scaffold is constructed. Rather than being inherited in a complete and stable form by actors, ideology is used and, in being used, created and recreated. In other words, ideology can be emergent during periods of mobilization and shaped by the interactions of movements’ leaderships and participants, and even movement exogenous actors. Thus, the assumption of a coherent and stable nature of ideology can be problematized (Snow 2004).

In early stages of mobilization, movements are often riven by ideological debates as movement goals and strategies are crafted. In later stages of a movement’s life, ideological debates are again often prominent as successes and failures challenge prior settlements of tactics and objectives. Thus, one strategy has been to analyze how ideologies emerge and the role of leaderships and intellectuals in crafting ideologies. For example, Wuthnow (1985) examines the role of “discursive communities” in shaping sixteenth-century Protestant theology, eighteenth-century Enlightenment principles, and nineteenth-century socialism, all of which became important ideological bases for social and political movements.

Ideology is also often held to be created by the interactions of movement actors, publics, countermovements, and authorities. A primary emphasis in this perspective is on the discursive side of ideology, seeing it as heavily shaped, and even created by, ongoing and iterative ideological appeals and repartees. Emphasis on the emergent and interactional side of ideology is most prominent in studies of revolutionary movements (e.g., Goldstone 1991; Moaddel 1992), perhaps because revolutions seem to be times of confusion where prior actions and beliefs are challenged and new ways of doing and understandings are formed (Sewell 1985; Kurzman 2004).

IDEOLOGY AS ACTION AND STRATEGY

As ideology has interactional dynamics and can be a form of activated culture, a third perspective has emphasized how ideologies inform collective action’s tactics and goals, link supporters to movements, and are strategically employed in mobilization. The primary example of this approach is found in the framing literature on movements (see Benford & Snow 2000). Framing focuses on the construction of meaning by actors and how through the rhetorical use of particular meanings, “frames,” movements mobilize and transform society. From the perspective of ideology, frames are crucial to the extent that they resonate with actors (as suggested by a social psychological approach) and articulate, amplify, and transform existing beliefs and values (as suggested by an interactional approach) in a strategic manner that furthers a movement’s goals. An important part of this process is the existence of “master frames” that are broad enough value and belief systems that multiple meanings and instantiations can thrive under their aegis. For example, discourse and belief in civil rights has extended beyond a race-based notion to encompass the rights of numerous other marginalized groups. Ideology thus may suggest particular frames, but a unidirectional link should not be assumed (Snow 2004).

The framing perspective on movements has been criticized for only describing intentional and strategic use of ideology, rather than being a distinct process (Oliver & Johnston 2000; Westby 2002). Framing may also be dynamic as well as strategic, transformed through discursual (see Steinberg 1998). In particular, master
frames may be considered as systems of beliefs and values, that is to say ideology, present outside of a movement’s use of them. Thus, another ideology as action perspective has been to emphasize how ideological forces enable and constrain all collective action, even outside of the strategic and constructivist process of framing. Zald (2000), in particular, proposes that consideration of “ideologically structured action” is a broad and fruitful area for research on movements. In this view, the historic and stable nature of ideology is stressed. Rather than being primarily emergent and interactional, belief systems are held to be more permanent properties of society.

IDEOLOGY AS SOCIAL ORDER AND STRUCTURE

If ideology is a more stable and permanent feature of society, then it logically follows that social structures and institutions can have ideological features. Thus, a fourth perspective is to examine how ideology is institutionalized within society and how these legitimate belief systems shape collective action of any sort. This, in fact, is the classic approach to ideology in Marxist thought, for example, the hegemony of Gramsci (1971) or the ideological state apparatuses of Althusser (1971). The Marxist view stresses how ideology is a tool of social control whereby widely shared beliefs and values are created and/or maintained by elites to legitimate their authority and undercut opposition.

It is possible, however, to recognize the institutionalization of belief systems in society without necessarily seeing all ideology as a facet of state cooptation and repression: “ideology needs to be recognized as a constitutive feature of social order itself” (Wuthnow 1985: 815; see also Rudé 1980). Social structures are embedded in cultural and ideological constructions that make sense of them and articulate their role in society. One view in the structure–agency debate holds that social structures are dual, comprised of both resources that can be used and rules that govern the action of using them. Thus, all institutions and orders have an element of ideology in the schemas that are used to interpret resources (Sewell 1992). In short, “Ideology, then, should be conceived in structural terms” (Sewell 1985: 60).

In the context of movements, a focus is on how the ideological properties of existing structures and institutions inform collective action. These beliefs, principles, values, and so on, may inform the repertoires of movements – particular forms of action and strategy are deemed more or less legitimate at different times. Further, the goals and discursive appeals of movements are likely shaped by the ideological orientation of the society in which they occur. And the cognitive and social psychological resonance and utility of particular systematized beliefs are heavily dependent on prior cognitions and psychology shaped by the context of the social system. Thus, a social order or social structural view of ideology may provide a perspective that unifies the dissensus among the other approaches.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY

Each of the four perspectives on the nature of ideology suggests particular conceptual tools and methods of empirical analysis. For example, a cognitive and social psychological approach calls attention to the role of individual beliefs and group processes in collective action. Interactional and emergent approaches suggest that ideology can be studied through discursive dynamics in times of mobilization, while action and strategy perspectives lend themselves to examining the tactics of movements. And a social order or social structural view requires a broader examination of the context, both current and historical, in which collective action takes place. In this manner, the study of ideology in movements may benefit from consideration of discussion in other subfields; be it on cognition and culture (e.g., Vaisey 2009), the dynamics of intellectual movements (e.g., Frickel & Gross...
2005), or the traditional political orientations literature (see Walder 2009).

Rather than only consider ideological effects at the individual, group, movement, or social level, systematic research could examine the interactions and overlaps of the four perspectives, for example, the stages at which one is more important than the others or how changes in one cascade into changes in the other. Clearly, existing social orders do change, novel strategies and repertoires are innovated, new ideologies do emerge, and beliefs and values evolve. It is possible to consider these as “contentless” social processes that have common features no matter the ideology in question. However, there is likely a role for the particular beliefs and values at hand in shaping the dynamics of these processes. Thus, the implicit understanding of social movement research – that all movements have an ideology – could be harnessed explicitly to advance knowledge of ideational processes.

SEE ALSO: Claims-making; Culture and social movements; Discourse analysis and social movements; Framing and social movements; Institutional theory and social movements; Master frame; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Immigration, protest, and social movements

Simon Weffer

As pointed out in her 2010 piece on the state of the discipline vis-à-vis the immigration literature, Menjivar argues that the links between immigration and protest (or social movements more broadly) have been few and far between. In fact, she states that link “...has remained underdeveloped and thus could stand to benefit from a more active dialog” (18). She further argues that the immigration protests of 2006 in the United States served as a jumpstart to the study of the relationship between immigration and protest. While it is true that the study of this connection between immigration and protest has been sparse, there are four specific venues in which we can see this relationship engaged and examined: (1) immigration as an explanatory variable in protest research; (2) specific immigration-related movements; (3) the aforementioned 2006 protests; and (4) the study of immigration and protest in a non-US contexts.

The first example of the relation between immigration and protest are those studies that focus on immigration not as a principal explanatory variable, or even the dependent variable (e.g., immigration protests), but where it is just one of many independent variables in a statistical model explaining rates, timing, or counts of protest. It should be noted this is not meant to be a pejorative critique of the work. It is meant to say both empirically and theoretically immigration isn’t the primary focus. Here we can look at studies such as that by Olzak and Shannah (Shannah & Olzak 1999; Olzak & Shannah 2002) where immigration is used primarily in the context of testing competition theory. Here immigration is used to explain the hardening of the boundaries between groups and increasing ethnic violence.

The second broad category of research on the intersection of immigration and protest entails immigration-focused, specific movements. Some of the best examples of this work include Lippert (2005), Cunningham (1999), Wiltfang and Cochran (1994), Coutin (1993), and Wiltfang and McAdam (1991), with much attention focused on the Sanctuary Movement. This movement originated in Arizona, and was initially designed to take in Central American refugees created by the political turmoil of the 1980s. It soon spread to several hundred congregations nationwide, including sanctuaries in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. In the United States, the Sanctuary Movement lasted from 1982 to 1993, but continued in Canada into the early years of the twenty-first century, eventually taking on international dimensions with sanctuary cities and congregations in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Australia. Thus, while the literature has examined Sanctuary Movement mobilization, systematic analysis of disruptive, public protest in support of immigrants’ rights movement has been emphasized less.

The third category of investigation focuses on the immigration protests of 2006 in the United States. These protests arose in reaction to H.R. 4437 – The Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, otherwise known as the Sensenbrenner bill, after its sponsor, Wisconsin congressman Jim Sensenbrenner. The bill was not your average immigration bill; rather opponents saw it as a draconian measure that, along with “strengthening the border” (and adding more fence in various locations), increased penalties not just on employers of undocumented immigrants, but also made it a felony for anyone to provide assistance to any undocumented individual – regardless whether the individual might be a doctor or even a priest. The bill was seen as a clear threat to the undocumented and their allies, and thus greatly
immigration, protest, and social movements facilitated mobilization, resulting in the largest protests (at least to that point) around immigration in major US cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York, as well as in much smaller locales.

From these events have come studies with major contributions, both empirical and theoretical, to our understanding of immigration protests. The first set of important results emerged in a special issue of *American Behavioral Scientist* in December 2008, and the second in a coedited volume by Irene Bloemraad and Kim Voss entitled *Rallying for Immigrant Rights: The Fight for Inclusion in 21st Century America* (Voss & Bloemraad 2011). We should think of these two works as companion pieces, as many of the same authors in the special issue are present in the edited volume. The introductory pieces in each serve as bookends to the 2006 immigration marches. Pantoja, Menjivar, and Magaña (2008) contextualize the 2006 marches given their relative proximity to the events, while Bloemraad and Voss and Lee set the stage for the 2011 edited volume by providing a broader overview of immigrant protest and how it fits into topics such as immigrant incorporation, while the Wang and Winn chapter speaks more generally about how to use protest mobilization as a springboard to large issues of empowerment and incorporation of immigrant mobilizers’ communities (a set of ideas that often movement/protest scholars ignore).

Many of the authors who are in both the *American Behavioral Scientist* and the Bloemraad and Voss edited volume use the new book as a chance to build on their previous work from the special issue. For example, Ramirez expands on his work on the use of ethnic media and protest from the special issue to more closely examine how Spanish-language radio, especially widely syndicated and distributed shows such as *El Piolín* aided in the development of a Latino political identity rooted in mobilization. In more closely examining the edited volume, we can look at two clear themes that emerge: institutional engagement and place-based analysis. In the first case, that of institutional engagement by protesters, the most obvious institution targeted is the political realm – specifically looking at the relation between civic engagement (broadly defined) and immigration reform, which clearly encompasses all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial), as well as how the marches impacted Latino perceptions and opinions of the US political process and institutions.

But more than just the social institution of politics were impacted by the marches. Religion, as well as the media, in the role it plays on identity formation is examined. As we now exist in a 24/7/365 news cycle, critical analyses of the role of the fourth estate in mobilization, particularly on “hot-button” topics such as immigration, will only increase in importance. Finally, the most personal (and micro focused) of social institutions, the family, is examined in Pallares and Flores-González (2011) work on family mobilization in Chicago, as well as on Bloemraad and Trost’s expanded work on intergenerational mobilization.

The fourth and final broad category examining the intersection of immigration and protest is the work that has occurred outside of the United States. One possible critique of Menjivar’s 2010 piece is that the focus was on the case of the United States in the analysis of the intersection of immigration and protest. As point of fact, looking internationally, there have been more empirical studies, using a variety of methodologies, to examine immigration and the resulting protest and/or social movements. Specifically the work of Ruud Koopmans and his colleagues (Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans & Statham 2000 in particular) has examined immigration protest comparatively across multiple countries, as well as the effects of immigration and protest in various social structures. Interestingly, in the study of European immigration protest, it has typically been framed as part and parcel of the contentious political tradition, in contrast to the United States, which has often seen immigration and contentious politics as separate and distinct spheres. Koopmans and his colleagues explain that this is due to the European political elites,
as well as the constituencies, having resisted the notion of European counties being “countries of immigrants.” This point is made in the very introductory paragraph of Koopmans et al.‘s 2005 work, where they state that “as late as 1998 it was still the official position of the German government that Germany is not a country of immigration.” This open hostility clearly explains why immigration is automatically pushed into the realm of contentious politics. It is therefore no surprise that studies on immigration and protest include European Far Right parties, organizations, and opinions, as often as they do supporters of immigration rights (see Koopmans & Olzak 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). On some level, protest in Europe seems to have always included multiple sides of the immigration debate at protests. In fact, as Koopmans et al. (2005) point out, immigration protests often include three groups – migrants themselves, those working on behalf of migrants, and those against migration. In the United States, there has been a tendency to treat immigration protests either strictly on behalf of or including immigrants (such as the 2006 march in Los Angeles) or against immigration (Minuteman Militia events).

As noted, the work on Europe takes on a comparative nature, not just across nations, but across other categories. For example, Koopmans et al. (2005) examine not only how grievances/claims are handled, but also the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the different actors (antiracists, racists, pro-immigrant, the state), the access of different groups to institutional channels, and the differences in tactics (e.g., protest action vs. confrontational action vs. public statements), the relative openness/closedness of institutional structures, and the access to the political structure. For example Giugni, Koopmans, Passy, and Statham (2005) examine the opportunities (both institutional and discursive) for the Far Right in five countries.

One final contrast to the United States in terms of immigration mobilization is that in Europe, immigration and related protests are not confined to issues of foreign nationals, but also concern religion – specifically protest for and against Muslims. For example, one can examine the work of Astor (forthcoming) on conflict surrounding the building of mosques in Madrid and Barcelona. Koopmans et al. (2005), in their examination of this intersection of immigration and protest, find that there is not much faith-based mobilization for non-Muslim groups. This is not surprising; when we look at the threats (which encouraged mobilization) against various religions from 1992–1998 (the time period where events were collected) clearly the bulk of the threats were vis-à-vis legislation targeting Muslims. The most well documented of these threats was the French legislation to ban headscarves. This ties into another finding derived from examination of group-based demands: that “. . . European public controversies about claims for group demands are not about migrants’ cultural differences per se, but arise from a specific contradiction of Islam in the liberal nation-state” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 174). This then leads us to the conclusion for Koopmans et al. that if the political institutions fail to recognize and include Islam/Muslims, this will lead to an increase in mobilization both for and against Muslim immigrants. The question, as they pose it, is whether Europe will adopt a model of incorporation similar to the United States in the nineteenth century where the Irish, Italians, and Polish Catholics, or those of Jewish descent from Eastern Europe, were incorporated into US society. Or, instead, will Muslims be increasingly socially isolated, which then may lead to increased radicalized protest and mobilization by an increasingly marginalized group.

SEE ALSO: Antiracist movements in Europe; Asylum, refugee, and immigration movements in Australia; Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Ethnic movements; Racist social movements; Right-wing movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Indymedia (the Independent Media Center)

STEFANIA MILAN

Indymedia, short for Independent Media Center (IMC), is a global network of independent media organizations offering grassroots anticorporate news coverage. Its website, indymedia.org, operates as an “open publishing” platform, enabling anyone with Internet access to upload text and digital files.

The first IMC appeared in late November 1999 in Seattle, Washington, on the occasion of the mass demonstrations against the World Trade Organization, when a coalition of media and grassroots tech activists created a media center in downtown Seattle and launched a web site to enable activists to report directly from the protests. The Seattle IMC operated for over a week, providing up-to-date reports, videos, photos, and audio clips, broadcasted via a local low-power radio station. It produced its own newspaper, “The Blind Spot,” and launched a documentary project about the protests. Its reports were picked up by a number of mainstream media, which relied on the firsthand accounts provided by about 150 IMC activists. For the first time in history, a web site provided unfiltered access to the web: no registration was required, and content was not filtered. During the week of protests, indymedia.org received over a million and a half hits, outstripping mainstream media coverage (Kidd 2003).

What started as a localized response to the distortions of mainstream media reporting spread quickly across the world. In early 2000, an IMC was formed in Washington to cover the protests against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Soon other local groups became interested in forming their own IMC and asked to connect to the main web site. In 2002, three years after its foundation, there were already 89 IMCs in six continents. The growth of the network began to slow down only in 2005, following the decrease in number and prominence of antiglobalization protests. Currently, there are 150 local IMCs, from Kenya to Canada, from Indonesia to the Basque Country, operating under the motto “Don’t hate the media, be the media.” According to its mission statement, Indymedia is a “democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth.” The web site is its main interface, and provides coverage in eight languages. Local IMCs occasionally also operate offline, particularly in situations where Internet access is limited. In Mexico, for example, IMC activists rely consistently on audiotapes and radio.

In early 2000 “open publishing” was a novelty, and Indymedia can rightly be considered the “mother of all blogs” (Milan 2010: 89). Currently, the web site closely resembles the original 1999 platform, and provides news from a variety of social justice movements. It is divided in three main columns. The left column provides access to local IMCs, the various mailing lists, and information about how to get involved and form an IMC. It also links to the video and audio spin-off projects, such as the monthly production Indymedia Newsreal, airing on online video channel FreeSpeech TV. The right column is devoted to the news posted by activists: thanks to the open publishing policy, anyone can post his or her article, video, or photo. The content is unfiltered; however, occasionally content may be “hidden,” if a post breaks the Indymedia editorial guidelines, which may vary across the IMCs but share the rejection of hateful, racist, and sexist content. Hidden content, however, remains accessible through the web site. The newswire, or central column, features the main news stories, as agreed by the editorial collective. Occasionally, stories may be promoted to the newswire from
the left column. “Gatekeeping” is kept to a minimum.

IMC nodes are autonomous groups with their own mission statement, finances, and decision-making procedures. However, IMCs share some basic values, summarized in ten “Principles of Unity.” According to such principles the network is rooted on equality, decentralization, self-organization and local autonomy, diversity and nondiscrimination, and trust. IMCs are committed to develop nonhierarchical and antiauthoritarian relationships, both at the interpersonal and group levels, as well as to promote participation and consensus-based decision-making. All IMCs are not-for-profit. Open exchange of and access to information are seen as “a prerequisite to the building of a more free and just society.” Whenever possible, digital infrastructure of the network should be based on open-source software. The principles, however, are not written in stone, and are considered to be in permanent revision.

Decisions are taken in open mailing lists and chat rooms. The Indymedia global group and the various collectives in charge of specific sections of the network are formed by self-appointed, highly committed individuals. Indymedia can be seen as an example of prefigurative politics, as “the way these networks were created, run and developed, mirrored, as much as possible, the direct, participatory, collective and autonomous nature of the emerging social movement(s)” (Milan 2010: 88–89). However rooted in equality and nondiscrimination principles, Indymedia consensus-based decision-making processes, online discussion and offline meeting dynamics, and open-publishing policy have been object of criticism within the network. For example, decision-making processes are potentially distorted by the male dominance of technical work within the network, and the consensus process might hinder diversity, as minorities are sacrificed in favor of the dominant vision (Brookten & Hadl 2009).

Indymedia has frequently been targeted by national security agencies in the United States, Canada, Italy, and Spain, to name a few. In July 2001, during the protests against the meeting of the world’s eight richest countries (G8) in Genoa, Italy, the IMC media center was brutally raided by the Italian riot police. In October 2004, the global Indymedia network suffered a major breakdown, as the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seized the disks of two Internet servers located in London which hosted about 20 local Indymedia web sites. The seizure triggered strong reactions from many civil society groups around the world, including the International Federation of Journalists.

Despite not being the mouthpiece of the movements, Indymedia is frequently associated with the Global Justice Movement. More recently, however, with the explosion of blogs, video-sharing platforms such as YouTube, and social network sites like Facebook, grassroots movements seem to rely increasingly on commercial platforms rather than Indymedia. In response to these concerns, some local IMCs, including the London group, are working on developing their web site to respond to the organizational needs of contemporary activists, including for example the possibility of texting news directly from the streets with a mobile phone.

SEE ALSO: Consensual decision-making; Electronic protest; Internet and social movements; Media activism; Media and social movements; Prefigurative politics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Indymedia Documentation Project. http://docs.indymedia.org/


Initiator and spin-off movements

DOUG MCADAM

Most theories of movement emergence treat movements as independent of one another. The popular convention of naming individual movements reflects this view as well. So we refer to movements – for example, the women’s movement, the civil rights movement, the environmental movement – as separate and discrete phenomena. This conventional view, however, does not accord with the “facts.” The facts are that a good many movements:

• cluster in time and space;
• are developmentally dependent on the broader, ideologically coherent “movement families” (della Porta & Rucht 1995) in which they are embedded;
• and bear the clear tactical, organizational, and ideological imprint of prior movements within the same “family.”

That movements cluster in time and space is clear from even a cursory survey of recent history. So we note the popular uprisings in major European capitals in 1848–1849, or the wave of independence movements that swept through South America between 1810 and 1820, or the “velvet revolutions” that toppled the Soviet system in the late 1980s, or the American New Left of the 1960s/early 1970s, or Samuel Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democratization, or the nationalist revolts that emerged in many Southeast Asian countries in 1948–1949. We could add many more examples to this list, but the point has been made. The most consequential movements or other forms of “contentious politics” tend to come in waves.

First introduced by McAdam in a 1995 book chapter, the concept of “initiator” and “spin-off” movement is but one of a number of attempts by scholars to align social movement theory more closely with the wave-like structure of popular contention. Initiator movements refer to those rare, but exceedingly important, struggles that set in motion an identifiable “protest cycle” or wave of ideologically linked movements. “The second . . . category of movements includes those spin-off movements that, in varying degrees, draw their impetus and inspiration from the original initiator movement” (McAdam 1995: 219; emphasis in original). Examples of the former would include the American civil rights movement, which birthed the cluster of struggles – the anti-Vietnam War movement, women’s liberation, the American Indian movement, gay liberation, and so on – that came to be known as the New Left, and the movement that deposed Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 2000, that set in motion the wave of “color revolutions” that shook post-Soviet Eurasia in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

McAdam’s discussion of the link between initiator and spin-off movements is but one of many scholarly attempts to theorize the interdependence of movements. Meyer and Whittier (1994) have written perceptively on the processes of “movement spillover” by which later struggles adopt/adapt the tactics, organizational forms, and strategic action frames of earlier movements. A number of scholars including John Markoff (1996) and Samuel Huntington (1991) have authored books on the dynamics of democratizing “waves.” Mark Katz (1997) and Colin Beck (2011) have sought to do the same for “revolutionary” waves. In his work on both the collapse of the Soviet Union (2002) and the emergence and spread of the “color revolutions” (2007), Mark Beissinger has begun to fashion a theory of the diffusion of what he calls “modular” forms of contention. Ruud Koopmans (2004) has also offered a general account of “the evolution of waves of contention.”
If a good many scholars have acknowledged and sought to theorize the temporal and spatial connections between movements, close empirical studies of such links would appear to be somewhat rarer. But there are certainly exceptions to this rule. Although it is typically described as a follow-up study of movement activists, McAdam’s (1988) research on the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project (see separate entry in this volume) is also a detailed account of how participation in the project and the Southern civil rights movement in general helped to catalyze three later struggles: the Free Speech movement at Berkeley, women’s liberation, and the anti-Vietnam War movement.

In collaboration with Dieter Rucht, McAdam also authored a detailed empirical account of how fortuitous ties between American and German student activists helped, they claim, to spread the student New Left from the United States to West Germany in 1964–1965 (1994). In his aforementioned work (2007), Beissinger offers both a general explanatory perspective on the cross-national diffusion of contention and a specific account of the spread of the so-called “color revolutions” from Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. For Beissinger, the key to the latter process was the critical role played by the dissident student group Otpor (“Resistance” in English) in first fashioning the very distinctive modular form of nonviolent electoral challenge used to such good effect in Serbia and then aggressively spreading the Otpor “template” through brokered connections to like-minded student groups in other Russian republics. Indeed, a number of Otpor activists remain active today in the dissemination of this template.

In her 1979 book, *Personal Politics*, Sara Evans offers a final and particularly rich example of the generative ties between an initiator and spin-off movement. The initiator, is once again, the civil rights struggle and the spin-off movement is the radical wing of the women’s movement. Evans recounts how the women’s liberation movement was born of the contradiction between the egalitarian ideology of the civil rights struggle and the forms of discrimination experienced by female civil rights workers. Outraged by the contradictions, yet inspired by the movement’s ideals, the female workers sought to create a movement of their own. In an eerie parallel, the women’s rights movement of the 1830s developed within the similarly inspiring, constraining context of the antislavery movement. Empowered by abolitionist ideals, yet treated as second class citizens within the movement, first generation feminists – like their sixties counterparts – broke away to forge their own struggle.

The last two examples underscore an important point. While movements clearly do cluster in time and space, the specific social processes that account for the spread of contention are by no means uniform. In the case of the color revolutions, brokerage and intentional emulation mediated the diffusion process, while the rise of both first- and third-generation feminism owed more to a gradual process of radicalization and rejection of older struggles in favor of entirely new movements.

**REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS**


Injustice frames
WILLIAM A. GAMSON

Students of social movements with different orientations share an emphasis on the importance of a strong injustice component in the political consciousness that supports collective action (Moore 1978: 88; McAdam 1982: 51; Turner & Killian 1987: 202). The main challenge on this point comes from those who accept that a sense of grievance is necessary but argue that it is so ubiquitous that it lacks any explanatory value (Oberschall 1973: 133–134; McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1215). But the view that grievances have little explanatory value, since it is so easy for leaders or organizations to link more elaborate world views with the sufferings of the “lower orders,” has not prevailed (Gamson 1992).

Most contemporary analysts treat it as no simple matter to explain how the indignities of daily life are sometimes transformed into a shared grievance with a focused target of collective action. Different emotions can be stimulated by perceived inequities – cynicism, bemused irony (for example, “Who says life is fair?”), or resignation. But injustice focuses on the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul.

A sense of injustice is not merely an abstract intellectual judgment about what is fair but is what psychologists call a “hot cognition” (Zajonc 1980). The heat is intimately related to beliefs about what acts or conditions have caused people to suffer undeserved hardship. The critical dimension is the abstractness of the target. Vague, abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish. We may think it dreadfully unfair when it rains on our parade but nature is a poor target for an injustice frame. When we see impersonal, abstract forces as responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept what cannot be changed and make the best of it.

At the other extreme, if one attributes undeserved suffering to malicious or selfish acts by clearly identifiable persons or groups, the emotional component of an injustice frame will almost certainly be there. Concreteness in the target, even when it is misdirected, is a necessary condition for an injustice frame. Hence, competition over defining targets is a crucial battleground in the development or containment of injustice frames (Alinsky 1972: 130–131).

More specifically, an injustice frame requires that motivated human actors carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering. These actors may be corporations, government agencies, or specifiable groups rather than individuals. They may be presented as malicious, but selfishness, greed, negligence, and indifference may be sufficient to produce indignation.

The antidote to excessive abstraction has its own problems. In concretizing the targets of an injustice frame, there is a danger that people will miss the underlying structural conditions that produce hardship and inequality. They may exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets or scapegoats.

To sustain collective action, the targets identified by the frame must successfully bridge abstract and concrete. By connecting broader sociocultural forces with human agents who are appropriate targets of collective action, one can get the heat into the cognition. By making sure that the concrete targets are, in fact, linked to and can affect broader forces and policies, one can make sure that the heat isn’t misdirected in ways that will leave the underlying source of injustice untouched (Gamson 1992: 33).
INJUSTICE FRAMES AS A COMPONENT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

Collective action frames “are relatively coherent sets of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that legitimate and inspire social movement campaigns and activities” (quote taken from Framing and social movements entry, this volume). Movements may have internal battles over which particular frame will prevail or may even offer several frames for different constituencies but their frames have in common the implication that those who share the frame can and should take action.

Injustice is only one of three crucial components in such frames but it can be viewed as the core that holds the three components together (Gamson 1992). In addition to injustice, there is an agency component that refers to the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. Collective action frames imply some sense of collective efficacy and deny the immutability of some undesirable situation. They empower people by defining them as potential agents of their own history. They suggest not merely that something can be done but that “we” can do something.

The identity component refers to the process of defining this “we,” typically in opposition to some “they” who have different interests or values. Without an adversarial component, as noted above, the potential target of collective action is likely to remain an abstraction, greatly complicating the development of the injustice component.

The injustice component of collective action frames facilitates the adoption of other elements. It increases awareness of social movements among bystanders and encourages sympathy toward their efforts at collective action even when people are not ready to join. It promotes personal identification with whatever collectivity is being wronged and spurs the search for agents who are responsible for the undeserved hardship that members of the recipient group suffer. Hence, it is the key to integrating the three elements into a single collective action frame.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Frame disputes; Framing and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Identity fields; Master frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Interviewing activists

KATHLEEN BLEE

Personal interviews with activists are a common strategy for gathering data on current social movements. They allow scholars access to a broader segment of social movement participants than are represented in documents and propaganda produced by movement leaders. Interviews also provide different kinds of data than can observational methods. Through interviews, researchers can probe the biographies and motivations of activists as well as the meanings they give to their actions (Blee & Taylor 2002; Munson 2009). Indeed, activist interviews are a key source of information on many critical issues in social movement studies, including how individual and collective identities are constructed, how movements attract followers, and how members’ commitments fluctuate over time.

TYPES OF INTERVIEWS

Social movement scholars use structured, unstructured, and semi-structured interviews to collect information from respondents. In structured interviews, each participant is asked a similar or identical set of questions. These produce data that are comparable across activists, but since they generally are based on pre-determined categories and questions, researchers cannot follow up when new issues or concepts are raised in the interview (Eliasoph 1998). Unstructured interviews are non-directive, open-ended, and often very lengthy. These are used to understand the perspective and experiences of a few activists.

Semi-structured interviews are used to capture the emotional and affective dimensions of movements, reveal the nuances of many activists’ perceptions, and illuminate how subcultures develop and shape movement goals and outcomes. The most common forms of semi-structured interviews are oral histories, life histories, key informants, and focus groups.

Oral histories generate historical information by interviewing people with firsthand knowledge of past events or time periods. They are particularly important for studying aspects of social movements that are not represented in documentary sources or official records, such as how domestic life impacts movement participation or the activism of poor or disenfranchised people (della Porta 1992).

Life histories are similar, but focus more on the activist’s narration of their life story. They are valuable for uncovering the fluctuations in activist commitment over a lifetime and how activists evaluate and make sense of their experiences in social movements (della Porta 1992; Blee 2002; Auyero 2003; Team Members 2006). Activists have an interest in presenting themselves and the movement in a certain light, making them unreliable narrators of the history of movements in which they have been involved. However, the point of life histories is to capture activists’ meaning and emphasis rather than record the facts of history. As Luisa Passerini (1989: 197) argues, “all autobiographical memory is true; it is up to the interpreter to discover in what sense, where, for what purpose.”

In key informant interviewing, scholars select interviewees for a particular purpose. They may choose those who can provide information on particular aspects of a social movement, such as its tactics or strategies, modes of recruitment, internal dynamics, membership composition, or future plans and goals. Or a scholar may interview those likely to know about a movement’s history or relationships with other movements. Interviewees also may be chosen because they can convey a certain perspective on the movement, like that of a leader or rank-and-file member. Many key informants are movement insiders who have
extensive knowledge of its operations over a long period of time or who are active in many of its operations.

Focus groups can be used to interview small groups of activists at the same time. In a focus group, activists are asked to talk with each other about a set of questions provided by the interviewer. These are useful for capturing topics that unify and divide movement participants.

Interviews of all types can be conducted on the telephone or face-to-face if activists are in close proximity to each other and to the researcher. Increasingly, both structured and semi-structured interviews also rely on virtual media such as e-mail, Internet web sites, and other forms of communication technologies. Phone and virtual interviewing allow access to activists across the globe and provide the possibility for anonymity that generally is lacking in face-to-face interviews.

SAMPLING

Scholars use varying sampling methods to select interviewees. How they do depends on the type of movement and the purpose of the study. Formal social movement organizations may have a membership list that can serve as a sampling frame from which current or former activists can be chosen randomly or purposively. For less institutionalized social movements or those whose memberships are not well documented, scholars often rely on snowball sampling, asking initial interviewees to suggest or contact others to be interviewed. Snowball sampling is particularly effective for finding activists who are hidden, difficult to locate, or hard to identify, such as those associated with violent or stigmatized movements or movements that are not currently operating, and for identifying former or marginal members or supporters of current social movements (Team Members 2006; Morrison 2009). Social movement scholars also sample by approaching activists at events such as protests or rallies and either conducting interviews on-site or arranging interviews for a later time.

DYNAMICS OF INTERVIEWING ACTIVISTS

Researchers need to be flexible to the changing dynamics of the relationship between interviewer and activist as these can affect what questions are asked and how the interview proceeds. The dynamics of rapport can be particularly complicated. When researchers remain distant and emotionally guarded, activists may be reluctant to provide rich information about themselves and their movements. Yet, researchers who become too closely identified with interviewees may find it difficult to evaluate the taken-for-granted assumptions by which activists operate. There are a number of strategies for keeping a healthy balance of closeness and distance during an interview. Some scholars keep their opinions and personal lives to themselves to maintain a neutral interviewing situation; this is also a strategy used by scholars to protect themselves from potentially violent activists and to maintain rapport with activists from various factions of a movement or on different sides of a conflict (Blee 1998; Stein 2001). Other scholars position themselves as “distant but not neutral” researchers by revealing beliefs and experiences that differ substantially from those of the activists they interview (Blee 1998: 385).

Not all researchers strive to maintain a distance from the movements or activists they study. Indeed, some reveal their support, or are themselves involved in the movements they study. Such personal and political involvement with activists can get scholars an entrée to important or nuanced information about movement participants and operations that are generally only available to insiders (Blee & Taylor 2002: 97). Verta Taylor (1998) built rapport with activists involved in issues of postpartum depression by being both an advocate for the movement and a confidante who talked openly about her own bouts of depression. However, scholars who develop a close relationship with activists may worry that in writing the analysis, they will misrepresent, misinterpret, or
interviewing activists

Javier Auyero (2003: 194) related how Lara, an activist and friend, summarized her feelings about his work: “I offer you trust; if you do something that betrays it, you are the one who’s going to be a bad person, not me. I am positive I did the right thing.” The emotional dynamics of the interview also can be an important source of data. Activists may display emotions of anger, grief, or excitement that suggest how deeply they are attached to a movement or issue, the emotional dynamics of the movement itself, or how activists relate to those outside the movement (Blee 1998; Whittier 2001).

Scholars have opinions about the value, morality, efficacy, or direction of the political work in which the activists they interview are involved. Such political or moral judgments are unavoidable, but they need to be considered in the process of interviewing and analyzing interview data. For example, scholars may need to decide whether or not they want to publicize a movement through their research. To avoid giving publicity to a movement they dislike, scholars may use pseudonyms in place of actual group names. In contrast, scholars may use identifying information for movements they want to publicize as long as they are confident that the research will not expose these movements to legal or other harm (Blee & Taylor 2002; Blee & Vining 2010). Also, scholars’ assessment of the movement or activist may influence the direction of activist interviews. Interviews with activists from particularly disagreeable movements like far-right racist or antigay groups might focus less on the movement’s goals and more on how activists became involved in such movements (Blee 1998; Stein 2001).

CODING

In order to analyze information gathered in interviews, scholars transcribe interviews in whole or part into written text, develop a coding schema, and code statements, lines, or words from interviews into a set of analytic categories. Coding is the exercise of naming interesting items and “applying the name consistently, wherever you find that item in your notes” (Lichterman 2002: 130). In structured interviewing, responses by interviewees may be entered directly into a computerized word processing program and, since the categories of analysis are established in advance, codes are developed directly from the questionnaire. In semi-structured and unstructured interviewing, the process of coding is more elaborate. Typically, scholars use a combination of open, closed, and focused coding. In inductive studies, scholars rely heavily on open coding to create analytic categories based on meanings and interpretations in the interviews that may not be documented in prior research. Open coding requires scholars to carefully read interview transcripts so as to “identify and formulate any and all ideas, themes, or issues they suggest, no matter how varied and disparate” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw 1995: 143). Scholars find that working with concepts throughout data collection can help them decide what codes are most significant and what codes ought to be dropped (Lichterman 2002: 130). Creating codes during the first stages of research can also help scholars form new questions for subsequent interviews. Closed coding, done after or instead of open coding, is more deductive; codes are created from categories derived from issues, questions, and findings in prior research. In focused coding, which takes place after both open and closed coding, scholars connect analytically significant themes and develop “subthemes and sub-topics that distinguish differences and variations within the broader topic” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw 1995: 160).

ETHICAL ISSUES

Activist interviewing raises a number of ethical issues. There are ethical concerns about the legal, emotional, financial, and social vulnerabilities to which activists may be exposed by being interviewed about their involvement in social movements, especially
those that are under official scrutiny (Blee & Vining 2010). Scholars who interview activists also may face thorny ethical issues about the interpretation of these interviews (Borland 1998; also see Chodorow 1989). Activists and scholars may struggle over who controls the story that is conveyed in an interview, especially when scholars are critical of movements or categorize them with labels, like “feminist,” “racist,” or “political,” that activists and movements do not use for themselves (Borland 1998; Mahmood 2005). Researchers must be responsible in their relationships with activists without necessarily adopting their definitions of reality (Eliasoph 1998; Auyero 2003).

SEE ALSO: Activism; Emotion and social movements; Ethnography and social movements; Life history research and social movements; Survey research.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Institutionalization of social movements
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG

Social movement theorists have viewed various phenomena as aspects of the “institutionalization” of social movements. One meaning of institutionalization is that movements become established interest groups that are formalized in structure and headed by professional leaders. Along with formalization and professionalization, movements may also become institutionalized in the sense that their goals become conservative or mainstream. Another meaning of institutionalization is that movement ideas are incorporated into mainstream organizations or practices. And movements can be institutionalized in the sense that they operate within social institutions and organizations. All of these ideas are important to theories of the origins, development, and outcomes of social movements.

Ideas about institutionalization as the final stage in the movement “career” can be found in early analyses of collective behavior. Other analyses have looked at the process whereby movement organizations become formalized and professionalized, making them difficult to distinguish from established interest groups. In the tradition of Robert Michels (1962), some analysts associate the adoption of formalized or bureaucratic structures with oligarchy and a move toward conservative views and strategies; as organizations grow, leaders spend more time on organizational maintenance and adopt mainstream positions that allow them to survive. Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that the creation of large bureaucratic organizations in poor people’s movements is counterproductive because such movements can only succeed through disruption, and institutionalization leads to the decline of mass protest.

Work on other types of movements suggests, however, that formalized structures aid organizational maintenance and that such groups can assist grassroots efforts (Staggenborg 1988; Gamson 1990). Institutionalization in this view is not necessarily the end stage in the life cycle of a social movement, but a process that allows movements to survive and re-mobilize when environmental events create the impetus for new campaigns. Institutionalized actors may play a role in the origins and maintenance of social movements, and in some instances they help to spur countermovements. In the US women’s movement and in various minority rights movements, insiders in government agencies helped the movements get off the ground (Skrentny 2002; Banaszak 2010). When movement strategies show signs of success, interest groups might find it useful to take on the forms and tactics of the less established social movement, thereby creating or supporting a countermovement. Established interest groups sometimes join outside activists, or, in the absence of genuine grassroots activity, they may mimic the organizational structures and tactics of movements in what critics have derided as “astroturf” campaigns. Useem and Zald (1982) found that a pronuclear power movement, comprised of both a nuclear power industry-supported wing and a local community wing, emerged as a result of the successes of the antinuclear power movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. In this case, an established pressure group provided substantial resources to a movement to promote nuclear power. Thus, both institutionalization and de-institutionalization can occur in political struggles.

When movements become institutionalized in the sense that their frames, rhetoric, and goals are taken up by mainstream organizations, this is sometimes seen as a kind of co-optation of the movement. Yet, such changes might also be counted as a sign of movement
success in dissemination of its ideas to mainstream institutions. Often, movements operate within organizations and institutions, targeting government, corporate, and other authorities (Zald & Berger 1978; Katzenstein 1998; Raeburn 2004; Snow 2004; Soule 2009). By gaining footholds within institutions, movements such as the women’s movement can use institutional resources (e.g., women’s studies programs at universities) to help maintain themselves over time (Staggenborg 1996). When organizations and institutions change their policies in line with movement goals, it is often because the movement creates pressure for change, sometimes from within. For example, Raeburn (2004) shows how gay rights activists within corporations pressured many Fortune 500 companies to adopt gay-friendly policies. Movements often create institutional changes either through outside protests, such as boycotts, or insider tactics, such as shareholder resolutions (Schneiberg & Lounsbury 2008; Soule 2009). Yet not all movement efforts at institutionalization succeed; the characteristics of both movements and institutions affect institutional willingness to adopt practices in line with movement goals (Davis & Anderson 2008).

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratization and social movements; Institutional theory and social movements; Organizations and movements; Social movement organization (SMO).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Instrumental versus expressive action
BERT KLANDERMANS

Instrumental action refers to action as an attempt to influence the social and political environment; expressive action refers to action as an expression of people’s views.

Instrumental action presumes that participants take part because they believe that they can change their social and political environment at affordable costs. Therefore, movement organizations try to make participation attractive by increasing the benefits and reducing the costs of participation. Authorities or opponents for their part may try to make participation less attractive by imposing costs upon participants. Instrumental action presupposes an effective movement that is able to enforce some wanted changes or at least to mobilize substantial support. Making an objective assessment of a movement’s impact is not an easy task, but movement organizations will try to convey the image of an effective political force. They can do so by pointing to the impact they have had in the past, or to the powerful allies they have. They may lack all this, but then, they might be able to show other signs of movement strength. A movement may command a large constituency as witnessed by turnout at demonstrations, or by membership figures, or large donations. It may comprise strong organizations with strong charismatic leaders who have gained respect, and so on. From an instrumental perspective a solution must be found to the dilemma of collective action. Olson (1968) argued that a rational actor will choose to take a free ride, unless selective incentives (costs or benefits that are made contingent upon participation in the production of the collective good) prevent him from doing so. Therefore, instrumentality also implies the provision of selective incentives. Movements may vary considerably in the selective incentives for participation they provide. This is, obviously, also a matter of the resources a movement commands. Surprisingly little comparative information is available on the resources movements have at their disposal. In a similar vein, systematic documentation is lacking on the way in which the larger political system and the alliances and opponents of movement organizations influence movement participation. Tilly coined the now classic terms “repression” and “facilitation” to distinguish between political systems that increase or decrease the costs of participation. Indeed, repressive political environments may increase the costs of participation considerably: people may lose friends, they may risk their jobs or otherwise jeopardize their sources of income, they may be jailed, and they may even lose their lives.

Expressive action presumes that people take part in collective action because they want to express their views. In classic studies of social movements the distinction was made between instrumental and expressive movements or protest. In those days, instrumental movements were seen as movements that aimed at some external goal, for example, the implementation of citizenship rights. Expressive movements, on the other hand, were movements that had no external goals. Participation was a goal in itself, for example, the expression of anger in response to experienced injustice. Movement scholars felt increasingly uncomfortable with the distinction, as it was thought that most movements had both instrumental and expressive aspects and that the emphasis on the two could change over time. Therefore, the distinction lost its use. Recently, however, the idea that people might participate in movements to express their views has received renewed attention. Attention arises this time from movement scholars who were unhappy with the overly structural approach of resource mobilization and political process theory. These scholars...
began to put an emphasis on the creative, cultural, and emotional aspects of social movements, such as music, symbols, rituals, narratives, and moral indignation. People are angry, develop feelings of moral indignation about some state of affairs or some government decision, and wish to make that known. They participate in a social movement not necessarily to enforce political change, but to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression.

Acting on one’s view is one of the fundamental motives of action participation and necessarily charged with emotion. Appraisal and action are socially constructed, that is to say, are formed in interpersonal interaction, especially in the case of politically relevant emotions. Cultural and historical factors play an important role in the interpretation of the state of affairs by which politically relevant emotions are generated. Obviously, appraisals can be manipulated. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package. But also in the ongoing activities of the movements emotions play an important role. In the literature, two kinds of collective emotions are distinguished – reciprocal emotions and shared emotions – that reinforce each other. Shared outrage against an injustice reinforces the reciprocal emotion of fondness for others because they feel the same way. Conversely, mutual affection is a context in which shared emotions easily arise.

Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values. Rochon (1998) makes the important distinction between “critical communities” where new ideas and values are developed and “social movements” that are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. “In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames” (31), states Rochon, who continues to argue that social movements are not simply extensions of critical communities. After all, not all ideas developed in critical communities are equally suited to motivate collective action. Social movement organizations, then, are carriers of meaning. Through processes such as consensus mobilization or framing they seek to propagate their definition of the situation to the public at large. Social movements do not invent ideas from scratch, they borrow from the history of ideas. They build on an ideological heritage as they relate their claims to broader themes and values in society. In so doing they relate to societal debates that have a history of their own and that history is usually much longer than that of the movement itself.

SEE ALSO: Emotion and social movements; Free rider problem; Ideology; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Interest groups and social movements
ONDŘEJ ČÍSAR

This entry elaborates the conceptual similarities and differences between interest groups, social movements, and social movement organizations (SMOs). First, two views of their relationship are presented, followed by an abbreviated description of the main contributions to their conceptualization. Although, according to an important part of the available scholarship, contemporary SMOs and interest groups share many common features, the entry concludes by summarizing differences between the two concepts.

TWO APPROACHES

There are two basic ways to capture the conceptual relationship between interest groups and social movements. While still indebted to collective behavior theories, the first perspective conceptualizes interest groups as institutionalized and formalized collective actors included in the policymaking process. In this understanding, interest groups are political insiders. They are governed by formal rules, positioned close to power centers, mostly utilizing formal channels of political communication, and engaging in conventional strategies such as lobbying. The image of dressed-up lobbyists captures this understanding particularly well.

The same perspective views social movements as these lobbyists’ unruly siblings. Although they share the goal of expressing political demands and influencing politics – except perhaps for identity-oriented movements active in the sphere of civil society – they are much less institutionalized, often informal and, since they are excluded from routine politics, they rely on collective mobilization and protest instead of conventional action. As a result, the first perspective views interest groups and social movements as two “different kinds of collectivities” (see Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004: 7–8).

The second approach, drawing on classical pluralist and, to some extent, resource mobilization theories of collective action, regards the concept of social movement organization as something akin to the overlap of interest groups and social movements. From this perspective, in both their organizational structure and action repertoire, contemporary SMOs do not differ from interest groups (see also below). Consequently, Paul Burstein (1999: 19) claims that there is “no theoretical justification for distinguishing between social movement organizations and interest groups.” According to this approach, the difference is purely nominal: while sociologists prefer the term SMO, political scientists subscribe to interest groups. In their effort to bridge the two disciplines, Andrews and Edwards (2004) offer a synthetic definition of the advocacy organization, including not only (public) interest groups and SMOs, but also nonprofit organizations. Influential as it may be, their definition excludes one particularly powerful category of interest groups, namely business and economic groups.

Although they are embedded in different disciplines, the concepts of SMOs and interest groups share many common characteristics. According to the standard definition, an SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement . . .” (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1217–1218). At the same time, SMOs do not seek to run candidates for public office. Similarly, according to contemporary definitions, interest groups are organizations advocating for some degree of political or social change or continuity and not competing in elections (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney 2008: 1106).
INTEREST GROUP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES

Originating in the pluralism of Bentley’s *The Process of Government* (for a summary, LaVaque-Manty 2006), and fully expressed in David Truman’s *The Governmental Process* (1951), interest group studies viewed organizations as a vehicle, in a democratic society, that were more or less available to every population segment, through which citizens aggregate and articulate their preferences and interests. Interest groups serve citizens as a means of collective coordination and as a conduit for letting their voices be heard in the decision-making process. Similarly, resource mobilization theories underscore the role SMOs play in the coordination of collective action and sustaining that action over time. From this point of view, there are not as many differences between SMOs and interest groups as the first perspective would claim. Except for those interest groups that are completely devoid of individual members, such as some entrepreneurs’ associations, interest groups and SMOs are essentially the same in nature, providing individuals with organizational means to overcome a collective action problem.

In contrast to interest group studies indebted to the pluralist perspective, social movement scholars underscore the inequality in access to organizational resources existing across citizens and their groups (for a summary, Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Unlike pluralism, social movement studies demonstrate that the generally better resourced segments of society are also better organized, making it easier for them to collectively coordinate, mobilize, and influence political outputs. Nonetheless, there are also traditions within interest group studies, such as neopluralism, which acknowledge this inequality. Neocorporatism, in particular, made this argument one of its most important “trade marks” (Balme & Chabanet 2008).

While neocorporatism, like social movement theory, acknowledges the privileged access to politics enjoyed by some interest groups, it parts company with social movement studies by making these privileged groups – trade unions and employers’ associations – the sole focus of scholarship. According to the main idea of corporatism, the incorporation of trade unions and employers together with the state in coordinated tripartite institutions made the economic management of modern societies more effective and the distribution of national product more just (for a summary, Molina & Rhodes 2002).

Neocorporatism has developed as a distinctive paradigm in interest group studies and in complete isolation from the social movement field, partly because while neocorporatism was clearly European-centric in its focus, the empirical studies of social movements originally developed in the United States. The very different trajectories of Europe and the United States after World War II account for the separate development of these two fields of study. By including employers and trade unions in policymaking, European societies started to experiment with and build corporatist institutions to coordinate their postwar economic boom; in contrast, starting in the 1950s, the United States experienced consequential social movements, most notably the civil rights struggle and the various successors it inspired.

For some time, a division of labor existed: interest group studies were primarily defined by their focus on institutional insiders, while social movement scholars concentrated on outsiders instead. While essentially capturing the same type of phenomenon, namely the interest organization, the former researched those organizations integrated in policy process, and the latter called attention to institutional challengers (Burstein 1999). At the same time, both understood organizations as important preconditions of collective action, be it channeled intra- or extra-institutionally.

As stated by Meyer and Tarrow (1998), this distinction largely evaporated during the last decades of the twentieth century: with the exception of radical SMOs, which opt out of the established system of interest representation, in
contemporary Western “social movement societies,” it is easily possible to distinguish between interest groups and mainstream SMOs neither on the basis of their position vis-à-vis the political system nor the strategic repertoire used. First, some radical social movements of the 1960s and 1970s have become institutionalized and incorporated in routine democratic politics. In developed democracies, (new) social movements, such as environmentalism and feminism, may be as close to the decision-making process as (traditional) interest groups, such as trade unions. Second, important portions of the protest repertoire, traditionally associated with social movements, have spread across democratic polities and become institutionalized; protest is utilized as a more or less conventional way of claim-making nowadays. In many countries around the world, not disruptive social movements, but institutionalized trade unions are able to sponsor the biggest protest events. All in all, based on the level of incorporation and action repertoire, the distinction between the large part of SMOs and interest groups is no longer as pronounced as once argued. However, three important differences remain.

THREE DIFFERENCES

First, while interest groups may or may not be embedded in interpersonal networks and thus may or may not have a constituency on the level of individual citizens, SMOs at least need to claim that they are embedded in social networks and represent a particular constituency. Although this does not necessarily mean that all SMOs have to mobilize individuals – in fact, the opposite is sometimes true in contemporary democracies (Minkoff, Aisenbrey, & Agnone 2008; Fagan & Carmin 2011) – it nonetheless means that they engage in some type of either direct or indirect communication with them. A group formed by the representatives of the most important national corporations may still be a powerful interest organization, but at the same time lack any real ties to the public.

Second, unlike an interest group, an SMO is typically embedded in a broader interorganizational network defined by various types of mutual transactions. These can concern interorganizational cooperation, information exchange, resource borrowing, and most importantly an overlapping interest. While there can be a “free-standing” interest group, there is rarely a complete “SMO isolate.” Although an SMO may lack immediate organizational ties to other parts of the network, it often shares in the identity and/or interest of its constituent parts. In other words, SMOs form the nodes of broader networks, namely social movements constituted by “formally independent actors, who all identify nonetheless – if with variable intensity – with a common cause” (Diani 2011: 226). Unlike interest groups there are no social movement organizations without social movements, from which the SMOs derive their identity in the first place.

Third, interest groups may overlap only with a certain portion of SMOs. Unlike interest groups, there are radical social movements and SMOs that by their definition do not strive to be included in the conventional political process as legitimate partners. Instead of advocating a particular interest, they normally present both a comprehensive critique of the present order and its preferred alternative. Radicals deliberately refuse to develop a stable organizational structure, mobilize substantial financial resources, and be included in the political process: “to gain acceptance [for their claims] from a system they critique would be anathema” (Fitzgerald & Rodgers 2000: 587). Therefore, these radical SMOs consciously opt for disruptive strategies challenging the established system with its repressive apparatus to question its very legitimacy and existence.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Movement society; Networks and social movements; Political science and the study of social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO); Social movements.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Internet and social movements

VICTORIA CARTY

The emergence of new information communication technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet and the digital media boom in general, have strongly affected scholarship on social movements. The Internet has fuelled a new source of political energy that posits a new relationship between ICTs, political struggle, and public life. Electronic social movement organizations (SMOs) and online activists are redefining political struggle across the dimensions of contentious politics in terms of recruitment, mobilizing, strategizing, fundraising, and protest activities. The explosion of e-movements, e-protest, and e-activism highlights the importance of the Internet as an organizational tool to the dissemination of information and wired activism, and shows it has become a significant, if not essential, repertoire for social movement actors (Carty 2010). Many scholars therefore argue that the novel intricacies of the ICT-driven “network society” require a fundamental re-conceptualization of social mobilization that was originally formulated for face-to-face contact.

Historically, communication and information have been fundamental sources of power and counter-power of domination and social change. This is particularly true in contemporary society given the increasing numbers and variety of producers, distributors, and consumers of information through the World Wide Web and other digital forms of media using little time, effort, or money. New online technologies allow for more varieties of group formation and support among individuals, even among some of the most marginalized sectors of society who care about similar issues, as like-minded people are easier to find in cyberspace. Activists can use electronic communication to engage in direct civic communication outside of traditional broadcast media and national elites through the quick and cheap dissemination of information via e-mails, listservs, and bulletin boards that allow for discussion and debate. This has proven significant in the mobilization of political struggle and is of particular relevance for transnational social movements.

The potential of ICTs to organize social movements across borders was first illustrated in 1994 by the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, who declared war on the Mexican government to coincide with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). They used the Internet, e-mail, listservs, and various web sites to reach an international audience who mobilized to pressure the Mexican government to adhere to a ceasefire (Garrido & Halavais 2003). Having accomplished this, the Zapatistas and their supporters helped form the Peoples Global Action Movement (and later the Global Justice Movement) during the 1996 global summit held by the Zapatistas that encouraged dozens of international grassroots social movements to work collectively to combat other neoliberal policies. Out of this summit also came collective organizational strategies to mobilize against the World Trade Organization when it convened in Seattle 2001 as days of action were repeatedly advertised over the Internet.

A few years later, the 2001 “Battle of Seattle,” which successfully shut down the World Trade Organization meetings, served as one of the first major examples of the significance of the Internet in terms of the intersection between online organization and offline mobilizing/protest. The Internet facilitated and coordinated not only the various networks of global protesters, but also permitted an international division of labor prior to and during the protests. Leading up to the three-day protest, in which over 500 000 activists from all over the world
participated, actions were electronically organized and mobilized via e-mail, bulletin boards, chat rooms, and alternative media outlets. The Web also facilitated global and simultaneous protests to coincide with the Seattle disruptive actions. Demonstrations were held in over 80 locations in dozens of countries (Rheingold 2003). These were organized through the web site (www.seattlewto.org/N30), which put out action alerts and calls for action in ten different languages to provide information regarding how potential participants could contact local directors all over the world to get involved. These protests set a pattern that was followed by demonstrations mainly organized by the Global Justice Movement at nearly every major summit over the next few years that targeted powerful economic/political entities, proposed treaties, regulatory agencies, and trading blocks. Targets included the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the Free Trade Treaty of the Americas, EU meetings, and the G8 summits among others.

ICTs also proved critical in facilitating the largest global protest ever when, on February 15, 2003, 15 million citizens across 75 countries participated in a coordinated day of action, organized by the British-based Stop the War coalition, against the US invasion of Iraq in March of that year. More recently, protests against alleged electoral fraud following the 2009 Iranian presidential election demonstrated the power of not just the Web but also of social networking sites. The catalyst for the uprising was when Neda Agha-Soltan, a young female Iranian, was shot and killed by police during a protest. Amateur videos of the episode and her death spread virally across the Internet after being posted to Facebook and YouTube, and were eventually picked up by mainstream media coverage. This sparked solidarity among Iranians abroad in the United States, Britain, and Canada who protested outside of Iranian embassies in Washington, DC, London, and Toronto in solidarity (Bawaba 2009).

CONTRASTING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTERNET ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The above examples support the more celebratory theoretical affirmations of the power of the Internet and claims among scholars that it can help build a new form of civil society based on what Castells (2001) calls the “electronic grass-rooting” of democracy. The power of horizontal networks of interactive communication via a many-to-many flow of communication, and the increased visibility of opinions and opportunities to network in the virtual sphere are viewed among many researchers as advantageous to political struggle. ICTs such as the Internet are in many ways resistant to state regulation and control over information and communication, and the flexibility and efficiency among online groups allows them to embrace a new type of civic engagement at the grassroots level and form “virtual public spheres” (Bennett & Iyengar 2008) and “post subcultures” (Kahn & Kellner 2004). Online networks also flatten bureaucratic structures and make boundaries more permeable and can lead to more collaborative decision-making and strengthen a sense of collective identity and community. Additionally, they result in a shift toward more fluid, issue-based group politics which can promote permanent campaigns and broad networks despite relatively weak ties.

These scholars also credit the Internet’s ability to create a “spillover” effect whereby online organizing, recruitment strategies, and information sharing lead to offline engagement in local and concrete settings.

Critical theoretical perspectives of the Internet, however, contend that social relations in cyberspace are not a substitute for traditional and face-to-face forms of community, protest, and collective identity, and these may in fact weaken forms of political engagement (Bimber 2003). Many discussion groups and listservs tend to be composed of like-minded people, and citizens self-select issues relevant to them. Other critiques highlight elite domination over cyberspace and control over listservs
by gatekeepers, as well as the digital divide regarding access to computers. Others note the phenomenon of “Cyberbalkanization” or the “echo chamber” effect (Putnam 2000). This means that online discussions can lead to fragmentation and polarization as viewers choose sites and discussion boards in search of like-minded people.

Additionally, state authorities can use sophisticated monitoring software to facilitate surveillance and repression via social media especially when material is deemed political or critical of the government. This was the case in Iran following the 2009 protests against the reelection of president Ahmadinejad whereby the government effectively shut down certain pro-opposition web sites and access to social networking sites (Bawaba 2009). Another example is Google’s announcement in January 2010 that it may pull out of China after hackers tried to access Gmail accounts of human rights activists.

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

ICTs are certainly not monopolized by progressive social movement actors, and the Internet has both democratic and antidemocratic potentials. In addition to state control and regulation, conservative and extremist grassroots groups use the Internet, as well as other digital media such as MySpace, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in similar ways that marginalized groups do. The demonstrations against healthcare reform and the Tea Parties across the United States in general, as well as the use of the Internet to increase recruitment for jihad groups or the Ku Klux Klan, are some relevant examples. The dialogue within the social movement literature thus far, however, is limited regarding the undemocratic nature of the Internet. This serves as a fruitful area for more rigorous investigation. Also, more longitudinal and comparative studies, rather than just case studies, can help further the field of social movement research.

SEE ALSO: Culture jamming; Electronic protest; Hackers; Indymedia (the Independent Media Center); Media activism; Technology and social movements; Transnational Zapatism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Resource mobilization, a dominant theoretical approach to the study of social movements for many decades, points to social movement organizations (SMOs) as a focal point for efforts to understand the variations in both the impact and fate of social movements. SMOs, like other types of political organizations, are expected to represent members' common preferences for some specified social change, acting to bring about such change by influencing formal political decisions, or the values and behaviors of the members of a polity, or both. In this context, the classic analysis offered by Robert Michels (1962) of typical evolutionary processes in the governance of political organizations, and the impact of such processes on organizations’ goals, is very relevant to scholars of social movements. Early studies of social movements often drew heavily on Michels’ work (e.g., Messinger 1955; Sills 1957; Zald & Denton 1963; Zald & Ash 1966), documenting and fleshing out the nature of the evolutionary processes he posited, and the transformational consequences for social movements. Concern with movement transformation has been less dominant in contemporary work, despite a lack of evidence that such processes are any less operative in current movement organizations. Below, the key processes involved in what Michels’ referred to as the “iron law of oligarchy” are sketched, followed by a brief discussion of some of the implications of this analysis for social movement researchers.

Drawing on his own disillusioning experiences as a member and supporter of a socially liberal political party in early twentieth-century Germany, Michels described a number of conditions and processes that inevitably impel (in his view) even the most democratically committed organizations to become divided into a set of elites, or oligarchs, with their own set of distinctive interests in the organization, and the rest of the membership, whose labor and resources are exploited by the elites. The first condition precipitating the drift to such an oligarchical system is, ironically, success in recruiting new members to the organization’s cause. As organizations grow, the ability of members to participate equally in organizational decisions becomes progressively more difficult, both because it is hard to find a place and time for all members to assemble and because decision making is significantly slowed – not infrequently to a standstill – as the number of decision-makers increases. The usual response to such problems is delegation of responsibility to a relatively small subset of members for formulating and recommending lines of action. Although members may attempt to maintain democratic control by demanding extensive explanations for leaders’ proposals and maintaining ultimate voting rights on these, a number of forces militate against such control.

First, as a very large body of research on organizations has documented, increases in organizational size lead to increases in complexity – the creation of separate, specialized positions and units to carry out different tasks – as well as to increases in rules and formal processes. Thus, effective administration requires both hard-to-gain, specialized knowledge of these aspects of the organization (Michels referred to these as “administrative secrets”), and what are often scarce organizing talents, such as the ability to manage interpersonal relations and to conduct logistical planning. This limits the ability of rank-and-file members to challenge leaders’ recommendations or decisions, and to replace them; thus, power increasingly inheres in the leadership.

Moreover, once ensconced, leaders are likely to acquire vested interests in maintaining their positions in the organization. As with complexity and formalization, increasing
organizational size also typically leads to the creation of full-time administrative positions; thus, office-holding becomes a means through which incumbents make their livelihood. Michels argued that this, in turn, makes it likely that the leaders will ultimately recognize their common interests in maintaining their positions within the organization, and develop a sense of solidarity with one another (becoming, in Marxian terminology, like a classe fur sich). As such, they are inclined to act cohesively in fending off criticisms and warding off displacement efforts by the membership. If serious challenges are not readily suppressed, the leaders may resort to co-optation of individual rank-and-file members, thus effectively hobbling lower-level resistance. Because their continued position also depends on the survival of the organizations, Michels also suggested that leaders of once-radical protest organizations are likely to guide them in an increasingly conservative direction, to minimize chances of state or general social sanctioning, and the ultimate disbanding of the organization. Given these commonplace evolutionary developments in organizations, Michels was led to the famous, pessimistic conclusion (1962: 365), “He who says organization, says oligarchy.”

As noted at the outset, Michels’ analysis has provided the basis for a number of classic studies documenting the evolution and transformation of social movements; it has also generated efforts to define conditions that may mitigate the postulated evolutionary processes (see Lipset, Trow, & Coleman 1956; Rothschild-Whitt 1979). In a classic analysis, Zald and Ash (1966) identified a number of conditions that affect the probabilities of oligarchical transformation, including the consonance between an SMO’s goals and values commonly held in society, the nature of the incentives provided to members and their involvement in an SMO, and the occurrence of turnover in founding members. It has been revisited, although somewhat less directly, in research and debates on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of professional employees by social movement organizations (e.g., Jenkins 1977; McAdam 1983; Staggenborg 1988). A key implication of Michels’ work for social movement researchers, however, has been given only limited attention: the need to understand sources of variations in governance arrangements, and their impact on SMO decision-making processes and outcomes. Some progress has begun to be made on this front (e.g., Carmin & Balser 2002; Jasper 2004; Osterman 2006; see also Tolbert & Hiatt 2009, for an extension to business organizations), and recent studies have explicitly called for more work (Minkoff & McCarthy 2005), but it remains an important, largely unexplored legacy of Michels.

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratization and social movements; Institutionalization of social movements; Leadership; Movements within institutions/organizations; Organizations and movements; Participatory democracy in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Journalism and social movements
ALICE MATTONI

When looking at journalism from a social movement perspective, there are two possible viewpoints. On the one side, the journalistic field, its rules and values, routines and practices, is external to the social movement milieu. On the other side, the very notion of journalism has always intertwined with grassroots communities of activists that rethink and reshape journalistic practices from a bottom-up perspective. In the first case, scholars investigate the interactions between social movements and journalism at large, where journalism denotes mainstream journalistic practices. In the second case, conversely, scholars research the development of so-called alternative and grassroots journalistic practices within activist communities and networks.

Interactions between social movements and journalism situated into mainstream and for-profit media corporations usually rest on an asymmetric distribution of symbolic power in naming realities and give visibility to oppositional claims and demands. Both journalists and activists work at the symbolic level in that they participate in the elaboration of public and political discourses. Social movements, however, need journalists to reach wide audiences, but journalists do not need social movements in order to have news published in the press (Rucht 2004). Several studies underline the difficulties for social movements in achieving unbiased representation within the press. Due to the presence of strong news values, such as proximity and violence, usually both a selection and description bias characterizes journalistic accounts of demonstrations, rallies, and strikes (McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith 1996; Smith et al. 2001). This means that fewer mobilizations than those which actually occur receive journalistic coverage and, frequently, mobilizations able to gain journalistic accounts and reports suffer from misrepresentation and misrecognition. A factor influencing the limited access to mainstream news is the strong competition for news coverage amongst political and nonpolitical actors that surround contentious issues: political parties, interest groups, governments, and activist groups compete in the same arena to voice their own definitions and interpretations of a given contested topic (Ferree et al. 2002). In this competition, activist groups are usually the weaker ones in terms of material resources. Other political and nonpolitical actors than social movements, furthermore, often have a central role in the political and economic fields, which in turn have a strong influence on the journalistic field. Finally, journalists usually seek reliable and stable news sources, while social movements are changing and fluid subjects that refuse some of the dynamics on which the press relies. In the case of the Global Justice Movement, for instance, the movement often refuses to have an official spokesperson, while journalists prefer to have easily identifiable activists from whom they can elicit information about mobilizations.

The difficult interaction between journalism and social movements creates a dilemma for activists. Social movements, indeed, seek recognition in societies and they do so in an attempt to gain journalistic coverage. At the same time, however, they develop knowledge about journalistic routines and news values, through past experience and as active audiences, so that they frequently develop a negative image of journalism. The result is a continuous tension between the need to gain coverage and the awareness of the negative role that journalism may have for social movements in reporting mobilizations. For this reason, social movements often engage in several types of interactions within and at the borders of the journalistic field.
They accept and adapt to journalistic news values. They refuse and subvert journalistic routines. But they can also create alternative models of journalism that challenge the dominant one (Rucht 2004). The second viewpoint on social movements and journalism highlights the existence of bottom-up approaches to journalistic practices that is revisited through the involvement of activists and citizens that create and diffuse reports outside mainstream media corporations and within alternative, radical, autonomous, and independent media. Activists producing accounts of their own mobilizations and discourses act as grassroots and alternative journalists who put into question news values and organizational patterns at work in mainstream journalism. They, indeed, engage in a form of “native journalism,” according to which the boundaries between the news source and the person writing the news dissolve (Atton & Hamilton 2008).

Difficult interactions between social movements and mainstream journalism as well as the engagement with alternative journalism within the social movement milieu existed in the past and will continue to exist in the future. What changes, however, is the mediated space where this twofold interaction between journalism and activism takes place. The emergence of information and communication technologies contributes to a blurring of the boundaries between mainstream and alternative journalism in the online and offline environment. Portable communication devices like cell phones, for instance, render virtually everyone capable of reporting on demonstrations and struggles in the streets. Nonprofessional journalists produce video and audio accounts that are then uploaded into the online mainstream press. This enlarges the opportunities for social movements to gain visibility, but opens up new questions related to the role of mainstream journalism and alternative journalism in the construction of the public and political debates.

SEE ALSO: Indymedia (the Independent Media Center); Media activism; Media and social movements; Technology and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Law and social movements
STEVEN A. BUTCHER and JAMES E. STOBAUGH

Legal institutions, elites, and norms played an important role in the development of social movements over the latter half of the twentieth century, yet social movement scholars have only recently begun to take notice. The subfield of law and social movements has developed in two separate but increasingly integrated fields – legal scholarship and social movement scholarship – and has developed around two broad sets of research questions. First, is litigation an effective strategy for social movements? Second, what role does law play in shaping the trajectories of social movements? Early research tended to focus on the question of effectiveness, but more recent scholarship has expanded to include analyses focusing on the dynamic role that law plays in shaping movement trajectories. Here we focus on how legal institutions and strategies have been incorporated into existing social movement theories.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Traditional scholarship on law and social movements has been skeptical of the effectiveness of litigation as a viable tactic for social change. Sociolegal scholars have analyzed the many ways that law, as a formal institution, is biased toward the status quo and reinforces social hierarchies (Galanter 1974; Kairys 1998). To the extent that outsiders rely on law and rights-based strategies, these scholars have painted a pessimistic picture for successful social change. Early movement studies were very critical about litigation as a strategy for achieving broad-based social change. Indeed, the classic works of both Stuart Scheingold (2004) and Joel Handler (1978) were highly skeptical about the effectiveness of litigation. These scholars argued that litigation was a conservative strategy dominated by elites and that it saps the energy from more political and broad-based grassroots organizing (see also Meyer & Boucher 2007).

The lure of litigation, spurred in part by the successes of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) campaign to end desegregation, has led subsequent social movements to take faith in a “myth of rights” – a view that directly links rights, litigation, and social change together in a unilateral process (Scheingold 2004: 5). Scheingold argues, however, that relying on the courts alone removes movement struggles away from being political struggles and that activists are more effective when they focus on the “politics of rights” – the infusion of rights strategies into a broader political strategy that includes multiple modes of activism. As Scheingold (2004: 8) notes, “litigation is more useful in fomenting change when used as an agent of political mobilization than when it is employed in the more conventional manner – that is, for asserting and realizing rights.” Echoing many of these arguments, Gerald Rosenberg (1991) argues that litigation strategies reflect a “hollow hope” for substantive policy reform. Drawing upon an impressive array of data across a variety of movement campaigns, Rosenberg concludes that litigation almost never leads to significant social change, and to the extent that it might, it is due to the unusual circumstances leading to the overcoming of judicial constraints, including elite and public support, low levels of opposition, and compliance incentives. Indeed, as Rosenberg illustrates, the NAACP’s desegregation campaign, which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, spurred local opposition to enforcement and the mobilization of a strong countermovement – resulting in political failure, even though the litigation campaign was a success.

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THE CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Although early scholarship was skeptical about the role of litigation for social change, recent scholarship has focused on the more subtle, nuanced, and dynamic ways that law affects social movement processes. Moreover, whereas early scholars focused on a top-down, formalistic relationship between legal institutions and social movements, recent scholarship decenters law from a narrow focus on the courts and shifts the analysis to the social movement – focusing on the constitutive role that law plays in movement dynamics. As Michael McCann states, “law provides both normative principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social struggle . . . the primary project of legal mobilization analysis is aimed at the constitutive role of legal rights both as a strategic resource and as a constraint, as a source of empowerment and disempowerment, for struggles to transform, or to reconstitute, the terms of social relations and power” (McCann 2006: 22). Consequently, scholarship has focused on how law structures the very terrain that activists navigate in their struggles to reconstitute social relations. Indeed, in line with this perspective, the research agenda has been directed toward the indirect effects of law and litigation, focusing on how activists have used litigation to leverage power from targeted groups, build organizational resources, and mobilize constituents. This line of research also questions the assumption that lawyers necessarily co-opt and channel movement strategies – demonstrating that legal strategies are often incorporated in conjunction with other political strategies (McCann 1994; Cummings & Eagly 2001).

Studying law and social movements as a bottom-up, constitutive process aligns socio-legal scholarship with the long tradition of social movement scholarship that focuses on resources, political opportunities and threats, and framing. However, social movement scholars have been slow to include law in their models of movement processes. Nonetheless, there is a burgeoning line of research, which builds from a constitutive perspective.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES AND THE LAW

Resource mobilization

Resource mobilization theory explains social movement mobilization, outcomes, and longevity from the standpoint of the resources available to movements (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Litigation can provide important resources to a movement to sustain its challenges. Historically, the view of law as a resource has focused on the availability of lawyers to represent the movement’s interest in the court (Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger 1978). Lawyers bring important resources, including professional skills, knowledge, and legitimacy, to a movement, which are vital to navigate the complexities of the legal system. However, recent research has also shown that legal advocacy organizations can be also constrained because they privilege certain types of claims over others (Levitsky 2006). Other research has shown that the threat of litigation is often a valuable resource in balancing the power inequalities between challengers and their targets. For example, McCann (1994) illustrated that the threat of litigation by pay equity reformers was often enough to leverage management into bargaining with workers. Furthermore, others have found that litigation can provide indirect resources outside of the courts, including raising money from supporters and raising awareness of the issue in the media (Handler 1978; McCann 1994).

Political opportunity

Recent scholarship has incorporated the legal arena as a component of a movement’s overall political opportunity structure – representing both the “stable” and “volatile” dimensions of the theory (Pedriana 2004; see also Gamson & Meyer 1996). For example, legal systems (e.g., federalism in the United States) represent
a stable context that shapes social movement strategies whereas court decisions are examples of the volatile forms of political opportunity (Pedriana 2004: 184).

Focusing on court decisions as an element of political opportunity, sociolegal scholars have demonstrated that positive decisions can facilitate subsequent movement activity. For example, in his study of pay equity reform, McCann (1994) has shown how a positive victory expanded the space for activism—facilitating a "rights-consciousness" among female workers and spurring them into action. Similarly, in their studies of the civil rights movement, both McAdam (1982) and Morris (1984) illustrated that the victory in *Brown v. Board of Education* facilitated increased mobilization.

In her study of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement, Andersen (2005) developed a "legal opportunity structure" framework, which focuses on the importance of the institutional character of the courts. Courts can be more or less open to opponents at different points in time, which structures the types of strategies and cases that activists bring forward. Furthermore, recent scholarship has demonstrated how the expansion of legal opportunities for one group has affected subsequent movements. For example, Meyer and Boutcher (2007) argue that *Brown v. Board of Education* not only helped shape the expectations of the civil rights movement—by creating an opening in the legal and political system that the civil rights movement seized—but that the perception of a progressive court affected the legal strategies of other rights-based movements on both sides of the political spectrum.

**Framing**

Finally, there is a growing interest in the relationship between social movement framing and legal frames. Social movement frames are interpretive schemes that activists use to highlight problems, propose solutions, and mobilize constituents (Snow et al. 1986). It is through these frames that activists impart meaning to the environment, institutions, and their interactions with others. Recent scholarship has shown that framing toward the court matters for how a movement constructs its identity and for outcomes (Bernstein et al. 2009; Pedriana 2006). For example, Pedriana’s (2006) research on legal frames examined the contest that occurred internally within the National Organization for Women about which legal frames the movement should pursue. Similarly, in her study of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Andersen (2005) shows that the organization changed its strategy to pursue different legal frames at different times. Specifically, the issue of sodomy repeal was initially pursued using the legal frame of "privacy" but shifted to an "equal protection" frame in a later court challenge. Legal framing strategies are often contested and both examples highlight the consequences of legal frame selection, which can include both legal and symbolic cultural victories (Pedriana 2006: 1753). Beyond framing to the court, framing also matters in the legislative formation of laws. McCammon and her colleagues have shown the importance of strategic framing in influencing the adoption of laws allowing women to serve on juries (McCammon et al. 2008; McCammon 2012).

The choice of legal frames is constrained by several factors. Courts legitimize certain legal arguments over others, which affects the framing decisions of activists (Stobaugh & Snow 2010). Furthermore, opposing movements also influence the legal frames that activists choose (Andersen 2005). Because the American legal system is inherently adversarial, legal frames must counter the frames of the opposition within the acceptable institutional context. For example, the shift in legal frames utilized by creationists in advocating for intelligent design is a case where a social movement had to reframe itself in an institutionally acceptable manner but in so doing it also attempted to neutralize its rival’s framing strategy (Stobaugh & Snow 2010).
CONCLUSION

The intersection of law and social movements is a growing area of inquiry; however, mainstream scholarship remains slow to incorporate law as a central institution shaping social movement processes. Law is not only a target for activism, but is also a source of cultural meaning that shapes the terrain that activists navigate in their ongoing struggles for social change. Recent research has expanded upon these insights and we hope that scholars continue to incorporate law and legal institutions into existing social movement theories.

SEE ALSO: Cause lawyering; Framing and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Leadership
BELINDA ROBNETT

Surprisingly little is known about leadership in social movements (Morris & Staggenborg 2004). It is not that there are no studies on leaders or leadership. Indeed, nearly all studies of social movements include some acknowledgment or discussion of the role of leadership in relation to, for example, recruitment, mobilization, or the achievement of goals. Rather, the area suffers from weak theoretical development, and a general failure to place leaders and leadership at the center of the analysis. Leadership is often tangential to analyses of social movement development, goals, tactics, and outcomes. Until recently, leadership has been treated as a structurally or socially constituted dependent variable, thus we know little about its independent effect on social movements.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Max Weber and Robert Michels have shaped our approaches to the study of leaders and leadership in social movements. Weber posited that there are three types of legitimate authority, legal, traditional, and charismatic (Weber 1947). Individuals will follow leaders only inasmuch as they fulfill the requirements of one of the three types. Just as Weber asserts the inevitability of the routinization of authority accompanied by bureaucratic structure, so too Michels argues that leaders of social movements eventually come to serve their own interests rather than that of the group they purportedly represent. The bureaucratization of the movement through party formation leads to the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1962). The party leaders become isolated from their followers, and defend their own particular interests. Michels believed that “one dominant class inevitably succeeds to another” and that the principle of oligarchy is a “preordained form of the common life” (1962: 354). Both Weber and Michels view leadership as largely a product of structural forces (see Barker 2001). Legal authority and traditional authority as well as the “iron law of oligarchy” emerge from the nature of the structures inhabited by the leader. Charismatic authority is an exception, but it is temporary and cannot be sustained before succumbing to organizational imperatives.

PROBLEM APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

Early sociological trends

Aminzade and colleagues provide an excellent critique of the theoretical treatment of leadership in social movements, arguing that structuralists, culturalists, and rationalists neglect the independent effect of leaders on social movement outcomes. Early sociological research on social movement leadership focused on structural imperatives, rendering leadership as either a dependent variable or an indirect variable (Aminzade, Goldstone, & Perry 2001). Adhering to the work of Weber and Michels, the research emphasized the impact of organizational shifts from the peak of activism to routinized bureaucracy on leadership change. In moving away from overly deterministic perspectives, scholars of social movements adopted Talcott Parsons’ general theory of action, which views leadership as a product of group processes with a focus on its relative influence in the decision-making process. Although extensively criticized for its failure to take power relations into account, the shift to a conceptualization of leadership as a product of group interactions broadened our understanding of the multiple contexts in which movement leaders operate.

Subsequently, scholars employed an organizational and institutional analysis in the study

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of social movements. Organizations form clusters because of incentives and their pursuit of specific goals. As a result of internal struggles and external pressures, particular types of organizations emerge, each requiring a specific type of leader. Leadership status, then, is conferred upon those individuals who can fulfill the organization’s needs.

Another area of earlier research on movement leadership applied a rational theory approach to examine why individuals choose to serve as leaders, and emphasized the costs and benefits of leadership. The costs include the expenditure of time and energy, and the benefits may include status, monetary benefits, and deference goods or psychological gratification. Ultimately, this explanation also rests on structural imperatives. Leaders lead because the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Research shows deference incentives or psychological gratification is not enough to overcome the costs (Oberschall 1973), thus structural incentives provide the basis for continued leadership. The structuralist and rational choice approaches treat leadership as a dependent variable that is determined by the organizational or movement needs and resources.

The contemporary treatment of social movement leadership

Much of the contemporary treatment of leadership in both the political process models and framing traditions views leaders as intermediaries or tacticians, between the movement and the state, or between culturally held beliefs and followers. Theoretically, leaders emerge from organizational structures and because of political opportunities. As Morris and Staggenborg (2004) have pointed out, not all leaders take advantage of political opportunities (Oberschall 1973), but they maintain that leadership emerges from preexisting structures.

Morris and Braine (2001) provide a significant contribution to our understanding of the relationship between leadership emergence and the type of a social movement. In liberation movements such as the US civil rights movement, leaders emerge from preexisting institutions such as the Black church; in special issue movements such as the abortion rights movement, they emerge from preexisting, related movements such as the women’s movement; and in social responsibility movements, leaders may emerge suddenly, as in the Mothers Against Drunk Drivers Movement (MADD). Cultural tradition and political contexts are central to their analysis, but these are mediated through structures. In the case of the civil rights movement, tradition dictated that Black ministers lead the movement, and Candy Lightner spearheaded MADD because she framed the culturally resonant message of the “killer drunk” that supported the “personal responsibility” ideology promoted by 1980s conservatives during the Ronald Reagan era (Morris & Braine 2001). As scholars have pointed out, not all leaders emerged from the church. At the time, the church tradition and culture did not support women as formal leaders, yet their leadership emerged less from structures than from the cultural context of their communities and spontaneous events (Robnett 1997). Thus, while structural analyses help us to understand the emergence of some leaders, it only provides a partial understanding of who becomes a movement leader and how.

Although critical to our understanding of social movement processes, the framing approach provides another example of the limits of structural and cultural analyses as they have been generally applied. Leaders serve as protest persuaders, emphasize success in the face of defeat, transform cultural understandings, and market and package issues. Movements are movements because leaders successfully frame a core set of beliefs to which followers align their understandings. This approach neglects the multiple variations in the success of frame alignment.

Leaders must choose among a large array of resonant long-standing beliefs, amplifying some, altering others, and choosing to downplay those that will undermine the movement’s
ability to recruit or sustain followers. The framing perspective provides agency to leaders, but often neglects the negotiation processes (Payerhin & Zirakzadeh 2006) or the ways in which such processes determine movement outcomes. As Payerhin and Zirakzadeh acknowledge, some framing analysts discuss internal disagreements and factions, but nonetheless focus on consensus.

A relational perspective views movements as segmented contentious entities (Melucci 1996). Leaders must expend considerable energy building some semblance of temporary cohesion. That frames are critical to this process is undisputed. What we do not know are the circumstances under which leaders are best able to achieve consensus. What types of leaders are most able to unify meanings and contending movement groups? What types of leadership structures, both within the movement as a whole and within specific movement organizations, are most amenable to frame alignment? In order to answer these questions, researchers must examine the direct effects of leadership on social movement outcomes.

RELATIONAL APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP

The relational approach to leadership challenges the notions that rational choices and/or organizational needs determine who becomes a leader and leadership styles. It illuminates the processes through which actors acquire and maintain authority. Organizational structures both within and outside of the movement remain important, but within a relational context. Conceptually, leadership may consist of an individual authority or levels of individuals with authority within a movement (Ganz 2000). Authority, however, stems not just from the internal dynamics of a movement but also from the acknowledgment of opponents, the media, and other supporters. Leaders operate in a field in which they must simultaneously focus on external and internal interactions.

Charismatic, traditional, and legal–rational authority are products of the processes of authority legitimization. The interaction patterns between each of three types of leaders – charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic – and social movement followers is the central focus of the relational approach. This processional model gives agency to leaders as, for example, the charismatic leader must initiate her/his role, by articulating for and acting on behalf of the community.

Although this approach represents a significant conceptual and theoretical leap, several gaps remain. Our understandings of the relational processes through which leaders gain leadership status, inspire commitment, and influence movement outcomes require further development. The focus of much of this research remains on leaders’ capacities to manipulate movement strategies and tactics in response to political opportunities or repression. We still know little about the nature of the relationship between organizational structure and leadership capacity, the social psychological aspects of the interactions between leaders and followers, or the relative influence of different levels of leadership on organizational capacity.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL GAPS

Organizational structure and leadership capacity

There is little attention paid to the nature of the relationship between organizational structure and leadership capacity. “To progress beyond Weber, scholars need to construct empirically based typologies that can tap the kinds of leadership within SMOs over time and can also relate organizational characteristics to expected bases of authority” (Baker 1982: 335). Ganz’s (2000) richly detailed comparative analysis of the United Farm Workers (UFW) and Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), for example, provides the basis upon which further research may be built.
Ganz’s focus on what he terms the strategic capacities of organizations and leadership includes three key areas. Both organizations and leaders are more likely to effectuate successful movement outcomes if they have access to salient knowledge about the local or global environment, cultivate heuristic processes that are deliberative and inclusive of multiple repertoires and ideas, and are personally, as opposed to professionally, motivated and committed because of intrinsic rewards. Conceptually, Ganz’s work expands our knowledge of the factors that enhance successful strategic organization and leadership capacities. However, in his formulation, organizational structure and leadership capacity operate as separate entities, each with a set of strategic capacities. Unlike the UFW, AWOC failed to organize support because of its hierarchical organization and the professional rather than personal style of its leadership. What is unclear is the extent to which the organizations reflect the leadership types, or the leadership types reflect the organizational structures. Moreover, there is some suggestion that the outcomes may have been influenced, in part, by the race-ethnicity of the leaders.

Identity

Recent scholarship finds that race-ethnicity influences organizational life and can enable or constrain leadership. Nepstad’s and Bob’s (2006) research shows that ascribed characteristics impact the success of movement strategies. They posit that successful leadership capital is comprised of cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital. Leaders must possess localized cultural capital or an understanding of a community’s grievances, universalistic cultural capital, or knowledge of the broader society’s “values, sympathies, cultural principles, and political trends,” and transcultural skills or the ability to connect to groups in other movements. Social capital is essential in the form of strong ties to members but, in larger groups, the primary leader must have strong ties to secondary leaders. In comparing two anti-Vietnam direct action Plowshares movements, the authors find that, with similar cultural and social capital, the US Plowshares movement was successfully mobilized in contrast to the movement waged in Sweden. The former was led by priests who framed the message around biblical texts. In more secular Sweden, male leaders attempted to frame the movement ideology with a popular feminist discourse. Their attempts failed largely because they were men (Nepstad & Bob 2006). Thus, symbolic capital derived from status or ascribed qualities matters. Specific leader qualities can determine the acceptance or rejection of a resonant frame.

Still, many unanswered questions remain. First, given that symbolic capital is dependent upon perceptions, which perceptions count? Who is designated “the leader” of a movement variously requires the acknowledgement of followers, the larger public, state actors, and supporters. How does this relational process work? Second, recent scholarship has failed to systematically analyze the ways in which such constructions may influence leadership styles, movement structures, and strategic choices. Feminist organizations have been characterized as collectives that require consensus in decision making and nurture an ethic of care. It is clear that the style of leadership and decision-making processes may be influenced by the identity of the leader. Third, there is evidence that identity constructs influence strategic choices. Baker’s (1982) research on a lesbian-feminist group shows that the leaders’ commitment to radical egalitarianism led them to consciously sacrifice organizational maintenance. In keeping with Weber’s and Michels’ predictions, the organization moved from a less structured organization to a bureaucratic hierarchical model, but the leaders’ personal commitment to anti-masculine models of egalitarianism led them to dismantle it (Baker 1982). Comparative analyses of different types of movements over time are needed to determine if, when, and how identity influences social movements.
MULTIPLE LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP

Levels of leadership are also associated with ascribed characteristics and the social meanings attached to them. Both gender and race served to constrain and enhance the leadership capacities of participants in the civil rights movement. For example, black women’s leadership contrasted with that of black men and white women. While black men occupied formal leadership positions, black women largely served as bridge leaders, who through face-to-face interactions fostered ties between the social movement and local communities. White women’s leadership was significantly more constrained. Traveling throughout the South with black male activists often provoked violence, so their leadership skills were generally focused on connecting white mainstream institutions to the movement. All three types of leadership, however, were crucial to the success of the civil rights movement (Robnett 1997). Most studies of leadership in social movements focus exclusively on a single leader or a small core of primary leaders. Leadership, however, is often comprised of multiple levels, as organizations may include grassroots branches or other tiers of leadership. Leadership teams are found to reduce or prevent burnout, to sustain long-term leaders that in turn support the longevity of a movement (Reger & Staggenborg 2006), and to facilitate strategies that cultivate both a general membership and a loyal cadre (Robnett & Alabi forthcoming). Analyses of the multiple roles and levels of leaders may tell us a great deal about leadership capacity, about the ability of movements to create a movement culture or collective identity, and about the ability of movements to frame cognitive understandings and respond to emotional needs.

CONCLUSION

The relational approach to the study of leadership in social movements is promising, but we must guard against the tendency to reduce the role of leaders to that of strategists or tacticians who simply fulfill the needs of movements. Leaders are much more than intermediaries, and analyses of leadership in social movements should examine their independent effect. To be sure, leaders must develop strategies, respond to crises, interact with state or institutional officials, persuade followers and potential adherents, and frame movement outcomes. However, leaders and leadership structures are more than the sum of these parts. Leader characteristics such as gender or ethnicity matter inasmuch as such qualities may inspire or dissuade others to act, impede or enhance democratic processes, and connote status or power. Leaders do not emerge in a vacuum, but derive acceptance and acknowledgement from others, determined largely by socially constructed and culturally embedded understandings of who should lead. As scholars of social movements, we must be as concerned about who becomes a leader as by who does not.

One way to avoid slippage into a structurally deterministic analysis of leadership is to examine relations of power. This necessarily entails a comprehensive understanding of the relationships between multiple levels of leaders, between leaders across the movement sector, between leaders and state actors, between leaders and followers, and between leaders and opponents. Analyses of frames, strategies, tactics, and organizational structure do not always tell us about the relational dynamics of power that produced them.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Culture and social movements; Entrepreneurs, movement; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Organizations and movements; Social capital and social movements; Strategy.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Leadership

Life history research and social movements

Catherine Corrigall-Brown and Mabel Ho

Life history research is a useful technique in qualitative methodology. This technique is suited for researchers interested in generating rich and textured detail about social processes, understanding the intersection between personal narratives and social structures, and focusing on individual agency and social context. Life history research captures the participants’ subjectivities while being aware of potential pitfalls such as generalizations and memory recall problems. Life history research can deepen our understanding of social processes, including social movements. Here we examine what life history research is and when it is used. Through an examination of two social movement studies that employ these techniques, we assess the utility of these methods. We conclude by discussing potential problems associated with this methodology and how to deal with these issues.

WHAT IS LIFE HISTORY RESEARCH?

Life history research explores how the individual, group, or organization experiences and interprets their particular circumstances (Denzin 1989). In practice, methods that employ life history research are varied, including life history interviewing, biography, case history, ethnography, and oral history. The focus for the life history researcher is to situate the participants’ lived experiences in the broader economic, social, historical, cultural, and political context (Cole & Knowles 2001). As a qualitative methodology, life history research is interested in the subjective experience of participants. Because of this, research in this tradition directs attention to the participants’ perception of what issues are central. As a result, life history research has a potential to be filled with rich and nuanced descriptions when exploring a particular phenomenon.

Life histories in social movement research are oriented toward understanding the experiences of individual activists over time and exploring the interaction between macro events such as protests and social movements with individual actions and identities. In life history interviewing, the informant herself or himself is often the subject of study, in addition to serving as an observer and narrator of the past. Scholars using life histories pay close attention to how individuals tell stories about their past and to how their accounts of social movement participation fit with other events in their lives (Blee & Taylor 2002).

WHEN IS LIFE HISTORY RESEARCH USED?

While there are a number of different ways that life history research can be used, we focus on the role of life history techniques within interviewing. Interviewing has a number of benefits as a methodology. Through interviewing methods, scholars can gain access to the motivations and perspectives of a broader and more diverse group of social movement participants than would be represented in most documentary sources and brings the role of agency to center stage. In addition, interviewing allows researchers to scrutinize the semantic context and meanings of statements by social movement participants and leaders. Interviews can provide a longitudinal window on social movement activism and allow social movement scholars access to such nuanced understandings of social movement outcomes as the construction of collective and individual identities (Blee & Taylor 2002).

Blee (2003) describes four important contributions life history interviews bring to social movement studies. First, as life history
research is participant centered, researchers are able to draw connections between identity and ideology as understood by the participants. This personal narrative construction allows the researcher to pinpoint tipping points in an individual’s life. Second, the life-story technique provides political and discursive context of the social movement. Third, life history traces the cause and effect in participants’ lives and how the individual’s life trajectory intersects with broader societal changes. In other words, this technique allows for conceptual dimensions of time, agency, and context to be explored critically and to assess their interactions in an individual’s life. Fourth, the life history approach can capture the patterns of participation in social movements. For example, issues surrounding strategies involved in mobilizing social action and the dynamics within a social organization can be explored. Life histories provide rich depth and a thorough examination of individual subjectivities. The goal of the researcher is to locate and identify the interaction between individual narratives and the context that surrounds it.

LIFE HISTORY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

There is a wealth of research within social movements that uses life history methods. We focus on two examples of such studies: Blee (2003) and Corrigall-Brown (2011). These studies illustrate how life history interviews can be used to answer fundamental research questions in the area of social movements.

Blee’s (2003) study of women members of the contemporary US racist movement used life history interviewing to explore how women, often from secure, stable, and politically moderate backgrounds, come to be committed to the violent and extremist agenda of organized racism. Blee’s decision to use life history interviewing was shaped by her theoretically informed interest in understanding racist activism as a constructed identity whose meaning changes with the increased exposure to a racist group. Through life history interviews with her participants, Blee challenges conventional preconceptions of the women who participate in hate groups and disentangles the cause and effect of why women join the racist movement. This analysis also illuminates the critical involvement women play in the hate movement in their roles in families, as social facilitators, and as recruiters. Thus, the life history approach is useful for exploring the internal dynamics within this social movement as well as providing rich insight to how organized racism perpetuates in contemporary times.

Corrigall-Brown’s (2011) study of individual trajectories of participation in social movements is also, in part, based on life history interviews. While quantitative data is used to assess the general demographic, biographical, and resource factors that predict participation in social movements, this type of quantitative data is less well suited for assessing the role of important factors like social ties and identity in predicting the trajectory of an individual’s participation over their lives. Because of this, Corrigall-Brown employed life history interviews with 60 activists in four movements in order to trace their engagement in social movements from their initial engagement until the present day. These interviews allow for an assessment of, for example, how individuals understand their identities as supportive of, or not connected to, their activism and how these identities change over time.

Both these studies illustrate how life history interviews can give a researcher insight into the ways that individuals make sense of their engagement in social movements and why they continue to participate in these groups over time. In addition, the element of time is explored in both studies, which enables the researcher to illustrate how the experiences of individuals evolve and change instead of being static and stationary. These life histories add to our understanding of larger social movement processes.
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN LIFE HISTORY

Biographical reconstruction and memory failure are always a problem in life history interviewing. Although revealing how social movement participants make sense of their lives, life histories need to be used with caution since they can be highly unreliable indicators of autobiographical change. For example, virtually all of Blee’s racist informants spoke of their decision to participate in an organized racist group as the result of a “conversion” (2003). Yet it was clear from their responses to a structured questionnaire that few became converted to racism before joining a racist group. Most joined through a personal connection to a current member and only then learned intensely racist ways of thinking. Mills’ (1940) insight that vocabularies of motive are often furnished “after the act” is a useful reminder that it is problematic to take at face value a respondent’s articulated reasons for joining a social movement. For this reason, social movement researchers need to weigh life history accounts against data from other sources.

There are a number of ways of dealing with this issue of biographical reconstruction. One technique used by Polletta (2002) to respond to these problems was by discussing particular decisions, sometimes showing interviewees portions of meeting minutes. In addition, she conducted a number of group interviews with two to six people, all with histories in the same organizations. From diminishing interviewees’ candor, the group setting allowed people to jog each other’s memories and to push each other to give unvarnished accounts of the internal dynamics of their organizations.

It is also useful to structure questions around past events rather than past attitudes because memories of events are more reliable (Markus 1986). In addition, research shows that more salient, less repetitive events are remembered with particular accuracy (Scott & Alwin 1998: 114). To this end, it is possible to ask respondents about memorable life events, such as the birth of a child or marriage, and then ask if this event had occurred before or after pivotal participation events. This makes it possible to assess more clearly the temporal order of events and cue respondents to the context in which they made particular decisions or experienced certain events.

CONCLUSION

Life history techniques can be used with a variety of qualitative research methods, such as ethnography and case studies. They provide rich descriptions of social processes, focus on the intersection between individual experience and social context, and allow for an examination of temporality. While there are potential problems with life history approaches, such as issues of recall and biographical reconstruction, these issues can be moderated through the use of techniques that help respondents more accurately recall information and situate that information in larger context. When used effectively, life history research can provide important insights into the dynamics and processes of social movements and illuminate key issues such as individual recruitment and participation in social movements, identity changes in movements over time, and the role of the individuals in larger social movement campaigns.

SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Collective identity; Conversion and new religious movements; Ethnography and social movements; Interviewing activists; Narratives; Racist social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Marxism and social movements

COLIN BARKER

One distinctive feature of Marxist thought is that it yokes together three ideas: class struggle, social movements, and social revolution. For Marx and Engels, struggle between classes was both a characteristic of exploitative modes of social production, but also the means by which class society could be abolished. Marxism thus generates a central theoretical and practical question. How can humanity emancipate itself from the toils of existing capitalist society and begin creating a new and different form of society?

There is a second question. How does the language of “class struggle” mesh with an understanding of “social movements” (or, simply, “movements”)? Marx, Engels, and their successors regularly used the term “movement” (and less regularly “social movement”), but none seems ever to have fully defined their usage. An account of Marxism’s approach to social movements must therefore involve a degree of selection and reconstruction, and must hold in mind that Marxism is itself both a contested and a developing tradition.

The main theme of Marxist thinking and practice is the struggle against capitalism as a system. Capitalism is one of a set of “modes of production,” a term delineating the dominant form in which human social cooperation is organized across a whole historical epoch. What distinguishes such modes of production, Marx suggested, is the particular form in which “unpaid surplus labor” is pumped out the class of immediate producers: “the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers” provides “the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and servitude, in short, the specific form of state in each case” (Marx 1981: 927).

The form taken by exploitation also shapes the ways that class struggle develops. Under capitalism, surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers in the money form, as surplus value, accumulated by the bearers of capital. This mode of cooperation is marked by a number of core contradictions and oppositions.

The inherent opposition of “economic interests” between capital and labor is interwoven with a contradiction between opposed legal–political principles. Value and surplus value rest on commodity production and exchange. That, Marx stresses, does indeed presuppose a form of freedom and equality between participants. The principles of market exchange, celebrated by liberalism, are indeed what he terms “Liberty, Equality, Property and Bentham” (Marx 1976: 280). Capitalism – unlike slave or feudal modes – can function with direct producers who are legally free and equal before the law, and who possess “rights.” Liberalism cannot, however, adequately explain how enormous surpluses are accumulated in a few hands alongside material poverty and propertylessness for the many. Behind the surface freedoms and formal equality of exchange Marx uncovers a netherworld of production where these relations are reversed. Here seeming equals are transformed into master and servant, capitalist and worker; here the freedom to make contracts becomes a world of “despotism,” where the propertyless labor under the command of and to enrich their rulers.

Capitalism’s inner movements are dominated not only by exploitation but also by competition – both between the bearers of capital and the bearers of labor power. Competition compels capitalists into endless innovation, giving this system its dynamic expansionism. Capitalism has, on one hand, generated vast increases in human productivity, and forcibly drawn the entire globe into a
single interacting world market, while, on the other hand, it is also a system beyond anyone’s power of control. It has produced untold riches alongside grinding poverty, ferocious expansions and convulsive collapses, immense growth in both human creativity and human destructiveness.

The “pumping” of surplus value, driven by competition, sets up systematic conflicts across the whole face of society. Class struggle, an inherent property of this system of social relations, is a two-sided affair: labor must find ways to evade or limit capital’s depredations just as capital must struggle to contain and overcome labor’s resistance. Even considered at its most abstract level, however, class struggle is interwoven with competitive impulses. Those who play the part of capital form a working fraternity vis-à-vis labor, while they are also (especially in periods of crisis) a band of “enemy brothers” (Marx 1981); and while labor may share common interests vis-à-vis capital, it too is divided by competition in labor markets into potentially “hostile brothers and sisters.”

In this system, the translation of “class interests” into political action is always liable to be a complex and difficult process, since the key social forces identified are also riven by inner rivalries and mutual conflicts. Just to add to the problems, Marx identifies two other reasons why the proletariat might find its gravedigging work difficult. First, “the dull compulsion of economic relations” means that the worker “by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of Nature” (Marx 1976: 899). Second, there is the impact of ideas supportive of the dominant social order: “The ruling ideas of every age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class” (Marx and Engels 1973: 85).

Historically, capitalism has expanded not only by “economic” means. Its history has included the colonial subjugation of whole peoples, slavery and other kinds of forced labor, wholesale depopulation and the forcible breaking up of older systems of social reproduction, immensely destructive wars, along with the promotion of racist, sexual, and religious oppression. The combination of capitalism’s development and resistance against it has always entailed more than a simple economic opposition between capital and labor.

For capitalism’s Marxist antagonists, these complexities set up both theoretical and practical–strategic problems, reflecting the need to understand and oppose capitalism at a number of different levels which are themselves interrelated. Marx’s own methodological reflections are very explicit about the need to distinguish between different levels of abstraction and concreteness (Marx 1904, 1973; Ilyenkov 1982; Ollman 2003). In *Capital*, Marx mostly explores the inner workings of the capitalist mode of production at a high level of abstraction. Its landscape is populated by “bearers of economic relations” – the capitalist, the laborer, the financier, the landowner – who appear as “cartoon” characters lacking all but the most general history, who speak no definite language and draw on no particular cultural traditions. This abstraction is necessary in order to define the capitalist systems underlying processes, relationships, and tendencies of development.

In these terms, “class struggle” too is a concept involving a high level of abstraction, generalizing from a multitude of forms of both domination and resistance across whole historical epochs. Much greater historical concreteness is required, however, to explore how people, as Marx puts it, “fight it out.” *Classes* are not themselves coherent political actors, capable of acting as single entities: they are inwardly divided by particular interests and perspectives, subject to conflicting impulses and pressures. Political actors are compelled to confront “class issues,” in the sense of problems arising from the nature of capitalism’s underlying character, but their action is always “mediated” by a host of concrete particulars.

Marxism is sometimes mistakenly described as a “structuralist” theory – which would imply it has no room for social movements, or indeed for human agency. Rather, Marx construes agency and structure as dialectical poles of an
ongoing and developing unity. Human beings are active creators of their own history, though not under conditions of their own choosing. On one hand, they necessarily enter into social relations that are the product of previous activity and independent of their will (Marx 1904). These social relations have their own “emergent properties” independent of the individuals who compose them: for example, divisions of labor, rules, patterns of rights, and responsibilities. They coexist at a whole number of levels, all the way from epochal “modes of production” to the immediate and local relations of family, neighborhood, and workplace. On the other hand, the people who, as self-developing, active, reflective beings, compose these various systems of activity also actively remake them as they “live” them. They regularly run up against features of these systems that impede them in the pursuit of their self-developing needs and goals. As they seek to resolve the problems thus engendered, they act in ways that are liable to disrupt existing patterns, generating conflicts that potentially reconfigure both their social relations and themselves as actors. Such a general conception underlies a Marxist approach to social movements.

Only at a more immediate level than that explored in Marx’s Capital can we locate definite people, speaking in particular tongues and with their own histories and traditions, struggling to understand and achieve control of their material and social conditions. It is at this more immediate level that “social movements” emerge, as specific forms of social and political activity.

From a Marxist standpoint, social movements – the predominant form in which the class struggle is fought – are collective achievements, transcending individual and atomized responses to the problems posed by capitalism. For Marxism, collective organization and activity is significant, for it contains within itself the immanent possibility of alternative ways of organizing social life.

Movement organizational forms vary in permanence, from temporary “crowds” to semipermanent institutional networks. Like repertoires of activity, these forms are not fixed, but shift according to how participants respond to immediate situations. The inherent changeability of form and of activity provokes an ongoing Marxist concern with how movements transform themselves and their potentials.

A movement does not possess a unified “identity,” “ideology,” “cognitive praxis,” or “strategy.” Rather, movements are fields of argument. What is a movement’s purpose? What is it trying to maintain or change? How are its boundaries defined? Who are its opponents, and why and how are they organized? What strategies, tactics, and repertoires of collective activity should it deploy? How should it respond to specific events and crises? All these and other matters are open to ongoing contestation and debate among a movement’s varied adherents – and not only among them. For nothing prevents a movement’s opponents from also seeking to influence the way it interprets the world and seeks to alter it. The means of such influence vary according to the opponents’ nature, but they include the deployment of law and state force, control of mass media, co-optation and neutralization of movement “leaders,” and so on. Movements, precisely because they engage in social conflict, induce responses from opponents that shape the ways they develop. The “class struggle” is conducted not only between movements and their antagonists, but also within them: their ideas, forms of organization, and repertoires of contention are all within their opponents “strategic sights” (Shandro 1995). Marxist theory is reflexively concerned with its own active involvements and interventions in class struggle, as movements conduct it and argue about it.

In one respect, Marx and Engels, along with other nineteenth-century thinkers, employed the language of “social movement” in a way different from much contemporary usage. They wrote not of “social movements” as a multiplicity, but of “the social movement” as a single entity, describing the upsurge in popular organization that marked the turbulent politics of Europe and beyond in their period. For
them, the term encompassed revolutions, trade unionism, suffrage movements, nascent feminism, the emergence of socialist and utopian ideas, demands for national independence and unification, peasant pressure for land, and more—and the ways that these were challenging and sometimes transforming states’ legal and political systems. All these, taken together, constituted a single reality: “the social movement,” a notion with a loose class reference, indexing political and social organization by “the poor,” “the plebs,” the working classes’—all those contesting “the social question” but also the “national” and “colonial” questions. In this usage, “social movement” denoted a whole field of emerging political and social struggles, seen as mutually interacting, sometimes underground and sometimes overt, sometimes mutually reinforcing but sometimes contradicting forward movement, and variably capable of embodying a challenge to class privilege and domination.

This usage was connected to their overall concern with social revolution. Rather than following today’s academic tendency to consider movements as relatively distinct entities, each conceptually isolated from each other—for example, the “peace,” “labor,” “feminist,” “gay and lesbian,” “black,” “migrant,” “ecology” movements—they considered the pattern of organization of resistance as a whole in relation to the totality of capitalism. That involved a continually critical probing of the limits of existing forms of movement activity, organization and ideas, matched by an ongoing concern with the kinds of interventions that they and their co-thinkers might make with respect to existing movement practice and ideology.

Some accounts assume that “class struggle” refers only to immediate struggles between capitalists and workers over matters like wages, hours, working conditions, and the like, and that such struggles enjoy some kind of “primacy” over all other questions. This was not Marx’s own view.

There is no question that Marx and Engels, and their successors, paid great attention to the “labor movement” aspect of the social movement. They treated labor movements—trade unions, socialist parties, cooperatives—as embodying a combination of struggle against the rule of capital with submission to its dictates. Marxism, from its beginnings, involved a critical stance toward working-class practices and institutions. Marx did not—unlike many nineteenth-century socialists—reject unions and strikers, but rather urged that their demands (e.g., “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay”) and their forms of organization were insufficient. Trade unionism limited itself to “guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system” instead of using its organized power to bring the wages system itself to an end. The workers’ movement needed to go beyond economic struggles to a political movement, “a movement of the class, with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force” (Marx 1965b: 271). However, Marx also celebrated the victories of the Ten Hours campaigns, and of the cooperative workshops, not so much for their immediate achievement as for outlining the beginnings of a “political economy of labour” (Marx 1974: 79–80). The argument is characteristic of Marx’s revolutionary theory: he looks within existing movement practice for intimations of future possibilities, for what is potentially immanent within it, and draws its significance to the movement’s attention.

Trade union struggles certainly have a particular significance for Marxism, for at least three reasons. First, in most capitalist countries, trade unionism remains the largest “part” of the social movement in terms of simple, continuous membership. Second, workers engaging in strikes, the most characteristic form of union action, do—even if in limited measure—challenge capital’s power. Third, collective action itself changes the participants, partly transforming their view of themselves, of their own potentials, and of their relations with fellow workers. It was in that sense that Lenin described strikes as “schools of socialism.” That said, the limitations and contradictions of trade unionism remain significant. As the
“labor movement” has emerged as a recognized and licensed agency of working-class representation, it has also commonly narrowed its ideological agenda. Trade unions appear as agencies of both struggle for and containment of workers’ demands. To maintain any influence over employers, they need to threaten and occasionally deploy the strike weapon, which requires that they maintain some semblance of membership involvement and democracy; at the same time they offer finished examples of “labor bureaucracy.” As Gramsci commented, trade unions “are in a sense an integral part of capitalist society, and have a function that is inherent in a regime of private property . . . The trade union has an essentially competitive, not communist, character. It cannot be the instrument for a radical renovation of society” (Gramsci 1977b: 99). That said, “trade unionism” is not a fixed quality (Cliff & Gluckstein 1986). As with all movement questions, trade union forms and activities are highly contestable, and their history is one of great variation. “Unofficial” and “wildcat” strikes have been quite as numerous as “official” strikes; in the US, for example, the Knights of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World were very different from the American Federation of Labor, while the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in the 1930s added more diversity to the mix. Distinct forms – occasional one-day protest strikes summoned by union officials as against semi-insurrectionary mass occupations and strikes – contain very different developmental potentials. One involves bargaining over the price of labor within capitalism, the other contains revolutionary possibilities.

For Marxism, moreover, “labor movements” must be judged not simply by how they engage with employers, but how they relate to other forms of oppression and exploitation within capitalism. Marx strongly supported Irish independence from the British Empire. He and Engels explored the way that anti-Irish prejudice divided and held back the English workers’ movement, just as American racism held back the workers’ movement there. In 1869, Marx wrote to Engels that he had changed his mind about how this problem might be solved:

…it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connection with Ireland . . . For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendency. I always expressed this point of view in the New York Tribune. Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. That is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general. (Marx 1965a: 232)

Here, Marx takes the “social movement in general” as his standpoint of judgment. He is in no sense inclined to idealize the English workers’ movement – indeed, his correspondence with Engels is full of rueful remarks about its general backwardness after the 1848 defeat of Chartism. His opponents, like Proudhon and Bakunin, were prone to reduce the struggle for a dictatorship of the proletariat to a simplistic struggle of “class against class,” resisting his support for both Polish and Irish emancipation (Anderson 2010: 146–147). Marx, rather, treats the struggle against national oppression, in still agrarian nations, as a condition for advance by “the social movement in general.” Marx likewise supported the nascent anticolonial movement in India. On slavery, he was very explicit about the interconnection between antislavery and the workers’ movement: “In the United States of North America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded” (Marx 1976: 414). The centrality of “class struggle” does not mean “economic” questions are somehow “more important.” Struggles against oppression – whether based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, skill, or sexuality – are not distinct from or opposed to class struggle, but are mutually interdependent parts of the social movement against capitalism as a totality.
The shaking up of social movement life by something “from without” is a recurring theme in its history. Raymond Williams recorded that all the innovative movements in Britain in the previous 30 years had originated outside the institutions of the official “labor movement”: “all have this character, that they sprang from needs and perceptions which the interest-based organizations had no room or time for, or which they had simply failed to notice” (Williams 1983: 172–173). The same can be said about movement development in the postwar US. Developing capitalism enlarges and empowers new layers, especially within the working class, providing resources to pose new demands and thus to enrich the social movement with new perspectives and new layers of activists. Successive waves of colonized and enslaved peoples, migrants, working women, white-collar employees, and college and school students have all, in different ways and times, fought their way into “the social movement in general.” In the process, they have both reshaped the imagery of “class” and enriched Marxism’s content.

In practice, a recurring test for Marxists has been to respond adequately to new issues and struggles as “newcomers” have forced their concerns onto the social movement agenda. If they ignored or denied them, their own formations were liable to collapse, as did the Italian Left groups who couldn’t come to terms with feminist resurgence in the 1970s. More often, the Left embraced new issues and sought to carry them into the “labor movement,” a more open environment, for all its inner contradictions, than the institutions of capital or states. Consciously or not, they followed Lenin, who urged – against the “economists” who focused only on workers’ immediate struggles against employers – that revolutionaries should be “tribunes of the people,” opposing all forms of oppression and drawing workers into the struggle against them (Lenin 1961a).

The ongoing development of capitalism and its states system has posed new problems for the Marxist tradition. Even as the working class has massively expanded and changed its inner composition, social movements have – in the very process of making partial gains – increased their inner complexity. Unevenly, sometimes only after periods of severe repression, more and more states have conceded universal adult suffrage, expanded state “welfare,” licensed a range of forms of popular contestation like strikes, street demonstrations, public rallies and meetings, loosened censorship, and in other ways promoted the conditions for social movement expansion. One effect has been to promote the development, within social movement formations, of a variety of “career paths” for officials and representatives in unions, parties, nongovernment organizations, and other licensed formal institutions. Mediating between movements and their opponents, their presence sets up new political and organizational dilemmas and sources of ideological division, providing an extended basis for “reformist” as against revolutionary tendencies within movements.

Marxism since Marx has had to grapple with these questions, and to consider how struggles within capitalism might be transformed into a potential struggle against it. The problems are practical as well as theoretical.

Much of the time, the key issues concern how day-to-day struggles should be conducted. Marx and Engels themselves devoted less attention to immediate questions about strategy and tactics than did their successors, some of whose accounts amount to virtual cookbooks of militancy (Dobbs 1972). Among the matters stressed are cases for mass mobilization, maintaining and developing rank-and-file democracy, developing solidarity, connecting initially distinct struggles, restricting the influence of conservative officialdom, and making socialist propaganda. Movement activity always creates space for practical and theoretical debate, since movements change in the course of conflicts, involve smaller or larger crises of development, and experience advances and retreats. Every concrete situation offers more than one potential way forward, and the literature of Marxism is in part a repository of practical historical lessons to be offered.
With one eye always on the idea of social revolution, Marxism is always alert to new possibilities, new forms of organization and activity, new potentials for movement breakouts and breakthroughs. Marxism has, naturally, a particular interest in the phenomena of “waves” in movement development. Periods of relative calm, when stability and social reproduction appear to be the watchwords of development, are punctuated by crises both of capitalism’s everyday functioning but also – though not in parallel – by what Shanin terms “axial moments” and Tarrow calls “cycles of protest” (Shanin 1986; Tarrow 1994).

It is in such periods of crisis that the development of social movements in the direction of revolution appears most realistically possible. The first significant analysis of the inner development of movements in such conditions was Luxemburg’s account of mass strikes in the period of the 1905 revolution (Luxemburg 1986). She stressed several matters: the breakdown of the everyday distinction between “economic” and “political” struggles, the ways that different parts of a mass movement interacted with each other to extend its mobilizing reach, the rapid growth of new organizational attachments, and especially the “cultural and spiritual growth” experienced by participants. Similar arguments were made about potentially revolutionary movements by such writers as Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci (Lenin 1961b; Trotsky 1965; Gramsci 1977a). In a whole series of large-scale movements in the century since 1905 similar phenomena to those Luxemburg identified have been recorded and analyzed by Marxists writers – in, for example, Germany 1918–1923, Spain and France 1936, Hungary 1956, France 1968, Chile 1972–1973, Portugal 1974–1975, Iran 1978–1979, Poland 1980–1981, Argentina 2001–2002. (For exploration of some of these, see Barker 1987.) It is especially when such movements begin to develop new kinds of democratic institutions from below that they can pose anew the possibility of working-class self-emancipation.

However, such possibilities must still be realized. There was a fatal weakness in Luxemburg’s account. She recognized the conservative potential in existing social democratic parties and unions, but argued that “if once the ball is set rolling then social democracy, whether it wills it or not, can never again bring it to a standstill” (Luxemburg 1986: 77). That prophecy proved sadly amiss, as her own experience would demonstrate when mutinies and mass strikes erupted on a much larger scale in the course of the German revolution from November 1918 (Harman 1982; Gluckstein 1985; Broué 2006).

Despite a huge upsurge of militancy, German Social Democracy was able to ally with right-wing armed forces to contain and defeat revolutionary impulses. This combination murdered Luxemburg herself in January 1919. The “spontaneity” of mass mobilization, while it brought down the Kaiser’s regime, proved insufficient to generate successful social revolution—a recurring pattern in a whole series of potentially revolutionary situations over the next century.

These problems were most directly addressed by that tradition in Marxism represented by Lenin, Trotsky, Gramsci, and their successors. Even in revolutionary situations, “spontaneity” both rests on previous experiences and organizational forms and involves a mixture of radical and conservative aspects (Lenin 1961a: 373–397; Trotsky 1965: 510–511; Gramsci 1971: 196–199). Rather than popular consciousness representing a finished and coherent set of positions, it is inherently a contradictory mixture of radical and conservative elements, containing quite different potentials for development (Gramsci 1971: 333). Movements remain, as suggested, field of argument and discovery, in which different tendencies struggle for leadership (Gramsci’s “hegemony”). However large, mass movements do not travel from initialisation to mobilization to potential revolution along a single, smooth path, but undergo crises and turning points in their development, as they draw in new forces, engage in unexpected kinds of struggles with their opponents, formulate innovative understandings, and find out new qualities in their own capacities and
aspirations. The beginnings of potential popular revolutions are commonly marked by a sense of harmonious unity: the moment of the “springtime of peoples,” the moment of “the beautiful revolution.”

But that moment opens new possibilities and dangers. Now, questions can be posed about the very structures of society which could hardly be named before, let alone addressed with any hope of solution. One weight of oppression has been removed, but the new question is, “What next?” “Class struggle” soon intrudes in new forms. The “people” redissolve into their opposed parts, to contest the future. Arguments about strategy come to the fore.

Under such conditions, questions about what any kind of “Left” is capable of saying and doing become immensely significant, for good or ill. In the midst of a popular upsurge, a host of variegated voices can always be found, urging a movement not to “go too far.” Indeed those who first come to the leadership in an initially successful movement may well be moderate figures, as Trotsky suggests happened in Russia in February 1917 (Trotsky 1965). For a movement to continue forward, the Left must struggle for its leadership: its own capacity to organize itself coherently, and to draw wider sections of the movement toward itself, becomes a vital issue. Hence the enormous attention that Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci paid to questions concerning Marxist party organization, strategy, and tactics. Whether or not social movements, in the fire of major struggles, do indeed become agencies of revolutionary development depends, ultimately, on the outcome of political argument within them.

What, then, of the Marxist emphasis on the working class? In the Marxist revolutionary perspective, what matters is not simply the working class “blocking power” – still celebrated by radical theory – but ultimately its “replacement power.” In numbers of great social movements over the past century working people have created the outline of new institutions of the kind Marx celebrated in the Paris Commune of 1871: highly democratic bodies with the capacity to found a new society. The Commune’s modern heirs – under names like soviet, workers’ council, cordón, shora, interfactory strike committee, popular assembly – have sought, as yet without triumphing, to unite popular political power with the extension of democratic control over economic life. The direct products of “the social movement,” potentially uniting struggles against exploitation and oppression in a common project of social revolution, they embody the Marxist vision of social movements.

Capitalism in the new millennium continues to demonstrate its crisis tendencies and its immense destructiveness. These will provoke new “axial moments” and “cycles of protest,” and new potential challenges to capital’s domination of the world. It’s unlikely that we have heard the last of Marxism.

SEE ALSO: Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Lenin (V.I. Ylianov) (1870–1924); Revolutions; Russian Revolution; Social class and social movements; Social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Marches

STEFAAN WALGRAVE

Marches are part of the classic action repertoire of social movements. They are a form of protest closely connected to rallies and demonstrations. In the case of rallies, marches are the relatively organized means through which an aggregation of individuals gets from point A to point B, coming to assemble in a common space for the purpose of a protest or celebratory rally. Although the terms “marches” and “demonstrations” are often used interchangeably, demonstrations typically encompass a broader set of collective actions, including not only the march but also assemblage and the rally in which economic, political, and social or cultural concerns and demands are voiced.

One of the best-known marches in modern social movement history was the Great March on Washington staged by the civil rights movement in the US in 1963. The march consisted of more than 200,000 participants marching to the Lincoln Memorial where Martin Luther King delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech.

Some protest organizers often call their regular demonstrations or rallies “marches” in order to avoid radical and political connotations. In many countries, marches are held to protest against random violence or to make other nonpolitical, or at least not explicitly political, claims. For example, after the killings of several young girls in 1996 in Belgium, some 300,000 Belgians took the streets in the White March to protest against the felling of the judiciary and the police to capture the convicted killer, who had mistakenly been released earlier. Another example is the Million Mom March, a massive rally in Washington, DC, in 2000, claiming stricter gun laws in the US.

However, sometimes marches are specific types of demonstrations with typical properties. In contrast to demonstrations, a march often refers to a long-distance walk, sometimes spanning several days connecting two symbolic places, or to a long walk toward a symbolic target place (e.g., the capital, the headquarters of the target organization or decision-maker, the sea). Once under way, other activists join in, often with the march becoming larger as the destination nears. For example, one of the earliest examples of the study of individual protest participants is Parkin’s Middle Class Radicalism. Parkin drew on a survey of the participants of the three-day Easter Peace March organized by the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1965 (Parkin 1968). The most famous multi-day march is probably Mahatma Gandhi’s 390 km March to Dandi in 1930. The march was part of the Indian independence movement and involved civil disobedience against the British salt monopoly and salt tax. In general, multi-day march formats have often been employed by the peace movement from the 1950s onward.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Direct action; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Indian Independence Movement; King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); Modular protest forms; Repertoires of contention; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The term “master frame” was originally conceptualized in order to account for the empirical observation that cycles of protest occasionally emerge in the absence of a favorable political opportunity structure (POS). Given that POS had been theorized as the engine driving cycles of protest, an alternative explanation was sought from the social movement framing perspective to account for those instances when a number of movements clustered together during a period even though the structural conditions did not appear conducive for widespread mobilization. Under such conditions a cycle of protest could be attributed in part to the development of a resonant master frame. A master frame refers to a generic type of collective action frame that is wider in scope and influence than run-of-the-mill social movement frames (Snow & Benford 1992). Whereas most collective action frames are context specific (e.g., drunk driver frame, cold war frame, exploited worker frame, environmental justice frame, etc.), a master frame’s articulations and attributions are sufficiently elastic, flexible, and inclusive enough so that any number of other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their campaigns. Typically, once a social movement fashions and espouses a highly resonant frame that is broad in interpretive scope, other social movements within a cycle of protest will modify that frame and apply it to their own cause. For example, once the US civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s experienced a number of successes based on an equal rights and opportunities frame, several other movements, including the American Indian, women’s, gay and lesbian, Chicano/a, and Gray Panthers, adopted and proffered a similar frame to their specific movement campaigns.

In addition to the equal rights and opportunities master frame, researchers have suggested the following as master frames: injustice, justice, oppositional, hegemonic, imperial, anti-imperial, and market choice. There are no doubt others. Since its original formulation the concept of master frames has been used to explain more than cycles of protest (Snow 2004). Mooney and Hunt (1996), for example, extended their analysis of agrarian mobilization beyond a single cycle of protest to show how movements can create a repertoire of interpretations across periods of mobilization and abeyance to produce ideological continuity in a movement. Carroll and Ratner (1996a, 1996b) have used the master frame idea to explain and understand cross-movement networking and unity among several Canadian social movements. Other scholars have shown that inclusive and elaborated master frames are essential for broad-based mobilization campaigns, especially when the targeted audiences are diverse (Gerhards & Rucht 1992; Noonan 1995). In an analysis of the Irish Sinn Féin movement, Swart (1995) concludes that social movement actors rhetorically transform the various master frames within a cycle of protest so as to bring them into alignment with the social movement’s specific cultural and historical context thereby affecting “master frame alignment.”

Despite the concept’s popularity, social movement scholars still do not know much about the conditions under which a particular collective action frame will evolve into a master frame and thus spawn a cycle of protest. Nor do researchers know much about the transportability of particular master frames from one culture to another. A recent study of nationalist movements in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan suggests that a successful master frame in one place can lead to mobilization failures elsewhere when local differences or shifts in the political environments are ignored (Markowitz 2009). Finally, in their initial conceptualization of master frames Snow and

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Benford (1992) set forth ten propositions regarding the relationship between master frames and the emergence of cycles of protest, specific movements within a cycle, tactical repertoires within a cycle, the shape of cycles, and the decline of cycles of protest. To date, none of those propositions have been examined empirically.

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Media framing and social movements; Protest cycles and waves; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Mechanisms
SIDNEY TARROW

A intellectual movement has been growing in the social sciences around the adoption of mechanism-based explanations, as complements to, or even substitutes for, variable-based explanations (Bunge 1997). In sociology, Arthur Stinchcombe recently emphasized studying causal mechanisms as part of a larger repertoire of methods of sociological research (2005). Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, working in the rationalist tradition, moved in the same direction (1998). John Campbell has identified a number of common mechanisms in social movement and organizational research (2005).

Political scientists’ discussions have also begun to turn more to mechanism-based approaches (Mahoney 2001, 2002, 2008; Mayntz 2004; Zuckerman et al. 2007). In his well-known Alchemies of the Mind, Jan Elster took a decidedly mechanistic line, albeit one that rejected the methodological individualism that has dominated this approach in rationalist quarters (Elster 1999).

All episodes of politics and social exchange result from mechanisms: delimited changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. What is new is the attempt to specify them as having influence upon outcomes independent of structural, organizational, or attitudinal preconditions, attempting to measure them with some degree of reliability and identifying mechanisms that are common to different circumstances or processes, like democratization, revolutions, or nationalist episodes.

Scholars of contentious politics and social movements have long been interested in the dynamics of change – particularly in the emergence, escalation, diffusion, and demobilization of social movements. But they have generally sought to get at them by measuring the relationships among static structural variables rather than specifying the mechanisms that link independent and dependent variables. For example, it has long been observed that communities characterized by dense network ties are more likely to experience collective action than those with sparser ties. And they have demonstrated that recruits into activism tend to have more ties to those already in the movement than non-activists (McAdam & Paulson 1993). But these relationships tell us nothing about the mechanisms on which such network-based recruitment turns. Is it due to social control, mutual trust, and confidence, or the power in numbers? We need to be able to specify and empirically investigate the mechanisms that connect network preconditions to behavioral outcomes.

As is always the case when new movements arise, competing definitions and practical proposals for the study of mechanisms have proliferated (Mahoney 2001; Norkus 2005). The proliferation of research using mechanisms has led to criticisms of conceptual vagueness, proliferation of mechanisms, and lack of methodological rigor in the production of mechanism-based analyses. Particularly in the field of contentious politics, where structuralists and culturalists have been contesting over turf for decades (Goodwin & Jasper 2004), mechanism-based approaches which attempt to connect structure and agency have met with less than universal approval (Mobilization 2003).

Although the specification and measurement of mechanisms has become more insistently in the last decade, mechanisms are nothing new in the study of contentious politics. Mechanisms like mobilization and demobilization, escalation and defection, identity shift and boundary delimitation have long been important for the dynamics of contention. For example, an entire class of mechanisms has been specified in the
research that has grown up around the concept of “framing”, originating in the theoretical work of David Snow and his collaborators (Snow & Benford 1988). In her sensitive analysis of educational controversies, Amy Binder has also made excellent use of a mechanism-based approach (2002). And in her rigorous work on the antiapartheid movement, Sarah Soule has effectively traced the mechanism of diffusion (1997).

Citing such different styles of work as those of Snow and Benford, Binder, and Soule side-by-side leads to a major methodological premise: that a range of methodological strategies are compatible with a mechanism-based approach to the study of contention. We can divide methodological approaches into four quadrants according to whether measurement is direct or indirect, systematic or ethnographic:

- Mechanisms of contention can be measured directly by using systematic events data to identify and track the mechanisms that produce episodes of contention, as Charles Tilly did in studying the general process of scale shift, illustrating it through the specific form of parliamentarization during a long period of contentious politics in Britain (Tilly 1995);
- Mechanisms can also be measured directly through the use of field-ethnographic methods. Focusing on the process of coalition formation, we Ann Mische (2008) studied networking among a wide array of Brazilian student groups;
- Much of social science is based on indirect statistical measurement. Such measures are usually associated with correlational techniques, but Elisabeth Wood also used it to indicate the presence or absence of elite defection in El Salvador and South Africa (2000, 2003);
- Finally, indirect field-ethnographic methods can be used to indicate the presence or absence of mechanisms. Von Bülow (2010) studied the mechanism of brokerage in the construction of trade-policy coalitions in Brazil and Chile.

Four main problems arise in inserting mechanisms deliberately in the study of causal processes: First is the difficulty of measuring mechanisms directly. Mahoney is correct that mechanisms cannot easily be entered into a correlational analysis as “an empirical state to be measured across cases for its covariation with some outcome” (Mahoney 2001: 581). But correlation is not the only route to effective measurement, and scholars of mechanisms have identified a variety of ways of studying mechanisms.

A second problem is the relationship between mechanisms and variables. In his Logic of Social Research, Stinchcombe lucidly summarized the logic of variable-based explanations: it is to show that distances among different observations in one dimension (conceived of as a dependent variable) correspond to distances among different observations in at least one other dimension (conceived of as an independent variable) (Stinchcombe 2005: 11–12, 89–91). Analysts ordinarily tell causal stories about relationships between dependent and independent variables, but mechanistic explanations need to specify what sort of event produces the correspondence between the presumed cause and the presumed effect.

Mechanistic purists like the later Tilly insist that studying mechanisms is an alternative to the more familiar correlational mode of social analysis. “How is why!” he proclaimed, in response to criticisms that mechanistic analysis elides causation. But most other analysts of mechanisms see them as the connective tissue between independent and dependent variables. The dilemma is that mechanism-based analyses often use a different metric than variable-based analysis and thus are frequently tacked on as “as-if” statements to “explain” otherwise underspecified correlations.

A third problem is specifying the relationship between mechanisms and contexts. Tulia Falleti and Julia Lynch have argued that “credible, causal social scientific explanation can occur if and only if researchers are attentive to the interaction between causal mechanisms and the context in which they operate” – no matter
whether the methods they employ are small-N, formal, statistical, or interpretive in nature” (2009, emphasis in original). As an example, they focus on temporality, pointing out that how we specify time is essential for what we can observe and what we can infer about an episode of change. Similarly, Büthe (2002) argues for more careful attention to the placement of starting and ending points in research using historical narratives, an injunction that applies to time-series event histories as well.

Fourth, mechanisms are often used as synonyms for processes, which are larger-scale causal events that contain sequences or combinations of mechanisms. For example, the best studied process in contentious politics is mobilization. But mobilization contains, at a minimum, the mechanisms of attribution of an opportunity, the assessment of cost or risk, the framing of the issue involved, and the adoption of a form or forms of collective action (McAdam 1999). Distinguishing mechanisms from processes is essential if we are to understand whether broad processes like democratization are invariably made up of the same mechanisms and how similar mechanisms combine with others to produce different processes.

Once we have agreed on the dignity and measurability of mechanisms, how can mechanisms of contention be ordered? Stinchcombe distinguished five classes of mechanisms: structural holes, individual actions, rational choices, situations, and patterns. McAdam and colleagues distinguish environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001: 25–26; Stinchcombe 2005: 170–176). It is the combinations of mechanisms that explain differences in causal outcomes. For example, successful revolutions invariably appear to contain elite defection; failed revolutions almost never do.

This discussion brings us back to the limits of the dominant structural perspective on social movements/contention. By starting from the accomplished fact of contentious action, and then working back in time to note that movements tend to arise in established social settings, structural analysts exaggerated the link between organization and action. And by selecting on the dependent variable – in this case, successful collective action – analysts inevitably focus on the exceptional cases in which existing groups produce movements, and elide the more numerous examples in which groups constrain action. In searching for causal mechanisms that produce collective action, we should be as interested in cases where nothing much happens as in those in which widespread action ensues. In order to do so, it makes sense to examine fields of decision making – (rather than social movements) that may produce emergent collective action, but need not do so. Unpacking episodes of contention into their constituent mechanisms and designing ways of measuring them will improve our ability to understand contentious politics and social movements.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Diffusion and scale shift; Framing and social movements; Ethnography and social movements; Political process theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Media and social movements
DEANA ROHLINGER and CHRISTIAN VACCARO

Mass media refer to any medium used to diffuse mass communication. Generally speaking, mass media include eight mediums: radio, television, newspapers, magazines, books, recordings, movies, and the Internet. Mass media are relevant to the study of social movements because they carry movement ideas to a broad audience and give activists leverage in institutional and political processes. More specifically, mass media are important to social movements because they legitimate movement issues, provide social movements an opportunity to shape public understandings of political problems, and mobilize a broader public to action. Mass media coverage legitimates movement issues and claims. News media, for instance, set the public agenda by, first, choosing what events and social problems are relevant to the citizenry and, then, focusing public attention on these events and problems. Media coverage of social movement ideas and organizations is legitimizing because it indicates to the broader public that a movement represents credible claims. A publication of a book can have a similar affect. Ralph Nader’s book, *Unsafe at Any Speed*, exposed the reluctance of car manufacturers to spend money on safety features (such as seat belts) and supported Nader’s efforts to mobilize a consumer rights movement. Mass media offer frameworks for understanding the causes of and solutions to political problems (Gamson 1992; Benford & Snow 2000). Social movements, then, that garner media attention have an opportunity to shape public perceptions of political problems and affect broader debate. Mass media can also mobilize a broader population to action. Social movement frameworks disseminated via mass media identify motivations for and targets of collective action.

For example, radio played an important role in strike campaigns of textile workers between 1929 and 1934. Music broadcast throughout the South articulated the concerns of textile workers (such as low wages and family subsistence) and identified the root causes of these problems (i.e., exploitative owners and domineering managers). This music and Franklin Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats,” which indicated support for industrial workers and improved working conditions, helped mobilize workers (Roscigno & Danaher 2001).

GENERAL APPROACHES TO STUDYING THE MEDIA–MOVEMENT RELATIONSHIP

Mass media constitute an institutional arena that is governed by rules, norms, and relationships, and subject to economic pressures; both affect media content. With this in mind, research on mass media and social movements generally takes one of two approaches. The first approach focuses on the institutional logics guiding mass media operations and examines how these logics influence the diffusion of movement messages. Much of this research analyzes how journalistic norms and practices bias when and how social movement protest events are covered in news media outlets. Researchers have identified two biases that influence protest event coverage: selection bias and description bias. Selection bias is a result of “gatekeeping” in the newsroom, whereby journalists and editors make choices about what events to cover and ignore (McCombs & Shaw 1972). This means that while there are a large number of protest events in a given city only a very small number are covered by news outlets. More importantly, the protest events that get media attention share a number of characteristics. For instance, protests that are large, involve a visible opposition, and address issues
that are currently on the political or public agenda are more likely to be covered than events that lack one or more of these characteristics (McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith 1996; Oliver & Maney 2000). Description bias refers to how a selected protest event is portrayed in media coverage. Journalists are less concerned with movement messages than they are with how to present movement ideas and events in ways that will attract their target audience and generate profits. As such, journalists often cover the most dramatic events and extreme groups in a social movement. Such coverage can undermine a social movement because journalists marginalize activist groups in news stories which cast the entire movement in a negative light and reinforce a political status quo (Gitlin 1980; Smith et al. 2001).

Researchers also examine how the institutional logics of the entertainment industry affect the diffusion of movement ideas, although this literature is very limited. Eyer- man and Barretta (1996), for example, examine the conditions under which the profit-driven music industry provided an opportunity for folksingers to promote political ideas and symbols in the 1950s and 1960s. They find that these opportunities are historically contingent and, therefore, limited. Specifically, the promotion of political music by the mainstream recording industry was a result of demographic change in the US, and the emergence of a huge youth market in particular, which left record labels scrambling to find acts that would appeal to this population.

The second approach to understanding the media–movement relationship examines the ways in which social movement groups contend with the challenges inherent to mass media and try to use mass media for their own purposes. Social movement organizations make choices regarding how mass media can best be used to accomplish their goals and employ strategies that will further their efforts. Research highlights the strategies that social movement organizations use in the media arena and the utility of these choices. For instance, social movement organizations that want to affect public and political debate will build standing, or credibility, with mainstream news organizations. It is necessary for activist groups to build standing because journalists, who consistently deal with scarce resources, tight deadlines, and limited space for their stories, rely heavily on known and legitimate sources of information. This creates an overreliance on institutional sources such as politicians, government officials, and academics, which shape how the broader public understands issues. Social movement organizations that want to influence public debate mimic institutional sources in order to build their credibility with journalists and affect how issues are presented to the broader public (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993). In contrast, activist groups that are primarily interested in using mass media to alert the broader public about a problem and to mobilize this public to action use extreme rhetoric and dramatic tactics to do so. The pro-life, direct action group Operation Rescue, for example, saw mainstream media as critical for mobilizing Evangelicals and staged dramatic “rescues” intended to stop the killing of unborn babies outside of abortion clinics. The rescues resulted in mass arrests and a great deal of mainstream media coverage.

Not all strategies involve getting media coverage or even mainstream venues. For instance, activist organizations sometimes try and get like-minded experts, rather than themselves, in media coverage because it will buttress movement claims and generate additional support for their issue. Likewise, social movement groups may remain publicly silent on issues that they believe undermine public support for their cause (Rohlinger 2006). Similarly, social movement organizations sometimes decide to bypass mainstream media outlets altogether and, instead, target media venues that are sympathetic to movement issues and, therefore, more likely to give groups a platform for promoting their ideas and campaigns (Rohlinger 2007).

An emerging area of research examines how social movement organizations strategically use the Internet to forward their goals. The Internet
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provides a means through which movement groups can communicate with an audience directly. Social movement organizations can use websites as both a “brochure” to advertise their issues and campaigns and as an information clearinghouse (Earl & Kimport 2008). The latter is particularly important for activist groups that want to legitimate their claims and build credibility with mainstream media outlets because it enables activists to share research and documentary evidence on movement issues. Additionally, activist groups can use the Internet to mobilize international support and, in some instances, constrain how a government responds to a social movement. For example, the relative success of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, which includes a lack of violent repression by the Mexican government, is attributed to Subcommander Marcos’ use of the Internet. Marcos, the leader of the army, employed the new technology to bring the plight of indigenous people in Chiapas to a broader audience, including journalists who brought international attention to the small Mexican state (Schulz 1998).

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Although the movement–media relationship has generated substantial empirical research, there are at least three issues that have not been adequately addressed. First, the proliferation of online venues, including virtual newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and blogs, has altered the media–movement relationship and the strategies of social movement organizations. Much of the existing literature is based on the premise that the media–movement relationship is unequal and that activist organizations must find ways to deal with its many disadvantages. While this unequal relationship likely still exists, the proliferation of online outlets has shifted the dynamics of the relationship. Social movement organizations have more choices regarding how they can diffuse their ideas than ever before. Additionally, a strategy that does not initially include mainstream media does not mean movement ideas will not make it on the evening news. Mainstream outlets increasingly cover news that breaks online, which gives social movement organizations an opportunity to move their ideas from the Internet to the mainstream. Second, and related, it is not clear what biases resulting from journalistic norms and practices exist in nonmainstream outlets. As a result, scholars do not know what challenges social movement groups face when they try use these alternative venues for their own purposes (Rohlinger 2007). Finally, scholars need to pay much more attention to the role of entertainment media and celebrity in social movements. In an age where celebrity reigns, there are incentives for social movement organizations to collaborate with commercially recognized artists (Meyer & Gamson 1995). However, the forms that these collaborations might take as well as the potential risks associated with a celebrity’s fall from grace are unclear. Likewise, the extent to which social movement organizations create their own entertainment products, such as online games, and exploit online networks, like Facebook, and the benefits derived from these endeavors are completely unexplored.

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Internet and social movements; Music and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Social movement organization (SMO); Strategy.

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Micro-meso mobilization
MARIJE BOEKKOOI and BERT KLANDERMANS

Social movement events do not spontaneously occur; they need to be organized and mobilized. This involves two steps of mobilization: mesomobilization followed by micromobilization. Mesomobilization refers to the efforts of an initiator(s) of a campaign, trying to mobilize other organizers to jointly set up and organize the event (Gerhards & Rucht 1992), while micromobilization refers to the joint effort of the organizers to mobilize participants for the event (McAdam 1988). The mobilization process thus involves two steps: the mobilization of other organizers by the initiators and the mobilization of participants by the organizers.

Mesomobilization involves building mobilizing structures, in which organizers cooperate and negotiate to set up a strategy to jointly mobilize participants for the event. Mobilizing structures are those “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996: 3). At any time, all kinds of groups, organizations, and networks that exist in society can become part of the mobilizing structure. However, none can be assumed to automatically become part of it. Networks need to be adapted, appropriated, assembled, and activated by organizers in order to function as mobilizing structures. Even networks whose primary goal is movement mobilization (e.g., social movement organizations) might need hard work to be activated to participate in a particular campaign. Social movement organizations often decline to participate in a campaign, and thus do not become part of the mobilizing structure. On the other hand, networks with very different goals such as a network of colleagues, friends, neighbors, or the parent-teacher association, might become involved in the campaign and thereby become part of the mobilizing structure. Some of these informal networks are especially helpful in building a mobilizing structure, because they consist of activists in “abeyance.” Although invisible, networks of activists may continue to exist. They are “submerged” in everyday life, but can reemerge and become active when a specific issue arises. Between upheavals these groups are in “abeyance”; they no longer stage large-scale activities, but keep a network and a minimum of organization going (Taylor 1989), which can be reactivated when a new campaign starts.

The assembling of mobilizing structures is becoming increasingly important as civil society is changing. Solid societal patterns are eroding and we are moving toward a more liquid society (Bauman 2000) or a network society (Castells 1996), in which bonds between people are becoming looser and more flexible. Individuals in late modern societies prefer less binding and more flexible relationships with organizations over traditional rigid and hierarchical ones. Underlying this is what Lichterman (1996) calls “personalism”: people feel a personal sense of political responsibility, but they do not want to feel restricted or obliged to a community or group. Thus, “light” groups and associations that are loose, easy to join, and easy to leave are replacing the more “greedy” ones (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp 2005). Society is thus becoming organized around networked individuals rather than groups or local solidarities, and connections are loose and flexible rather than fixed. Assembling a mobilizing structure is important as it helps in the process of micromobilization. Mobilizing structures are the connecting tissue between organizers and participants. Many studies have shown that networks are important in explaining differential recruitment and mobilization (e.g., Snow, Zurcher, & Eckland-Olson 1980; Klandermans & Oegema 1987). Which organizations join the mobilizing coalition is an important predictor of who will participate in the protest
Most studies are based on organizational affiliations, showing that organizations predominantly mobilize their own members. Some scholars have also looked at membership in civil society organizations (Baldassarri & Diani 2007) or embeddedness in a community (Gould 2003). Other studies have shown that not only organizations mobilize their members, but members themselves are important agents who activate new people since they often ask people in their environment to join as well (Boekkooi 2010).

After assembling the mobilizing structure, organizers need to cooperate, negotiate, and make decisions to set up a campaign. The development of these negotiations impacts on the formation and consolidation of the coalition (e.g., if they develop badly some people and groups will likely leave the coalition and/or not want to cooperate again in the future). Furthermore, in these negotiations choices regarding the campaign itself are made, such as what kind of action to organize, which slogans to use, and how to attract people. This process is often problematic; it can cause quarrels and even splits within movements. Several social movement scholars have noted that cooperation between different organizational forms and styles can cause problems (Clemens & Minkoff 2004). Social psychologists have studied negotiations and the problems that may occur extensively. They define negotiation as the “joint decision making between interdependent individuals with divergent interests” (van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead 2004: 510). This may involve two people or a large group. In the case of negotiations among social movement organizers, these are typically “multiparty” negotiations. Multiparty negotiations are characterized by interdependent decision-making, the presence of multiple issues, heterogeneity in members’ motivations toward social interaction, the absence of natural coalitions, and a mixed-motive nature of the problem (Kern, Brett, & Weingart 2005). That is, they usually involve a large group of negotiators—often representatives of an organization or group—who need to talk about and make decisions on several different issues. They might already know each other and have opinions about the others, but not necessarily, and it is not predetermined who will agree with whom. Furthermore, because of the mixed-motive nature of their “problems,” the organizers need to cooperate to maximize “the size of the pie,” but compete with each other to gain as much as they can for themselves. Outcomes better than compromises can be achieved by making trade-offs across issues of differential importance to the parties (Schei & Rognes 2005). As may be clear from this description, negotiations between social movement organizers are usually complicated. In such complex negotiations cooperative behavior is necessary to find a solution (Kern, Brett, & Weingart 2005). Many activists too, see this approach to negotiations as the ideal form of negotiation.

Cooperative behavior is not a given, though; people may have either a cooperative or a competitive negotiation style. In a cooperative approach, effective communication, friendliness, and nonobstructiveness are central. Cooperative negotiators define conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort. On the other hand, when negotiators use a competitive style communication is impaired. Within this style obstructiveness is central, and the conflict becomes a power struggle or a matter of moral principle. Several factors impact on whether or not organizers behave cooperatively. One important factor is cultural background. Cooperation is more likely in groups with a more horizontal culture than in groups with a more vertical or hierarchical culture (Chen & Li 2005). Cooperation is also more likely when organizers discuss practical issues as opposed to ideological issues, as they are unwilling to trade off their principles (Harinck & de Dreu 2004) and, unsurprisingly, cooperation is more likely when organizers have positive relationships with each other rather than negative ones (van Kleef, de Dreu, & Manstead 2004).
Despite these hurdles, organizers need to set up their campaign and decide on a mobilization strategy. Then micromobilization—the execution of the mobilization strategy—can start. Micromobilization entails the further expansion of the mobilizing structure, because if organizers want to mobilize widely they will need to appropriate additional bonds and turn those networks into a mobilizing structure for themselves. When organizers use mass media to spread their message, these media have become part of the mobilizing structure, and the same goes for other channels. These channels through which one tries to reach out to potential participants are as an important part of the mobilizing structure as is the network of organizers. Both the shape of the network of organizers and the mobilizing strategy that they choose, therefore, determine who can be reached and mobilized.

In order to mobilize participants organizers can use strong and weak bonds, and open and closed channels. Strength and weakness of bonds refer to how much is invested in them, the strength of identification, and the influence the bond can exert (Granovetter 1973). Open and closed refers to who can be reached by the channel (Walgrave & Klandermans 2010). Closed channels target only the own group, examples are organizational meetings or newsletters. Open channels on the other hand target potentially everyone; the mass media is the clearest example. We would like to add to this semi-open (or semi-closed) channels, that target beyond the own group; for example, the Internet. Websites of organizations, forums, blogs, and mailing lists, are not exclusively for members of one specific group, but they usually only attract those people who are already interested in the topic and likely to agree. They thus have a wider reach than closed—organizational—channels, but not as wide as the mass media. The distinctions between open and closed and strong and weak are related. Granovetter (1973) noted that strong bonds exist mainly within a group, while it is the weaker bonds that form a bridge between various groups. Thus, closed channels tend to target the people with whom organizers have strong bonds. They are expected to be efficient mobilizers. Open channels on the other hand, create weak bonds, which will usually not change people’s opinions, but when consensus has formed in society, such channels can mobilize people by letting them know an event will be staged.

It is thus easiest for organizers to mobilize their strong bonds, that is to say, the members of their group, organization, or network. These strong bonds do not have a wide reach, but the more successful the mobilization of organizers has been (i.e., the more all-embracing the mobilizing structure), the more people can be reached through strong bonds. It is thus important to build an encompassing mobilizing structure; by involving a central member of a group the entire group can be mobilized (Oberschall 1973) and coalition formation becomes a shortcut to mass mobilization. In addition, those mobilized by the organizers can in their turn start mobilizing the people with whom they have strong bonds, such as their friends, family, or colleagues. Extra-movement interpersonal bonds of members are an important asset for mobilization as has often been shown (McAdam & Paulsen 1993).

Organizers will usually want to reach beyond those to whom they are directly or indirectly related. In the case of mass demonstrations it is not enough to reach a critical mass; organizers need to reach as many people as possible. To reach beyond the circles of people with whom they are directly or indirectly connected, the organizers need to use open channels and weak bonds. Weak bonds and open channels are the only way to inform people who do not belong to the organizers’ own and indirect networks. However, to get media attention is often not easy for social movements, it is either expensive to employ, or it is hard to control the coverage. Nonetheless, weak bonds diffuse information most effectively, because they connect people from different groups, and consequently enable individuals to spread and receive new information (Granovetter 1973). The most common example of weak bonds
is the mass media. Although weak bonds are not sufficient to change opinions or spur motivation, such an impact might not always be necessary. Some groups in society may already agree with the message and be convinced that action should be taken, so that they need to only hear about an imminent demonstration (Walgrave & Manssens 2000).

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Bloc recruitment; Coalitions; Consensus and action mobilization; Networks and social movements; Social movement organization (SMO); Solidarity and movements.

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Modular protest forms
CLARK MCPHAIL

Tarrow’s (1993) concept of “modular protest” is an improvisation on Tilly’s (1977, 1979) concept of protest repertoire. Tilly frequently compared his concept to the repertoires of jazz musicians and street theater troupes whose players improvise on familiar tunes or stories to produce pleasing sounds or humorous scenarios. Of protest repertoires Tilly argued (1979: 131) “The main point is elementary: within any particular time and place, the array of collective actions that people employ is well defined and quite limited in comparison to the range of actions that are theoretically available to them. In that sense, particular times, places, and populations have their own repertoires of collective action.” Modularity was not yet in Tilly’s own published theoretical repertoire.

Tarrow (1993: 77) wrote:

By the modular character of the modern repertoires I mean: first, that its forms were relatively few and were very flexible; second, that they were distinct from the identity of those who used them and those they were aimed at, and third, that they could be adopted by different groups in a variety of settings and serve as a common denominator for different groups acting together or in series. All of this made it possible for even scattered groups of people with minimum organization, perhaps unknown to one another, to unite in national social movements.

Hence the title of Tarrow’s influential article in the spring of 1993: “Modular Collective Action and the Rise of the Social Movement” (cf. Tilly 1979).

Tarrow (1993) cites a coauthored conference paper (Soule & Tarrow 1991) as influential in the development of his own treatment (1994) of “modular forms of protest” and Tilly (1993) cites the same paper. Soule and Tarrow cite as their source of inspiration Anderson’s (1991) treatment of “modularity” as a model or exemplar that is emulated in the diffusion of phenomena across time and space (cf. Soule 1997). Tilly’s first published reference to “modular” protest appears in his (1993) analysis of changes in Great Britain’s repertoires of collective action. He characterized the British eighteenth-century repertoires as “parochial, particular and bifurcated . . . particular because forms of contention varied significantly from one place, actor, or situation to another” (1993: 271). In contrast, he characterized nineteenth-century British repertoires as “national, modular, and autonomous . . . modular in that the same forms served many different localities, actors, and issues” (272). The relationship between repertoire, modularity, and the birth of social movements was, of course, at the center of Tilly’s (1995) magnum opus on the birth of social movements. Tilly’s treatment of modularity was less on models to be emulated than on components of a repertoire that could be employed by different actors in the solution of their particular problems in space and time, for example, “Modular means that the performances in the repertoires transferred easily from place to place, issue to issue, group to group” (2006: 42).

Protest forms will be treated here as the modules of protest repertoires. Social movement campaigns comprise linked repetitions of various combinations and permutations of forms. Most forms reviewed here involve what Tilly calls “contentious gatherings.” Gatherings refer to multiple persons occupying a common location in time and space; they are contentious when those persons collectively assert grievances, claims, and demands by employing one or more forms. Some large public gatherings involving sport (Snow, Zurcher, & Peters 1981), civic (McAdam et al. 2005), or religious concerns (McPhail 2006) are not primarily contentious but warrant attention for comparative analyses. All these gatherings are
comprised of alternating and varied individual and collective actions and interactions. Just as there are repertoires of protest forms, there are also repertoires of elementary forms of collective action (McPhail 1991). The three methodologies used to study protest forms are discussed below, followed by brief comments on their advantages and disadvantages and on some recent innovations.

SURVEYED FORMS

Crozat (1998) analyzed 1974 and 1990 attitude surveys in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US that asked respondents if they “accepted” five different forms of protest: the petition, the demonstration, the boycott, the “wild-cat” strike, or the sit-in occupation of a building. His measure of “acceptance” was any respondent’s statement that they had participated, or they would participate, or they might participate. The percentage of “participation acceptance” was highest for the petition in all five countries and declined stepwise through the remaining four forms in the 1990 survey. In the 1974 survey, Italy had a lower rate of acceptance for boycotts and strikes, and a higher level for sit-ins. Crozat concludes that people in all five countries are more likely to participate in noncontentious than contentious forms of protest.

ARCHIVED FORMS

Most students of protest have mapped a country’s repertoire by scrutinizing newspaper archives for journalists’ reports of protest events. Tracking reports over time provides a quantitative record of the fluctuating incidence of protests that, in turn, is taken as an index of protest incident dynamics. Studies of mid to late twentieth-century protest in three countries are notable for the overlapping spans of time they cover, and for the similarities and differences in those countries’ repertoires of protest forms. Rucht (2004) examined forms in Germany from 1950 through 1997. Tarrow (1989) cataloged forms in Italy from 1966 through 1973. McAdam et al. (2009) examined forms in the US from 1960 through 1995. Rallies, marches, and civil disobedience were in the top five most frequent forms, and strikes and petitions among the top ten forms, in all three countries. Lawsuits were in the top five in the US, the top ten in Germany, and near the bottom in Italy. Each study had several slightly different categories of violence targeting person or property. When both target categories are combined within country (but see Martin, McCarthy, & McPhail 2009), violence tops the list of most frequent protest forms in Italy; it moves into the top five forms in the US and into the top ten forms in Germany. This yields a crude overall portrait of the prevailing repertoires of protest forms in three countries. For a longer and more diverse list of protest forms, see Wikipedia (Protest 2011).

The accessible data set of McAdam and colleagues’ (2009) Dynamics of Collective Action project enables plotting a dynamic portrait of the year-by-year proportions of 18 protest forms in the US repertoire from 1960 through 1995. Limited space dictates a snapshot here. Rallies were in double-digit percentages in 35 of 35 years, followed by lawsuits in 26 of 35, civil disobedience in 21 of 35, petitions in 12 of 35, marches in 9 of 35, pickets in 8 of 35, and rioting in but 2 of 35 years. Four forms – attacks, press conferences, strikes, and vigils – each occurred in double-digits in only one of 35 years; dramaturgies, boycotts, and clashes occurred even less frequently. This project has produced a very useful portrait of the repertoire of protest forms in the US over a 35-year period.

OBSERVED FORMS

A few investigators (Wright 1978; Snow, Zurcher, & Peters 1981; Lofland & Fink 1982; McPhail & Wohlstein 1986; Steinhoff 2008) have observed and reported what participants actually do in protest gatherings. McPhail (1991) and colleagues (Schweingruber & McPhail 1999) have observed and
analyzed collective actions in several hundred political, sport, civic, and religious gatherings in an attempt to catalog the phenomena to be explained (Tilly 2002). Their catalog is comprised of four dozen elementary forms of collective action (EFCA) divided into collective facing, voicing, manipulating, and locomoting. All consist of what two or more adjacent persons are doing with or in relation to one another.

1. Facing EFCA includes: the common direction two or more persons are orienting toward some actor, activity or object; or the convergent directions two or more persons are orienting toward one another. (McPhail 2008)

   Voicing EFCA includes: the similar vocal sounds of two or more persons cheering, booing, laughing, or whistling; or their verbal sounds of conversing, chanting, singing, or praying. (McPhail 2006)

   Manipulating EFCA includes: the similar ways the hands of two or more persons are engaged in: gesturing; embracing; grasping leaflets or petitions (Steinhoff 2008) that assert grievances, claims, and demands; grasping candles or clubs; throwing bottles or rocks; clenching hands in applause or in 'high-fives'; clenching fists in gestures of solidarity or in preparation to strike another person.

   Locomoting EFCA includes; two or more persons whose lower limbs are engaged in: the similar postures of standing, sitting, kneeling, or lying; or the similar locomotions of marching, walking, running, crawling, dancing, or kicking. (McPhail & Wohlstein 1986)

   These are modular forms of collective action; almost any two or more persons can engage in them; most occur repeatedly in political, sport, religious, civic, and convivial gatherings; and most are likely to occur in multiple cultures. Systematic one-minute observation records at ten-minute intervals of the proportion of rally members engaging in one or more of these EFCA provide quantitative measures of the dynamic variation in participation over time (McPhail 2006). These data illustrate the “illusion of unanimity” with evidence that mutual inclusive collective action is extremely rare and short lived when it does occur. Combinations and permutations of two or more forms in the same observation minute yield a measure of the dynamic complexity of collective action over time (McPhail, Schweingruber, & Ceobanu 2012). These data illustrate the claim that most gatherings, including protest gatherings, are kaleidoscopes of alternating and varied individual and collective actions and interactions rather than a blanket of uniformity. This also suggests a useful conceptual continuum in which individual and collective actions and interactions comprise gatherings: two or more gatherings (e.g., a rally followed by a march) comprise events; multiple gatherings and events comprise campaigns; and multiple gatherings, events, and campaigns comprise waves or surges.

ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

Surveys are the most practiced of all social science data collection methods. Some, like those Crozat (1998) examined, tell us more about attitudes than about participation. Surveys have also been used to ascertain who participated in protests (and who did not) and how participants came to do so. Few have inquired about participants’ actions during the events. Surveyors now interview participants as they are assembling or dispersing. Assemblers have been asked if they are alone or with others (and how many); dispersers have been asked the same questions, as well as if they remained with their companions throughout the event. Dispersers could be asked if they had participated, or not, in a checklist of activities (e.g., cheering, singing, chanting, gesturing, applauding, booing, cursing, throwing, striking, etc.)? Did their companions participate? Did most, some, or none of the other persons immediately surrounding the respondent-and-companions also participate in those activities?
Answers to these survey questions cannot tell us about variation in participation across time and place but would tell us far more than merely that respondents were present during a protest.

Newspaper archival research has its limitations (Earl et al. 2004) but also has no equal for constructing longitudinal records of the incidence of protest events. Fluctuations in incidents correlate with a host of other important variables of social science interest (see the publications list in McAdam et al. 2009). The journalists who provide the raw data from which newspaper stories are written and subsequently archived are trained to report who does what, when, and where. Large protest gatherings are a challenge for journalists because the latter are too few in number, cannot be everywhere at once, and have not been trained to look for and report collective actions, or variations across time and place. Ideally they could be trained to beware the twin illusions of unanimity and continuity and to observe and report whatever alternating and varied individual and collective actions occur. Conceivably this could improve the quality of archived accounts of protest events for subsequent generations of archival researchers.

Systematic observations in situ can provide rich records of the alternating and varied individual and collective forms of action that comprise contentious gatherings. There are no immaculate perceptions; observers must know what to look for. They have to be trained to recognize and record collective actions when they see or hear them (Schweingruber & McPhail 1999); that training can be accomplished in a day or two. To date, it has been costly to train and deploy multiple observers, to compile and analyze the records they produce. Cell phones, digital cameras, and other digital recording devices lend themselves to prudent sampling and recording of the actions comprising protest events. Digital film records are lending themselves to the development of new and efficient means of coding and analyzing digitized data. Digital recording devices are now ubiquitous in protest and celebratory gatherings; consequently, similarly equipped social scientists may be less obtrusive to others around them while producing systematic observation records.

INNOVATIONS AND DERIVATIVES

The Internet, cell phones, and digital videocams have revolutionized the way in which three traditional forms of protest – vigils, blockades, and rallies – are mobilized and recorded. After Cindy Sheehan’s son was killed in the Iraq War, she stood vigil outside the US president’s summer home protesting the war; the media covered her vigil. At a press conference she called for nationwide sympathy vigils on August 17, 2005; that call was repeated on several antiwar movement websites. One site asked local organizers to report when and where their vigil occurred (McCarthy & McPhail 2006). The reported total of 1627 different vigils throughout the US on that single day was four times larger than the number of vigils reported in the 35-year period covered by the Collective Action Dynamics project. Neither of those data sources tell us whether two or more vigilers at any of the sites were collectively stationary or rotating, silent or intermittently chanting, singing or praying, carrying lighted candles or placards, distributing leaflets or depending on placards to inform onlookers and passersby of their grievances, claims, and demands; nor do we know the duration of their vigils. Social scientists have reported observations of all of these combinations and permutations of EFCA in numerous vigils over the past half-century.

The Internet has also been used to mobilize participants throughout the US to send faxes and/or emails to congressional offices in Washington, DC in protest of the Iraq War. The resulting tens of thousands of electronic messages effectively obstructed those offices by shutting down their fax machines and computer systems, thereby blockading business-as-usual. Both the Internet and cell phones
are now routinely used to mobilize participation in forthcoming rallies and marches as well as impromptu protests and celebrations. Cell phones are used on site to contact others located elsewhere informing them of the impromptu gathering in progress and inviting them to assemble. Inquisitive social scientists can use these same recording and reporting tools to generate systematic data on the individual and collective actions comprising protest and other temporary gatherings.

SEE ALSO: Asylum rights protest campaigns; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Demonstrations; Internet and social movements; Marches; Protest cycles and waves; Repertoires of contention.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


6 MODULAR PROTEST FORMS

Moral incentives
JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG

One of the most fascinating and puzzling features of collective action is the fact that people undertake potentially high-risk protests with little likelihood of reward. Take the widespread protests of early October 1989 in East Germany with high chances of repression and low chances of success. Why are people time and again prepared to participate in protests?

This question refers to the so-called collective action problem. Collective action problems arise in relation to public goods because they attract free riders who consume but do not contribute to the production of public goods. Why were the thousands of East Germans prepared to overcome this free rider dilemma? The literature identifies two main answers (Olson 1965). The first explains participation in terms of collective incentives, a combination of individual demands for public goods and perceptions of individual and group efficacy. The second explains participation in terms of selective incentives, benefits that participants – participants only – derive from the activity itself, irrespective of whether they manage to provide the public good or not.

Selective incentives are classified according to the different ways in which they affect people’s motives and actions (e.g., Marwell & Oliver 1993; Opp, Voss, & Gern 1995). Material incentives are payments or incentives for participating or coercion for not participating. Social incentives are benefits or costs of participating (or not) arising from relationships with other people, either their respect and honor, or the communal pleasures of doing things together. Moral incentives arise from the internal feeling of doing the right thing. A person acting on moral incentives can expect a sense of self-esteem, and approval or even admiration. People take a free ride on the collective good unless selective incentives propel them to protest participation. Olson (1965) emphasized material incentives as the logics of action, whereas scholars such as Chong (1991) and Opp, Voss, and Gern (1995) emphasized social and moral incentives. Note that Olson did not argue that people participate in social movements out of rational self-interest. He acknowledged that moral attitudes could mobilize to the extent they provide selective incentives, but, he argued, it is not possible to get empirical proof of the motivations behind these “soft” incentives (1965: 61, n.17). Nowadays, moral incentives and motivations can be and are measured (e.g., Gross 1995; Opp, Voss, & Gern 1995; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Muhlberger 2000; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Van Dijk 2009). They appear to be of utmost importance in explaining protest participation.

People participate in protest because they see it as an opportunity to change a state of affairs they are unhappy with at affordable costs (instrumental route), or because they identify with the others involved (identification route), or because they want to express their values and their anger with a target that violates their values (ideology route, cf. Klandermans 2004). The literature suggests efficacy and selective incentives (Olson 1965; Klandermans 1984) as the logics of action in the instrumental route. The feeling of being able to make a difference combined with selective incentives helps to lower the costs and increase the benefits of participation. Social incentives: commitment, respect and honor, and communal pleasures of doing things together, are the logic of action in the instrumental route. Moral incentives function as the logic of action in the ideological route. Violated (sacred) values generate moral outrage propelling people into action to express their views (Jasper 1997). The more a political or social “wrong” is against people’s principles and values, the more they feel obliged to defend their subjective moral
boundaries (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Van Dijk 2009).

In taking the instrumental route people have to overcome the free rider dilemma, but the identification and ideological route generate an inner obligation that helps to overcome this dilemma – even though the two routes create an inner obligation for different reasons. Maintaining one’s moral integrity may incite an inner moral obligation to oneself, versus the inner social obligation to other group members incited by group identification (Stürmer et al. 2003). These obligations release an energizing force if and only if one participates, and therefore make free riding less likely. Hence, one might take a free ride on the production of a collective good, but one cannot take a free ride on one’s own inner obligation.

With these insights in mind, let me conclude by returning to the East German protesters of early October 1989. Opp, Voss, and Gern (1995) demonstrate that social and moral incentives especially helped them to overcome the fear of repression and negligible success probability. Successful collective action requires an ever-changing mix of material, social, and moral incentives that work together to overcome collective action problems, and hence, dependent on the sociopolitical context, a different mix of incentives may motivate people to protest.

SEE ALSO: Collective efficacy; Free rider problem; Mechanisms; Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives; Social and solidary incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Motivation and types of motives (instrumental; identity, ideological motives)
BERT KLANDERMANS

The social psychology of movement participation distinguishes three fundamental reasons why people participate in social movements: people may want to change their circumstances, they may want to act as members of their group, or they may want to express their views. Together these three motives account for most of the reasons why people take part in collective political action. Social movements may supply the opportunity to fulfill these motives and the better they do the more movement participation turns into a satisfying experience. In brief, the literature refers to these three motives as instrumentality, identity, and ideology. Instrumentality refers to movement participation as an attempt to influence the social and political environment; identity refers to movement participation as an expression of identification with a group; and ideology refers to movement participation as an expression of one’s views. Different theories are associated with these three angles (Klandermans 1997; Tarrow 1998). Instrumentality is related to resource mobilization and political process theories of social movements and at the psychological level to rational choice theory and expectancy-value theories; identity is related to sociological approaches that emphasize the collective identity component of social movement participation and with the social psychological social identity theory; and ideology is related to approaches in social movement literature that focus on culture, meaning, narratives, moral reasoning, and emotion and in psychology to theories of social cognition and emotions.

These are not mutually exclusive motives, or competing views on social movement participation, although some parties in the debates in the literature seem to take that position. However, approaches that neglect any of these three motives are fundamentally flawed. This is not to say that each motive should necessarily be active, or that they should be equally strong. For some people a specific motive can be more important than another and the same holds for some movements. One might imagine that in the case of the labor movement instrumentality, that is, aiming for a better agreement, is more important. Identity motives, on the other hand, might be more important for the gay and lesbian movement, while ideological motives might have been more important for participants in the anti-Iraq War demonstrations.

Perceived costs and benefits. The instrumental motive to participate in collective action conceives of action participation as controlled by the perceived costs and benefits of participation. Klandermans presented his classic expectancy-value model in the American Sociological Review in 1984. The model holds willingness to participate dependent on collective benefits and selective incentives. The selective incentives are the expected outcomes of participation multiplied by the value of those outcomes. Between values and expectancies a multiplicative relationship exists which implies that each factor must be higher than zero. If an expected outcome is not valued it does not make a difference; if a valued outcome is not expected, it does not make any difference either. Some outcomes are called selective incentives because they are contingent upon participation. Others are characterized by jointness of supply, that is to say that once they materialize everybody benefits, including those who did not take part in their realization. Therefore, they are called collective benefits. This makes collective action vulnerable to the free-rider problem, that is, nonparticipation under the...
assumption that one will reap the collective benefits anyway. The key factor of this part of the model is expectations: expectations about the behavior of others, expectations that the goal will be reached, and expectations about the contribution of one’s own behavior.

Inner social obligation. The drive originating from identification with other participants is the felt inner social obligation to act on behalf of the collective. Stürmer and his collaborators demonstrate that the motivating force behind collective identity is such a felt inner obligation (Stürmer et al. 2003). Sociopsychologically, and in terms of motivation, a felt inner obligation to participate is important because it is impossible to take a free ride on such an obligation. An inner obligation to participate can only be met by acting upon it, that is to say by participating.

Inner moral obligation. Ideology as a motivating force results in an inner obligation as well, but this time a felt moral obligation (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007). Norms and values are violated, for instance, equality or protecting the weak, and in order to maintain their moral integrity people choose to participate in collective action. And again, one cannot take a free ride on a felt inner obligation.

An additive model. Instrumental, identity, and ideological motives presumably combine in an additive manner. That is to say that each motive adds to the other two in explaining why people participate in collective action, although the relative contribution need not be equal on all occasions. This also implies that the three motives can compensate for one another. Indeed, someone can participate in a protest event although she is not convinced that it will have much impact on politics, but she identifies with the other participants and that is what makes her participate. Alternatively, someone can feel so upset about the violation of some core value, for example animal rights, that he wants to express his indignation irrespective of the expected political outcomes. Van Stekelenburg (2006) was the first to demonstrate that, depending on the organizer or the issue, the relative weight of the motives vary. She proposed and tested that movements might have different action orientations that appeal differentially to the three key motives. Borrowing Turner and Killian’s distinction between power-oriented, participation-oriented, and value-oriented movements she argued that power-oriented movements appeal more to instrumental motives, and value-oriented movements more to ideological motives (Turner and Killian 1987). This turned out to be true.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Free rider problem; Ideology; Moral incentives; Political process theory; Rational choice theory and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Selective incentives; Social and solidary incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Movement/counter-movement dynamics
MARIA K. DILLARD

Movement/counter-movement dynamics refers to the patterns of interaction between the originating social movement and the responding countermovement. A recognition of the importance of this dynamic came about with the concept of countermovements, which arose when scholars recognized that opposition to the movements of the 1960s bore a striking resemblance to social movements in both form and function. Scholars have since identified the interaction of social movement and countermovement as an important aspect of the political context and of democratization. Movement/counter-movement dynamics span a range from direct influence of the opposing side to indirect changes to the political context in which the other side operates (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). Countermovements (CM) and social movements (SM) have been distinguished from one another on several key dimensions, including goals, ideology, tactics, membership, and location in the social structure. SMs and CMs engage with each other on each dimension. Movement/counter-movement dynamics include the ways in which SMs contribute to CM emergence, relationships of SM, CM, and the state, and patterns of interaction.

EMERGENCE

The first interaction of the SM and CM can be traced to the emergence of the CM. A variety of factors have been tied to countermovement emergence, including progress and success of the originating SM, threatened interests for some population as a result of the SM, the CM ideology, availability of political allies and other resources to support the CM, and the political opportunity structure. SMs create the grievances and political opportunities for the emergence of CMs through actions that advocate for change, threaten established interests, mobilize constituents, and that demonstrate the use of collective action as a means to effect or resist social change (Zald & Useem 1987). Therefore, SMs are active in creating the conditions for the mobilization of their own opposition. Upon emergence of the countermovement, SM/CM interaction begins. Zald and Useem (1987: 247) famously describe the movement/counter-movement dynamic as a “loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization.”

RELATIONS TO STATE

The state or some other authority (e.g., political authorities and social institutions) often mediates the interaction of a SM and CM. The relationship of the SM, CM, and the state varies, as does the direction and nature of the conflict. Models of possible SM–CM-authority relationships take into account the issues and goals of the SM and CM, as well as the type of governing structure in place at the time of emergence. In addition, the relationships vary as the SM evolves and gain complexity when interacting with multilevel governing structures.

DYNAMICS

Though the state’s relationship to SMs and CMs is important, its involvement often obscures the sustained interaction of SM and CM. As a result, many theorists have called for analysis of these strategic interactions, particularly when the conflict persists over time (Zald & Useem 1987; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). This interaction or conflict may take various forms, depending on how tightly coupled the movements are (Zald & Useem 1987). With sustained conflict
between SMs and CMs, the consequences may include unexpected outcomes for the original movement and society. For example, the emergence of new, all-white private schooling institutions in Mississippi has been tied to the interaction of SM and CM (Andrews 2002). SM/CM dynamics are among the determinants of selection of tactics and strategies, development of an ideology, and of success for both sides.

Zald and Useem (1987) identify a number of points at which the SM and CM connect (and confront) one another. They include direct, face-to-face encounters, attempts to gain support from the same third party, and efforts to undo the impacts of the other. The resulting conflicts can be indirect (e.g., efforts to persuade authorities and bystanders to return to original policies) or direct (e.g., legal battles, violent confrontation), but are ultimately focused on inhibiting the mobilization of one side while persuading the relevant authorities and bystanders to adopt the ideology of the other. The presence of conflict may lead to increased opportunities for SMs in some areas (e.g., gains in media attention as the media strives to maintain balance), and decreased or limited opportunities in others (e.g., resources are exhausted in actions aimed at reacting to the opponent).

Movement/countermovement strategies include the use of disruptive or damaging actions to harm the opponent, preemptive action directed at the opposition, and persuasion and recruitment of the opposition to join the movement (Zald & Useem 1987). Within each strategy, SMs and CMs utilize various tactics. In order to increase the costs of mobilization for the opposition, a movement might resort to gathering information on their opponent in order to expose negative aspects of the movement or its members, create fear, or simply dissuade mobilization. The mass media serves as a source of strategic information on the opposition’s views and behaviors, as well as on the public’s reaction to the strategies in play. Additional tactics include restricting the opposition’s access and use of resources and creating a negative public image of the opposition. Interactions between SMs and CMs make it difficult for either side to choose an exclusively institutional tactical repertoire; such tactics are too limiting in the presence of opposition. Instead, tactical innovation and adaptation, as well as escalation, are used in the SM/CM interaction as a means of counteracting the moves of the other (McAdam 1983).

The more tightly coupled the SM and CM, the more closely related the patterns of mobilization and the more influence they will have over the tactics and strategies employed by the other. For example, SMs and CMs are generally forced to act within the same venue, which narrows the tactical repertoires available to each (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). Protracted oppositional interaction of SMs and CMs focused on the same targets and within the same venue leads to the development of similar structures, strategies, and tactics, despite other differences (Lo 1982; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).

SM/CM dynamics extend to the production of each movement’s cultural resources. While SMs are able to create a new ideology, CMs have to “remember the answers” (Zald & Useem 1987: 270). CMs are forced to justify the way things already are and provide support for the lack of change. SMs must show that new times necessitate new ways. Alternately, CMs have the burden of discrediting the ideas and goals of the SM and of showing that the status quo is still relevant. The ideology of the movement impacts the mobilization efforts of both sides, particularly in framing one’s opposition.

Movements and countermovements also engage in framing contests, in which each side attempts to persuade authorities and bystanders that they are on the right side of the issue (Zald 1996). CMs sometimes publicly challenge the diagnostic and prognostic frames of the original SM (Benford & Snow 2000). The demands of the SM and the way in which those demands are framed are impacted by the CM. Framing contests between SM and CM are very important to public perception of
the movement, the definition of the problem, the assignment of blame, and for highlighting the solution or desired change, as well as for determining media coverage, resource allocation, and mobilization success. The process of framing is determined, in part, by SM/CM dynamics, as each side competes for the support of the bystander public.

Political opportunities and constraints impact both SMs and CMs, as well as their interaction. For example, critical events that dominate the sociopolitical landscape, open government structures, political instability, and threatened interests (e.g., political, economic, cultural, social) can facilitate and hinder mobilization efforts for both SMs and CMs. According to Meyer and Staggenborg (1996), because SMs and CMs influence political opportunities and public policies, they are part of the creation of the political structure within which they operate. The SM and CM shape and are shaped by their interaction. For this reason, Mottl (1980: 631) conceptualized this movement/countermovement dynamic as a “continuous dialectic of social change.”

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Several of the key theoretical examinations of the movement/countermovement dynamic came about in the 1980s, as the theoretical development of social movement research was gaining momentum. In the years that followed, the theoretical backdrop for explaining the interactions of SM and CM further developed. Theorists have applied resource mobilization theory, collective behavior theory, and the concept of political opportunity structure, taken from political process theory, to the exploration of SM/CM dynamics. Alongside the development of specific propositions about SM/CM dynamics, movement theorists outlined directions for future research related to movement/countermovement dynamics, including calls for macro-level research on countermovements, more longitudinal, multimovement studies, and analyses of the continuous pattern of mobilization of SMs and CMs.

Social movement scholars have since responded to these calls. In empirical analyses, countermovement variables have been utilized to explain such things as the selection of movement tactics and movement outcomes. Further examples include work on animal rights (Jasper & Poulsen 1993), climate change (McCright & Dunlap 2000), German politics (Koopmans 1997), nuclear weapons (Useem & Zald 1982), student divestment (Soule 1997), and abortion (Rohlinger 2002). The theoretical and empirical importance of countermovements and their interaction with originating movements is no longer unknown.

SEE ALSO: Claims-making; Frame disputes; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory; Tactical interaction and innovation.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The phrase, “social movement society,” represents a theory to unify a series of observations about social protest in the contemporary era. Offered by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (1998) in their introduction to an edited collection on contemporary social movements, it makes a series of claims about how protest movements have changed, and raised a series of questions to provoke subsequent scholarship.

Some early work on social movements focused on the profiles of those who engage in protest, offering aggregated psychological explanations for mass behavior, but for the past 40 years, many researchers have emphasized the politics context, concerns, and outcomes of social movements. The explicit premise of this tradition of research was that social protest, or unconventional political participation more generally, was the province of groups poorly positioned to get what they want through conventional means. The disadvantaged could use disruption to bring attention to their cause, to engage latent support, and to mobilize countervailing resources (see Lipsky 1970). In relatively closed or repressive polities, this meant that anyone outside the ruling group might try to launch protest movements. In advanced industrialized democracies, however, people who were disadvantaged politically, economically, or socially were the ones who would use protest to try to make gains.

The focus of the social movement society theory was on those advanced industrialized democracies. The signal social movements of the 1960s, particularly in the US, supported the notion that people who could get what they wanted in other ways would avoid protest. The large movements of the time were animated by ethnic minorities seeking civil rights and inclusion, young people seeking to end the war and enhance their opportunities to participate in decisions about both political life and higher education, and women seeking meaningful inclusion in politics and economic opportunities.

But by the 1970s, social movements emerged representing constituencies that had more tenuous claims to being disadvantaged, often organizing and mobilizing on issues that might have little direct effect on their lives. By the 1980s, the repertoire of social movement actions, including demonstrations and even civil disobedience, had extended to people and causes that were not dramatically disadvantaged, and they were often making claims on behalf of others. The peace and environmental movements, for example, were led by educated and middle-class people who could engage in more conventional politics, including participating in electoral politics; indeed, they often did in addition to movement tactics.

Meyer and Tarrow (1998) observed an increase in the number of causes and constituencies represented by social movements and a diffusion of the social movement repertoire across the political and economic spectrum. Social movements, in effect, became a permanent presence in American life. Increased frequency of protests, they argued, was accompanied by other changes in politics and life that made the social movement less disruptive: (1) the general public became more tolerant to protest as a political tactic; (2) police and other state authorities developed negotiating strategies to manage protests to increase predictability for all concerned and minimize disruption; (3) social movement organizations formalized, bureaucratized, and established themselves as more or less constant presences in political life, (4) creating a professional identity for organizers (Everett 1992); and (5) activists employed a narrower range of social movement tactics, emphasizing less disruptive, threatening, or costly approaches to invite broader participation, for example,
staging a large and colorful demonstration on a weekend in a public location negotiated with authorities rather than staging ongoing civil disobedience campaigns.

Meyer and Tarrow (1998) questioned whether the social movement society represented an increased democratization of political life in advanced industrialized societies or the effective neutering of a tactic that had sometimes been useful to those without other access to political influence. They suggested that the more crowded social movement landscape made it harder for any new cause of constituency to break through the clutter of movements. When social movements become routinized, they asked, do they also become routinized so as to be less consequential?

Subsequent scholarship has made extensive use of the social movement society idea, and this has informed research on protest movements in advanced industrialized states. Soule and Earl (2005) used protest events data drawn from newspaper reports to test social movement society claims. They interpret their results as mostly consistent with the movement society theory, but different in important particulars that merit additional scrutiny. They found, for example, that the papers actually reported fewer, but much larger, protest events, employing more moderate tactics. They also found that the number of claims supported by protest events has increased, but there is a decline in the number of new claims, and that these claims may actually be narrower than the overarching ideas that animated movements in an earlier time.

Rather than employing direct tests, the social movement society has mostly been taken as a given, providing a backdrop for the analysis of a particular case or political behavior. For example, Earl and Kimport (2009) have examined fan engagement in computer networks, in effect recognizing nonobtrusive mobilization that is stripped of all political content. Interestingly, the movement society theory has extended much as its originators suggest the social movement form has extended, leaving larger questions about political, social, and economic inequality to be addressed.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Democracy and social movements; Organizations and movements; Outcomes, political.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Movements within institutions/organizations
CALVIN MORRILL and ELIZABETH CHIARELLO

Social movement scholars traditionally concern themselves with coordinated and sustained collective action apart from institutional channels that promote or constrain change. Organizational scholars, by contrast, traditionally focus on the strategies and structures embodied in bureaucracy. Zald and Berger (1978) were among the first to systematically articulate the idea that organizations are polities in which members can engage in collective action to change and/or resist official policies. Over the past three decades, scholars began blurring the boundaries of the conventional analytic foci of organizational and social movement research as they recognized that a great deal of social change occurs in organizations via social movements and movement-like dynamics. As Davis and colleagues (2005) illustrate, these developments led to multiple, interrelated shifts in social movement research, including: investigating the organizational bases of social and institutional change; expanding focal analytic concerns beyond state-centered authority to address collective challenges to institutionalized authority that operates separately from or in the shadows of state authority; examining collective action that involves both formally organized and tacitly coordinated efforts within and across organizations, markets, and fields.

Davis and Zald (2005) observe that organizational researchers likewise have increasingly drawn on social movement theory to explain structures and strategies in private corporations with nonbureaucratic, distributed production processes that resemble social movements; collective action in consumer and financial markets; and shifting organizational alliances across private, public, and nonprofit organizations. The combination of social movement and organization theory, rather than organization or economic theory alone, is more useful for explaining the dynamics of this new organizational world. Of particular importance has been collaboration and intellectual dialogue among social movement and neo-institutional organization theorists who explain organizational structures and strategies as expressions of taken-for-granted cultural-cognitive assumptions that constitute key institutions in society, including markets, law, work, the family, gender, and ethnoracial hierarchies. Much of the analysis in neo-institutionalism concerns “fields,” which are recognized domains of social life that bring together similar types of organizations, practices, normative regulation, and legitimized cultural-cognitive assumptions. As neo-institutionalists have increasingly focused on field emergence and change, as well as contradictions within and between different institutions, social movement theorists have recognized that broad collective attempts at change often target multiple institutions and fields at once. The American civil rights movement, for example, simultaneously targeted ethnoracial hierarchy, law, education, and other key institutions of contemporary society in the quest for social justice and racial equality. This intellectual cross-traffic among social movement and organizational researchers has prompted a multi-institutional conception of society in which the state is but one source of legitimate authority and power.

Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue that the multi-institutional conception of society calls attention to how social movements and other collectivities challenge and shape nonstate, institutionalized authority in many fields involving multiple social institutions. Scholars advocating a “new social movements” approach have similarly broadened understandings of power and authority to include multi-institutional targets. While new
social movement scholars typically address nonmaterialistic, cultural sources and changes, organizational scholars focus on movement dynamics and institutional change within and across organizational and field boundaries. Although not all social movement scholars recognize collective action in which the state is not directly involved as a social movement, many scholars argue that applying social movement theory outside state-centered politics can yield insights into organizational and institutional change that conventional theories in those domains cannot.

Attention to organizations and institutions as contexts and targets of social movements underscores the importance of reconceptualizing social movements as challenges to institutionalized authority (whether linked to governments or not), variation in the forms and strategies of political conflict in organizations and fields, and the dynamics of movement emergence and their consequences.

RECONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CHALLENGES TO INSTITUTIONALIZED AUTHORITY

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) argue that social movement theory traditionally falls under the umbrella of contentious politics, which locates social movement research in the realm of political sociology by focusing on how social movements target state agents, facilitate or disrupt political processes, and secure state-based outcomes. Organizational and social movement scholars increasingly identify social movement processes occurring in organizations and fields outside or loosely connected to the state.

Snow (2004: 11) calls for liberating social movements from the stronghold of state-centered contentious politics by redefining social movements as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization...and continuity...primarily outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging extant systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems, in the organization, society, culture or world order of which they are a part.” Systems of authority share two key characteristics: (1) behavioral elements – they are the locus of decision-making that influences some group of people, and (2) interpretive elements – they are supported by an interconnected set of beliefs and values that serve to justify their exercise of authority. Movements may challenge either or both of these elements in seeking organizational and institutional change.

A focus on challenges to institutionalized authority enables scholars to expand and refine social movement theory by evaluating whether the mechanisms and processes identified in state-oriented political arenas apply similarly to collective change efforts or resistance to change in other venues. Since different forms of institutional authority link to different constituents, norms, goals, and ideological bases for exercising authority, the applicability of social movement theory across various institutional arenas speaks to the robustness of those theories while the need for theoretical modification reveals how institutional targets influence the forms and processes of collective action. The expansion of social movement research to include all institutionalized systems of authority ties studies of social movements to research on authority and power more generally, thereby linking social movement studies integrally to key concerns across much of the social sciences.

Empirically, this approach expands the array of organizations to which social movement theory can apply and facilitates comparative research by enabling researchers to focus on a broad range of organizational forms and settings. This approach also facilitates scholars bringing under the rubric of social movements those forms of collective action that are not aimed at the state, such as religious, self-help/therapeutic, countercultural, and scientific/technological movements. Including these movements in the analytic purview of social movement research broadens an understanding of the sources and mechanisms of institutional change as it enables scholars
to understand different forms of collective action at various developmental stages. This expansion also provides a fresh look at entrepreneurial activity in fields and organizations that can account for new technologies and innovations in markets and, in scientific fields, new waves of ideas and discoveries.

Social movement research sometimes receives criticism for using the single case study as a primary method of analysis. State-centered studies lend themselves to single case studies as it is difficult to engage in cross-comparative research when examining a phenomenon unique to one country or governmental system. To rectify this, Amenta (1991) has argued for breaking cases into smaller units of analysis, such as examining governmental subunits (e.g., states, provinces) within federal governments. The study of social movements in and across organizations provides additional opportunities for comparative research by investigating collective action in multiple kinds of organizations and their environments.

FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN ORGANIZATIONS AND FIELDS

The examination of collective challenges to institutionalized authority, broadly understood, draws attention to organizations and fields as political systems in which social power is reproduced and challenged. As Ewick and Silbey (2003) argue, power is not a fixed essence, but a relational process constituted at all levels of social life through ongoing social interactions. Social hierarchies in organizations and fields are linked to broader institutionalized arrangements, including hegemonic structures that organize economies and social relations of all kinds (e.g., social class, gender, race, and ethnicity). Because power is grounded in the relational dynamics of organizational systems, the same structures that reproduce power provide resources for resistance. This cycle of power and resistance occurs in organizations of all types and is constrained and facilitated by broader institutional arrangements and movements, including legal changes.

Political conflict in organizations and fields varies in terms of its visibility (overt to covert), structure (disaggregated to formally coordinated), and size (small group/network to mass mobilizations). Zald and Berger (1978) identify three categories of movement dynamics in organizations that illustrate some of these differences. Coups d’etat involve covert, informally coordinated small groups who target leaders for change. Bureaucratic insurgency typically begins covertly but can become more overt with large, formally coordinated networks of followers. Mass movements within and across organizations are highly visible, large-scale mobilizations typically requiring formal coordination. Likewise, collective efforts of change within and across fields can take on similar variation from small critical masses to mass mobilizations that captivate and/or create whole fields and markets.

Most studies of political conflict in organizations/institutions address overt, formally coordinated action, but recent work attends to covert tactics – collective dissent that occurs beneath the surface of normalized routines, but can facilitate or resist change. Because those who challenge or resist institutionalized authority often lack material or cultural resources, they opt to engage in their actions covertly to avoid repression from dominant and/or official groups. Morrill, Zald, and Rao (2003) argue that covert political conflict is marked by multiple attributes, including perceptions of collective injury (or the failure of orthodox practices), contestation of institutionalized power and authority, social occlusion, and officially forbidden forms of dissent that target material and/or symbolic elements of institutionalized authority. Although perceptions of collective injury and the failure of orthodox practices can precede the contestation of institutionalized authority, they need not do so and can emerge in the social interaction that constitutes covert action. Sabotage and theft exemplify covert challenges to the material aspects of institutionalized authority while symbolic challenges include “symbolic escape” in which aggrieved
parties psychologically or physically separate themselves from the sources of organizational injustice and abuse by taking long breaks or daydreaming, hidden transcripts, gossip, and insubordination paired with feigned ignorance of the rules. In all these dynamics, it may be difficult for both dominant groups and broader audiences to make accurate attributions of the identities and interests of covert challengers.

The collective dimensions of covert action that challenges institutionalized authority can also be conceptualized as a continuum from “disorganized co-action,” in which actors simultaneously subvert dominant norms without consciously coordinating their actions, to “tacit complicity,” where organizational members conceal the actions of others engaged in covert conflict, to informal coordination through networks and virtual groups, to clandestine formal coordination via unions and other organized groups that can result in overt mass mobilizations.

Official structures that permit or constrain dissatisfaction/voice influence the forms of political conflict in organizations. McFarland (2001) demonstrates how authority structures in high school classrooms that permit student participation create opportunities for mass mobilization against teachers while those that impede student participation limit disruption to those students with advantaged social networks. Professional, voluntary, and federated organizations with flatter organizational structures diminish covert conflict while those with more hierarchical organizational structures suppress overt voice and exacerbate covert conflict. Roscigno and Hodson (2004) demonstrate how other aspects of organizational structure, such as disorganization and union presence, yield both collective and individual political action. Institutional fields with dominant organizations may experience similar dynamics as challenges to institutionalized authority take more overt forms, while fields with more fragmented structures can lead to more overt and organized forms of collective challenges.

MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

For collective action to emerge in organizations and fields, the same conditions identified by social movement theorists as necessary in broader social settings must exist: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and resources, and resonant frames. At the same time, the experience of social movement dynamics in organizations and fields blurs the traditional dichotomy of social movement “outsiders” and targeted “insiders.” Categorizing individuals as insiders or outsiders glosses over the complexities of activism; scholars suggest this belongs along a continuum since many individuals operate simultaneously inside and outside organizations and fields. Scully and Segal (2002) demonstrate that activists within and across organizations and fields can play multiple roles depending upon their focal activities; organizational members engaged in activism within their own organization may have to devise strategies to reach out to constituents that prefer anonymity while at the same time sharing activist strategies across organizations and fields in more explicit ways. Meyerson (2003) analyzes “tempered radicals” who buy into the formal goals of the private corporations at which they work yet also look for opportunities to collectively fight for social justice within their workplaces.

Organizational members’ accountability to the organization and to outsiders helps explain the emergence and dynamics of their activism. They may depend on the organization or field to which they belong for financial resources, but depend on an outside movement for discursive resources (resonant frames). Katzenstein (1998) observes that divided accountability helps shape the forms activism takes. To fight for change from within, activists must first gain entrée to the organization or field. Broad societal and legal changes resulting in an influx of minorities into mainstream organizations has set the stage for this pathway to activism. Traditional movements developed outside institutional channels help pave the way for institutional activism by
movements within institutions/organizations

furnishing activists with discursive and tactical repertoires promoting movement goals. Movements that emerge inside organizations reach out to external movements to validate their claims and pressure the organization using tactics unavailable to insiders such as boycotts and petitions. Similarly, Binder (2002) argues that movements emerging outside organizations can reach out to sympathetic insiders to advance their claims from within.

MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

One of the most vexing questions in social movement research concerns linking collective action with particular outcomes. The most well-known conceptualization of social movement outcomes comes from Gamson’s (1975) early focus on the “acceptance” of movement goals by targets and the “new advantages” to which such acceptance can lead. In organizations, scholars have framed the outcomes of collective action in terms of micro-level changes to workplace routines, implementation of new policies and technologies at the organizational level, and alterations of existing and the construction of new organizational forms and fields. Aside from these types of outcomes, movement outcomes can also carry biographical and personal outcomes in terms of risks and opportunities to professional careers or emotional commitments to activism. Outcomes can also unfold in various kinds of settlements and quasi-formalized collaborations of groups with very different practices and orientations across organizational and field boundaries, which can lead to broader consequences involving new values, beliefs, identities, and cultural practices out of which new organizational forms and fields can form.

CONCLUSION

The study of social movements in organizations and institutional fields underscores the blurring of boundaries between the concerns of social movement and organizational research. Scholars operating on and/or across these boundaries have drawn from social movement theory to understand institutional change and new formations in organizations, fields, and markets. Scholarship on social movements in and across organizations has expanded both the types and targets of collective action, as well as the forms and consequences that such action produces. By taking seriously the idea that a great deal of social and institutional change occurs in and across organizations, social movement and organizational scholars can demonstrate how institutional change at multiple levels of analysis occurs.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Bureaucratization and social movements; Institutional theory and social movements; Multiculturalism and social movements; Multiorganizational fields; Organizations and movements; Resistance.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Movies and movements
PETRA ANDITS

Film has been recognized for its potential social and political impact since its beginning (see, for example, the debate between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno). Therefore, film, and in particular documentary film, can also be seen as an instrumental tool of social movements to bring about social and political change. Although generally ignored by social movement scholars, films can have a wide range of important impact on the public, social movement organizations and policymakers. Social movements continually attempt to create public space for debate of the issues they consider important, and films can become a crucial segment of that struggle as they create a forum in which the public can encounter issues (Whiteman 2003). Activist documentaries may provide a sense of shared identification around the issue at stake and this in turn can mobilize citizens, as was the case after the screenings of *Panama Deception*, a film about the 1989 US invasion of Panama. Activist films may also influence the activist communities themselves. The production process itself can stimulate greater communication among individuals and organizations and can strengthen organizational networks. For example, labor organizations have mobilized their members by educating them about the long history of labor activism in the southeastern US through *The Uprising of ’34* (film about the 1934 textile strike). In addition, documentary films have proven to be powerful tools in influencing public policy. For example the documentary *Yes, In My Backyard*, exploring the dependence of one American farming town on the prison industry, helped spark debates about policy and reframe the policy agenda (Whiteman 2003).

The first wave of activist documentary appeared during the early 1930s, influenced by the emerging radical ideas of the time. Probably the most notable filmmaker of this period was John Grierson, whose famous film *The Drifters*, about commercial fishing off the west coast of Scotland, attempted to shift the image of the proletariat away from the Victorian capitalist perspective.

During the 1960s and 1970s heightened political turbulence and the development of low-cost video technology facilitated the peak of film activism. Most prominent were the French and South American activist cinemas. They promoted the politicization of cinema, not only as a cultural apparatus but also as means of social and political transformation (Granjon 2011). Some of the key French collectives in the period were Unicité, Ciné-Lutte, Medvedkine, Arc, Iskra, and Cinéma Rouge. Activist cinema’s main emphasis laid on factory workers’ and farmers’ class struggle against capitalism, while other films focused on immigrants, prostitutes, gays, women, and new critical issues, such as antipsychiatry and ecology. Examples include the *Les prostituées de Lyon parlent; Coup pour coup; Travailleurs immigrés; Avoir vingt ans dans les Aurès; Malville, état de siège.*

At the same time, the New Latin American Cinema grew out of the Imperfect Cinema from Cuba, Third Cinema from Argentina, and Cinema Novo from Brazil. These collectives shared not only the regional sociohistorical conditions under which they emerged, but also an urge for radical political and social intervention (Del Sarto 2005). Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, the two notable Argentinean filmmakers of the Third Cinema, claimed that the “new historical situation” demands a new “revolutionary cinema”; a “militant cinema that contributes to the possibility of revolution” (cited in Del Sarto 2005: 81). The focus of their films was oppression, exploitation, marginality, and poverty.

A noteworthy example of the usage of films by social movements during this period is that...
of the women liberation movement. During the second wave of feminism a number of feminists used films as part of their liberation activities. Women’s use of film has been crucial in creating feminist political expression (Tomsic 2007). Activists involved in the movement made films to self-represent female experience and feminist demands and to address what they saw was missing from films already in circulation. Some feminist film examples are *Wanda, Maidens, Ladies Rooms, Film for Discussion, We Aim to Please, Separation, Vibration*.

The use of film by social movements to convey their messages has increased dramatically in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In the last ten years SMOs have successfully incorporated documentary film projects into their campaigns for social and political change. The third wave of activist documentary began to evolve with a number of labor documentaries and films documenting the mounting AIDS crisis (for example, *Voices from the Front and Fast Trip, Long Drop*). Social movements championing human rights are probably the most fruitful in producing and distributing films about the issues they fight for. Since the turn of the century a great many activist documentaries have recorded human rights abuses. For example, *Total Denial* (2006) exposes violations of the Burmese people’s rights; *The Greatest Silence* (2007) portrays rape and mutilation of women in Congo; *Taxi to the Dark Side* (2007) deals with torture in Abu Ghraib and Afghanistan. *Not in Our Town* shows the residents of Billings, Montana, who stood up for local minorities when they were targeted by white supremacists. Human rights film festivals are burgeoning worldwide. Examples include the Annual Human Rights Watch International Film Festival, the Annual International Human Rights Film Festival in Buenos Aires, and the Human Rights Arts & Film Festival in Melbourne. By screening thought-provoking films, festivals offer platforms to discuss issues, mobilize activists, and promote action to stop the abuses (Kaiser 2011).

SEE ALSO: Activism; Media activism; Media and social movements; Music and social movements; Outcomes, cultural.

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Multiculturalism and social movements
FABIO ROJAS

Multiculturalism is a movement advocating the representation of multiple cultures in education, government, and other institutional settings. Multiculturalists are motivated by ethical and practical considerations. Ethically, multiculturalists believe that it is unjust that social institutions only recognize a single cultural group. States, for example, have an obligation to recognize all citizens and their traditions, not merely those that have traditionally controlled the state. Multiculturalists also believe that individuals and groups benefit when they are exposed to multiple cultures. Individuals may become more tolerant if they know about ethnic groups aside from their own. Groups that have been historically repressed may benefit from having their voices heard in schools or government, and thus decrease the stigma associated with being from a particular group. It is also argued that recognition of multiple cultures reduces conflict because nondominant groups are not forced to completely assimilate the dominant culture.

THE BEHAVIOR OF MULTICULTURAL MOVEMENTS

Multicultural movements operate at multiple levels. Some political movements institutionalize multiculturalism in the national government. A number of Southeast Asian nations have created policies that emphasize the representation of multiple groups. Following a period when Chinese ethnics dominated, the Malaysian government created a 1963 policy that formally recognized non-Chinese groups and gave them power. A very well-known example is Canada, which has formally recognized multiple cultures for decades. Not only are the French-speaking Quebecois recognized, but so are indigenous groups and various immigrant communities (Driedger 1996).

Multicultural movements also target civil institutions. In the 1980s, for example, multiculturalists targeted American schools (Binder 2002). The principal argument was that American schools had systematically ignored or minimized the history and culture of various ethnic groups, such as African-Americans, Native Americans, and Chicanos. The solution was to thoroughly revise school curricula, especially in history and languages. At the primary and secondary level, multiculturalists demanded that schools employ textbooks showing the accomplishments of non-European individuals (Binder 2002). At the post-secondary level, activists demanded that universities require students take courses exploring the experiences of different ethnic groups and that administrators create ethnic studies programs to conduct research on American ethnic groups (Bryson 2005; Rojas 2007).

THE IMPACT OF MULTICULTURAL MOVEMENTS

The success of multicultural movements depends on a number of factors, such as the tactics employed and the openness of the targeted institutions. In studies of educational politics, it has been found that moderate levels of protest are the most likely to lead to implementation multicultural college curricula. Protest that is violent, or that does not occur at all, has a negative impact on creating multicultural college curricula (Rojas 2006). The culture of the institution appears to matter a great deal as well. If activists can make their proposals consistent with the school’s stated goals, then they are more likely to have the proposals accepted. Radical demands that schools or colleges completely change are ignored. Similarly, multicultural movements
that find allies within institutions are also likely to experience success (Binder 2002).

The long-term impact of multicultural movements on individuals is unclear. For example, even though a number of universities have multicultural course requirements, there is almost no research on whether such courses significantly change students’ attitudes or academic experiences. One exception is Yamane’s (2002) discussion of multicultural university curricula. Yamane suggests that multicultural course requirements might be a policy that mitigates vocationalism in the university. Ethnic studies majors, unlike other liberal arts majors, have not decreased relative to business. Similarly, there is little research in political science asking if state-sanctioned multiculturalism decreases ethnic tensions within a country. However, it is clear that there are lasting organizational impacts. Multicultural policies regarding languages and ethnic rights remain in many countries and they are enforced. Despite criticisms, ethnic studies ideas are now found in many school curricula, whether it be in history books or in the novels assigned in reading classes. Governments often have ethnic caucuses, such as the Black Congressional caucus, that continue to have influence.

**OPPOSITION TO MULTICULTURALISM**

Like most movements, multiculturalism has spawned its own countermovements. In the United States, there are associations of university professors who oppose campus multiculturalism and espouse a return to classical teaching. Political parties have arisen to combat multiculturalism and associated group rights. These parties are often populist and traditionalist in orientation and target immigrant groups. The Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) is one such example. Founded in 2005, it opposes dual citizenship, a key feature of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, and continued immigration from Islamic nations.

Many intellectuals have opposed multiculturalism on practical and ethical grounds. Practically, critics claim that multiculturalism exacerbates ethnic tensions by celebrating group differences. Instead, people should be encouraged to adopt the dominant culture. On moral grounds, critics claim that multiculturalism is bad because it “ghettoizes” people and sorts them into low status groups, rather than treating them as autonomous individuals. Other critics note that multiculturalism relies on the assumption that all cultures equally deserve respect. Thus, multiculturalism is criticized by traditionalists and populists, who value the dominant culture, and individualists, who are highly suspicious of group differences.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Ethnic movements; Movement/counter-movement dynamics; Movements within institutions/organizations; Racist social movements; Symbolic crusades.

**REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS**


Multiorganizational fields
BERT KLANDERMANS

Movement organizations are embedded in multiorganizational fields (Curtis & Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1992). Multiorganizational fields can be defined as the total possible number of organizations with which the movement organization might establish specific links. A social movement organization’s multiorganizational field can be broken down into sectors that are supportive, antagonistic, or indifferent. The first is described as the movement organization’s alliance system, consisting of groups and organizations that support it; the second as the organization’s conflict system, consisting of groups and organizations that oppose it— including countermovement organizations. Alliance systems provide resources and create political opportunities; conflict systems drain resources and restrict opportunities. The boundaries between the two systems remain fluid and may change in the course of events. Organizations that try to keep aloof from the controversy may choose or be forced to take sides. Coalitions can fall apart and former allies can become opponents.

The composition of a movement’s organizational field is not random, but relates to existing cleavages in a society, be it class, religion, ethnicity, Left–Right affiliation, the environment, and the like. Long before a controversy develops into an open conflict, various groups and organizations exist within a society, each with its own position and opinion. Depending on the issue one can to some extent predict which groups and organizations will end up on which side of the controversy. Opinions about social issues develop within subcultures of groups and networks of individuals who already share many attitudes and agree on certain principles. The direction in which these opinions develop suggests the initial contours of the multiorganizational field of a would-be challenger. Individuals, organizations, and groups may be antipathetic, sympathetic, or indifferent toward the issues at hand. In this situation, persuasive communication by a challenger resonates first among individuals from those sectors who have some sympathy or affinity for the challenger’s viewpoint. Many a persuasive campaign never goes beyond these sectors. It should be emphasized that movement campaigns direct their messages not only to potential supporters but to opponents as well. Indeed, a large number of a challenger’s arguments emerge in interactions with its opponents. As a result, “us–them” dynamics tend to develop.

Different social movement organizations have different but overlapping conflict and alliance systems. The greatest overlap will exist among organizations from the same social movement industry (e.g., the women’s movement or the environmental movement), but organizations from different movement industries will also have overlapping conflict and alliance systems (e.g., groups from the women’s movement and the environmental movement may coalesce in antiwar protest). The specific makeup of the multiorganizational field will vary over time and with the particular movement and situation. The proportion of the field engaged in one of the two systems expands or contracts according to the cycles of protest. At the peak of a protest cycle, initially indifferent organizations may choose sides, while in a downturn organizations may drop off. Although other movement organizations constitute a major part of the alliance system of a social movement organization, almost any kind of organization can become engaged in it: youth organizations, student organizations, women’s organizations, organizations of conservationists, business people, consumers, community organizations, as well as political parties, unions, churches, social welfare, and neighborhood organizations. The principal components of a
social movement's conflict organization are its targets: governmental institutions, employer’s organizations, elites, political parties, countermovement organizations, and so on.

The concept of a multiorganizational field provides us with a new way of looking at the mobilization of individual citizens (Fernandez & McAdam 1989). Individuals are embedded in multiorganizational fields and, depending on their positions within these complex fields, they become a more or less likely target of mobilization attempts and thus involved in events. The social construction of protest takes place within the context of a community’s multiorganizational field – in the groups, networks, and organizations the multiorganizational field is composed of. It is there that grievances are interpreted, means and opportunities are defined, opponents appointed, strategies are chosen and justified, and outcomes are evaluated. Such interpretations and evaluations are as a rule controversial. As a social movement organization competes to influence public opinion or the opinion of its constituency, its multiorganizational field determines its relative significance as an individual actor. Because of the complex makeup of multiorganizational fields, individuals are objects of persuasive communication emanating not only from movement organization A but also from competing organization B, opponent C, countermovement organization D, and so on. The individual’s embeddedness determines what impact these different sources have.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Discursive fields; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Organizations and movements; Social movement industry; Social movement organization (SMO); Subcultures and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Narratives
FRANCESCA POLLETTA

A narrative or story is an account of a sequence of events in the order in which they occurred to make a point. Formally, narratives are composed of (1) an orientation, which sets the scene; (2) a series of complicating actions (implicit "and then..." clauses) ending with one that serves as dénouement; and (3) an evaluation, which can appear at any point in the story, establishing the importance of the events related (Labov & Waletsky 1967). As a rhetorical form, stories are distinctive in their use of sequence to denote causality, their integration of explanation and moral evaluation, and their reliance on a structure (plot) that is familiar from prior stories.

Scholars of social movements have used narrative materials such as life histories and news stories to capture dynamics of protest, and scholars often present analyses in narrative form, as for example, in accounts of the rise and fall of particular movements. They have also treated narratives as objects of analysis, for several reasons. Methodologically, it is fairly easy to isolate narrative in a chunk of discourse. This makes it possible to compare narratives over time and across contexts, examining how changes in stories create new arenas for and stakes in contention. Second, there exists a large multidisciplinary body of scholarship on how narrative figures in processes such as cognition, identity transformation, and persuasion. Scholars have drawn sometimes counterintuitive hypotheses from that literature about culture’s role in mobilization. Third, the fact that stories are a familiar rhetorical form as well as a conceptual one makes it possible to identify how institutional rules and popular norms limit the ways in which one can use culture to challenge the status quo.

While many scholars of social movements have treated stories as a persuasive rhetorical tool, showing how stories can, among other things, mobilize participants, build solidarity, and secure third party support, other scholars have made a stronger argument. Stories are strategic and they set the terms of strategic action. Available stories and norms for telling stories shape the interests on behalf of which people mobilize, the kinds of action they see as effective, and the conditions in which they are able to achieve their goals.

Thus, with respect to why movements emerge when they do, scholars have drawn on narrative to account not only for why groups act on preexisting interests but also why those interests come to exist in the first place. Protest is likely, goes one argument, when the stories that govern action and interaction in a particular institutional arena lose their force. For example, Luker (1984) showed that physicians who routinely performed abortions developed a stake in abortion reform when medical advances rendered implausible the moral story that they were acting to save the life of the mother. Since stories integrate description, explanation, and evaluation, institutional stories, in this view, both describe institutional practices and legitimate them. When the description is no longer accurate, the moral warrant suffers too. Newly vulnerable to challenge, physicians mobilized to gain legal protection for abortion.

People may also develop a stake in protest when new stories come to animate an institutional arena. For example, Davis (2005) attributes the rise of a movement against child sexual abuse to the institutionalization of a new storyline derived from the anti-rape movement. Before the 1970s, child sexual abuse was seen through the lens of family systems and psychoanalytic therapies. Harm to the victim was not considered inevitable and was rarely thought to be long lasting. Family members, and even the victim, were often seen as collusive with the abuser in tolerating the
abuse. That account changed when antirape and child protection movements converged on the issue of child sexual abuse. The rape experience was transposed to the experience of sexually abused children. In the new storyline, abuse was widespread but unrecognized, even by victims themselves, victimization was clear cut, and harm was profound and long lasting. The appropriate response to such abuse was for victims to mobilize to speak out and gain rights. The adoption of a new story thus made it possible for people to interpret their experiences in new ways, and in ways, crucially, that gave them a stake in collective action.

Once movements are underway, activists use stories strategically to enlist support, make claims in diverse political contexts, and defuse opposition. Activists use other rhetorical forms, of course, such as arguments and logical explanations. But recent research in communication shows convincingly that stories are better able than other kinds of messages to change people’s opinions (Slater & Rouner 2002). This is especially true when audiences are not already invested in the issue in question, a situation that social movement activists confront routinely.

However, activists are not unconstrained in their efforts to use narrative to advance their cause. One constraint comes from the range of stories that are considered relevant and believable. Activists with access to widely known and oft-told stories of collective resistance undoubtedly have an advantage over those who have not. Yet the very familiarity of such stories also poses obstacles. Nicaraguan Sandinistas could claim the historical figure of Augusto Sandino as inspiration and guide because Sandino had largely dropped out of official memory; he was thus available for the taking. By contrast, since Emile Zapata remained prominent in Mexican national memory, Zapatistas had to struggle with the state to claim his legacy (Jansen 2007).

Often, activists’ claims, in whatever form they are made, are heard against the backdrop of stories that have taken on the character of common sense. For example, advocates for the poor in the 1980s fought cuts to welfare that were justified as curbing welfare “dependency.” The new idea that dependency was a psychological problem rather than a structural relation made sense in the context of stories that were circulating about (chiefly women’s) dependency on drugs, alcohol, and destructive relationships (Fraser & Gordon 1994).

A second kind of constraint on effective storytelling comes from institutional norms governing how and when stories should be told. For example, plaintiffs making claims of gender discrimination in employment have been pressed by judges to provide stories of individual episodes of discrimination, even when their claims have rested rather on patterns of disparate treatment (Schultz 1990). Adult survivors of child abuse who appeared in court seeking monetary damages were advised to emphasize the debilitating consequences of their past abuse, not to present themselves as survivors who were in control of their lives rather than controlled by their pasts (Whittier 2009). Media reporters’ tendency to tell stories about people and events may make it difficult for activists to communicate the structural causes of the injustices they fight (Smith et al. 2001).

Certainly, activists can challenge conventions of narrative performance. Plaintiffs could have refused to have women tell personal stories of discrimination, insisting that proving a single case of discrimination was not their point. But doing so would have been risky. Culture shapes strategy in the sense that abiding by the rules of cultural expression – here, institutional norms of storytelling – yields more calculable consequences than challenging them. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that activists themselves are immune to popular beliefs about storytelling. Animal rights activists discouraged women from serving in leadership positions because they believed that women were seen by the public as prone to emotional storytelling. That would cost the movement credibility. However, activists spent little time debating whether women were in fact prone to emotionalism or whether emotional stories rather than rational arguments were in fact bad for the
movement (Groves 2001). So their calculations were strategic but only in the context of a set of questionable assumptions about the relations between emotion, reason, stories, and gender. Like other cultural constraints, those imposed by the conventions of narrative’s use and evaluation are not insuperable but, like the distribution of financial resources or the structure of mainstream politics, they operate for the most part to support the status quo.

Finally, studying stories can shed light on how and when movements achieve the impacts they seek. This, however, is an area that merits much further study. Scholars have shown that movement groups possessing strong narrative traditions of overcoming are better able to withstand setbacks than those that do not possess such traditions (Voss 1998). Movements that have prominent spokespersons in politics, even after the movement is over, are better positioned to gain public acceptance for their preferred storyline than those without such spokespersons (Meyer 2006). We do not know, however, just what kinds of benefits flow from winning public acceptance of a movement’s preferred storyline. Congressional representatives now ritually tell the story of the civil rights movement – but in a way that casts further protest as unnecessary (Polletta 2006). And although we know that stories about past movements and their accomplishments or failures are contentious, we know little about just what is at stake in those debates and what is required to win them.

More generally, we do not know what kinds of stories prove the most politically effective: whether, for example, simple stories are more effective than complex ones, or just how accurate stories have to be to remain convincing, or whether it is possible to tell stories that depart from familiar ones. Better answers to questions like these should advance our understanding of how stories figure in much broader dynamics of political change and constraint.

SEE ALSO: Claims-making; Collective memory and social movements; Culture and social movements; Discourse analysis and social movements; Framing and social movements.

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New Left and social movements
RICHARD FLACKS

The term “New Left” came into use in the late 1950s, when it was adopted by British intellectuals who came together after the Khruschev revelations about Stalin and the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the British invasion of Suez. Politically, this group shared a rejection of both Stalinism and the rightward drift of social democracy and a determination to oppose the political framework defined by the cold war.

A similar US-based intellectual/political dynamic paralleled the British formation, and, though influenced by it, had its own indigenous roots. Restlessness among American socialists and other radicals with ideological and theoretical foundations originating in Europe was expressed early in the twentieth century by intellectuals such as Jane Addams, Walter Lippman, and Randolph Bourne, who shared a sense that cultural and educational transformation was fundamental to the fulfillment of visions of radical democracy. One can see in the thought and action of John Dewey a quest, over several decades, for a radical political formation that would be grounded in American experience and language. The organizational experiments of A.J. Muste to create a revolutionary framework rooted in Gandhian pacifism and Marxian anticapitalism resulted in formations, including the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that, in the 1950s and 1960s, transformed American protest strategies and tactics as well as the ideological premises of many American radicals. Muste was a mentor to key founders of the nonviolent civil rights movement, including Bayard Rustin, James Farmer, and James Lawson and his teaching was a strong influence on Martin Luther King in his formative years.

By the late 1950s, efforts to define a radical critique and to articulate alternative social possibilities were being advanced by several public intellectuals who commanded large audiences. The most explicit exponent of the need and possibility for an American New Left was sociologist C. Wright Mills. In the space of some seven years, Mills wrote a series of books and articles that contributed much to setting the agenda of what became the new left in the US. These included The Power Elite (an effort to rework radical analysis of power relations), a reader on Marxism with his own theoretical annotations, The Sociological Imagination (a scathing critique of academic sociology combined with a stirring program for its renovation), The Causes of World War III, and a “Letter to the New Left” enunciating a hope for new sources of radical political agency.

Alongside these fresh intellectual fusions and visions came, as the 1950s turned into the 1960s, an outburst of unexpected grassroots social movement.

Emerging civil rights and peace movements appealed strongly to significant fractions of the American student body. The first wave of youthful activism was the mass nonviolent actions – sit-ins, Freedom Rides, etc. – of mostly black students in the South, beginning in 1960. White and black students on a number of northern campuses engaged in sympathy protests in support of the southern sit-ins; these actions sparked a strong moral/political turn in the intellectual subcultures of university towns after years of self-conscious disaffiliation. A number of new journals suddenly came out of these towns (these included Studies on the Left in Madison, New University Thought in Chicago, and Root & Branch in Berkeley). They shared a theme: the new potential for a
A major breakthrough in the development of the New Left was the founding of a new national student organization: Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The organization had its roots in the “Old Left” tradition: it grew out of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), which itself had begun as the Intercollegiate Socialist society in 1905. The League for Industrial Democracy was founded by a number of prominent intellectuals and labor leaders (John Dewey was an early president), and SLID had been an important campus organization in the activist 1930s. A small group of students, led by Al Haber, persuaded the LID board to turn the moribund SLID over to them in hopes of creating a new organizational format to provide organizational and ideological leadership for the emerging student activism of the early 1960s. With this ambition and a small budget, Haber was able to recruit a number of local leaders of campus activism to the project. Among these, Tom Hayden, editor of the University of Michigan Daily, was perhaps the most ambitious to create a new radical intellectual as well as organizational synthesis. Hayden, a voracious reader and stylish writer, strongly identified with the British New Left. In addition to reading their work, he, like other early 1960s activists, was affected by Camus’ critique of revolutionary strategies based on power and violence. Most importantly, he was impressed with Mills’ work, his social analysis and his presentational style. He could see in all of these, sources for crafting a morally grounded political manifesto for a new generation of the left. He brought a draft of the manifesto to the founding meeting of the new SDS at Port Huron, Michigan, in 1962; the several dozen assembled there spent some days debating its substance. Out of this deliberation came the Port Huron Statement (PHS), which is generally regarded as the seminal document of the American new left.

The central idea of the PHS was embodied in a phrase derived from the teaching of a young pragmatist philosopher at Michigan: Arnold Kaufman. He apparently coined the term “participatory democracy,” but it was the PHS that gave it currency. The phrase itself condenses much of what the New Left project was about: it was a neologism designed to displace “socialism” in defining Left vision and program; it tried to situate the Left squarely in the American democratic tradition; it was, however, a radicalization of that tradition because it extended democracy’s meaning beyond the conventionally political and electoral. “Participatory democracy” establishes a critical standard for evaluating all institutional arrangements: the family, the school, the church, the prison, the workplace – as well as the state (and by so doing connects to the culturally based social critiques identified with John Dewey, as well as with a multiplicity of anarchist thought streams). Indeed, the phrase quickly became identified with efforts to create new forms of internal organization within the new social movements of the 1960s, replacing “party” style structures with forms of direct democracy, consensus decision making and decentered leadership. It was a model that typified the new social movements of the 1960s and beyond.

There were a number of other “new” ideas expressed by the PHS. The manifesto explicitly rejects the cold war as a framework for thought and action, condemning the communism of the soviet bloc and the communist parties as profoundly antidemocratic, but also criticizing anticommunism as a major barrier to articulate social criticism and collective action. Its anticommunism greatly distressed most ‘adult’ leaders of the old ‘democratic Left’ (although it was prescient about how the Left in both Europe and the US would be reconstituted in the decade to follow).

Equally prescient was the statement’s argument that a New Left must have an important base in the university. The university, it declares, is now a crucial social institution; the knowledge it creates and distributes is critical for social change; its inhabitants, especially the students, may be ready for active mobilization. But academia as currently constituted needs reform: it must be a space where scholars and
students can connect both to the world of ideas and to the public sphere (especially the social movements).

Thus, in its formal beginning, the American New Left was an effort to: (1) define a post-Marxian radical democratic ideological foundation for radicalism; (2) foster new strategies, organizational forms, and tactics of grassroots collective action; (3) legitimate the role of the “public intellectual” within the university; (4) sustain ongoing internal critique of radical activism itself in terms of a radical, participatory democratic standard.

SDS, by 1965, had become a mass student organization, because of its early leadership of protest against the Vietnam War. SDS mobilized the first national protest against the war in April 1965 and pioneered antidraft protest in the months that followed. The organization’s membership ballooned, and dozens of its chapters spearheaded the waves of anti-war protest on American campuses in the second half of the 1960s. SDS, as a national organization, refrained from leading national mobilizations against the war, but its local activists helped trigger campus confrontations. These typically focused on local manifestations of the war effort (defense research, military recruiting, Reserve Officers Training Corps); demands for ending university “complicity” in that effort were advanced by mass occupations of administration buildings. In the many cases when such actions were met by harsh police responses, mass student strikes resulted. Some of these confrontations reverberated internationally (as for example the crises at Columbia University, University of Wisconsin, and Kent State).

Such antiwar confrontations were embedded in a diffuse national student movement that was widely seen as a potent cultural as well as political force in those years. SDS’ founding leadership had not imagined that such a student movement was possible in the US, envisioning their efforts as aimed at helping to create a national coalition of labor, civil rights and other reform movements. A successor leadership generation in SDS advocated a focus on “student power,” an extension of participatory democracy to the governance of the university itself. By the end of the decade, and particularly after the killings of students at Kent State and Jackson State, their hope for a mass student movement was realized, at least for a brief time.

The early New Left had sought ideological moorings apart from traditional Marxist and socialist perspectives. An amalgam of radical democratic, anarchist, pacifist, and pragmatic principles and values shaped action orientations of New Left organizers. As the war and repression of protest escalated many activists were attracted by revolutionist rhetoric and sentiment. SDS and other groups identified with the New Left increasingly reframed their goals in revolutionary terms, rejecting non-violence, embracing third world revolutionary models. New movement organizations, of which the Black Panther Party was the most visible and influential, embodied these new directions, affecting movement discourse and practice. The revolutionist moment was short lived, but the 1960s organizations that defined the New Left project (SDS and SNCC) did not survive it.

Although the specific New Left projects and organizations of the 1960s were not sustained, important elements of their perspectives continued to characterize post-1960s social movements:

1. Many of the “new” social movements – feminism, environmentalism, gay liberation – were led, in part, by veterans of the 1960s New Left. In crucial ways, these developments were fueled by reactions against established New Left practices. Late 1960s feminism was pioneered by SDS and SNCC activist women. Less well known were initiatives by previously closeted gay SDS leaders in foundational gay movement organizing.

2. These movements have continued and elaborated the New Left’s demand for forms of participatory democratic decision making. This can be seen in the
global emergence of community-based movements seeking local voice or control over development; in the spread of environmentalist consciousness, questioning market or technology-based planning; in mass street mobilizations challenging authoritarian regimes in many countries; in the World Social Forum and related manifestations challenging established global trade and economic structures.

3. These movements have elaborated the decentralized forms of social movement mobilization and decision making that originated in the 1960s.

4. New social movement emphasis on cultural and personal as well as “economistic” goals represent further elaboration of the New Left project.

5. Finally, the New Left project is embodied in continuing efforts to legitimize and promote “public” social science (as opposed to strictly “academic” or “policy” bases of legitimation). As the Port Huron Statement argued, the fulfillment of the New Left project depends on processes of interaction between the intellectual worlds of universities and of social movements in hope of generating knowledge of democratic use.

SEE ALSO: Democracy inside social movements; New Left and social movements in Europe; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Participatory democracy in social movements; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (United States); Student movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The New Left and the social movements that were born out of it changed for good the way in which movements were conceptualized in Europe. The New Left began in the US as the intellectual offspring of critical sociology, French existentialism, Beat literature, and participatory democracy principles deriving from the civil rights movement. The New Left in Europe shared some of these premises but, according to Carl Oglesby, mainly had to “overcome the memories, the certitudes, and the promises of the Old Left” (Oglesby 1970: 13). On one hand, the advent of a postindustrial age in post-World War II Europe put into question the centrality of the capital–labor conflict. On the other, the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 exacerbated the disillusionment of certain left-wing circles with old style communism due to the harshness of repression of the 1956 revolts in Eastern Europe that took place in its aftermath.

In France, vanguard groups organized around the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie, which was focused, from the late 1940s, on the premise that both superpowers followed an imperialist path. In Britain, the New Left Review (1960) became one of the most important platforms for the promotion and popularization of New Left ideas. In Italy the ideas of interwar Communist leader Antonio Gramsci were rediscovered, especially his stress of the role of culture in social change. The ethos that the New Left promoted was putting an emphasis on more democratic decision-making, less bureaucratic centralization, and a more humanist understanding of politics.

But the New Left did not limit itself to the realm of ideas. In mobilizational terms it was very much influenced by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain and, in general, by the peace movement of the 1950s. But its climactic point was the 1968 student movements in France, West Germany, and Italy, in particular, which to a large extent bore the characteristics of a radical opposition to both blocs of the cold war and an identification with the national liberation struggles of the third world. The emergence of students as the revolutionary subjects par excellence proved correct the idea, advocated by intellectual figures such as Herbert Marcuse, that the proletariat was not the definite carrier of social change (Varon 2003). This fact once more underlined the divide between the two Lefts, since for the old Marxist guard a revolution without the workers that was instead spearheaded and led by inexperienced students was inconceivable. The tacit rejection of the 1968 movements by a number of Western European communist parties and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that crushed the Prague Spring consolidated the divide.

The year 1968 signaled the advent of the so-called “new social movements” (NSMs) that mobilized different resources and used new protest ideas and techniques. Young activists of the New Left felt that they no longer had to wait for a revolutionary situation to arrive; they could instead create this situation themselves by accepting their role as revolutionaries. Among the most important exponents of this tendency was the Italian “Autonomia” in the 1970s, promoting the idea of “self-management,” and the emergence of minority nationalism in Spain, with the advent of Basque and Catalan separatism being framed as identity politics. Follow-up movements, including peace movements, antinuclear energy protests, homosexual rights, second wave feminism, animal rights, and New Age and ecology movements (the West German Greens being the most prominent) capitalized on the organizing efforts of the previous years and had a distinctly local emphasis. In a few
cases, such as the Greek New Left, parts of the movement stepped back later on and (re)joined the “Old Left.”

What were the basic characteristics and what were the broad theoretical and practical concerns of these NSMs? First of all, they tended to transcend class differences as the movement participants came from diverse class backgrounds. Second, in terms of ideology, NSMs were not defined by a Marxist conception of social affairs like the working-class movements of the past. Third, they were characterized by the emergence of new identities – as identity issues were deemed to be more important than class or economic grievances. Fourth, in opposition to the rigid Marxist analysis of the Old Left and its social conservatism, the New Left proposed a radical transformation not only of the political but also of the personal sphere. Therefore, the boundaries between public and private in the NSMs were blurred, including intimate aspects of human life. Moreover, their action repertoire changed radically from the workers’ movements of the past. Nonviolence, civil disobedience, and street theater were among the tactics that were introduced by NSMs. Finally, in terms of organization, NSMs tended to be nonhierarchical, horizontal, and decentralized social networks – in contrast to the vertical way in which traditional parties were structured (Laraña, Johnston, & Gusfield 1994).

From very early on, the New Left and NSMs were criticized and attacked for not privileging categories such as class. They were linked from the very outset to “postmaterialism” and the changing values of postindustrial societies. The typical critique is summarized in the idea that their focus on issues of identity and culture bred a lifestyle phenomenon that was ultimately “postmodern” and nonpolitical. A recent tendency, however, is to challenge the differentiation between “new” and “old” social movements, arguing that their outlook did not differ as much as literature suggests.

In terms of current research, among the most interesting contributions of recent times is the emphasis on culture in general, but also the relationship between the local and the global in terms of “transnationalism.” A good oral history of the movements – with a focus on the changing subjectivities of collective actors over time – still needs to be written, as well as a comprehensive history of the New Left juxtaposed to the parallel evolution of the communist parties and the Eurocommunist phenomenon. Finally, it would be interesting to see the ways in which “old technologies” facilitated “cultural transfers” between the New Left and Eastern bloc activists.

Perry Anderson, the renowned editor of New Left Review, hinted in his first editorial of the year 2000 that the New Left’s political credentials were historically defeated. However, its impact was not commensurate with its political and economic successes or failures (in a Marxist type of analysis), but rather with its significant social and cultural impact.

SEE ALSO: Identity politics; Marxism and social movements; New Left and social movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Participatory democracy in social movements; Postmaterialism and social movements; Revolutions; Student movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


New social movements and new social movement theory
STEVEN M. BUECHLER

New social movement theory (NSMT) emerged in the 1980s in Europe to analyze new social movements (NSMs) that appeared from the 1960s onward. These movements were seen as “new” in contrast to the “old” working-class movement identified by Marxist theory as the major challenger to capitalist society. By contrast, NSMs are organized around gender, race, ethnicity, youth, sexuality, spirituality, countercultures, environmentalism, animal rights, pacifism, human rights, and the like.

If the history of movement theory in the US can be crudely summarized as a transition from collective behavior to resource mobilization and political process approaches, European social movement theory underwent a parallel transition from classical Marxism to NSMT. Paradigms changed on both continents, but the gulf between the later orientations remained almost as great as that between the earlier ones (Crossley 2002: 10).

This is largely due to differences in theoretical style on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Theorizing in the US has largely followed a middle-range strategy that is analytical, empirical, and scientific, occasionally empiricist and positivist, and nominally neutral or objective. In sharp contrast, the “European trajectory has been more firmly framed by the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of the philosophy of history” (Crossley 2002: 10). European analyses of collective action have followed a “grand theory” strategy that is historical, philosophical, and speculative, occasionally metaphysical and teleological, and distinctly normative in blending ethical, political, and cultural concerns.

THEMES OF NSMT

NSMT is a distinct approach to the study of social movements, albeit with significant internal variations (Cohen 1985; Klandermans 1991; Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield 1994). Indeed, the very term “new social movement theory” can be misleading if it implies unanimous agreement on core premises, just as the term “new social movement” can be misleading if it is seen as an ontological claim about an empirical object (Melucci 1996). It is more accurate to speak of a congeries of interrelated ideas and arguments that comprise new social movement theories (NSMTs) with many variations on a general approach to the topic (Buechler 1995). As a first approximation, however, it is possible to identify several themes that are prominent in most if not all versions of NSMTs.

First and foremost, these theories identify a distinct social formation that provides the context for the emergence of collective action. While theorists differ on specifics, the identification of a historically specific social formation as the structural backdrop for contemporary collective action is perhaps the most distinctive feature of NSMTs. As a corollary, transitions between social formations change the context and hence the types of movements that emerge over time.

Thus,

European debates have typically been as much about the constitutive structure and type of society in which modern movements emerge, the relation of those movements to that society and their ‘historical role’ therein, as they have been about the movements themselves. There has been an assumption that societies centre upon certain key conflicts or contradictions and that these conflicts generate particular movements, perhaps even a singular key movement, which seeks to address them. (Crossley 2002: 10)
Hence, a second theme is a causal claim that links NSMs to the contemporary social formation; they are direct responses to postindustrialism, late modernity, advanced capitalism or postmodernity. If contemporary society is defined by capitalist markets, bureaucratic states, scientized relationships, commodified culture, and instrumental rationality, then NSMs are historically specific responses to these conditions. These depictions often emphasize the extent to which large, anonymous, institutional forces have become especially intrusive and invasive; this “colonization” (Habermas 1987) has prompted new collective responses to new forms of social control in late modernity.

A third theme concerns the diffuse social base of NSMs. Some analysts see these movements as rooted in a fraction of the (new) middle classes (Kriesi 1989). Others have argued that these movements are no longer rooted in the class structure, but rather in other statuses such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, or citizenship that are central in mobilizing new NSMs (Dalton, Kuechler, & Burklin 1990). Still others have argued that even these statuses are less important than ideological consensus over movement values and beliefs. For all these reasons, the social base of these movements is presumed to be more complex than in older, class-based activism.

This leads to a fourth theme concerning the centrality of collective identity in social protest (Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1989, 1996). With the uncoupling of activism from the class structure as well as the fluidity and multiplicity of identities in late modernity, the ability of people to engage in collective action is increasingly tied to their ability to define an identity in the first place (Melucci 1989, 1996). This places a premium on the social construction of collective identity as an essential part of contemporary social activism, and it has led to a belated appreciation of how even “old” class-based movements were not structurally determined as much as they were socially constructed through mobilization itself.

A fifth theme involves the politicization of everyday life as the “relation between the individual and the collective is blurred” (Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield 1994: 7) and formerly intimate and private aspects of social life become politicized. The equation of the personal and the political fosters not only identity politics but a lifestyle politics in which everyday life becomes a major arena of political action. Like many aspects of these movements, this characteristic cannot be understood apart from its social context. It is late modernity with its invasive technologies that has blurred the lines between the political and the personal. Movements are as much responses to the systemic politicization of life as initiators of it.

A sixth theme concerns the values advocated by NSMs. While some have argued that the sheer pluralism of values and ideas is their defining hallmark (Johnston, Laraña, & Gusfield 1994), others have focused on the centrality of postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1990; Dalton, Kuechler, & Burklin 1990) in such activism. Whereas materialist values involve redistributive struggles in the conventional political sphere, postmaterialist values emphasize the quality rather than the quantity of life (Habermas 1987). Rather than seeking power, control, or economic gain, postmaterialist movements are more inclined to seek autonomy and democratization. As a generalization about NSMs, the “postmaterialist” designation can be challenged. Where accurate, however, it means that such movements are resistant to conventional strategies of co-optation via material rewards.

A seventh theme involves cultural, symbolic forms of resistance alongside or in place of more conventional political strategies (Cohen 1985). For many movements, this signifies a philosophical or spiritual rejection of the instrumental rationality of advanced capitalist society and its systems of social control and co-optation. This cultural emphasis rejects conventional goals, tactics, and strategies in favor of the exploration of new identities, meanings, and symbols. While some have criticized this orientation as apolitical, such criticisms ignore
the importance of cultural forms of social power. If hegemony is an important form of such power, then the culturally oriented, anti-hegemonic politics of new movements is an important form of resistance. The very ability to envision and symbolically enact new and different ways of organizing social relationships can itself be a potent challenge to dominant social arrangements (Melucci 1989, 1996).

A final theme in NSM activism is a preference for organizational forms that are decentralized, egalitarian, participatory, prefigurative, and ad hoc (Melucci 1989). For these movements, organization is less a strategic tool than a symbolic expression of movement values and member identities. NSMs function less as standing armies than as cultural laboratories that vacillate between latency and visibility (Melucci 1989, 1996) as they episodically organize for specific battles and then revert to politicized subcultures that sustain movement visions and values for the next round of explicitly organized activism.

These themes distinguish NSMT from both classical Marxism and resource mobilization/political process theories with their emphases on political contention, material resources, formal organization, and instrumental success. They also suggest some common concerns between NSMT and collective behavior or social constructionist approaches with their emphases on symbolic meaning, grievance articulation, fluid processes, and malleable identities. Having described NSMT, it is also important to acknowledge some internal variations in this paradigm as it emerged in European sociology.

TWO IDEAL-TYPICAL VERSIONS

There are two ideal types of NSMTs that we can loosely label “political” and “cultural.” The political version draws upon neo-Marxist scholarship to describe the social formation of advanced capitalism and to trace links between this formation and the emergence of NSMs.

This version is macro-oriented in general and state-oriented in particular. It sees strategic questions and instrumental action as central to social activism while recognizing the importance of identity formation, grievance definition, and interest articulation. It recognizes new constituencies in social activism based on race, gender, nationality, or other characteristics, but it does not jettison the potential for class-based movements alongside these groups.

This version emphasizes the potential for progressive change if appropriate alliances between class-based and nonclass-based movements can be forged. The political version is wary of the “apolitical” nature of culturally oriented NSMs as limiting their potential for producing meaningful social change. And finally, this perspective identifies the social base of NSMs in class terms by analyzing the complexity of contemporary class structure and its contradictory locations as the backdrop for social activism.

The cultural version of NSMT is post-Marxist in presuming a more radical break between past and present societal types and movement forms. The cultural version identifies the dominant society in cultural or semiotic terms as an information society whose administrative codes conceal forms of domination. It emphasizes the decentralized nature of both power and resistance, so it is less macro oriented or state centered and more focused on everyday life, civil society, and the cultivation of “free spaces.”

The cultural version eschews strategic questions and instrumental action in favor of symbolic expressions that challenge the instrumental logic of systemic domination. This version not only recognizes new social constituencies but also argues that the old worker-based constituencies for social activism have been transcended along with industrial capitalism. The cultural version views activism as a defensive reaction to domination that can potentially challenge systemic imperatives, but it rejects the language of “progressive” movements as invoking an unwarranted metaphysics of history.

This approach also rejects the apolitical label often attached to culturalist movements by arguing that political movements can be
easily co-opted whereas cultural movements challenging symbolic codes can more effectively expose contemporary forms of power. This version is also more likely to identify the social base of NSMs in nonclass terms that identify other statuses or distinctive values as defining movement constituencies.

EXEMPLARS OF NSMT

Four founders of this perspective illustrate its scope and evolution. Their work also reveals a relative shift from the political to the cultural version of NSMT over time. Thus, in the early 1980s, the political version was prevalent and it was linked to other forms of neo-Marxist theorizing. By the mid 1990s, it had been largely eclipsed by the cultural version, reflecting the broader cultural turn in social theory.

For Manuel Castells (1983), capitalist development has transformed urban space into arenas of conflicting interests and values. Elites pursue capitalist commodification and bureaucratic domination while urban social movements demand noncommodified forms of collective consumption, defend community identity and local culture, and seek political self-management and autonomy. Pursuit of these goals requires state action prodded by effective movement strategies; movements must thus engage in instrumental action to shape state policies if they are to realize their goals. Finally, Castells retains a role for the conventional working class while also recognizing other newer constituencies for such movements across the urban landscape. Castells is thus a good exemplar of the more political or neo-Marxist version of NSMT.

For Alain Touraine (1981), postindustrial society provides knowledge and technology that enhances the conscious self-production of society. Control of this capacity is at the center of an ongoing struggle between a dominant class of managers and technocrats and a popular class of consumers and clients. As they clash over society’s self-management, they become NSMs. Touraine assumes every type of society has a central conflict; in postindustrial society, it centers around the state as the repository of this increasing capacity for societal self-production. This emphasis on the state and instrumental action links Touraine to the political version of NSMT. Touraine (1985) also expresses misgivings about contemporary activism that displaces protest from the political to the cultural realm because it promotes individualism and identity quests that can blunt the denunciation of power and undermine genuinely collective action.

Jurgen Habermas (1987) proposes the most elaborate theory of modern social structure by distinguishing between a politico-economic system governed by generalized media of power and money and a lifeworld organized through normative consensus. Whereas the system follows an instrumental logic that detaches money and power from any accountability, the lifeworld retains a communicative rationality requiring that norms be justified through rational discourse.

The problem is that, in modern society, system imperatives colonize the lifeworld, so that money and power regulate not only economic and political transactions but also identity formation, normative regulation, and symbolic reproduction. These intrusions undermine unquestioned traditions and politicize the lifeworld at the same time they consolidate decision-making power in administrative structures that deny participatory input into the arenas they have politicized (Crossley 2002: 161–162). Colonization thereby dramatizes the tension between the instrumental rationality of the system and the communicative rationality of the lifeworld.

Habermas locates NSMs at the seams between system and lifeworld. At a minimum, they defend the lifeworld against colonization and sustain a role for normative consensus and communicative rationality. More broadly, NSMs practice a new politics concerned with quality of life, self-realization, identity formation, moral autonomy and political participation. Since they largely avoid material, distributional struggles, they are more difficult
to co-opt than conventional movements. As incubators of new politics and communicative rationality, NSMs foreshadow the discursive contours of a more rational society.

For Alberto Melucci (1996) modern, complex societies are based on the production of signs and the processing of information in accordance with the instrumental logic of administrative systems. Hence, the search for meaning and the decoding of information is central to social life in general and to collective action in particular. Contemporary conflicts thus emerge at the intersection of information production, symbolic resources, and social control. Since power is increasingly embedded in control of information, movements that challenge prevailing cultural codes strike directly at this new form of power.

Contemporary society also fractures traditional bases of identity. The pace of change, plurality of memberships, and abundance of messages weaken traditions and identities rooted in religion, neighborhoods, parties, or classes. The result is a homelessness of personal identity that turns people into “nomads of the present” (Melucci 1989). The resulting intensification of personal needs paradoxically fuels participation in NSMs as people join movements based on an individualist logic. In late modernity, however, the linkage between the personal and the political is not just a slogan but a reality; fulfilling personal needs is increasingly and self-evidently contingent on addressing global problems of ecological preservation, resource sustainability, and conflict resolution.

Melucci thus argues that NSMs are largely about establishing and maintaining new collective identities connecting personal needs and movement participation. Such movements have heterogeneous, non-negotiable goals that bypass the political system and challenge boundaries between private and public. They survive as dispersed networks submerged in everyday life, and they thrive as cultural laboratories exploring alternative forms of social life in opposition to the technocratic, instrumental rationality of administrative systems. These movements thus have a self-referential quality; their organizational form deliberately prefigures a more egalitarian society.

The goal of symbolic challenges to dominant codes is “rendering power visible. The function of contemporary conflicts is to render visible the power that hides behind the rationality of administrative or organizational procedures” (Melucci 1989: 76). By making power visible, movements reveal it as a social construction subject to transformation rather than a natural force beyond human intervention. The promise of NSMs thus resides less in achieving a specific agenda than in promoting democratization in society and in everyday life.

CONCLUSION

NSMT has been criticized on various grounds. The most common criticism is that many features of supposedly “new” movements can also be found in “old” labor or working-class movements, including collective identity, movement cultures, or symbolic grievances. The most eloquent rejoinder to these criticisms is that NSMs are analytical constructs and not empirical objects and that NSMT was never intended to make an ontological claim. Thus, Melucci has bemoaned a misguided debate in which “both the critics of the ‘newness’ of the ‘new movements’ and the proponents of the ‘newness paradigm’ commit the same epistemological mistake: they consider contemporary collective phenomena to constitute unitary empirical objects . . . The controversy strikes one as futile” (1996: 5).

Although there have been claims of a synthesis of perspectives or a division of labor around distinct questions, the real fate of NSMT in US sociology has been selective co-optation. The grand theorizing behind European versions of NSMT was simply too foreign to take root in the pragmatic, middle-range, and frequently positivist soil of US sociology. Thus, as it entered US sociology, NSMT was stripped of its most sweeping and distinctive claims about the connections between social formations and types of
movements. Instead, the paradigm was reduced in elementarist fashion to new dimensions or factors that needed to be considered alongside more familiar ones. For these reasons, the story of NSMT remains entangled with larger differences in theoretical style between European and US sociology (Buechler 2000).

Having said that, there are at least two ways in which new social movement theory may leave an indelible mark on social movement theorizing in the foreseeable future. The first concerns the concept of collective identity, perhaps best articulated by Melucci (1996) and now widely recognized in many movement studies. For instance, collective identity is now routinely included as a “variable” alongside opportunity, mobilization, and framing in much mainstream research.

Perhaps more significantly, this concept has figured prominently in recent discussions of recognition struggles and identitarian movements in which the creation, defense, or recognition of particularistic differences or collective identity has been either a primary mobilizing focus or a major dimension of collective struggles across diverse historical and cultural contexts (Hobson 2003).

A second indicator of this perspective’s impact concerns the widespread adoption of NSMT’s distinctive claims about collective identity and cultural struggles among theorists and activists in lesser developed regions such as Latin America. This popularity is initially perplexing since these (national) societies do not closely resemble new social formations to which new social movements presumably respond.

This interpretation becomes more compelling if we shift the unit of analysis from nation-states to globalizing forces. To whatever extent globalization combines economic exploitation and political domination with ethnic homogenization and cultural standardization, the rise of new social movements in lesser developed regions as a response to these intensifying globalizing forces fits the original logic of NSMT quite nicely. If we understand the new social formation to which new social movements respond to be global rather national, then new social movement theory may yet have a very promising future as a means to understand collective struggles around the globe.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Democratization and democratic transition; Free spaces; Globalization and movements; Identity politics; Postmaterialism and social movements; Prefigurative politics; Public sphere.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Nongovernmental organizations

JACKIE SMITH

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are formal organizations that lie outside formal government structures. They include social movement organizations (SMOs) as well as other organizations that may be potential mobilization structures available to social movements. The term comes from the United Nations, where it is used to distinguish UN member governments from other actors. As it is commonly used in official circles, the term NGO thus can include both national and transnational groups and private, for-profit actors as well as not-for-profit associations of all kinds. Scholars have used the general term to refer to the collection of formal organizations of civil society groups pursuing any collective aims. Thus, social movements and other political advocacy groups are a subset of this larger category, which includes many other nonprofit, voluntary groups.

Article 71 of the United Nations Charter grants NGOs formal recognition within the United Nations according to three distinct consultative status categories. Currently the UN reports more than 3000 NGOs have consultative status with its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and another 400 have official consultative relations with the more recently established Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which was formed following the UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992). Groups entitled to consultative status must show that their work addresses the broad issues of UN jurisdiction. The status is granted by a committee made up of government representatives, and groups must regularly renew their status (Willetts 1996a). NGOs with consultative status may make oral and written interventions in relevant UN meetings, have access to some official documents and to the UN buildings, and may be invited to attend open sessions of United Nations conferences and other meetings. Rules of accreditation were revised in 1996, following a dramatic increase in civil society participation in the United Nations system (Willets 1996b; Charnovitz 2007).

Because the United Nations and its agencies address issues of peace, human rights, environmental protection, and other matters of concern to social movement activists, some social movement organizations have participated in UN certification processes and conferences. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when the UN hosted a series of global conferences on key global problems to help the post-cold war international community respond to the openings and challenges of the changed international context. Typically such SMOs have involved transnational memberships, and they have helped to inform other civil society groups and individuals about relevant policy developments in UN and related international forums. But since the late 1990s, many social movements have become less optimistic about the prospects for achieving their aims through the United Nations process (Smith 2008).

While the generic term NGO refers to any nongovernmental association, many of the more critical and radical activists have come to view the term as derogatory, referring to an ideal type of the professional, staff-run organizations that are typically well funded and focused more on official agendas than the concerns of people in local settings. The term “NGO” is thus often contrasted to “grassroots organizations” – which are seen as less well resourced, membership-based, democratically run organizations that are more responsive to the concerns of people “on the ground.” This dichotomy emerges from the observation by some activists that groups that were deeply involved in United Nations politics during
the 1990s tended to become very focused on technical issues and on influencing language in international treaties, which were increasingly seen as irrelevant to influencing the actual problems social movements sought to address. Moreover, the process of “NGOization” generated organizational practices and routines that contradicted the participatory, democratic, and feminist values of some groups and heightened internal tensions within organizations and movements (Alvarez 1998). Other analysts have argued that some NGOs have become co-opted through their participation in intergovernmental arrangements, particularly those within the World Bank, contributing to what Ferguson calls the “neoliberalization of civil society” (2006).

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Co-optation; Social movement organization (SMO); Transnational social movements; Voluntary associations and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Organizations, 
community-based
EDWARD T. WALKER

Community-based organizations (CBOs) are local organizations, active in low- or moderate-income communities, which mobilize individual community members in order to develop the civic and political power of local residents. They do so mainly through canvassing rather than building upon pre-existing community institutions. Although the term “community organizing” refers to a broad range of organizations (McCarthy & Walker 2004), the focus here is not on organizations that use congregations as recruitment blocs. CBOs have become an important part of our national civic and political discourse, especially as the 2008 election of Barack Obama brought community organizing into the national spotlight.

Modern community organizing can be traced to the War on Poverty’s Community Action Program starting in the 1960s, building toward the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977. The 1970s were a crucial period in the history of CBO activity (Boyte 1980), despite being a period that scholars more often associate with the decline of the New Left and conservative turn against government. And yet it was in this period that a broad range of new CBOs were established in order to fight back against slumlords, bank redlining, manufacturing corporations that were closing their doors, and local officials who were seen as oblivious to the low quality of local schools, housing, and economic opportunities. The community activism of the 1970s toned down “the late sixties emphasis on ideology” and replaced it with a focus on “winning power and building organizations owned and directed by working class people” (Fisher 1994: 140).

The CBOs active in the 1970s “backyard revolution” (Boyte 1980), like CBOs today, were often very interested in building coalitions among diverse community stakeholders. These early struggles by groups like National People’s Action in Chicago helped to shape the passage of the CRA, which sought to reduce discrimination in the provision of credit and lending in low-income communities. Consistent with the expectations of scholars of American political development, new legislation did more to spur organizing than the opposite: The passage of the CRA encouraged the founding of many new organizations who would seek to exploit the potential of the Act. Walker and McCarthy’s (2009) sample of long-standing local community organizations, for example, shows that the 1980s was a period of considerable growth among CBOs.

The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) was, until a concerted series of attacks by conservative groups, the Republican Party, and conservative media outlets in 2008 and 2009, the leading national individual membership CBO in the US. Founded in Arkansas in 1970 by welfare rights organizer Wade Rathke (1948–), ACORN had a presence in 27 states by 1989, ultimately expanding to include 85 local groups active in 37 states as of 2008 (Swarts 2008). ACORN was heavily active in the areas of community reinvestment, fair lending policies, increasing the minimum wage, voter registration, and, to a lesser extent, public safety and access to health care. As of this writing, local ACORN chapters are reforming as unaffiliated local groups, such as the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (formerly California ACORN) and New York Communities for Change (New York ACORN) (Tarm 2010).

Like other types of community organizations, many individual-membership CBOs are affiliated with regional or national networks.
that provide staff support and technical assistance to local groups. These networks include the Center for Community Change (est. 1968), National People’s Action (est. 1972), National Training and Information Center (est. 1972), The Woodstock Institute (est. 1973), the Center for Third World Organizing (est. 1980), and the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (est. 1990). Networks like these assist local groups such as People United for a Better Oakland (Oakland, CA) and Oregon Action (Portland, OR) by providing staff support, assistance in locating funding sources and applying for grants, conducting policy research, and mobilizing the media. Thus, although these networks are themselves nonmembership organizations, they play a considerable role in building the infrastructure needed for effective grassroots advocacy (Minkoff, Ainsbrey, & Agnone 2008; Walker, McCarthy, & Baumgartner, 2011).

CBOs often have a smaller membership base than their congregation-based counterparts, but are more willing to take on contentious issues like workers’ rights or police brutality. In part because they lack the established congregational support of the faith-based organizations, they are much more likely to rely upon grassroots fundraising sources like bake sales, canvassing, and direct mail. Even though less stable than other sources of funding, grassroots fundraising builds local legitimacy and is a powerful predictor of long-term CBO survival (Walker & McCarthy 2010).

In the years since the 1970s “backyard revolution,” community organizing has waxed and waned, but, until the financial crisis of 2008, had remained relatively stable. Indeed, research on the survival of CBOs found that nearly 60 percent of organizations that were active in the early 1990s continued to be active as of 2004, which translates to an annual mortality rate of approximately 3.6 percent (Walker & McCarthy 2010); this is considerably better than what has been found for seemingly more stable organizational populations like peace and antidrunk driving groups. Although the current environment facing individual-membership CBOs is quite turbulent, the accomplishments of these organizations, won through the hard work of knocking on doors to mobilize low-income citizens, are considerable.

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972); Community organizing (United States); Organizations, congregation-based; Organizations and movements; Social movement organization (SMO); Urban movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Organizations, congregation-based
EDWARD T. WALKER

Congregation-based community organizations (CBCOs) are local organizations active in low- or moderate-income communities that build upon the existing infrastructures of diverse religious congregations in order to develop the civic and political power of local residents. Typically, individuals may only participate in a CBCO by virtue of being a member of a participating congregation. Although such groups represent only one of the two dominant models for organizing local communities (McCarthy & Walker 2004), CBCOs are a major force in local (and, increasingly, state and national) civic and political discourse. Indeed, it is worth noting that current US president Barack Obama was trained as a South Side Chicago community organizer through the faith-based Gamaliel Foundation.

CBCOs can be identified through six key characteristics: (1) Their organizing is explicitly grounded in the diverse faith traditions that comprise the organization; (2) They are broad based and inclusive, and center their organizing around either ecumenical Christianity or interfaith dialogues, while also seeking to be inclusive across racial, gender, and class lines; (3) Their emphasis is mainly on local rather than state- or national-level organizing; (4) They are multi-issue in focus, and allow member congregations to determine which issues are worth pursuing in the first place; (5) They hire outside professional organizers to develop indigenous leadership, often through “relational organizing” strategies that enhance the social capital of the community; and (6) CBCOs are political but nonpartisan nonprofit organizations (Wood & Warren 2002: 15). The most recent estimates of the field suggest that there are over 130 CBCOs active, mostly concentrated in California, Texas, New York, and Florida. Groups have, on average, 26 member congregations and nearly 200 core leaders each (Wood & Warren 2002).

Although organizing in low-income communities has historical roots in the work of Jane Addams in the settlement house movement in late nineteenth-century Chicago, modern CBCO traces its origins to the work of famed organizer Saul Alinsky (1909–1972). Alinsky, a sociologist by training, helped to found the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) in Chicago in 1939, which served as an “organization of organizations” that brought together representatives of a broad range of local institutions, including the Catholic Church, numerous labor unions, and local social clubs and small businesses. At the core of BYNC’s model, replicated by many CBCOs since, was the idea to link representatives of diverse community institutions in order to find their common interests and build power. Through groups like BYNC, Alinsky developed a template by which outside organizers would assist leaders of local institutions to create a unifying organization designed to improve community conditions by way of direct action and, often, confrontational negotiation with policymakers.

Alinsky then adapted this framework in organizing the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) in 1941, which continues to this day to serve as the central network of CBCOs across the US. Like BYNC, IAF-affiliated organizations followed Alinsky’s tradition of enrolling institutions such as churches, unions, schools, and community groups as members. This model continues in the IAF, although, after Alinsky’s death in 1972, former seminarian Ed Chambers took the helm and began to emphasize congregations as the central organizing bloc. Aside from IAF, three other major organizational networks support local congregation-based organizing, including the Gamaliel Foundation.
(established 1968), Direct Action and Research Training Center (DART, established 1982), and the Pacific Institute for Community Organizations (PICO National Network, established 1972). These regional and national networks help organizations to train and retain staff, identify issues of community concern, and develop strategies for building influence for their congregational members.

Importantly, as informed by Alinsky’s teachings, CBCOs are quite attuned to avoiding the concentration of power within their own ranks. The IAF network, for example, has always prescribed the role of its national office, as true power in the organization resides in its local affiliates, in groups like the well-known Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) of San Antonio, TX. As Dreier (2009: 14) puts it, the national office “is primarily responsible for training staff members and leaders, but it does not seek to coordinate organizing campaigns, raise money, or conduct research for its affiliates, nor does it encourage chapter leaders to strongly identify with IAF as a national organization.” Osterman (2006) argues that this structure, which reflects the culture of CBCO, helps congregation-based groups resist tendencies toward oligarchy. Similarly, Staudt and Stone (2007) maintain that IAF organizations are “built through careful socialization and control,” and that such CBCOs adopt the forms associated with their congregational members while still taking a cautious approach to the issue of hierarchy in organization building.

Warren (2001) provides a compelling portrait of faith-based community organizing today. Based upon a rich, detailed ethnography of IAF organizers in Texas, Warren illustrates the many strengths of the “relational organizing” approach common in CBCOs. This organizing strategy attempts to activate preexisting community networks, find mechanisms to help those networks coalesce into broader interfaith coalitions, and then to determine which issues to pursue for advocacy from the bottom up. In so doing, the IAF affiliates he studied were able to effectively reform the public school system, secure the reallocation of millions of public dollars for services in low-income neighborhoods, and more generally to help disadvantaged citizens to have a civic voice and to work together across not only religious but also racial and ethnic boundaries. We know, however, that CBCO networks beyond the IAF are also having a significant influence on local communities. Affiliates of the PICO National Network, such as PACT in San Jose, CA, for instance, can boast of considerable successes in mobilizing communities and generating diverse and boundary-bridging coalitions (Swarts 2008: ch. 7).

The congregation-based model of community organizing offers a number of distinct advantages and challenges. One challenge is that recruiting congregational members may limit organizations’ ability to mobilize the poorest of the poor, who tend not to be members of congregations (Delgado 1994). Further, as Wood (2002) identifies, CBCOs may, at times, “buffer the sacred core” by prioritizing the religious activities of individual congregations over the community organizing activities of the collective. Also, compared to community organizations that are not congregation based (like local ACORN chapters), CBCOs tend to avoid divisive issues that might cause rifts between members (McCarthy & Walker 2004). The benefits of this organizing model, however, are many: (1) local organizations’ institution-based approach confers a degree of durability; (2) affiliate organizations are broad based and represent diverse community stakeholders; and (3) they address a wide range of community concerns, unlike the professionalized single-issue advocacy organizations that have become influential in Washington since the 1970s (Osterman 2002).

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972); Community organizing (United States); Organizations, community-based; Organizations and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Outcomes, cultural
JENNIFER EARL

Whether and when social movements result in cultural, social, and/or political changes are important questions in social movement scholarship. However, as has been widely reported (e.g., Bosi & Uba 2009), scholars have made less progress on these topics than is desirable. Research that is able to establish a clear causal connection between social movement activity and cultural change has been in particularly short supply (although research showing that culture can affect mobilization, which is a distinct question, has been increasing). This entry examines why this may be the case and provides a brief summary of the literature that is available on the topic.

DEFINING CULTURAL OUTCOMES

Studying cultural aspects of social movements has become increasingly common, contributing to both social movements scholarship and the sociology of culture. However, the way in which culture is understood and conceptualized has varied widely, resulting in a fractured literature on cultural outcomes. Moreover, researchers interested in cultural outcomes face the same kinds of definitional quandaries that face other outcomes researchers (see Earl 2004 for a brief review of these), with the added challenge that culture is also divergently defined. For instance, while political outcomes researchers face a host of concerns about how to define outcomes, politics is a commonly understood referent whereas culture is not.

In the face of this basic divergence, mapping different and parallel lines of work on cultural outcomes is necessary. Hart (1996) breaks the conceptualization of culture within social movements scholarship into three visions of culture: culture as opinions and beliefs (i.e., culture as what is in people's heads), culture as sign and signified (i.e., cultural products and their meanings), and culture as community and worldview. In the first vision of culture, culture is fundamentally social psychological. In the second, culture is material (or behavioral, as when the culture product is a specific ritual or institution, such as a handshake). In the third, culture describes the underlying fabric of entire communities; this view is well represented by Geertz’s reflections on cock fights (1973). All three of these views of cultures correspond to different conceptualizations of cultural outcomes of social movements. Below I separately review the literatures on each broad category of cultural outcomes and comment on the specific research challenges or methodological difficulties that each sub-area faces.

Culture as beliefs: Cultural outcomes as belief change

A number of scholars have focused on changes in beliefs and opinions as social movement outcomes. Most recently, Krinsky (2008) argued for a cognitive model of how belief change results from contention, but research going back two decades also finds merit in describing opinion change as a cultural outcome (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani 1989). Rochon (1998) wrote one of the most extended treatments on cultural outcomes from this perspective, arguing that one could study cultural outcomes by focusing on changes in discrete values. Other notable work from this tradition examines value and opinion change surrounding slavery and abolition (e.g., d’Anjou 1996). This view of cultural outcomes also has an obvious affinity with scholarship on New Social Movements (NSMs), which has been interested in the rise of “lifestyle” politics and in broad changes in public opinion (e.g., Melucci 1989).

Methodologically, this area of cultural outcomes research benefits from survey research and a host of other methods that are well
outcomes, cultural

equipped to help researchers identify and track opinion change over time. Nonetheless, while identifying opinion change may be methodologically soluble, causally tying such changes to social movement activity is much more difficult. For instance, it is not enough to show that movements were active at the same time that opinions were changing at a macro level. Rather, researchers need to be able identify and measure mechanisms that would translate movement activity into opinion change. That is a much harder task than measuring opinion alone.

Culture as sign/signified: Cultural outcomes as products and practices

This view of cultural outcomes suggests that specific products or practices have been developed or altered because of social movement activity. In terms of material outcomes, scholars have traced the impact of social movements on children’s literature (Pescosolida, Grauerholz, & Milkie. 1997), magazines (Farrell 1995), and a specific novel subgenre (Isaac 2009). Music has been argued to both affect social movement mobilization and to be affected by social movements (e.g., Eyerman & Jamison 1998). Oldfield (1995) argues that the abolition movement also created specific visual images that were adopted into visual culture through various mediums (coins, prints, etc.). McAdam identifies impacts of civil rights activism on fashion (McAdam 1988).

Beyond discrete material artifacts, others have argued that fields of production have been affected by social movements. For instance, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) examine the impacts of social movements on media coverage and discourse more broadly. Katzenstein (1995) also identifies discourse effects of social movements. Academic disciplines have also been developed in reaction to social movement activity (e.g., Rojas 2007 on black power and black studies). Alternatively, other disciplines have been altered by their interactions with social movements (e.g., Moore 1999 on science and engineering). More broadly, one might think of myths that are told and retold as potential social movement outcomes (e.g., Armstrong & Crage 2006).

In terms of creating or modifying specific practices, research has shown that movements can affect language (McAdam 1988; Rochon 1998). Work showing that social movements affected existing academic disciplines also showed effects on practices within the discipline (e.g., Moore 1999).

Methodologically, this area of cultural outcomes research faces dual burdens of tracking the actual outcome of interest and also causally tying that change to social movement activity of some sort. For scholars interested in material cultural products, the challenge of measuring cultural change in the first place (without respect to causality) is often easier than the challenges facing scholars interested in changes in cultural practice or institutions. For instance, it is much easier to identify and count songs, trace the diffusion of images, or track the growing publication or circulation of print products than it is to trace (and count) the emergence and diffusion of cultural practices. Ingenious researchers have found ways to identify and measure these changes, but the level of difficulty is certainly high. Moreover, even after establishing a clear change in sign/signified, the daunting task of tying this to social movement activity remains, which is as difficult for this area of cultural outcomes research as it is for others.

Culture as worldviews: Cultural outcomes as collective identity and community

To other scholars, culture denotes larger worldviews, communities, and associated collective identities. There is a tradition of studying utopian communities (e.g., Hall 1988), counter-cultures, and countercultures (Yinger 1982); one could see these communities and subcultures as distinct social movement outcomes. More recently, Epstein (1991) examines the creation of a direct action movement that included distinct values, decision-making processes, and ideology.

Methodologically, these scholars are in a good position to both identify the emergence
of new communities and to trace the role of social movements in creating those communities since there are often fewer other potential causes. However, the creation of entirely new communities or subcultures is probably one of the more rare cultural outcomes.

Scholars have also focused on the collective identities associated with social movement communities as a potential cultural outcome. Social movements may explicitly view the creation of new identities as a goal or the (re)creation of collective identity may result directly from conflict and contention (e.g., Fantasia 1988). This type of outcome is particularly relevant to NSM research (e.g., Melucci 1989).

On a methodological front, scholars interested in tying changes in collective identity to social movement activity have been fairly successful. This may be because of the strength of existing collective identity research. Alternatively, it may be that research examining the dialogic co-construction of contestation and identities (e.g., Fantasia 1988) is able to uniquely show how social movement activity and co-identities co-evolve through micro interactions. Whatever the case, this has also been an area where methodological problems have been less constraining.

MECHANISMS THAT MIGHT PRODUCE CULTURAL OUTCOMES

Although other areas of social movements outcome research have produced coherent theoretical accounts of how outcomes are produced (e.g., political mediation), there are no dominant, coherent accounts about how culture is influenced by social movements. Instead each of the individual studies referenced thus far has generated its own specific account of changes that sometimes overlap with other existing accounts but are largely independent. The field awaits a more coherent approach derived from the sum of this work or generated in some other fashion.

The range of accounts that have been featured by prior work varies widely. The only two accounts that have been used to explain more than one broad type of outcome include the impact of movement framing and the impact of media coverage (which is itself a result of movement interaction with the media; see Gamson & Modigliani 1989). Both have been used to explain social psychological cultural outcomes and outcomes that view culture as sign/signified. For instance, to varying extents, Rochon (1998), d’Anjou (1996), and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) all focus on framing as a key mechanism of cultural change. Earl (2004) traces other idiosyncratic explanations to all three types of cultural outcomes reviewed here.

While enumerating the reasons for such a divergent set of explanations goes beyond this review, a few important possibilities are clear. First, many accounts of cultural outcomes focus more on establishing an outcome than on identifying or evidencing a clear causal pathway to the outcome (save notable exceptions such as d’Anjou 1996 and Rochon 1998). Precisely how social movements promote an outcome is often fairly opaque. Indeed, Earl (2004) infers the causal pathway for many of the studies she examined because the original work did not offer a specific tie between contention and a subsequent cultural change. That said, a few exemplary works have forwarded explicit and detailed explanations. Scholarship on cultural outcomes as belief change has been the strongest area in this regard. D’Anjou and Rochon both offer clear causal explanations of belief change. Krinsky (2008) introduces a cognitive model of belief change.

Second, the variety of outcomes that have been considered also make it difficult for the field to converge on causal explanations – having a common explanation for belief change is a tall order, let alone an explanation that might also account for changes in music, fashion, visual culture, the academy, and so on. Diani (1997) is one of the few authors who attempt a grand approach. He traces how social networks are integral to a wide variety of other social movement outcomes, including cultural outcomes. Network ties may influence belief change, ties may affect
cultural production, and social capital may contribute to the formation of new subcultures or communities.

Third, cultural outcomes may result from conjunctural historical processes that complicate theory building. For instance, Isaac’s (2009) study of the labor problem novel suggests that contention was only one of several factors that converged to shape the subgenre. However, other areas of outcomes research have forwarded conjunctural models (e.g., political mediation), so this is certainly not an insurmountable barrier.

CONCLUSION

Divergent definitions of culture combine with all of the conceptual and methodological dilemmas facing outcomes researchers generally to make this a very challenging area of inquiry. Nonetheless, advances in identifying and evidencing specific cultural outcomes have been made, ranging from research showing opinion changes related to social movement activity, to changes in material cultural products and everyday practices, to the emergence of new communities and/or identities. More general theories of cultural change and cultural outcomes are still on the research horizon; unifying causal approaches would offer major advances to the field. Lacking that, new researchers’ best course of action is to examine studies of cultural outcomes most similar to their outcome of interest in hopes of identifying or inferring potential causal pathways tied to the specific outcome of interest.

SEE ALSO: Biographical consequences of activism; Countercultures; Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; Movies and movements; Music and social movements; Outcomes, political; Public opinion and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Pacifism
JAVIER ALCALDE

The term “pacifism” was first used in 1901, although the idea can be traced back to the beginning of recorded human history across all cultures. Anglo-American pacifism opposes war and other forms of violence by combining advocacy of personal nonparticipation in war with a commitment to use nonviolent means of resolving conflict. From the European perspective, pacifism would include the efforts to achieve international peace and mutual understanding. Whether pacifism is expressed through a political movement or as a specific ideology, it can be based on moral, religious, or pragmatic principles. From a strictly rational perspective, pacifists are aware of the costs of war and violence and therefore believe in other ways of resolving conflicts.

The main areas in which pacifists have exercised an independent influence include issues of war resistance and the rights of conscription objectors, as well as the practical application of nonviolent techniques by different social movements. Pacifists have also been influential on the theoretical side with regard to innovative concepts, such as human security or nonoffensive defense and in promoting civilian resistance ideas. On the practical side, many mediation and reconciliation projects develop from pacifist ideas.

In its origins, the efforts to promote peace were linked to the essence of the great religions. But this early almost solitary focus on peace came to be linked with other major challenges of the day, such as human rights, the danger of the nuclear threat, the relationship between peace and development, and the environment. Similarly, the understanding of peace has evolved from a merely negative idea (i.e., the absence of war) to a more positive conception, which includes the conditions of dignity and social justice for every human being.

Accordingly, most collective action events, campaigns, networks, and movements have focused on one or another of these issues now linked to peace.

Through history various movements have advocated personal nonparticipation in war and suggested alternative nonviolent means of conflict resolution or transformation. A pacifist tradition based on nonviolence and noncontention was developed in Eastern religions, which would be translated in the twentieth-century pacifism into an active, social, and political nonviolent attitude. In the West, the character of Jesus represents a turning point in the development of a pacifist ethic. With the early Christian communities believing in “turning the cheek” – that is, not reacting with violence to violence, the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman empire would mean the end of Christian antimilitarism and the substitution of the Christian martyr by the soldier of Christ as a symbol of faith (Brock 1972).

Most of the historic peace churches have roots in religious expressions inspired by Christian sects, such as Mennonite nonresistance, peace testimony by the Quakers, or the international Bible students (later known as Jehovah’s Witnesses). They advocate for unconditional acceptance of nonviolent pacifism on the basis of their work as conciliators in different parts of the world and for a more peaceful international order. On another front, a more institutional approach is represented by the peace societies, the oldest of which date back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. These groups campaigned for causes such as antislavery or women’s rights through arbitration, the codification of international law, and disarmament. They were not connected to the emergent labor movement, which lacked a completely pacifist ideology, though many supported a socialist antimilitarism.

An important influence bridging historic pacifism and contemporary nonviolence is Lev Tolstoy. By rejecting all kinds of violence, he also rejected participation in military service and paying taxes for war. The Russian writer is thus a precursor of the movement for conscientious objection, religious but also political, to conscription. This is a stage in the history of the peace movement which has lasted until today. With different levels of success, national social movements have led the way towards the abolition of compulsory military service in countries such as Greece, Germany, France, and Spain, as well as in Eastern Europe and even in Israel.

Another influential figure who bridges pacifist and nonviolent philosophies is Mohandas Gandhi. Inspired by the principles of truth, noninjury, and readiness to suffer, and through the technique of civil disobedience, he and his followers practiced their campaign first in South Africa, against legal discrimination of the Indian minority on the grounds of race, and then in India, against British rule. Since then, nonviolent resistance in the face of aggression has been successfully used in different parts of the world, by African nationalist leaders against the British, but also by the civil rights movement in the US. Other recent examples include Kosovo and Serbia, Colombia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Palestine.

During the cold war many pacifists played a role in the antinuclear movement, as in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain. They promoted traditional nonviolent direct actions, such as the refusal to pay taxes for war and the organization of international peace walks, but also more innovative protest events, such as trespassing within the areas set aside for atomic testing. Also in this period the Esperanto movement was relevant as a way of communication between civil societies of the East and the West. Created by L.L. Zamenhof at the end of the nineteenth century, the international language achieved its biggest recognition as a tool for peace and mutual understanding until the interwar dictatorships and the world wars. In the current century new technologies have facilitated the expansion of this movement.

In the last decades, pacifism has gained in complexity and sophistication both in theoretical and practical terms. With reference to the opposition to wars, this has included questioning military expenditures and the arms trade, and allowing activists to participate in the different phases of the military economic cycle. However, some protesters in antiwar demonstrations have aimed to resist a particular war rather than wars in general, such as the Vietnam War or the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, this stream of peace activism has been present in almost every recent war and continues to be a key aspect of peace movements.

Another important trend of the current peace community is the feeling that opposition to war and the advocacy of nonviolent methods of conflict resolution are linked to a series of related issues of political, social, gender, environmental, and economic justice. In this sense, pacifist influence has been visible in the transnational nuclear disarmament movement in Europe, which sprang out of nonviolent campaigns such as those against nuclear energy and nuclear testing. More recently, the Global Justice Movement and the Arab Spring revolts have adopted civil disobedience techniques and nonviolence as key principles of their struggles. At the same time, new authors have challenged the claims of the moral superiority of pacifism, arguing that violence can be an effective and even a just form of power in politics, thus promoting a brand of pacifism differentiated from absolute pacifism. This alternative conception recuperates a political ethic that encourages broadened thoughtfulness about suffering and taking responsibility for our actions (Howes 2009).

As opposed to previous decades, current peace movements do not only focus on elaborating abstract theoretical discourses against the use of violence or nuclear power and weapons. Instead, they focus most of their effort on contingent and concrete action. The loss of the nuclear and chemical weapons’ primacy on the international agenda has allowed the emergence of new issues related to the humanitarian consequences of the use of some types
of conventional weapons. This context has facilitated the creation of single-issue advocacy networks that have been partially successful at both the national and global level (Alcalde 2010). The repertoire of action of the recent disarmament and arms control transnational campaigns is less oriented towards big protest events (with remarkable exceptions, such as February 15, 2003, the global day of action against the war in Iraq), and more oriented towards lobbying and negotiating processes. These trends suggest that pacifists might now have a lower profile, but at the same time be more effective than in the past. The treaties banning landmines and cluster munitions, and the efforts to regulate the conventional arms trade, provide confirmatory illustrations.

SEE ALSO: Antiwar and peace movements; Citizen peacebuilding movements; Civil disobedience; Civil rights movement (United States); Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Global Justice Movement; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Religion and social movements; Satyagraha; Violence and social movements.

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Participation in social movements
CATHRINE CORRIGALL-BROWN

Social movements are one of the pre-eminent vehicles for social change in contemporary Western society. From the civil rights movement to those for women, gays and lesbians, and the environment, social movements have left an indelible mark on public policy and cultural values. While social movements are larger than the individuals who comprise them, their survival and success is based on the participation of individuals. In fact, the rise and fall of campaigns at the macro-level is largely the result of the shifting involvement of individuals in and out of movement organizations at the micro-level. The discussion that follows outlines the variety of ways in which individuals can participate in social movements and the major factors which predict differential recruitment to social movements.

DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION

While many individuals participate in social movements, the nature and extent of their participation is highly variable. While social movement participation can take the form of membership in social movement organizations (SMOs), some individuals are not affiliated with specific groups but participate in contentious political activities, such as rallies, demonstrations, marches, and protests. In addition, many individuals engage in everyday activities that could be seen more broadly as part of social movements and contentious politics. For example, recycling, carpooling, signing petitions, or making financial contributions to SMOs are all ways that individuals can support causes and campaigns.

The variety of ways in which individuals participate in social movements has been conceptualized along the two key dimensions of risk and cost. The risk of participation can vary depending on the issue, group, or tactics used. Engagement in mainstream activities like signing petitions and attending peaceful protests is not particularly risky for most participants. However, participation in sit-ins, road blockades, or other tactics that may involve arrest, violence, or stigma can be very risky, as such activities could result in a loss of personal freedom, employment, or friendships. Participation can also vary in terms of cost, which entails the time and energy required. For example, costs are incurred when individuals have to travel, take time off work, or find child care in order to engage in social movements.

Risk and cost vary independently. Some activities can be costly but not risky, such as quitting your job to volunteer for a SMO. Other activities can be risky but not especially costly, such as attending a protest against election results in Iran. However, cost and risk can also vary together; signing a petition is generally low on both dimensions and engaging in a prolonged campaign like Freedom Summer is high on both dimensions.

When individuals are prepared to persevere in costly and risky activities they are said to be committed to a movement or cause. For example, engaging in the United Farm Workers (UFW) in the 1970s and 1980s sometimes involved both high cost and high risk. These volunteers often moved to and lived at the union headquarters and worked 12 hours a day, six days a week on union business. They were also targets of violence on the picket lines. Despite these costs and risks, many activists remained involved in the UFW for long periods, showing their commitment to the cause. Engagement in other organizations or causes requires much less commitment. For example, involvement in large national groups like the Sierra Club is often low cost and risk if a
participant only sends a yearly donation or reads the group’s newsletter.

PREDICTING PARTICIPATION

What leads certain individuals to participate in social movements while others do not? Recent work in the area has recognized that participation is a two-step process. First, individuals need to become committed to the goals and tactics of a movement to be eligible to participate (Klandermans 1997). While becoming committed to the goals of a movement does not necessarily translate into activism, individuals who are not sympathetic to the movement’s cause will not participate. For this reason, ideological commitment is the first condition of participation, priming an individual to become active in social movements.

Ideology

Political ideology is an important predictor of social movement participation. Beliefs play a significant role in an individual’s decision to participate in protest activity and are shaped by participation. Traditionally, protest has been seen as a tool for liberals who want to change the political establishment and who feel a need to go beyond the traditional political arena to get their views heard. Research in the US supports this argument, showing that liberals are more likely than other people to report participating in protest (Dalton, van Sickle, & Weldon 2010). However, it should be noted that the rise of the religious right and conservative movements in the US has, to some extent, changed the social movement terrain and fostered the participation of conservatives.

Religiosity is another element of ideology that can predict a wide range of behaviors, including engagement in contentious political activity. Religiosity can foster activism because belonging to and participating in a religious institution is associated with social networks, political knowledge, and resources. As a result, individuals who are strongly connected to their communities through religious institutions are more likely to join social movements than are other individuals (McAdam 1986; Diani 2004). Also, religious institutions can serve as political training grounds (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995), and provide an abundance of resources that are favorable to collective action, including formal membership, an organizational headquarters, meeting places, publications, and professional leadership.

In addition to having an ideology that is supportive of protest, individuals must feel that their participation in social movements and related contentious political activity will yield results. This sense of efficacy is the belief that one is capable of the specific behaviors required to produce a desired outcome in a given situation (Gecas 2000). A high level of efficacy indicates that individuals feel self-confident, are causal agents in their environment, and, consequently, are able to produce the changes in the world that they desire. Research suggests that there is a positive relationship between efficacy and participation in protest activity (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993).

Resources

While having certain ideologies can predispose individuals to participate in social movements, these beliefs are not sufficient on their own to cause participation; individuals must also have the resources which allow them to translate these beliefs into action. Past research consistently finds that participation in collective action is more likely for individuals who have certain kinds of resources. For example, money is a key resource that can facilitate an individual’s engagement in contentious politics. In addition, there are less tangible resources, such as education and knowledge, which are also associated with participation.

Socioeconomic status (SES) is a critical predictor of participation in both social movements and traditional political activity (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995). High SES is significant because it is associated with resources such as time, money, and civic skills which enable individuals to participate in politics and
social movements. Because of this, it is found that individuals with higher SES are more likely than other people to engage in political activity and in groups of all kinds, including social movement organizations (see also Rosenstone & Hansen 1993).

In addition to monetary resources, education is an important predictor of engagement. Level of education has a positive relationship with protest (Wilkes 2004). And, beyond formal education, political knowledge is also related to engaging in traditional political activities and protest. At a minimum, individuals must know about social movement groups, events, and issues in order to participate in them. Putnam’s work on political participation and general group membership finds that political knowledge is a “critical precondition for active forms of participation” and those who know more about politics are more likely to engage in protest (2000: 35). The importance of SES, political knowledge, and education for predicting engagement can be taken as evidence that protest is at least partially a function of personal resources, and mirrors the accepted relationship between resources and conventional political participation.

Biographical availability

The concept of biographical availability has long been central to studies of differential recruitment. This work argues that it is only when individuals are biographically available to participate in social movements that they will be able to convert their beliefs and resources into action (Beyerlein & Hipp 2006). Individuals experience life-cycle changes that make them more or less available to participate in contentious politics. For example, some personal constraints, such as family responsibilities or full-time employment, might increase the costs and risks of movement participation (McAdam 1986: 70). In addition, when individuals are performing certain kinds of roles, such as the role of parent or spouse, the commitments associated with these roles might limit their ability to participate in social movements. This suggests that individuals with fewer of these types of responsibilities and constraints would be more likely to have the time, energy, and inclination to engage in contentious political activity.

There are a number of specific role and life-cycle changes that can affect an individual’s decisions or ability to engage in collective action. Marriage and childrearing, for example, imply commitments to one’s spouse and family that may supersede loyalties to a movement and may take time away from activism. In addition, the many new responsibilities and dependencies that generally accompany marriage and parenthood also reduce the willingness of people to engage in especially risky forms of participation, which could result in arrest or other punishments. Empirical findings, however, are mixed. Being married and having children is a negative predictor of engagement in some work (Wiltfang & McAdam 1991) but a positive (Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009) or neutral predictor of participation in other studies (Barkan, Cohn, & Whitaker 1995).

In addition to changes in family circumstances, individuals also experience transitions in employment status over the course of their lives which could affect their propensity to engage in activism. McCarthy and Zald (1973), for example, hypothesize that those free of employment pressures, such as students, individuals who do not work, or those with flexible jobs, are more likely to participate in social movements. However, empirical findings have mostly contradicted these expectations. McAdam (1986) and Nepstad and Smith (1999) find that those who are employed full time and in less flexible jobs were more, not less, likely to engage in protest. This can be partly explained by the resources with which employment is associated, which are clearly predictive of participation and which may offset the effect of a restricted schedule.

Finally, age is an important source of biographical availability. Younger people tend to be free of family and employment constraints that could hinder political activity (Wiltfang & McAdam 1991). In addition, older people are often biographically available as their children
participation in social movements have left home and they are more likely to be retired (Nepstad & Smith 1999). In this way, both younger and older people tend to have more free time and less constraint on their activism and past work on social movement participation has demonstrated this curvilinear relationship between age and activism (Beyerlein & Hipp 2009).

Social ties and identity

Social ties have long been recognized as important predictors of engagement in social movements. As social movement activities are usually embedded in dense relational settings (Diani 2004), the probability that an individual will join an organization depends upon the number and strength of social ties that connect group members to each other and to non-members. In this way, integration into social networks can draw individuals into social movements (McAdam 1986) and, because of this, individuals who are well integrated into a community are more likely to engage in these organizations.

Many empirical studies have demonstrated the importance of social ties for social movement mobilization. For example, Morris (1981) finds that the Southern sit-in movement of the 1960s developed out of pre-existing social networks formed inside churches, colleges, and protest organizations. These personal networks of friends provide individual incentives to participate in social movement. They also create a gateway for participation and lower the costs of engagement for individuals. In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that past research repeatedly finds that the presence of a social tie to someone already engaged in a movement is one of the strongest predictors of individual participation (e.g., Nepstad & Smith 1999).

Social ties are, in part, significant because they help to foster identities that are supportive of social movement engagement. Identities are the names that people give to themselves and others in the course of social interaction (Snow 2001) and identity is central to social movement participation. Some sociologists claim that a collective identity, a sense of “we-ness” or “one-ness” that derives from perceived shared attributes or experiences among those who comprise a group (Melucci, Keane, & Mier 1989), is a prerequisite for collective action (Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). In addition, many scholars, such Taylor and Raeburn (1995), argue that engagement in social movements leads participants to fundamentally change their identities and the way they see themselves. To this end, identities can be both the precipitant of social movement engagement as well as the result of participation in movements.

Political context/critical events

In addition to individual and interpersonal predictors of engagement, the context of mobilization is important for facilitating mobilization to social movements; some locations are more conducive to social movement mobilization than others. Such facilitative locales have been termed “free spaces,” which Polletta (1999) defines as the small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntary, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political mobilization. Movements need free spaces where occupants enjoy some protection from authorities and enemies. These spaces give activists protection from state surveillance or repression, and segregated or partially autonomous institutions can shield them from interference by authorities. Such spaces could include student lounges and hangouts, union halls, and tenant associations (Fantasia & Hirsch 1995), which allow for the growth of movements and for mobilizing participants.

Zhao’s (1999) research on the prodemocracy student movement in Beijing highlights the importance of free spaces to the rise of that movement. Specifically, he shows that the various universities in Beijing provided safe spaces and common areas that facilitated student aggregation and mobilization, largely because these areas were relatively protected and encompassed much of the students’ everyday routines. This empirical example clearly
illustrates how spatial context can matter in creating an environment that is conducive, or prohibitive, for movement recruitment and mobilization.

CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION

Scholars have repeatedly found that social movement participation has long-term transformative effects for individuals. Participation has been shown to be related to educational attainment, job choice, income, marriage age, divorce rate, and the number and timing of children (for a summary of this research, see Giugni 2004). Similarly, individuals who join social movements are likely to continue to engage in political organizations and remain consistent in their ideology over time (Downton & Wehr 1997).

Follow-up studies of new left activists of the 1960s illustrate the important consequences of social movement engagement on the later lives of activists (e.g., Whalen & Flacks 1989) and can shed light on the predictors of engagement over the life course. These studies follow individual participants over time periods varying from 4 to 20 years, and assess the biographical and personal consequences of participating in social movements. All of these studies point to the powerful and enduring impact of participation on the biographies of participants. Politically, these studies find that activists tend to continue to espouse leftist attitudes, continue to define themselves as liberal or radical in orientation, and remain active in contemporary movements and other forms of political activity. Personally, former activists are concentrated in the teaching and other helping professions; have lower incomes; are more likely to have divorced, married later, or remained single; and are more likely to have experienced an episodic or non-traditional work history.

While social movement participation is clearly significant for the lives of individual activists, it also has larger consequences for movements as a whole. Mass movements cannot be successful without individual activists. In addition, the participation of individuals in movements is a vital part of social movement success. This is, in part, because mass mobilization shows the strength of a social movement. In turn, this mobilization of support can help sway public opinion and shape government policy.

SEE ALSO: Biographical availability; Biographical consequences of activism; Disengagement in social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; High and low risk/cost activism; Identity work processes; Ideology; Networks and social movements; Resource mobilization theory.

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Participatory budgeting (PB) is a process that directly involves local people in the definition of priorities and/or spending for a defined public budget. PB represents an institutional form of civic engagement implemented by an official body, but possibly involving social movement organizations (SMOs) in different ways. At the end of the 1980s, PB was jointly invented by local SMOs and members of the newly elected Workers’ Party in the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil (1.4 million inhabitants). It is based on neighborhood assemblies and thematic meetings that take place throughout the year and involve volunteer citizens (principle of grassroots democracy). Allocation criteria are used in the discussions about local infrastructure in order to redistribute funds to those with the greatest needs (principle of social justice). Specific boards of citizen delegates, trained by independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ensure that local priorities are taken up in the budget to the largest extent possible (principle of citizen control). In Porto Alegre, this process has led to huge changes: it involved large parts of the (poor) population – up to 33,600 people in 2002, reduced corruption, and rendered public administration more efficient and transparent (Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005). As a result it created great enthusiasm around the world and is recognized as good practice by international organizations. Although a government change in 2004, financial problems, and the newly established link between PB and ideas of “governance” have modified the original process, it has been widely diffused to Brazil, Latin America, and other continents. In 2010, between 795 and 1469 versions existed in the world: 511–920 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 174–296 in Europe, 2–10 in North America, 40–120 in Asia, 66–110 in Africa, and 2–10 in Oceania (Sintomer et al. 2010).

Through the adaptation of PB by different actors and to different contexts, a broad diversity of procedural forms exists. At least six models can be identified as ideal types (Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röck 2008):

1. Adaptation of Porto Alegre: key elements of the original process (e.g., transfer of decision-making powers to civil society, high degree of citizens’ autonomy) are adapted to a new context.
2. Proximity participation: PB implemented only in neighborhoods; there are no clear rules and little autonomy of civil society.
3. Consultation on public finance: Citizens are consulted on priorities of overall financial situation of a town or city; there are clear rules, but little autonomy of civil society.
4. Multistakeholder participation: Citizens and private enterprises take part and discuss concrete projects financed by public/private partnerships; there are clear rules, but little autonomy for civil society.
5. Community participatory budgeting: Mostly local communities participate and directly decide and implement concrete projects; there are clear rules and a high autonomy for civil society.
6. Participation of organized interests: Different organizations participate (trade unions, associations, enterprises) in discussions, which are centred on specific public policies and possibly on single projects; the degree of autonomy for civil society is variable.

Real cases often combine elements of the six different models. Due to the activities of (inter)national networks and the combination of PB with existing traditions of participation, some models have become dominant in single
countries. For example, the “community PB” is very widespread in Great Britain (and in the Anglo-Saxon world), the “proximity” model in France, Belgium, and Portugal, and the “adaptation of Porto Alegre” in Spain, Italy, Brazil, and Latin America. Overall, it seems that the direct influence of Porto Alegre is diminishing in favor of the development of “homegrown” models. Whereas initially mostly left-wing political or community activists brought the idea of PB to other Latin American countries, the Western European context and the US or Canada, it was introduced in other contexts through development cooperation and international organizations (Africa, Eastern Europe). Social scientists have also played an important role in the global dissemination of PB.

Due to the huge diversity of contexts and procedures, it is impossible to provide an overall evaluation of the impact of PB. Moreover, many processes are very young and little comparative statistical data is available. Finally, the goals differ greatly, reaching from the provision of information and transparency of budgetary issues to the empowerment of citizens, the improvement of services, and the democratization of local political structures. The existence of clear procedural rules, a high degree of autonomy of civil society participants, a direct impact on decisions (or an indirect influence on decisions linked to an official process of accountability), and the discussion about local and broader political questions are crucial factors for initiating a democratization process. In many European countries, PB has been shown to have positive impacts on the development of a more user-oriented administration, whereas its effects in terms of social justice remain limited compared to the Latin American continent (Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke 2008); allocation criteria or specific methods to engage with “hard-to-reach” groups are promising ways to create a greater social profile of PB in Europe. Overall, PB can trigger certain positive developments, but needs to be embedded in a broader reform process in order to pave the way for an encompassing democratization of political systems. Core challenges consist in involving local SMOs without reducing their critical potential, the integration of new themes like gender mainstreaming and sustainable development, and the creating of new institutional links between the sphere of representative democracy and the space of direct citizen participation.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Democracy and social movements; Direct democracy; Participatory democracy in social movements.

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Petitions
JEAN-GABRIEL CONTAMIN

Petitions are usually defined as “protest texts which are intended to be signed by a number of persons, at least one of whom has not the opportunity to amend it.” This element of the repertoires of collective action has rarely been studied in sociology because it seemed too obvious. But, because it might be less obvious than it appears, it might be a fruitful opening to questioning social movement theory.

AN OBVIOUS PRACTICE

A petition “is not likely to be noticed” because it “might not offend anyone” (Crozat 1998: 59). Crozat summarizes what appears to be the dominant representation of the object “petition” in the contemporary sociological literature. Petitioning is simply not a very effective means of protest, perhaps because it requires very little effort from participants. Therefore, for petitioning, the paradox of collective action – according to which it would be more rational to let others mobilize rather than bear the costs of collective mobilization in order to get a collective good that would benefit all (Olsonian model) – would not work. “Free riders” would become “easy riders.”

This explains the relative rarity of surveys that address this mode of action. Most often, the study of petitioning is used as a pretext to deal with other objects. For instance, some psychosociologists have made it an ideal ground for studying the phenomena of obedience and conformity. They tend to show that situational factors are more efficient than personal beliefs or personal factors to explain the signature of a petition (Klandermans & Oegema 1994).

Petitioning is also sometimes taken into account as a political activity among others in quantitative studies which aim at comparing different models of political participation in different countries (Crozat 1998) or different social groups (Chong & Rogers 2005), for instance comparing the level of petitioning practice in different countries in order to conclude that the German nation “tolerates the less contentious form of protest but will not tolerate the more contentious ones” (Crozat 1998: 67) and to relate this teaching to “national cultures,” to historical traditions, or to political opportunity structures specific to each country. Thus, petitioning remains a little studied subject, either because it is regarded as a mere survival in the epoch of broadcast media, or because it seems a practice whose persistence is explained in an obvious way: certainly, it is not effective, but it costs little to those who use it.

THE DUAL PARADOX OF PETITIONING

However, according to these studies, petitioning does not appear to be a mere survival tactic, but the only one of those so-called “unconventional” political activities which has been practiced by almost half the population regardless of country. Furthermore, this practice tends to spread, although it appears archaic in a time of television, polling, and individualized democracy.

Similarly, it might be questioned that petitioning is generally an inexpensive practice for individuals. Of course, signing a petition often costs neither time nor energy nor money. However, this practice is supposed, like a contract, to leave the written record of a commitment identified by a name, a signature, and often an address. It is then likely to expose signatories and, even more, petition initiators, to some legal, physical, and moral risks (Hayes, Scheufele, & Huge 2006: 262), notably with the spread of the Internet.

The study of this practice adds then an extra dimension to the traditional “paradox of
collective action.” The Olsonian model implicitly assumes that collective mobilizations contribute to the gaining of the claimed collective good. So, for petitioning, it is necessary to understand why the signatories and those who organize these petitions endure the inconveniences of collective action even though they believe that this activity will not be sufficient to get what they ask for. This may be called the “dual paradox of petitioning” (Contamin 2001: 53).

A FRUITFUL OPENING FOR QUESTIONING MOBILIZATION STUDIES

Petitioning seems to be a fruitful way to question social movement theory from within and from outside. From outside, because admitting that petitioning might be less effective than other forms of action, without being less expensive and less used, leads us to postulate that everything cannot be reduced to rationality.

But it also questions the cost-benefit model applied to mobilizations. The rationality of petitioning cannot be explained without abandoning the paradigm that tends to evaluate the success and the rationality of mobilizations in terms of their ability to achieve some explicit demands. To understand this practice, it is necessary to reason relationally. In connection with other available modes of action petitioning takes place in sequences of mobilization within repertoires of collective action that constitute structures, and also in connexion with what everyone expects from others, according to a “metarationality.” In connection, finally, with the way each actor appropriates the petition. The persistence of petitioning can be understood by focusing on the plural uses that might be made of a petition: to test the echo of a question in a population, to engage in conversation with potential signatories, to create files of supporters, to occupy activists. In this sense, a petition is not so much an intangible protest text that each signatory must endorse in its entirety, than a pivotal text with which some people, who have not taken part in its writing, accept for heterogeneous reasons to be linked, despite the deep differences they may have, and provided that, at least symbolically, they can express those differences (Contamin 2001). So the paradox of collective action can be solved.

SEE ALSO: Direct democracy; Free rider problem; Rational choice theory and social movements; Repertoires of contention.

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Policing protest
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA and HERBERT REITER

THE POLICING OF PROTEST: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT

Relying mainly on protest as a means to put pressure upon decision-makers, social movements challenge the power of the state to impose a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Taking to the streets, often forcing their presence beyond the legal limits in order to get their voices heard, they directly interact with the police, who are supposed to control public order. In their interventions, the police force therefore has to realize an uneasy balance between the defense of state power through the implementation of law and order and the recognition of demonstration rights.

The intervention of the police in the case of violations of law is additionally not automatic: in public order, many minor violations are tolerated in order to avoid major disorders. While sometimes the government gives specific orders (or at least sends signals) about the type of intervention required (or desired) at political demonstrations, the police enjoy broad margins of discretion, at different hierarchical levels, as most decisions are taken on the spot, and are determined by the assessment of the specific situation as well as by interactive dynamics.

For many years a neglected issue in the social science literature, the policing of protest started to attract attention in the 1990s. The collection *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstration in Western Democracies*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (1998a), introduced the concept of protest policing, defined as the police strategies and practices used in order to control protest.

In authoritarian regimes, the policing of protest is often characterized by brutality, with challenges to public order not infrequently ending in massacres (see, among others, Sheptycki 2005). In democratic regimes, however, encounters between demonstrators and the police can still be a very delicate issue. In modern democratic societies, protest policing requires a difficult balance between the protection of the legal order and the defence of individual freedom and of citizens’ rights to political participation, and thus the very essence of the democratic system. The public order strategies employed by the police are in fact reflected in citizens’ perceptions of the respect the state shows toward their rights and freedoms. In this sense, the way in which a police officer intervenes in order to control protest is perceived as an indicator of the quality of democracy in the political system (della Porta & Reiter 1998b).

Empirical research has indicated that the policing of protest also affects the evolution of protest. Increasing the costs of protesting, it may reduce the individual availability to participate (Davenport 2005; Francisco 2005). However, the sense of injustice as well as the creation of intense feelings of identification and solidarity can increase the motivation to participate (della Porta & Piazza 2008). Police control tends to impact on the repertoires of protest, through a reciprocal adaptation (or sometimes, escalation) of police and demonstrators’ tactics (della Porta 1995). It may also influence the organizational forms used by social movements, for instance by spreading a sense of mutual mistrust through the use of infiltration (e.g., Fernandez 2008; Starr et al. 2008). Different effects of repressive behavior have been related to the timing of police intervention as well as to the characteristics of the affected social and political groups.

Equally protest has an impact on police forces and strategies. The policing of protest is a key feature for the development and the self-definition of the police as an institution.
and as a profession. Its gradual affirmation as the main agency specializing in this task was of fundamental importance to the process of modernization and professionalization of the European police forces in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, waves of protest have had important effects both on police strategies and on the organization of the police (Morgan 1987). In contemporary democratic societies, the way in which the police address protest is a significant aspect of their self-image (Winter 1998).

THE HISTORICAL TRENDS

With the development of the nation-state, the policing of protest has been characterized by some trends towards a growing deprivatization, nationalization, and demilitarization. First of all, the tasks of policing are at the core of the definition of a Weberian state power that claims the monopoly of force. Second, processes of state building brought about the centralization of the control of public order. Even if the degree of centralization in police structures clearly varies, and local police bodies often keep specific profiles and styles (see e.g., Kriesi & Wisler 1998 on Switzerland and Winter 1998 on Germany), there has been a progressive orientation of protest and its policing towards the national level. Third, here also with cross-country differences, there has been a progressive transfer of public order control from the military to the police. In democratic regimes in particular, the military aspects of protest policing were further reduced and the democratic accountability of police forces strengthened.

The protest policing style dominant in Western democracies prior to the 1960s and 1970s has been defined as “escalated force” (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy 1998). Based on a presumption of irrational crowd behaviour (Schweingruber 2000), it was rooted in intolerance of direct forms of political participation. Highly suspicious of any gathering, its adherents gave low priority to demonstration rights and foresaw the massive use of force to suppress even small violations of laws and ordinances.

According to many studies, the “1968” protest cycle had a profound impact on protest policing. The need to adapt to new forms of protests as well as the increasing legitimacy of (once) unconventional forms of political participation led to an increasing tolerance of protest by the police. From the 1970s onwards, police forces started to implement new public order strategies, considering peacekeeping more important than law enforcement and avoiding coercive intervention as much as possible.

Especially since the 1980s, research on the policing of protest in European democracies and the United States has singled out the dominance of a “negotiated management” strategy in protest policing (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy 1998). A shift was noticed from hard to soft forms of power, based upon the recognition of the right to demonstrate, tolerance for (even disruptive) forms of protest, frequent communication between protestors and the police in order to insure a peaceful evolution of events, and limited use of coercion (della Porta & Reiter 1998a; della Porta & Fillieule 2004). Research, however, has stressed the selectivity of police intervention, with the survival of harsh modes of protest policing in the 1980s and 1990s (della Porta 1998; Fillieule & Jobard 1998).

THE RECENT TRENDS: POLICING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Recent developments in the policing of protest seem to indicate some (more or less abrupt) inversions. If protest policing had never been exclusively under public control (see e.g., private policing on university campuses or in the factories, but also the use of organized crime to intimidate unionists and protestors), the privatization and semi-privatization of spaces such as shopping malls as well as the outsourcing of police functions to private companies (e.g., in airports) have recently increased and made
more visible the role of private police bodies in the control of protest. Additionally, the control of more transnational protests brought about a growing coordination of police units from different countries and the introduction of transnational aspects into protest policing. Third, in the last few decades, processes of militarization of public order have been noted even in countries, such as Great Britain, once considered the best examples of “citizens’ policing.” Finally, negotiated management was less consistently implemented, leading researchers to indicate the emergence of new protest policing styles, variously defined as “command and control” (Vitale 2005) or “selective incapacitation” (Noakes & Gilham 2006) and characterized by a particular emphasis on prevention, with a growing reliance on “intelligence-led” policing, and a return to coercion, also employed preemptively.

What had been considered by many as a generally accepted “post-1968 standard” proved particularly fragile when confronted by the mass demonstrations of an emerging transnational movement (della Porta, Peterson, & Reiter 2006). At protest events of what came to be known as the global justice movement, coercive strategies (based upon the use of force) returned as a prominent aspect of protest policing, apparently recalling the “escalated force” style, although with adaptations to new protest repertoires, police frames, and technologies. Transnational aspects of protest policing were particularly evident in intelligence gathering, the basis for preventive (or preemptive) intervention against protest. Signs of militarization included a massive and usually highly visible police presence, heavy anti-riot gear, the use of special units for (also preemptive) coercive intervention against “troublemakers,” and the deployment of army units. Various types of “less-lethal” arms were also used against demonstrators, from those traditionally deployed by police public order units, such as tear gas and/or water cannons, to newer developments like hand-held irritating sprays and rubber and plastic bullets, which leave the responsibility for their use largely to individual police officers.

These developments, visible also at national and local protest events, emerge as significant departures from the protest policing styles dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. However, it should be recalled that the advent of negotiated management did not signify the disappearance of coercive intervention. Antagonistic interventions with a “show of force” attitude and a massive, highly visible police presence were however generally reserved for small extremist groups – in this period of demobilization not connected with a broader movement – or for a universally stigmatized phenomenon like football hooliganism. In the case of transnational protest events organized by the global justice movement, these features have been observed in conjunction with mass demonstrations of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of participants.

Deterrence of demonstrators and the closing of public spaces to activists were underlined as growing strategic elements in the policing of protest events (Fernandez 2008). During the prelude to transnational counter-summits and other major protest events, the police forces in various countries also employed coercive measures offensively, directed against movement activists and movement strategies, including preventive arrests, the confiscation of propaganda material, and searches of demonstrators’ headquarters, independent media centers, and legal assistance offices. Moreover, temporary ordinances, creative use of old laws, and legal permits became common ways to control protests (Fernandez 2008: 166).

As for negotiation, there has often been stronger emphasis on isolating political leaders and dignitaries from the risks of contact with demonstrators than on negotiating with organizers to define spaces and limits of protest. In some cases of counter-summits, serious negotiations started late and were more or less haphazard, while no particular care seems to have been taken to assure open communication lines during demonstrations, one of the cardinal points of negotiated management. Above
all, preparations for the “fortification” of summit sites and, in general, police measures aimed at its protection, constituted public messages difficult to reconcile with a negotiating strategy.

Coercion and deterrence strategies were linked to information strategies. The literature on transnational policing has underlined the significance of technical innovation and the influence of advanced surveillance, information processing, and communications technologies on the way policing is organized. New terms such as “strategic,” “pro-active,” and “intelligence-led” policing imply approaches for targeting suspect populations and individuals in a highly systematic way. The trend towards intelligence-led policing, first established in the US with the “war on drugs,” is highly evident in particular in transnational protest policing, both in North America and in Europe. Comparative research (della Porta, Peterson, & Reiter 2006; Fernandez 2008) indicates an attempt to extend control over a population of transnational activists through a broad collection of information (from open sources as well as infiltration), shared transnationally among the different police bodies. Untrue information is also often spread in order to picture the activists as violent (della Porta et al. 2006; Fernandez 2008). However, the various police forces’ capacity for monitoring the “suspect population” of the protesters is often not sufficient to allow them to efficiently intervene in a strategic and proactive way. The massive amount of information collected on single activists and groups and the political (and not criminal) character of the phenomenon of transnational protest seem to have overstretched their analytical capacities.

EXPLAINING PROTEST POLICING STYLES

Della Porta and Reiter (1998b; 2006) suggest explaining the policing of protest based on characteristics both internal and external to the police, with both types of characteristics filtered through police knowledge – that is, the cognitive appreciation by the police of their role in society as well as of external demands and challenges.

Concerning external characteristics, social movement scholars have stressed the role of political opportunities, as both stable institutions and contingent developments. As for the first, the more centralized the political power, the less accessible “from below” political institutions have been considered to be. Additionally, historically rooted cultural elements about the proper ways to deal with opponents tend to reproduce themselves determining different degrees of inclusiveness versus exclusiveness towards social movements. Less durable political contingencies that influence the availability and influence of political allies (electoral instability, divisions among the elites, etc.) have also been mentioned as relevant in opening windows of opportunities for protestors.

As far as the particular case of the policing of transnational protest is concerned, the low formal accountability of international governmental organizations as well as the convergence on neoliberal policies of right-wing and left-wing political parties have been read as closing down channels of access for political movements (della Porta, Peterson, & Reiter 2006). The reduced support by allies in the institutional sphere of politics seems to have pushed the police towards harsher strategies, adapted from those applied in preceding decades against weak (politically unprotected) groups and generally stigmatized phenomena like football hooliganism. In addition, while the targets and organization of the protest become transnational, protest rights remain anchored at the national level (Reiter & Fillieule 2006).

Internal characteristics of the police, like its organizational resources as well as its professional culture, are also important in explaining police behavior. The degree of militarization of the structure and the equipment, the legal competences and the degree of professionalization influence the strategic choices of the police. Recent trends towards a (re)militarization of public order control reflect a more general
augmentation of paramilitary units, used for instance in the intervention against drug dealers, as well as the growth of a military culture exemplified by police training, armament, uniforms, and more.

Ethnographic research and case studies have allowed an understanding of the motivations for the different styles the police use towards different social and political groups (e.g., D. Waddington 1992; P.A.J. Waddington 1994). Police have been said to be sensitive to the characteristics of the perceived threat but also to the expected demands from authorities and public opinion. Research on the police has stressed that the organizational imperative is keeping control over situations, rather than enforcing the law. Police officers indeed enjoy a high degree of discretion in their encounters with citizens. However, they must also maintain (to different degrees) the support of authorities and the public. Research on the policing of social movements has identified a tendency to use harsher styles of protest policing against social and political groups that are perceived as larger threats to political elites, as being more ideologically driven, or more radical in their aims (see Earl 2003; della Porta & Fillieule 2004; Davenport 2005). Additionally, police repression is more likely to be directed against groups that are poorer in material resources as well as in political connections (della Porta 1998; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy 2003).

Police tactics in the control of protest also followed some general conceptions of the role of the police. Noakes and Gillham (2006) underline the importance of shifts in the dominant visions of the causes of crime and in the corresponding conceptual principles underlying police intervention for protest policing, in particular the implications of the “new penology” with its emphasis on protection and risk management. Zero tolerance doctrines, as well as militaristic training and equipment, are imported into the field of protest policing from other forms of public order control addressing micro-criminality or football hooliganism.

The elaboration of a “penal law of the enemy” is another case in point. The strategy of space fortification reflects the relevance of a conception of prevention as isolation from the danger (and the dangerous ones), through a reduction of rights (of demonstration, movement, privacy) of those citizens that are considered as potential enemies. A situation defined as an emergency is faced through the strategies experimented with in the control of the different, the street enemies (migrants, petty criminals). If this emergency right deviates from the principles of universal rights, instituting a dichotomy between citizens and enemy, in the control of protest the political rights of the citizens are subordinated to the security of certain groups.

The expansion of police preventive powers (e.g., in the control of football stadiums or of organized crime) facilitated the rise of intelligence-led policing in the control of protest. In addition, new laws on terrorism passed after September 11, 2001, and the enhanced international police cooperation on security issues, have provided instruments and norms that allow for a consistent restriction of demonstration rights. Old and new antiterrorism legislation is more and more used for the surveillance and intimidation of activists, who risk very high penalties for minor violations (see e.g., Starr et al. 2008).

Finally, the policing of transnational events tends to involve international policing, characterized by a very low level of democratic accountability. The involvement of multiple law enforcement agencies, as well as secret services, further reduces internal coordination and external controls on police intervention. A supranational public sphere capable of keeping a critical eye on the defense of citizens’ rights is emerging (as, for instance, the wave of international protest against police brutality at the Genoa counter-summit indicates), but it is still weak and surfaces only occasionally. Finally, the merely intergovernmental character of police cooperation (even among EU member states) has notably increased the difficulty for citizens to single out the institutional level which is politically and juridically responsible for limitations of their rights and where to ask for redress.
SEE ALSO: Agents provocateurs; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Police riots; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Public order management systems; Repression and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Police autonomy
FABIEN JOBARD

The police usually enjoy a great amount of autonomy, of which two levels can be distinguished. The first level (micro level) is called police discretion, and is used by rank-and-file officers. Daily police matters call for quick if not split-second decisions by individual officers on the beat, like bringing someone to the police station, approaching an apparent source of disorder, or following or abandoning the task given by a superior in order to help someone in trouble. The second level (macro level) is the autonomy exercised by the police as an institution. This autonomy is conceptualized in relation toward the authorities (usually political or judicial authorities), which give the police their mandate.

With respect to these two levels of autonomy, crowd control operations are specific in that the first level of autonomy has been more and more reduced in the course of the militarization process that characterizes the maintenance of order in most contemporary democracies. Individual officers are expected not to act on their own initiative: today, almost no discretion is tolerated in the context of highly professionalized forms of protest policing, even in the case of self-defence.

Two different conceptions of police autonomy are at stake. In common law countries, the key notion is the police chief’s “independence” in all law enforcement operations, specifically in maintaining order. This was expressed by the Royal Commission on the Police in Britain in 1962, and reaffirmed in what Stenning (2007) calls the “most oft-quoted statement of the doctrine in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand”: the “Blackburn doctrine,” which states that “[t]he responsibility for law enforcement lies on him [the chief constable]. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.” An opposite conception can be found in “continental” countries, especially as far as protest policing is concerned. There, the police are seen as the long arm of government. For instance, in France, the central government handles the police operations during protests, riots, or collective violence through its local representatives, the préfet. The préfet give the orders and police commissioners receive and implement these orders on the field.

It is true that, in both protest policing regimes, the government’s intervention in protest policing operations can lead to large-scale political scandals. Nevertheless, the public response is different in each system. The Canadian prime minister’s interference with police operations during the APEC meetings held in Vancouver in 1997 led to the formation of a commission which deplored that the police had “succumbed to government influence and intrusion.” In France, events like the massacre of more than one hundred peaceful Algerian protestors in 1961, the massacre of communist protesters the year after, or, more recently, the debates over police provocation through overintervention or nonintervention, never generated any public discussion on police subordination to the government’s stakeholder (the préfet or the ministry of the interior), but only with regard to the intent or the final result of the political intervention. Policing protest in France is always a matter for the government. No parliamentary, independent, or judicial commission ever investigated such issues, which simply remained part of the political debate between the government, its opposition and the voters.

These two opposite notions of police autonomy actually rely more on different patterns of policing than on a strict division between continental law and common law systems. Countries like New Zealand or Northern Ireland have, like France, a centralized police force headed by the government, and the notion of...
“police independence” appears almost fictitious there.

One should, however, not overestimate the size of the differences between the two police systems. First, operational autonomy is not the only thing at stake. Resources, nominations, promotions, working conditions, transactions with police unions, as well as general police policies, are always defined by the government or the regional or local political authority, which therefore has indirect control capacities. Facing a political protest, police chiefs keep that in mind. From this point of view, recent changes in police policies tend to increase central controls, via fiscal constraints, audits, and new public management doctrine in the organization of the police. Moreover, the focus on police agencies by “law-and-order” governments favors the intermingling of government interests and police matters. The uniformity of management guidelines and the growing importance of police issues in contemporary democracies contribute to erasing the differences between the two police systems outlined above.

The second reason why the differences between the two systems are less clear cut hinges on the fact that national police organizations display their own (sub)cultures and collective identities. A universal aspect of police subculture seems to be that it favors more repressive orientation toward groups identified as specifically weak or threatening, like racial minorities, foreigners, students, urban youths, prostitutes, etc. This kind of police autonomy is the source of a police-centred approach introduced by many scholars of social movements, which examines institutional factors in how the police handle protest. From this perspective, the problem is no longer the dependence of police chiefs on government or politicians, but, on the contrary, the lack of adaptation of police organizations vis-à-vis political change. This can be illustrated by the difficult transition from escalation to negotiated management strategies. During some periods (at the end of the 1980s and again since the end of the 1990s), local government in Berlin, Germany, has tried to discipline the inclination of the local police force toward repressive tactics against left-wing and anarchist May 1st demonstrations, and finally succeeded. In contrast, police autonomy was so strong in France during the 1950s–1960s that the government’s only hope was damage control strategies in order to limit the police abuse of force in Paris. The police’s power extended so far that many local politicians in Paris and its surroundings, and many civil servants in charge of immigration and colonial issues, were former police chiefs from Algeria – which reverses the question of police independence and political influence.

SEE ALSO: Police riots; Policing protest; Public order management systems; Social protest; Social control errors.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Police riots

ABBY PETERSON

Researchers remind us that most political acts of protest do not result in violence. However, when violence does break out authorities, protesters, and the general public alike are eager to place the blame on some party to the events. But it is often difficult to determine who was “responsible” for the violence when it does occur, or who lay behind its escalation. Responsibility is most readily assigned to protesters. However, activists are not the sole actors in riots, however instrumental to its outbreak they may be. Violence arises out of an interaction between protesters and responding authorities. Research since the 1960s suggests that police authorities often bear a major part of the responsibility (e.g., Waddington 1991; Skolnick & Fyfe 1993; della Porta 1998).

Direct confrontations between activists and police bring to the surface highly emotionally charged moments – moments of “collective effervescence” – which inevitably lead to processes which in most cases will result in an escalation of violence. In Peterson (2001) these moments of “collective effervescence” were analysed as to their role in the construction of militant collective identities, as well as to how these “moments of collective effervescence,” enhanced by the explosive sociality of direct confrontations, led to a rationale of violence on the part of activists. Waddington (1991: 177–178) turns the logic of these arguments toward the police, arguing that the baton charge easily leads to an escalation of violence.

The reason why baton charges are difficult to control is known colloquially in the Metropolitan Police as “the red mist”. This refers to a potential cocktail of psychological conditions which diminishes any person’s self-control, and from which the police are not exempt. Baton charges require officers to act aggressively in conditions of relative anonymity… they may be wearing protective clothing with visors to obscure their facial features; and they will almost certainly be acting, not as individuals, but an equally anonymous collective.

Protest events often reveal two groups “high” on the potent “red mist” cocktail – the masked, anonymous activists and the masked, anonymous police. The protagonists enter a “spiral of violence,” during the actual events as well as in their aftermath (cf. Peterson 1997). Emsley and Bessel (2000: 4) refer to French sociologist François Dieu and his typology of the violent force employed by policemen. The typology includes: la violence instrumentale, which is the exercise of force justified by their legitimate authority; la violence dérivée, which is a by-product of the former when individual police officers are carried away by panic or accident and strike out indiscriminately at those who happen to get in the way; and la violence déviante, which are uncalled-for and indefensible exercises of force by individual police officers carried away by anger, frustration, and revenge. I argue that the latter two categories are both examples of the unprofessional exercises of coercive force, only the motives behind their exercise vary. Violence dérivée is violent acts in the heat of the moment, by-products of the legitimate exercise of police power, which has gotten out of control. Violence déviante is premeditated acts of revenge and anger, by-products of the situations where authorized force has been instrumentally employed.

Stark (1972) analyzed police riots in the USA and argued that police riots were unusual only in their relative infrequency. Stark argues that whatever ideas and practices officers bring to their more everyday police work, the “culture of policing” is simply exacerbated during riots. Excessive acts of violence against persons who “anger, offend, or frighten” police officers are commonplace. “What is abnormal about police riots,” according to Stark, “is the number of policemen and civilians involved in a single
incident during a relatively condensed time-span” (1972: 55).

Stark finds the preconditions for police riots in the cultural predispositions of individual police officers embedded within a police culture that tends to demonize adversaries. This explanation is woefully inadequate. A siege mentality accounts for arbitrary and excessive acts of violence among individual officers, but it does not explain their collective occurrence. The existence of a police culture, which is predisposed to perceive political activists as more or less criminal hooligans, can underlie police riots, but other factors must come into play. Research on the police riots in Gothenburg 2001 during the European Union summit suggests that other factors were equally decisive. Deficiency in preparedness due to inadequate or nonexistent crowd control and riot control training, the lack of an operational strategy and set of tactics which could control and contain unexpected situations arising in the field, the breakdown in the operative command and coordination structure which undermined the authority of senior officers in the field, as well as a police culture that readily demonized in an arbitrary manner the activists assembled in the city, contributed to the police riots on the streets of Gothenburg (Peterson 2006).

SEE ALSO: Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Police autonomy; Policing protest; Riots; Social control errors; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Political alignments and cleavages
MARIE-LOUISE DAMEN

In social sciences, cleavages are a way to describe the political landscape along the fault lines of society. Cleavages structure the organizational field and its constituency, creating a supply and demand for politics (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Cleavage theory occupies a central place in literature on conventional political participation, but is remarkably absent in literature on unconventional political participation (but see Kriesi et al. 1995). In explanations of conventional political behavior, cleavages supposedly affect party politics and citizens’ political beliefs and attitudes (Bartolini & Mair 1990; Deegan-Krause 2006; Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Transposed to unconventional political behavior, cleavages shape mobilization potential, or the “demand-side” of protest, and mobilizing structures, or the “supply-side” of protest (Klandermans 2004; Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg 2010). Thus, cleavages can be found in both conventional and unconventional politics. In order to understand political conflicts, we have to study cleavages in both conventional and unconventional politics.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were the first to claim that political conflicts are related to a limited number of cleavages. They assumed that political alignments can be applied to a historical sequence of four cleavages: those between center and periphery, state and church, urban and rural, and finally between owners and workers. In the seminal introductory chapter of Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explained that national and industrial revolutions across Europe have led to long-term alignments between social groups and political parties. In the processes of nation-state building, alongside the Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter-Reformation, the cleavages between center and periphery and between state and church were formed. The two other cleavages are products of the industrial revolution: the urban–rural cleavage of opposing agricultural and industrial interests, and finally the class-cleavage between workers and employers.

Based upon the legacy of Lipset and Rokkan, Bartolini and Mair proposed a definition of cleavage that stressed three crucial elements for a political division to be called a cleavage:

- an empirical element which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an organizational/behavioral element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage. (Bartolini & Mair 1990: 215)

The empirical, normative, and organizational elements are central in the literature on stability of party systems and electoral volatility. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that the existing conflicts “froze” into party systems when universal suffrage was introduced in Western Europe in the 1920s. Conflicts which developed on the basis of social stratification created the basis for collective group identities. These group identities reinforced political consciousness of the group members and enabled the construction of an organizational infrastructure. When groups are socially and culturally clearly segmented from each other and internally highly integrated, the degree of closure is considered to be high. The higher the degree of closure of social groups, the more likely people are to be politically aligned along these cleavages (Kriesi et al. 1995). The freezing hypothesis came under pressure from a changing...
political and social reality since the mid-1970s. Social mobility diminished the degree of closure of social groups. The individual link to the social group weakened and people became less inclined to participate on behalf of common group interests. A growing electoral volatility and more party competition pointed to a decline of traditional cleavages. In the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan, such large-scale historical societal transformations can be held responsible for the emergence of a new cleavage. Several authors pointed to a change of values in Western societies, due to processes of modernization (Inglehart & Wenzel 2005) and educational expansion (Kriesi et al. 2008). The process started with a left-libertarian turn in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a right-populist turn since the 1990s. Interestingly, the left-libertarian turn was driven by the emergence of the so-called “new social movements” (Kriesi et al. 1995), whereas the right-populist turn developed in the electoral arena (Hutter 2011; Hutter & Kriesi 2012). The last turn is thought to form a new integration–demarcation cleavage in Europe, demarcating the “winners and losers” of globalization (Kriesi 2010). Along this new cleavage new identities and grievances developed and crystallized into organizational fields. The emergence of new social movements can point to changing cleavage structures. At the same time, changing cleavage structures can facilitate the emergence of new social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995). Protest can thus be seen as the precursor or the tip of larger underlying or emerging conflicts.

To fully understand how cleavages affect protest, conflicts must be analyzed at various levels. At the macro level, cleavages are represented in the national sociopolitical context. Cleavages are “frozen” into stable party systems and civil societies, which are found both at the supply side (party and movement politics) and the demand side (public opinion or electoral and protest behavior) of politics (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg 2010). The more salient a cleavage is, the more strongly it applies on the supply and demand side of conventional and unconventional politics and the higher its issues figure on the political agenda. At the meso level, the salience of a cleavage is also reflected in the density of the multiorganizational field (i.e., social movement organizations) linked to that cleavage and the embeddedness of the citizens in the organizational field. At the micro level we find citizens and their “readiness” to act in response to that cleavage. Who they are, why they protest (or not), and by which organizations they are mobilized (or not), is related to the cleavage the conflict reflects.

At times when conventional political behavior is on the decline and unconventional political behavior is on the rise, insight into the various levels of sociopolitical conflict is increasingly important. Cleavage theory seems promising in order to improve our understanding of the dynamics of both electoral and protest politics, especially when analyzing the relationship between the two arenas (see Hutter 2011; Hutter & Kriesi 2012). In social movement research, its application is rather new and limited, with many important questions waiting to be answered.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Demand and supply of protest; Multiorganizational fields; New social movements and new social movement theory; Organizations and movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Political economy and social movements

JASON STANLEY and JEFF GOODWIN

The analysis of the interplay of capitalism and politics – in other words, political economy – played an extremely important role in many of the seminal, English-language studies of social movements and revolutions written by social scientists during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Piven & Cloward 1977; McAdam 1999). These studies had the effect of radically reorienting the academic study of movements, revolutions, and political conflict generally. The field moved away from primarily psychological and social-psychological treatments of political protest – studies that often cast a very negative light on protest – to more sympathetic analyses that emphasized the importance of resources, power, solidarities, and opportunities for movements. But all this is now common wisdom among students of movements. What has been largely forgotten is that these same studies tended to emphasize the effects of capitalism on movements. The dynamics of capitalism figure prominently in these studies, sometimes constraining and sometimes inciting or enabling disruptive collective action. By capitalism, these authors generally mean a mode of production in which a class that owns the means of production (capitalists) employs a class that must sell its labor power in exchange for a wage or salary (workers), and in which market competition among capitalists leads them to reinvest part of the surplus (or profits) in the production process (i.e., capital accumulation). The dynamics of capitalism that these authors emphasize include processes directly linked to market competition and capital accumulation, especially the proletarianization (or commodification) of labor, the commodification of productive forces generally, the concentration and centralization of capital, and periodic crises.

In McAdam’s (1999) influential study of the US civil rights movement, for example, the disintegration of the Southern cotton sharecropping economy and the concomitant movement of African Americans into urban waged jobs are portrayed as necessary preconditions for the emergence of that movement. McAdam writes, “If one had to identify the factor most responsible for undermining the political conditions that, at the turn of the [twentieth] century, had relegated blacks to a position of political impotence, it would have to be the gradual collapse of cotton as the backbone of the southern economy” (1999: 73). The collapse of the South’s cotton economy, in McAdam’s account, facilitated the emergence of the civil rights movement indirectly, through its effects on elite political alignments and on the “indigenous organization” and beliefs of African Americans. Note that this economic process was crucially important for the very possibility of the civil rights movement even though this movement was not itself a class-based insurgency making primarily economic demands, but rather a cross-class coalition – linking working- and middle-class African Americans as well as sympathetic whites – whose primary demands (at least until the movement fractured in the late 1960s) were desegregation and voting rights.

Political economy offers a range of ideas that are helpful for understanding social movements. Here we point to seven such ideas. First, political economy asks that we pay attention to actors’ material interests, which derive from their structural location in economic and political institutions. For example, employers have an interest in reducing labor costs because higher costs impinge upon the profitability of their firms. By contrast, workers have an interest in increasing their wages and improving their working conditions (e.g., working fewer hours) because their health and well-being...
depend on these. As this example makes clear, interests can differ substantially depending on one’s structural position and antagonisms can exist between the interests of different groups. Interests are not the same thing as perceptions or actions, but they will likely play some role in how people think about and act in the world around them. For example, the range of ideas or ideologies that appeal to particular classes of people are likely to be limited by their material interests. At times, individuals with common interests may act collectively against those with other interests, as is the case when organized workers struggle against employers. At other times, movements are comprised of groups with conflicting interests, as was the case in the US women’s movement, where conflicts erupted between elite and working-class women over the goals of the movement.

Second, while many analysts agree on the centrality of material resources in shaping movement persistence and success, political economy is unique in its focus on the key mechanism of resource distribution in capitalist societies, namely, the market. Capitalist property relations guarantee that the owners of productive assets acquire on average much greater wealth and control greater resources than do their workers. The market mechanism also makes likely a stratified working class, where some earn much greater incomes than others – a doctor who is employed by a hospital will have a much larger salary than that of a janitor who works at the same hospital. Understanding how markets distribute resources among different classes and class segments can help us make sense of variations in the emergence, trajectories, and success or failure of different movements.

Third, in assessing the relative strength of a movement (and its opposition), political economists distinguish between power that derives from a movement’s size, on the one hand, and power that derives from the structural position of movement participants in economic and political processes, on the other. Organized truckers have significant “structural power” because they have the capacity to tie up traffic and commerce and thereby seriously disrupt social and economic life. So too do soldiers, whose widespread disobedience would make impossible any war effort. Unemployed workers, on the other hand, have great needs and are sometimes well organized, yet they have little structural power to force elites to bend to their demands because they play no role in the production process. Paying attention to this distinction will help us understand why movements of equivalent size may be more or less effective at achieving their goals.

Fourth, political economy pays close attention to the ways in which competition between firms influences social movements. Competition drives individual firms to adopt strategies aimed at outcompeting rivals. One such strategy is the introduction of new technology, which can displace or de-skill workers or change patterns of social life among workers. Firms also sometimes relocate production away from expensive or militant workers. In both cases, these strategies seriously impinge upon the strength and organization of workers’ struggles. Competition also generates antagonisms between groups of economic elites based upon their ownership of different kinds of firms. For example, export-oriented firms have an interest in a weaker domestic currency (because this makes exports cheaper abroad), while import-dependent firms have an interest in the opposite. These divergent interests can generate open conflict among factions of economic elites. We see this arise where different business associations ally with and contribute financially to different political parties, with each economic faction hoping their investment will pay off with increased access and preferential treatment in the future. This intra-elite conflict can also generate openings for political mobilization from below, as movements find ways to ally with one elite grouping to make inroads against another.

Fifth, political economists also examine the implications for movements of the aggregate dynamics that arise from competition as firms throughout the economy pursue the strategies mentioned above. One area where this is clear
is in the recurrence of recessions and economic crises. While the trend in recent decades in most industrialized economies has been slow growth, this process is filled with ebbs and flows deriving from the uncoordinated nature of capitalist competition among firms. Booms can stimulate political mobilization as expectations grow, optimism increases, and anxiety over risk-taking subsides. Busts too can stimulate action, as when crises eject millions of workers from their jobs, convulse communities, and generate serious fiscal challenges for governments. Those affected by crises sometimes mobilize along lines of shared interests, as when the unemployed organize to push for job creation programs. Crises can also spark antagonism between vulnerable groups struggling over scarce resources, as they do when working-class movements against immigration rise up in the face of disappearing jobs, declining living standards, and evaporating welfare state provisions. States sometimes turn to military spending and even war as a “solution” to economic crisis – massive public expenditures help pump the domestic economy, while intervention abroad can open markets for domestic firms. Of course, wars often incite antivar movements, both at home and abroad.

Sixth, political economy stresses the ways in which the states confronted by reform movements remain biased in favor of the shared interests of the capitalist class. This bias arises from two features of capitalist democracies. The state is dependent on tax revenue derived from private economic activity, so it will be extremely reluctant to implement reforms that bring about a slowdown in overall private investment, even when strong movements demand such policies – and even when the government in question appears to be allied with such movements. In cases in which a government actually implements such reforms, moreover, any slowdown in investment will likely result in rising unemployment, declining tax revenue, and hence greater difficulties in financing social programs, all of which are likely to increase the unpopularity of the government. This does not preclude reforms, but it does lead governments of all political stripes to pay close attention to the demands of employers and to shy away from reforms that would jeopardize economic growth.

Seventh, political economy can be helpful in understanding the rise of new collective identities, some of which instigate and shape collective action. With the rise of large-scale factories, many industrial workers came face to face for the first time with others who shared similar exploitative experiences, creating the conditions for the rise of working-class identities. The dynamics of capitalist development also influence collective identities that appear to have little connection to the economy. For example, today’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movement has roots in the industrial revolution, the urbanization that accompanied it, and the wars that followed it, as men and women left farm and rural life in droves to take advantage of jobs in big cities or to fight overseas (D’Emilio 1983). These changes carried with them new forms of independence, as well as the possibility for men and women to socialize more regularly with others of a similar sexual orientation, all of which contributed to the rise of self-conscious gay and lesbian identities beginning in the early twentieth century and (especially) after World War II. Movements for and against gay marriage today have their roots in these developments decades ago.

Political economy helps us understand some of the key factors behind movements that many scholars treat as “given” or as independent variables. It helps to explain elite divisions, state fiscal crises, and other “political opportunities” for movements; it helps to explain how people are connected to one another (or not) at work and in “civil society” (i.e., the “indigenous organization” or “mobilizing structures” of movements); and it helps to explain why some ideas, frames, collective identities, narratives, tactics, and emotions are especially resonant for certain classes of movement participants (or potential participants) at certain times. The dynamics of capitalism often directly shape movements, but they also strongly influence the political, institutional,
and cultural processes that recent scholarship on movements has emphasized.

SEE ALSO: Antiwar and peace movements; Civil rights movement (United States); Employers’ collective action; Marxism and social movements; Political alignments and cleavages; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Unemployment movements.

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Political generation
RICHARD G. BRAUNGART

Conflict between the generations is as old as history, as young people periodically challenge and confront those in authority. For centuries, generational conflict was expressed by youthful outbursts of collective behavior (e.g., medieval town-and-gown riots, raucous youth festivals, destructive student protests against university officials). In the early nineteenth century, generational conflict took a new form when young people organized full-fledged political movements that surged throughout European states. The political generation was launched as a dramatic and significant force for societal innovation and disruption.

Simply defined, a political generation is an age-conscious group that mobilizes for social and political change. The concept may be used to designate a decisive age group that attempts to reform or revolutionize society (e.g., Young Russia, Nazi generation, Chinese Cultural Revolution), or refer to age groups or segments of age groups that experience extraordinary events that have lasting effects on their members’ lives (e.g., lost generation of 1914, World War II generation, Vietnam generation). While “political generation” has been applied loosely and sometimes haphazardly in the media and popular culture, the term has a rich tradition in sociology and political science.

Political generations are a product of modern history. Spurred by the Enlightenment, the Age of Nationalism, and the American and French Revolutions, a highly diverse political culture emerged in the West. The modern democratic state was forged, ushering in competing ideologies (from political left-to-right and moderate-to-extreme) and unleashing various segments of society struggling to direct or redirect the course of human history. In 1815, the first political generation burst forth, when German university students (Burschenschaften) protested the failures of their elders and the Congress of Vienna and demanded liberty and national unification. Youthful political generations then spread quickly to Italy, France, Ireland, Russia, and elsewhere in nineteenth-century Europe. Eruptive and episodic, political generations reject the status quo in favor of a new order and are especially threatening to authorities, often creating a spiral of confrontation and conflict that may last more than a decade. Increasing in number and intensity throughout the twentieth century, political generations became global in scope by the 1960s, bringing with them opportunities for greater democracy and social reform as well as repression, violence, and destruction. Although most political generations have been mobilized by young people, a political generation can coalesce around any age group. Not all youth movements qualify as political generations.

Generational theory provides a useful framework for understanding political generations (Heberle 1951; Mannheim 1952; Ortega y Gasset 1962; Rintala 1968; Braungart & Braungart 1989). According to the theory, age-group membership gains potency in the formation of a political generation largely through the dynamics of inter- and intragenerational conflict. Intergenerational conflict is rooted in the incompatible life-cycle differences between youth and adults (life-cycle effects) as well as the disparate growing-up experiences of each age cohort in rapidly changing societies (cohort effects). During routine eras, age-based differences in politics play themselves out through the uneventful evolutionary process of cohort replacement. However, during extraordinary eras of cultural and historical change (period effects), an age cohort may be transformed into a political generation. A cohort becomes a political generation when a generational consciousness develops among age-group members at odds with other age groups because of a particular constellation of
events and expectations. Most important, there is a shared consensus (collective mentality and morality) of the need to mobilize for political change. Political generations also involve intra-generational conflict. Representing a range and intensity of political views, separate generation units form within a political generation, with some units organized by youth themselves while others are adult-sponsored. Though oriented against the dominant generation in power, the various generation units compete and struggle over the direction and control of the larger political generational movement. Thus, political generations involve a dynamic convergence of life-cycle, cohort, and period effects during heightened eras of change, and they have significant political consequences (Braungart & Braungart 1987; Scappini 2006).

In assessing youthful political generations over the past 200 years, several patterns emerge. Political generations are likely to occur in clusters and waves, called historical generations. Five historical generations have been identified: the Young Europe generation (1815–1848, 1860–1890), post-Victorian generation (1890–1918), Great Depression generation (1930–1940), 1960s generation (1960–1970), and 1980s generation (1980–1990). Each eruptive era involved intergenerational conflict as youthful generations deauthorized the adult generations and authorized themselves to bring about or resist political change.

Intragenerational conflict among competing generation units arose as well. Political generations are essentially forged by the events that differentiate the age groups during unsettling times. Period effects – cultural innovations, institutional discontinuities, societal and economic breakdowns, demographic bulges, and mobilization opportunities – were critical to the formation of political generations. The issues over which political generations clashed most often concerned Enlightenment values of citizenship (freedom, equality, democracy, self-determination, human rights). The effects of political generations are lasting on societies and their participants (Esler 1971; Braungart & Braungart 1993). Aided in part by rapid communications and electronic technology, both the issues and recruitment of political and historical generations are becoming transnational and global (Edmunds & Turner 2005).

Research at both macro and micro levels demonstrates the wide applicability and utility of the political generation concept. First, at the societal level, political generations have been identified as significant forces for institutional change, reform, and revolution. Researchers note that while the US has experienced two eras of political generational activity (1930s and 1960s), countries such as Germany, Russia, and China have long histories of generation-based conflict. Political generations have been responsible for toppling governments, gaining national independence, and reorganizing societies (i.e., Turkey, India, Indonesia, Argentina, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, among other countries). Second, a number of studies provide support for Mannheim’s contribution to understanding political generations. For example, late adolescence has been identified as a critical stage for crystallizing political values and orientations, which, as Mannheim argued, do not change substantially with age (Alwin & McCammon 2007). Research has confirmed that eras of political generational activity are characterized by competition and conflict among a range of left–right and moderate–extreme generation units (Braungart 1993; Klatch 1999). Third, longitudinal studies document intergenerational shifts in values and political orientations over time (Inglehart 2008) and the lasting effects of the intergenerational transmission of political attitudes in the family, especially if parents are caring and politically engaged (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers 2009). Fourth, when applied to social movements, generational theory has proven useful, such as identifying changes in the feminist movement due to cohort replacement (Whittier 1997), assessing political generations in developing countries (Tessler, Konold, & Reif 2004), and tracking the lasting effects of generational activity on leaders as they
The concept of political generation provides a rich framework to explore age-based movements and political change. If treated broadly, the theory can incorporate sociological perspectives advocated in social movement theory (i.e., social movement organization, processes, and resource mobilization). However, there are several caveats to consider. To employ the concept political generation accurately, it is essential to document the existence of a shared generational consciousness and demand for change that distinguishes a generation from an age cohort and one generation from the next. Political generational analysis also requires researchers to be thoroughly familiar with a society’s history, culture, and trends in order to identify the cohort effects that forge generational attitudes and behavior and the period effects associated with the rise and fall of political generations and generation units. A host of topics and dimensions related to political generations remains to be explored more thoroughly. Particularly important is the formation of political consciousness and collective identity (mentalité collective) as a principal dynamic of social movement mobilization, and it is not yet well understood how the interplay between inter- and intragenerational conflict sustains political generational activity. Detailing the political ramifications of demographic and historical trends on individuals, cohorts, and society over time is at the heart of studying political generations. Thus far, most of the research has focused on youthful political generations; in the future, older, elite, and global political generations need to be identified and studied as well.

SEE ALSO: Age and social movements; Collective identity; Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Demography and social movements and revolutions; Generational and cohort analysis; Political socialization and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Political mediation model

EDWIN AMENATA

The political mediation model is a theory explaining the influence of movements in politics. This theory builds on a series of ideas scattered throughout sociology and political science about the forms of mobilization, strategies, and political conditions that might account for the various political impacts of movements. It goes beyond them in indicating that specific movement strategies, activities, and forms in combination with specific political contexts will lead to influence for social movements – that social movement collective action is politically mediated (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006).

Theories about the political impact of social movements were slow to develop because most scholars focused on why movements appeared or declined and developed theories of that, but had not thought specifically about what caused them to be politically influential (cf. Gamson 1990). Scholars tended to apply the main determinants of mobilization, resource mobilization, framing, and political opportunities to explain the political consequences of movements – generally arguing that one factor was a kind of magic bullet that would make movements influential (Amenta et al. 2010). But various scholars made arguments about movement influence combining aspects of movements or their strategies and their political environment, notably Piven and Cloward (1977), Kitschelt (1986), and Skocpol (1992, 2003). Each of these scholars discussed the mobilization of challengers and their strategic actions in relation to political contexts. Amenta and colleagues (Amenta et al. 1992, Amenta, Caren, & Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006) extended and went beyond these ideas in arguing that some forms of mobilization and strategies would likely be productive in some contexts rather than others.
in public opinion, acting on stated beliefs and claims, or increasing the support for the missions of governmental bureaus.

Political mediation arguments can rely on “action/reaction” models of influence (Andrews 2004; e.g., Piven & Cloward 1977), but most political mediation arguments work through slower-moving processes. More generally, the political mediation argument holds that some strategies and forms work best in specific contexts. To be influential, challengers need to alter their strategies and forms to address specific political contexts, notably the level of democratization in the polity, the partisan regime in power, and the development of bureaucratic authority surrounding the issue at hand. However, the mediation model drops the standard distinction in the movement literature between “disruptive”/“non-institutional” and “assimilative”/“institutional” strategies in favor of addressing “assertiveness,” meaning the use of increasingly strong sanctions beyond protest. Indeed, most assertive strategies involve institutional collective action. If the political regime is supportive and the domestic bureaucrats are professionalized and supportive, limited or symbolic protest or other relatively unassertive action is likely to be sufficient to provide influence. By contrast, achieving collective benefits through public policy is likely to be more difficult without a supportive regime or an administrative authority, and more assertive collective action is required. The sanctions in assertive institutional collective action threaten to increase or decrease the likelihood of gaining or keeping something valuable to political actors – their political support or their reputations. The institutional collective action of challengers works largely by mobilizing high numbers of people behind a course of activity demonstrating that a large segment of the electorate cares strongly about an issue. These theoretical claims have the advantage of specifying political conditions and making links between systemic political contexts and more short-term ones.

The policy situation facing the challenger is also an important part of the political context. Mobilized challengers will have to do far less work to be influential if their issue is already on the political agenda. A challenger may need to do little more than mobilizing to keep the issue from leaving the agenda and can act to bid up the benefits in legislation at issue, as well as induce legislators to back the legislation. A social issue’s appearance on the political agenda is usually connected to political alignments. An antisocial policy political alignment will generally prevent augmentations in social policy from getting onto the political agenda. However, a pro-social spending alignment will not insure that the issue will come up. Similarly, a mobilized challenger has an easier time influencing the implementation of legislation that has been recently enacted, but may have a more difficult time influencing it once the program becomes institutionalized. Once an issue comes on the agenda, it is incumbent on a challenger to attempt to influence its content and support. Once a program has been passed, issues of implementation take precedence (see Amenta 2006).

It is easiest for challengers to influence policy in its earliest phases, before a program or policy becomes highly institutionalized. The best case is for movement actors to be installed in a bureaucracy implementing policy chosen by the challenger, affording it great leverage over current and future policy. Somewhat less advantageous, but more likely, are well-run domestic bureaucracies with firm missions, committed experts, and a strong esprit de corps. In such instances, the bureau will press for the mission, which will often run in the same direction as the interests of a constituency of a challenger, but not always. Worse for movements pushing change are when domestic bureaus’ missions are subverted by being captured by nonexpert political operatives, such as by opposing groups, or when patronage political parties fill bureaucratic positions with nonexpert appointees. Challengers hoping to influence policy often face a target that is both
moving and becoming better fortified against it (see Amenta 2006).

Political mediation arguments also hold that it requires many simultaneous circumstances, some movement related and some not, to effect extensive change (see also McAdam & Su 2002; Giugni 2007). In the US setting, where controlling the government through a party is rarely an option, a national challenger with far-reaching goals is likely to need to have a favorable partisan context, its issue already on the agenda, high challenger organization and mobilization, credible claims-making directed at elites and the general public, and plausible assertive action, such as electoral strategies that seek to punish policy opponents and aid friends (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006). The same is likely to be true for bids to transform the structural position of groups, such as through voting or civil rights.

RESEARCH RESULTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The explanatory value of political mediation arguments is underlined by recent literature on social movements. Research findings that a diversity of tactics or organizational types at the movement level produce political gains are consistent with these claims; more generally, a study of articles published regarding the political consequences of social movements in 2001 through the first half of 2009, in four major general sociology journals and specialty journal Mobilization (see Amenta et al. 2010 for details) found the following. Of the 50 positive relationships found, 47, or 94 percent, found that the size of the effect of the movement activity or size indicator varied by other factors interacting with it. Of these other factors, the most frequently noted were the partisan political context, involving 18 movements; another 6 addressed the stage in the legislative process. Another set of interactions of note included 11 involving different sorts of tactics. These studies, however, tended to focus on the larger and more publicized movements and organizations.

There is also some evidence in favor of the arguments that a combination of very favorable political circumstances, high organization and mobilization, and a policy of assertive, focused action can bring major changes. Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005) found that the most likely route to get US senators to vote in favor of a transformation of old-age policy included their being from a democratic and open polity, having Democratic or radical third party affiliation, being in a state with a strongly mobilized pension movement, and one that had engaged in assertive, institutional electoral action. Similarly, Amenta (2006) found that the best circumstances at the national level for the old-age pension movement took place in 1941, during a moderately favorable regime with old-age policy on the political agenda, with a new old-age insurance policy only starting to come into effect, and after the Townsend Plan had engaged in a productive new recruitment drive and the old-age pension movement having engaged in assertive electoral action that resulted in new endorsed proponents in Congress.

To address the degree to which movements have mattered and to test complex arguments about the mediation of influence, however, will require research designs that compare across several movements and over long stretches of time. One way to do so is to compare a small number of historically similar movements with greatly different results in political influence. Recent work (Amenta et al. 2009) suggests that there have been about 34 major movements over the last century in the US, and these might be compared comprehensively for their influence in the manner of Gamson’s (1990) study of movement organizations. Comparative and historical studies that examine the population of movements over time in one country, or an entire movement across many countries, taking into account other potential influences on outcomes, would go far in answering the big questions about overall movement influence and in testing hypothesized interactions among movement form, strategies, and political contexts.
SEE ALSO: Outcomes, political; Political alignments and cleavages; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Political science and the study of social movements.

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Political opportunity/political opportunity structure
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

Social movements not only challenge political institutions, but also interact with them in diverse arenas. The characteristics of these interactions affect the form and intensity of the challenge as well as its probabilities of success. These are the main tenets of the so-called political process approach that pointed at the links between social movements and politics. Developed especially by political scientists, this approach allowed a correction of a vision of social movements as belonging to a civil society, separated from the political system.

Within the political process approach, the most widely used and discussed concept for defining the characteristics of the external environment relevant to social movements is the political opportunity structure. A significant idea, developed by Tilly (1978), is that the forms of protest are influenced by broad contextual changes, such as the formation of the nation-state. Later, cross-national analyses linked some specific features of political institutions to the strength and strategies of opponents (Kriesi et al. 1995). Also, contingent conditions – such as the availability of potential allies and the instability of opponents in power – have been considered as windows of opportunity for social movements to emerge (Tarrow 1989).

THE (MORE) STABLE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous contrast between a “weak” American government and a “strong” French one is usually an implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional structures – or “regimes” in Tilly’s definition (1978) – with social movement development (Kries 2004: 71). De Tocqueville considered that a system in which the state was weak and civil society strong (the US) would face a constant but peaceful flux of protest from below. Where the state was strong and civil society weak (France), on the other hand, episodic and violent protests would result. The idea that states’ strength or weakness influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general, and on revolutions in particular. Operationalizing the dimension of the strength or weakness of the state, research has looked at several dimensions.

Mirroring the traditional comparison between consensual and majoritarian democracies, the territorial and functional distribution of institutional power has been considered as relevant for social movements’ developments (Kitschelt 1986; Rucht 1994; della Porta 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995). Referring especially to the power of the central executive, these studies conceptualize the openness of opportunities for challengers as linked to the dispersion of political decisions. The assumption is that the larger the number of actors who share in political power, the greater the chance for social movements to influence institutions. So, territorial decentralization, as well as functional distribution of power has been seen as facilitating movement access to decision making, and therefore increasing protest, but also moderating its forms.

In the same vein, the characteristics of the public bureaucracy as well as the autonomy and powers of the judiciary have been considered to influence social movements. An efficient bureaucracy is better capable of implementing decisions, and the greater the independence of the judiciary the greater the possibility of access for social movements.

Relevant also is the overall amount of power in the hands of the state as compared with other
actors such as pressure groups, political parties, the media, and ordinary citizens. Opportunities increase with the degree of participation by citizens, through for instance, referendums for the proposition or abrogation of particular measures or procedures for appealing against the decisions of the public administration.

Institutions are embedded in political culture, and contribute to reproduce it. Social movements have been compared cross-nationally with reference to the characteristics of national political cultures (Kitschelt 1985) – another dimension that resonates with attention to consociationalism, quite familiar to European political science. A main hypothesis here is that countries with a strategy of exclusion (that is, repression of conflict) will tend to experience polarization of conflict with opponents, whereas a strategy of inclusion (co-optation of emergent demands) would produce a moderation of conflict (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Again resonating with an interest in cross-national comparison in the development of democratic regimes in European political science, comparative research on social movements also addresses the influence of a country’s democratic history, remarking that past authoritarianism often reemerges in times of turmoil. Young democracies tend to fear political protest and to have police forces that remain steeped in the authoritarian values of the preceding regime (della Porta & Reiter 1998). National democratic history has also been seen to influence protest through its impact on protest policing (della Porta & Reiter 1998).

THE CHANGING CONFIGURATION OF POWER

Not only structural, but also more dynamic political dimensions – susceptible to change in the short term and the object of pressure from social movements – influence social movement evolution. Some of the first scholars in the political process approach looked especially at changes which could cause sudden openings in the system. Attention went to aspects such as electoral instability, elite divisions, or availability of allies (see, for example, Tarrow 1989), with particular attention to sudden changes in these conditions (see also Tilly & Tarrow 2006).

The main assumption is that social movements interact with allies and opponents within the public administration, the party system, interest groups’ structure, and the civil society. Institutional structures are mediated by an alliance structure, formed by the political actors who provide resources and opportunities for challengers, and an opposition structure that aims at reducing them (della Porta & Rucht 1995). This configuration of power – defined as the distribution of power among the various actors operating within the party or interest groups’ system – affects the forms and results of the conflict (Kriesi 1989).

When looking at left-wing social movements, which have constituted the main object of empirical investigation in social movement research, the trade unions have been noted as an important ally for emerging actors, particularly in Europe. Here, cross-national research has helped, developing hypotheses on the conditions under which trade unions and the labor movement are more likely to ally with other movements, such as the student movement or the women’s movement. A main hypothesis is that the more recognized the trade unions (within the neocorporatist system of industrial relations), the more limited their tendency to ally with other (“new”) social movements. Vice versa, the weaker the institutional recognition of workers’ representatives in the workplace and the decision-making process, the greater will be their propensity to assume a political role, allying themselves with social movements and taking part in public protest. However, well-structured, neocorporatist systems of industrial relations could also create a tendency to incorporate emerging groups within the structure of concerted policymaking.

Movements have also often developed special links with a political party or party family: labor movements rise from, or give birth
to, socialist parties, regionalist movements to regionalist parties, environmental organizations to Green parties. In fact, the configuration of power on the Left has been considered as a most important component of political opportunities (Kriesi 1989). The strategy adopted by the Left towards social movements has been changing over time and space: competition has sometimes prevailed, sometimes negotiation, and sometimes co-option. Dimensions that influence the choices made by the parties on the Left refer to the characteristics of the political cleavages as well as the existence of party divisions within the traditional Left. Some research has indicated that the lack of pacification of the Left–Right cleavage has delayed (in countries such as France or Italy) the development of new social movements; however, where the party Left has been divided, communist parties have often sided with social movements, even if with much internal tension. Electoral competition is also an important variable in explaining the reaction of potential allies towards social movements. The propensity to support protest has been connected with electoral instability, which renders the winning of new votes particularly important. The position of the Left towards social movements can also be influenced by whether or not they are in government, alliances being easier when the Left is in opposition. It should be added that the actions of left-wing parties in government often depend on their weight within the governing coalition. They are obviously freer to take decisions when governing alone. Beyond being in government or not, the attitudes of the parties of the left towards social movements are related to their openness to reform politics (della Porta & Diani 2006: ch. 8).

CRITICISMS AND ADAPTATION

The political process approach to social movement studies has the merit of firmly linking social movements to the normal political process. The studies cited above demonstrated the explanatory power of the concept of political opportunity, but also raised some problems. First, there is a lack of consensus on the political opportunities which are relevant (McAdam 1996), resulting in an exponential growth in the concept’s dimensions, up to the point of making it a sort of trash can for any contextual dimensions which could have an effect on social movements (della Porta & Diani 2006: ch. 8). While the first studies focused on a small number of variables, since the 1980s growing research has added new variables to the original set. This accumulation of heterogeneous variables reflecting different authors’ concerns and ideas has stretched its conceptualization, reducing its heuristic value. This is why recent studies have aimed at singling out specific contextual conditions for specific movements: such as the citizenship regime for movements on migrant rights or the welfare state for those on unemployment.

An additional problem is a lack of clarity concerning the explanandum. The political opportunity structure has been investigated in order to explain a large number of dependent variables, among them social movement mobilization, the emergence of the protest cycle, the relationship between allies’ attitudes and movement behavior, and the predominance of either confrontational or assimilative protest strategies. To address this problem, attempts have been made to discern which variables in the complex set of political opportunities explain which social movement characteristic. So, territorial decentralization have been said to influence the geographical level at which social movements decide to act, and the presence of allies in government to affect their chances of success (della Porta & Diani 2006).

The concept of political opportunities has been particularly criticized as bearing too structuralist and deterministic a vision of reality, without taking into account the importance of the social construction of opportunities. More specifically, changes in the political opportunity structure do not have any effect on a social movement unless they are perceived as being important by the movement itself; alternatively, closed opportunities might be perceived as open by the activists. Research has
been therefore driven to address the cognitive processes which intervene between structure and action (Gamson & Meyer 1996), analyzing the lenses through which activists view potential opportunities for their movements (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996).

With its focus on structures, the political process approach has been accused of the same kind of weakness of previous breakdown theories: not being able to single out the intervening mechanisms between broad (and distant) structures and action. Even former proponents of the concept of political opportunity structures have recently written, “Opportunities and threats are not objective categories, but depend on the kind of collective attribution that the classical agenda limited to framing of movement goals” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001: 45). Their program is in fact oriented to single out the relational mechanisms that explain how contextual dimensions matter for social movements.

The criticism, however, has gone beyond the role of perceptions, addressing instead the restrictive effect that focus on political opportunities has had on social movement studies (Goodwin & Jasper 2004). The political opportunity approach is in fact accused of not recognizing that “cultural and strategic processes define and create the factors usually presented as ‘structural’” (Goodwin & Jasper 2004: 27). The emphasis on the political has in particular been said to have largely obscured the role of the cultural dimension, such as the capacity of movement’s themes to resonate with cultural values. Also structural (in the sense that they are beyond the movement’s sphere of immediate influence), cultural opportunities are, however, distinct from political institutions (Polletta 2004).

Still another criticism is aimed at the contextual limitation of the conceptualization of political opportunities. Given the (geographical, historical, and disciplinary) context in which this approach developed, it embedded social movements into an historically and geographically specific political process that was conceptualized as rooted within the nation-state, “party democracies,” and mature welfare states. These three dimensions of Western democracies have been challenged, however, in the evolution of the political and societal fabric at the turn of the millennium. In particular, neoliberal globalization as well as other general evolutions in contemporary democracies have produced a shift of power from the nation-state to international governmental organizations; from parties (and representative institutions) to the executives; and from the state to the market. Additionally, some recent major changes in political parties have been mentioned as affecting their interactions with social movements. In the past, participation developed especially within political parties, where the reference to common values permitted the formation of collective identities. Recent developments reduced the identity-building functions of political parties – which not only lost members, but have substituted activists with media experts, contributing to growing electoral volatility and declining identification with parties. Finally, neoliberalism produced a retrenchment of the welfare state. Recent research has therefore addressed social movements’ adaptation to these changes, as well as the need to revisit the conceptualization of political opportunities towards a more dynamic, processual understanding of contentious politics (e.g., della Porta 2009).

Additionally, the research on transnational activism and the Global Justice Movement stimulates reflections on the range of opportunities and constraints that various international institutions, located within the multilevel political system, offer to social movements. Such elements as a consensual culture and a reciprocal search for recognition are available, for example, for the United Nations, but not for the (much more closed and hostile) international finance and trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Social movements that target international institutions look for the specific leverage offered, for example, by the unanimity rules of the WTO,
which make alliances with some states particularly relevant, and by access to the international experts and formal channels of consultation with regard to the International Labour Organization. In recent research, intergovernmental organizations emerged as complex and fragmented institutions, composed of different bodies that provide external actors with differentiated opportunities.

Finally, the conceptualization of political opportunities has been said to reflect a mainstream conception of politics and democracy that social movements themselves have constantly contested (Cefai 2007; della Porta 2009). The theorization of the political process approach – even though enlarging the domain of politics to social movements – seemed to have inherited some of the (mainstream political science) minimalistic and procedural conceptions of democracy, limiting the role of social movements at the “input” of the political process. Through the seminal work by Charles Tilly (1978), as well as Michael Lipsky (1965), a modified version of Easton’s political system model seem to have penetrated social movement studies. Even though stressing the presence of conflictual interests and identities, research in social movements has located them at the border of the “black box” where decisions are taken, and stressed their need for alliances with powerful gatekeepers (as political parties or elites) to make their voice audible.

Recent research has in fact focused the attention on the transformation in the conceptions of politics and democracy that social movements not only prefigure in their internal structures, but also are often able to introduce in public institutions (della Porta 2009). The representative conception of democracy, with its emphasis on representative power and majority voting, is only one of the existing normative visions of democracy. On the basis of, among other things, pressures from social movements, the existing democratic regimes indeed mix the majoritarian and representative elements of democracy with others derived from associative, direct, participatory, deliberative conceptions of democracy. The labor movement has (often successfully) challenged the liberal, individualistic conception of rights, bringing about the recognition of collective civil and political rights, as well as social rights as part and parcel of democratic citizenship. So-called “new social movements” have asked for, and sometimes obtained, a broader space of participations, producing some institutional changes. And visions and practices of democracy centered around the development of public spaces are relevant for today’s movements, even finding some resonance in institutional reforms. As Tilly (2004) noticed, if there is no doubt that democracy was essential for social movements, social movements, with their challenging vision and practices, have been essential for the development of institutional democracy well beyond its minimalistic definition.

Finally, the concept of political opportunities has addressed movements in democratic systems. Only recently, research on non-democratic regimes has stressed that, even in situations of strong repression, social movements can emerge and survive, in some cases finding niches of alliance within the governing elites, in some cases opposing them in transnational alliances for democracy. Studies on social movements in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2004) indicate that the concept of political opportunities and constraints could be useful, but should be adapted in order to understand the interactions of social movements in authoritarian regimes.

In sum, contextualizing movements’ opportunities and effects in the interactions of complex national institutions with complex transnational ones requires enriching our analytic tools, especially where we are weaker: that is on the analysis of contested democratic fields and compound policies (della Porta & Tarrow 2004).

SEE ALSO: Comparative research; Interest groups and social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Multiorganizational fields; Outcomes, political; Political alignments and cleavages; Political process
theory; Political science and the study of social movements; State building and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Political process theory
DOUG MCADAM

McAdam used the term “political process model” to designate the theory of movement emergence sketched in his 1982 book, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. In the book, he posed the theory as an alternative to two other perspectives. The first was what he referred to as the “classical strain model,” at the time best exemplified by the “collective behavior” perspective. But McAdam also critiqued and sought to distinguish his model from the newer resource mobilization framework. Over time the distinction between these two perspectives has been blurred by incorporating elements of both into a more general theoretical synthesis that emphasizes the simultaneous importance of “political opportunities,” “mobilizing structures,” and “framing processes.”

In its original formulation, however, McAdam stressed a somewhat different set of three explanatory factors, which, in combination, were held to explain the onset and development of most political movements. The three factors are: expanding political opportunities, established organizations, and the social psychological process of “cognitive liberation.” The first factor refers to those dramatic events and/or cumulative change processes that render established regimes more vulnerable or receptive to challenge; the second focuses on the extent to which “insurgents” have access to the kinds of existing organizations or informal networks thought to serve as the organizational locus of emergent mobilization. Together, McAdam argues, these two factors “only offer insurgents a certain objective ‘structural potential’ for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations” (McAdam 1982: 48). The real catalyst of a movement then is the process of “cognitive liberation” by which some critical mass of people come to “define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action” (51).

Over time, however, this original formulation and especially McAdam’s stress on the critical importance of these subjective processes, has given way to a more generic rendering of the model that emphasizes the singular role of political opportunities in the origins and development of movements and, more generally, the reciprocal relationship between institutionalized politics and social movements. Indeed, in referencing the theory, the term “political opportunity” is sometimes used interchangeably with “political process.” And the common thread that unites those who are routinely cited as proponents of “political process” theory is the shared focus on political opportunities (Tilly 1991; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1983, 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995).

In all its various guises the model has been used as the basic framework for explaining the origins of a large and diverse set of movements. These would include: the US women’s movement (Costain 1992); liberation theology (Smith 1991); peasant mobilization in Central America (Brockett 2005); the nuclear freeze movement (Meyer 1993); the Italian protest cycle of the 1960s; and the pace and character of new social movements in France (Duyvendak 1995) and West Germany (Koopmans 1995), among others.

Besides the increasing focus on political opportunities and general neglect of the other two components of the original model, work in the political process tradition came over time to exhibit other subtle forms of variation. Two distinctions are particularly relevant here. The first involves the distinction between the more “stable” and “variable” aspects of a given “political opportunity structure.” Perhaps the most prominent proponent of the former approach is Hanspeter Kriesi, who
along with his students, has sought to understand variation in the strength and character of the “new social movements” in various Western European countries on the basis of stable differences in the formal structural properties of those countries’ political systems (Duyvendak 1995; Koopmans 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995). In his groundbreaking 1986 analysis of antinuclear movements in four Western democracies, Kitschelt provides an even earlier model of this comparative research focus.

We can contrast this concern with how stable differences in the formal structures of political systems shape movement dynamics to the numerous studies that seek to understand how the emergence and development of particular movements are shaped by the variable expansion and contraction of political opportunities over time. McAdam used just such an analysis of the origins, development, and decline of the American civil rights movement to formulate his original version of the political process model. Other works in this tradition would include Costain’s (1992) analysis of the US women’s movement, and Smith’s (1991) study of the origins and ultimate decline of liberation theology.

The other distinction is between those scholars who treat political opportunities as an objective feature of systems of institutionalized power and those that stress the necessarily subjective, constructed nature of political opportunities. It should be clear that this second distinction is not entirely independent of the first. It makes sense that scholars who are centrally engaged in a comparative analysis of the stable features of political systems would conceive of “political opportunities” as an objective, if variable, property of those systems. Not surprisingly, it was Kriesi and his colleagues who popularized the use of the term “political opportunity structure,” to refer to these objective system properties.

Consistent with McAdam’s original formulation, however, a good many movement analysts have continued to assert the social construction of perceived opportunities (or threats) as the necessary catalyst of collective action. In an important 1996 article, Kurzman took movement analysts to task for equating political opportunities with objective structural weaknesses, insisting that at least for the case of the Iranian revolution, insurgents managed to construct perceived opportunities in the absence of any clear structural vulnerabilities. Similarly, in her analysis of Chile’s transition to democracy, Noonan (1995) highlights the critical role played by the “mothers of the disappeared” in constructing opportunities and fashioning particularly resonant frames that simultaneously shamed state officials and galvanized the opposition movement.

Indeed, uncomfortable with what they see as the structural bias inherent in the POS concept, some culturally oriented movement analysts have begun to theorize and research the “discursive opportunities” and “discursive opportunity structures” that they see as critically implicated in the origin and development of social movements (Ferree 2003; Koopmans & Olzak 2004; McCammon et al. 2007). Among the most promising foci in these works is an emphasis on how other institutions – the media, courts – facilitate or constrain the prospects for framing by movement actors. More importantly, however, the work serves to underscore the general importance of social construction, framing, and other discursive practices to an understanding of social movements and contentious politics.

A case can be made that in its various guises the political process model is the dominant theoretical perspective on social movements, at least within the sociological study of social movements. That does not, however, mean that the model has been free of criticism. On the contrary, as the dominant perspective, it has invited lots of critique. Some of these complaints have in fact been noted above. Critics have found fault with the perspective on at least four counts:

1. structural bias — Any number of critics have decried what they see as the “structural bias” inherent in the political process model and, more specifically,
the concept of “political opportunity structure” (Noonan 1995; Kurzman 1996; Polletta 1999; Goodwin & Jasper 2007).

2. rationalist bias – In stressing the importance of political opportunities, the political process model betrays an implicit cost/benefit account of collective action. Movements emerge, the perspective suggests, when “opportunities” reduce the costs of organizing. Not surprisingly, then, the model has also been criticized for being overly rationalist in its underlying view of political action (Aminzade & McAdam 1999).

3. neglect of emotions – if the model has tended to privilege a kind of implied rationality, it has also neglected, critics charge, the critical role of emotions in shaping the dynamics of contention (Aminzade & McAdam 1999; Goodwin & Jasper 2007; Andreas 2007; Gould 2009).

4. narrow focus on states as targets and neglect of non-political movements – Finally, scholars have found fault with the perspective for its general stress on states as the central target of movements (King & Soule 2007; Armstrong & Bernstein 2008), and for not paying sufficient attention to categories of movements other than conventional political struggles (Smilde 2005).

I think it fair to say that the political process perspective has been enriched by these criticisms even as it has continued to help shape the theoretical and empirical agenda of social movement scholars.

SEE ALSO: Cognitive liberation; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Political alignments and cleavages; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Political Process Theory


Social psychology of movement participation
JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG and BERT KLANDERMANS

The social psychology of movement participation is concerned with the question as to why people participate in social movements. As social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings and actions of people – and primarily how these are influenced by social context – it has a lot to offer to the study of movement participation.

INDIVIDUALS IN MOVEMENTS

Over the years grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions, and social embeddedness have been proposed to explain movement participation.

Grievances

Grievances are at the heart of movement participation, be it moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, or the experience of illegitimate inequality (Klandermans 1997). Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat upon people’s rights or circumstances (Walsh 1981). Moral outrage results when important values or principles are violated. Illegitimate inequality is what relative deprivation and social justice theories are about.

Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparison of one’s situation with a standard – be it one’s past, someone else’s situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Folger 1986). Relative deprivation based on personal comparisons is referred to as egoistic deprivation and relative deprivation based on group comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation (Runciman 1966). Fraternalistic deprivation is particularly important for engagement in protest (Major 1994), while the combination of egoistic deprivation and fraternalistic deprivation is the strongest predictor of protest (Foster & Matheson 1999). Moreover, the affective component – feelings as dissatisfaction and indignation about outcomes – has more influence on movement participation than the cognitive component – the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008).

Feelings Social justice theory explains how feelings of injustice translate into protest (Tyler & Smith 1998). Two classes of justice judgments are distinguished: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice approximates relative deprivation; it refers to the fairness of outcomes. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of procedures (being treated with respect, dignity; Tyler & Smith 1998). People care more about procedures than about outcomes. Therefore Tyler and Smith propose procedural justice to be a more powerful predictor of movement participation than distributive justice.

Efficacy

Because grievances are ubiquitous whereas protest is not, social movement scholars began to question the effects of grievances on movement participation. The social psychological answer to this insight is efficacy. Efficacy refers to the individual’s expectation that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through protest (Gamson 1992). The relationship is straightforward: the more effective an individual believes protest participation is, the more likely she or he is to participate. Mummendey and colleagues (1999) propose that group rather than personal efficacy predicts protest participation. Furthermore, Klandermans (1997) shows that people are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to...
redress their grievances at affordable costs. Efficacious and ineffectivacious people take different routes to social change though: while normative forms of protest like petitioning and demonstrations tends to attract highly efficacious people, non-normative forms of protest are more likely to attract less highly efficacious people.

Identity

The more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf of that group (Reicher 1984; Simon et al. 1998; Stryker, Owens, & White 2000; Simon & Klandermans 2001). Why is group identification such a powerful motivational push to movement participation? First of all, identification with others is accompanied by an awareness of similarity and shared fate with those who belong to the same category. Furthermore, the “strength” of an identity comes from its affective component; the more “the group is in me” the more “I feel for us” (Yzerbyt et al. 2003) and the more strongly I am motivated to participate on behalf of the group. Collective identification, especially the more politicized form of it, intensifies feelings of efficacy (see Van Zomeren et al. 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008). Next to shared fate, shared emotions, and enhanced efficaciousness, identification with others involved generates a felt inner obligation to behave as a “good” group member (Stürmer et al. 2003). When self-definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm will carry and the more it will result in an “inner obligation” to participate on behalf of the group. Together these dynamics explain why group identification functions as a “stepping stone” to politicization.

Emotions

Anger is seen as the prototypical protest emotion (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2007). Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame or despair. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that group-based anger is an important motivator of protest participation. There exists a relation to efficacy: People who perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who perceive the ingroup as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup (Devos, Silver, & Mackie 2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg 2008). In explaining different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant too. Group-based anger is mainly observed in normative actions where efficacious people protest. However, in non-normative violent actions contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman 2007). This suggests two emotional routes to protest: an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action and a contempt route as the situation is seen as hopeless invoking a “nothing to lose” strategy leading to non-normative protest (Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn 2011).

Group-based appraisal theories of emotions have introduced emotions to the social psychology of movement participation (see Van Zomeren et al. 2004). Appraisal theory of emotion conceives appraisal, emotion and action as the means by which people perceive and cope with events in their social world. Hence, two persons can appraise the same event differently and have different emotional responses. Appraisal theory was developed to explain personal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, Smith (1993) extrapolated personal appraisals to group-based appraisal with the main postulate that people can experience emotions based on their group membership, thus “I” feel for “us” (Yzerbyt et al. 2003).

Social embeddedness

Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context of protest. Networks provide space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities, and it provides a way for active opposition to these authorities to grow (Paxton 2002). Discursive processes take place to form a consensus that makes
up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). The more political discussion occurs in social networks, the more people are able to gather information and the more they will participate in politics (McClurg 2003). Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms, immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest provided that they were embedded in social networks, which offer an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. People are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg 2008). In their networks people talk politics by which the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed and people are mobilized for protest.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In providing answers to the question of why people participate in movements, we separately discussed grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions and social embeddedness, but obviously in practice all these concepts are interwoven. And this is precisely the focus of contemporary social psychological approaches: combined, multiple pathways to movement participation.

Simon and colleagues (1998) were the first to propose a dual path model to protest participation in which they distinguished between an instrumental pathway – in which efficacy figured prominently – and an identity pathway guided by processes of identification. Rather than replacing instrumentality as an explanatory paradigm, identification added to the explanation as a second pathway. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) also propose a dual path model, comprising an efficacy and emotion path. The importance of emotions as motivators is shown, again without replacing the instrumental pathway. Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk (2009) combined grievances, efficacy, identity, and emotions. This model assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk 2009). In order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions a shared identity is needed (see figure).

The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to take part in protest to protect their interests and principles and/or to express their anger. These pathways are meta-analytically confirmed and modeled in the so-called Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008).

The next step for the social psychology of movement participation will be to theorize on when people take what pathway and why. Yet, compared to 25 years ago, the social psychology of movement participation has become richer,
more sophisticated, and as such has a lot to offer to the study of movement participation.

SEE ALSO: Collective efficacy; Collective identity; Commitment; Emotion and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Networks and social movements; Participation in social movements; Politicized identity; Relative deprivation; Social and solidarity incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Political science and the study of social movements

MASSIMILIANO ANDRETTA

Social movements have been studied from the perspective of several disciplines—sociology, anthropology, social psychology, economics, and political science. When we conceive of social movements as political phenomena we need to take seriously their relations with the political context in which they act. Clearly, many, if not most, social movements are embedded in political institutions (Tarrow 1994). For this reason, the discipline of political science is of importance in understanding the close link between political institutions and social movements, and how politics matters in shaping social movements in different contexts.

It is especially in relation to the political process approach that political science has become a central discipline in social movement studies. This is for several reasons: first, because political institutions affect social movements’ strategies, interests/identities, organizations and actions; second, because power is central in social movements’ constitutive goals; and third, because social movements are bearers of policy ideas, frames, and goals. All those issues have been addressed, in part, by social movement scholars by means of comparative politics, which also is a central methodology in the discipline of political science.

In as much as political science has been helpful in addressing various research questions and issues within the social movement community, the latter has also contributed to the main subfields of political science. In this entry I briefly discuss how the study of social movements has contributed to a number of these subfields, namely, political participation, political parties, international relations, and democratic theory.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If one looks at the classic studies on political participation, it is striking to observe the amount of the literature dedicated to electoral behavior. This is understandable since elections are at the center of the operation of democracy. But it is also the case that citizens often have alternative ways to make their voices heard apart from casting ballots. Research has shown that people not only combine different types of participation quite often (Barnes et al. 1979), but that there has been an increasing tendency for people to engage in nonconventional forms of action (Norris 2002) through participation in social movement and protest events.

Certainly one of the most important contributions social movement studies has made in understanding the more nonconventional forms of participation is showing that participation is not only a matter of different resources and values, but that the set of means or actions citizens have at their disposal is partly culturally and politically encoded, and that it is built through a historical collective process. The most important work on this aspect is by Charles Tilly, who first introduced the concept of “collective action repertoire.” Tilly taught us that the collective action repertoire is not unlimited but constrained by political institutions and political culture, even if there is some space for collective creativity (Tilly 1978). Subsequently, social movement scholars have noted that this repertoire has been enlarged since the mobilizations of the 1960s, and that one of the major factors affecting tactical choice, or influencing tactical action, is the political opportunity structure in which collective actors are embedded. But scholars
also have stressed that political opportunities are mediated by actors’ ideology, frames, and values (Dalton 1994).

POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties are just as important as electoral behavior in political science analyses. Political parties are, in fact, seen as the most important actors in the classic democratic theories, and their functions, behaviors, and organizations are therefore constantly monitored. If political science has correctly warned that political parties do not act in a vacuum and that their features strongly depend on the relations they have with a state’s institutions, party systems, and electors (Gunther et al. 2002), social movement scholars have focused on the way in which parties are influenced by challengers and vice versa. For instance, della Porta and Diani, reviewing the broad literature on the relationship between social movements and parties, isolate six factors that influence to what extent parties (those of the Left, but the argument can be applied to those on the Right as well) are responsive to social movements’ claims: the rigidity of Left–Right division, the existence of party divisions, electoral instability, proximity to government, weight of the parties in governmental coalitions, and their openness toward movements’ claims (2006: 202–207).

At the same time, if political parties are mediators between state and citizens, “they are far from indifferent to social movement pressure” (215).

Thus, there are a number of studies which underline how social movements have been able to influence political party behavior, for instance by pushing them to take part in a protest campaign, by showing how a party’s ideology is consistent with social movements’ claims, or by activating social movement activists who are also party members. As Goldstone (2003: 4) has recently put it “in the United States and Western Europe, political parties and social movements have become overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics to the point where long-established political parties welcome social movement support and often rely specifically on their association with social movements to win elections.” Other scholars have found the same kind of interdependence in Latin America (Hochstetler & Friedman 2008).

Indeed, it has been said that political parties are less and less able to perform their traditional function of collective identity building, and thus they need social movements to do this job. Social movements have even built their own parties, and this applies both to recent New Left and Green parties as well as to the older and stronger mass parties linked to the labor movement.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Social movement studies are increasingly addressing the field of international relations. As the process of globalization has accelerated, social movement campaigns have addressed global issues such as human rights, the environment, and social justice (della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht 2009). Scholars have also underlined the way in which social movements are questioning the global governance structures that are growing in order to solve problems that national states are less and less able to address (della Porta et al. 2006). If international relations theorists have traditionally focused on national states’ responses to the international anarchical order, social movement studies demonstrate that there are other transnational actors beside states that intervene in shaping global politics (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink 2002). If the dominant realist/neorealist approach in political science has focused only on states’ strategies, properties and resources, and the liberal/neoliberal one has underlined the influence of market actors, social movement scholars are providing new insights on the way in which complex relations between states, market actors, and civil society interact at the global level to produce new ideas and norms and, in some cases, new international regimes.
THEORY AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY

In dealing with empirical research in these and other fields of political science, social movement scholars have started to reflect upon the implications of their findings for democracy theory. Social movements in fact challenge the very basis of modern democracies, namely political representation. As Kitschelt (1993: 15) claimed, “social movements . . . invoke an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organization of collective decision-making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grassroots or direct democracy against democratic practices in contemporary democracies labeled as realist, liberal, elite, republican or representative democracy.” Some of the most important contributions on alternative democratic norms of the past have indeed been inspired by social movement mobilizations.

More recently, scholars have found that social movements are trying to overcome the classic dilemma between representative and direct (or participatory) democracy by reflecting upon, calling for, and practicing some forms of deliberative democracy (della Porta et al. 2006). In these views, the complexity of the world and its myriad problems pose almost insurmountable challenges for standing democracies, as data on citizen (dis)satisfaction consistently show (Norris 2002). Representative democracies are not always able to include citizens’ opinions in their decision making, and do not allow for a full, inclusive, and collective reasoning on problems and solutions. This, the argument follows, brings about suboptimal decisions, inefficient outcomes, declining trust, and therefore contested institutions. Social movements have recently pushed for new inclusionary models of decision making, and tried to implement these deliberative mechanisms within their own organizations. Some scholars argue that social movement practices and ideas about how democracy should work can complement actual democratic institutions, and some politicians are starting to implement them (for example, the practice of participatory budgeting in many cities in the world, the experimentation of deliberative pools in the US and Europe, or the many forms of citizens’ inclusion in local decision making).

Transnational social movements are also calling for a deliberative democratic reconstruction of world politics.

CONCLUSION

Just as social movements and politics are inherently intertwined, so are the fields of social movements and political science. This entry points to the obvious fact that the discipline of political science has provided theories, concepts, and methods relevant to the study of social movements, but especially shows how social movement studies have contributed in broadening the substantial knowledge in some subfields of political science. This applies also to other subfields in political science not covered here, such as local government, public policies, regime change, democratization, and organizational studies.

SEE ALSO: Direct democracy; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Political process theory; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Politicized identity
JACQUELIEN VAN STEKELENBURG, ANOUK VAN LEEUWIN and DUNYA VAN TROOST

Politicization of identities is key to the dynamics of contention. Protest movements are built on politicized identities and they are populated by people with politicized identities. Politicization of identities is simultaneously a characteristic of collectivities and people. There exists a division of labor between students of politicization of identities. Sociologists tend to study politicization at the collective level on the supply side of contentious politics, while social psychologists typically focus on the individual level of politicization at the demand side of politics (cf. Klandermans 2004). The politicization of the supply side of protest refers to the characteristics of protest movements. Is it a movement people can identify with? Is the movement able to frame personal problems into political claims? The politicization of demand refers to the potential of protestors in a society. It relates to the problems people perceive in a society and whether people attach political meaning to these problems. In order to understand how the division of labor conceptually and empirically affects the study of this phenomenon, we will briefly elaborate on the concept of identity.

Identity is our understanding of who we are. Simon and colleagues (1998) succinctly describe identity as a place in society. A place is a metaphorical expression for any position on any socially relevant dimension such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, and so forth. A person has a personal identity and several social identities. Personal identity refers to self-definition in terms of personal attributes, whereas social identity refers to self-definition in terms of social category memberships (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Collective identity concerns cognitions shared by members of a single group (Taylor & Whittier 1992). Hence, collective identity is a group characteristic – group members’ shared beliefs, destiny, and feelings – while social identity is a characteristic of a person – the idiosyncratic remake derived from these shared beliefs, destiny, and feelings. Group identification forms the link between collective and social identity. The stronger the group identification, the more the shared beliefs, destiny, and feelings comprised in the group’s collective identity are incorporated in the individual’s social identity. However, individuals do not incorporate the complete picture, but rather a selection of what a collective identity encompasses. These idiosyncratic remakes of collective beliefs at the individual level create a variety in the content of social identities. Indeed, not all Americans, Muslims, workers, women, or gays have identical social identities, yet they do feel American, Muslim, and so on. Importantly, identities vary in strength, and identifying more or less strongly with a group makes a real difference, especially in political contexts. The more people identify with others involved, the more they will incorporate shared destiny, shared emotions, and enhanced efficaciousness (see Simon et al. 1998; Yzerbyt et al. 2003; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears 2008). It is therefore the strength of group identification rather than group identification per se that influences group members’ readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership (Huddy 2001).

Salience of a collective identity does not necessarily make that identity politically relevant; collective identities must politicize to become the engine of collective action. Politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared grievances for which an external enemy must be blamed. Next, claims for compensation must be leveled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of others, they must identify with the group.
of third parties, such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national government) or the general public, identities fully politicize (Simon & Klandermans 2001). Politicization of identities and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment, whereby the tactical choices are again shaped by identity (Polletta 2009).

What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? First, raised consciousness: “the growing awareness of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive elaboration of one’s worldview providing group members with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their place in it” (Simon & Klandermans 2001: 327). The second distinction is about the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as “pro” or “con,” thus as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral correlates of politicized collective identity, namely, politicized group members are more likely to engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides.

The theoretical division of labor reflects in the phenomena that are studied. Sociologists study collective identity by examining such phenomena as the group’s symbols, rituals, beliefs, and the values its members share. Social psychologists study group identification by examining what it means to an individual to belong to the group and will thus implicitly or explicitly refer to the pride of being a member of the group, to the individual’s beliefs, sentiments, and commitment to the group (Klandermans & Roggeband 2007; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007; Van Doorn et al. forthcoming). Not surprisingly, the same division of labor can be found for politicized identities.

**POLITICIZATION OF SUPPLY**

Central to the sociological literature is the work of Taylor and Whittier (1992), who clarify both theoretically and empirically how strong bonds existing in social networks shape political actors. Within these networks individuals come to see themselves as part of a group when some shared characteristic becomes salient and is defined as important. As a result, boundaries are drawn between “a challenging and a dominant group” (1992: 175). These boundaries are not clear cut, stable, and objectively visible, but exist in the shared meaning attributed to group membership by group members. The second component is consciousness. Consciousness consists of both raising awareness of group membership and the realization of the group’s position within society, in comparison to other groups. This position must be perceived as illegitimate or unjust to make group membership politically relevant. The third component is negotiation. Within and outside their networks, people negotiate in order to change symbolic meanings of daily life’s thinking and acting – “the politicization of daily life” – and to free the group from dominant representations or to undermine the status quo in the power balance between groups in the larger system. Social movement organizations do their utmost to politicize an identity by framing personal grievances in political claims and by offering their supporters the opportunity to act upon these political claims. Hence, political and identity entrepreneurs use their power, resources, and creativity to pull a collectivity together and to turn grievances into claims. As a consequence, organized identities are more likely to mobilize than unorganized identities.

**POLITICIZATION OF DEMAND**

From a social psychological perspective, group identification is crucial to politicization of an identity. People who strongly identify with a social movement organization feel an “inner obligation” to participate on behalf of
the group (Stürmer et al. 2003). The more identities politicize, the more aggrieved and efficacious people feel and the more they participate in movements of change. Politicized identities are dual identities. González and Brown (2003) coined the term “dual identity” to point out that one individual can at the same time identify with two – competing – groups. For instance, workers going on strike can at the same time identify with the union and with the company. Two competing identities that are active at the same time cause “cross-pressure” (Oegema & Klandermans 1994). However, this does not mean that dual identification is detrimental to protest participation. On the contrary, workers who are loyal to the company are the ones who will make the effort of acting collectively against it – in a legal and peaceful way (Simon & Ruhs 2008; Simon & Grabow 2010). Simon and Ruhs (2008) showed that dual identification – with both an ethnic minority and the nation as a whole – spurred protest, a finding replicated and further specified by Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008). They report that immigrants who display a dual identification tend to be more satisfied with their situation than those who do not display such identity, but if they are dissatisfied, they will be more likely to participate in protest. Recently, Langner (2010) developed a measure of politicized collective identity in terms of social identity content that assesses individual differences in the political meaning of an identity. The more group members attach political meaning to their identity, the more likely they will engage in protest.

Hence, sociologists study politicization at the collective level on the supply side of contentious politics, while social psychologists focus on the individual level at the demand side of politics. In reality, politicization of identities involves a mesh between individual and collective levels. We can learn from work that focuses on a single level, but neither is adequate by itself if we want to understand how politicization of identities translates into protest. Interdisciplinary work that treats politicization as the interplay between the two levels – between collectivities actively “pulling” a collective identity together and people being “pushed” onto the streets as political meaning is attached to their identities – is needed. When people participate in protest staged by a social movement organization, this is the result of mobilization that successfully brought demand and supply together. In unraveling politicizing identities an interdisciplinary approach focusing on politicization processes of supply and demand might be helpful.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Demand and supply of protest; Dual identity; Identity politics; Political socialization and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Population ecology and social movements
DEBRA MINKOFF

The population ecology of social movements takes as its starting point theories of organizational evolution. First elaborated by Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989), what came to be known as organizational ecology provides a research paradigm for scholars interested in understanding how diversity in organizational forms develops and changes over time. Drawing on evolutionary models, organizational ecologists focus on competition and environmental selection as the central mechanisms driving the creation and institutionalization of new organizational forms. In addition to competition over scarce resources, processes of legitimation are also important in explaining how new organizational models become established. A central theoretical principle is that the development of organizational populations is “density-dependent”: early on, increases in the number, or density, of successful organizations improve the legitimacy of the forms and provide a template for action that creates resources and incentives for organizational formation; as the population expands, however, competitive pressures drive down the founding rate and increase the failure rate of existing groups.

Building on resource mobilization theory’s emphasis on the role of formal organizations as carriers of social movement goals (McCarthy & Zald 1977), the population ecology of social movements provides a framework for analyzing changes in the organizational composition of social movement industries and sectors.

The earliest application of organizational ecology in the field of social movements focused on the evolution of the contemporary women’s and civil rights movements in the US. In a series of publications, Minkoff (1994, 1995, 1999) examined various aspects of social movement and organizational development, from the influence of density-dependent legitimation and competition on organizational founding, failure, and change to the role of organizational density in the spread and decline protest cycles (Minkoff 1997) and civil rights policy gains (Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Subsequent studies have taken up such issues as organizational mortality and the decline of the post-cold war American peace movement (Edwards & Marullo 1995), transnational coalition-formation in the environmental movement (Murphy 2005), the institutionalization of the self-help/mutual aid movement in the US (Archibald 2007), the comparative ecology of immigrant organizations in Berlin and Amsterdam (Vermeulen 2006), and the “sequencing” of national and transnational environmental organizations (Johnson & McCarthy 2005).

Other researchers have drawn on organizational ecology to analyze different aspects of social movement diversity and its broader impacts. Some exemplary studies include Olzak and Uhrig’s (2001) application of the concepts of niche overlap and niche localized competition to understand the consequences of tactical overlap between new social movements in West Germany and Olzak and Ryo’s (2007) extension of theories of density-dependent legitimation and competition to explore how tactical and goal diversity influences social movement vitality and success in the case of the black civil rights movement. Soule and King’s (2008) comprehensive integration of resource mobilization and resource partitioning theories illustrates the affinities (and differences) between these two approaches, specifically with respect to how competition and industry concentration influence tactical and goal
specialization and how specialization influences organizational survival across the peace, environmental, and women’s social movement industries. King and Cornwall (2005) usefully deploy the specialist/generalist distinction in applying organizational learning theories to social movement strategies, positing retention, adaptation, and diffusion as the main mechanisms by which movements, normally prone to inertia, evolve strategically. Organizational diversity has also been linked to policy outcomes in the environmental movement (Johnson 2008), as have issue competition and legitimacy with respect to congressional attention to rights issues (King, Bentele, & Soule 2007).

Organizational ecology is considered to be “heterodox” by many sociologists, both because of its reliance on evolutionary thinking and its more quantitative orientation (Hannan 2005). However, an ecological approach to social movements is distinctive in that it examines macro-level processes that are most amenable to quantitative research designs and methods. Further, it shares with resource mobilization and political opportunity theories the insight that the prospects for activism are constrained by the political and social context, adding the importance of organizational dynamics in understanding the mechanisms that shape the mix of available options for social change.

SEE ALSO: Organizations and movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Postmaterialism and social movements
PETER MILLER

Postmaterialism is a general theory of value change, developed in large part by Ronald Inglehart. It describes a shift in individual and societal priorities from survival-based needs to needs related to self-expression. Two hypotheses describe the underlying logic of this change in values. First (the scarcity hypothesis), an individual’s priorities reflect the larger socioeconomic context insofar as the individual places the highest value on those things which are in short supply. Second (the socialization hypothesis), there is a time lag between the socioeconomic context and the individual’s value priorities, largely because one’s basic values reflect the context of one’s pre-adult years (Inglehart 1990: 68). Consider each of these hypotheses. First, scarce resources form, to a large degree, an individual’s perspective on the world. Consider the lengths a starving man would go to acquire food. We would expect him not to be dissuaded by laws banning theft if his life was on the line. However, we would expect a man who has no fear of starvation to have a contrasting view of the world, due to the latter’s material security. Second, the shift in priorities is not immediate. Giving a starving man a single loaf of bread will probably not cause the man to turn his attention away from an all-consuming search for food, but a sustained trajectory toward material security may cause the man to shift his attention away from the search for food. Conversely, reducing one’s material security can, over time, lead to a reversal in value priorities away from postmaterial needs for self-expression. Thus the cultivation of postmaterialist values is dependent upon contextual factors including the level of material security during one’s upbringing, but also the economic conditions during the time of a survey measuring the prevalence of postmaterial values (Duch & Taylor 1993).

As the name suggests, postmaterialism is a framework for individual and societal priorities that supplants a set of priorities related to material (i.e., survival) needs. The materialist paradigm focuses on economic growth and increasing standards of living above all else. While postmaterialism recognizes the importance of these materialist objectives, it incorporates societal concerns for the quality of life (e.g., weighing economic growth against environmental degradation) and individual needs for self-expression (e.g., a desire for meaningful work and the quality of the work experience rather than income alone). The goals that fueled the emergence of industrial society are, in the postmaterial paradigm, less important than concerns for environmental or personal well-being (Inglehart 1997: 77–78). Postmaterialism refers to a set of goals individuals strive for only after material security has been realized (Inglehart 1997: 35.)

How can we recognize survey respondents who express postmaterialist views? Cross-national surveys, the World Values Survey in particular, categorize people as postmaterialists according to their ranking of the following four-item battery of national priorities (a 12-item battery is also used, however the simpler form is more common).

- Maintain order in the nation.
- Give people more say in the decisions of the government.
- Fight rising prices.
- Protect freedom of speech.

Materialists tend to privilege the first and third options, while postmaterialists favor the second and fourth items. Those respondents who select one of each are generally considered to have a “mixed” set of priorities (Inglehart 1981: 884; 1990: 74–75). While the segment
of the population identified as postmaterialist may be small (in the order of 15–25%), Inglehart has found that postmaterialists tend to occupy elite sectors of the employment pool:

The pure Post-Materialist type comprises only about 8 percent of the manual workers, and 7 percent of the farmers; in these occupational groups, pure Materialists outnumber Post-Materialists by ratios of at least five to one. Post-Materialists continue to outweigh Materialists in the student milieu. This is significant, but not particularly surprising. What is surprising is the fact that among those less than 35 years old with jobs that lead to top management and top civil service posts, Post-Materialists outnumber Materialists decisively: their numerical preponderance here is even greater than it is among students. (Inglehart 1981: 892, emphasis in original.)

The tendency for postmaterialists to be found among elite sectors of society led Inglehart to label these rising technocrats “The New Class” given their societal position and postmaterialist worldview (1990: 331).

A profound finding of the cross-national survey research on postmaterialism is the clustering of a wide range of opinions on political, social, and religious beliefs along a two-dimensional space (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 48–76). A factor analysis of public opinion data included in the World Values Survey reveals a great deal of the difference between materialist and postmaterialist views can be mapped in a space where the x-axis is a spectrum running from survival to self-expression needs and the y-axis is a similar spectrum from traditional to secular-rational authority structures. Traditional values describe a set of beliefs and values, including the importance of God, a rejection of abortion, a strong sense of national pride, and a deference to authority. Secular-rational respondents will express opposite views on each of these topics. The survival versus self-expression dimension addresses “a syndrome of tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, civic activism and self-expression” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 52). Respondents expressing survival values tend to agree that

men make better political leaders than women, to be less accepting of foreigners or alternative lifestyles (including homosexuality and the de-emphasis of the two-parent family), and more supportive of authoritarian governments. As we might expect, self-expressive respondents hold opposite views on these subjects. The theoretical expectations of postmaterialism are found through empirical analysis of public opinion data.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVITY BY POSTMATERIALISTS

Postmaterialism de-emphasizes deference to authority and social conformity while accenting individual autonomy, civic activism, and subjective well-being. As such, we might expect postmaterialists to be more likely to voice their grievances collectively, such as by means of a social movement organization (see Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004 for a summary of the literature on defining social movements). Cognitive mobilization is one mechanism that increases the likelihood that postmaterialists engage in elite-directing and elite-challenging behavior. Cognitive mobilization is defined as the “development of the political skills that are needed to cope with the politics of a large-scale society” (Inglehart 1990: 372). It can be operationalized as levels of formal education, political information, and cognitive skills (Inglehart 1997: 307). Critically, cognitive mobilization includes skills such as communications which are highly valued in the service economic sector, as opposed to routinized labor practices often found in the manufacturing sector.

High levels of educational attainment are associated with greater degrees of cognitive mobilization – and, thus, more likely to be associated with postmaterialism (Inglehart 1997: 152) – as well as forms of political participation, ranging from signing a petition to joining a protest (Verba, Nie, & Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Barnes & Kaase 1979). As we might expect, postmaterialists are more likely to participate
in conventional forms of participatory activity, and in elite-challenging forms of participation, such as a protest or demonstration (Inglehart 1997: 308–315). Inglehart suggests three reasons why postmaterialists are more likely to engage in these participatory activities: first, postmaterialists are able to invest their energy in concerns other than immediate physiological needs; second, postmaterialists tend to be an emerging minority who feel their priorities are not shared by the majority; third, the disruption inherent in unconventional political action (e.g., protest) may be less negative to postmaterialists because the actions threaten things postmaterialists give lower priority to than materialists (Inglehart 1990: 310). Postmaterialism contributes to a set of participatory activities, ranging from petition signing to protest movements.

POSTMATERIALISM AND ECOLOGICAL POLITICAL PARTIES

Postmaterialist values are present in a variety of social movements, including womens’ movements, organized labor movements, and groups organized around environmental and antinuclear issues. Let us consider one example of collective action and political organization that clearly expresses postmaterialist values: the German Green Party.

Initially an out-growth of the antinuclear movement in Germany in the 1970s, the Greens gained their first seat in the Bundestag (the German lower house of parliament) in 1983. The party is dedicated to the postmaterialist ideals of environmental protection, gender equality, and the limited use of military force. The Green Party was pivotal following the 1998 elections where the left-of-center Social Democrats fell short of an outright majority of seats in the lower house. As a result of interparty negotiations, the Greens became the junior member of the ruling coalition and their leader, Joschka Fischer, became vice chancellor and foreign minister until the fall of the coalition in 2005. As of the 2009 elections, the Greens have 68 seats in the lower house of parliament (67 of which came from party list votes).

There is a clear relationship between postmaterialism and voting for an ecological party. For example, postmaterialists were 23 times more likely to vote for the West German Green Party in the 1980s than materialist voters (Inglehart 1990: 384). Inglehart suggests that ecological parties introduce a new postmaterialist dimension to the classical Left–Right political spectrum, contrasting with the materialist program advanced by parties like the Republikaner in Germany or the National Front in France (Inglehart 1997: 243–252). The presence of these postmaterialist parties, then, serves two functions: first, to give a voice to the segment of the electorate expressing postmaterialist policy preferences. Second, to induce other parties to move toward their policy preferences as a means to capture the postmaterialist segment of the electorate.

Green politics are becoming increasingly prevalent in European states. The Greens are currently in a governing coalition in Ireland (since 2007). Green or ecological parties hold a number of seats in the French and Scandinavian parliaments, though the parties in these countries have limited experience in government, at least when compared to the German party. That being said, evidence suggests that Green parties do better under a proportional representation electoral system. These electoral systems generally have more political parties than majoritarian electoral systems. In the British House of Commons, for example, there is only one Green member of parliament.

The concept of postmaterialism has been subjected to considerable scholarly attention over the last three to four decades. We have seen that postmaterialism informs a great deal of the change in priorities following a sustained period of economic development (in accordance with the socialization hypothesis) that results in securing the material requirements for survival (the scarcity hypothesis). In any society postmaterialists tend to be a nontrivial minority, though they tend to be overrepresented among students and elite-level managers.
and bureaucrats. Furthermore, Green political parties tend to reflect postmaterialist values. Though Green parties represent a small segment of the electorate, occasionally these parties have joined governing coalitions and been able to implement policies consistent with the set of postmaterialist priorities.

SEE ALSO: Environmental movements; Globalization and movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Political socialization and social movements; Public opinion and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Precipitating events and flashpoints
PETER B. OWENS

It is often the case that certain critical events can have enormous impacts on the dynamics of collective action. When such events appear to “trigger” or “spark” collective action by convincing potential participants that action is necessary or desirable, or mark a critical turning point in the dynamics of a particular pattern of mobilization, they may be thought of as precipitating events. These events will tend to fall along a varied range of characteristics. Some may be violent and traumatic, such as an assassination or an instance of police brutality, while others may be relatively civil or even celebratory, such as the election of a supported political candidate or the victory of a sports team. Some events may appear to be relatively isolated and singular, while others may occur in a cumulative pattern over time. An event might be planned and executed by movement participants, or be completely unexpected. One event might trigger explosive episodes such as riots, while others might lead to long-term changes in a cycle of protest, such as shifts in a movement’s strategy. Despite such variation, the defining feature of a precipitating event is that it serves as some form of social-cognitive “trigger” that defines, in part, the forms of collective action that occur in its wake.

Early theorists of collective action utilized the concept of precipitating events to explain the emergence of collective action in the context of underlying structural conditions. Smelser’s (1963) “value-added” model of collective behavior locates precipitating events as one of several necessary but insufficient conditions for collective action to take place. Within this conceptualization, precipitating events serve as “evidence” that links underlying structural “strains,” and the collective beliefs they engender, to a concrete situation or experience. They “confirm the existence, sharpen the definition, or exaggerate the effect” of some underlying structural problem within a group’s collective beliefs (Smelser 1963: 249), and thus help to make eventual mobilization possible. In a study of early twentieth-century American race riots, Lieberson and Silverman (1965) found that the majority of riots were set off by some form of initial confrontation. These confrontations became precipitants of racial violence through a real or perceived violation of group mores by a member of another racial group. However, violations were only sufficient to produce riots in the presence of underlying conditions of economic deprivation and sociopolitical exclusion, which precipitating events highlighted and exemplified.

Conceptualizations of precipitating events as primarily a manifestation of pressures brought on by underlying structural strain have given way to more nuanced approaches that highlight the interactional and situationally contingent effects of such events. For instance, the “flashpoints” model developed by Waddington and colleagues (Waddington, Jones, & Critcher 1989) defines precipitating events as only “triggering” disorderly episodes in the presence of numerous contextual factors. These factors range from relatively micro-level variables, such as the quality of interactions between authorities and participants, and how participants understand the nature of a conflict situation, to increasingly macro-level factors such as existing political and ideological debates on relevant issues. Within this model, issues of perception and interpretation are placed on equal footing with larger structural and political factors in understanding how certain events trigger episodes of disorder. Such critical events, then, serve as both symbolically and structurally charged focal points that disruptive collective action becomes focused around.
It is understandable that many scholars have utilized precipitating or “flashpoint” events primarily to explain relatively spontaneous and disruptive forms of collective action. Such usage may be thought of as both a reflection of, and response to, popular explanations for riots and disorders emphasizing underlying conditions that are “sparked off” by a particular incident (Waddington, Jones, & Critcher 1989). However, scholars of social movements have also incorporated analyses of the effects that critical or precipitating events may have on broader patterns of mobilization. Rasler (1996) incorporates an analysis of four critical “triggering” events into larger patterns of repression and concession during the Iranian Revolution. She finds that one critical political event (the election of a reform-oriented prime minister), and two critical incidences of deadly repression (the burning of the Abadan cinema and the “Black Friday” massacre), contributed both to increased levels of protest and greater spatial diffusion of protest in the following months. Similarly, Walsh’s (1981, 1988) exploration of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident demonstrates how the accident, and resulting evacuation, transformed nearby communities into “hotbeds” of antinuclear activism. The precipitating accident generated what Walsh terms “suddenly imposed grievances,” spawning widespread grassroots mobilization of the local population. While antinuclear activist groups had existed prior to the accident, it was only afterwards that they were able to successfully mobilize large numbers of participants in nearby communities. Snow and colleagues (1998) argue that the creation of such sudden mobilizing grievances may be linked to the disruption of the taken-for-granted routines and structures of everyday life, which they term the “quotidian.” Critical events, then, may not only trigger spontaneous eruptions of collective action, but can also have enduring effects on mobilization dynamics and the environments that collective action occurs within. These effects may be particularly acute if the event significantly disrupts the day-to-day lives of large numbers of people.

While precipitating events have moved from a central theoretical role in explaining collective action and crowd behavior (Smelser 1963), to a more contingent and interdependent role in overall patterns of mobilization, it remains hard to deny that certain events can powerfully shape the dynamics of many forms of collective action. However, it is important to note that the effects of precipitating events on ensuing collective action do not necessarily inhere from any objective content of the events themselves. An event that serves as a critical “trigger” for one type of collective action in one social context may have very different or no effects in another. For example, an instance of police brutality may “trigger” riots in multiple cities, or more localized protests in one city, or no collective action may occur at all. It is the social contexts that events occur within, and the ways in which various social actors draw from these contexts to construct meaning around them, that largely determine whether or not an event may serve as a precipitating event. Precipitating events are not strict manifestations of underlying structural problems, nor are they inherent symbols of existing beliefs or grievances. Rather, these events serve as social-cognitive focal points around which action and meaning are constructed and negotiated.

SEE ALSO: Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Quotidian disruption; Riots; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Prefigurative politics
DARCY K. LEACH

The term prefigurative politics refers to a political orientation based on the premise that the ends a social movement achieves are fundamentally shaped by the means it employs, and that movements should therefore do their best to choose means that embody or “prefigure” the kind of society they want to bring about. On one level, this commitment to means–ends consistency reflects what Weber called a “value-rational” logic of action, in which action is guided by values rather than instrumental efficiency. But a prefigurative orientation is motivated by more than a commitment to moral action in its own right; it has been pursued as an alternative to both vanguardist and structural-reformist strategies for social change. Rather than looking to a revolutionary vanguard to seize existing power structures and implement revolutionary change on behalf of the masses or to trade unions or political parties to leverage reforms within the existing system, a prefigurative approach seeks to create the new society “in the shell of the old” by developing counterhegemonic institutions and modes of interaction that embody the desired transformation. In this sense, a prefigurative strategy is based on the principle of direct action, of directly implementing the changes one seeks, rather than asking others to make the changes on one’s behalf.

THE PREFIGURATIVE TRADITION

The first prefigurative movements were anarchist and syndicalist responses to the early stages of industrialization and bureaucratization in Europe. Other early examples include the Paris Commune in 1871, the “council communist” insurgencies in Russia, Italy, and Germany after World War I, the anarchist collectives in the Spanish Civil War, and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (Boggs 1977). For much of its history, the prefigurative impulse was only characteristic of the beginning stages of a rebellion and faded as the movement became more centralized (Arendt 1963). From the 1960s onward, however, the approach has become both more clearly articulated and more widespread, such that one can now identify a stable prefigurative tendency or wing in a wide range of movements around the world, most notably in women’s, environmental, autonomous, peace, and indigenous rights movements, and on a more global scale in the movements against neoliberal globalization (Day 2005; della Porta et al. 2006; Graeber 2009).

FORMS OF PREFIGURATIVE PRACTICE

How the commitment to aligning means and ends affects political practice depends on the central ideals of the particular movement. Most commonly, the focus has been on implementing more participatory forms of self-governance, be they workers’ councils, collectives, and cooperatives in the economic realm (Boggs 1977; Rothschild and Whitt 1986), or sociopolitical structures such as soviets, communes, affinity groups, spokescouncils, direct action networks, and people’s assemblies. In whatever sphere of social life, and whether they are conceptualized as prefiguring nonviolence (Lakey 1968; Epstein 1991), gender equality (Harris & King 1989), participatory democracy (Breines 1982; Polletta 2002), or autonomy (Katsiaficas 1997; Leach 2009), these forms all share a decentralized, directly democratic, and often consensus-based authority structure. Some movements have created dense networks of such organizations, forming “temporary autonomous zones” (Bey 1991) or more
permanent social movement “scenes” (Leach & Haunss 2009) to undergird the movement and prefigure a more egalitarian way of life. The Independent Media Centers, Peoples’ Global Action, and the World Social Forum are examples of current efforts to create prefigurative networks on a global scale.

ASSESSING PREFIGURATIVE MOVEMENTS

Because prefigurative revolutionary strategies envision that more and more people will choose the movement’s alternative institutions and modes of interaction until they gradually replace those of the old system, their success should be measured in terms of the sustainability, purity, and proliferation of the prefigurative models. Very little empirical work has been done to assess this at the societal level, but case studies suggest that while many models have proven fairly sustainable, they often lose their prefigurative character over time and have yet to supplant mainstream institutions. Boggs (1977) notes three common patterns of decline in prefigurative movements: Jacobinism, in which popular forums are repressed or their sovereignty usurped by a centralized revolutionary authority; spontaneism, a strategic paralysis caused when parochial or antipolitical inclinations inhibit the creation of broader structures of effective coordination; and corporativism, which occurs when an oligarchic stratum of activists is co-opted, leading them to abandon the movement’s originally radical goals in order to serve their own interests in maintaining power.

As theories of social movements have often assumed instrumentally rational actors and bureaucratic organization, prefigurative movements are often misconstrued or appear as anomalous cases in social movement research. More comparative research on value-rational actors is needed to better understand such movements’ varying degrees of success and assess the viability of a prefigurative strategy for social change.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Paris Commune; Participatory democracy in social movements; Social Forum, World.

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

Protest cycles and waves
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

THE INTENSIFICATION OF PROTEST IN TIME AND SPACE

Social movement studies have traditionally stressed conflict as a dynamic element in our societies. Social movements are conflictual not only because of their stakes, but also because of their forms of action. Defined in the sociology of social movements as a “resource of the powerless” (Lipsky 1968), protest has been considered as the main repertoire of action – or even the modus operandi – of social movements.

From the 1960s on, researchers of political participation have added to the traditional forms of participation (such as discussing politics with others or working for political parties or their candidates), then unconventional forms of political participation, such as signing petitions, participating lawful demonstrations, boycotts, withholding of rent or tax, occupations, sit-ins, blocking traffic, and wildcat strikes. Further research in political participation, based on surveys, has time and again observed a growing legitimation of these forms of protest, up to defining this expansion of the repertoire of political participation as what appeared to be a “lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics” (Barnes et al. 1979: 524). In the 2000s, “Protest politics is on the rise as channel of political expression and mobilization” (Norris 2002: 221).

Forms of protest expanded especially during periods of intense contention. A widespread observation in social movement studies is that protest events tend to cluster in time and space; cycle, waves, campaigns, and tides are concepts developed in order to define “a punctuated history of heightened challenges and relative stability” (Beissinger 2002: 16).

The first concept introduced in social movement studies in order to describe this phenomenon is that of protest cycle, defined as:

- a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organised and unorganised participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution. (Tarrow 1994: 153)

Cycles are composed of an ascending phase, a peak, and a declining phase. In his analysis of the cycle of protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s in Italy, Tarrow observes some mechanisms (of imitation as well as reciprocal learning), that he considers as regularly occurring during intensification and deintensification of protest.

Similarly, the concept of wave recognizes the unequal distribution of protest over time: “periods of relative quiet alternate with waves of intense mobilization that encompass large sections of societies, and quite often affect many societies simultaneously,” even if denying the existence of a regular, “periodically recurrent sequence of phenomena” (Koopmans 2004: 21).

Cycles or waves of protest are often composed of interrelated campaigns, a series of interactions connected to each other from the thematic point of view and oriented towards a common aim (della Porta & Rucht 2002). Protest campaigns on abortion rights for the women’s movements, or against the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles for the peace movement are well-known illustrations.

Developed to describe nationalist protest, the concept of protest tides also points at “not only a powerful, substantively related stream
of mobilization within a mobilizational cycle, but also a transcultural and transnational phenomenon” (Beissinger 2002: 31).

CYCLICAL DYNAMICS

The concepts of cycles, waves, campaigns, or tides all attempt to describe and explain periods of intensified protest. As Mark Beissinger observed “Most important for understanding the politics underlying events is the fact that events and the contention over identity which they represent are not distributed randomly over time and space. Their appearance is structured both temporally and spatially” (2002: 17). As in culture and the economy, there is indeed a recurrent dynamic of ebb and flow in collective mobilization.

The concept of protest cycle also points at some regularities in cycles: protest rises and declines following some specific sequences. Mobilization proceeds “from institutional conflict to enthusiastic peak to ultimate collapse” (Tarrow 1994: 168). Research aimed to single out some main determinants of both the ups and the downs of mobilization.

During the ascending phases, protest spreads geographically and socially, through cognitive, affective, and relational mechanisms. Precipitating circumstances produce a radical destabilization of social relations within a polity, and the increased unpredictability of interactions favors the diffusion of protest, as movements borrow (successful) inventions from each other (Koopmans 2004). By demonstrating the vulnerability of the authorities the first movements to emerge lower the cost of collective action for other actors (Tarrow 1994). Through process of imitation and learning, spin-off movements mobilize, sometimes in alliance, sometimes in opposition to the previous ones (della Porta & Tarrow 1986). Organizational dynamics are also involved. Social movement organizations cooperate and compete with each other, investing resources to intensify mobilization. As Tarrow notes about cycles of protest, “After gaining national attention and state response, they reached peaks of conflict that were marked by the presence of movement organizers who tried to diffuse the insurrections to a broader public” (1994: 168). During cycles of protest new social and political actors emerge, as collective identities are created during intensely emotional moments. Events are linked sequentially to one another across time and space: “in the narrative of the struggles that accompany them, in the altered expectations that they generate about subsequent possibilities to contest; in the changes that they evoke in the behavior of those forces that uphold a given order, and in the transformed landscape of meaning that events at times fashion” (Beissinger 2002: 17).

Protest cycles, however, unavoidably decline, following similar relational, cognitive, and emotional mechanisms. Authorities tend to increase repression, but also to learn how to better target it against the emerging actors. Often, they aim at dividing the movement, through a mix of co-optation and exclusion. Also, once innovative forms of protest tend to lose their newsworthiness. If spin-off movements contribute to the mobilization of other groups, inventing new forms of action, enlarging the protest claims, and winning some concessions, they also push elites and countermovements to form law-and-order coalitions (della Porta 1999). At the individual level, intense activism tends to lead to disappointment and a return to private life.

CYCLES AND FORMS OF PROTEST

Research has also observed some cyclical dynamics in the forms of protest, moving from innovation to institutionalization and radicalization. Protest includes nonroutinized, unconventional, novel ways of affecting political, social, and cultural processes. Its forms vary, however. First, their capacity for disruption changes. They can be more or less radical in nature, ranging from more conventional petitioning to more conflictual blockades, and including a number of episodes of violence. Forms of action can also be
distinguished according to the “logic,” or modus operandi, which the activists assign them: logic of numbers, of testimony and of damage, the latter being reflected, in its most extreme form, by political violence. In violence against property the costs are still largely economic, but the logic becomes increasingly “military” in violence against persons. In all these events, however, violence has both symbolic and instrumental aims.

The first theorization on cycles of protest assumed some typical evolution at this level. The emergence of protest is characterized by innovation. In the initial stages of protest the most disruptive tactics are often to the fore, promoted by new social and political actors. Disruptive, innovative forms of protest initially attract media attention, surprise authority, and, appearing successful, tend to be emulated by other social groups. The use of the same forms of action reflects, but also often facilitates, reciprocal identification.

As the cycle of protest extends, processes of institutionalization but also radicalization develop. First, the authorities tend to channel the protest, through selective repression of some actors and some forms of action, and acceptance of others. Also, formal organizations emerge out of the protest and previously existing ones (such as unions or parties), that had been challenged in the beginning of the cycle, regain control. Moreover, “Participants, at first enthused and invigorated by their solidarity and ability to challenge authorities, become jaded or disillusioned. Authorities, instead of calling out the troops or allowing the police to wade into a crowd, infiltrate dissenting groups and separate leaders from followers. Routinization follows hard upon disruption” (Tarrow 1994: 112).

At the same time, there tends to be, however, a process of radicalization. While at the outset of protest violent action is usually limited in presence, small in scope, and unplanned (often the unforeseen result of police intervention during innovative forms of protests), as protest develops, violent forms of action initially spread more slowly than nonviolent ones. Clashes between demonstrators and police or counter-demonstrators, that start out as occasional episodes, tend to take on a ritual quality. Their very presence increasingly intimidates the moderate, accelerating their exit from the movement, and contributing to a demobilization. Also, the newsworthiness of protest tends to decline with its use, and the mass media tend to refocus attention; radical actions succeed in getting attention, but at the price of a broad stigmatization. The final stages of the cycle thus see both processes of institutionalization and of radicalization, as indicated by a growing number of violent actions.

**CONTEXTUALIZING CYCLES**

Concepts such as cycles, waves, campaigns, and tides have the merit of helping locating single protest events as well as social movements within the broader historical context to which they belong. They stress that each protest event builds upon previous ones, and that its forms as well as the reaction in the broader environments are influenced by those previous ones. Additionally, the evolution of individual movements – be they nationalist, labor, or new social movements – cannot be understood in isolation from that of other, cooperating and/or competing, ones.

While assisting the contextualization of research on social movements, the reflection on cycles of protest (and related concepts) has been criticized for its tendency to too quickly generalize from specific historical circumstances. Theorization on the evolution of cycles of protest developed in particular on the Italian protests between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, when small groups began to specialize in increasingly extreme tactics, built up an armory for such action and occasionally went underground (della Porta 1995).

Comparative analyses have pointed at some specific characteristics of specific cycles. For instance, radicalization in a violent form does not seem to be an unavoidable consequence of cyclical dynamics. Looking at left-wing social
movements in Europe, it has been observed that if in the 1970s there had indeed been a tendency to maintain media attention and “threat potential” through an accentuation of extreme forms of action, since the 1980s, a growing moderation in the repertoires of collective action has been noted. A new cycle of protest that developed between the end of the 1990s and the 2000s, including forms of nonviolent direct action, did not undergo radicalization processes (della Porta 2007).

Second, even in the 1970s, the spread of violence during the same cycles of protest varied by country. Cycles of protests during the formation of the nation-state led to a repertoire of centralized political activity and social movements organized at the national level (Tilly 1978), while recent challenges to the state have led to the development of multi-level social movement organizations (della Porta & Tarrow 2004). In particular, radicalization happened in some cases but not in others, as it was influenced by political opportunities as well as relational dynamics, rather than being determined by either structural constraints or fixed patterns of evolution (della Porta 1995).

In addition, if the choice of protest forms is limited by a series of factors internal as well as external to protest itself, actors maintain a capacity to reflect and act strategically. This means that they learn from past experiences about the advantages and disadvantages of specific tactics, trying to avoid previous mistakes. Already in the 1980s, the Italian left-wing social movements had developed a strong criticism of the violence of the 1970s. Beyond strategic thinking, normative concerns change, with the movement cultures, influencing the evolution of successive cycles. As James Jasper (1997: 237; see also Taylor & van Dyke 2004) observes, “tactics represent important routines, emotionally and morally salient in these people’s lives.”

The challenge for future research is, therefore, to combine the reflections on how cyclical dynamics interact with those on specific contextual conditions as well as movement cultures.

PROTEST EVENTS AND CONTINGENT EVOLUTION

A different type of criticism to a deterministic view of cycles of protest develops from the observation of the contingent and open-ended developments of protest events. In research on protest cycles, waves, campaigns, or tides, protest events have been mainly conceptualized as aggregated collective action. In social movement studies, protest has in fact been mainly studied through protest event analysis, oriented to collect information on an aggregate of protest events, and explained on the basis of political opportunities and organizational resources. More recently, some scholars suggested instead looking at the effects of protest on the social movement itself, by focusing on “eventful protest.” Historical sociologist William H. Sewell has promoted an “eventful temporality [that] recognizes the power of events in history” (1996: 262). If events are a “relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transform structure,” an eventful conception of temporality is “one that takes into account the transformation of structures by events” (1996: 262, emphasis added).

This way of looking at events tends to correct the structuralist bias that has been noted in first research on protest cycles (Koopmans 2004), by looking at the ways in which contingency affects the given structures by fueling mechanisms of social change: organizational networks develop; frames are bridged; personal links foster reciprocal trust. The events have a transformative effect, in that they “transform structures largely by constituting and empowering new groups of actors or by re-empowering existing groups in new ways” (Sewell 1996: 271). In this sense, the protest events that form cycles are not considered as determined by their context, but as constituting arenas in which collective experiences develop through the interactions of different individual and collective actors, who with different roles and aims take part in them.

With reference to “eventful temporality,” the concept of “transformative events” has
been developed to single out those events that have a particularly high capacity of agency. As McAdam and Sewell observed, “no narrative account of a social movement or revolution can leave out events... But the study of social movements or revolutions – at least as normally carried out by sociologists or political scientists – has rarely paid analytic attention to the contingent features and causal significance of particular contentious events such as these” (2001: 101). Moments of concentrated transformation have been singled out, especially in those highly visible events that end up symbolizing entire social movements – such as the taking of the Bastille in the French Revolution or the Montgomery Bus Boycott in the American civil rights movement. These represent critical junctures altering the cultural meanings or signification of political and social categories and fundamentally shaping collective loyalties and actions.

Beyond these few turning points, many protest events have cognitive, affective, and relational impacts on the very movements that carry them out (della Porta 2008). During protest events, new tactics are experimented with, signals about the possibility of collective action are sent, feelings of solidarity are created, organizational networks are consolidated, and sometimes public outrage at repression is developed. Events that were initially constrained by the external structural conditions, help therefore in redefining the conditions for a successive chain of events. As Beissinger has observed for nationalism, it “needs to be understood not only as a cause of action, but also as the product of action. This recursive quality of human action – the fact that action can function as both cause and effect – and the significance of this for the study of nationalism are the central theoretical issues this books seek to address” (2002: 11). Not only do protest events reproduce, rather than just consuming, resources of solidarity and collective identification (Fantasia 1988; Rochon 1998), but they are also “contentious and potentially subversive practices that challenge normalized practices, modes of causation, or system of authority” (Beissinger 2002: 14). Research on cycles of protest should therefore address the ways in which events “become turning points in structural change, concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity when the logic of historical development is reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished” (McAdam & Sewell 2001: 102).

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Diffusion and scale shift; Event history analysis; Master frame; Protest event research; Repertoires of contention; Spillover, social movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Protest event research
SARAH A. SOULE

Social movement research has developed a rich tradition of using data on collective action and protest events (hereafter “events”) that is culled from various sources (e.g., news reports, police records). Event data has been used by scholars to answer questions about the causes of ethnic violence and collective action (Olzak 1992), citizen protest of various types (Soule & Davenport 2009), and strikes (Biggs 2005). Event data has also been used to analyze the outcomes of social movements (Soule et al. 1999; Olzak & Soule 2009), including the policing of protest (Soule & Davenport 2009). A major benefit of this type of data is that it facilitates both comparative and historical research (Tarrow 1996), while also allowing for quantitative research on social movements (Olzak 1989). Additionally, there is often no better alternative (Franzosi 1987).

DATA SOURCES AND METHODS

The most common source of protest event data is the news media, whether from traditional newspapers (Rucht & Neidhardt 1998; Soule & Davenport 2009), less traditional newspapers (Davenport 2010), newswires (Schrodt & Gerner 1994), or Internet sources (Earl and Kimport 2010). However, researchers routinely use the following additional sources to construct a catalog of events: police records (McCarthy et al. 2008), records of permits filed for upcoming protest events (McCarthy, McPhail, & Smith 1996), annual reports by private or public agencies (Braun & Vliegenthart 2009), activist calendars (Hadden & Tarrow 2007), archival materials (Tilly 1986), and participant observation (Gillham & Noakes 2007). Of course, many researchers use a combination of sources in an effort to paint a complete picture of protest in a given time or place.

Some scholars use indexes to locate candidate events (Olzak 1992), while other scholars scour sources in their entirety for evidence of any event (Olzak & Soule 2009). Additionally, some scholars opt to look for events on each and every day of the given time period of inquiry, while others opt to sample some days or weeks or years of a given period (Hadden & Tarrow 2007).

Once a catalog of events is collected, scholars then typically use content coding techniques to summarize the information provided by the source and, in most cases, to provide a numeric representation of the information for quantitative analysis. Most scholars code information about the number of protesters present, location of the event, goals or claims of the event, tactics used by protesters, presence and extent of violence at the event, and police response to the event.

POTENTIAL BIASES AND SOLUTIONS

Most scholars agree that there are two potential sources of bias associated with event data (Earl et al. 2004): selection and description bias. Description bias refers to how well the source describes what actually happened at a given event. Selection bias is a function of the fact that not all events will be covered by a given source and the possibility that what is covered is not a random sample of all events that took place. Simply put, not all protest is covered by newspapers, nor do police attend all protest events (thus they do not issue reports on all protest), and not all protest is permitted.

With respect to description bias, scholars usually try to triangulate among sources in an attempt to get a more complete picture of what actually happened at an event (Soule 1997; Davenport 2010). However, this proves impractical when compiling large event catalogs.
With respect to selection bias, a number of practices are becoming commonplace. First, because scholars have found that larger, more intense (i.e., violent), events are more likely to be covered by the media and are more likely to draw police presence (hence to be picked up in police reports), it is important to include controls for the size of the event, the use of violence, and the use of extreme tactics (Larson & Soule 2009). Second, some scholars (Soule & Davenport 2009) use a series of simulations to ascertain how over-reporting of certain kinds of events may impact the results. By randomly deleting violent, intense, or large events, and then re-running statistical models, these scholars show that their findings remain stable until about 40–50 per cent of the “intense” events are removed. While we do not know precisely the extent of over-reporting of such events, this provides some confidence that the results remain stable, even if we assume a fairly high amount of over-reporting.

Third, because scholars find that events that are close to the source are more likely to be covered in a source (Oliver & Maney 2000), most quantitative research now includes statistical controls for the distance of the event from the news source (Soule & Davenport 2009). Usually this is done via including dummy variables for the location of the event (for example, including a dummy variable for New York City events, if using the New York Times). Others only collect information on events that are located in the same city or state as a source (Snow, Soule, & Cress 2005) or analyze student events reported in campus papers (Van Dyke 2003).

Fourth, some scholars note that the reporting of events in newspapers, in particular, is likely affected by the broad editorial policies and/or the political leanings of the newspaper (Davenport 2010). This has led some quantitative scholars to include time period measures for different editorships in an attempt to control for editorial practices. One could also imagine constructing a time-varying measure for the political leanings of the newspaper by studying the overall history of the newspaper, including the history of the ownership (e.g., family vs. corporate) of the paper (Davenport 2010: 186).

Fifth, some scholars note that newspapers, in particular, are subject to biases associated with media attention cycles, which can make it difficult to discern whether or not observed fluctuations in levels of protest are due to actual fluctuations or due to fluctuations in media attention to the issue (Soule et al. 1999). One way this has been dealt with is to collect generic measures of media attention to a given issue area and include this as a statistical control in quantitative analysis. For example, when studying levels of women’s protest events, Soule and colleagues (1999) include a count of articles on women’s issues that was generated from the Readers Guide to Periodic Literature to control for media attention to women’s issues.

CONCLUSION

The field of social movements has learned a great deal from studies using protest event data; in fact, many of our most central theories have been developed by scholars who used this kind of data. Many of the findings from the body of literature using protest event data have been replicated by scholars using other kinds of data (Earl et al. 2004). Thus, there is no sign of a decline in the usage of protest event data. This is because movement scholars have asked themselves if the best available data (however flawed) are worthy of analysis and because they have studied the biases and come up with some creative solutions. This, of course, is no different from analysis of the quality of other kinds of social scientific data (e.g., social surveys, reports of crime). Berk (1983: 392), for example, notes that sample selection bias is pervasive in most social science data and that the question should not be whether bias exists, but “whether the bias is small enough to be safely ignored.” On this note, it is important to take the question of bias seriously and to follow steps to reduce this bias, while also suggesting further remedies and sharing these
with the wider scientific community. However, the field is far from ready to cease using event data.

SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Comparative research; Event history analysis; Historical research and social movements; Media and social movements; Survey research.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


4 PROTEST EVENT RESEARCH


Public opinion and movements

KATEŘINA VRÁBLÍKOVÁ

Although public opinion would seem to be a crucial factor for achieving a large-scale mobilization and impacting politics and public policy, it has not yet received much attention in the social movement literature. There are probably a number of reasons for this lack of attention: (1) data on public opinion suitable for social movement scholars are not usually covered in publicly available opinion surveys and to gather them is costly; (2) requirements for data gathering would be even more demanding than for standard surveys because more developed research designs going beyond one survey at one time, such as public opinion across geographical units or longitudinal data, are needed; (3) public opinion is frequently studied by political science, while social movements are a primary focus of sociology. The following will first define what public opinion is, and how social movements can influence it, and then present two ways in which public opinion can play a significant role for social movement activism.

Public opinion can be defined as a distribution of opinion statements regarding a given issue in a society (Zaller 1992: 36). It is closely related to the way it is measured, in opinion polls. Public opinion researchers point out that public opinion, the results from opinion surveys, should not be understood as an aggregation of people’s pre-existing “true attitudes” towards a particular issue. Actually, people very rarely have fixed attitudes that they would reveal when responding to a survey question. Rather, individuals balance various considerations and, as a result, public opinion is a count of a “range of reactions” rather than stable “true attitudes” (Zaller 1992: 34). Nevertheless, this is not to say that public opinion expressed in opinion surveys is inauthentic or not perceived as real by political actors. It is only to say that public opinion is permanently reconsidered, open to change and unstable.

Also, the social movement literature has long ago acknowledged that identities, interests, and attitudes toward specific policy issues are not fixed and that only a few people are able to transform their grievances into political consciousness. Together with other political actors social movements play an active role in mobilization of public opinion. They can put a completely new issue on the public agenda, as women’s movements did with issues that were until that time considered only personal. Social movements can bring new perspectives on already existing issues, reframe them, and try to influence the direction of public opinion towards particular issues. For example, protests against the war in Vietnam tried to change the direction of public opinion towards it. Lastly, social movements can make an already existing favorable general opinion of their issue more salient. There are many issues that almost always receive majority public support such as human rights, environmental, and health issues. However, they are often buried among issues perceived as more important at a given time and social movements can help increase their visibility. For instance, civil rights protests in the US managed to increase public attentiveness to African American civil rights during the heyday of the movement in the 1960s (Burstein 1985).

Social movement literature has paid a lot of attention to the process of how social movements can influence public opinion, interpretative schemata, identities, and political consciousness by providing identification and interpretation of social problems through framing processes (Snow et al. 1986), which can lead to consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984). However, acknowledging that social movements mobilize public opinion is
not to say that they would or could completely manipulate people’s minds. There always has to be a resonance between existing prior values in the population and a mobilizing issue. That is why the existing public opinion and generally shared values can be regarded as the cultural opportunity structure (Gamson & Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996) that puts external constraints on how movements can be successful and what persuading strategies they can use. In order to be successful in their consensus mobilization, social movements’ framing should resonate with generally shared values and opinions (Snow et al. 1986). For social movements it is easier to shape public attitudes towards specific policy issues that are unstable and vulnerable to persuasion strategies of political elites, including social movements, than to change deeply rooted core values that are fairly stable over time (Zaller 1992). For this reason, when social movements want to influence public opinion towards a specific political issue, they strategically frame it and link to the cultural opportunity structure represented by the generally accepted value structure in the society.

Public opinion is important to social movements for two reasons. First, supportive public opinion is a necessary precondition of larger protest events. If people do not support the goal of social movement activity they are unlikely to take part in it. People having sympathetic views towards a social movement and its goals constitute the so called “specific action potential” from which social movements can draw the actual participants of their protest events (Klandermans 1984). This reservoir of supportive people sets limits within which an action mobilization can succeed. When it is small, social movements cannot hope for a large-scale popular mobilization. At the same time, by shaping public opinion, social movements actively help establish constituencies of people supporting their political views, from which they can later recruit individual participants (Klandermans 1984). Changes in public opinion can be fast and substantial in both directions and significantly influence the scope of individuals mobilizable into action. For example, the longitudinal study of activist mobilization by the Dutch peace movement done by Oegema and Klandermans (1994) shows that the loss of support and sympathy for the movement was one of the two most important accounts of why people originally supporting the movement and planning to sign its petition against cruise missiles did not end up doing so.

However, not all social movement organizations intend to follow consensus mobilization with action mobilization. For some social movements public opinion is a more important goal than the action itself. As the director of the Greenpeace European Unit put it “we are less interested in having tens of thousands of people in Brussels, although we have also participated in mass demonstrations, but it is much more about creating an image...that can catch people’s attention and that can illustrate the problem” (Cisar 2010: 740). Similarly, collective action itself can be used to shape public opinion. Some action repertoires of social movements are primarily focused on influencing public opinion and are not based on mass mobilization such as happenings, political theatres, hunger strikes, and terrorist attacks. These repertoires are intentionally focused solely on influencing public opinion where ordinary citizens play only the spectator role and do not act themselves.

Second, large-scale protests or supportive public opinion are usually not the ultimate goal for the majority of social movements. Rather, they mobilize public opinion and individuals into protest action because they want to pursue policy changes. In the literature there is no general agreement on how social movements, public opinion, and policy outcomes are related, and therefore several theories exist. One group of researchers argues that it is primarily public opinion that matters for policy change and not the activity of social movements. Social movements can influence policy outcomes only when their action is mediated by public opinion (Burstein 1985, 1999). This means that social movements have only an indirect impact on
policy outcomes and that public opinion functions as the intervening variable. But, still, it is primarily public opinion that influences policy outcomes and can do it independently of social movements. The theory explains that without the support of a wider public, political leaders, who seek re-election, do not have any reason to positively respond to the requirements of social movements because they do not represent the majority of society. Politicians will change the policy only if they think that the demands of social movements are supported by the majority of citizens and are important enough for people to base their vote on them. For example, Costain and Majstorovic (1994) show how the American women’s movement mobilization increased the public awareness of gender issues that consequently influenced the legislative action in this area. Burstein (1985) shows that the civil rights movement had an impact on policy changes through heightening the salience of the issue of African Americans’ rights.

Some other studies give support to a different relationship. They show that both social movements’ activism and favorable public opinion have their independent impact on policy outcomes. In other words, public opinion is not necessary to mediate the effect of social movements that can influence politics directly. For instance, McAdam and Su (2002) show how different types of protests influenced congressional voting on the war in Vietnam in conjunction with changes in public opinion on the issue.

A third group of studies suggests a more complex perspective on the relationship between social movement activism and public opinion. According to these authors, public opinion and social movement protests have a combined effect and interact together to increase the likelihood of policy change. The studies show that social movement activism moderates the influence of public opinion on policy changes (e.g., Agnone 2007). They explain that in addition to the independent effect of both public opinion and protests, protest mobilization increases the saliency of supportive public opinion that leads to a higher likelihood of policy impact. For example, Agnone (2007) shows how the effect of favorable public opinion on the number of passed federal laws supportive of the environment was increased when accompanied by more protests by the US environmental movement.

SEE ALSO: Consensus and action mobilization; Culture and social movements; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Outcomes, cultural; Resonance, frame; Survey research.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Public order management systems

PATRICK RAFAIL

Public order management systems (POMS) are “the more or less elaborated, more or less permanent organizational forms, their guiding policies and programs, technologies, and standard policing practices that are designed by authorities for supervising protesters’ access to public space and managing them in that space” (McCarthy & McPhail 1998: 91). Variations in the features and styles of policing protest have received extensive analyses in recent years, but comparatively little systematic attention has been paid to the organizational structures that institutionalized police practices are embedded within. Three major components of POMS are apparent in contemporary Western democracies: (1) spatial and temporal restrictions on protest, grounded in a widespread adoption of advanced permitting systems; (2) training regimens and technologies designed to help the police more effectively contain and control demonstrations; (3) an emphasis, at least rhetorically, on the police negotiating with key participants and organizing groups before and during events.

Advanced permitting systems have become sufficiently widespread that applying for a permit is a staple component of organizing a demonstration in many Western democracies. Permitting systems are generally framed by governments and police departments as creating legal and procedural infrastructure intended to provide an accessible and rule-governed channel for activists who wish to organize protest events. Yet, scholars have also noted that permitting systems impose various restrictions on the time, location(s), activities, and duration of protest events. Indeed, permits may facilitate the tightening spatial control over demonstrations by the police (Gillham & Noakes 2007), and have been increasingly used to restrict dissent to specific “protest zones” (Zick 2009). Permits are typically granted by municipal governments or police departments and are often required for demonstrations. As such, applying for a permit reflects asymmetries in power and resources between protesters and the state, and some scholars have claimed that the permitting system is a form of tacit state control over dissent (Mitchell and Staeheli 2005).

A second major attribute of contemporary POMS is linked to changes in police training and technology over the last 30 years. Traditionally, training for public-order policing taught officers to engage with crowds as individuals or with a partner. In contemporary POMS, this has evolved towards a more comprehensive, squad-based approach to controlling large gatherings (McPhail & McCarthy 2005). Changes in training regimes are clearly seen in the widespread diffusion of police paramilitary units (PPUs). Several studies (e.g., Kraska & Paulsen 1997) suggest that there has been a routinization of police reliance on paramilitary units for daily operations over the last 30 years, and many different police departments have made extensive use of PPUs at high-profile events, including the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, and 2010 G20 protests in Toronto. Police have also increasingly relied on less-than-lethal weapons such as pepper spray or tear gas during demonstrations, and traditional technologies such as barricades are being used to more effectively separate a large group of protesters into manageable clusters. Such uses of pens and barricades complement the adoption of “protest zones” mentioned above, as these technologies can be used to create physical structures demarcating the boundaries of designated free-speech areas.

Contemporary POMS, at least in their accompanying rhetoric, also emphasize a more
give-and-take relationship between protesters and police, grounded in negotiation before and during protest events. This denotes a considerable break from the 1960s wave of protest where the police relied primarily on coercion and intolerance to protest (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy 1998). This creates an incentive for more professionalized social movement organizations to cultivate cooperative and durable relationships with the police, and such practices have been linked to the historic decline in more coercive protest control over the last 50 years. However, significant and regular exceptions to negotiation-based strategies occur with what appears to be an increasing frequency. For example, Vitale’s (2005) analysis of the tactics used by the New York Police Department during several recent protest events suggests that the NYPD has become decidedly more hostile to negotiating with protesters. There remains a paucity of research examining how the police interact with more radical movements or groups that refuse negotiation with authorities.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that POMS represent ideal typical constructs that vary considerably across police departments within and between nation-states. For example, Rafail’s (2010) comparison of contemporary protest policing in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, Canada, finds that only the police use of force and protester pre-mobilization consistently predict arrests at protest events, while a variety of protester behaviors and other factors had variable effects across the cities. Wisler and Kriesi (1998) compare protest policing in Zurich and Geneva, Switzerland, and suggest that factors such as the legitimacy of demonstrations and local histories of contention influence the tactical repertoires of the police and challenging groups. Overall then, even within nation-states having strong traditions of social movement mobilization and highly institutionalized POMS, the daily operation of protest control strategies is strongly predicated on locally constructed factors and relationships between activists and the police, which vary widely.

SEE ALSO: Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Demonstrations; Marches; Police autonomy; Police riots; Policing protest; Protest event research; Repression and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The public sphere is hard to define in terms of boundaries – it has in principle no limits. We can try to separate it from the private sphere; yet even here claims abound that the private is political, thus undermining a clear separation of the sites where public communication takes place from sites where private communication takes place. We can try to separate it from the economic sphere or from other spheres; yet the porosity of the boundaries is obvious. Some sites succeed better than others in keeping the public sphere outside for a time. Often such attempts collapse. Boundaries move in and out of other spheres of social life, and no definition can be given that clearly delineates either a spatial boundary (as the concept of public space insinuates) or a functional boundary (private versus public) or a thematic one (things you do not talk about, i.e. tabooed topics, and things you talk about). This difficulty has preoccupied one of the most sensitive functionalist thinkers, Luhmann, who struggled with the problem of how to make sense of what he finally called the “reality of the mass media” (Luhmann 2000).

The public sphere is constituted in acts or practices which seek to make public what others may try keeping from becoming public. There is also the other movement of keeping private what others want to make public (e.g., talk shows, Facebook, etc.). This particular character of the public space prevents us from treating it as a clear entity with boundaries. Rather, it emerges from moving boundaries. This also explains the variety of theories of the public sphere (Ferree et al. 2002).

The birth of the public sphere has been located in the nineteenth-century struggle of an emerging civil society trying to emancipate itself from the authoritarian state. This idea has found its classical expression in the early work of Habermas published in 1962 (Habermas 1989), rephrased yet basically remaining unchanged in later reformulations (Habermas 1992). He combines two arguments: a cognitive argument which gave an important role to intellectual debates in the making of a public sphere, and a genuinely sociological argument in identifying sites which escaped control from authoritarian censure and enabled actors to coordinate their activities, thus constituting a realm of civil society as the counterpart of the state. An expanding number of sites and a particular cognitive debating mode generate what contemporaries have described at times as opinion publique, the opinion uttered in public, or Öffentlichkeit, an ideal space where cognitive orientations prevail over normative orientations. It crept into society yet did not become identical with it. Öffentlichkeit imposed itself upon the parts of society as a kind of reflexive image of society, and its apotheosis became the attempt to identify this emerging collective voice with the civil society claiming its emancipation from state authority.

Given the normative idealization of the rise of the public sphere, the observation of a fall of the public sphere made increasing sense given the empirical evidence of its real functioning. The diagnosis of a fall is linked to the power resulting from the control of the means of symbolic production that have become available by the emergence of a public sphere. Habermas described this process of control as a structural transformation of the public sphere which, on the one hand, became part of the capitalist organization of mass communication and, on the other hand, part of the regulatory state emerging from the debris of the old regimes. It is a double appropriation of the public sphere: one by capitalist market forces, which made profits from organizing public communication through mass media; the other by the state, which used the mass media for its self-presentation to the public – the civil society and later on the proletarian and rural society.
Habermas himself withdrew his negative account of this phase, which would have led to the theory of the self-destruction of the public sphere. The ambivalence remained, however. The public sphere turned out to be an ideal instrument for mobilizing democratic sentiments, especially through mobilizing the working classes. Yet it also served well for mobilizing antidemocratic sentiments and movements. The rise of fascism in Europe cannot be explained without a reference to the role of public communication. The economic rationalization of mass communication and the rise of control capacities of the state generated a public sphere which turned the cognitive mode of public debate on its head. Transforming its cognitive mode into an aesthetic mode of communication, the emotions of the public became addressable, which went far beyond the direct mode of addressing people of traditional rulers. By doubling the direct presence by the indirect presence of words and pictures, a public sphere emerged which pushed the project of control of the emerging public sphere to its extreme.

Another transformation, the second one, is the increasing presence of voices within the public sphere. Putting people on the public stage and thus peopling the public sphere with its constituency is realized in the modern entertainment industry. The public sphere gives a voice to the people—they can say what they want, they can even break taboos and talk in public about things nobody would have dared to talk about before. This characteristic of the contemporary public sphere—giving a voice to almost everybody—produces ambivalent effects: democratic institutions are not only exposed to the volatility of mass media staging, but they become dependent upon this volatility.

Being exposed to cycles of attention or indifference to politics in the course of its transformations, the public sphere is undergoing a third transformation: the “normalization” of the public sphere. Normality is often associated with the loss of the critical capacity of the public sphere. Taking up an argument by Habermas against the story of the decline of the public sphere, we have to reckon with counterprocesses triggered by a “normative power” or “argumentative power” inherent in the idea and practice of the public sphere. Simply by engaging in a public debate with others we implicitly accept rules which are oriented toward “rational understanding” as a mechanism of agreement by consensus. Empirically, this does not mean that our action is oriented toward such agreement and consensus. Defending believing in the “illusion” of the rationality of public debate provides “critical power.” The public sphere is forced by this illusion to make invisible the power of the argument which often succeeds but at critical junctures fails. It is in these junctures that social movements gain momentum and take serious issue with the illusion upon which the idea of a public sphere is based.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Fascist movements; Media and social movements; Public opinion and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Quotidian disruption
ELIZABETH BORLAND

Quotidian disruption refers to the breakdown or interruption of everyday practices, routines, and expectations which leads to a heightened likelihood of the emergence of collective action. The word “quotidian” means the routines of daily life, and encompasses the everyday practices we all take for granted. A modern variant of breakdown theory, the central argument of the quotidian disruption model, proposed first by Snow and colleagues (1998), is that actual or threatened disruption of the quotidian is the key element which connects social breakdown to movement emergence.

PRECURSORS TO QUOTIDIAN DISRUPTION

The quotidian disruption model has precursors in classical breakdown theory, one stream of the strain theory which dominated the early literature on social movements until it was displaced by resource mobilization theory. Breakdown theories of collective action posit that all sorts of collective action – from riots to revolutions – arise when social order breaks down and can no longer exert control over social actors (see Useem 1998 and Buechler 2004 for reviews). Individuals living in societies that have experienced social disintegration are released from this social control and are therefore more likely to participate in collective action.

Though the critiques made by proponents of resource mobilization theory challenged the assumptions and empirical accuracy of breakdown theory, and led to its decline in the 1970s (see Useem 1998 and Buechler 2004 for a summary of arguments by resource mobilization critics), some movement scholars continued to advance arguments in support of the importance of breakdown for social movements. In their work on poor people’s movements, Piven and Cloward (1977) argued that disadvantaged groups will only make demands when they face exceptional “social dislocations.” They pointed to how the Great Depression and the modernization and migration of the 1960s in the United States led to the disintegration of communities which had previously regulated and structured everyday life, paving the way for large-scale mobilization. They maintained that movement grievances and claims are shaped by daily experiences with social dislocation, rather than the mobilization of resources by social movement organizations. In models predicting movement success, Goldstone (1980) found support for these arguments: Social breakdown was a better predictor of success than organizational variables.

Subsequent work by Walsh (1981) on activism in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster introduced the concept of “suddenly imposed grievances” which is relevant for the development of the quotidian disruption model. Walsh found that the sense of immediate threat which affected local communities after Three Mile Island had an important effect on mobilizing activism. Evacuees from the area – the individuals who found their lives most disrupted by the disaster in its immediate aftermath – were most likely to organize, a finding which contradicts the predictions of resource mobilization theory. For quotidian disruption, it is this notion that rupture of the daily order of life leads to activism, rather than the suddenness of the accident, which is critical (Snow et al. 1998).

THE QUOTIDIAN DISRUPTION MODEL

Though scholars of collective action had previously noted that movements are most likely to arise when the patterns of everyday life are...
threatened, the term “quotidian disruption” was first introduced by Snow et al. (1998) in an article that advances a new model to help us understand collective action in the wake of social disruption. They argue that social movement scholars were too hasty in their dismissal of breakdown theory, and refine breakdown arguments to fit a wide variety of movements.

Quotidian disruption adds two elements not present in earlier breakdown models: insights from cultural theory and prospect theory. Cultural arguments derived from Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1983) contribute the notion of the quotidian as being made up of daily practices and habits, routines which vary depending on one’s position in the social structure. In addition to these practices, the quotidian also includes a cognitive component of routine expectations, which Schutz (1962) terms “natural attitude.” Snow and his colleagues also draw from cognitive psychology’s prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), which argues that people are loss averse, so they will risk more to prevent the loss of what they already have than to gain something new. Therefore, when the quotidian is disrupted and people are faced with the loss of their subsistence routines or other things that are central to their everyday experiences, they are more likely to mobilize in protest.

In their model, Snow and colleagues build on previous research as well as original fieldwork to elaborate four conditions in which quotidian disruption leads to an increased likelihood of collective action. The first condition is based on Walsh’s (1981) previously mentioned research on Three Mile Island: accidents which disrupt the daily order of life, particularly those that can be blamed on human negligence, are likely to generate collective action. The second condition is that threatened or actual violations of people’s privacy or safety will cause people to mobilize in order to restore control over these aspects of daily life. This condition is derived from research on anti-drunk driving activism, anti-busing efforts, and a wide variety of NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) movements that organize to repel the incursion into neighborhoods of threats like waste dumps or group homes. The third condition is elaborated on using the authors’ fieldwork on mobilization by homeless people. They find that an increase in the demands for scarce resources and/or a decrease in available resources will cause changes in subsistence routines, and this disruption will likely generate protest. The final condition builds on work on prison riots by Useem and Kimball (1989): Changes in the structures of control and social organization which cause dramatic shifts in daily routines, such as in the case of highly regulated settings like prisons, are likely to lead to collective actions to modify the new regulations. Though different, each of these four conditions involves a disruption which is experienced collectively, rather than at the individual level. Also, they are similar in that each disruption does not have a resolution within normal institutionalized channels.

In addition to specifying these conditions, Snow and colleagues connect quotidian disruption to collective action framing, and the mobilization of resources. They suggest that some types of framing and resources may be less important for movements that organize in the wake of quotidian disruption. They suggest that individuals who are motivated to organize because of threatened losses may not need as many organizational or other resources, or as much motivational framing, as in other types of collective action.

APPLYING QUOTIDIAN DISRUPTION

As a modern variant of breakdown theory, the quotidian disruption model is part of a broader trend to reexamine and renovate breakdown theory in recent years (see Useem 1998; Van Dyke & Soule 2002; Buechler 2004; Snow, Soule, & Cress 2005), but the model has not been applied or tested sufficiently in the literature on social movements. The quotidian disruption model is a particularly useful variant on breakdown theory because – unlike earlier versions of the theory – it allows for
the breakdown of everyday routines as well as strong social network ties (Buechler 2004). By emphasizing the disruption of the quotidian, rather than the breakdown of social control and the disintegration of communities, the model can help us understand how people maintain solidarity even when faced by quotidian disruption, and how they capitalize on social ties to organize in the face of such uncertainty. Therefore, applying quotidian disruption to recent cases in which people’s everyday lives are shaken by natural and/or human-made disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina or the earthquake in Haiti, could help us see how people build community in their aftermath.

However, the fact that the model emphasizes a combination of local community-level disruption and individual-level experiences is one reason why quotidian disruption has not been examined using hypothesis testing in statistical models. Snow, Soule, and Cress (2005) raise this problem in their study of homeless protest using a large sample of protest events in 17 cities; they test strain models using city-level data, but – like most scholars doing quantitative protest event research – they do not also have individual-level data which would be necessary to test quotidian disruption.

Qualitative research that examines collective action in the wake of social crises may be better suited to understand this link between the community-level and individual-level processes that are captured in the quotidian disruption model. Borland and Sutton (2007) examine quotidian disruption in the wake of Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis, focusing on how individual women were mobilized to participate in collective action. They find quotidian disruption to be a helpful concept because the notion of the quotidian recognizes variation depending on one’s position in the social structure. They argue that in the case of Argentina’s economic crisis, quotidian disruption was gendered, as it challenged everyday domestic practices and taken-for-granted assumptions about women’s place in society. Thus, an important strength of the quotidian disruption model is that it can shed light on how social movement activity varies among different social groups.

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Resource mobilization theory; Strain and breakdown theories; Threat.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Radical flank effects
HERBERT H. HAINES

Radical flank effects (RFEs) are interactive processes involving radical and moderate factions of social movements and third parties outside those movements. They result in detrimental and/or beneficial impacts of radical group actions upon the reputations and effectiveness of more moderate collective actors—typically social movement organizations. The relative “radicalism” or “moderation” of actors is generally defined in terms of the degree of legitimacy that is imputed to their objectives, rhetoric, and tactics by relevant external audiences. Radical flank effects were first studied systematically by Haines (1984, 1988) in his investigations of the American civil rights/black power movements, but other scholars had made reference to RFE-like phenomena in earlier works on the civil rights (Killian 1975), feminist (Freeman 1975), labor (Ramirez 1978) and antinuclear (Barkan 1979) movements.

Broadly speaking, RFEs may take negative or positive forms. Negative radical flank effects resemble “backlashes,” and they occur where the actions of “extremists” damage the ability of more moderate actors to mobilize and to achieve their goals. For example, audiences outside a movement may fail to differentiate the unpopular ideas and actions of its radicals from those of its moderates (see Hoffman & Bertels 2009), seeing all movement participants as equally offensive and threatening. Even if such audiences do make a distinction between factions, they may hold the moderates responsible for the emergence of extremists. Similarly, authorities sometimes use extremist threats as a pretext to either ignore or suppress moderates and radicals alike.

It is positive radical flank effects, however, that have attracted the greatest interest from social movement scholars. Positive RFEs occur when the actions—or even the very existence—of radical groups work to the benefit of a moderate faction in various ways. For instance, disruptive tactics or inflammatory rhetoric employed by radicals may attract greater public attention to issues that moderate actors have long addressed with limited success. The presence of a radical flank may also allow moderates to portray themselves as the “reasonable” and “responsible” voices within the larger movement (Elsbach & Sutton 1992; Conner & Epstein 2007; Hoffman & Bertels 2009). And by enhancing the moderates’ reputations in this manner, the radical flank may also increase moderates’ attractiveness to potential contributors of funds and other resources (Haines 1984). Finally, radical flanks may use disruption or violence to create crises which authorities and other target groups attempt to resolve through accommodating longstanding moderate demands (Jenkins & Eckert 1986; Haines 1988; Conner & Epstein 2007). While it is possible that moderate and radical factions in “strategically articulated” movements (Downey & Rohlinger 2008) might cooperate in order to bring about positive RFEs intentionally, this is a risky strategy that could easily backfire if exposed. Moreover, it requires radicals to sacrifice their own objectives in order to further those of other groups. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that positive RFEs are almost always unintended results of movement fractionalization.

Researchers have identified a number of important issues regarding radical flank effects that merit further attention. First, there have been attempts to define “radicalism” and “moderation” in more precise ways (Downey & Rohlinger 2008; Hoffman 2009), which may eventually aid in the analysis of RFEs. Second, some scholars have suggested that there are other types of RFEs that are not fully accounted for by the simple positive–negative dichotomy. Rather than being passively impacted by radicalism, for example, moderate...
groups may be forced to shift their tactics and ideologies toward those of the radical flank (Gupta 2002) to avoid becoming irrelevant. These under-theorized forms may produce more complex and emergent impacts than those analyzed to date. Finally, there is a need to clarify whether positive RFEs typically occur as the result of elite strategies to co-opt or “channel” insurgency (Jenkins & Eckert 1986; cf. Piven & Cloward 1977) – to the ultimate detriment of the constituents of movements – or as fortuitous dynamics that ratchet up social change in ways that are genuinely beneficial to those constituents (Haines 1988).

SEE ALSO: Black Power movement (United States); Civil rights movement (United States); Radicalism; Social movement organization (SMO); Strategy; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Radicalism
REMY CROSS

The term “radicalism,” as used within the milieu of political and social movements, can have several different usages. Primarily there are three ways of looking at it: as a process, as a practice, or as a set of beliefs. It is a process in the sense that radicalism, whatever its form, is rarely born whole cloth. Rather, it is usually a journey from a nonradical state towards a more radical state. The practice of radicalism is most commonly associated with a set of tactics and strategies that lie outside the bounds of accepted political or religious protest, often verging on illegality. Radical beliefs, or ideologies, typically hold that the potential for desirable change lies outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena.

Because radicalism, and those associated with it, are generally regarded by their institutional targets as operating beyond the legitimate boundaries of protest and challenge, radicals and radicalism represent a kind of deviant behavior and expression. Like social deviance, radicalism represents the extremes of a wide central distribution of acceptable political behavior and can often include criminality, but for reasons of belief rather than personal gain. Pushing for an agenda or goal that lies outside of the field composed of peer organizations and state authority places that agenda or goal in the sphere of radicalism.

What is radical, however, is always situational and highly dependent upon both the norms of the movement and what state and institutional actors are willing to accept on the part of the movement. Movement norms can vary widely from movement to movement; the labor movement allows for a higher degree of direct confrontation than a movement such as education reform where similar tactics are more likely to be seen as radical. Similarly, the types of acceptable protest behaviors expressed in France are often seen as more radical by American observers, but contrasted with the extremely limited range of activity allowed in more totalitarian states where even simple marches can be seen as radical. Regardless of the type, whether it is part of a process, a set of practices, or a belief system, radicalism is situated at the edge of what is considered appropriate political practice within a society.

Whether radicalism manifest as a set of practices or a belief, it rarely springs fully fledged out of nothing. Instead it represents a point along a continuum of political behavior that groups and individuals move towards over the course of their activity. When speaking of radicals and radicalism, there is always talk of “becoming radical.” Della Porta (1995), writing about the European radical leftist groups of the 1960s and 1970s, records that they spoke of becoming increasingly radical as they became more enmeshed in the movement and it began to take over more of their lives, but it was always a process that required time and close proximity to fellow travelers.

Radicalism can also apply to practices or actions that are characterized by bystanders or participants as radical. This is usually applied to groups that employ strategies or tactics outside the realm of what is normally acceptable, often verging into the realm of illegal action. Political process advocates such as Tarrow (1998), and resource mobilization theorists like McCarthy and Zald (1977), root this move towards radical practice in resource deficits, either of traditional resources or access to elites, since radical acts are often relatively resource low. This lack of access is seen as a factor pushing some movements or offshoots towards more radical tactics and strategies.

Finally, radicalism can refer to beliefs about how best to achieve movement goals. Radical beliefs develop out of a sense that currently accepted pathways to social change are
insufficient and that extraordinary measures must be taken. Piven and Cloward (1977) believed that radicalism would rise as elites became increasingly less in tune with the demands of a movement. This is echoed by Tarrow’s (1998) thesis that contention emerges in cycles and that elites would favor those movements that were quicker to institutionalize, leaving those unable to do so with the choice of radicalizing to remain viable, though for Tarrow the choice to radicalize is one that would ultimately result in the demobilization of the movement. The implication of such possibilities is closely related to the idea of the radical flank effect (Haines 1984).

The shift in focus towards more process and resource-oriented theories of social/political change over the past few decades is what prompted, in part, a view of radicals as disenfranchised movement actors who were relegated to the outskirts of legitimate activity due to their lack of resources and insider access (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001). However, the recent resurgence of both leftist radical movements, such as animal rights, deep green environmentalists, indigenous rights, and antiglobalization advocates, as well as right-wing groups such as religious fundamentalists, antistatist and nativist groups, have brought attention back to the role and process that radicalization plays in both practice and belief systems.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Barricades; Direct action; Extremism; Ideology; Radical flank effects.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Rational choice theory and social movements
KARL-DIETER OPP

Scholars who systematically apply rational choice theory (RCT) to explain social movement phenomena are a minority. Examples are Oberschall 1980, 1994; Klandermans 1984; Taylor 1988; Chong 1991; Karklins & Peterson 1993; Marwell & Oliver 1993; Pfaff 2006; Wood 2008; Opp 2009a, 2009b. For applications of game theory, which is not discussed for limitations of space, see Chong 1991; Pierskalla 2010. This may suggest that RCT is a deficient theoretical approach, and that other perspectives are better suited to explain social movements and political protest. Is this conclusion correct? This question will be addressed here.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: THE GENERAL MODEL AND VALUE-EXPECTANCY THEORY

The most general version of RCT consists of three propositions. The first is that human behavior is goal-directed: preferences determine behavior that is considered relevant to achieve the actor’s goals. This is the preference proposition. Goal-attainment depends on behavioral opportunities or constraints (i.e., benefits and costs). These are events that facilitate or impede goal attainment. This is the constraints proposition. For example, an individual may wish to express his or her discontent about a government decision. This goal could be achieved if there is a demonstration against the respective decision (i.e., a behavioral opportunity).

What happens if an individual’s goals cannot be achieved simultaneously? For instance, an activist has to decide how much time he or she will spend on the job or to organize social movement activities. The utility maximization proposition holds that individuals do what they think is best for them. The activist will look at the consequences of the different options available to him or her. For example, will a reduction of the time spent on the job decrease the likelihood of promotion, and how does he or she value this?

RCT is formulated for individual actors. But the theory is also applied to explain the behavior of collective actors like a government. This is only possible if goals and constraints or opportunities can be ascribed to collective actors. This is possible, for example, if the major decision makers have common goals. The decisions of a social movement are often made by a steering committee whose members try to achieve certain common goals. The constraints they face are, for instance, the available resources like money or support by organizations. Conflicting goals may be, for instance, to act immediately to influence a government decision or to enlarge the resource base as a first step in order to increase the chances of success. The actors will weigh the costs and benefits (including the likelihood of success) of the given alternatives and choose what they think is best (utility maximization).

A more specific version of RCT is value-expectancy theory (VET), also called expectancy-value theory (see e.g., Eagly & Chaiken 1993: 231–241). The theory explains which of the perceived behavioral alternatives an individual will perform. For example, a student may consider whether to work for an exam or join a protest group. The perceived behavioral alternatives will normally not coincide with the real alternatives. Our student has actually numerous other alternatives such as going to the cinema or jogging that will never be considered. The choice of a perceived behavioral alternative depends on the perceived consequences of the behavior. The student may reason that working for the
exam may improve his or her grade, whereas not joining the group will not increase the success of the protest group.

Two aspects of behavioral consequences are important: their subjective probability (the extent to which a person believes the consequences will obtain) and their utility (the extent to which a person values the consequences). The student may think that working for the exam will very likely lead to a better grade, and may value this very positively. Probability and utility of a given consequence have a multiplicative (i.e., interaction) effect. In other words, the effect of the utility depends on the value of the probability. For example, if the subjective probability of a behavioral consequence is zero (such as influencing the success of a demonstration) the utility will not have any effect on the respective behavior. Assume the sum of these products of the behavioral consequences for a given behavioral alternative is relatively high. This means that a behavior has a relatively high value for a person (i.e., the utilities and probabilities of the behavioral consequences are relatively high). The theory states that the behavior with the highest value (net utility) is chosen.

How is VET related to the general rational choice model described above? Preferences in the general model are equivalent to the utilities in VET. The subjective probabilities refer to the (perceived) opportunities and constraints. The claim of VET that the behavior with the highest value is performed means that utility is maximized – given the behavioral alternatives. Although the variables of the two versions of RCT are identical, VET is more informative: it specifies, for example, exactly the relationships between preferences on the one hand and opportunities and constraints on the other.

**THE WIDE AND THE NARROW VERSION OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY**

Applications of RCT in economics are often restricted to material costs and benefits. For example, the decision to buy a good depends on the price of the good and the consumer’s income. It is further assumed that reality is perceived correctly, at least in the long run, that actors are fully informed, that actors calculate before they act, and that the objective utility is maximized (i.e., actors do what is best for them, from the perspective of an omniscient observer). Another assumption is that actors are egoistic; their only concern is their own well-being. This is the narrow version of RCT. Explanations of behavior often require a wide version which does not make these restrictive assumptions. For a characterization and detailed discussion of these versions see Opp 1999; advocates of a wide version in sociology include Boudon (e.g., 1996), Esser (e.g., 1999), and Hedström (2005). For example, the wide version holds that beliefs may be wrong, that altruism is a possible human motivation, and that individuals do what they think is best for them in the given situation. Showing “solidarity” or conforming to norms are possible motivations in the wide version. This model is compatible with the idea of bounded rationality.

Pamela Oliver (2009), a prominent social movement scholar, gives a correct account of modern RCT:

“Rational choice” sociologists have studied the effects of decisions motivated by principles like altruism, adaptive learning, conformity, ideology and identity-maintenance. Much of the work in this tradition focuses not on individuals, but on collectivities, and is concerned with how the structure of relations among individuals affects both choices and the consequences of choices... At the same time, I believe that work done in the broad rational choice tradition has made huge contributions to understanding complex social processes. I am particularly excited by the ongoing formal work on collective action that continues to offer new insights.

This is in line with a wide version of RCT. Many critics, especially in the social movement literature, attack a narrow version. This is clearly the target of Fireman and Gamson’s article (1979). More recently, McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly (1996: 26) claim that RCT is stuck in an “extremely narrow – and generally materialist – conception of incentives.” This does not hold for the wide version.

**EXPLAINING PROTEST PARTICIPATION WITH RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY**

In applying RCT to explain specific behaviors such as protest participation (see the references at the beginning of this entry) it must be determined empirically what the preferences and constraints (i.e., the incentives) are. They cannot be derived from the theory. This is obvious, given the great variety of protest situations and individuals that are involved in protests. Compare, for instance, the demonstrations against the Iraq War in 2003 on the one hand and the Leipzig Monday demonstrations in 1989 against the communist regime. The researcher has to formulate hypotheses about the incentives which may be relevant. These hypotheses must then be tested.

It would be useful to find a sort of inventory of possible preferences and constraints (or, in terms of VET, behavioral consequences) that often determine participation in protest events (for the following see the references at the beginning of this entry). Various empirical studies suggest such a list of possible incentives. A good starting point is the grievances that motivate individuals to participate. These are preferences to bring about collective goods such as peace or less pollution. RCT implies that even if there are strong discontents protest is only likely if there is some likelihood that protesting diminishes the grievances. Thus, strong discontent only matters if individuals perceive that they are influential. To be sure, a single individual’s participation is negligible in a large group like a demonstration with 100,000 participants. But empirical research indicates that individuals often overestimate their political influence – an example that beliefs may be biased. If this is true, strong grievances affect participation even in large groups, contrary to Olson (1965).

Does (perceived) influence of the group contribute to protest participation? From a rational choice perspective, the question arises why an individual should be willing to participate if the group is successful anyway. In other words, perceived *individual* and not *collective* efficacy should have a positive effect on protest behavior. But collective efficacy might have indirect causal effects on protest: it would be dissonant to believe that joint action is efficacious but that the individual’s contribution is futile. Thus, if collective efficacy is high it is to be expected that individual influence is high as well.

Individuals often accept a *protest norm*: under certain conditions they feel an obligation to protest. The acceptance of protest norms is thus a determinant of protest participation.

Another finding is that integration into social networks (i.e., having many friends or acquaintances or being a member of groups) is related to protest behavior. Rational choice theory would predict that network integration only matters if this is related to incentives to protest, such as social encouragement of protest. Thus, membership in a golf club will not be conducive to protest, whereas this is to be expected for membership in environmental groups.

This list of possible incentives is often used in social movement research that is not based on RCT. However, the list also indicates some differences with this literature. This concerns, for example, the effects of collective efficacy and membership in social networks.

Is RCT compatible with the idea that frames affect protest participation? Assume it is observed that unorganized individuals align their frames to those of a social movement because movement activists have convinced unorganized individuals that their beliefs are not consistent with the facts. Why do unorganized individuals change their frames? An answer could be that retaining a belief that is considered incorrect would be dissonant or psychologically stressful. This means that changing a belief that is regarded as inconsistent with reality yields psychic benefits, whereas retaining it is costly. This is implied by
the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) which is a version of RCT.

“Collective identity” is often defined as identification in the sense of having some emotional attachment to a group or movement (see e.g., Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg 2008). Focusing on this relatively clear concept, identifying with a group support of the group is a (selective) incentive: for those identifying with a group support of the group is a benefit whereas not acting in the interest of a group is a cost (see e.g., Hirschman 1970, who speaks of “loyalty”; Friedman & McAdam 1992; Opp 2009a: 221–227).

MICRO–MACRO EXPLANATIONS: THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH

The previous sections focused on rational choice theory, that is, on propositions that explain individual behavior. Major social movement theories such as the political opportunity structure (POS) or resource mobilization (RM) perspectives refer to the macro level: POSs are properties of collectivities like cities or countries. Can a theory about individual behavior help to explain macro phenomena (such as social movement) or relations between macro phenomena (such as the relationship between POSs and collective protest)? The rational choice approach answers this question in the affirmative. This is a research program, also called methodological or structural individualism. Its basic idea is that macro phenomena are an outcome of individual actions or, in general, properties of individuals. For example, “growth” of a social movement means that an increasing number of individual actors join or support a movement. Movement “growth” is thus a result of the decisions of individual actors. These decisions depend, according to RCT, on the incentives for individual participation. There is thus a micro-to-macro relationship: individual behaviors aggregate to collective action.

Explaining movement growth by pointing to increasing incentives to join or support movements is not satisfactory: the question is why the incentives have changed. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that a general increase of societal resources (such as free time or higher income) motivates individuals to divert part of these resources to social movements. Thus, a macro change has influenced certain incentives of individuals. There is thus a macro-to-micro relationship.

This example illustrates the basic thrust of micro–macro explanations: they consist of three components: a macrotheory (increase of societal resources leads to a growth of social movements), a microtheory (i.e., a theory about individual behavior like RCT) and propositions that connect the macro and micro level (so-called bridge assumptions). We will return to this explanatory procedure later.

It is important to note that methodological individualism does not require RCT. It is only presupposed that some microtheory is applied. Nonetheless, one may advance micro–macro explanations as a fruitful explanatory strategy.

MICRO–MACRO MODELING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT PHENOMENA

Rational choice theorists argue that micro–macro explanations yield new and interesting insights. This holds, in particular, when findings on the macro level are unexpected. Assume, for instance, that political opportunities opened up: a leftist new coalition government comes to power. However, protests did not increase, as would be expected. How can this be explained?

POSs are often defined as phenomena that increase the perceived chances of success of citizen activities, that is, perceived collective efficacy (see figure 1). Assume that the seizing of power of the new leftist government increased perceived collective efficacy. There is thus a positive effect of the respective macrovariable on a microvariable, as figure 1 shows. Does this suffice to bring about increasing protests? To answer this question we need a micro-theory of political protest. Let this theory assume
that not only perceived collective efficacy, but grievances and the other variables listed in figure (see the lower panel) are the major factors that explain individual participation in protest actions. The participation of individuals aggregates to the macrovariable “frequency of protest events.” Why did the opening of POSs not raise protest activities? A possible explanation is that the new coalition had only a weak impact on the incentives to protest: it affected only perceived collective efficacy. The pre-existing incentives, which may be the major factors for participation, did not change. (Note that the relationship on the macro level is a correlation and not a causal relationship. The reason is that the macrorelationship is explained by the intervening variables on the micro level. The independent macrovariable has only an indirect causal effect on the dependent macrovariable.) This illustrates that a micro–macro explanation leads to a deeper understanding of why macro propositions are valid or invalid.

Our reading of the social movement literature indicates that the major authors typically engage in micro–macro explanations, without spelling them out explicitly. For example, Klandermans (1984) wishes to provide “social psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory.” On the one hand, he applies value-expectancy theory. This is an expansion of RM theory because so far this perspective is not founded on a microtheory. The question is how VET is related to propositions of the RM perspective. This could be effected if macro–micro links between the RM variables on the macro level and the variables of the microtheory suggested by Klandermans are established. But this is not done in a systematic way, but only insinuated. For example, Klandermans claims that the strength of the union (a macrovariable) has some effects on independent variables of value-expectancy theory. In addition, he mentions other micro–macro relationships without specifying an explicit micro–macro model.

A long list of quotations from the major authors in the field could be added where similar micro–macro explanations are insinuated but never worked out in detail (see Opp 2009a, 2009b). The previous arguments suggest that engaging more systematically in micro–macro explanations would improve social movement theory considerably.
A RESEARCH PROGRAM TO INTEGRATE SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVES: THE STRUCTURAL-COGNITIVE MODEL

The fact that social movement scholars engage in micro–macro modeling suggests that this is a fruitful explanatory strategy. Why then not move from implicit to explicit and systematic micro–macro explanations? This explanatory strategy can be called the *structural-cognitive model* (SCM) (Opp 2009a: 327–350). The basic idea is to overcome the separation of macro perspectives on the one hand (the RM and POS perspectives) and micro perspectives on the other (framing and identity perspectives). The SCM model suggests that both types of perspectives can be integrated — hence the name “structural-cognitive” model. Figure 2 provides an outline of this research program.

The macro level (see the upper part of the figure) consists of the macro propositions that have been suggested in the social movement literature, in particular in the RM and POS perspectives. However, these propositions are no longer isolated from the micro level in the SCM. Instead, they are explained by linking them to the micro level. This implies that we get to know under what conditions macro propositions hold. This is the major difference with previous scholarship.

The micro level could consist of an expanded wide version of RCT that includes framing theory (see Snow et al. 1986). This theory refers to sets of cognitive elements (i.e., frames) that include variables of RCT such as grievances, norms, or beliefs (like efficacy). These factors are also included in RCT. However, hypotheses on frame alignment imply that incentives are explained. Framing theory thus extends the theory of rational action: it explains what has been regarded by rational choice theorists as given.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Collective (public) goods; Collective identity; Framing and social movements; Free rider problem; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Resource mobilization theory; Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Rational Choice Theory and Social Movements


Repertoires of contention
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

REPERTOIRES AS CONSTRAINTS AND RESOURCES

A repertoire of contention comprises what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening. In the definition developed by Charles Tilly, it includes the “whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals” (1986: 2). Repertoires refers to “claims making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more” (Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 16). While the first conceptualization of repertoires of action has been criticized for focusing only on public display of disruptive action, in his most recent work Tilly (2008) has talked of broader contentious performances, stressing the constant innovation in the various forms of contentious politics.

A main idea is that, as in its theatrical variant, a repertoire of contention is constrained in both time and space. In any given period, knowledge concerning “what is to be done” to protest is limited, as “far from the image we sometimes hold of mindless crowds, people tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of the existing forms, and to miss many opportunities available to them in principle” (Tilly 1986: 390). Rooted in the shared subculture of the activists, repertoires contain the options considered practicable, while excluding others. Usually forms of action emerge as a by-product of everyday experiences: for instance, the barricades derive from the tradition of using chains in order to block access to neighborhoods at nights or in times of turmoil (Traugott 1995: 47).

Traditional forms of action are then handed down to new generations of activists, who tend to adapt them to changing conditions. In fact, “the theatrical metaphor calls attention to the clustered, learned, yet improvisational character of people’s interactions as they make and receive each other’s claim” (Tilly & Tarrow 2006: 16). As in the repertoire of commedia dell’arte or jazz the general rules of performance are constantly varied, with some space for improvisation (Tilly 1986: 390). The public march developed centuries ago out of the practice of electoral banqueting, and survived until today, with an adaptation of rituals and structures (such as the closing rally and the stewarding of marches) (Favre 1990).

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF REPERTOIRES

As well as conceptualizing the repertoire of protest, Charles Tilly has made an important contribution to the study of contention by linking its characteristics to historical processes, such as industrialization and the formation of the nation-state. Studying protest in France, he observed that from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century the repertoire of protest was parochial in scope, as protests targeted local actors or the local representatives of national actors, and relied on patronage “appealing to immediately available powerholders to convey grievances or settle disputes, temporarily acting in the place of unworthy or inactive powerholders only to abandon power after the action” (Tilly 1986: 392). For instance, peasants burned down mills in order to oppose increases in the price of bread; assemblies converged on the private residences of the crowd’s enemies; funerals were turned into the occasion for denunciations of injustice.
In the nineteenth century, a new repertoire of protests started to develop, including actions such as strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, marches, insurrection, and the invasion of legislative bodies. Differently from the previous one, the modern repertoire is national, addressing seats and symbols of the national public power, and autonomous, as “instead of staying in the shadow of existing powerholders and adapting routines sanctioned by them, people using the new repertoire tend to initiate their own statements of grievances and demands” (Tilly 1986: 391–392). Rather than organizing episodically at the local level, as members of preconstituted communities, in modern politics they build permanent, national associations in charge of representing their particular interests. Whereas the older repertoire tended to use the same type of action as the authorities, taking advantage of official celebrations or occasions, using forms of caricature or temporary substitution, the new one invented autonomous forms, with the deliberate organization of assemblies and occasions for action. This new repertoire responded to a new situation in which politics was increasingly national in character, and industrial development reduced the role of communities (Tilly 1986: 309).

Besides its national scale and autonomous character, the modern repertoire is characterized by its modular quality: it is used by a variety of actors to achieve a variety of objectives. In traditional societies the repertoire was specific, direct, and rigid: “In a society divided into orders, isolated by poor communication and lack of literacy and organized into corporate and communal groups, it was rare to find forms of collective action distinct from the conflicts that gave rise to them” (Tarrow 1994: 35). The consolidation of the nation-state, the expansion of the means of communication (whether roads or newspapers) and the growth of private associations favored instead the development of a new, general, flexible, and indirect repertoire. This in its turn facilitated the diffusion of protest and the mobilization of new and diverse groups within the population.

A NEW REPERTOIRE?

Even without denying that “performances evolve over time,” Tilly and Tarrow (2006: 12) stress continuity, as improvisations occur on shared scripts. It is true that the main forms of action which emerged with the French Revolution—boycotts, barricades, petitions and demonstrations—are all still present (and even dominant) in the panorama of contemporary protest. However, new elements can also be identified.

First, mobilizations are more and more transnational in nature. Even though most protests still take place at the local or national level, increasingly often countersummits have contested international governmental organizations and world social forums and global days of action have developed beyond national borders.

Second, in addition to newspaper and television, computer-mediated communication has transformed the ambitions and capacity for intervention of social movements. Not only is communication cheaper through the Internet, but it is also more horizontal, allowing for a broader autonomy from the mass media.

Third, the modern repertoire of protest had tended to adopt forms of action which reflect a particular logic of action. The attempt to influence decision-makers traditionally rested on a demonstration of strength, either in numbers (mass demonstrations, petitions, and so on) or, to use a military analogy, by inflicting maximum damage on the enemy for minimum losses (strikes, barricades). This type of political logic has not been abandoned in recent movements, but another, more symbolic logic has also been employed, the logic of bearing witness, designed to convince rather than to win (della Porta et al. 2006). Forms of ethical consumerism developed within this logic.

Fourth, performances adapt to different generational tastes (Jasper 1997: 250). So, for instance, the rituals of marches have changed from those oriented to show unity and organization to more theatrical ones, giving space to
a colorful expression of diversity and subjectivity that reflect cultural changes. In the recent demonstrations of the global justice movements, the younger cohorts of activists have changed the images of marches, with their taste for a more playful and spontaneous outlook (della Porta 2009).

Transformations in the very characteristics held to be essential for the emergence of the modern repertoire can explain such changes. Capitalism developed from nation-state-based industries to multinational corporations. While the nation-state has certainly not disappeared, it is now flanked by sub- and supranational entities which possess increasing powers. New means of communications have developed. As happened in the shift from the ancient to the modern repertoire of protest, social movements seem to adapt their protest tactics to these broad contextual changes.

SEE ALSO: Barricades; Boycotts; Contentious politics; Demonstrations; Everyday activism; Marches; Modular protest forms; Protest cycles and waves; Protest event research; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Resistance
DANNY TROM and DANIEL CEFAI

The uses of the concept of “resistance” have multiplied in the printed literature, even if without success in the attempts to define it in an unequivocal way. That notion implies the dimensions of habit, imagination and judgment. It lies short of any organized action, collective and public, of any obvious social unrest. Being infrapolitical, resistance expresses a will to elude a power, a predominant norm, or a social control. It deploys in the background of everyday life. It does not form a consistent repertoire of action, but rather shows itself by means of such practices as trickery, concealment, smartness, double meaning, humor, feigned ignorance, work-to-rule, absenteeism. It comes with all the dynamics of contention.

One can point to three intellectual sources of this concept. Michel de Certeau (1984) was the first to define a kind of oppositional action called “tactics.” It includes all the invisible practices of cunning, by which the “dominated” fill out the dominant order, playing with the constraints it enforces. Rather than confronting the power face to face, these tactics will nestle in the interstices of the disciplinary apparatuses and open free spaces of autonomy. Elaborated within a dialogue with Michel Foucault’s micropolitics of daily life, the notion of “tactics” allowed room to maneuver on the battlefield of everyday practices, instead of the regular institutional class struggles.

A second source of the notion of resistance is to be found in works on the moral economy of the dominated classes, peasants or workers, in the tradition of E.P. Thompson (1971). Here again, the focus shifts from institutional organization and organized struggle to subcultures, more or less autonomous, which English workers share and use as frames and resources to resist the exploitation in an expanding capitalist economy. Then resistance means a silent revolt, fed from popular traditions of solidarity, against the abuses of authority, felt as illegitimate, on the part of the ruling class.

A third source of the notion of resistance is the notion of hegemony formulated by Gramsci (1988), intended as an extension of Marx’s statement according to which the values of the dominant classes are also the dominant values of the time. As a counterpoint to material struggles, it stresses the power of legitimation of ideas, values, and discourses. Resistance in this case means a capacity of the workers to free themselves from the dominant ideology, and produce counterdiscourses and narratives that overthrow the established values.

The prejudice of the apathy of the dominated thus gets invalidated. Subaltern and powerless actors are able to avoid, to bypass, or to divert power to their advantage by means of a whole set of diffuse attitudes and practices, either individual or common, concealed from the eyes of the dominant groups, yet accessible to the researcher.

James Scott’s case studies on the peasants of Malaysia are a good illustration of the notion of resistance and have become models for a number of later inquiries. In Weapons of the Weak (1985), Scott shows how subordinates resist, in everyday life, the invasiveness of the market economy, on the one hand by relying on traditional forms of mutual help and assistance; on the other by elaborating innumerable practical and symbolic activities, in complicity with their peers, but in secrecy with respect to the dominant groups. In Domination and the Art of Resistance (1990), Scott stresses the hidden transcripts, a collective oppositional narrative, concealed from the public sphere, where facades of deference and obedience are displayed. Diversion of ceremonies, inversion of the dominant talk, mockery of judicial power, complaints without having to spell things out, are elements which concur in the collective making of counter-rituals and symbols, the
circulation of which contributes to the sharing of a common experience among the dominated. Scott clearly emphasizes what is at stake in the core of the notion of resistance: The capacity to withstand the cultural hegemony of the dominant groups is to be investigated through ways of acting which do not crystallize in strategies of power. The "subaltern groups" are neither passive, nor resigned. They resist in such various contexts as in race relationships, factory work, or political ceremonies.

If those who are enduring injustice and are exploited have an objective interest in overthrowing the established order, they may estimate the cost of open opposition to be too high. In that sense, the notion of resistance presupposes a theory of action alternative to the theories of false consciousness or the incorporated habitus, as bases of compliance with an unjust and repressive order. While the works of Burawoy (1979) or Willis (1977) demonstrate how any kind of resistance comes to be functional in connection with the reproduction of the dominant order, Scott analyzes how resistance is an infra-institutional tactic of bypassing, side-stepping, or turning over the dominant order. The question of the degree of reflexivity of the actors remains open. Dominators and dominated may take the acts of resistance as part of a game of reciprocal accommodation.

Internalization of norms or the enforcement of belief often account for the manufacture of consent. But resistance studies endow the actors with a relatively clear awareness of the injustices they are enduring. Their action is underground as far as a structure of control and punishment constrains it. As soon as they cross the border between unofficial, secret, tacit, local compromises to public, open, explicit, overall conflicts and claims, they leave the regime of resistance.

SEE ALSO: Countercultures; Everyday activism; Free spaces; Moral economy theory and peasant movements in Latin America; Subcultures and social movements; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Resonance, frame
HOLLY MCCAMMON

One of the most utilized concepts in social movement framing studies is “frame resonance.” Snow and Benford (1988) introduced the term to account for the ability of a collective action frame to resonate or appeal to a targeted audience. They ask, “[u]nder what conditions do framing efforts strike a responsive chord or resonate with the targets of mobilization?” (1988: 198). In order to answer this query, one must explore both the properties of the frames themselves and the characteristics of the broader cultural environment in which collective action framing takes place. That is, the source of frame resonance lies in a conjunction of the content of framing and ideational elements in the wider cultural milieu. Frames resonate because a segment of individuals find them convincing, or as Gamson (1992: 135) states, they find them “natural and familiar.” Identifying the precise circumstances in which movement frames achieve this persuasive status, then, is the critical question researchers confront. When will a collective action frame rouse the interests of bystander publics, elected officials, institutional authorities, or potential social movement recruits?

In answering this question, a number of scholars point to the importance of salient values or beliefs. Snow and Benford (1988) tell us that highly resonant frames are those that articulate centrally held ideas for target audiences. The greater the correspondence between themes identified in a frame and the core values and beliefs of those receiving the frame, the more likely framing audiences will find the frame compelling. Empirical support for the importance of belief centrality is pronounced. In a study of the US women’s-suffrage movement, McCammon and colleagues (2001) find that where proponents of the franchise for women relied on “separate spheres” framing, or arguments stating that the ballot for women would better allow women to protect the domestic sphere, activists were more likely to succeed in their quest for voting rights. Traditional beliefs that women’s place was in the home predominated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Suffrage activists strategically tapped into such beliefs to further their suffrage cause. Trevizo (2006) arrives at a similar conclusion in her explanation of how peasant protesters in Mexico drew on national myths, narratives, and ideology to reduce the willingness of state agents to use repression to quell the revolt.

Other researchers, however, say that resonant collective action frames often do more than simply invoke dominant ideas residing in the broader culture. Maney, Woehrle, and Coy (2005) concur that activists routinely harness dominant cultural elements in their discursive work, but these researchers emphasize that movement actors also frequently challenge those ideas, by defining oppositional beliefs or even alternative worldviews (see also Piven & Cloward 1977; Mansbridge & Morris 2001). Collective actors, thus, also generate frame resonance by tapping into or bolstering feelings of discontent or a sense of injustice or unfairness, and they begin to articulate for their audiences alternative responses or challenges to the usual routines and practices. McAdam (1994: 38) remarks on civil rights leader Martin Luther King’s ability to capture both “the culture of the oppressor” and “the culture of the oppressed.” Rohlinger (2002) tells us that the National Organization for Women sought to balance cultural themes dominant in broader society with its own organizational identity, and Hewitt and McCammon (2004) find that frames balancing “cultural resonance and contestation” are more effective recruiting frames than are those that simply resonate or simply contest. Finding a framing middle ground that offers resonance to both movement sympathizers and
a broader public is an ongoing rhetorical challenge for movement activists.

Students of social movements point to other ways in which frame resonance occurs. Snow and Benford (1988) state that more resonant frames are those with “empirical credibility” and “experiential commensurability.” That is, frames that define circumstances that fit with audiences’ perceptions of the world around them are more likely to be convincing. Similar to belief centrality, there is substantial empirical support showing that the empirical credibility of a frame can enhance its resonance and, therefore, its persuasive capacity. In a study of the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, Zuo and Benford (1995) find that student leaders succeeded in winning support more broadly among citizens because their frames identified problems in Chinese society, such as corruption, profiteering, and increasing inequality, that were evident to many Chinese residents. Einwohner’s (2009) study of Jewish resistance in the ghettos during World War II demonstrates that mobilization was most likely when empirically credible frames detailing the Nazis’ plans for genocide were available. Babb (1996), however, warns that while social movement framing efforts may resonate ideologically, they can at the same time fail to be empirically credible. And, in the end, the lack of empirical grounding will undermine the movement’s ability to gain constituents, even when framing aligns with salient beliefs.

Finally, Snow and Benford (1988) indicate that frames encompassing a broader range of beliefs and values will also often be more resonant than frames limited, say, to just one key attitudinal or value domain. Frames can be extended to incorporate additional issues, goals, or agendas, and this can heighten their appeal. Gerhards and Rucht (1992) examine leaflets from anti-International Monetary Fund (IMF) protests in Germany and show that “bridging phrases” were successfully used by activists to encourage participation by a variety of groups, such as peace, environmental, women’s, neighborhood, and labor groups. The bridging phrases revealed alignment between the goals of the anti-IMF activists and the interests of these various groups. Discursive efforts that use a broadened scope to widen their appeal can help build coalitions among challenging organizations and strengthen already existing alliances. But as Snow and Corrigall-Brown (2005) discuss, there is no specific scope to framing that works under all circumstances. Some movements can benefit from narrow framing strategies that formulate focused and detailed constructions of the problem at hand (see, e.g., Cress and Snow 2000), whereas, as Gerhards and Rucht (1992) demonstrate, broader framing can also provide benefits.

While many researchers who study frame resonance focus their attentions on the qualities of the frames themselves, qualities that give these rhetorical devices greater resonance, others have turned their energies to understanding the broader cultural and political environment in which activists must operate, environments which provide a stock of cultural matter on which collective actors can draw in their efforts to shape resonant frames. Koopmans and Statham (1999) coin the term “discursive opportunity structure” to point to elements in the cultural landscape that make some movement frames more resonant than others. Steinberg (1999) introduces the notion of “discursive fields,” where hegemonic discourses facilitate and constrain resonant framing options for activists. Oliver and Johnston (2000) draw our attention to ideologies or belief systems that reside in every political culture.

Others provide more specific understandings of the contextual elements that augment frame resonance. Both Ferree (2003) and Pedriana (2006) suggest that legal discourse provides fertile ground for study of highly resonant framing constructs. According to Pedriana, “legal rules and norms, statutory texts, administrative regulations and guidelines, and judicial rulings” are critical cultural resources activists can draw on as they deploy discursive tactics. Notions of rights, due process, privacy, property, and contracts allow challengers to invoke the power of the law as they make their claims for social and political change.
In another approach to the cultural context, Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) encourage researchers to consider how individual and collective identities are articulated in social movement frames. Along these same lines, Ernst (2009) suggests that researchers must consider the presence of privileged identities in the broader culture, particularly those privileged by race, class, or gender hierarchies and how such identities can enhance or limit frame resonance. Finally, other scholars move beyond the cognitive dimensions of frame resonance to explore how salient emotions can prime some framing approaches for resonance. Schrock, Holden, and Reid (2004) describe how “emotional resonance” occurs for potential members of the transgender support movement when the movement utilizes collective action frames that invoke key themes in the emotional lives of potential movement members.

SEE ALSO: Claims-making; Culture and social movements; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Master frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Revolutions
RENE ROJAS and JEFF GOODWIN

In common parlance, “revolution” has come to mean virtually any fundamental change. Transformations of ways of thinking, technologies, and even fashions and consumer goods are often described as “revolutionary.” Social scientists, however, generally define revolution in one of two ways. For some, a revolution refers broadly to any extralegal overthrow and transformation of a political regime or state by a popular rebellion, whether by violent or nonviolent means. (Although some state officials may support revolutionaries, a revolution differs from a coup d’état, which refers to the overthrow of a government by political elites, often led by military officers, with little if any popular support or active participation by ordinary people.) Others define revolutions more narrowly as only those historical episodes in which the overthrow of a regime or state is accompanied by or facilitates fundamental changes in a society’s economic institutions and class structure (e.g., the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions). This latter type of revolution is often called a “social revolution” (or “great revolution”) in order to distinguish it from those revolutions (or “political revolutions”) that entail new political orders, but little, if any, change in economic or class structures (e.g., the English and American revolutions). Of course, what begins as a political revolution may end up being a social revolution.

For some analysts, including Marxists, revolutions necessarily involve a substantial redistribution of property or the creation of a new type of economy or “mode of production.” Yet other analysts argue that revolutions may radically alter everyday life for millions of people – through political and perhaps cultural change, for example – without entailing much economic change. However defined, most social scientists agree that social revolutions have been relatively rare, if momentous, occurrences. By most counts, fewer than two dozen major social revolutions have taken place during the past two centuries (see table).

Prior to the French Revolution of 1789, the word “revolution” was generally applied in its literal sense to political affairs; the word referred, that is, to a return to some prior state of affairs. “Revolution” was thus synonymous with “restoration.” With the French Revolution, however, the word itself was revolutionized. It no longer suggested a cyclical return to the status quo ante, but rather a linear progression to a radically different (and presumably superior or more advanced) type of society. After the French Revolution, “revolution” became not just a popular term and a social science concept but also a moral ideal and even imperative for many millions of people. Myriad rebellions and insurgencies have occurred over the past two centuries with the explicit aim of deposing oppressive political authorities and, often, remaking the social order from top to bottom. When such rebellions obtain substantial popular support, one may speak of the existence of a “revolutionary situation.”

There have been hundreds of revolutionary situations around the globe during the past two centuries. Most popular rebellions or insurgencies, however, do not succeed in overthrowing the state. If the state’s armed forces remain strong and cohesive, rebellions are typically defeated or confined to peripheral regions within the national territory. Most revolutionary situations, in other words, do not result in actual political, let alone social, revolutions. A revolution typically requires the prior weakening or collapse of the state’s “infrastructural power” – the state’s capacity, that is, to enforce its will upon the society that it claims to govern. While revolutionary movements themselves sometimes muster the power to incapacitate states (by winning over...
military officers, soldiers, and government officials, for example), such movements just as frequently overthrow states that have already been fatally weakened by interstate wars, economic and fiscal crises, and/or elite divisions and conflicts.

Many social scientists view violence as an essential characteristic of revolutions and many, if not most, have in fact involved considerable violence among the parties contending for state power. Foreign states, moreover, have often intervened militarily in revolutionary conflicts or attacked newly installed revolutionary governments. Some revolutionary regimes, furthermore, have employed considerable violence in order to reorganize society along new lines, and some have perpetrated genocides or mass murders or have attacked neighboring countries.

Still, the extent of violence in revolutions is quite variable, and some have occurred with comparatively little bloodshed. Some social scientists, furthermore, have detected a trend in recent decades toward nonviolent revolutions. For these reasons, violence is best viewed as a potential and variable component of revolution, not as one of its defining characteristics. “Nonviolent revolution” is not an oxymoron.

Whether one employs the broader or narrower definition of revolution, the concept clearly stands apart analytically from such kindred forms of political conflict as wars (interstate or civil), popular rebellions, social movements, riots, and coups d’état. Historically, however, these latter forms of conflict have often been closely connected with revolutions or revolutionary situations. Interstate wars sometimes help to cause revolutions by weakening states, as well as by inflaming popular grievances, including perceived threats to nationhood or national identity; in turn, revolutions often result in interstate wars, usually because foreign powers seek to destroy those revolutionary movements or regimes they perceive as threats. For their part, popular rebellions or revolutionary movements create revolutionary situations, which often result in civil wars, and they bring about actual revolutions if such movements successfully seize state power. Similarly, social movements that initially seek reforms within the existing political system become revolutionary movements if they ultimately attempt to overthrow the state, which often happens when the political order breaks down or when the state persistently refuses to implement the reforms desired by such movements. Spontaneous riots, furthermore, may help to precipitate revolutions, and they have occurred frequently as a result of the breakdown of political authority that characterizes revolutionary situations. Finally, coups may become “revolutions from above” if their leaders mobilize masses of people and implement radical political or socioeconomic changes. In sum, while revolutions, and especially social revolutions, are a distinctive and comparatively rare form of political conflict, they are often connected, whether as cause or consequence, with other and more frequently recurring types of conflict.

Table 1  Major social revolutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1789</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1945</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1989</td>
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</table>

Note: The listed dates are conventional markers that refer to the year in which revolutionaries initially overthrew extant political authorities. Revolutions, however, are best conceptualized not as events, but as processes that typically span many years.
CLASS CONFLICT, POLITICAL REGIMES, AND REVOLUTION

Classical Marxist theories of social revolution have focused on the confrontation between classes with conflicting economic and political ends. Indeed, the trajectories of the major revolutionary conflicts of the modern era have been largely patterned by the aims and struggles of opposing class forces. Class conflict is, no doubt, the principal factor driving most revolutionary situations and outcomes. However, in revolutionary situations classes (or class coalitions) do not directly confront each other as discrete and monolithic adversaries. Revolutionary struggles are shaped by state institutions, political parties, and other organizations and networks as well as by the resources and ideas mobilized by each of these. Furthermore, the dynamics of such struggles are seldom linear or uniform. Revolutionary conflicts are punctuated by critical moments that disrupt existing political arrangements and thus shift the balance of power between opposing forces. Finally, the political dimensions of class contestation are significantly impacted by developments in the international arena, chiefly conflict and competition among states – contests aggravated by the uneven global development of capitalism – but also transnational ideologies and flows of resources.

A particular mode of economic production, at a particular level of development, is characterized by a specific structure of social classes and, at a very general level, defines the interests of such classes; it simultaneously shapes the features of political regimes, understood as the formal and informal rules of governing institutions and processes. Class structures do not directly determine political rules and behavior. Instead, political regimes constrain the political interventions of class actors, at times reducing if not altogether suppressing the political influence of others. In short, class conflict is mediated by the institutional configuration of the existing political regime.

Political regimes mediate among competing segments of dominant classes and also establish the possibilities for cooperation among otherwise adversarial class forces. As a given class structure allows for a range of possible rules demarcating the political participation of organized social groupings, regimes can be more or less democratic. The degree of democratic opening of a regime refers to both the formal, procedural rules of citizenship and governance as well as the substantive political integration of nonelites. Regimes, in short, can be more or less inclusive in terms of the nonelite sectors that are given institutionalized access to political influence and material welfare. In addition, the level of economic development also offers regimes varying degrees of organizational and ideological resources, tools wielded by the state as well as by political and civil associations representing various social groupings and advancing their interests. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, political elites – institutional leaders and ruling politicians – while generally attuned to the needs and demands of economic elites, can present a more or less unified response to the claims of nonelite groups. The efficacy and adeptness of state actors and institutions in addressing demands from below, the forms and intensity of the fights around these demands, and the cohesion and flexibility with which elites confront rising struggles are crucial in understanding the emergence (or absence) of revolutionary situations. History has shown that revolutionary conflicts almost always emerge in authoritarian political contexts in which nonelites are repressed and excluded from power – yet have some capacity for collective action – and elites are badly divided.

REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS

Revolutionary situations can be understood as moments when regimes come into sharp conflict with mobilized nonelite forces, that is, when the rules of political competition and incorporation can no longer manage or accommodate the competing interests and demands of the groups they are meant to govern.
A revolutionary situation arises when the conflict is acute enough to open the possibility of deep political and social change. Lenin famously stated that revolutionary situations display “three major symptoms”: (1) when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the ‘upper classes’, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth . . .; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who . . . are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the ‘upper classes’ themselves into independent historical action (Lenin 1915: 213; emphasis in original).

Since Lenin’s time, scholars of revolutions have developed these basic insights. Perhaps the most crucial “symptom” Lenin lists – acute “suffering and want” – typically involves a sharp decline in material conditions. Accordingly, some scholars of revolution understand revolutions as a product of “relative deprivation.” More likely, what Lenin had in mind are disruptions of everyday life which unsettle people’s routines and thereby instigate their defiance of economic and political elites. In this sense, revolutionary situations require what Piven and Cloward refer to as the weakening or breakdown of “the regulatory controls inherent in the structures of institutional life” (1977: 11). Economic crises, wars, and even natural disasters typically cause these dislocations. The consequences are felt in the immediate lives of ordinary people, who endure the loss or deterioration of work, are sent into bloody and often unpopular wars, or suffer the breakdown or even collapse of institutions upon which their survival depends – work, markets, transportation, and schools.

At the regime level, furthermore, such shocks disrupt the existing balance of political forces. In order to preserve regime stability, political elites may feel compelled to seek new allies, incorporating new sectors of nonelites – who consequently find themselves with enhanced influence – and perhaps discarding old allies. On the other hand, some elites may respond to profound social dislocations by attempting to exclude formerly incorporated sectors or significantly elevating the costs of their incorporation. These dislocations may also place increasing strain on politically excluded groups which had found relatively stable means of securing their reproduction. As disturbances redefine the inclusiveness of the regime and activate nonelites in new ways, political alignments are redrawn and the balance of power shifts. Acute shocks typically release nonelites from passivity, activating their grievances through new organizational structures and institutional avenues. In sum, one precondition for revolutionary situations consists of massive disruptions that break down routinized systems of social stability and control. Subsequently, explosions of nonelite mobilization may place regimes under great duress.

In fact, while such dislocations may be necessary for the emergence of revolutionary situations, they are clearly insufficient. Lenin identifies another indispensable condition for revolutionary situations: The shock must provoke “fissures” among elites that fracture the foundations of the regime. Elite divisions and the resulting destabilization provide an opening that may itself magnify pressures from below and which newly mobilized nonelites can exploit. Such a crisis typically occurs when the usual consensus over arrangements for settling competing elite claims collapses as wars and state-led efforts at economic modernization generate growing fiscal pressures. As elite agreement over how the costs of fiscal and institutional reform should be distributed disintegrates, the institutional coherence of the regime comes under enormous strain. The state’s capacity to control and enforce its will and rules upon the population within the territory that it claims to govern – that is, its infrastructural power – may begin to contract and even collapse.

Elite conflict and state breakdown may follow two scenarios. In the first, a crisis, such as
a fiscal emergency provoked by international war or competition, may generate instability as elites resist the burdens imposed by state officials. The ensuing institutional crisis in the regime, involving the disintegration of state power and legitimacy, then serves to facilitate and exacerbate rebellion by subordinate groups that are mobilizing through existing collective structures. This is the model offered by Theda Skocpol in her influential book, States and Social Revolutions (1979). In the second perspective, the shock unleashes mounting and threatening pressure from below by nonelite political forces. No longer bound by the institutions of social control, their growing, uncontrollable unrest generates the crisis among elites who are pulled into opposing directions by the developing insurgency itself. One elite faction might prefer to restrict the influence of nonelites, extracting more resources to cover fiscal gaps, clamping down on democratic rights or even resorting to coercion; other elites, by contrast, might prefer reformist incorporation, resigning themselves to accommodating nonelite demands in order to preserve their overall rule. In this view, were it not for the additional stress from nonelite demands, elites might converge on a unified and stabilizing response, preventing regime collapse. In either scenario, the cohesion of the police and armed forces is crucial for preventing the fall of the regime. If the costs of war, repression, and/or reform divide weaken the military and undermine its ability to act in a unified and decisive manner against popular protest, then revolution becomes likely or even inevitable.

In short, the second condition listed by Lenin and emphasized by so-called “political opportunity” and “state-centered” theorists, involves elite division and institutional collapse which either results from or results in nonelite responses to systemic dislocation. In either event, ruling elites find it impossible to coexist in harmony under the existing regime. The revolutionary crisis intensifies as the actions of disaffected elite segments impair the efficacy of state institutions.

These conditions, when combined, would seem to be sufficient to produce a revolutionary situation. After all, if nonelite actors are thrust into action owing to the erosion of the regulatory capacity of key institutions, and elite divisions lead to a collapse in the state’s infrastructural power, a powerful insurrection would seem to be at hand. However, Lenin raises a third condition. He adds that nonelites, “drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the ‘upper classes’ themselves,” must also increase their “independent historical action.” By “historical” Lenin means a qualitatively superior ability to act collectively on the part of insurgents who are seeking a new social order. The final ingredient that he has in mind is the capacity of nonelite forces to take advantage of the institutional shock and collapse in order to place radical transformation on the national agenda. Simply stated, an existing regime is likely to weather a weakening of state institutions and pressures from below if nonelite groups are incapable of organizing into a political force that can effectively threaten it.

For such capacity to take shape, two requirements must be met. First, the activated insurgent groups must enjoy leverage over the existing regime. This condition is met when the insurgents’ roles in important institutions are necessary and/or highly valued, which gives their threats of withdrawing their contributions to such institutions more disruptive force. That is, when nonelites enjoy “structural power” rooted in their essential institutional roles, their capacity for generating costly disruptions is enhanced. In the context of shock and crisis, elite vulnerability to effective leverage grows. At a micro-level, this is the mechanism identified by Michael Schwartz (1976) in his study of radical protest movements. Moreover, this capacity is reinforced when elite factions, responding to crises, formalize nonelite leverage by bringing them into governing institutions. Overall, the position of elites becomes weakened relative to their nonelite adversaries, increasing the fragility of the regime; if would-be insurgents fail to exercise such leverage, elite domination
remains robust. On a more macrohistorical level, this is the basis for Trotsky’s argument (1961) that the uneven development of capitalism in Russia gave industrial workers unprecedented influence and allowed them to turn a struggle against autocracy into a fight for radical social and economic transformation. Trotsky’s theory, in turn, was a variation on Marx’s classical formulation that increased industrialization would lead to larger and larger concentrations of (and cooperation among) workers, resulting in their overwhelming leverage over the entire social order as crises became more pronounced. The central point is that the structural position of insurgents must translate into the capacity to undertake “historical” action which challenges elite power.

Second, a capacity for “independent” and “historical” action requires the political and ideological resources necessary to convert increased activity and leverage into decisive action. Viewed in this manner, Lenin grants strategic importance to organization, tactics, and ideas. These factors involve the ability of insurgents to obtain, process, produce, and deploy information among their followers. Such tactical and ideological dimensions of action cannot be viewed as the mere epiphenomena of economic structures and institutional opportunities or, even worse, as wholly inconsequential. Clearly, ideas and ideology play an important role in the origins and outcomes of revolutions. However, they do not operate as autonomous forces that drive the larger political arena in which revolutionary situations unfold. Viewing the role of ideas as “scripts” constructed from existing symbolic fields and superimposed onto new historical arenas, albeit with adaptive modifications, as some have argued, is misleading. After all, radical ideologies have existed and appealed to large numbers of people in most if not all modern regimes. They have seldom, however, resulted in successful movements, much less in revolutionary situations.

The added effects of culture, broadly understood, operate when particular ideologies closely match and are able to exploit a shifting balance of forces that weakens regime elites. In other words, the effective deployment of ideologies and the agency of their “carriers” are circumscribed by, though never reducible to, existing material and political conditions. When dislocations and state crises offer openings for challenges by nonelite actors, the tactical decisions of activists and the framing effects of ideas can, in the final analysis, be decisive. When the strategies and ideologies promoted by revolutionaries give meaning to and resonate with nonelites, and when they are not only consistent with but also promote increased popular mobilization, thereby maximizing its disruptive impact, they can be the final necessary ingredient that endows them with the momentous capacity to “make” revolution. In fact, Lenin ended his famous statement on revolutionary situations with an important qualification: “Not every revolutionary situation,” he explained, “gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary class to take revolutionary mass action strong enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, ‘falls’, if it is not toppled over” (Lenin 1915: 213; emphasis in original).

DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND REVOLUTION

As noted, revolutionary situations are much more likely to arise in authoritarian and repressive political contexts than in democratic and liberal ones. In fact, no popular revolutionary movement has ever overthrown a long-consolidated democratic regime. The great revolutions of the cold war era, for example, toppled extremely repressive colonial regimes (as in Vietnam and Algeria), personalist dictatorships (as in Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua), and the Soviet-imposed single-party regimes of Eastern Europe. But none overthrew a regime that even remotely resembled a democracy.
In fact, revolutionary movements tend to prosper when states sponsor or defend—with violence when necessary—economic and social arrangements that are widely regarded as unjust. In certain societies, economic and social arrangements may be widely viewed as unjust (i.e., as not simply unfortunate or inevitable), yet unless state officials are seen to sponsor or protect those arrangements—through legal codes, taxation, conscription, and, ultimately, force—revolutionary collective action aimed at overthrowing the state is unlikely. People may blame their social “superiors” or employers for their plight, for example, or even whole classes of such elites, yet the state itself may not be challenged unless there exists a widely shared perception that it stands behind and defends those elites.

Revolutionaries also fare well, other things being equal, when the state legally or forcibly excludes aggrieved groups from state power or resources. For even if such groups come to direct their claims at the state, they are unlikely to seek its overthrow if they manage to attain some significant share—or believe they can attain such a share—of state power or influence (e.g., through elections or bureaucratic influence). Even if such groups view their political influence as unjustly limited, their access to state resources or inclusion in policymaking deliberations will likely prevent them from becoming radicalized. In fact, the political incorporation of mobilized groups, including the putatively revolutionary proletariat of Marxist theory, into parliamentary and other political institutions has typically served to de-radicalize them. Such groups often view this sort of inclusion as the first step in the accumulation of greater influence and resources; as a result, they are unlikely to jeopardize their relatively low-cost access to the state by engaging in “disloyal” or illegal revolutionary activities. Exclusionary authoritarian regimes, by contrast, tend to “incubate” radical forms of political contention. Those who call for revolution tend to prosper under such regimes, because they come to be viewed by many people as more realistic and potentially more effective than political moderates and reformists.

Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, violence by weak states against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures also unintentionally helps revolutionaries. For reasons of simple self-defense, people who are targeted by the state may arm themselves or join clandestine groups. People whose families or friends have been victimized by the state may also join or support revolutionaries in order to seek revenge against the perpetrators. Indiscriminate state violence may also be viewed by the general population as illegitimate or unjust, especially if the targets of this violence are making demands or claims that are widely perceived to be just. Unless state violence is directed at unpopular groups or is simply overwhelming, then, indiscriminate coercion may backfire, producing an ever-growing popular mobilization, often (though not always) led by armed movements, and an even larger body of indignant sympathizers. Revolutionary movements may thus prosper not so much because of their ideology per se, but simply because they can offer people some sort of protection from, and means for striking back at, authoritarian states. Political groups and parties have generally turned to disruptive strategies, including armed struggle, only after their previous efforts to secure change through legal means were violently repressed. Under repressive conditions, ordinary people often view armed struggle as a legitimate and reasonable means of political contestation.

Finally, like political exclusion, indiscriminate state violence also reinforces the plausibility and legitimacy of revolutionary ideologies, that is, ideologies that (1) proclaim the existing order to be fundamentally unjust and (2) envisage a radical reorganization of the political system and perhaps of society as well. In other words, violent, exclusionary regimes often unintentionally bolster the popularity of their most radical social critics—religious activists, socialist militants, and radical nationalists, for example, who view existing institutions as more or less completely corrupt,
incapable of reform, and thus requiring a thorough and even (if need be) violent recon-
struction. Precisely which radical group, if any, will come to lead or dominate a revolutionary movement, however, is contingent upon a great many factors, including how much coercive force it can muster and how well (or poorly) its ideology resonates among political activists and ordinary people.

Authoritarian and repressive states, in sum, unintentionally facilitate the development of revolutionary movements by generating or reinforcing popular grievances, contributing to widespread feelings of moral outrage, focusing those feelings on the state, foreclosing possibilities for peaceful reform, enhancing the plausibility and legitimacy of revolutionary ideologies, and (often) compelling people to employ disruptive and even violent strategies in order to defend themselves and to pursue effectively their collective interests and ideals.

By contrast, more liberal and democratic regimes tend to pacify and institutionalize, but hardly do away with, class and other forms of social conflict. Elections have been aptly described as a “democratic trans-
lation of the class struggle.” Democracy “translates” and channels a variety of social conflicts – including, but not limited to, class conflicts – into party competition for votes and the lobbying of representatives by “interest groups.” The temptation to rebel against the state, which is rarely seized without trepidation under any circumstances, is generally quelled under democratic regimes by the knowledge that new elections are but a few years off, and with them the chance to punish unpopular incumbent rulers. In addition, democracies have generally provided a context in which popular protest can win concessions from economic and political elites, although this often requires a good deal of disruption, if not violence. But armed movements that aim at overthrowing elected governments rarely win much popular support, unless such governments (or the armies that they putatively command) effectively push people into the armed opposition by indiscriminately repressing suspected rebel sympathizers. By and large, however, the ballot box has been the coffin of revolutionaries.

This does not mean that political radicalism and militancy go unrewarded in democratic societies. Democracy, to repeat, by no means eliminates social conflict; in fact, in many ways democracy encourages a flowering of social conflict by providing the “political space” with which those groups outside ruling circles can make claims on political authorities and economic elites. Not just political parties, then, but a whole range of interest groups, trade unions, professional associations, and social movements can become the organizational vehicles of political life in democratic polities. These institutions of “civil society,” however, are generally just that – civil. Their repertoires of collective action include electoral campaigns, lobbying, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and civil disobedience – forms of collective action that may be quite disruptive and undertaken for quite radical ends, but which are not aimed at bringing down the state.

Democracy, then, dramatically reduces the likelihood of revolutionary change, but not because it brings about social justice. Formal democracy is fully compatible with widespread poverty, inequality, and popular grievances of all sorts. This is why extraparliamentary movements for social justice so often arise in democratic contexts. But, again, these movements almost always view the state as an instrument to be pressured and influenced, not as something to be seized or smashed. Revolutionary movements, for their part, develop not simply because people are angry or aggrieved, but because the state under which they live provides no other mechanisms for social change, violently repressing those who peacefully seek incremental reforms.

Past waves of democratization, alas, have in fact been regularly followed by antidemocratic waves. Yet this should give relatively little comfort to revolutionaries, for only a very few of the resulting authoritarian regimes were toppled by revolutions. As emphasized earlier, revolutionary movements, even those
with extensive popular support, rarely succeed in seizing power unless the authoritarian regimes that they confront are very weak or suddenly weakened. That said, the spread of democracy will not necessarily render revolution passé as a form of political struggle. Radical leaders and parties have sometimes been able to amass a broad following in democratic contexts and to win elections. Perhaps during the twenty-first century we will see some democratically elected governments attempt to revolutionize economic and political institutions. As yet, however, the democratic route to revolution has never been successfully traveled.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution; Arab Spring; Chinese communist revolution; Cuban revolution; Democratization and democratic transition; Demography and social movements and revolutions; French Revolution; Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979; Marxism and social movements; Mexican Revolution; Russian Revolution.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Selective incentives
PAMELA OLIVER

Selective incentives are private goods made available to people on the basis of whether they contribute to a collective good. Selective incentives can either reward participants (or contributors) or punish nonparticipants. The concept of selective incentive is important for focusing attention on the factors besides the group goal that affect people’s desire to participate in social movements. Selective incentives can be material, solidary, or purposive. The concept of selective incentive is embedded in a rational choice or cost/benefit approach and originates with Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action. Collective or public goods have the property of nonexcludability: if they are provided to any member of a group, they cannot be excluded from other group members. Nonexcludability can lead to the free rider problem or collective dilemma wherein rational individuals should prefer to let others pay for collective goods. “Only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way . . . The incentive must be ‘selective’ so that those who do not . . . contribute to the attainment of the group’s interest, can be treated differently from those who do” (Olson 1965: 51). Formal theorists since Olson have moved far beyond his original statement to show how the interplay between collective goods and selective incentives can produce complex and even surprising collective action dynamics.

Olson emphasized material incentives. Some movement leaders are paid, and some movement organizations sell things like magazines, insurance, or vacations. Physical coercion has often been important for maintaining mass actions like strikes. Some theorists prefer to restrict the concept of selective incentives to material good. However, most theorists recognize two other broad types of incentives: solidary and purposive (Clark & Wilson 1961). The concepts of solidary and purposive selective incentives provide a way of talking within a rational action framework about the importance of social influence, ideology, and identity.

Solidary or social incentives are intangible benefits of participating (or not participating) in collective action deriving from the approval or disapproval of other people, or from the intrinsic pleasure or displeasure in being with them. Socializing with friends or approval from others for participating are nonrival social incentives that everyone who participates can share. Movement participants tend to be friends with other participants and have friends who approve their participation. Leaders and those who sacrifice much can be given prestige and honor for their efforts (Willer 2009).

Purposive or moral incentives are intangible benefits of participating (or not) that arise from internalized norms and values in which a person’s self-esteem depends on doing the right thing. They may feel an obligation to witness or make a public expression of their beliefs. These purposive incentives are tied to larger religious, ethical, or political ideologies and are often linked to a person’s socialization. Those who participate in movements over time often develop a movement or activist identity in which their sense of self depends on being an activist. People motivated by purposive incentives are focused on being the right kind of person who does the right kind of things.

The interplay between collective goods and incentives can become quite complex, and formal theorists have explored these relations. Selective incentives cannot in general “solve” collective dilemma because using incentives entails the second order problem of paying the costs of incentives (Oliver 1980). Rewards to cooperators have different cost structures...
from punishments to noncooperators, these varying with the nature of the production function for the level of collective good provided as it depends on the number of contributors (Oliver 1980). Heckathorn (1990) shows that sanctioning systems can promote or hinder the group good depending on the value of the good, the strength of the sanction, monitoring capacity, and the level of intergroup control. Heckathorn (1993, 1996) show that the composite of the original production function for the collective good and the production function for the incentive jointly determine a complex space with regions that differ in their strategic dilemmas and the difficulty of promoting collective action. In some regions, people will rationally use incentive systems to enforce collective action that benefits none of them. Kitts (2006) shows that incentives such as prestige, in which the value of the incentive declines with the number who share it, can paradoxically promote norms against collective action when the value of the incentive is high relative to the value of the collective good. These and other complex formal analyses of incentives provide tools for understanding why groups sometimes successfully organize to challenge authority or provide for the common good and other times fail to do so.

SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Critical mass theory; Experimental methods; Free rider problem; Moral incentives; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Rational choice theory and social movements; Social and solidary incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

The notion of situational analysis has different origins. The most relevant, historically, are Max Gluckman’s ethnography of a conventional crowd, that met at the “inauguration of a bridge in Zululand,” and Goffman’s innovative ecology of public encounters and gatherings, as exposed in Behavior in Public Places (1963). In the first case, the situational analysis was highlighting the link between face to face relationships and exchanges, and the macro-processes of the colonial society in Rhodesia; in the second case, it intended to discover an “interactional order,” meaningful in itself, “loosely coupled” with social structures. Both meanings can be found in the literature on social movements.

SITUATED INTERACTIONS: MICROMOBILIZATION AND MICRECRUIMENT

The first models of collective behavior postulated that small interactions of contagion generated crowd phenomena, as those mythified by Le Bon’s crowd psychology. But these situations of excitation, milling and imitation remained hypothetical. When markets substituted for crowds, in the 1960s literature on social movements, social trends and processes were then taken as aggregations of individual strategies and decisions. The situation became a cluster of microconstraints and opportunities the individual deals with in order to maximize, through utilitarian rational subjective choices, his/her chances of success, and better the ratio between investments and benefits.

These two models had too simple a vision of the causes and motives of engagement in social movements. Situational analysis should start with the definitions of the situation endorsed by the people and focus on situations of interaction that make them sensitive to public problems or change their biographic experience – driving them, for example, to conversion to a Japanese Buddhist movement (Snow & Machalek 1983) or to a more indirect connection to the women’s movement (Taylor 1989). Instead of constructing factors of commitment or recruitment from outside – drawing on the perspectives of resources mobilization, political process, or organizational field – situational analysis should try to account for the meaning-contexts in which the people are involved and embed microdecisions of mobilizing (McAdam 1988) in daily situations. This shift means, in terms of methods, to practice life-story, ethnography, or microhistory, instead of applying psychosocial, structural, or rational hypotheses.

INTERACTION ORDER: PUBLIC GATHERINGS

Analyzing situations means spotting and scanning meaning-contexts, in close-ups, with thick descriptions. One could go back, as a reminder, to the classical series of questions: “What was done? (act) When and where? (scene) By whom? (agent) How and why? (agency and purpose),” Goffman (1963) proposed to analyze the “interaction order” that emerges on the occasion of social gatherings such as public meetings or protest marches. He enumerated the joint activities required for gathering: the allocation of participation roles, the footing or framing devices, the regulation of mutual involvement, the focusing of audience attention, the distribution of rights and obligations, the shielding of backstage from the front-stage, the sanction of improper behavior, and the managing of emotions and consent. An ethnographic inquiry of co-presence situations was set up, relevant to settings of
occupations, meetings and marches, riots and strikes.

Following Goffman’s trail, a few researchers developed such a program of inquiry. Snow, Zurcher, and Peters (1981) suggested an ethnographically based dramaturgical model for assessing interactions among constituent collective elements of crowds, whether celebrations or protests. McPhail and Wohlstein (1983) described accurately the elementary components of “assembling process” in public demonstrations: vocal expressions, rhythm alignments, collective locomotion, and practices of coordination. Gamson (1985) proposed a typology of meetings to investigate: constituents among themselves and with their leaders, with officials, and with the media. Benford and Hunt (1982) studied how audiences are enthralled by methods of scripting, staging, performing, interpreting, and emotions managing. And Lofland fieldworked a sit-in at the California Capitol, as a case of crowd lobbying – later wondering how to reconstruct cycles, waves, and campaigns of protest out of microsituated acts, gatherings, and events (1985).

LIFE-WORLD EXPERIENCES AS CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Situational analysis is important in another perspective. Gusfield (1981) contrasted the qualities of “fluidity” and “linearity” of social movements. Social movement organizations are not war machines or protest firms, the success or failure of which can be measured by the efficiency and profitability of their strategies. Field investigations have to disclose their diffuse and minute consequences in daily life, due to interaction chains between people, who share common experiences (e.g., while engaging in awareness-raising groups), or who appropriate meanings (e.g., while taking part in audiences of public performances). These practical and symbolic consequences, either intended or not, live in one’s biographical situation, and are different from material outcomes. Situational analysis of new social movements has to describe beliefs, affectivities, sensibilities, representations, arguments, narratives, as well as moralities – the sense of rightness, justice and legitimacy – which are continuously invented and tested in face-to-face situations.

These remarks direct us to go back to situated meaning-making activities. We could take as an example, closer to Gluckman than to Goffman, Fantasia’s (1988) description of the strike of Clinton Corn, Iowa, in the 1970s. Striking is not merely applying a repertoire of action according to strategic calculations. It means choosing a way of living, organizing new forms of coordination with colleagues in picket lines or protest marches, investing in new forms of reciprocity and solidarity – thus developing a new “class consciousness.” The analysis shifts to the microtransformations of people’s experiences and relationships – for example, the disruption of daily rituals and routines and the upheaval of class, genre, and race boundaries, when women become the breadwinners and men the homekeepers. New interpersonal ties are set up. A new web of connections in the neighborhood and at the factory transforms the blue collars’ and city dwellers’ identities. The uses and meanings of private property, mutual aid, or institutional trust change as the worlds of home, work, and politics mix. The strike, as a social movement, is thus scrutinized through the lens of situational analysis.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Dramaturgy and social movements; Ethnography and social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social capital and social movements
BOB EDWARDS

INTRODUCTION

Scattered mentions of “social capital” or similar terms date back at least to the 1920s, yet the concept did not gain currency and widespread use until popularized by the work of Robert Putnam in the 1990s. By the time Putnam’s book *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* came out in 2001, criticisms had already emerged regarding the scope of social, economic, and political processes social capital was said to affect, the lack of clarity in its conceptualization, and about both the validity and reliability of how it was being measured (Foley, Edwards, & Diani 2001). In the years since, the scholarly literature using some conceptualization of social capital has exploded, with the term appearing in the titles of over 300 books and upward of 6000 scholarly articles. The diversity of definition and elasticity of measurement evidenced in much of the recent literature confirms concerns expressed a decade ago that social capital was becoming merely a catch-all concept capable of solving any problem from local to global and thus problematic.

Nevertheless, “social capital” should not be dismissed as a passing fad by those interested in social movements. It is a quintessentially sociological concept that has long been identified as both an important resource facilitating social movement mobilization and a significant outcome produced by social movement activities. A careful conceptualization of social capital that differentiates it from other forms of capital – material, human, cultural – has much to offer the study of social movements and provides a much needed analytical corrective to overly economic and individualist theories of social innovation and political change. The remainder of this entry clarifies the theoretical origins of social capital, defines it, and discusses its importance for social movements as both a resource and an outcome.

FOUR TRIBUTARIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

Four tributaries of theorizing have shaped current conceptualizations of social capital in the recent social science literature. The work of Robert Putnam popularized a notion of social capital which ties it to the societal production of collective goods such as civic engagement, a spirit of cooperation, or generalized trust and reciprocity, which are presumed to be unambiguously good and equally available for use by all members of a given society. In this tributary social capital is a social-psychological and cultural phenomenon congruent with Talcott Parsons’ melding of Durkheim’s macrosociology and Max Weber’s social psychology into the structural-functionalism tradition predominant in American political science since the 1950s. This view oversimplifies social capital by relabeling an older conceptualization of culture as the ideas, norms, values, and attitudes that get internalized by individuals in a society through a socialization process that resembles a sponge soaking up water. Students of social movements who wish to use the civic culture theory underlying this conceptualization of social capital should engage the arguments of Almond and Verba (1963) directly.

By contrast, the three remaining tributaries of social capital theorizing have much to offer people interested in better understanding political and social movements. That associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu stresses differential access to resources via the possession of more or less durable relationships, socially constructed through “an endless effort at institution” (Bourdieu 1986: 249). In Bourdieu’s
view the fundamental structures that produce and reproduce access to social capital are neither the utility maximizing behavior of individuals, nor self-regulating markets, but networks of relationships connecting individuals, groups, and organizations. Where Bourdieu builds his notion of social capital on essentially Durkheimian microfoundations, James Coleman (1988) incorporates a similar understanding of social capital into a more economistic theory grounded in the rational choice of individuals. Bourdieu’s macrosociology owes its greatest debt to Marx, while Coleman’s methodological individualism remains solidly within the functionalist tradition of Parsons. Third, social network scholars have been working for several decades to develop an empirically based theory of social structure and action in which the resources embedded in specific networks are accessible to facilitate the actions of individuals within that network by virtue of their network location (Lin & Erickson 2008).

Despite their differences, the theoretical tributaries represented by Bourdieu, Coleman and Lin are broadly compatible for three reasons. First, they see social capital as relational and embedded in specific social networks and contexts. Second, social capital, like any other resource, is neither evenly distributed, nor equally accessible to all social movement actors in a given society. Third, all three recognize that social context influences the “use value” of social capital for the movement. By contrast, the civic culture tradition discussed above tends to downplay or outright deny the relational and context-dependent nature of social capital at the heart of the concept’s analytical usefulness.

WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL?

Social capital is best conceived as networked access to resources. Social capital is a relational and structural concept referring to the ability of individuals or groups to utilize their social relations and positions in various social networks to access a variety of resources, and to accumulate a reservoir of accessible resources by consciously investing in social relations.

Unlike the political culture conceptualization of social capital, the three other tributaries of social capital theory all take the analogy with financial capital seriously. Despite their differences, they conceptualize social capital as resources embedded in and accessible through social relations that facilitate the flow of goods and services to individuals and groups in a society. Social capital is not, in these views, a collective good that individuals appropriate directly from their broader culture. Rather social capital is embedded in social relations and access to it, or any other resources it makes available, is not distributed equally among the individuals, organizations, or social movements in a society.

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

That dense levels of pre-existing social organization among adherents facilitates the emergence, mobilization, and varied activities of social movements is one of the most consistent findings to emerge from nearly four decades of social movement research. Until recently social movement researchers seldom discussed these findings in terms of “social capital,” though if one reviews that body of work from the vantage point of recent theorizing, it becomes apparent that the structural and relational variant of social capital advocated here has long been an important element in the analysis of social movements.

Researchers have highlighted several forms of social organization that have served as the mobilizing structures for social movements: infrastructures, social ties and networks, groups, coalitions, and organizations. Infrastructures are the social-organizational equivalent of public goods like the postal service, roads, or the Internet, that facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday life. They are non-proprietary or open-access social resources. By contrast, access to social networks, coalitions, and especially groups and formal organizations can be limited by insiders. Thus, access to
resources embedded in them can be hoarded by insiders and denied to outsiders, often intensifying existing inequalities among groups in their ability to utilize crucial resources of other kinds. Because the resources embedded in various forms of social organization are not equally accessible to all members of a given society, social organization per se does not constitute social capital though it does increase the likelihood that social movement actors will be able to access resources. Social movement actors can be said to have social capital when resources are both present and accessible, in other words when they are actually available for use.

In order for social movements to convert social resources (the “raw materials” of social capital) into social capital two distinct, but necessary, components must be present. First, individual or collective actors must perceive that a specific resource is present in their social context. Second, they must have an exchange relationship that brokers individual or group access to a resource. Exchange relationships exist between two entities when resources of various kinds are made available and accessed. Exchange relationships are, however, not reducible simply to “social ties” in a strictly structural sense though they are closely related. All exchange relationships involve ties, but a tie per se only indicates the opportunity for an exchange and does not carry with it the social or cultural meaning of a relationship between entities. Thus, in a strictly structural analysis of social ties, networks or other forms of social organization are necessary, but not sufficient, for understanding social capital. Without some knowledge of the content of the social relations and of the specific resources available through them, one cannot assess the amount of social capital an individual, organization, or movement actually has at its disposal.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT AGENCY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

In closing, the role of social movement agency and strategy in producing and utilizing social capital merits emphasis. Social movement organizations (SMOs) often seek to overcome resource scarcities in several ways. Resource aggregation refers to the ways a movement or organization converts resources held by dispersed individuals into collective resources that can be allocated by movement actors. Such efforts both rely upon and build social capital as they access existing resources, pool them, and make them available for specific movement purposes. Similarly, social movements often co-opt or appropriate resources by utilizing relationships they have with nonmovement organizations and groups to access resources previously produced or aggregated by those other organizations. Perhaps most importantly social movements self-produce needed resources through the agency of their own SMOs, activists, and participants. Movements produce social-organizational resources when they found new social movement organizations, develop networks, and form issue coalitions (Diani 1996; Minkoff 1997). All of these endeavors utilize social capital to gain access to resources and produce new social capital as an important outcome of collective action.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Interest groups and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Networks and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social change and social movements
KENNETH T. ANDREWS

Do movements matter? The impact of movements on patterns of social change is one of the most enduring topics in the study of protest and social movements, and it has gained considerable attention in recent years. Understanding this complex topic requires careful attention to several interrelated issues including conceptualizing social change and appraising whether movements matter and, if so, how. Debates continue regarding how significant movements are for explanations of social change, the conditions under which movements matter, and the movement characteristics associated with greater or lesser impact.

CONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL CHANGE

The first challenge that scholars face is defining social change in a way that is useful and meaningful. In earlier scholarship, analysts focused on success to gauge whether movements achieved core goals. However, success or goal attainment models were criticized for assuming high consensus and stability on movement objectives and ignoring the unintended consequences of movements. Movements often have many objectives that change over time. Unintended impacts occur, for example, when movements motivate other groups to mobilize. In current scholarship, social scientists prefer impacts, consequences, or outcomes and use these terms interchangeably.

What impacts, consequences, or outcomes should scholars consider? Amenta’s “collective benefits” criterion provides the most useful framework in which he recommends identifying outcomes in relation to the benefits or costs to a movement’s constituency (see Amenta 2006; Amenta et al. 2010). Andrews (2004) builds on this framework by arguing that scholars should focus on outcomes across extended time periods and across multiple domains to assess the durability and breadth of movement influence.

Movement influence on social change may be direct as when authorities respond to protester demands. More often, movement influence is indirect or mediated by established political actors (Soule & Olzak 2004; Amenta 2006), the news media (Gamson 1990; Andrews & Caren 2010), public opinion (Agnone 2007), or other processes.

Movement consequences can be differentiated by their substantive domain – political, economic, and so forth. Undoubtedly, scholars have made the most progress studying the political consequences of movements in democratic societies – especially public policy. Cultural, economic, and biographical consequences are the three other domains that have been the focus of recent scholarship.

Studies of movement consequences have built on the work of political scientists to identify distinct stages in the policy process. This typically includes agenda setting, policy alternatives, policy adoption, and implementation. Above all else, this research has shown that movement influence is greatest at the earliest stages by drawing the attention of political elites to a movement’s claims (Soule & King 2006). Movement influence is considerably reduced in the crafting of policy alternatives or the passage of legislation. Other work on the political consequences has examined the implementation of policy, the election of movement supported candidates to office, and the impact of movements on political parties (Andrews 2004).

Cultural approaches to the study of social movements have grown in recent years, and scholars are beginning to examine the cultural consequences of movements (Earl 2004). This work is wide-ranging, reflecting the many ways...
that culture has been conceptualized in movement studies and in the social sciences. One strand of work considers the formation of new frames and collective identities as important outcomes of movements. For example, Rochon (2000) argues that critical communities of intellectuals forge the core ideas that movements diffuse into the broader society. Movements may also alter media discourse, public opinion, or scientific and intellectual communities (Ferree et al. 2002; Frickel & Gross 2005).

Although political process approaches shifted attention away from the economic causes and consequences of movements, scholars have been returning to enduring questions about the impact of strikes and labor organizing (Martin 2008). This work points to organizational competition and innovative organizing models as critical for labor movement gains. In addition, organizational and movement scholars have begun work on the impact of movements on markets including the formation of alternative markets, products, and regulatory systems (Bartley 2007; Schneiberg, King, & Smith 2008) and boycotts and protest targeting the behavior of large corporations (Ingram, Yue, & Rao 2010).

Beyond the political, cultural, and economic consequences described here, scholars have investigated the biographical, demographic, and legal impacts of movements. In addition, the impact of movements on subsequent movements—either by provoking counter-movements or inspiring allies—is another critical legacy of some movements. Here, scholars have identified the ways that movement ideas, tactics, organizational models, identities, and personnel directly and indirectly influence future movements.

MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Why are some movements more impactful than others? Two major debates have organized scholarship on this question concerning organization and disruption. First, scholars have considered whether organization enhances movement influence, or more precisely what kinds of organizations and resources matter. Early debates considered whether formal, bureaucratic, and mass membership organizations increased the likelihood of achieving movement goals (Gamson 1990). Piven and Cloward (1977) contended that mass membership organizations promote the routinization of protest and undercut leverage for what they call “poor people’s movements.” This question spilled into a related question of whether disruption is the primary source of movement leverage. Evidence remains mixed, with some studies showing that disruption imposes costs on targets that may motivate concession (King & Soule 2007). Others find that strong organizations and leadership structures yield gains even in the absence of disruption (Cress & Snow 2000).

Moving beyond the organization and disruption debates, recent work has considered whether organizational and strategic diversity and adaptability facilitates movement impact. Andrews’ “movement infrastructure” model integrates these insights by arguing that movements with diverse leaders, organizations, and resources are better able to secure gains. The underlying insight is that movement impact may depend on several mechanisms including disruption, persuasion, or negotiation/bargaining (Andrews 2004). Adaptation may allow challengers to maintain strategic advantages by catching targets off guard or develop more persuasive arguments, and organizational and leadership diversity may facilitate innovation and multiple mechanisms of influence (Ganz 2000; McCammon et al. 2008).

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Efforts to understand the consequences of movements must consider several important factors beyond the movement itself. At the most basic level, threats to spuriousness must be appraised. In other words, the factors that
explain the rise of movements may account for their apparent impact. Not surprisingly, scholars have focused most on the dimension of the political opportunity structure – especially electoral competition and elite allies – given the relatively large number of studies on policy outcomes. More recently, public opinion has been examined based on the hypothesis that favorable opinion may be necessary for movements to impact the policy process. We should expect to see an increasing number of studies that consider the ways economic and cultural contexts shape the possibilities of movement impact as scholars consider outcomes in these domains.

Another important development is the formation of more complex models of movement influence. In particular, some theoretical expectations identify contingent effects – for example, that militant tactics will be effective in some situations but backfire in others. Amenta’s “political mediation” model (2006) moves in this direction by specifying that different political contexts alter whether and how movements matter. For example, the theory would expect modest forms of mobilization to yield benefits in regimes where barriers to participation are low and political authorities are favorable toward the movement and its constituency.

SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Although considerable gains have been made in recent years, the study of movement consequences remains underdeveloped in comparison to other major topics such as movement origins or differential participation. Scholars have developed strong conceptual frameworks for examining consequences, and there are exemplary studies using a wide range of methods. Further work is needed that draws systematic comparisons across movements, that provides a much closer analysis of the interactions between movements and their targets, and that considers the consequences of movements for social inequality.

SEE ALSO: Biographical consequences of activism; Culture and social movements; Outcomes, cultural; Outcomes, political; Political mediation model; Political process theory; Social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social class and social movements
KLAUS EDER

THE STATE OF THE ART

The link between social class and social movements refers back to the assumption of Karl Marx that in some specified cases the formation of social classes is connected with the mobilization of these classes. Social movements then become what Marx has called “Klassen für sich,” classes conscious of themselves. Marx points to the small tenants in France as a famous example of a class not capable of developing a collective consciousness of itself and therefore being unable to act collectively. He referred to them as a “sack of potatoes.” Regarding the industrial worker, Marx was much more optimistic because of the intersection of two critical factors: (1) the presumed centrality of the conflict this emerging class would address; and (2) the social conditions that link the proletarian workers via their concentration in the industrial workplace and the urban housing conditions which makes communication and strong relationships among them more probable.

This Marxian analytical model for explaining social movements as the mobilization of social classes in space and time has been applied to research on the working poor and their capacity for collective action (Piven & Cloward 1979) as well as on farmworkers and peasants (Paige 1975; Landsberger 1976; Jenkins & Perrow 1977). The latter research plays an important role in research on peripheral capitalism where the issue of a class outside industrial production and linked to food production is the starting point for analyzing peasant movements, especially in Latin America. These “forgotten” classes are often linked to populist mobilizations, which points to an emerging nexus of class and mobilization in present-day societies (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2007).

Yet the most important debate has taken place in the core capitalist countries, triggered by the rise of the new social movements beginning in the second half of the last century. Here the debate was turned on its head: it did not begin with the idea of changing social relations of production or changing relations of power, but started with the outcomes of such relations, namely the series of protest events in the second half of the last century, a phenomenon that has continued with the rise of transnational activism. Here the issue of class emerged in search of a social basis for these movements similar to the one that Marx identified earlier.

The prominent idea guiding this search for explaining the rise of the new social movements in the analytical tradition of Marx (and Weber) is the assumption that the new social movements are an outcome of the mobilization of the middle classes. A partial theory pointing in that direction has been the argument that fascist movements have been (and still are) an outcome of mobilizing the middle classes (of the untaming of the petty bourgeois) (Elliott et al. 1982; Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993; Maheu 1995). The counterargument (Pakulski 1993a) has pointed to the dissolution of class in the course of the increasing social differentiation of groups in modern societies, with the result that the concept of class should be dropped. In retrospect, both camps have been right: classes are as complex as they have ever been, but they were also complex when Marx wrote The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852). The expectation that classes would crystallize into a few antagonistic forces has proved wrong; but this is not to say that complex class structures no longer generate classes as groups sharing certain properties. Thus, the issue turns into an empirical issue: What are the boundaries of the groups that were mobilized in the new
social movements and that are still mobilized in today’s transnational activism.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The classic idea of Marxian sociology that social movements are the expression of the interests of suppressed classes is half the truth. Inequality and being situated on the negative side of this social relation can be an important source of motivation for collective action. Yet those on the positive side of this social relation, those who are well off, might engage in collective action, but for reasons that have less to do with being disadvantaged than with moral reasons which define a given social relationship as unacceptable or simply against a sense of justice. Religious movements have often had this orientation, and the movement of the Enlightenment could be counted as a case of that.

Such material and moral interests, that address an unequal social relation, mingle with elements which define social relations among people who are similar or dissimilar and not necessarily unequal to each other. Ethnic movements, nationalist movements, or communal movements are movements that address boundaries between people that affect social relations of (non)recognition. In these cases, the concept of class alone is not so useful, since there are other factors that lead to group alignments and relations.

When dealing with class and social movements, we should be cautious about mixing these two forms of relation since it can lead to the fallacy of false averaging across cases. The link between class and social movements varies within the type of phenomena of collective action in which class-related issues of social relations, namely inequality, constitute the site for collective action. Marx was right in arguing that societies in which class relations are no longer embedded in moral bonds of hierarchical dependencies are cases in which we should expect collective action on unequal social relations to become the dominant mode of social conflict.

What Marx did not take adequately into account has been the mobilization of well-off classes against social inequality in the name of some norms of justice. Such “altruistic” social movements emerged in older societies when religious prophets dissociated from the dominant groups in order to act as proxies for the disadvantaged. This tradition is equally found in the emerging industrial society of the nineteenth century when welfare groups mobilized to counter the effects of early capitalism and it is continued – visible even by its naming – in the global justice movement.

The distinction between equality-oriented and recognition-oriented social movements is first of all an analytical one. The separation of networks of equal social relations from social relations of recognition requires clear methodological rules for separating effects of class from nonclass effects on collective action. Therefore, it is misleading to argue that the extent to which class does not covary with collective action is a proof of the causal effect (or non-effect) of class. What needs to be figured out is under which conditions the coupling of class and collective action is operative and to what extent it connects to nonclass parameters in generating collective action. Even the complete decoupling of class and collective action is possible – which presupposes a situation in which issues of unequal social relations are neutralized in favor of identity conflicts over recognition (an example being collective action based on nothing but struggles for boundaries, such as nationalist or fascist movements). The debate on the changing role of class in social movements is important, yet it becomes useless as long as it is framed in terms of an end of class in social movements (Pakulski 1993b; Pakulski & Waters 1996). Apart from being premature, such claims can only hold in situations that are underspecified. The historical variability of situations is so wide that any attempt to generalize will lead to contradictory results which inhibit further research. To find a temporal pattern in the rise or decline of class in social movements can only be linked to processes in which unequal social relations
are weakened in the long run. It would be sufficient to claim that declining inequalities will lower class-determined action. Yet even this link might have to be relativized by symbolic factors defining what constitutes an illegitimate violation of equality. It is to be expected that the competition of groups related to each other as unequal will continue to shape the evolution of societies. Therefore we will still have to reckon with class and with its variations.

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

Class and social movements can be seen from both an individual and a group perspective. Taking the individualist perspective, classes are aggregations of objective and subjective properties of individuals. Yet such conceptions produce nothing more than classes on paper, statistical constructions of possible groups with shifting boundaries in time and space. In network-analytic terms, we can engage in block-modeling of classes. Such classes on paper yet do not produce causal effects. They need some “glue” that makes sense of being positioned unequally or being deprived of recognition.

Classes are therefore groups of people that share some idea of being positioned in the world. Within these groups the variation of subjective properties might vary to the same, and even to a greater, extent than between groups. What makes an aggregate of individuals a group (or a class as a special case of a group) is shared meaning. Social movements take up such meaning and give to it a radical interpretation, often via framing processes and often in conflict with the class from which they emerge. Once we take class not simply as an aggregate of individuals, but as an emergent group level phenomenon on the methodological level, the link between class and social movements can be turned into the empirical issue of identifying different degrees of the group relationship of people sharing social positions in a society. The issue is not so much the theory but the methodology which helps or hinders us to see the way in which groups, as meaningful networks of actors, provide the ideas and the actors to form social movements. Moving from variable-oriented individualistic accounts of class to network-analytic accounts is therefore important in order to reanimate the old issue of class and social movements. In this way, we avoid the declaration of the death of class which has had a perverse effect: the death of research on the link between class and social movements.

SEE ALSO: Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Fascist movements; Framing and social movements; Global Justice Movement; Marxism and social movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Political economy and social movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social control is such a widely recognized concept that one would suspect that a consensual definition of it exists. That is not the case. While one can generally define social control as the formal and informal processes that socialize, sanction, and/or reward individuals for conformity, and produce social regularity, specific definitions of social control vary widely (see Meier’s 1982 discussion on this point and his fascinating history of the concept). In its broadest definition, childhood socialization plays an important role in social control, ongoing social influence processes such as shaming rituals play critical roles in informal social control, and law enforcement and the legal system play critical roles in formal social control. Moreover, social control can involve fairly innocent creations of conformity that generally bring great social good (i.e., driving on the same side of the street and acknowledging and abiding by common rules of the road) or can involve a dark side where conformity is achieved through the loss of liberty, individuality, and free expression. Perhaps because of this breadth and dimensionality, Sutton (1996) has argued that the concept goes too far and is too imprecise; he recommends abandoning the term altogether and using a more precise term such as sanctioning instead.

Nonetheless, in the study of social movements, social control has a far more well-defined set of meanings and can play an important conceptual role in uniting work on control processes. I discuss the various ways in which social control has been used in social movement research and related fields and then discuss how its conceptual utility in social movement scholarship might be much higher than in other areas.

REPRESSION AS SOCIAL CONTROL

The most obvious place in which social control is relevant to the study of social movements is through the study of repression. Repression operates to control and/or constrain protest, or to entirely prevent protest in some cases. However, despite the almost endless routes for controlling or constraining protest, repression researchers focus heavily on coercive state action at the expense of studying private repression and noncoercive forms of repression (e.g., channeling). Earl (2004) argues that by repositioning repression under the rubric of social control, or studying what she refers to as the “social control of protest” or, more briefly, “protest control,” scholars could more easily recognize the array of social actors (private and varying types of public actors) that may attempt to control or constrain protest and the wide variety of actions such actors could use to accomplish their goals.

For instance, company towns are complex social control systems that very effectively prevent the emergence and/or spread of protest and yet these have only infrequently been the source of social movement research (see Gaventa 1980 as an exception). Similarly, what Ferree (2005) has referred to as “soft” repression – which includes ridicule, stigma, and other forms of shaming and silencing – is easy to categorize as a form of protest control even if repression scholars have been slow to recognize the relevance of these actions. At the most general level, then, reference to the social control of protest is an attempt to broaden the repression research agenda to include less coercive, even less formal, and often private forms of protest control.
SURVEILLANCE STUDIES AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Although repression researchers have examined covert repression (e.g., Cunningham 2004) and surveillance as a type of repression (e.g., Marx 1974, 1979, 1988; Boykoff 2007), an entirely separate field of “surveillance studies” has emerged over the last few decades. This field has largely emerged from research on information technologies and legal research on privacy (see Marx & Muschert’s 2007 discussion of the development of surveillance studies). For instance, the dramatic rise of public surveillance systems like closed-circuit television systems and private and government use of large consumer and voter databases has led to concerns about the development of surveillance societies.

Repression researchers and surveillance studies scholars have overlapping concerns: most obviously, both are concerned with the use of surveillance as a form of social monitoring and social control, the tools and methods used to accomplish surveillance, and the consequences of surveillance for activism. Of course, surveillance studies also examine topics of less interest to social movement scholars (e.g., the use of hitherto private information in legal settings). But the overlap between the two areas is substantial enough that one might expect notable interactions between the areas. This is largely not the case. The two sets of scholars often publish in separate journals, have distinct scholastic identities, and have different primary literatures (social movement studies versus information studies, for instance). Key theorists also differ between the two areas: for instance, Foucault is a critical theorist for most surveillance studies scholars but of less central concern to most repression researchers. For a clear contrast in the tone and nature of inquiry in these two areas, compare works like Cunningham (2004) or Marx (1979) from social movement studies to Ball’s (2009) work in surveillance studies.

Yet, as I will discuss below, under a rubric of social control, the question for social movement scholars becomes what they can learn from surveillance studies about the monitoring and control of citizens generally and protest specifically. That is, if social movement scholars were to be concerned with the social control of protest, rather than repression as it has been classically studied, many of the main research questions in surveillance studies would be seen as of great import in social movement research.

CENSORSHIP AS SOCIAL CONTROL

Social movement scholars have been interested in censorship, particularly when studying social movement activism in nondemocratic states. For instance, Ball (2005) points to the need to find alternative ways to track state violence since regimes are likely to cover up and then censor news about state-based attacks on civilians.

Nonetheless, there is a wide and sprawling literature on censorship that is neither confined to repression studies nor social movement studies. For instance, while all of the following touch on the edges of social movement studies, none have not been central to the study of repression: (1) research on the censorship of artistic expression; (2) debates about pornography, its effects, and its proper regulation; and (3) legal debates about the boundaries between free speech versus material that is properly censored even in a democratic state. Below, I take up how research agendas might be altered if they were reoriented around social control and hence included more of the research terrain on censorship as relevant to social movement studies.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS SOCIAL CONTROL

In a provocative article, Oliver (2008) argues that social movement scholars have been ruefully indifferent to trends in mass incarceration in the US. Over the past several decades, the percentage of people (particularly minorities)
in the US that are in jails or prisons or on probation or parole has skyrocketed. Oliver argues that the disproportionate imprisonment of people of color has dramatically affected the mobilization potential of the civil rights movement. Yet, repression researchers have not seen mass incarceration as a form of repression, in part because there is no evidence that mass incarceration was intended to affect the civil rights movement. Oliver notes that, whether there was intention or not, there is a demonstrable effect of mass incarceration on the civil rights movement and that this deserves further interrogation.

This move would represent a major fusion between repression research and sociolegal research. But, that fusion is hard to make when concepts like repression seem to require intention. A study of the social control of protest, though, would not necessarily see intention as a necessary element of social control and therefore might more readily recognize and facilitate this kind of research.

SOCIAL CONTROL PROCESSES WITHIN MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Almost entirely unnoticed by repression researchers are the ways in which movements try to regulate their own members. This issue was an obvious theme of older research on religious and utopian movements (e.g., Kanter 1968) and of contemporary research on groups that vigorously police membership (e.g., Scientology: Peckham 1998), but is otherwise a relatively neglected area of social movement scholarship generally. However, if repression research were broadened to research on the social control of protest, these internal control dynamics would be much more apparent.

SOCIAL CONTROL AS AN INTEGRATING CONCEPT

In each of the areas above, I have tried to show the potential research connections between existing areas of research and/or empirical phenomena and core concerns of repression researchers. However, as Earl (2004) argued, the concept of repression has become so stylistically defined that it now conceals from study as much as illuminates. Social control, while too broad a concept to be useful to some research areas (see Sutton’s argument about social control as a concept in sociolegal studies), offers precisely the breadth and connection to other areas that repression as a concept increasingly lacks. Whether the social control of protest will become a vigorous area of study, or whether research will remain defined around repression, remains to be seen.

SEE ALSO: Agents provocateurs; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Policing protest; Political socialization and social movements; Public order management systems; Repression and social movements; Social control errors.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social control errors
WILLIAM A. GAMSON

Social movements that are unhappy with the choices of authorities must be handled in some fashion. The most basic distinction in how authorities respond to movement pressure is between (1) changing their decisions and policies, and (2) making some effort to control the social movement. The former response deals with the content of the unhappiness by modifying outcomes; the latter deals with controlling the source of the pressure for change. If social control is successful, there will be no need for outcome modification.

Successful social control allows authorities to maximize their room for maneuverability and this has several advantages (Gamson 1968: 115): (1) authorities are freer to exercise their own personal preferences; (2) if they have no particular preferences, they can use their authority as a resource to influence the decisions of other authorities in which they have an interest; and (3) effective social control increases slack resource, making influence cheaper. As Dahl (1961: 309) writes, “Slack resources provide political entrepreneur[s] with [their] dazzling opportunity.” They can influence at bargain rates when the competition has been removed by effective social control.

Major social changes through the influence of social movements can occur for two basic reasons: bad decisions or social control errors. Authorities may make decisions which adversely affect such a large and influential group that even the most skillful efforts at social control are not enough to contain the pressures for change. Or, the techniques of social control used may be so clumsy and ineffective that they stimulate greater mobilization rather than containing the pressure.

Movements may try to increase their effectiveness by deliberately trying to create social control errors. Such errors may be quite important in accelerating the pace of change. They may lead a social movement to new allies and increase the commitment of their supporters. They may also lead to the loss of legitimacy and trust in existing authorities and thus weaken the ability of officials to enforce their decisions and make new commitments. And they may create such serious instability that bystanders will now find the status quo intolerable.

In this situation, the natural advantage that accrues to those supporting the status quo switches to those who support change (Gamson 1968: 191). This possibility has on occasion led some social movements to welcome a worsening of social conditions on the grounds that the resultant crisis will enhance the possibilities of more fundamental social changes. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of movements, many different kinds of changes may follow and the relative probability of changes that are deplored may be enhanced even more than the probability of the changes desired.

Hence, while social control errors may accelerate the pace of change, a group which deliberately tries to create them is playing with fire. Authorities, as Dahl (1961: 320) points out, “have access to extensive political resources which they employ at a high rate with superior efficiency. Consequently, a challenge to the existing norms is bound to be costly to the challenger, for legitimist professionals can quickly shift their skills and resources into the urgent task of doing in the dissenter.”

SPECIFIC SOCIAL CONTROL ERRORS

Still, the application of social control is a delicate business, requiring discipline and intelligence on the part of the authorities if it is to dampen and remove pressure more than stimulating it. The shattered remains of many administrations and regimes testify to the fact
that serious errors are made. More specifically (Gamson 1968: 191–192):

- Removal of partisan leaders by exile, imprisonment, or execution can backfire. It offers a movement with strong secondary leadership an opportunity to mobilize its supporters to the fullest and to draw in sympathetic bystanders, especially if the pretext for repression is weak and unconvincing. However, such repression may be successful if the movement is weak and the regime is sufficiently strong, making repression an extremely dangerous social control technique for a movement to invite.

- Attempts to degrade and slander social movement participants can arouse sympathy and support for them among bystanders. If there is latent support, such actions may bring it into the open and thus strengthen the group. It may also succeed in scaring off some supporters, perhaps at the same time it helps the movement grow. Verbal attacks can do both at the same time by polarizing the attitudes of potential supporters.

- “Over persuasion” can create pressure for change through what one might call a “Frankenstein mechanism” (Gamson 1968: 193). Authorities may, in order to mobilize supporters for their policies, make strenuous efforts to persuade through their greater access to the mass media and other forums. If such efforts are successful, the same officials may find themselves under fire from the very people most persuaded. For example, having made strenuous efforts to convince constituents of the righteousness of a war, the convinced may use the administration’s own arguments to press for dramatic military action which the officials are reluctant to undertake.

A Frankenstein mechanism may also succeed in stimulating expectations which go unfulfilled. Broken promises fail to stimulate pressure when they are regarded with cynicism, but making such promises more credible without fulfilling them makes them more likely to create increased pressure for change rather than reducing it.

In conclusion, the application of social control by authorities to reduce the pressure of social movements is typically double-edged. If applied skillfully, it offers authorities a number of advantages. But it can very easily backfire and often does. And when it does, such social control errors can provide social movements with increased opportunities for bringing about social change.

SEE ALSO: Injustice frames; Movement/counter-movement dynamics; Repression and social movements; Social control; State breakdown and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Social movements
DAVID A. SNOW

Social movements and related phenomena, such as protest demonstrations and revolutions, are collective actions through which aggrieved collectivities give voice publicly to various grievances and press relevant authorities to attend to the associated claims and/or demands. The grievances generally range from political and religious oppression to socioeconomic inequalities to procedural and/or rights-based inequalities to all kinds of lifestyle concerns and perceived social and environmental harms. Although there are more institutionlized and typically less public forums in which collectivities can express their grievances and concerns, particularly in democratic societies, social movements have functioned as an important vehicle for articulating and pressing an aggrieved collective’s interests and claims for much of human history. Certainly many of the most significant events and changes throughout the course of human history – such as the rise and spread of Christianity and Islam, the Reformation, and the French, American, Russian, and Chinese communist revolutions, for example – cannot be fully understood apart from the operation and influence of social movements. Similarly, many of the world’s most influential and famous figures – such as Jesus Christ, the apostle Paul, Muhammad, Martin Luther, Lenin, Gandhi, Mao Zedong, Martin Luther King, Jr, and Nelson Mandela – gained their celebrity and influence, in part, from the movements with which they were associated and/or lead. And, today, it is difficult to name a contested social issue with which a social movement is not associated on at least one side of the issue. Whatever the issue – abortion, animal rights, border control, civil rights, human rights, democratization, environmental warming, gender equality, gun control, immigration, labor and unions, nuclear weapons, religious freedom, war, water conservation and control, and world poverty – one typically finds one or more associated social movements. Whether we live in a “movement society” or world, as some scholars have suggested (Meyer & Tarrow 1998), there is little question but that social movements are important social phenomena and that our understanding of the social world, both past and present, is partly beholden to our understanding of social movements and the activities and events with which they are associated.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

As with many concepts in the social sciences, there is little consensus as to how best to define social movements. Some scholars emphasize the strategic, rational, and organized character of social movements (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978); others focus on the networked and coalitional character of movements (Diani 1992; della Porta & Diani 2006); some accent the ideological element of movements (Zald 2000); still others emphasize the “manifestly political” character of movements as a form of contentious politics with one or more governments as a claimant or target of claims (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001); and some scholars argue for a more inclusive and elastic conceptualization, one that conceives of movements broadly as collective challenges to institutional, organizational, and cultural domains other than just the state or the polity (Snow 2004; Snow & Soule 2010). However, one does not have to choose one emphasis or focus over another so long as it is recognized that each conceptualization accents a particular dimension or aspect of social movements, much like the case of the storied description of an elephant rendered by six blind men on the basis of the part they touched: all parts were important features of the elephant but alone could not
provide a complete picture of the beast in the absence of the other parts. And so it is with social movements. Thus, whatever dimensions of movements a scholar might accent, it can be argued that all social movements share a number of characteristics that together define the phenomenon. First, all movements are change-oriented in the sense that they seek or oppose change, although there can be considerable variation in the level and degree of change sought; second, movements are, as a consequence of this change-orientation, challengers to or defenders of existing institutional structures or systems of authority, be they political, religious, corporate, educational, or cultural; third, movements are collective rather than individual enterprises; fourth, they act outside of existing institutional or organizational arrangements, although in varying degrees, with some movements employing only extra-institutional tactics and others working within institutional channels while also engaging in some extra-institutional collective action; fifth, they operate with some degree of organization, ranging from a single social movement organization (SMO) to a network or coalition of movement organizations that may vary in the degree to which they are tightly or loosely coupled; and, sixth, social movements typically display some degree of temporal continuity — they are relatively episodic but rarely fly-by-the-night fads that are here today and gone tomorrow.

TYPES OF MOVEMENTS

Although all social movements can be defined in part by the above characteristics, they can also be differentiated in terms of these characteristics. The most common axis of such differentiation concerns the degree or amount of change pursued, which makes sense since the promotion of or resistance to change is the raison d’être of virtually all social movements. The most basic distinction in this regard is between reform and revolutionary movements. A more subtle distinction is provided by Smelser’s (1962) differentiation between norm-oriented and value-oriented movements. Norm-oriented movements are said to seek relatively limited but specific system changes, mainly with respect to rights and rules of access and participation in the various societal institutions. Examples might include movements that have sought to change labor laws, decriminalize marijuana, expand or restrict immigrant rights, and criminalize or decriminalize abortion. Value-oriented movements, in contrast, seek more fundamental changes in cultural values and institutional structures and practices, as with movements that seek to redefine the fundamental rights and privileges of personhood and citizenship, like the Gandhi-led Indian Independence Movement and the African American civil rights movement, or those that have sought to recalibrate the very structure of political governance and association and the values on which they are based, as with the French and American revolutions.

Wallis (1984) provided a similar typology with his distinction between world-rejecting and world-affirming movements. Although developed to capture differences mainly among religious movements, this dichotomy parallels the norm- and value-oriented distinctions. The world-rejecting movement, like the value-oriented movement, condemns the dominant social order, including both its values and institutional arrangements, as with the Jim Jones movement that ended in mass suicide. The world-affirming movement, like the norm-oriented movement, is less contemptuous of the prevailing religious or social order and thus seeks more selective changes in specific segments of that enveloping order, as with the Liberation theology movement in South America (Smith 1991).

By focusing on the amount or degree of change sought, the above schemes provide one basis for differentiating among movements, but they are incomplete because they neglect the fact that change can have a different focus or occur at different levels. This oversight was addressed by the anthropologist Aberle (1966) in his research on the Peyote religion among
the Navaho Indians in the southwest region of the US. He differentiated among movements based both on the degree of change and the locus or level of change sought, directing attention to the target of change, which can vary from the individual level to some aspect of the broader structure. Based on the cross-classification of these two dimensions, Aberle derived four generic types of movements: alternative movements, which seek partial change in individuals, as in the case of the therapeutic and self-help movements that proliferated in the US in the 1970s and 1980s; redemptive movements, which seek more complete or total rather than partial change among individuals, which was the objective of various religious movements that flowered in the 1970s, such as the Hare Krishna and Unification Church (Moonies) movements; reformative movements, which seek limited but focused changes in the social system like the normative and world-affirming movements noted above; and transformative movements, which are akin to value-oriented and revolutionary movements.

An alternative approach to differentiating social movements takes a more historical approach, contrasting movements clustered in different historical areas. Differences in the amount and locus of change sought are not ignored, but the crucial criterion is the affinity between certain historical trends or changes and movement goals. Perhaps the most cogent illustration of this approach is found in Mannheim’s *Utopia and Ideology* (1946), wherein he identifies four major waves of movements in so-called modern times: chiliastic movements expressed in some religious movements and peasant revolts; liberal humanitarian movements associated most dramatically with the French and American revolutions; conservative movements expressed most fully in fascism and Nazism; and socialist movements associated mainly with international communism but also influencing labor movements in the US, Europe, and elsewhere. Extending Mannheim’s historical approach, Turner (1969: 391–395) has argued that “major eras in history have differed in the dominant sense of injustice which underlay the major movements of the time and dictated the main direction of social change,” contending that both the liberal humanitarian and socialist conceptions of injustice have been exhausted and that “a new revision is in the making.” Foreshadowing aspects of new social movement theory, Turner argued that the emerging change preference concerned the yearning for a satisfactory sense of personal worth, dignity, and identity. New social movement theory emerged in the 1980s in Europe to analyze the so-called new social movements that began to surface in the 1960s and which were seen as being different from the older, materially based working-class and labor movements associated initially with Marxism. In contrast, the new social movements – such as the environmental movement, human rights movement, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) movement – are driven by concerns with procedural rights and various life style issues (Larana, Johnson, & Gusfield 1994; Buechler 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995).

A final basis for differentiating among movements relates to strategic and/or tactical differences. Perhaps the foremost example is the distinction between violent and nonviolent movements. Although the use of violence may occur intermittently in a movement’s career, some movements are sometimes defined in part by their strategic use of violence, as with terrorist movements, or nonviolence, as with the US civil rights movement and the Indian Independence Movement. Strategic or tactical actions are also pivotal in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s (2001: 7–8) distinction between constrained contention and transgressive contention. In the case of the former, “well established means of claims making” are employed, which is to say that they are institutionalized or routinized; whereas in the case of transgressive contention, some parties embroiled in the contention “employ innovative collective action” – that is, the claims or means are “either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.”

Clearly there are a number of alternative ways of differentiating and typologizing social movements. What is important is to be
cognizant of the different axis of differentiation and not to assume that the conditions that account for the emergence and operation of movements of one type necessarily apply to all types of movements.

FOCAL ANALYTIC ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

As the study of social movements has evolved to the present, most inquiries and research are guided by a variant of one or more sets of four focal questions. First, there is the long-standing concern with conditions underlying the emergence of social movements. Here there are two associated questions: Since movement adherents are generally stirred to action by a combination of grievances and a sense of efficacy, what are the processes and mechanisms that account for the generation of these mobilizing sentiments? And, since the occurrence of social movements is nested temporally and spatially rather than randomly distributed across time and place, what specifically are the sets of contextual conditions that facilitate or constrain the emergence and flourishing of social movements? The second orienting question concerns the issue of micromobilization or recruitment and participation processes. Here there is a subset of questions as well: What is the character of movement participation? What are the different ways of participating? And who are the determinants of who participates in social movement activities, and why? Why do only certain individuals come to participate in movement activity while other similarly situated individuals remain on the sidelines? The third focal question concerns the dynamics of social movements. What happens once a movement has surfaced and it is, so to speak, up and running? More concretely, how are social movements organized and led, and how do they go about the business of strategically pressing their claims and dealing with the various relevant actors within their field of operation? What or who are the relevant actors that constitute the movement field of action, and what are their relationships? And what are the various mechanisms and processes associated with the operation and functioning of social movements? The fourth general focal issue concerns what many scholars and social movement activists consider as the bottom-line question: What difference do movements make, and for whom and in what ways? Do social movements play an important role in challenging authorities and generating impending social change? Are there other functions that they perform? What, in short, are the consequences or outcomes of social movements?

Answers to these questions understandably draw on a range of overlapping perspectives and processes, including political process theory, resource mobilization theory, ecological and spatial perspectives, framing processes and theory, cultural perspectives, social psychology, as well as other perspectives and points of view, all of which can found among the various entries included in this encyclopedia.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution; Civil rights movement (United States); Collective efficacy; Contentious politics; Ecological conditions/determinants; Framing and social movements; French Revolution; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Indian Independence Movement; Marxism and social movements; Movement society; New social movements and new social movement theory; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Religion and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Revolutions; Self-help movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social movement industry

JOHN D. MCCARTHY

Individual social movement organizations (SMOs) play a significant role in mobilizing social movement activity and it is common for scholars to take the powerful analytic advantage of aggregating all of the SMOs that identify themselves with a particular social movement in their analyses. Such aggregates of SMOs have been termed social movement industries (SMIs), conceptualized as similar to the many industrial categories of firms that compose an economy. All SMIs in a nation make up the social movement sector (SMS) (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The size and structure of SMIs has been hypothesized to have important consequences for the likelihood of a social movement’s success (Zald & McCarthy 1980).

One of the major challenges for researchers of SMIs has been the difficulty of generating a census of SMOs and therefore the possibility of creating representative samples of those that compose an SMI, since a fully exhaustive list of national or local SMOs rarely if ever exists. A major source for research on national SMIs in the US has been the Encyclopedia of Associations (e.g., Minkoff, 1995, 1997; Johnson 2008). Not without its critics (Brulle et al. 2007), several analyses suggest it is reasonably comprehensive (Martin, Baumgartner, & McCarthy 2006; Walker, McCarthy, & Baumgartner forthcoming). Researchers have also employed national lists of SMOs compiled by movement actors themselves (e.g., Edwards 2003; Edwards & Marullo 1995 for PMOs; Brulle et al. 2007 for EMOs), multiple lists of local SMOs (e.g., Andrews & Edwards 2005 for EMOs), and, as they become more comprehensive, Internal Revenue Service records of nonprofit organizations have also begun to be used (McVeigh 2006 for civil rights SMOs). Systematic evidence gathered from the organizations composing SMIs has been used to assess a diverse set of theoretical expectations about industry level dynamics, including the consequences of competition among their constituent SMOs, the structural conditions that affect an SMI’s density through time, and the consequences of an SMI’s temporal fluctuations in density on social movement outcomes.

As social movements emerge and grow their constituent SMOs proliferate such that mature SMIs typically are composed of many SMOs with a few very large ones and many more smaller ones. As an SMI grows and “the number of SMOs increase they differentiate in terms of ideological/constituency constellations and in terms of the functional niche they occupy” (McCarthy & Zald 2002: 538). Although the constituent SMOs may come together for some shared purposes either of protest or of collective representation, they compete for resources from sympathizers and adherents, and they conflict over leadership of the movement as a whole, over who should represent the movement to authorities and the larger public. Moreover, as more resources are available, specialization of function may occur. Some SMOs may become information-gathering organizations, provide legal services, or lobbying services to other SMOs committed to the broad general goals. (McCarthy & Zald 2002: 583)

Competition, then, is thought to have important effects upon the development of SMIs and research has shown that competition among
SMOs within a social movement industry can affect founding and disbanding rates and hence the total density of the industry at any point in time for ethnic civil rights and women’s movements (Minkoff 1995, 1997), the overall level of tactical and goal diversity of the civil rights movement industry (Olzak & Ryo 2007), the radicalization of tactics among the “new social movement” industries in Germany (Koopmans 1993), and the specialization of tactical and goal repertoires (Soule & King 2008).

Social movement leaders engage in diverse activities as they seek to advance their social change goals, an important one of which is the creation and development of new SMOs (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). A number of environmental factors beyond the important effects of competition among the SMOs in an SMI have been shown to contribute to higher rates of the founding of new SMOs, including sociopolitical legitimacy (Archibald 2008 for HMOs), levels of outside patronage, and extent of protest by movement actors (Minkoff 1995 for civil rights SMOs). Factors that affect the survival of the SMOs in the “racial-ethnic” and women’s movement industries include legitimacy, size, and stability of social change repertoire (Minkoff 1993).

The joint consequences of the emergence of new SMOs and the disbanding of existing ones results in an SMI organizational capacity level at any point in time, and research has begun to evaluate the impact of SMI capacity on social movement outcomes. Social movements may achieve diverse outcomes, including changes in public opinion, norms and values, as well as social structural and both minor and major policy changes. However, thus far research focused specifically upon the impact of SMI capacity on movement outcomes has concentrated mainly upon political agenda setting and legislative outcomes. For instance, women’s suffrage organizational capacity was found to have impact in getting women’s issues on state legislative agendas, but to be less important for the passage of suffrage bills (King et al. 2005). And, similarly, environmental movement organizational capacity over three decades in the US had direct effects in getting environmental issues on the federal legislative agenda, but little direct impact on the passage of environmental laws (Johnson, Agnone, & McCarthy forthcoming).

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratization and social movements; Interest groups and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Organizations and movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO); Social movement sector; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


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Social movement organization (SMO)
JOHN D. MCCARTHY

Traditional approaches to understanding the emergence and mobilization of social movements focused primarily upon fluctuations in the hearts and minds of aggrieved individuals. Analysts of social movements inspired by the accelerated founding rates of more or less bureaucratically organized groups of citizens in the 1960s – joining early risers in the organizational field some of which, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), had emerged in the nineteenth century – began to focus more directly upon the central mediating role that social movement organizations (SMOs) play in mobilizing social movement activity. Zald and Ash (1966) first systematically deployed the concept in their classic paper that effectively challenged the universality of Roberto Michels’ (1949) “iron law of oligarchy.” Denotatively bounding the SMO, their analyses referenced civil rights movement organizations of the 1960s, including the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and the NAACP, as well as the American Communist Party and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). The concept was later more clearly specified by McCarthy and Zald (1973: 1218): “A social movement organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal organization which identifies its preferences with a social movement or a counter-movement and attempts to implement those goals.” In subsequent years, the term and its acronym, SMO, have come into widespread use as scholars have sought to understand patterns of SMO emergence, variations in SMO structure, and functioning.

There exists wide agreement that social movements, however bounded, are increasingly likely to include one or more SMOs, even though social movements themselves are not exclusively defined by the actions of the SMOs that identify their preferences with them (Oliver & Marwell 1992). There is extensive theoretical and empirical overlap between the category of SMO and its close conceptual cousin, the interest group, historically the province of political scientists and consisting of “any organization or institution that makes policy-related appeals to government” (Baumgartner & Leech 1998: xxii). Not all SMOs make appeals to government, including notably many religious and cultural ones, although there has been a dominance of attention by analysts during recent decades to those that do. The more closely associated concept advocacy organizations, or groups that “make public interest claims either promoting or resisting change that, if implemented, would conflict with the social cultural, political or economic interests or values of other constituencies or groups” (Andrews & Edwards 2004: 481) has gained wide currency lately as a more easily operationalized alternative to the SMO, although the two terms are often used interchangeably.

SMOs typically seek to mobilize a diverse range of resources including material and human, as well as moral, cultural, and social organizational. (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). SMOs deploy a variety of technologies of mobilization, including, importantly, the recruitment of adherents. Rank and file participation in movements is heavily dependent upon the recruitment efforts of SMOs (Schussman & Soule 2005). SMOs also manage the interdependencies of adherents and activists committed to the movement. If a movement effort endures beyond a single event and links several networks of adherents and activists, a more or less formal organization (at a minimum a mailing list, a name, and a set of controllers of the mailing list and attendant resources) is
likely to develop. Although many SMOs may be relatively small, enduring movements with substantial members may develop larger SMOs that link adherents in different locales and even countries. (McCarthy & Zald 2002: 537)

Notably, SMOs deploy a variety of tactics in seeking to bring about change, and typically, but not always, these include signature forms of public protest, including importantly demonstrations, boycotts, and petitioning campaigns.

Recent cross-sectional research in the US shows (McCarthy & Zald 2002) that (1) most SMOs are small locally based groups managed mainly by volunteers, but a significant minority of them nevertheless employ paid staff; (2) a large proportion of local SMOs are linked to national SMOs through federated structures; and (3) while the common image of a social movement leads to the expectation that SMOs are composed primarily of individual members, large proportions of them include other organizations, as well as individuals as members, many include only other organizations as members, and a significant proportion have no members at all, but are managed by staff who speak on behalf of collective actors who have no involvement in the SMO. This latter social fact undermines the assumed broad scope of the “free rider” problem – that is that most of the members of a social category who stand to benefit from a social change do not participate in seeking it – in analyses of movement mobilization. And a theory of organizational behavior is more appropriate for accounting for why other organizations join SMOs.

Several observers have noted the prominence of SMOs without members in major social change campaigns during the last decades of the twentieth century, speculating that memberless SMOs have begun to dominate the US national SMO landscape, and that such dominance may explain the coterminous decline in civic engagement during the same period (McCarthy & Zald 1973; Skocpol 1999). A systematic assessment of trends in the founding and density of women’s, human rights, and peace movement SMOs during that period, however, undermines such an account. Instead, individual membership-based SMOs continue to make up a majority of national SMOs in these fields, and, in practice, the memberless organizations typically work closely with membership-based ones, enhancing their efforts at seeking social change rather than substituting for their efforts (Walker, McCarthy, & Baumgartner, forthcoming).

SEE ALSO: Bureaucratization and social movements; Free rider problem; Interest groups and social movements; “Iron law of oligarchy”; Micro-meso mobilization; Organizations and movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement industry; Social movement sector; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Many social movements at varying stages of mobilization may exist in a nation’s society at any time, or there may be very few struggling to exist. Understanding that variation in social movement mobilization across national societies remains a relatively unexplored arena of social science research. Social movements in most nations are importantly defined by the social movement organizations (SMOs) that identify with their goals, even though much collective action by social movement actors is not directly associated with SMOs. Nations differ dramatically in the extent to which they encourage and facilitate or discourage and repress SMOs. All the SMOs in a nation with roughly comparable goals, issue orientations, or ideological congruity constitute its social movement industry (SMI). All the SMIs in a nation constitute its social movement sector (SMS). The size and orientation of a nation’s SMS is a function of the amount of resources devoted to social change (whatever its substantive focus across the ideological spectrum), the associational supports provided by the larger society, the democratic or authoritarian orientation of the state, and the relationship of the movement sector to the political party space. The size and shape, or configuration, of the SMS varies between nation-states and over time within them (see McCarthy & Zald 1977, 2002).

Among the most important factors that are thought to affect the size and configuration of the SMS in any nation are: (1) the extent to which all citizens are free to publicly assemble and to organize associations to pursue social change; (2) the nature and density of its civic infrastructures; (3) the capacity for and the extent of repression of collective action in general and of SMOs in particular; (4) the features of a nation’s party structure; (5) the amount of discretionary wealth of a nation’s citizens; and (6) the level and social location of its citizens’ discontent.

Legitimate national legal regimes that support and defend the formation of dissident formal organizations can be expected to allow discontented citizens and their representatives to organize more widely. As well, nations with dense civic infrastructures facilitate the development of SMOs though both direct and indirect sponsorship. The dense and variegated landscape of religious organizations in the US (including congregations, denominations, and para-church groups) is important in accounting for the vigor of its SMS as well as to its distinctive substantive shape privileging minority civil rights and issues of personal morality. And nations with dense mobilization of labor associations can be expected to see much more widespread social movement mobilization around issues of class and inequality. Repressive regimes inclined to discourage mobilization by SMOs possess many mechanisms for effectively doing so and, when used selectively, repression can affect not only the size of the SMS but also its substantive shape. A nation’s political elite may favor one SMI over others, encouraging its allies and discouraging its opponents, ultimately shaping the SMS. Features of multiparty parliamentary political party systems may channel collective action through structures like the Western European “Green Parties” in contrast to nations with two-party systems like the US, where environmental SMOs flourish more widely. In addition, the permeability of a nation’s party structure as well as the ability of social movement supporters to create viable parties can affect the extent to which discontented citizens and their representatives chose to mobilize party structures rather than SMOs. There is an expectation that rich nations, all other things being equal, will exhibit more vigorous SMSs as a result of their more extensive levels of
financial discretionary government and citizen resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977).

SMIs can be characterized by their general configuration along a number of dimensions, including ideological, religious, issue specific, political, and cultural. Among the most important factors thought to affect the political configuration of a nation’s SMS are its political opportunity structure (POS) and its political party structure (Garner & Zald 1985; Tarrow 1988). Critics of the comprehensive impact of POS upon a national SMS suggest that it is not as helpful in explaining the density of cultural and personal change SMOs. As well, national SMSs may vary considerably in their protest potential and characteristic mix of protest forms, illustrated by the unusual dominance of the use of petitions to register dissent in Switzerland (Kriesi et al. 1995).

Researchers have generated a number of systematic estimates of the SMI or issue configuration of the US SMS, including Gamson (1975) for a sample of the peak SMOs of national social movements active during the 1856–1945 period employing historical records; Minkoff and colleagues (2008) for national level advocacy organizations at the turn of the twentieth century using multiple available lists of such SMOs; Larson and Soule (2009) for all SMOs reported in the New York Times between 1965 and 1975 as having participated in a protest event; and Amenta and colleagues (2009) for the entire twentieth century using an exhaustive list of all SMOs mentioned in any regard in the New York Times. The latter estimate shows that of the total mentions of SMOs during that period, almost 75 percent refer to SMOs making up just ten “social movement families,” or SMIs. These are, in order of prominence: labor; civil rights, African-American; veterans; feminist/women’s rights; nativist/supremacist; environment/ecology; civil rights, Jewish; civil liberties; antirwar; and conservative (Amenta et al. 2009: 642).

Theoretical expectations about cross-national variation in the size and shape of national SMSs remain to be systematically tested as the result of the difficulty of generating comparable evidence about the number, type, and size of SMOs in more than one nation at a time. Recent efforts to comparatively catalog national nonprofit sectors, for instance, illustrate the difficulties of data collection about national associations (Salamon & Anheier 1997). Notable exceptions are the theoretically well-informed comparisons of the “new social movement” sectors in the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Switzerland by Kriesi (1996) and comparative rates of national participation in transnational social movements by Smith and Wiest (2005).

SEE ALSO: Interest groups and social movements; Repression and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement industry; Social movement organization (SMO); Social movements; Voluntary associations and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Mancur Olson stated: “Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (1965: 2). Since no one is excluded from the benefit brought about by the achievement of public goods, individuals free ride and leave the costs of their production to others. Only *individual inducements*, that is “a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual . . . to act in a group-oriented way” (51). In Olson’s utilitarian theory, personal and instrumental incentives become the main motivator of actors’ participation in collective action.

One of Olson’s main contributions is to have highlighted the difficulty of motivating participation in collective action. By raising awareness that an aggrieved population will not necessarily struggle to defend its common goods, scholars were forced to recognize that, rather than being an obvious phenomenon, collective action is an exception worthy of explanation. However, despite the beauty of a parsimonious explanation of the rational choice theory to explain why people participate, Olson’s model fares poorly. A wide range of studies emphasizes the virtual absence of instrumental incentives in motivating individuals to participate in collective action (e.g., Walsh & Warland 1983; Knoke 1988; Seyd & Whiteley 1992). Many scholars state that selective incentives are too narrowly focused to give an adequate account of why people join collective action (Clark & Wilson 1961; Moe 1980).

STRETCHING A CONCEPT

Since the explanation of collective action through instrumental is insufficient, scholars developed *alternative bases of motivation*. Clark and Wilson (1961) were among the first to expand Olson’s concept. Besides instrumental incentives, they added two other inducements: social and purposive incentives. Individuals are induced to join political parties because this brings them into contact with like-minded individuals, and because they thereby enable political parties to realize their policies and achieve their ideological goals.

Clark and Wilson’s work led to numerous studies that expanded the range of selective incentives. Concept stretching implied opening up the *Pandora’s box of human motives*. Thus, actors could be motivated either by purposive incentives (political goals), collective incentives (the value of the expected public good), social incentives (the expected reaction of others), solidarity incentives (searching for the company of like-minded individuals), identity incentives (searching for a community of people), or normative incentives (fairness and equity values). This nonexhaustive list of incentives defined a set of inducements that Opp (1985) nicely labeled “soft incentives.” Thus, besides instrumental inducements, a set of soft incentives entered into play in explaining individuals’ participation.

Two schools of thought should be distinguished among scholars who have expanded the concept of selective incentives: those remaining *within* the utilitarian paradigm, and those scholars developing soft incentives *outside* this theoretical framework. Both schools stress distinct social mechanisms. For scholars staying within the conceptual perimeter of the utilitarian paradigm, individuals mobilize because of personal rewards or coercion. For example, Opp (1988) emphasizes that social control of others incites individuals to contribute to contentious politics. For Chong (1992), individuals are induced to collaborate in collective action to enhance their reputation. The social mechanism at stake closely resembles Olson’s explanation: *personal incentives* incite actors to
join collective action. In contrast, for scholars who expand the concept outside the utilitarian paradigm, individuals mobilize because of their identification to a group, the value of the public good, the potential success of collective action, or because of their personal norms. The social mechanisms are twofold. For some authors collective incentives induce participation (Clark & Wilson 1961; Knoke 1988; Klandermans 1997). Individuals are prone to participate because of the intrinsic value of the collective good, and not because they receive private and indivisible goods. Other scholars stress another social mechanism: norm-oriented action (e.g., Marwell & Arms 1979). Individuals’ norms, such as fairness, solidarity, or equity, induce them to participate in collective action.

**SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY INCENTIVES: SLIPPERY DEFINITIONS**

Social and solidarity incentives belong to the family of soft incentives, designated as being either within or outside the utilitarian paradigm. How do we distinguish one from another? It is a difficult question since in the literature we are faced with slippery definitions of those concepts. Solidarity incentives include the idea of group attachment, suggesting identification to a collective actor (Clark & Wilson 1961; Walsh & Warland 1983; Oliver 1984). Individuals are induced to participate because they identify with the collective actor, they share social ties with the group, or they are searching for the company of like-minded individuals. By contrast, social incentives involve various definitions. For some scholars, social incentives include emotional attachment, thus overlapping to a certain extent with the concept of solidarity (Knoke 1988). For others, they refer to norms, such as fairness and equity (Marwell & Arms 1979). For Klandermans, they mean an individual’s expected reaction to others. For Opp, they mean individuals’ integration into networks inspired by moral principles. In other studies social incentives comprise social and recreational activities offered to participants in return for contributing to a collective action (Knoke 1988).

Solidarity and social incentives often overlap. However, the difficulty for both concepts, particularly for social incentives, lies with the various definitions endorsing them. Slippery definitions render comparison impossible, and also make them useless as heuristic tools for research. In addition, studies mobilizing Olson’s concept of selective incentives face another important shortcoming: selective incentives are no longer selective. In revisionist models, incentives have become a catch-all concept, which has lost its explanatory power since any incentive explains why individuals participate in collective action. Thus Olson’s model is now devoid of its predictive strength (Green & Shapiro 1994). Expanding the concept has resulted in slippery predictions and post hoc embellishments, a criticism that specifically concerns scholars who remain within the rational choice theory. They thus evade problematic evidence that utilitarian motives are not sufficient to explain collective action. For example, Moe adopts a contortionist posture to explain why the pursuit of collective goals is in itself a selective incentive: “if group policies reflect (individual’s) ideological, religious, or moral principles, . . . he may consider the free-rider option morally reprehensible” (1980: 118). The same problem applies to Opp and Chong. Behind “moral duty” and “reputation” actually lies conformity to norms that explain why people promote common goods.

For scholars expanding the concept of incentives outside the rational choice theory, they use an inappropriate sociological terminology. In fact, they are discussing motives rather than incentives that favor individuals’ mobilization. Attachment to a group, feelings of solidarity, or willingness to promote political goals are not incentives in the sense that the rational choice theory has elaborated as a concept. For those scholars it would be more fruitful to restrict their study within the concept of motives or “raisons d’agir” and try to specify why those motives do play a role. They need to emphasize what social mechanisms are at stake.
TO MOVE FROM “THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION” TO MULTIPLE LOGICS

The stretching of the concept of incentives offers a clear finding: instrumental motives are, by far, not the only motives for participating in collective action. Multiple motives are what incite actors to join social and political movements. Whereas we started with a logic of collective action, the concept stretchers have introduced other logics, so that we now have to move on to the multiple logic of collective action (Sorber & Wilson 1998). Instrumental incentives could mobilize certain individuals to join a collective action. For example, actors could be tempted to support a group defending retired people by claiming higher reductions for them for entertainment activities. But many other motives bring actors to support collective action. For example, identification with a group and a feeling of solidarity induce actors to join collective action (Huddy 2001; Stryker, Owen, & White 2000). Ideological and moral concerns push several actors to mobilize (Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta 2001; Passy & Monsch 2009). Moral expression by aggrieved people in order to attain dignity in their lives motivates certain actors to join protest movements. Those motives cannot be understood within a unique utilitarian perspective since they are grounded in different sociological logics that need to be clarified if we want to better understand why people participate in collective action. The utilitarian paradigm that gave birth to Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action relied on a monist conception of human motives that failed to understand mobilization. This monist conception led several scholars to stretch a concept in order to stay within this monist and universal understanding of human motives. Since solidarity, ideology, emotion, and other motives favor activists’ action, we now need to move toward a plural conception of human motives. We certainly lose on explanatory parsimony, but certainly gain a better understanding of social reality.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives; Solidarity and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social problems and social movements

JOEL BEST

Both the sociology of social movements and the sociology of social problems experienced intellectual revivals that began in the 1970s. The study of social movements shifted from accounting for movements’ members’ discontent, to an effort to understand why movements succeeded or failed, based on models that emphasized framing, resource mobilization, opportunity structures, and identity politics. Similarly, the study of social problems turned from the analysis of harmful social conditions to an emphasis on the process by which social problems were socially constructed.

Obviously, the two fields overlapped. Social movements often play key roles in constructing social problems. Armand L. Mauss, one of those engaged in developing the constructionist perspective during the 1970s, actually argued that social problems were “a variety of social movement” (Mauss 1989: 34). However, Mauss’ framework proved less influential than those of other theorists, such as Herbert Blumer (1971) and Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse (1977), and most sociologists studying the construction of social problems came to view their subject matter as related to – but not the same as – social movements (Troyer 1989). That is, there is widespread consensus that many – but not all – social movements engage in social problems construction, and that many – but not all – social problems are constructed by social movements.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In everyday talk, social problems are understood to be troubling social conditions – crime, poverty, and so on. However, this is not a useful definition for analytic purposes; the category of troubling conditions – everything from suicide to climate change – is too diverse to be analytically useful; moreover, there is no agreement across time and space about which conditions should be considered troubling. Thus, social arrangements that disadvantage women have been viewed as natural and just in some societies during some historical periods, but understood to be a social problem (“sexism”) in others. Constructionist theorists define social problems, not as conditions, but as a social process, the process by which conditions that some people consider troubling come to be defined as social problems. This approach draws attention to the process of claims-making, in which actors (claimsmakers) argue that some condition is troubling and therefore demands society’s attention and concern. To study crime as a social problem, then, refers to analyzing the process by which claims are made about crime’s troubling properties.

This process is most visible when new issues come to public attention. Thus, the spread of cell phones led to a host of new claims: that radiation from cell phones (or cell phone towers) caused cancer; that cell phone users carried on loud conversations that annoyed those who could overhear; that using cell phones while driving was dangerous; that adolescents were “sexting”; and so on. In each instance, claimsmakers sought to draw attention to problematic aspects of cell phones. Constructionists often analyze claimsmaking rhetoric by distinguishing among grounds (basically what claimsmakers present as the facts), warrants (the values they invoke), and conclusions (their proposals to address the issue) (Best 2008).

Claimsmaking is competitive. There is a social problems marketplace where many claims compete for attention; the media only publicize some claims, and not all issues find their way onto policymakers’ agendas. Claims attract varying degrees of opposition.
Valance issues are not controversial; few people are willing to speak out in favor of child pornography. But position issues (such as abortion) feature opponents whose claims contradict one another. Whether a particular claim succeeds can depend, not just upon having effective rhetoric, but the ability to gain a hearing amidst the overall clamor of rival claims (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988).

The social problems process involves multiple constructions: in addition to the claimsmakers’ initial constructions, the media often reconstruct claims to fit their conventions for reporting; policymakers reconstruct the issue yet again to conform to political and institutional constraints on new policies; new policies are reinterpreted by the social problems workers charged with implementing those policies; and that implementation often inspires further constructions – critiques and new claims about needed reforms. In other words, at every stage in the social problems process, people are defining and redefining what’s wrong and what needs to be done; it is this interpretive work that constructionists view as the essence of social problems.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS PROCESS

Obviously, social movements often engage in claimsmaking. When the civil rights movement demanded an end to racial segregation, or when Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) emerged to campaign against drunk driving, SMOs served as the leading claimsmakers, the ones whose protests attracted media coverage and pressed policymakers to take action. A particular SMO can construct many problems; for instance, over more than a century, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has engaged in specific claimsmaking campaigns against lynching, school segregation, hate crimes, and many other forms of racial injustice.

At the same time, many social problems are constructed by other actors in the social problems process, with little or not SMO involvement. In some cases, members of the media are the first to draw attention to a new social problem. In other cases, the initial claims come from medical authorities, scientists, or other experts, from government agencies, or from politicians. While journalists, scientists, and politicians may sympathize with the goals of a social movement, they may not be members of particular SMOs. For example, few of the claims about the various problems related to cell phones have originated with SMOs.

Constructionist analysts distinguish between insider claimsmakers who are members of the polity, with established ties to policymakers, such that they can press their claims directly, and outsider claimsmakers who lack such connections, and rely on attracting media coverage and arousing public opinion in order to gain attention for their causes (Benford & Hunt 2003). When activists organize a protest march, gather signatures for petitions, give press interviews, and so on, they are acting as outsider claimsmakers. Over time, an SMO may gain ownership of an issue; thus, when some new aspect of drunk driving emerges, the media and policymakers tend to seek out MADD’s views, just as the National Rifle Association is seen as the leading voice of those opposed to gun control (Gusfield 1981). Well-established SMOs become members of the polity with direct access to policymakers; such organizations have the option of choosing to press their claims through outsider tactics (such as mobilizing protests) or insider tactics (such as lobbying).

Claims that originate outside SMOs may nonetheless be adopted by SMOs. For instance, the initial claims about stalking originated in media reporting, however, the established movement against domestic violence took over the cause, assumed ownership of the stalking problem, and quickly began organized lobbying that led to passage of dozens of federal and state antistalking laws (Lowney & Best 1995). Such adoptions can be vital; SMOs have personnel, budgets, and other resources needed to maintain claimsmaking campaigns during
Social problems and social movements

the period—sometimes years, even decades—it takes to change policies. In contrast, media claims that don’t get picked up by SMOs tend to fade quickly, as coverage inevitably shifts to newer, fresher topics (Best 1999). SMOs’ resources also allow them to remain interested in issues in the aftermath of policymaking, and continue to monitor, assess, and critique how policies work. This can inspire new rounds of claims making. It is a rare issue that can be resolved in a single cycle of claims making and policymaking, and the longer an issue’s history, the more likely SMOs are to play key roles in its construction and reconstruction, as illustrated by the NAACP’s long campaign against the many facets of racial discrimination.

Social movement theories and the study of social problems

When analyzing cases where SMOs are actively involved in claims making, sociologists of social problems are able to draw upon many of leading theories of social movements. The most obvious similarities between constructionist analyses of social problems and social movement theory involve discussions of framing (Benford & Hunt 2003). Framing—efforts to shape how prospective members, the media, or policymakers understand a movement’s cause—is a form of claims making. Thus, discussions of social problems rhetoric parallel framing terminology: what are called grounds, warrants, and conclusions in the social problems literature parallel what students of social movements call diagnostic frames, motivational frames, and prognostic frames. Similarly, movement scholars’ analyses of how the media package social issues resemble social problems theorists’ studies of media practices (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

Analysts of both social problems and social movements are interested in the conditions under which campaigns succeed. Most claims making campaigns do not lead to new policies. There is considerable competition in the social problems marketplace; many claims fail to attract attention from the press, the public, and policymakers. Claims makers may face, not just indifference, but counter claims, and they may engage in prolonged efforts to refine their campaigns. Here, social movement theories of resource mobilization and opportunity structures offer conceptual vocabularies for understanding the conditions which foster—or inhibit—successful claims making.

Social problems theory and the study of social movements

Social movement analysts who adopt the conventional view that equates social problems with harmful social conditions are likely to view social problems merely as sources for grievances that, in turn, can serve as the basis for social movements. This is not an especially helpful insight, in that grievances are ubiquitous, and cannot provide a sufficient explanation for movement activity.

In contrast, the constructionist approach to studying social problems has more to offer students of social movements. From a constructionist perspective, social movement activity can be seen as part of the larger social problems process. This has at least three implications for the study of social movements. First, SMOs make claims, but their claims must compete with those of other sorts of claims makers, including experts, the media, and officials; recognizing this broader competition can help explain the relative success of different campaigns. Second, SMOs cannot maintain complete control of their claims as they move through the various stages of the social problems process; media coverage transforms and translates claims for audiences, and policymakers and social problems workers rework SMOs’ claims to fit the demands of their institutions. This continual process of reconstruction helps explain the mixed success of many SMOs’ campaigns. Third, the social problems process can be seen as cyclical; claims lead to policies that inspire new claims. Students of social movements might consider how
this larger process affects movement activities; claims seeking to establish new policies require different rhetoric and face different receptions than those arguing for policy modification.

In sum, the sociologies of social movements and social problems are complementary; each offers useful insights for the other.

SEE ALSO: Claims-making; Discursive fields; Framing and social movements; Identity politics; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Media framing and social movements; Media and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO); Social movements.

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Political socialization and social movements
OLIVIER FILLIEULE

Political socialization (PS) has been defined in various ways in the literature. Among the most frequently encountered definitions is the one that equates PS with mere learning, that is, the state of a person’s political knowledge and comprehension. Other definitions focus less on an individual’s knowledge inventory than on the developmental sequence by which such knowledge and comprehension are acquired, whereas others focus on the continuity over time of such knowledge and attitudes. However, PS is more and more defined as the gradual development of the individual’s own particular and idiosyncratic views of the political world, the process by which a given society’s norms and behavior are internalized. This has three main theoretical consequences: primary and secondary socializations are equally important in the socializing process; it follows that not only family and school are central instances of socialization but also many other institutions active in the life spheres of work, affective ties, voluntary work and political engagements; and the political dimension is in play in all socialization processes and doesn’t correspond to a specific domain of activity or designated institutions.

If research on PS decreased dramatically during the 1980s, declining civic participation and social capital has helped the renewal of the field. Prompted by such trends, one can note a resurgence of scholarly inquiries not only in the field of PS. We then show how individuals can be politically oriented by their socialization towards protest behavior and in turn durably affected by their participation in social movements. This will bring us to discuss methodological questions and propose some directions for future research.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH FIELD

Four basic ideas about the ways political dispositions might vary with age or life stages have been most common in the literature.

The persistence model suggests that the residues of preadult learning persist through life, perhaps even hardening with time. This asserts a simple main effect of age, with dispositions acquired primarily in the preadult years (Hess & Torney 1967). This idea of lasting effects of early experiences was derived from psychoanalytic and learning theories and largely assumed rather than tested directly. The difficulty stems from the fact that any correlation of age with political attitudes potentially reflects three different confounded effects: cohort (birth cohort), life cycle (age at measurement), and period (year of measurement). That is why the persistence viewpoint faced strong critical...
reviews in the 1970s and 1980s (Searing, Schwartz, & Lind 1973), suggesting that “the primacy principle” had been overstated and that, at best, the evidence for it, such as adult retrospective accounts of their own attitudes or longitudinal studies, had been quite indirect. Long-term longitudinal studies appeared, implying that partisan tendencies change more after the preadult years than the persistent view would allow (Jennings & Niemi 1981). Strongly nourished by the rising influence of rational choice theories, revisionism went as far as stating that perhaps people were constantly revising their thinking, in some quite reality-based, data-oriented manner.

Some researchers then called for recognition of more openness to change through the life course than the persistence theory allowed, for example that “Change during adulthood is normal. The life course should be understood as a more integrated and contingent whole” (Sapiro 1994: 204) and that “learning and development are not completed by adulthood. Rather, they constitute a life long process” (Sigel 1989: viii). This gave way to the lifelong openness model, which suggests that dispositions have an approximately uniform potential for change at all ages and that age is irrelevant for attitude change. Unfortunately this model has been largely unexplored. The first volume on adult socialization appeared only at the end of the 1980s (Sigel 1989). This important series of studies examines the political effects of discontinuities within adulthood, such as entering the workplace, serving in the military, immigrating to a new country, participating in a social movement, getting married, or becoming a parent. Each of these cases incorporates three elements that potentially can affect political attitudes: crystallization of an individual’s own unique identity, assumption of new roles, and dealing with the unanticipated demands of adulthood. This line of research has been particularly convincing in stressing the fact that neither childhood nor adolescence adequately prepare mature adults for all the contingencies with which they have to cope over their lifetimes. Hence the necessity to adopt a lifespan perspective that takes into account the impact that individual-level events as well as macro-level ones have on the maintenance, modification, or abandonment of values and orientations to which the individual may have subscribed at an earlier point in his or her life. However, the authors agree upon the fact that all these specific discontinuities also occur most often in late adolescence and early adulthood, which means that the model here is quite close to a third view, the impressionable years model.

This model suggests that dispositions and attitudes are particularly susceptible to influence in late adolescence and early adulthood but tend to persist thereafter. A special instance of the impressionable years hypothesis is the generational effect (Mannheim 1952). This occurs when a sizable number of those in the supposedly impressionable life stage (late adolescence and early adulthood) are subjected to a common massive pressure to change on some particular issue. Three propositions are behind this model: youth experience political life as a “fresh encounter,” in Mannheim’s words, that can be seldom replicated later; dispositions and attitudes that are subjected to strong information flows and regularly practiced should become stronger with age; and the young may be especially open to influence because they are becoming more aware of the social and political world around them just at the life stage when they are seeking a sense of self and identity. Some important surveys support the formative years hypothesis, for example, Jennings’ (2002) research about the durability of protesters as a generational unit. As well, there is other research which suggests that American cohorts coming of age in the 1960s constitute a distinctive political generation.

Finally, there is the life-cycle model, which argues that people are attracted to certain attitudes at specific life stages, such as radical ideas in their youth and conservatism in old age (Jennings & Niemi 1981). This model is captured by the French saying: “He who is not a radical at 20 has no heart; he who is at 40 has no head.” Cohort analysis has been the
primary analytic technique used to test the life-cycle hypothesis and has revealed no significant diminution with age in the number of self-professed Left-oriented people nor any correlation between conservatism and aging.

To summarize, the contemporary resurrection of socialization research points to the now widely shared idea that dispositions, attitudes, and behavior change throughout life, especially during the formative years (i.e., between 15 and 25), and that some, possibly much, early learning is of limited consequence for adult political behavior. As a consequence, participation in social movements not only depends on PS, but also has to be considered as having potentially socializing effects, which means that social movement organizations and protest events have to be studied as explicit and implicit socializing agents.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, DISPOSITIONS, AND SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

Explicit and implicit PS through parental influence, school, and other varied institutions, such as churches and youth organizations, are considered as being among the main factors explaining involvement in social movements, but the systematic influence in early years of PS is too often overstated. Sharing the same set of dispositions with other members of an activist group is still not enough to explain commitment. In most cases, the mediation of significant others (i.e., relatives, friends, colleagues, or even mentors such as teachers or priests) is necessary though not sufficient. For example, social psychologist Molly Andrews (1991), who collected and analyzed the lifelong commitment of British socialist activists from the 1930s to the 1980s, identified three major factors of political involvement: intellectual stimuli, the role of political movements, and tutelary figures. In this case, class position, family influence, and formal education hardly counted in fostering commitment. It was first through the direct experience of labor conflicts or political meetings and the influence of trade union political work that they progressively came to join the party. Most of the time it was a neighbor, schoolmate, or older friend from the occupational life-sphere who played the role of initiator.

This stresses the fact that joining cannot be understood as the result of a linear form of socialization, with cumulative and mechanical effects that can be visualized. Just as sociologists of deviant behavior have overcome the deterministic explanations of deviance, sociologists of commitment have turned towards the analysis of “activist careers,” drawing directly on the symbolic interactionism toolkit. Applied to political commitment, the notion of career helps to understand how, at each biographical stage, the attitudes and behaviors of activists are determined by past attitudes and behaviors, which in turn condition the range of future possibilities, thus resituating commitment across the entire life cycle (Fillieule 2010).

However, the almost exclusive analytic concern with the institutional consequences of protest and the subsequent neglect of its independent psychological effects is certainly one of the major blind spots of contemporary social movement research. One of the most promising directions for future research would be to evaluate the degree to which a social movement transforms individual patterns of political thinking and behavior and outline the ways in which it does so. To date, three main empirical domains have been explored, paving the way for future research.

First, research on 1960s American activists has addressed the question of the biographical consequences of social movement participation on the life-course, based on a series of follow-up studies of former movement participants, suggesting that activism has a strong effect both on political attitudes and behaviors as well as on the personal lives of the subjects, like occupational orientations and marital status (Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath 1987; McAdam 1989; Whalen & Flacks 1989). However, in addition to having a narrow focus on New Left highly committed activists of the 1960s, these studies are less interested in the very process
by which movements act as socializing agents than by its long term effects, as measured by statistical indicators (see McAdam 1989 and Whalen & Flacks 1989 for exceptions).

A second direction of research deals with the study of black student activism in the civil rights and black power movements and of riot participants (Gurin & Epps 1975; Sears & McConahay 1973). It explores environmental influences as well as the impact of activism on political ideology and adult resocialization, suggesting, among other interesting results, that the riots themselves appeared to have generated a type of “riot ideology” that further resocialized not only the direct participants but those who only vicariously experienced them; a result that has recently been confirmed by studies on not-so-committed participants (Sherkat & Blocker 1997; Wilhelm 1998). But the value of this research lies primarily in analyzing how movements accomplish their socializing role, teaching young blacks to question the overall white system of domination through specific organizational mechanisms like mass meetings, workshops, and citizen and freedom schools.

A third research focus stems from feminist research and examines the development of a gender consciousness through the women’s movement (Whittier 1995). The reason that this movement has served as an active agent of socialization is partly because one of its central goals is to change women’s self-understanding: that is, to provide a social space in which women can consider and negotiate their social identity as women and its relationship to politics. The most well-known strategy for such development is the consciousness-raising group, which has spread around the world. Also important in relation to consciousness raising has been the call for “separatism,” demonstrations, and symbolic political acts like “Freedom Trashcans” or “Take Back the Night” events.

Beyond the specific case of the women’s movement, feminist research suggests that all protest movements may operate like gender workshops. Indeed, activism can play a liberating role for women in permitting them to leave the domestic universe and acquire social skills previously inaccessible to them. This is the reason why, even in movements where women are kept in positions of subjugation, mere participation can foster emancipation. The Black Panther Party, for example, which planned to link black liberation to a collective memory reinvented and nourished from a precolonial African culture dominated by men, served as a place for political training and consciousness raising about patriarchy and sexism.

Finally, it is clear that a social movement can have profound and widespread socialization effects on individuals in society by transforming their sense of identity and politicizing the resulting social identification. Beyond the results aforementioned, much work is needed in order to build a comprehensive and solid theoretical model for the study of the multiple socializing effects of social movements. One possible point of departure is the Goffmanian notion of “moral career,” which directs attention to the socializing effects of various formal and informal organizational constraints (status, proposed or reserved activities, leadership, and so on). Indeed, organizations do a lot of work in socializing their members, understood as role taking, which allows individuals to identify the different roles they face and correctly fulfil their customary tasks. This secondary socialization can, at times, assume the form of explicit inculcations, the goal of which is to homogenize activists’ categories of thought and their way of acting within and in the name of the organization. Most of the time, know-how and activist wisdom amounts to a “practical sense,” what Bourdieu refers to as “the anticipated adjustment to the requirements of a field, what the language of sports calls the ‘sense of the game’ (like ‘sense of place,’ ‘the art of anticipation,’ etc.),” acquired over the course of a “long dialectical process, often described as a ‘vocation,’ by which ‘we make ourselves’ according to what is making us and we ‘choose’ that by which we are ‘chosen’” (Bourdieu 1980: 111–112). This process takes place outside of our conscious awareness. If, following Gerth and Wright Mills (1954: 173), an institution “leaves its mark” on social
actors who are part of it “by modifying their external conduct as well as their private life,” then we need to examine both the content and the methods of the process of institutional socialization. Three dimensions may be distinguished: the acquisition of “know-how” and “wisdom” (resources), a vision of the world (ideology), and the restructuring of sociability networks in relation to the construction of individual and collective identities (social networks and identities) (Fillieule 2010).

AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

A major flaw in PS research stems from the fact that it is largely ahistorical, doesn’t put emphasis on contextual effects and has been remarkably unconcerned with the very process of socialization. To be sure, these shortcomings are not specific to PS studies. Observational studies are rare in political science and for the most part we study the product and assume it is the result of the process. However, to study process, the process needs to be observed, not merely inferred. This is particularly the case in PS. Largely because survey research has been the dominant method of choice, research attention has typically focused on individuals and their attributes as units of analysis. As a result, literature is still scarce that has actually studied and observed the manner by which “agents” do or do not make influence attempts. To study the process of PS, we need to think of different methods of inquiry and observation and undoubtedly will have to resort to a variety of methodologies, including field methodologies, such as participant observation and ethnography, the collection of life histories, simulations, and in-depth clinical techniques.

Beyond that radical change in methodologies, research could explore several avenues that have been neglected until now. We conclude by briefly mentioning some possible directions among others. One potential line of investigation would be to explore more systematically the socializing effects of political events and communication about them (Tackett 2006). Indeed, vivid political events should be important catalysts because they can have traumatic effects and stimulate heavy information flows. Events may have an impact at any age but depending on the position in the life cycle, the socializing effects will differ, from strengthening and substantiation for older people to conversion and alternation for youngsters. The hypothesis here, in line with the impressionable years model, is that people should especially recall events as important if they happened in their adolescence or early adulthood.

Two directions could be taken here. First, the effects of direct participation on political protest should be explored. Developing further research in this direction is all the more important in the subfield of social movements since some research suggests that younger participants often favor unconventional modes of action such as demonstrations and blockades, which then often constitute their first significant involvement with the political system, therefore having strong cognitive effects. The dramatic growth of the antiglobalization movement all over the world, with its strong appeal to young generations, is no doubt a rich field for studying such processes and their possible effects on subsequent movements (Fillieule et al. 2004). Research should also focus on the impact of political events on “engaged observers” and even “bystander publics” in the vein of Stewart, Settles, and Winter (1998), who suggest that those who were attentive to the movements in the 1960s but not very active in them, showed lasting political effects years later. Such inquiries could also suggest some interesting questions on how groundbreaking movements can play an important role in resocializing other groups to the politics of protest, as for example the American civil rights movement did with many subsequent movements.

Another fascinating field of research in PS concerns intergenerational effects of political socialization. Here again, social movement research has a lot to say in various directions. First, regarding parental influence on their offspring in a context of political unrest, it is
reasonable to ask: How long and in what magnitude parental influence persists over time in periods of upheaval like those of the mid-1960s, or when the political environment contains forces antithetical to parental inclinations. Understanding how political engagement plays out in such cases, and tracing its implications for intergenerational change, constitutes an important challenge for future research. But the prospect that offspring can also influence parental attitudes, especially in domains in which offspring introduce more “modern” attitudes to families, should also be taken into account. Recent research on protest marches of 2006 in the US (Pantoja, Menjivar, & Magana 2008) or more generally on political behavior of early adult immigrants and its effects on their parents is ripe territory for future work on political socialization and social movements.

SEE ALSO: Commitment; Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Conversion and new religious movements; Generational and cohort analysis; Outcomes, cultural; Participation in social movements; Political generation.

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Solidarity and movements
ROBERT D. BENFORD

Participation in a social movement often occurs out of a sense of solidarity. People become movement adherents when they feel they share with others a sense of enthusiasm and devotion for the group (Hunt & Benford 2004). Herbert Blumer (1939) referred to such shared feelings as esprit de corps. From his vantage point, esprit de corps has two dimensions: a body of confederates that are seen as a collectivity and a spirit that entails feelings of close identification with that group. The corpus feature of solidarity calls attention to the body of actors that comprise a group. Some organizations such as the military, police, athletic teams, marching bands, and so on, project an image of an actual corporal entity by having members wear uniforms and engaging in coordinated drills such as marching. In the present context, social movement organizations employ banners, placards, T-shirts, and bumper stickers to mark their membership boundaries. The spiritus feature of solidarity pertains to the feelings of belonging to a collectivity.

In this sense solidarity bears a close family resemblance to the more contemporary concept, collective identity (Melucci 1988). Collective identity tends to be used to refer to the ongoing social construction of cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community or social movement (Polletta & Jasper 2001). Solidarity, by contrast, tends to be employed somewhat more narrowly to refer to shared feelings and sentiments about a specific group. In practice, the two concepts are often used synonymously. Solidarity has been conceptualized as having two basic foci: internal and external. Internal solidarity is focused on the specific group or movement organization to which a person belongs and to the other members of that collective. External solidarity pertains to the identification of and identification with groups to which an individual does not belong (Hunt & Benford 2004). Social movements devote some of their framing activities toward constructing internal and external solidarity.

Social movement organizations also actively promote feelings of solidarity. For example, in the early 1980s the autonomous Polish trade union, Solidarność (Solidarity), strategically promoted a collective sense of identification with the plight of its shipyard workers that extended to Polish workers in other industries, as well as stimulating a sense of solidarity among citizens throughout Eastern Europe living under totalitarian rule, and eventually to movement allies around the world (Payerhin & Zirakzadeh 2006). Such a collective sense of oneness and the ensuing culture of solidarity (Fantasia 1988) contribute both to empowerment within a movement as well as heightening concerns on the part of the movement’s opponents about the movement’s potential to disrupt the status quo. Thus, a protest chant frequently heard at social movement marches and rallies amplifies both the sense of solidarity and the threat to their opponents: “The people, united, will never be defeated!” Movement adherents in turn tend to view a threat to any single member as a threat to all members. This sense of solidarity is best represented by the International Workers of the World rally cry: “An injury to one is an injury to all.” In short, solidarity is an identification with a collectivity such that an adherent feels as if a common cause and fate are shared (Hunt & Benford 2004: 439).

Traditionally, scholarship on solidarity tended to focus on the social construction and enactment of solidarity, particularly pertaining to boundaries and boundary work. More recently, scholars have turned to how people feel about their experiences participating in social movements and collective action and how those feelings are also at times subject to manipulation. But emotions can serve to
both facilitate and constrain collective action. Further research is needed on the conditions under which a sense of solidarity yields feelings that promote or diminish the prospects of sustained participation in social movements.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Ideology; Music and social movements; Participation in social movements; Social and solidary incentives; Solidarity (Poland).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Spillover, social movement
NANCY WHITTIER

Spillover refers to the influences that social movements have on each other. Social movement spillover takes place through both direct and indirect paths through which one social movement affects another’s ideology, frames, tactics, membership, organizational structure, or available cultural or political opportunities. These and related phenomena are also referred to as diffusion (McAdam & Rucht 1993; Soule 1997) and “spin-off movements” (McAdam 1995). The study of social movement spillover focuses on the paths, types, and mechanisms of influence. The types of social movement spillover can be broken down into two broad categories. First, movements can lead to new challenges, by changing the overall level of protest or opportunities for protest, sparking "spin-off" movements (McAdam 1995), or provoking countermovements. They can also affect or enable later waves of the same movement. Second, social movements can alter the form of other protests. Activists define themselves, frame their issues, develop tactics, and establish organizations with reference to what other collective actors have done. These effects can occur between movements that are contemporaries or across time.

A range of movement characteristics can spill over from one challenge to another, including frames, collective identities, tactics, organizational structure, and relations with authorities (Meyer & Whittier 1994). Social movements that emerge early in a protest cycle may establish frames that strongly influence those of subsequent and contemporaneous movements. For example, the civil rights movement’s emphasis on equality based on minority group status became a master frame that continues to shape the frames of movements across the political spectrum (Isaac & Christianson 2002). Influential movements can also promote new frames that supplant or modify existing master frames. The feminist movement’s emphasis on women’s oppression and its framing of individual problems as social in origin, in the “personal as political” frame, influenced how movements such as the peace, anti-nuclear, environmental, and numerous others (Meyer & Whittier 1994). Collective identities develop as a result of participation in social movements. Activists, many of whom participate in more than one social movement, carry their collective identities from cause to cause (Taylor et al. 2009). Further, a collective identity created by a social movement becomes publicly available for activists to adopt or challenge. For example, the collective identity “feminist” may be claimed by organizations that are not working directly on gender issues, as in a group that promotes a feminist approach to environmentalism. Movement tactics also often spill over from one challenge to another. Charles Tilly’s notion of repertoires of contention captures this phenomenon, in which social movements in a given era tend to draw from the same set of tactics. This spillover can occur across ideological divides. For example, the “Tea Party” movement in the US following President Obama’s election adopts many of the direct action and protest tactics originated by movements of the Left 50 years earlier.

Spillover occurs through several different routes. Spillover occurs through direct routes, including contact between personnel or organizations; and indirect routes, including the changes that one movement brings about in the larger social movement sector, culture, or political opportunities that affect other movements. When social movements share personnel, as when the activists are part of more than one movement at the same time or over their lives, these personnel can bring the influence of one movement directly into another. Coalitions between movement organizations around shared goals are another route.
for influence. Separate movements may also be linked to each other through networks, including participation in a common social movement community that shares institutions (such as gathering places), culture or activist art, and events (such as festivals). This overlapping participation provides another route for spillover. Further, when one social movement affects the larger cultural or political context, these changes reshape other social movements as well (Meyer & Whittier 1994).

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Collective identity; Diffusion and scale shift; Framing and social movements; Master frame; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Tactical interaction and innovation; Tactics; Tea Party movement (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Subcultures and social movements
GREG MARTIN

Subcultures and social movements are both empirically and analytically quite different creatures. In one formulation, youth subcultures are seen as groups subordinate to the dominant middle-class culture because they derive from a working-class “parent” culture, although they “exhibit a distinctive enough shape and structure to make them identifiably different from their ‘parent’ culture” (Hall & Jefferson 2006: 7). Thus, subcultures might be characterized as “interests that operate within the confines of the existing social order,” while social movements are conceived as “forms of solidarist action which force the conflict to the point of breaking through the system’s compatibility limits” (Melucci 1996: 28). It is largely for these definitional reasons that the study of subcultures and social movements studies have remained relatively separate and distinct. Fusing the fields, however, reveals two areas of commonality: (1) similar ideas and debates about how to conceptualize subcultures and social movements; and (2) shared concerns over the effectiveness of cultural politics (Martin 2002).

DELINQUENT GANGS, SUBCULTURES, AND STYLE

The concept of subculture was used in some early analyses of delinquent gangs to show how delinquency had social and cultural origins and was not the outcome of individual pathology. Delinquent gangs were regarded as collaborative solutions to “status problems” encountered by young men in working class neighborhoods (Cohen 1955). Others were critical of those who assumed delinquent gangs had an underlying organization and structure, which tended to “autistically distort gangs and gang behaviour towards a gestalt of clarity” (Yablonsky 1959: 112). In reality, Yablonsky argued, most gangs are “amorphous, diffuse and malleable,” and resemble “near-groups,” which he positioned midway on a continuum between cohesive “gangs” and disorganized “mobs”; the near-group being a convenient vehicle for youths who are “emotionally disturbed” and lack social skills. Accordingly, delinquent subcultural processes might not necessarily lead to gang formation, but could culminate in looser, more diffused collectivities (Downes 1966).

Although later subcultural theorists distinguished gangs or groups from broader and more loosely structured subcultures (Fine & Kleinman 1979; Hebdige 1979), the bulk of subsequent work carried out in the 1960s and 1970s by those working in Britain under the auspices of Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) or “Birmingham School,” dealt with reasonably tight-knit, distinctive, and coherent subcultures (Hall & Jefferson 2006). That approach was driven partly by a political desire to show how working-class youth subcultures were internally coherent despite official perceptions of them as lawless forms. Hence, the CCCS used the concept of homology to show how the focal concerns, music, and dress of these subordinate groups fitted together organically to form a unified (and spectacular) subcultural “style.”

For the CCCS, working-class youth subcultures were symptomatic of the disintegration of working class communities that occurred in Britain as a consequence of postwar reconstruction and rehousing policies. However, subcultures only provided symbolic solutions to the concrete problems associated with these transformations, and offered no “real” solutions to the general problem of being in a subordinate structural location. No solutions, that is, to unemployment, dead-end jobs, educational disadvantage, low pay, and de-skilling. The
symbolic solutions of working-class youth subcultures were manifest in their style. The mod style, for example, was an attempt to realize, although in an imaginary way, the conditions of existence of socially mobile white-collar workers; the dress and music of mods reflected hedonistic images of the affluent consumer.

Therefore, working-class youth subcultures were unable to transcend the “real relations” of being in a subordinate class position. Instead they expressed and resolved that common class problematic “magically.” Moreover, their critiques of capitalism and modern institutions were confined to the level of culture. Accordingly, they were unable to enter the arena of “proper politics,” nor challenge the institutional basis of their class subordination. This applied to working- and middle-class subcultures alike, which marked their final “tragic limit,” and raised “the whole question of the status and viability of cultural politics and of a struggle waged exclusively at the level of lifestyle” (Willis 1978: 175). The ultimate failure of working-class youth subcultures in postwar Britain was captured in the title of the seminal book produced by the CCCS: Resistance through Rituals (Hall & Jefferson 2006).

AFTER SUBCULTURE

The CCCS were criticized for romanticising working-class culture and for seeking to find revolutionary potential in young delinquents (Martin 2002: 75). However, the most trenchant criticism came from a group of researchers associated with the “Manchester School.” Their argument was that, by the 1990s, the concept of subculture no longer reflected—if indeed it ever did—the social reality of youth, pop, and deviance. They emphasized the fluidity of positions, poses, and desires, claiming that fixed identities and meanings in youth style dissolved in the 1980s (Martin 2002: 77). This transition was summed up in the phrase: “subculture to clubcultures” (Redhead 1998). Acid house music and rave culture epitomized the way various styles mixed on the same dance floor and attracted a range of disparate groups; from football hooligans to New Age hippies (see Martin 2002: 77).

“Post-subculture” theory is premised on the postmodern notion that young people shape and construct lifestyles and identities unfettered by the former restraints of class and social structure. The concept of subculture thus becomes replaced by terms like “neo-tribe” or “lifestyle choices,” which encapsulate identities and forms of association that are elective not ascribed, temporary not permanent, and fluid not fixed (see Bennett 1999). While subsequent post-subcultural work claimed to map the terrain “after subculture” (Bennett & Kahn-Harris 2004) and go “beyond subculture” (Huq 2006) others have insisted upon the continued relevance of subculture, style, and social class as analytically useful categories (Martin 2009).

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS SYMBOLIC CHALLENGES

Some early work on delinquent gangs and subcultures looked at them from the perspective of collective behavior theory, using the concept of social movement (Pfautz 1961). Pfautz argued that, because they were not goal oriented, delinquent gangs were akin to Blumer’s (1953) expressive social movements. However, that analysis underestimated the potential gangs had for generating and maintaining a culture of their own. Moreover, despite recognizing that movements developed a culture, Pfautz believed mobilization to be the goal of social movements and consequently assigned minimal significance to their culture and internal structure (Downes 1966: 17).

Typically, this conception of social movements equates them with mass mobilizations. It also suffers from “political reductionism,” seeing social movements only as actors in the political system (Melucci 1989), whereas “contentious politics” is but one permutation of social movement activity; others include religious and cultural extra-institutional challenges (Snow 2004). These perspectives
focusing on the relationship of social movements to the state and polity thus tend to ignore the hidden cultural dimension of social movements, which is significant because, among other things, it is the culture of movements—submerged in pre-existing networks of everyday life—that makes mobilization possible. In this way, the network of groups that constitutes a social movement serves as a platform for mobilization, since the movement network shares a culture and collective identity. Furthermore, in some contexts, “oppositional subcultures” (or countercultures) can provide the impetus for mass mobilization and eventually the formation of political parties (Johnston & Snow 1998).

For Melucci (1989, 1996), contemporary movements mount symbolic challenges to dominant homogenizing cultural codes by communicating to the rest of society the message of difference. They do that by living out alternative lifestyles. In this sense, the “medium is the message.” In order to communicate a clear and coherent message, movements must generate a collective identity. That is not easy given social movements consist of a plurality of meanings and orientations. Accordingly, a constructivist approach is required that reveals the processual nature of collective action whereby individual activists and groups interact and negotiate with one another to resolve conflicts and tensions so as to build and sustain a collective identity. By contrast, previous analyses of social movements have tended to reify collective action, treating it as a unitary empirical phenomenon (Martin 2002: 81).

CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, CRITICISM

Like some early theories of subcultures and the post-subculture perspective, Melucci’s constructivist approach scrutinizes the formal characteristics of social movements, and is critical of those who impose a sense of clarity upon complex collective phenomena. Moreover, just as many subcultural studies were influenced by symbolic interactionism (e.g., Cohen 1955; Hall & Jefferson 2006), the focus in contemporary studies of social movements on processes of collective identity formation acknowledges the influence of the symbolic interactionist tradition (Martin 2002: 85). Similar to post-subculture theory, this brand of “new” social movement theory is also associated with the “cultural turn” and postmodern ways of thinking. It is premised on the view that the “former unity (and homogeneity) of social interests has exploded” (Melucci 1989: 172) and, therefore, that the new conflicts no longer revolve about class. Rather, we inhabit a “complex society” wherein social movements are correspondingly heterogeneous, fragile, and complex (Bartholomew & Mayer 1992). Building on the accomplishments of past movements and, in particular, the establishment of the welfare state, contemporary social movements are increasingly oriented to “postmaterial” values about quality of life and cultural recognition and are less concerned with “old” issues relating to material redistribution and economic survival (see Martin 2001).

In their effort to avoid political reductionism, some new social movement scholars have been accused of “cultural reductionism” (Bartholomew & Mayer 1992). It is argued they put too much faith in the efficacy of symbolic challenges and ignore the prospect that to be successful in attaining their goals movements must connect to “institutionally immanent possibilities” (Giddens 1991: 155), which might entail engaging with policy makers, political actors and the state. This criticism is reminiscent of the CCCS’s point about the magical or imaginary resistance of youth subcultures ultimately being ineffective because they did not participate in “proper politics.” Like post-subculture theory, new social movement theory is predicated on a surplus model of abundance, opportunity, and choice. That not only prevents it from considering the persistence of “old” economic issues in contemporary struggles but also means it cannot make sense of collective action.
that is a response to social and economic restructuring processes variously associated with post-Fordism or neoliberalism, which have involved, inter alia, an increase in precarious labor, the dismantling of the welfare state, and the reversal of many of the achievements of previous social movements. Consequently, movements for civil rights and redistributive justice reappear to fight against new forms of social polarization and marginalization and deregulation of the workforce (Bartholomew & Mayer 1992).

SEE ALSO: Countercultures; Culture and social movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Postmaterialism and social movements; Student movements; Symbolic crusades.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


State building and social movements
MICHAEL P. HANAGAN

Since at least 1780, consolidating states have been providing an unusually fertile terrain for the development of social movements. Compared with other states, consolidating states are more contiguous, with better-defined borders and also more centralized, with an increased monopoly over violence. They are better able to identify their population, to protect it, and to serve it (or exploit it) than other states. But the association between states and social movements was typically more complex. Between 1780 and the present, empires formed the major alternative to consolidating states and while social movements originally developed within consolidating states they spread almost worldwide, to land-based empires, and to colonial empires. As they spread from consolidated states to empires, the tactics of social movements more or less retained their familiar form but profoundly changed their content. In our discussions of nineteenth and twentieth-century social movements, analysts often consider consolidating states as independent entities, but many consolidating states in the modern era were also metropoles, capitals of colonial empires. This entry looks at: (1) social movements in consolidating states, (2) land-based empires, and (3) colonial states and empires.

CONSOLIDATING STATES AND METROPOLES

The invention and spread of social movements mark the age of popular politics, an age when reformers not only claimed to speak for aggrieved populations but when aggrieved populations claimed to speak for themselves. Let us take one social movement tactic, the demonstration, as an example. By the 1820s and 1830s in England, monster demonstrations were used by the first social movement organizations to champion suffrage expansion and Catholic emancipation.

Implicit in the demonstration was the assumption that popular support for a cause was politically desirable. In an era of war and revolution, in return for centralization and enormously increased revenues, consolidating states extended rights to subjects who assumed a new and powerful identity, that of citizen. In Great Britain in 1832 and in France between 1789 and 1848 suffrage was extended to some male citizens. After the defeat of Napoleon it looked as if citizenship might disappear entirely from the European continent but, using mass demonstrations, by 1848 concepts of citizenship were again on the march. Arising on the basis of newly won rights, social movement tactics such as demonstrations emerged as tools for expanding rights.

LAND-BASED EMPIRES

In the 1880s and 1890s demonstrations spread to the world of land-based empires of czarist Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and even the Chinese Empire. In this period, land-based imperial states flourished in many parts of the world and were typically larger than metropoles but not colonial empires. Land-based empires relied heavily on coercion and engaged extensively in war making; imperial states possessed several distinct social compacts and significant elements of indirect rule. The states that formed the imperial core were deeply antidemocratic. Although originating in democratizing states, social movements and their characteristic forms of protest, such as demonstrations, also occurred in imperial states lacking any vestige of democracy.

Within land-based empires intimidation and force were used regularly against popular
contentious action and empires possessed almost no institutions for popular expression. As the important example of early twentieth-century czarist Russia shows, social movements adapted themselves to the special features of land-based imperial states.

In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, and developing at an accelerated pace in the early years of the twentieth century, there was a growing recognition on the part of the czarist government of the need for an authoritarian popular politics to combat Western ideals of citizenship. To respond to the challenge of citizenship, the czarist bureaucracy sought to rally people with the slogan “Nationality, Orthodoxy, Autocracy.” The anti-Semitic Black Hundreds of the 1900s represented an effort to build a state-backed popular movement. Russian autocrats engaged in a massive “invention of tradition” as instanced by efforts to make the czar’s coronation in 1896 a public event with massive crowd participation. In the event it ended badly with hundreds of spectators trampled to death when participants heard that the gifts provided by the government in its effort to increase participation were about to run out.

The contradictions of land-based empire provided one means for schooling discontented urbanites in the demonstration form of social protests. In the English and French metropoles ongoing demonstrations reinforced by pamphlets and newspapers provided means for familiarizing masses of people with demonstrations’ rules and conduct. How to initiate demonstrations where political organization and dissident newspapers were illegal?

But Saint Petersburg, the greatest center of worker militancy in czarist Russia, was less than two hundred miles east across the Gulf of Finland from Helsinki, capital of a province of the Russian Empire with its own constitution, where at the turn of the century demonstrations were legal and strikes common. Saint Petersburg workers could read about Finnish demonstrations in the newspapers and learn from migrant workers. A democratizing Finland, hostile to czardom, was the natural point of entry for illegal radical publications, printed abroad.

Illegal newspapers played a role in introducing the demonstration in the southern Russian city of Saratov in 1902. In his memoirs the future Bolshevik revolutionary Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov described the first May Day demonstrations. Meeting secretly, activists planned the demonstration; some wanted to carry weapons but eventually they agreed on an unarmed march with banners that read “Down with the Autocracy,” “The Eight Hour Day,” and “Long Live Socialism.” Little bands of radicals clumped along the sidewalk, then suddenly they unfurled their banners and seized the street. One spectator, frightened by this unfamiliar spectacle, shouted that a riot was going on but most spectators quickly accommodated themselves, grabbed for the leaflets, and carried them away in their pockets. One bold worker jumped on a cart to address the crowd only to discover that he hadn’t any idea of what to say. Startled authorities eventually responded, clubbing the fledging demonstrators and arresting their leaders.

While the forms of the demonstration are recognizable their content changed in the context of the land-based empire. In capital cities and core provinces, demonstrations sought not only to make claims on elites or on the government but to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the existing social order. By their very existence demonstrations challenged the central political myth that a Russian-speaking population, steeped in orthodoxy, supported the autocracy. In 1900 in metropole England or France demonstrations were tools for peacefully articulating claims and negotiating and bargaining about them, in Russia they were valuable in themselves and the authorities routinely responded with violence. In a war-weary Russia, an illegal demonstration for International Women’s Day began the revolution in February 1917.
COLONIAL STATES AND METROPOLES

In the colonies of metropoles with consolidating states, social movements spread in the 1920s and 1930s but, where they occurred, they too took on different meanings from those in Western Europe and the US, and also from those in land-based empires. Around 1900, a particular type of empire, the colonial empire, controlled a large portion of the world. Colonial empires were regimes of loosely organized and relatively decentralized states dominated by a single consolidating state (or metropole). Colonies played a relatively low profile role in world diplomacy; most of their military effort was devoted to policing their own populations. The great paradox of colonial governments was that while they possessed almost unchecked power over their subjects, their own power was dependent upon and subordinated to geographically distant metropoles in Europe, North America, or Japan where citizen rights were expanding.

While metropoles were often democratizing states, colonies were usually composite states combining elements of autocracy and citizenship. Take the case of the vast Indian colonies. Although administered by a tight-knit bureaucracy and trim military force, British rule (the Raj) did not penetrate very deeply into Indian society; a small contingent of British officials reinforced by an only somewhat larger group of natives ruled a vast population. Britain could rule only insofar as it left many features of local life untouched. The Indian Empire, like colonies in general, was no such repressive armed behemoth as the Russian Empire; demonstrations emerged in an environment in which protesters confronted and responded to both an authoritarian Raj and a democratizing English polity. In the 1910s and 1920s India may have been democratizing but, if so, at a slower rate than England.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century increasing numbers of businessmen, soldiers, and students returned from Britain to India with a knowledge of British politics. In London, visitors such as Gandhi observed demonstrations and assimilated concepts of citizenship to traditional Indian political ideas. By the early twentieth century, mass demonstrations were a common phenomenon in British India and colonial activists found support for their legal status among metropole reformers, some of whom, such as a prominent British socialist, condemned the Raj as rule “in the Muscovite manner.” Supported by metropole reformers many Indian dissidents claimed the rights of metropole citizens. In 1923, when a working-class party organized the first May Day demonstrations, it scheduled two simultaneous events, one in a popularly accessible location, the other across the street from the Madras High Court building, a direct assertion of the right to demonstrate on May Day. Both demonstrations went peacefully but many of the participants were later jailed as communists engaged in a “conspiracy against the king.”

The contradiction between the claims for metropole-type citizenship and the reality of colonial repression was at the center of the dynamic element in colonial politics. Generally peaceful demonstrations occurred during Gandhi’s famous march to the sea, protesting British taxation. The drama of the march actually captured an international audience for Indian protest. Yet violence was always a possibility and the salt marchers were brutally beaten when arrested. In British India the demonstration did not attain full recognition as a legitimate unchallenged form of protest, as shown by the Amritsar massacre. In Amritsar in 1919 Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer machine-gunned a peaceful crowd of Indians attending a rally protesting the incarceration of Indian nationalists, killing almost four hundred people, and severely wounding a thousand in order to keep the natives in their place. Dyer was never punished and his military career was in no way hindered by his murder of hundreds of Indians. Gandhi often claimed that it was this massacre that led him to abandon his faith in British rule.

The status of social movements and social movement tactics in colonies was always contradictory. Successful colonial social movements appealed to local activists searching to
mobilize constituents, to social movements in metropoles that viewed autocratic rule in the colonies as a threat to their existence, and sometimes to global audiences. Social movements mobilized within elaborately structured colonial polities that varied greatly in their recognition of citizenship either at the local and national level or at the colonial and metropole level. Anticolonial movements tried to take advantage of disparities in citizenship practice but they were frequently victims of them.

In conclusion, social movements may have originated in consolidating states but they did not long remain there. Social movements and social movement tactics spread from democratizing polities to undemocratic polities, but as they did so their character changed. In metropole nations, as shown by the example of the demonstration, contentious social movements became tools of peaceful bargaining and negotiation. In imperial contention, there remained elements of bargaining but social movements such as demonstrations challenged the very basis of the political order and almost always involved violence. In colonial empires contentious social movements sought to use metropole models, reformist allies, and indigenous political traditions to carve out a space for themselves, but this space grew and contracted in response to the interaction of colonial and metropole social movements, the involvement of colonial social movements with metropoles, and to changes in colonial policy. However similar in form, colonial social movements profoundly differed from those in the metropole.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Decolonization and social movements; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Social change and social movements; Tactics; Transnational social movements; World-system and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
State breakdown and social movements

AGNIESZKA PACZYNSKA

As Mancur Olson pointed out in his 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, one of the great puzzles of social dynamics is how people overcome collective action problems and organize to pursue common goals. What conditions facilitate and which hinder the emergence of social movements, what allows social movements to persist over time, and what accounts for their impact on social and political dynamics are some of the key questions that scholars have explored over the last few decades.

One of the key dynamics that facilitates the emergence of social movements is the processes of state breakdown. When previously cohesive state structures begin to fracture and weaken, and elite conflicts spill into the public arena, a space opens for social groups to mobilize more readily. The costs of mobilization decline as the state becomes either less willing or less able to deploy repression. At the same time, the appearance of new elite allies facilitates social movements’ ability to achieve their goals. By lowering costs of collective action and increasing the probability of success, periods of state breakdown are often accompanied by a rise in the number of social movements. At the same time, the emergence of social movements and collective challenges to state authority can contribute to the weakening of state structures and in some cases to state breakdown.

This explanation of collective action and social movements came to be known as breakdown theory. The theory sought to explain a wide variety of contentious collective action, including protests, riots, rebellions, and revolutions. What the different variants of the breakdown theory had in common was that they viewed these collective, contentious dynamics unfolding when “the mechanisms of social control lose their restraining power” (Useem 1998: 215). In other words, the breakdown of state structures, when combined with social pressures and strains, was seen as directly contributing to the emergence of collective action.

STATE BREAKDOWN, CHANGING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, AND REVOLUTIONS

State breakdown theories argued that social groups become more active and engage more readily in protest activities in periods of social crisis and breakdown (Goldstone 1980). Scholars argued that these structural changes provided a more compelling explanation of when contentious collective action emerges than such variables as ideology, movement organization, or strategies and tactics. As Skocpol notes “no successful social revolution has ever been ‘made’ by mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement . . . in no sense did (radical) vanguards ever create the revolutionary crisis they exploited. Instead . . . revolutionary situations have developed due to the emergence of politico-military crises of state and class domination” (Skocpol 1979: 17).

Social revolutions, and particularly the role that the breakdown of state institutions had in creating conditions that facilitated revolutionary transformations, generated much interest among scholars (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1980; Goldstone, Gurr, & Moshiri 1991; Tilly 1993; Goodwin 2001). In many of these accounts, an especially potent revolutionary mix combined fiscal strains experienced by the state, growing disunity within the political elite, and increasing public grievances.

Changes in structural conditions thus either hinder or facilitate the emergence of contentious collective action, including
social movements. These changes in what Eisinger (1973) called the political opportunity structure provide incentives for individuals and groups to mobilize. A number of conditions seem to be particularly significant in facilitating the emergence of collective action. These include: (1) the relative openness or closure of the political system; (2) changing elite dynamics and in particular the emergence of splits within the elite; (3) the appearance of new elite allies; and (4) the state’s changing capacity and/or willingness to repress its opponents (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998).

The changing political opportunity structure affects social actors’ assessment of the potential consequences of their collective action and whether such action is likely to succeed or fail. How these judgments are made, however, is complex and is shaped by the context in which individuals are making these assessments. Rational choice accounts, for instance, point out that individuals making decisions about whether or not to participate in collective action engage in a cost–benefit assessment. Shifts in political opportunity can change this calculus and make participation the preferred strategy. In conditions of bounded rationality, for example, a shift in the political opportunity structure that provides additional information about state’s declining capacity to repress can lead individuals to see participation in collective action as less costly. Alternatively, state repression might facilitate mobilization by shifting the perceived time horizons from long to short term (Chong 1991).

The changing political opportunity structure affects the patterns of social mobilization if this change is perceived by social actors. In other words, social actors need to recognize that a changing structural environment has created a new opening for collective action. As Tarrow points out, not all individuals are equally willing to test the degree of openness. Often, it is the so-called early risers who expose the state’s vulnerability to challengers and thus signal to other social actors that mobilization is possible.

The dominant position of breakdown theory came under challenge in the 1970s when scholars began to focus on other variables to explain the emergence of social movements other than the breakdown of the state, in particular, the key role of resource mobilization, and especially of dense social networks, that individuals and groups could draw upon as they engaged and challenged the states. The growing focus on the importance of framing in the emergence and success of social movements also challenged state breakdown theories. Although studies that emphasized the key role of resource mobilization and framing added new insights to our understanding of the complex dynamics of social movement emergence, growth and decline, success and failure, they did not displace but rather supplemented state breakdown theories.

EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The popular protests that swept through Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the first half of 2011 underscore how rapidly political opportunities can shift and how the dynamics of social movement emergence themselves can reshape political opportunities not just within a state but across state boundaries. Regional early risers, in the case of MENA, Tunisia, and Poland in the case of Eastern and Central Europe in 1989, can signal the shifting openness and cohesiveness not just of the state that the emerging social movement is confronting, but of the regional context as well. In other words, the inability or unwillingness of one state to respond with force to a collective challenge to its authority, and the breakdown of the state that follows, can signal to potential challengers in neighboring countries that effective confrontation with the state is possible and that a state that had appeared cohesive may in fact be torn by factionalism, and be brittle or weak. Demonstration effects can change perceptions of political opportunities.
This signaling across state boundaries is of course not always reliable. Eastern and Central Europe, for example, witnessed a wave of social mobilization and state breakdown but these dynamics were varied as they unfolded and were shaped by the domestic context of each country. Thus, while some transitions and state fracturing proceeded peacefully, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, in Romania the toppling of the Ceausescu regime was violent, as was the breakdown and splintering of Yugoslavia. Likewise, in the case of MENA, the dynamics of collective mobilization and challenge to the state were shaped by the internal structures of state and society as well as the state’s international relationships.

While state breakdown opens up political space for collective mobilization and the emergence of social movements, social movements can also emerge because they are stimulated more by shifting external political opportunity structures that contribute to undermining state cohesion and even state breakdown. In other words, the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia was precipitated by the emergence of collective action in opposition to the state. But this collective challenge was stimulated not by shifting domestic political opportunity structures that signaled the weakening of the state but was rather more of a consequence of shifting regional opportunity structures. Similarly, the 2011 Libyan state breakdown was stimulated more by regional signaling of changing opportunity structures than a shift in internal dynamics within the Libyan state.

Furthermore, as Tilly observed, the dynamics of state breakdown and revolution are not uniform across time and space and in fact vary significantly. Nonetheless, certain temporal and regional patterns can be discerned in how revolutionary processes, democratization, and social movement dynamics unfold. This is because “within a given region and period many states share political arrangements, national and international, [and] rough similarities and explicable variation appear in the experiences of connected states with revolution” (Tilly 1995: 1600).

GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGES POST 9/11

Since the 1990s, the relationship between state breakdown and the emergence of social movements has drawn attention from a different perspective. The September 11, 2001 attacks heightened concerns in Washington and other countries of the Global North about the global consequences of insecurity and state breakdown in the Global South. The “failed” and “failing” states in this perspective are seen as fundamentally changing the political opportunity structure for organizing collective action. These “ungoverned” spaces, where the state has either effectively broken down or where its writ does not extend across most of the territory it nominally controls, are thus seen as opening political space to groups who can challenge not only local order and state authority but can potentially affect the political, social, and economic dynamics of a whole region or, as in the case of groups like al-Qaeda, can have global reach.

More recent studies have also noted the growing importance of transnational linkages and alliances in facilitating the emergence of social movements. International factors have always played a key role in accounting for the pressures contributing to state breakdown. In particular, fiscal strains resulting from external military ambitions or threats have been noted by many scholars as weakening the state and making it more susceptible to revolutionary upheavals (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1980). The era of globalization has ushered in new opportunities for social groups to forge alliances across borders. This in turn has affected factors that shape the political opportunity structures. Individuals and social groups in closed political systems with few domestic elite allies can now turn, at least under some circumstances, to look for international allies and supporters. These international linkages can
thus provide new incentives for social movement mobilization, even when the domestic political opportunity structure appears unfavorable (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). In some cases these transnational movements seek to advance liberal goals and universal rights but in other cases new transnational actors pursue parochial forms of hypernationalism and reinforce traditional forms of power (Adamson 2005). Transnational rebels (Saleyhan 2009), diaspora networks, and transnational crime may contribute to state breakdown and opportunities for domestic social movements to mobilize.

SEE ALSO: Al-Qaeda; Framing and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Rational choice theory and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Revolutions; Strain and breakdown theories; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Strain and breakdown theories
STEVEN M. BUECHLER

One classic explanation for collective action involves structural strain or societal breakdown. The logic is that when chronic strain or acute breakdown undermine societal integration, the social controls and moral imperatives that normally constrain collective behavior are weakened. Strain or breakdown thus allows or "causes" collective action that would otherwise be contained.

CLASSICAL STRAIN AND BREAKDOWN THEORIES

Emile Durkheim is sociology's preeminent theorist of social integration. In traditional societies, such integration arose from common beliefs and collective morality. As societies grew in size and complexity, such unifying forces weakened and integration became a problem. Anomie refers to insufficient regulation of behavior while egoism involves excessive individuation. Both signify broader problems of social integration that contribute to dysfunctional outcomes, including suicide. The same logic applies to many types of unconventional behavior.

European theorists of crowd behavior directly linked social breakdown to collective behavior. In their view, "(t)he cause of civil violence . . . was the breakdown of rational control over human behavior through the spread of what one might call 'crowd mentality'" (Rule 1988: 83). Crowds were thought to create intense and volatile emotions that drove collective behavior. In the early twentieth century, Robert Park (Park & Burgess 1921) imported these ideas into US sociology and laid the foundation for the collective behavior tradition.

Herbert Blumer subsequently established collective behavior as a recognizable subfield in sociology. For Blumer (1951), collective behavior is largely spontaneous, unregulated, and unstructured. It is triggered by some disruption in standard routines of everyday life that promotes circular reaction or interstimulation with the qualities of contagion, randomness, excitability, and suggestibility. It is this social unrest that facilitates collective behavior in the form of crowds, masses, publics, and social movements. Turner and Killian (1987) later emphasized how collective behavior may also promote emergent norms and incipient forms of order through symbolic communication and interaction. This approach nonetheless assumes that collective behavior is triggered by some disruption in normal social routines. Moreover, the elements of contagion, excitability, spontaneity, and emotionality sharply set it off from conventional behavior. Finally, this approach has been widely interpreted as seeing collective behavior as irrational, disruptive, dangerous and excessive. Rightly or wrongly, this negative image of collective behavior played a major role in the subsequent decline of strain and breakdown theories of collective action.

Another version of strain theories involves relative deprivation (Geschwender 1968). Here, strain takes a social-psychological form as people assess their current situation against reference groups or past or anticipated future situations. Whenever they find a benchmark that implies they could or should be better off, relative deprivation exists and this psychological strain can trigger collective behavior. Through cognitive dissonance or frustration–aggression mechanisms, such psychological strain provokes collective behavior.

Smelser (1962) provided a structural-functional version of strain theory in the form of a value-added scheme of six factors that are individually necessary and collectively
sufficient for collective behavior to occur. Structural conduciveness means the social structure permits some form of collective behavior to emerge. Structural strain refers to ambiguities, deprivations, conflicts, and discrepancies in social structure. Generalized beliefs are (inherently irrational) cognitive schemata that focus grievances. Precipitating factors provide an immediate catalyst. Mobilization for action is the culmination of these background processes. If effective social controls are in place, this sequential emergence of collective behavior can be aborted; hence the breakdown of such controls is a final determinant. Smelser thus weaves strain and breakdown into a macrostructural theory of collective behavior.

Mass society theory is a final variant that revives Durkheim’s concerns with anomie and egoism. For this perspective, modernity promotes massive social structures and erodes intermediate groups that provide social anchors for individuals (Kornhauser 1959). Without such groups, isolation, depersonalization, and alienation prevail. Mass society theory predicted that the most isolated, alienated individuals would be most likely to participate in collective behavior. Although this prediction proved spectacularly unsuccessful (because isolated actors are no more likely to join collective behavior than any other collective undertaking), the theory reiterated the premise that some type of social strain or breakdown causes collective behavior.

The concepts of strain and breakdown connect an otherwise diverse group of social thinkers who invoked them to explain collective behavior. In the mid-1970s, an authoritative overview of social movement theory defended these concepts as crucial explanations for collective behavior and implied that strain and breakdown theories had a bright future (Marx & Wood 1975). Less than ten years later, however, a similar review did not even mention strain or breakdown (Jenkins 1983). The contrast between these two assessments hints at the paradigm shift that occurred from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s in the study of collective action. During this decade, strain and breakdown theories all but disappeared.

**FROM COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR TO RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL PROCESS**

Strain and breakdown theories virtually disappeared because they were seen – rightly or wrongly – as inextricably linked to a collective behavior paradigm that came under relentless criticism. Careful analysis of 1960s urban riots faulted strain explanations for obscuring the political dimension of protest and the rational orientation of protestors. Resource mobilization and political process theorists argued that breakdown theories suffered from “irreparable logical and empirical difficulties” (Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly 1975) and that explanations emphasizing solidarity among protesters always provided better explanations. These theorists rejected the mechanistic linkages between individual discontent and group action and the emphasis on psychological states over political interests (McAdam 1982).

The resource mobilization and political process alternatives challenged the accepted wisdom about collective behavior in several ways (Buechler 2000). They rejected the equation of social movements with short-lived riots, crazes, panics, or fads. Movements were rather seen as enduring, patterned, and even institutionalized expressions of political struggles over conflicting interests and scarce resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). In defining movements as normal, rational, challenges by aggrieved groups, these new paradigms equated collective action not with deviance or social disorganization but with political or organizational conflict. More broadly, these perspectives rejected deterministic imagery for an agency-centered approach in which actors’ purposes, interests, and goals were foremost. The presumably rational, political nature of such actors and their interests displaced explanations emphasizing marginality, deprivation, frustration, tension, and strain. In all these ways, strain and breakdown imagery was eclipsed by new concerns
with the mobilization of resources and dynamics of contention.

These shifts led to the aforementioned review article that made no reference to strain and breakdown as explanations of collective action (Jenkins 1983). These concepts were driven underground in three ways. First, direct criticisms challenged them on their own terms. Second, the rise of the resource mobilization and political process paradigms undermined the collective behavior tradition within which strain and breakdown theories had been embedded. And third, the research program of these new paradigms rendered strain and breakdown marginal to social movement theory. By the mid-1980s, strain and breakdown theories appeared completely moribund, but a closer look reveals a more interesting story.

THE PERSISTENCE OF STRAIN AND BREAKDOWN THEORIES

While resource mobilization theory established a new paradigm for the study of social movements, strain and breakdown theories persisted at the margins. One example is the role of state breakdown in the explanation of revolutions. Goldstone (1991) argued that revolutions follow similar causal processes involving state breakdown, revolutionary contention, and state rebuilding. State breakdown arises from a conjunction of state fiscal distress, elite alienation and conflict, and a high mobilization potential among the general populace. In this interactive model, all three elements must be present if a full revolutionary challenge is to unfold. By emphasizing external, deterministic background factors, the causal imagery of Goldstone’s theory recalls the classical collective behavior tradition with its emphasis on strain and breakdown.

Breakdown theories also feature prominently in Piven and Cloward’s (1977) work on poor people’s movements. They emphasize the extent to which social structures normally limit opportunities for protest and diminish its force when it does occur. It is the relatively unusual breakdowns in society’s regulatory capacity and everyday routines that provide rare but potent opportunities for mass defiance. Piven and Cloward (1992) explicitly defend breakdown theories – what they call the malintegration (MI) approach – as robust explanations of disruptive rather than normative forms of protest, and they criticize resource mobilization theorists for blurring the distinction between the two. They also challenge “solidarity” explanations by arguing that horizontal organization among challengers is rarely sufficient; effective protest also requires the more unusual breakdown of vertical integration that normally constrains challengers.

A more recent reformulation of breakdown theories locates the link between social breakdown and collective action in the disruption of the quotidian nature of social life (Snow et al. 1998). The latter refers to taken-for-granted, daily practices and routines that comprise habitual social action, along with routinized expectations about the social world. “When the quotidian is disrupted, then, routinized patterns of action are rendered problematic and the natural attitude is fractured” (Snow et al. 1998: 5). In this way, a specific type of breakdown is seen as the impetus to collective action. To actually produce that outcome, the disruption must be experienced collectively and it must not have a normal, institutional resolution if it is to provoke collective action (1998: 6). Examples of such disruptions may be found in “suddenly imposed grievances,” intrusions or violations of community space, and changes in taken-for-granted subsistence routines or social control structures. This account challenges the presumed dichotomy between breakdown and solidarity by specifying that breakdown refers to patterns and expectancies of everyday life rather than associational ties between individuals. Thus, the breakdown of everyday routines can occur alongside strong ties within groups, and it is this combination that may be most likely to promote collective action.

The contributions of Goldstone, Piven and Cloward, and Snow and colleagues illustrate
how strain and breakdown have persisted as explanations of at least some forms of collective action. More broadly, this history illustrates how classical concepts and theories never completely disappear from the discipline, though they may undergo significant revision. Indeed, if there is any cumulative progression in the development of sociological explanation, it may arise from a dialectic whereby classical notions are thoroughly challenged but persist in revised and more carefully specified forms. This process seems evident in the persistence and perhaps even the return of strain and breakdown approaches in social movement theory.

IS “OPPORTUNITY” THE NEW “STRAIN?”

It can even be argued that strain and breakdown theories have returned to mainstream social movement theory in a major, albeit disguised, fashion. There is considerable conceptual overlap between what classical theorists mean by strain or breakdown and what political process theorists mean by opportunity (Buechler 2004). What separates the approaches and obscures the similarities is the valuational bias of each set of concepts. The terms “strain” and “breakdown” inherently connote negative, problematic conditions to be prevented, avoided or repaired. As these terms functioned in the classical collective behavior paradigm, there can be little doubt that they conveyed negative value judgments about the appropriateness of collective behavior. It was not just the notion of breakdown as a neutral causal mechanism that provoked the ire of resource mobilization and political process theorists; it was also the halo of negative value judgments surrounding the concept that drew their fire.

The concept of opportunity was tailor-made for this debate. On the one hand, it provided the transvaluation sought by resource mobilization and political process proponents that allowed them to paint collective action in a positive light. Particularly in the US context, the concept of “opportunity” inherently signifies something to be sought, desired, seized, enjoyed, valued, and maximized. On the other hand, it preserved a way of talking about changes in structural conditions and cultural contexts that facilitate collective action. By substituting the concept of opportunity for that of breakdown, newer paradigms retained a powerful explanation for collective action while reversing the valuations placed on that action. There are as many different versions of opportunity in recent approaches as there are variations on breakdown in the classical tradition; the following examples merely illustrate some ways in which “opportunity” has become a substitute for “breakdown.”

The concept of opportunity has been there from the beginning in Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model of collective action. Most basically, it was defined as the increased vulnerability of other groups or governments to actions of a contender pursuing its interests. Opportunities emerge when the established order becomes vulnerable to the actions of contenders and when their costs of acting are reduced. McAdam’s (1982) political process model also recognized a central role for opportunity in the emergence of collective action. Alterations in political opportunity structures reduce power discrepancies between authorities and challengers and increase the cost of repressing protest. Once again, increasing strain or breakdown is mirrored in increased power for challengers relative to authorities and increased costs of social control for authorities. Tarrow (1994) also recognizes opportunity as a crucial variable in the emergence of social protest. While some types of opportunity are relatively consistent features of the political environment that correspond to a notion of social strain, others are more variable (unstable alignments, divided elites) and correspond to a notion of breakdown. In all these ways, where a classical theorist sees strain or breakdown, a political process theorist sees opportunity. While the valuations placed on these concepts are often opposed, they do essentially the same work in each theory as external, variable conditions that alter the balance of power between
authority and contenders, and hence the likelihood of collective action itself.

Under closer scrutiny, some noteworthy differences between breakdown and opportunity emerge. Strain and breakdown theories have been invoked to explain a very broad range of collective behavior whereas opportunity is usually cited to explain political, state-centered conflict. Opportunity explanations implicitly rest on a rational calculus of costs and benefits whereas strain and breakdown accounts may be better suited for explaining more spontaneous or transient forms of collective action. In these and other ways, these concepts retain distinctive connotations and implications.

While strain and breakdown theories remain somewhat marginalized in social movement theory, opportunity is a well established element in a theoretical synthesis of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996). While opportunity and breakdown are not the same thing, they do the same work in each respective theoretical tradition. Both refer to external, variable processes that increase the likelihood of collective action. To the extent that opportunity has become a stand-in for strain and breakdown, the latter never really disappeared from social movement theory.

CONCLUSION

From the classical era of sociology until well into the twentieth century, strain and breakdown theories provided crucial explanations for collective behavior. In the 1970s, such theories were dismissed by ferocious criticism that ushered in new paradigms. This criticism was directed at the logical and empirical flaws of those approaches as well as the negative imagery of collective behavior implicit in them. Alongside this antagonism to breakdown explanations, new assumptions about agency, rationality, politics, and organization led to different questions and answers than the classical collective behavior tradition. Nevertheless, strain and breakdown approaches persisted in various formulations at the margins of social movement theory. Finally, it can be argued that the concepts of strain and breakdown never really disappeared from social movement theory as much as they went underground and reappeared in the guise of a new conceptual language about opportunity. Given recent pronouncements about new syntheses emerging in social movement theory, perhaps it is time for an active reconsideration of the role of strain and breakdown in any such synthesis.

Any successful effort in this direction will require three levels of specification. Most obviously, we need greater specificity about what it is that undergoes strain or breakdown. Second, we need greater specificity about the mechanisms by which any type of strain or breakdown is translated into collective action. Third, we need greater specificity about what types of collective action are most likely to emerge from specific types of breakdown and strain. The classical collective behavior approach presumed an extremely broad spectrum, from panics, crazes and fads to riots, rebellions, and revolutions. Recent social movement theory has fractured the spectrum and claimed movements as its domain while paying less attention to other forms of collective action. This is precisely where a revised breakdown theory may have its greatest relevance. For example, the distinction between routine forms of collective action deriving from resource availability and nonroutine forms responding to strain and breakdown needs to be further explored if we are to specify which types of collective action are most likely to be associated with social strain and breakdown.

Finally, while we introduce greater specificity to notions of strain and breakdown, we must do the same with the concept of opportunity so we can then explore the relationships between strain, breakdown, and opportunity more carefully. To do so promises to advance social movement theory while also providing a fascinating test of the extent to which concepts embedded in antithetical theoretical traditions are capable of genuine synthesis.
SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Convergence/dispositional theory; Emergent norm theory; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Mass society theory; Participation in social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Quotidian disruption; Relative deprivation; Resource mobilization theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Strategy
JAMES M. JASPER

Derived from the ancient Greek word for a military commander, “strategy” has two common meanings. In business it is a broad plan, and in military terms, similarly, it is what is done before the battle begins (in contrast to the tactics that lower officers use to implement the commander’s strategy during the battle). In contrast, as an adjective, strategic and strategic action refer to interactions among players who have both ends and means, and who each realize that the others are also acting strategically to get what they want. In this latter sense, strategy covers almost everything that social movements do.

The most obvious strategic engagements are between movements and their opponents, but there is also strategic interaction between movements and their potential allies or recruits, the media, and various government agencies. As is obvious from this list, strategic interaction is not always conflict. It is still strategic when protesters endeavor to persuade supporters to send them funds, or judges that their cause is just. In all these cases, they are trying to get something from others. Players’ ends and means, as well as the arenas in which they interact, are the core of strategic action.

GOALS

The goals of social movements vary enormously. Some want to change society, others to block changes. Some want rights or material benefits for the groups they represent (such as the labor movement); others seek protections or advantages for others (the animal rights movement). Some groups are focused on local issues (NIMBYs), others on global ones (Attac). In addition, every social movement has multiple goals.

Many theories assume one kind of goal. Political opportunity theories were designed to explain movements aimed at political inclusion and power for members of a group. Rational choice models often assume participants want material rewards. Many approaches define social movements as efforts by oppressed or excluded groups, or as efforts to influence authorities’ decisions. In older work, movements were often classified as either expressive or instrumental in their goals. (In fact, most movements have both expressive and instrumental goals, with one focused on audiences internal to the movement and the latter on external audiences.) Little attention has been paid to the variety of goals, and the potential conflict among different goals. These are interesting dynamics, of which I shall mention several.

First, individuals have goals that imperfectly coincide with the stated goals of a group, so that they often try to pursue their personal ends at the same time as (or even instead of) group ends. The more compatible these are, the more work a movement gets out of its participants. But powerful leaders have considerable ability to use movements to attain their own goals, rather than the other way around. They can use the fame they derive from leading a movement to advance their own careers, for example, as happened in the New Left (Gitlin 1980).

There is also a Survival or Success Dilemma: once a group is formed, its members (and especially its paid employees) have an interest in its survival, which may sometimes interfere with the goals it was formed to pursue in the first place (Piven & Cloward 1977). This is connected to the Today or Tomorrow Dilemma: short-run goals may interfere with long-run goals. For instance, a movement victory may inspire countermobilization by its opponents, who may turn out to be more effective in the long run (Jasper & Poulsen 1993).
Another pair of strategic dilemmas suggests how movements change over time through interaction with other players. There is a Dilemma of Shifting Goals (Jasper 2006: 75). Activists may wish to abandon some goals as unrealistic, or they may add goals that they come to feel are important and attainable. In other words, it is strategically realistic to adapt goals to available means. But some supporters may feel betrayed; opponents can accuse you of being duplicitous. This links to the Articulation Dilemma: the more you specify what your goals are, the more you attract those who share them, but the more accountable you will be for failing to reach them. Articulation makes it more costly to shift goals.

Much research remains to be done on the sources of goals and the potential conflicts among them. Individuals and factions within an organization battle over what the organization’s officially stated goals will be, through processes that are still poorly documented.

MEANS

Strategic players have three basic families of means at their disposal: they can use physical coercion or threat, they can persuade others, or they can pay others to do what they want them to (Jasper 2006: ch. 4). Although they may use all three, social movements rely heavily on persuasion to accomplish their goals. To the extent they rely more on coercion, they become a rebel army or a band of criminals. To the extent they rely more on paid staff, they shade into the status of interest groups.

The threat of coercion is a way to disrupt economic and political systems, a strategy that Piven and Cloward (1977) believe is the only path open to those without monetary and other capacities. In a parallel inquiry, Gamson (1975) found that groups using violence were more likely to attain their goals (which he reduced to benefits for represented groups and recognition for the protest organizations). These works were an important breakthrough in our understanding of the effects of different strategies, shattering a complacent pluralist intuition that disruptive protest was somehow bad. Instead we see the Naughty or Nice Dilemma (Jasper 2006: 106): aggressive tactics can attain some ends, safe choices obtain others. Aggression runs the risk of arousing repression by authorities and the erosion of public support, but if it can seize gains that are hard to reverse later, it is often worth it.

Scholars have given greater attention to the means that activists use to persuade rather than coerce others. Foremost have been the processes by which mobilizers must find the right frames to appeal to participants and potential participants (Snow et al. 1986), diagnosing a problem and motivating work toward a solution. Moral shocks (Jasper 1997), dizzying experiences that challenge a person’s assumptions about the world, are a similar concept meant to get at the processes by which recruits are first attracted to a movement. Over time, it has become apparent that framing and moral shocks are most effective in the context of social networks, motivating those already involved and sometimes pushing them toward more radical tactics. For instance Gould (2009) demonstrates that lesbian and gay activists moved toward more disruptive tactics in the late 1980s because of the moral shock of the US Supreme Court decision, *Bowers vs. Hardwick*, upholding antisodomy statutes.

In the affluent nations since the late twentieth century, protest groups have often paid staff to conduct many basic activities instead of relying on volunteers, a process famously analyzed by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Groups that choose this route come to depend on their financial backers, and frequently turn into interest groups. In addition, professional activists emerge who can move from one cause to another, bringing their specialized skills with them—for a price. With paid staff comes bureaucracy, which often undermines some of the basic moral goals of the protest groups.

Means and ends conflict in this and other ways. Foremost, in the Dirty Hands Dilemma, there are certain goals that can only be obtained through means that are morally suspect (Jasper
For some participants, money and bureaucracy fall in this category, making it hard for them to sustain organizations. A few movements, notably nonviolent movements, define themselves by the tactics they reject on moral grounds, although often recognizing that more aggressive tactics might help them get what they want sooner. A good example is the American animal rights movement, which in its early years obtained powerful propaganda about the abuse of animals through spies and burglars.

Tactics originate from either invention or borrowing from other movements. Tactical innovation seems to occur through interaction with opponents, in a kind of strategic game (Ganz 2009). Diffusion of tactics is better studied (Soule 2004). The transmission mechanisms include direct influence through social networks (Morris 1981) and indirect inspiration through reportage by the media (Myers 2000). Far from simple contagion, diffusion involves varying degrees of active consideration on the part of either those transmitting or those adopting (and adapting) innovations. Because strategic innovation always carries risks, protesters try to solve the Innovation Dilemma by observing what the costs, benefits, and risks have been for others before they do something new themselves.

DECISIONS AND DILEMMAS

Little attention has been given to how activists make decisions about what to do, leaving the impression that they simply follow the scripts and routines they have learned in or from other movements, or what Charles Tilly called a repertoire of contention. But it is precisely the ability to choose among options and to invent new actions and arguments that sometimes allows “David” to defeat “Goliath” (Ganz 2009). Good choices are more likely, according to Ganz (2009), in groups with regular, open, and authoritative deliberation; diverse networks of supporters; knowledge about diverse tactics to choose among; resources drawn from supporters rather than outsiders; accountability to supporters; and leaders drawn from inside and outside local groups with personal commitments to the cause. What is crucial is feedback about what is working, and flexible reactions to that feedback; in a word, the ability to learn.

The most basic strategic choices typically take the form of dilemmas: each option comes with a long list of potential benefits and risks, some known and some not, as well as various costs. There are dozens of such dilemmas, such as Naughty or Nice and Dirty Hands. Other common ones include the Extension Dilemma over whether to build a broad team with more resources or a small and better focused team; the Organizational Dilemma over whether to devote time to creating a formal organization supported by a stable flow of resources or to attract supporters to singular, especially disruptive, events; and the Janus Dilemma of balancing attention to one’s own members or to outsiders (Jasper 2004, 2006).

Such basic questions cannot be debated at every group meeting. As Tilly suggests, most are ignored in favor of familiar routines. But even when not faced as explicit dilemmas, they are still there as underlying trade-offs. Much of the strategic creativity of organizers arises when they take on one of these trade-offs, realizing that there are other ways to do things. Leaders with experience in other contexts are especially good at seeing these openings.

PLAYERS AND LEADERS

Attention to decisions and dilemmas highlights who exactly it is who is making the decisions. Scholars often write loosely about “social movements” as making decisions or undertaking actions, but none think of movements as coherent entities. They are composed of formal organizations and individuals who feel as though they share enough goals to call themselves a social movement, a term of collective identity that suggests purpose and power. The label is largely a hortatory rhetorical tool.
In even the most democratic of groups, some individuals have more influence than others. In most there is some formal division of labor. As part of their role, formal leaders set agendas, guide discussions, and make a number of smaller decisions on their own. Alliances of protest groups negotiate their stated goals and their means through formal mechanisms, although here too the decisions often come down to a small group of individuals. Factions, too, struggle to set agendas and formulate public statements. Organizations and movements are as much an arena for internal contention as a player in external contention. Careful catalogs of all relevant players in a conflict, internal and external, can help avoid much confusion.

Once we recognize the human beings who make decisions, we can see a range of additional mechanisms at work. For instance, people attach moral value to their means as well as their goals. They also know how to do some things and not others. Together these give people a “taste in tactics” (Jasper 1997: ch. 10) that is partly independent of the perceived efficacy of the tactics; tactics are rarely neutral means about which protesters do not care. Thus protesters face dilemmas having to do with clashes between means and ends.

A universal leadership challenge derives from the Janus Dilemma: some leaders are more effective at reaching external audiences, others at appealing to or managing a group’s own membership. Given the different expectations and goals of insiders and outsiders, it makes sense that few leaders are effective at both, perhaps one reason that leadership teams made up of insiders and outsiders often are more successful (Ganz 2009). Similarly, individuals who try to act as brokers between groups frequently find they are not fully trusted by either.

We come now to two topics that scholars have addressed extensively, to see how they are related to strategies.

CAPACITIES

A group selects means of action to take advantage of the capacities it has or can mobilize. This simple insight inspired the resource mobilization theory of social movements (McCarthy & Zald 1977), which focused on how those without extensive financial resources could appeal to those with them, but also how paid staff could attract time resources from volunteers. In the first flush of this paradigm, any advantage came to be called a resource, including cultural meanings and psychological states. My own preference is to restrict the term to money and the technologies and services it can buy.

There are other useful capacities for a movement to have. Leaders with experience, intelligence, and know-how tend to make better decisions (Ganz 2009). This kind of intelligence can often substitute for resources. Organizations, too, can develop mailing and phone lists, offices, and social networks, partly independent of the individuals who work in them. One of the most important capacities is reputation, of both individuals and groups. Considerable work is devoted to reputation building, such as the “WUNC displays” that Tilly (2004) described: protests designed to demonstrate the moral worth, unity, numbers, and commitment of participants. Even here there are dilemmas: portray yourself as a victim of evil, and you gain sympathy from outsiders but undercut your own team’s confidence in their strength to act; portray yourself as heroic and your team feels strong, but others may not think you need their help.

Organizers also try to arouse the right emotions in themselves and their rank-and-file members. Foremost, perhaps, is confidence: faith in your own abilities and ultimate success. This gives participants the energy to undertake any number of activities, just as a lack of confidence deflates energy. Interaction rituals, in which members are brought face to face in emotional arousal to ratify their group’s basic values, stir emotional energy that carries over into other activities. The emotions of strategic engagement are still poorly understood, partly because they have a way of blending ends and means together (accomplishing one goal generates emotional energy that helps attain the
next one). But scholars increasingly recognize that emotions are an essential part of action, not an irrational undermining of it (see Jasper 2011 for a review).

ARENAS

Strategic action is aimed at capturing the rewards available in specific arenas, which we can envision as combinations of rules, expectations, material support, and rewards. Players adapt their actions to those arenas, looking for opportunities to get what they want. In some cases, new arenas even inspire the creation of new players who are especially suited to the new opportunities. This is the great insight of Charles Tilly and the political process theory he developed. Protesters develop repertoires of action that seem appropriate to each arena (and indeed a distinct repertoire to deal with each player in that arena). This perspective helps us understand changes in tactics over long periods of history.

Movements that manage to match their strategies to their institutional arenas are more likely to obtain their goals. For movements oriented toward public policy, as Amenta (2006) found in his study of the Townsend Movement, assertive strategies work only when elected politicians are uninterested or opposed and when bureaucrats are weak or opposed to the movement; otherwise, electoral or legislative arenas are more promising. Working within the system, however, always runs the risk of co-optation, in which the survival of the protest group or benefits for its leaders begin to crowd out its original goals. Working within one institutional arena takes attention from others, and many arenas turn out to be “false arenas” in that they become powerless when newcomers join them (Jasper 2006: 169).

In the end, the question of arenas returns to the issue of the players with whom movement groups interact. Just as we need to understand the strategic considerations of protesters, we need to understand the goals, means, dilemmas, and so on of these other actors. Considerable work has been done on the media and on the police, for instance. The idea of “multi-organizational fields” was coined to focus on these many interactions (Curtis & Zurcher 1973), although the term “field” often conflates the players and the arenas in which they operate. Future research might usefully concentrate on the interactions among these various players to balance our inherited focus on the arenas in which they interact.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Framing and social movements; Moral shocks/outrage; NIMBY movements; Political opportunity/ political opportunity structure; Political process theory; Rational choice theory and social movements; Repertoires of contention; Resource mobilization theory; Tactics; Threat.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Survey research
BERT KLANDERMANS

Survey research is a frequently employed research design in social movement studies (Crist & McCarthy 1996). As there are quite a few excellent source books for researchers who want to apply survey methodology (e.g., Robson 1993), I will restrict myself to the specificities of survey research in the context of social movement studies (see Klandermans & Smith 2002 for a detailed discussion).

In social movement research, survey techniques are employed both with individuals and organizations as the unit of analysis. In the prototypical individual survey a sample of individuals fills in a questionnaire encompassing questions about knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, behavior, demographics, and other personal characteristics. In an organizational survey spokespersons of social movement organizations are questioned about their organization’s structure, resource acquisition and allocation, tactics, policy, and the like.

Survey research can use cross-sectional or more sophisticated longitudinal or comparative designs. While intellectually more demanding and more costly, survey designs that draw comparisons across movements, space, or time provide empirical leverage that can help advance theories of social movements. The intelligent use of such designs turns surveys into a powerful tool for the study of social movements.

THE USE OF SURVEY RESEARCH IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The most frequent use of surveys is for description: the description of members, of participants, of potential participants, of different types of participants (male/female, black/white, young/old, etc.), and of their opponents. The key questions of this type of research are who participates and who doesn’t, and do different types of participants have different motives to participate? Sometimes these studies are simple descriptions and sometimes they root in theories that are tested against survey responses. An example of the latter is Opp’s work within a rational choice theoretical framework on the antinuclear power movement in Germany (1989) and of the democratization movement in former Eastern Germany (Opp & Gern 1993). The problem with such studies is that they often lack a proper standard of comparison. In order to understand the dynamics of participation one needs to compare participants with nonparticipants. It is not enough to assert all kinds of characteristics of participants, one needs to know whether such characteristics are typical for participants or not. But what is a proper comparison? Participation is a process that can be conceived in four steps (Klandermans & Oegema 1987). Each step can be thought of as a crossroad where people can move toward or away from participation: becoming a sympathizer or not, becoming a target of a mobilization attempt or not, becoming motivated to participate or not, and overcoming barriers to participation or not. Comparisons must be made between people at the same crossroad, that is, between sympathizers and nonsympathizers, between targets and nontargets, between those who are motivated and those who are not, between those who did overcome barriers and those who didn’t. If we don’t separate these comparisons, our comparison of participants with nonparticipants encompasses each of the four types of nonparticipation and thus is blurred.

But there is more to comparison than distinguishing participants from nonparticipants. I maintain that it is far more informative to survey several smaller samples in a comparative design, than one large sample noncomparatively. Six times fifty interviews with two
different groups of informants at three points in time will tell us considerably more about movement participation than three hundred interviews with one group at a single point in time. It is such comparisons that help us to understand movement participation. After all, movement participation is a process, and we cannot investigate a process with a single shot measure.

Comparative designs may incorporate comparisons of movements, comparisons of movements across space or time, or some combination of these comparisons. Such comparisons are rare. Yet, comparative research of movement participation is important. It tells us that what holds for a participant in the one movement, or at one point in time, or at one place, is not necessarily true for a participant in the other. Comparisons across different social movements are uncommon. One example we find is Klandermans’ (1993) comparison of participants in the labor movement, the peace movement, and the women’s movement. This comparison used similar measurements and concepts within a unified theoretical framework and found that a different mix of motives spurred participation in each of these movements.

Comparisons of space are the most common. The surveys by Opp and others in Germany, Israel, and Peru (1995) are examples. These authors investigated participation in legal and illegal protest in the three countries. Their results suggest that the simple association between ideology and protest behavior can vary widely according to country context. Findings like this demonstrate the importance of comparison of space.

Comparisons of time are equally important, as levels of participation tend to go up and down. Klandermans’ research on the peace movement provides a dramatic example. In June 1985, he and his colleagues interviewed samples of the Dutch population. Sixty-nine percent said that they would sign a petition against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. The interviews were repeated again in November, when just two-thirds of those who said that they would sign reported that indeed they signed. Of the initial petition supporters remaining, two-fifths indicated that in fact they wanted to sign but failed to do so, but three-fifths said that they had never wanted to sign. Had we only interviewed our sample in November, we would not have found this group of people who changed their positions completely (Oegema & Klandermans 1994).

HOW IS SURVEY RESEARCH DONE?

The first decision a researcher must make when considering a survey research design is what unit of analysis is most appropriate to the questions being asked. Obviously a first choice is whether one is principally concerned with answering questions about individuals or organizations.

**Sampling**

Once we have identified the unit of analysis for our study, we must find a sampling frame (the list of individuals or organizations that comprise the research population). This is often the real problem in social movement research. Once we find an appropriate sampling frame, sampling is a technical matter. Our research population can be (some subset of) the general population or the participants in a social movement. If the general population is the research population one can use a telephone book, postal codes, postal addresses, or population registers as sampling frames. Far more complicated is it to sample subsets of the population or movement participants. Often, reliable lists of individual members of some subgroup are either not available or not accessible to third parties for privacy reasons.

Sampling movement participants can be even more cumbersome as many movements do not have reliable lists of participants. Sampling potential participants in order to find actual participants is usually not very efficient. Actual participants amount to only a small proportion of the mobilization potential. One may
easily end up approaching 10 to 20 potential participants in order to find one active participant. Another option is to sample participants at events: the people who attend a meeting, take part in a demonstration, sign a petition, and so on. Apart from the technical problems of sampling participants at events it is obvious that the kind of activity influences who participates. The people who attend a meeting are not necessarily the same as the people who participate in the demonstration or who sign the petition. Yet, all three are and probably see themselves as participants in the same movement.

Choosing the type of survey

Survey questionnaires can be mailed to respondents, completed in face-to-face or telephone interviews (often computer assisted), or transmitted via the Internet. Each of those techniques has its advantages and disadvantages.

1. Costs. Face-to-face interviews are the most expensive form of data collection, and the Internet is the cheapest option. Mailing questionnaires is cheaper than telephone interviews, but the difference between the two is much smaller than one would be inclined to believe, especially if the interviewers are inputting responses directly into a computer database.

2. Response rates. Each survey method influences response rates differently: face-to-face interviews have the highest response rates, and mailed questionnaires the lowest. Telephone interviews occupy a position in between, but nearer to face-to-face interviews than to mailed questionnaires. So far, the Internet generates large unsystematic samples. If one knows some characteristics of the population one can easily create a weighted sample out of the response.

3. Timing. Surveys take time. However, telephone and Internet surveys can be organized on much shorter notice than mail and face-to-face surveys. Someone who has access to the appropriate facilities can organize a telephone or Internet survey almost overnight. The Internet is by far the speediest form of data collection.

4. Substance. Not every kind of question can be asked via each approach. For example, knowledge cannot be assessed in mailed questionnaires or via the Internet; open questions fare better in interviews. Mailed questionnaires and questionnaires on the Internet have the advantage that people can take their time and work on their response when it suits them. Telephone interviews need to remain limited in length.

Response rates and nonresponse bias

Nonresponse threatens the reliability and validity of our findings more than sample size. Therefore, researcher effort should emphasize achieving high response rates rather than large samples. Indeed, it is better to draw a smaller sample and aim at as high a response rate as possible, than to draw a large sample to compensate for low response rates.

Questionnaire

The typical survey questionnaire in the social movement domain encompasses a mixture of questions regarding knowledge, opinions, and attitudes about the movement and its goals; reported participation in movement activities in the past and intended participation in the future; perceived costs and benefits of participation; ideology and identity; affective components such as commitment to the movement, and demographic characteristics such as gender, age, profession, income and education, position in social networks and political affiliation. Organizational surveys might ask about an organization’s goals, structure and procedures, strategies and activities, involvement with members or volunteers, and resources. It would be worth the effort to standardize questionnaires. Indeed, one would be able to compare the results from different studies even if different researchers, in different places or on different movements conducted them.
LIMITATIONS AND ADVANTAGES OF SURVEY RESEARCH

1. **Questions.** Surveys are certainly not appropriate tools for addressing all research questions in social movements. Research that takes the individual as its unit of analysis necessarily restricts itself to the explanation of individual opinions, attitudes, and behavior. It can help us to understand why individuals participate in social movements once they have emerged, but is not able to tell us much about the emergence of social movements.

2. **Costs.** Properly designed surveys are time consuming, and they can be expensive. As most survey costs cover telephone, mail, and personnel to interview or code or enter the data in the computer, anything that can cut down on those items reduces costs.

3. **Logistics.** Organizing a survey cannot be done overnight. Designing and printing questionnaires, preparing questionnaires for computer-assisted interviewing or for use on the Internet, drawing samples, organizing a mailing, or hiring interviewers are time-consuming matters.

4. **Information.** One is dependent on what informants are prepared to tell us. The answers to our questions can be socially desirable answers. There is no guarantee that people are telling the truth. Although sometimes informants may provide false responses, attempts by survey researchers to assess this potential problem revealed no indications that it takes place on a large scale.

5. **Quantitative method.** Necessarily, the measures used in surveys are fairly superficial. Feelings and emotions, people’s uncertainties, doubts and fears, all the inconsistencies and the complexities of belief systems are matters that are not easily tapped with survey questionnaires.

However, if used properly, survey research is a powerful tool for the study of social movements, especially if employed in comparative designs. Rather than conducting large-scale, single-shot surveys, researchers might put their time and resources to more productive use by comparing smaller samples drawn from different movements, places, or at different points in time.

SEE ALSO: Comparative research; Organizations and movements; Participation in social movements; Social psychology of movement participation.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Tactical interaction and innovation
DOUG MCADAM

The concepts of tactical interaction, tactical innovation, and tactical adaptation were introduced by McAdam in a 1983 article in American Sociological Review. Tactical innovation refers to the introduction of new and novel tactics by movement actors. McAdam defines tactical adaptation as “the ability of [movement] opponents to neutralize these [innovative] moves through effective tactical counters.” Taken together these two “define an ongoing process of tactical interaction in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset the moves of the other. How well each succeeds at this task crucially affects the pace and outcome of [movement activity]” (1983: 736, emphasis in original). McAdam goes on to demonstrate the utility of these concepts by showing empirically that the pace of insurgency in the US civil rights movement waxed and waned in accordance with these two processes. Peaks in protest activity correspond to the introduction and spread of tactical innovations (e.g., bus boycott, sit-in, Freedom Rides, etc.), while valleys reflect the gradual development of effective tactical counters by social control forces.

Besides the pace of insurgency, McAdam also sees the success of the movement as at least partially attributable to the novel tactics. They serve, in his view, to offset the institutional powerlessness of Southern blacks, disrupt public order, and put effective pressure on an otherwise reluctant federal government to intervene in support of the movement. In similar fashion, McCammon et al. (2001) credit novel tactics – including picketing and other public demonstrations that defied gender prescriptions – with helping suffragettes to finally win the franchise. Kurtz (2002) attributes the successful strike by clerical workers at Columbia University in 1991–1992 to a series of innovative and disruptive tactics that simultaneously served to dramatize the plight of the workers and to embarrass the University’s board of directors.

So if new and novel tactics accelerate the pace and positively shape the outcomes of movement activity, why don’t all movements seek to devise and employ such innovations? Besides the obvious fact that innovations are, by their very nature, rare and hard to produce, various strands of movement scholarship have also identified a number of ways in which movements are constrained in their choice of tactics. Three such constraints are worth noting. The first is captured by Charles Tilly’s (1977) concept of the repertoire of contention. In introducing the term, Tilly sought to make a simple, but critically important, point. In seeking ways to press their collective claims, insurgents are largely constrained by the tactical forms and techniques available and known to them. These “forms and techniques” comprise the normative “tool kit” (Swidler 1986) or repertoire specific to a given time and place. In general, we can expect movement actors to rely heavily – if not exclusively – on this repertoire in devising ways to press their claims.

The tactics employed by movement groups also reflect narrower cultural conventions or affinities. As Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 276) note, “Frequently activists adopt strategies and tactics not simply because they have been shown to be effective, but because they resonate with the beliefs, ideas, and cultural frames of meaning people use to make sense of their situation and to legitimate collective action.” Thus there is an expressive function to the adoption of tactical forms as well as an instrumental one. Movement groups adopt tactics to express their affinity with a broader culture of protest or to affirm their identity as a certain kind of activist (e.g., anarchist, New
Leftist, pacifist, etc.). This amounts to a second constraint on choice of tactic.

Finally, it has been argued that the organizational basis of movement activity also shapes the tactical choices made by activists. Consistent with a long line of theoretical work starting with Weber (1958) and Michels (1962), considerable empirical evidence appears to show that more established groups and formal social movement organizations are more likely to use conventional tactics and strategies (Michels 1962; Piven & Cloward 1977; Rucht 1999; Van Dyke, Soule, & McCarthy 2001). Embedded as they are in the institutional establishment, such groups eschew innovation in favor of accepted practices.

Given these various constraints, perhaps the operative question is not why don’t more groups engage in innovative action, but under what presumably rare circumstances are we likely to see the introduction of novel tactics? We can discern three partial answers to this question in the movement literature.

The first is suggested by McAdam’s work on tactical innovation during the heyday of the civil rights movement. We can expect the pace of tactical innovation to accelerate during those rare periods of sustained, intense contentious interaction that define the very peak of movements/revolutions. Tarrow’s (1989, 1998) concept of the “protest cycle” implies a second answer to the question of when we might expect to see greater or lesser innovation in the tactical repertoire. The implication is that new and novel tactics cluster at both the beginning and end of the cycle. Tactical innovations help to set the cycle in motion, but also occur at the end as the movement splinters and radicals frustrated at the slow pace of social/political change gravitate toward ever more violent forms of contention.

The third and final answer to the question focuses not on the timing of tactical innovation, but the kinds of groups who are more likely to embrace new tactics. One line of research associates disruptive and innovative protest with highly decentralized and participatory forms of movement organization (Staggenborg 1988; Jasper 1997; Polletta 2002). Another finds that “actors who occupy subordinate positions economically and socially and who lack access to institutionalized political and economic power are more likely to engage in disruptive [and innovative] protest” (Piven & Cloward 1977; Scott 1985; Van Dyke, Soule, & McCarthy 2001).

Regardless of when these innovations occur or at whose initiative, it is by such means that the repertoire evolves and once new and novel forms become part of the normative kit bag that constrains subsequent tactical choice.

SEE ALSO: Protest cycles and waves; Repertoires of contention; Resonance, frame; Strategy; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Tactics

BRIAN DOHERTY

When we refer to the tactics used by social movements we mean forms of action that have been deliberately chosen with the aim of influencing or coercing one or more of opponents, the general public, and fellow movement activists. These features are so central to the nature of social movements that consideration of movement tactics inevitably entails an understanding of other aspects of social movements, including strategy, the nature of protest, and movement identity, all of which affect how tactics are understood. Yet, as many have noted, while accounts of tactics used in particular protests are ubiquitous, conceptual analysis of tactics per se and especially of how movements choose their tactics is relatively rare (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Smithey 2009).

There are a number of reasons for this. First, if tactics are deliberate choices made by groups it is often difficult to ascertain who made the choices and how: Activists interviewed after the event may give self-serving and inaccurate accounts of how decisions emerged. Second, movement tactics are relational in that their effects depend on the response of others outside the movement and they cannot always be sure how their opponents, and, where different, the authorities and even their adherents will react. Particular tactics may be determined by an expectation of their likely impacts on the behavior of others, but these expectations may be misplaced and opponents may counter movement tactics successfully.

MAJOR THEMES

Despite these challenges, there are common themes in the analysis of tactics that provide useful resources for the analyst of social movements. The major dimensions of this work fall under the headings of protest event studies; repertoires of contention; and movement identity, habitus, and activist biography.

Protest event studies

Blumer (1969) in an early analysis of movement tactics eschewed any effort to specify them because he argued that they were so variable and dependent on context. Nevertheless the burgeoning number of surveys of protest events have classified the most common forms of protest action into the most frequently observed types. These include marches and rallies, strikes, boycotts, petitions, occupations, sit-ins, blockades, sabotage, and street theatre. Landmark studies have shown how some movements with similar aims in different countries pursue contrasting tactics (Kriesi et al. 1995), and also that movements need to change their tactics over time to maintain an advantage over their opponents. McAdam’s (1983) survey of the US civil rights movement’s protests showed that when new tactics such as sit-ins and Freedom Rides were used they put the supporters of segregation on the defensive and inspired more protest action by the movement as a whole. However, tactical innovation was quickly followed by tactical adaptation which neutralized the temporary advantages gained by the movement.

Most quantitative surveys of protest seek to explain social movement strategy in relation to the political opportunities and resources available to protesters. Tactical choices in this approach can seem to be largely shaped by external factors such as the degree of repression, the availability of allies, and rational calculations of the chances of success. This makes tactics a consequence of strategy. For example, a movement that chooses to emphasize its worthiness is most likely to pursue tactics that are dignified, and unlikely to alienate potential supporters. Movements in democracies that
choose tactics based on these strategies will favor conventional forms of action such as well-marshaled demonstrations organized in conjunction with the police. Relatedly, movements which seek mass support are less likely to pursue disruptive and provocative tactics that might exclude those unwilling or unable to take part, especially if the costs of repression are high, as in authoritarian regimes. Movements with few activists are more reliant on the solidarity and commitment of their members and, if their aims are radical and their sense of injustice is strong, they often choose forms of action that are more militant and confrontational, which may in turn attract more attention from the media. Studies have shown that disruption and confrontation can be effective for movements of the poor and excluded (Gamson 1975; Piven & Cloward 1977). Gamson’s (1975) analysis of 53 protest groups in the US between 1800 and 1945 showed that disruptive and violent tactics could lead to movement success, particularly when combined with a large membership, a bureaucratic organization, and specific and limited aims. Morris (1984) also highlighted the importance of stable bureaucracy in the success of the sit-in as a tactic for the civil rights movement because it allowed for rapid decision making, the mobilization of finance and legal support, and the coordination of strategy.

But the effects of strong bureaucratic structures on tactical success have also been challenged, since it has been argued they can also lead to deradicalization as movement leaders seek to protect the organization’s status at the expense of the movement’s wider goals (Piven & Cloward 1977). There are also small movements with informal organizations in which protesters demonstrate the intensity of their commitment by putting their bodies on the line without seeking to harm their opponents physically. The affinity groups of radical environmentalists protesting new roads, GM crops, or climate change are an example of an apparently effective use of nonviolent disruption, often sustained over many years without a bureaucratic organization. In these cases the vulnerability of protesters is skillfully exploited to maximize the contrast with powerful or violent opponents in media coverage. Della Porta and Diani (2006) usefully divide these kinds of tactical choices into the logic of numbers, in which legitimacy and authority come from evidence of mass support, the logic of bearing witness, in which the tactic depends on an appeal to moral authority and evidence of the commitment of the protesters to their cause, and the logic of material damage in which the aim is to impose costs on your opponent.

**Repertoires of contention**

While the variety of protest tactics has grown, researchers on movements have been struck by how limited and regularly repeated are the sets of tactics used by most movements. Tilly (1995) used the term “repertoire” to emphasize the extent to which forms of protest are like the performance of a piece of music or dance. Protest tactics come from what participants already know how to do, they must be comfortable and familiar with them, and while they may be open to some improvisation the pace of innovation is usually slow, not least because the performance involves other participants, who also learn what to expect. As movement tactics become more familiar to their targets they create less uncertainty and are often institutionalized in the legal system, as in the legislation governing strikes and demonstrations. Tilly developed the concept of repertoires in his magisterial analysis of the gradual shift from parochial claims, violent action, and local networks to national political demands, nonviolent action and national organizations in Britain between the 1750s and 1840s, during which time the major features of modern protest tactics first became available for popular use.

Once particular forms of protest become recognized parts of public life they can be taken up and adapted by other movements with completely different aims: demonstrations, boycotts, and petitions can all be used by a movement but also by its opponents in a countermovement. In May 1968 in Paris, the
mass demonstrations of students and workers were countered by a huge rally of supporters of de Gaulle. Tarrow (1998) calls such forms of protest “modular,” drawing attention to the way in which this transferability demonstrated the normalization of particular tactics. He argues that forms of protest are classifiable as either conventional, disruptive, or violent. While many contentious episodes combine all three, in modern democracies forms of action that were previously seen as disruptive have tended to become increasingly conventional as public authorities and protest groups learn what to expect of each other. Tactics that wrong-foot opponents and disrupt normal politics are often, therefore, the most effective.

The concepts of repertoire and modularity rest on assumptions about collective learning which point towards the role of culture and tradition in linking everyday life and movement action. This suggests that protest tactics are likely to be affected by what political scientists call path dependency, in which the combination of structural constraints from state institutions and the weight of tradition limits the possibilities for tactical innovation. This is in some ways at odds with much of the popular perception of changing forms of protest tactics. For instance, the use of cell phones to coordinate “People Power” demonstrations in the Philippines was noted in 2001; in the Arab Spring in 2011 social media were said to be crucial in bypassing the control of information by states and encouraging participants to take the risk of mobilizing in public. Many of these tactical uses of new communications technology can be connected to wider trends observed in protest and political participation away from collective forms of participation: Movement organizations and their associated activist culture are limited to a small minority, but larger numbers are prepared to take part in occasional action (Dalton 2008). The “Occupy” movement of 2011 is a further example of this. These mass mobilizations may be initiated by experienced activists but they spread fast because social media have reduced barriers to participation and the protests are much less under the control of membership-based mass organizations. Moreover, through the use of Facebook and Twitter the narrative of the events and their meaning is reported by many more voices than was the case in previous mobilizations. Academic understanding is struggling to keep pace with the rapidity of these changes in communication and political participation.

Movement identity, habitus, and activist biography

The analysis of protest events and repertoires of contention has contributed to the understanding of movement tactics by showing the range and variety of those movement tactics that gain most public attention, but this needs to be complemented by analysis of the internal processes within movements and especially how movement identity shapes and in turn shaped by its tactics (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004; Smithey 2009). Protest event surveys generally exclude consideration of tactics that are not reported publicly, such as sabotage, the forms of small contention in authoritarian regimes, analyzed as “weapons of the weak,” and insider agitation within established institutions. Even if some might question whether such covert actions are “protest” it is clear that they are still part of a movement’s tactical repertoire. Second, protest event surveys leave out those elements of tactics that are governed by the creation, maintenance, and development of internal movement organization and its collective identity.

The split between public and political social movement action and less visible and non-political social movement base privileges a conventional and narrow conception of the political as located in governmental institutions, as distinct from the broader view of the political as involving power relations in wider society. Since feminist movements have challenged the narrow view of politics as obscuring the way in which power operates in the private sphere and is reinforced through dominant discourses, it is not surprising that those who study women’s movements have challenged the limits of the contentious politics definition of protest as public claims-making and also
affirmed the importance of the link between movement identity and tactics (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004). One example is the December 1982 “Embrace the Base” protest at the US Air Force base at Greenham Common in the UK. Around 30,000 women surrounded the base, decorating the fence with symbols of life that contrasted symbolically with the purpose of the base as a location for nuclear-armed Cruise missiles. Although the gates were briefly blockaded, the effectiveness of this action was in its powerful symbolism, which combined the feminist assertiveness of a women-only action with a rupture of the acceptance of the normality of a nuclear weapons base. The long-term effects on movement solidarity were significant in that it inspired a network of hundreds of local women’s groups who provided support for the permanent camps of women at the base. It also led those involved to take more militant action, so that for instance they no longer agonized as they had done initially about whether cutting the fence of the base was a form of violence (Roseneil 2000).

Those who focus their attention on the cultural aspects of social movements argue that the links between tactics and movement identity can only be understood if we see activist identity as a process through which those involved construct a sense of “them” and “us,” with consequential emotional dynamics, and with the aim of understanding the world in order to change it. Rupp and Taylor’s work on drag queens (2003) shows how drag performances were a tactic that successfully challenged biological understandings of gender and essentialist categories of sexual identity for those that went to see them. Thus a form of entertainment, with no direct claim on the state, was also a deeply political protest tactic.

Crossley (2002) draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of *habitus* to define how the experience of activists over time helps us to understand the relationship between individual biographies and their shared practice in movements over time. An activist habitus is based on the practices that become part of the movement’s collective identity. Insofar as this reflects what activists know how to do, it seems similar to the idea of repertoires, but habitus establishes a clearer link between individual experience and changes over time. Crossley showed the different tactics favored by experienced and politically cynical activists in the psychiatric survivors movement, who were more likely to challenge those in authority, and those less experienced, who were more inclined to be optimistic about being listened to by those in authority. He also points out that those who were lawyers tended to use legal tactics, academics favored research, and those in the media favored media-focused campaigns. This was not only a rather obvious case of efficient use of resources, but reflected a deeper sense of what kinds of tactics these individuals had faith in and which were consistent with their own life choices. This suggests that the tactical repertoires favored by movements are likely to reflect the experience of their adherents in other parts of their lives and also shows that not all tactics are equally available to all groups.

*Biographical approaches* can provide convincing explanations of cases that otherwise seem to be at odds with the regular mechanisms and processes that have been used to explain tactical choices in social movements. In 1943 in Berlin several hundred women whose Jewish husbands and children had been seized by the Nazis were able to prevent their loved ones from being deported by staging a noisy, visible, and defiant demonstration in Rosenstrasse. The women did not know each other, so they had no organization, no collective identity, no established repertoire to draw on, and no examples of recent successful anti-Nazi protest to copy. A close analysis of the women’s biographies (Stoltzfus 2001) provides an explanation for their actions. For a decade they had resisted pressure from the Gestapo to divorce their husbands, and discrimination and harassment from neighbors, an experience which set them apart from their countrywomen. Thus, while love and loyalty were a powerful motivation, they had also developed a practice of individual resistance that enabled them to take spontaneous action at the decisive moment.
METHODOLOGY AND THEORY: DEVELOPING THE UNDERSTANDING OF TACTICAL CHOICES

The Rosenstrasse protest shows that it is useful to make an analytical distinction between two elements of tactical choice: first, the decision to choose particular forms of action—which involves planning and calculation—and second, the relational moment when the tactic is put into action, and others react. In the Rosenstrasse case, there was no collective planning, this action was as close to spontaneous as a protest can be, but in this it is similar to other examples that remind us of the importance of decisive but unplanned actions taken in the heat of the moment (e.g., Ayuero 2003). In the decisional sphere movements’ collective planning will be affected by the anticipated reaction of others and they can also intend to express elements of their collective identity or frame their message through the choice of a tactic. In the interaction sphere, movements lose what had previously been an imagined full control of their action, because things may not go to plan. This idea is stressed in Foucauldian theory, which argues that protest or “resistance” is never pure opposition and necessarily always contains and reproduces elements of the system that is being challenged.

It is notable how this distinction mirrors one in literature produced by activists on tactics. Manuals such as Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals have been an important reference point for academic work but there is little evidence that activists have made much use of the academic work on tactics. Activist manuals are much more likely to focus on the pragmatic question of “what works,” whereas for academic analysis the most interesting question is “why that tactic rather than another?” There are numerous manuals on how to organize planning for protests and on what to expect and how to act during protest actions. The methods-oriented literature on nonviolent action (NVA) (Sharp 2005) has been acknowledged as influential by many movements, including the “color movements” of Eastern Europe in the 2000s. It is in some ways an indictment of the sociological social movement literature that it has not been used in the same way by activists. NVA texts tend to offer examples of methods that have worked in ways that activists can see as transferable to their own struggles. The call by Tilly and Tarrow (2007) for a focus on discerning regularities in the mechanisms and processes that explain collective action could be seen as providing a means by which more systematic knowledge of tactics might emerge, but since their approach is also acutely sensitive to historical and political context, it always leaves open the question of other possible causal explanations, as good social science must.

The difference between the social science focus on post hoc explanation and the practical methods of NVA can be illustrated in an examination of cases where the same tactics are used in different contexts. In the US Plowshares protest activists poured blood on missiles in an action that was rooted in Christian theology; in Thailand in 2010 supporters of ousted prime minister Shinawatra also poured blood on the steps of the central government building: the reasons given to explain this tactic varied, but none was rooted in Christian theology. For those interested in effectiveness, it is the symbolic power of blood that links the two events, but for a sociological explanation that alone is not enough, before we could say that this tactic is “the same,” we would need to know what the link is between identity and habitus and specific movement repertoire in each case and that is why the study of tactics in movements requires a different approach to that found in the more pragmatic literature on activist tactics.

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972); Civil rights movement (United States); Collective identity; Demonstrations; Modular protest forms; Movement society; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Policing protest; Protest event research; Repertoires of contention; Resistance; Strategy; Tactical interaction and innovation; Violence and social movements.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Most scholarly interest on social movements has been focused on movements themselves; the types of tactics they employ, what resources they use, and how they mobilize rank and file to bring about social change. The actual target of movement activism is less well examined. Generally, in modern democratic societies, the assumption is the state is the primary granter of benefits, and therefore the most logical target of protest, although other institutions also function in that capacity (Snow 2004). Moreover, targets vary in their vulnerabilities to movement pressure; some are more susceptible to challenges than others. In what follows I explore the importance of targets in relation to social movements and protest.

Perhaps the most significant theoretical task is identifying precisely who or what is the potential target of protest. Again, the vast majority of early research largely conceived of protest as directed against the state. This made good empirical and theoretical sense for a number of reasons. First, in many case studies of specific movements, the state was the primary granter of benefits. The civil rights movement, which sought equality for African Americans under the law, the peace movement of the late 1960s/early 1970s protested for an end to the Vietnam War, and the antinuclear weapons movement’s goal of nuclear disarmament all were primarily either contesting actions by the state or pressing the state to address specific grievances. Theoretically, the growth of the welfare state in most democratic countries resulted in a single target that encompasses a wide range of services and actions; thus, it was logical that movements would target the state to redress grievances.

Despite these realities, there is a growing recognition that other, nonstate actors can be and are frequently targeted by movements. For example, van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor (2004) found that almost half of the protest events reported in the New York Times target actors other than the state. Unions, for example, have long won benefits at the point of production by targeting businesses through strikes and other actions. Other groups have also targeted businesses; the civil rights movement, for example, employed boycotts to force white-owned businesses in the South to desegregate. Indeed, the issue of discrimination at work, be it based on gender, race, or sexual orientation, is an important potential source of movement activism against corporate actors. More recently, corporations have come under scrutiny for their business practices, and a growing number of groups are pushing for greater corporate responsibility in issues ranging from sweatshops to environmental practices (Soule 2009).

There are at least two reasons why corporations have become an increasingly important locus of social protest. The first is simply the growing power of these actors. They have won an increasing array of legal protections, and their centrality in the growing global economy means they are a touch point for issues ranging from labor, immigration, and free trade debates. This growth in corporate power occurred during the state’s shift towards neoliberalism. A major consequence of this is that the state no longer plays a role in mediating conflicts between actors; thus, in the case of corporations, actors with grievances must directly challenge the firm, rather than using the power of the state as an intermediary.

And while corporations are one logical locus of nonstate protest, other targets are also quite common. The student movement of the 1960s obviously directly challenged the authority of higher educational institutions. As health care becomes increasingly difficult to obtain, movements have begun to challenge experts’ definitions of disease in order to secure treatment for constituents. More recently, there have been...
cases of protest against religious organizations, not surprisingly, given their role in hot button issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and other social issues. A more challenging, but no less important, target of social movements is the general public. Changing people’s attitudes towards particular issues has long been at the forefront of issues surrounding gay rights, environmental protection, and antidrunk driving, for example. This reflects the importance of culture as a locus of contention; reorienting values and beliefs can be particularly difficult for a movement, and groups often rely on the mass media as a vehicle for changing individual attitudes and behaviors (encouraging recycling, for example).

Targets matter because the specific target chosen has a number of implications for movements’ tactical considerations. Recent evidence suggests that while the state has the widest range of claims made against it, the tactical repertoire used by movements is narrower and more institutionalized than those targeting corporate actors or institutions of higher education. This is due in part to the fact that in the US there are numerous institutional channels and actors that can be used by movement actors to effect change by the state. Corporations, in contrast, have a much more closed structure and therefore invite a more contentious set of tactics. Additionally, the state is the sole wielder of legitimate force, and the threat of repression may also lead to more mainstream tactics by state-centric movements.

It is also important to consider how targets vary in their vulnerability to protest. At the state level, a politician who is dependent upon the voters for continued service may be a more appealing target than a career bureaucrat whose power rests on technical, rather than political, authority. Firms, too, vary in the degree to which they can be influenced by third parties. It is much easier to employ a boycott against a highly visible company producing consumer goods than a firm whose client base is other corporate actors. Recent scholarship on campaigns by unions to influence corporations has argued that no two “corporate campaigns” look alike because no two firms have the same set of vulnerabilities.

Given the differences among potential targets of protest, and the range of actors movements target today, it is important to seriously consider how this shapes the ability of social movements to effect social change. The waning role of the state in mediating conflict, the growth of global trade, and the changing religious landscape in the world all will play an important role in how social movement scholars think about targets.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Social movements; Strategy; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Technology and social movements

ALICE MATTONI

The history of social movements developed in parallel to technological changes in societies. From the invention of the press to the diffusion of television, communication technologies gave social movements new opportunities of expression and organization. Frequently, therefore, social movements met, appropriated and reshaped technological devices and supports that were at the same time opportunities and challenges for grassroots political participation. Technology intertwines with social movements at different levels. At the instrumental level, technology has an impact on mobilizing structures, organizational patterns, and protest activities of social movements. At the symbolic level, social movements have an impact on discourses about technologies and their role in societies, often including new technological visions in alternative systems of meanings. Finally, at the material level, social movements have an impact on technological supports and devices, in that activist technical knowledge and competencies lead to alternative and creative use of technology.

At the instrumental level of mobilization, technological devices and support are key resources for social movements. Technology may change the environment in which social movements and protest activities take place. For instance, technological advancements in the transport sector contributed to render people’s travelling across the globe safer, quicker, and cheaper. Activists benefited from this technological change that had a role in fostering face-to-face communication amongst activists belonging to different political, cultural, social, and economic contexts. In turn, this technological advancement facilitated the creation of international social ties and the construction of transnational alliances in cycles of protests, like the Global 1968 movement and the more recent Global Justice Movement.

At the symbolic level of mobilization, social movements have an impact on technologies in that they elaborate knowledge and develop discourses about technological topics, transforming them in contentious issues. For instance, environmental movements elaborate alternative and contentious discourses about technologies and the way in which they should be employed in societies (Pickerill 2003). Past and recent waves of mobilizations emerged against the construction of technologically advanced infrastructures having a supposed negative impact on the environment. The diffusion of digital camcorders in urban areas and the trading of private, digitalized data led to the emergence of digital surveillance in both the online and offline environment as a new contentious issue.

At the material level of mobilization, social movements have an impact on the actual use of technological devices and supports. For instance, the free and open software movement stresses the emancipatory potential of information and communication technologies that should be freely available to everyone and developed according to an open-source attitude. Moreover, the free and open software movement also engages in media activism practices that enable and support the adoption of such technologies in societies at large. Activists in social movements, moreover, sometimes begin to use existing technological devices and supports in an innovative manner engaging in a prefigurative employment of technology that will gain broader diffusion in the future. The collaborative informational website Indy-media, for instance, is based on a technological platform that allows users to produce alternative pieces of news at the local, national, and transnational level. Exploiting the potentialities of information and communication...
technologies, therefore, activist groups who created Indymedia proposed one of the first examples of Web 2.0 applications.

One of the most recent technological innovations has been the creation and diffusion of communication and information technologies. As it happened with the introduction of other technologies in the past, emerging computer networks first and then the establishment of the Internet and the Web at the end of the 1990s contributed to change different aspects of social movement and protest activities, presenting an entirely new set of challenges and opportunities that activists continue to explore today.

The rise and wide use of information and communication technologies by activists lead to a vivid debate with regard to social movements and political participation. Some scholars argue that this technological innovation fosters new forms of political participation, such as the creation of spontaneous communities of activists who do not share the same physical space, but act in the same technological environment (Rheingold 2002). Other scholars argue that the online realm remains strictly linked to the offline, material geographical environment in which internet users are embedded (Rogers forthcoming). Information and communication technologies need infrastructures rooted in the physical space to work and situated technological devices allowing the connection with the online realm. The use of each technological device, from mobile phones to Internet relay chats, is situated and linked to a pre-technological environment. It is exactly this situated use that contributes (or not) to the creation of opportunities (and constraints) for social movement and protest activities. In addition, other scholars noted that activists tend to use old and new technologies in a cumulative manner, because emerging technologies are often interpreted through the lenses of older technologies (Dunbar-Hester 2009) creating multimodal communication channels resting on mixed technological structures (Gillan, Pickerill, & Webster 2008). Although there are valuable exceptions, further investigation is still needed in order to understand the actual (re)appropriation and (re)combination of technologies in and by social movements at the local, national, and transnational level.

SEE ALSO: Hackers; Indymedia (the Independent Media Center); Internet and social movements; Media activism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social movements sometimes emerge in response to threats. Over recent years, the literature on social movements has emphasized the importance of political opportunities in fostering mobilization. When actors see that the political environment is becoming more receptive to their claims, for example, if new allies appear in the institutional political environment, then they will be more likely to mobilize to take advantage of the opportunity. Research shows that political opportunities have influenced a range of movements, including civil rights (McAdam 1999), women’s (Costain 1992), and environmental movements (Almeida & Stearns 1998), to name just a few. However, a growing literature demonstrates that threats can be important triggers for mobilization as well.

Threats involve social conditions which may result in the loss of a group’s power or resources. Tilly (1978: 134–135) long ago theorized that both political opportunities and threats inspire mobilization, and, in fact, suggested that threats may be a more powerful motivator to action, saying “a given amount of threat tends to generate more collective action than the ’same’ amount of opportunity.” This argument is based on the work of social psychologists which finds that people tend to inflate the value of things they already possess, and therefore are more likely to take action when someone is trying to take them away. Similarly, Snow and his colleagues (1998) suggest that people are inspired to mobilize when their taken for granted way of life is disrupted, when the quotidian is disturbed. Recent research finds that real or perceived threats have been important factors in the emergence of a variety of movements, including the Ku Klux Klan (Cunningham & Phillips 2007; McVeigh 2009), militia groups (Van Dyke & Soule 2002), environmental movements (Jasper 1997; Smith, Walsh, & Warland 1997), progressive movements in Latin America (Almeida 2003), and the AIDS movement in the US (Tester 2004).

Researchers find that threats can involve a loss of political or economic power, or threats to health and safety. For example, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) find that the militia movement emerged in the US in the 1990s in response to economic changes, including the loss of manufacturing jobs and farms, as well as political threats from women and minorities.

While there is growing research on the role of threats in mobilization, a number of important tasks remain for future research. I argue that two questions in particular are in need of further scholarship: the conditions under which threat mobilizes, and the relationship between threat and grievances.

Almost by definition, mobilizations motivated by increased threat are reactive. Reactive movements involve efforts to defend existing rights or privileges when those are being challenged, in contrast to proactive movements which involve efforts to gain additional rights (Tilly 1978). Thus, threats to resources or power trigger reactive mobilization. However, it’s unclear whether threat is a sufficient condition of mobilization, or whether threats only mobilize in conjunction with other social conditions. Almeida (2003) finds that, in El Salvador, a slight opening in political opportunities afforded progressive groups the opportunity to form new organizations, which then were ready to take action when the semi-authoritarian government began repressing political action. Without having had the opportunity to organize, the groups never would have been prepared to take action in response to the repressive threat. Similarly, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) suggest that militia group members mobilized in the US in response to political and economic threats, but
that they also enjoyed resources and the opportunity to mobilize. Thus, it remains unclear whether threats are sufficient conditions for mobilization, or whether they typically act in concert with other factors.

While threats may inspire mobilization, they don’t always do so (Goldstone & Tilly 2001). Maher and Einwohner (Einwohner & Maher n.d.; Maher 2010), show how in an extremely repressive context, Nazi death camps and Jewish ghettos, whether or not active resistance occurred depended on a variety of factors. Although residents in all locations faced threats, resistance was more likely to emerge in those contexts where the threat was seen as lethal, imminent, credible, applicable to themselves, and impervious to any action taken in resistance (i.e., when death was seen as inevitable). Einwohner and Maher theorize that, in highly repressive contexts, collective action depends on individual interpretations of the threat’s severity, temporality, credibility, applicability, and malleability. Further work needs to explore when threats in less repressive settings lead to mobilization.

Threats almost by definition involve grievances. While grievances were one of the dominant explanations for movement emergence through the 1960s, they were largely discredited and abandoned in the 1970s and 1980s, as scholarship increasingly demonstrated that resources, organization, and political opportunities better explained the timing of mobilization for groups such as African Americans. As scholars recognize, earlier grievance models of mobilization are limited by their emphasis on irrational motivations to action. However, grievances can create real and rational reasons for collective action. In addition, while scholars have argued that grievances are ubiquitous and do not explain mobilization, research on reactive movements shows that changes in structural conditions are often associated with mobilization. Cunningham and Phillips (2007), for example, show that the presence of a long-standing NAACP chapter does not explain Klan mobilization in North Carolina in the 1960s; however, the formation of a new chapter is associated with Klan organizing. Thus, long-standing grievances may not be what Snow and Soule (2010) call mobilizing grievances. However, social conditions change, and sometimes lead to mobilization. Future scholarship needs to further elaborate the relationship between threats and grievances.

SEE ALSO: Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Patriot/militia movement in the United States; Quotidian disruption; Right-wing movements; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Violence and social movements
CHARES DEMETRIOU

The study of the intersection of social movements and violence is diverse. This is so, principally, because the forms of violence under study are all encompassing, ranging from police arrest of peaceful protesters, to protest by throwing food at politicians, to protest by lethal, indiscriminate violence on civilians. Nevertheless, in the social movement literature, the mainstream approach to the study of these phenomena takes the position – sometimes by default – that neither the various forms of violence nor the various types of the groups engaging in violence need to correspond to particular theories, but rather both action and groups should be studied through the more general conceptual frameworks and theoretical presuppositions characterizing the literature. This position is partly a consequence of the fact that the study of these phenomena developed within the broader study of social movements. Thus, for example, research on the American civil rights movement of the 1960s covered not only the peaceful tactics of this movement but also state violence in response to these tactics, as well as the violence wielded by the radical branches of the movement, most notably the Black Panthers. The conceptualizations and theories pertaining to the study of the phenomena connecting social movements to violence, therefore, have not claimed autonomy within the general literature on social movements, but rather have relied heavily and approvingly on this literature.

FOCI OF RESEARCH

While the study of social movement-related violence has not promoted particular theories, the phenomena studied do feature particular characteristics requiring conceptualization and explanation. Chief among these characteristics is the turn to violence, that is, the ways in which violence enters a social movement’s realm. More particularly, when social movements employ violent tactics intentionally and persistently, a series of questions about the determinants of such an outcome are raised. Some of the most basic questions relate to the extent to which these determinants can be attributed to factors at a macro-level (deprivation, suppression, ideology formation, and spread, etc.), to organizational factors at a meso-level (movement splintering, resource mobilization, change in opportunity structures, etc.), or to more immediate factors at a micro-level (strategic choice, inadvertent escalation of claims, reaction to events, etc.).

In navigating through such determinants, substantive accounts of the emergence of violence have followed the broad evolution of social movement research, from reliance on structural models to reliance on models of social interaction. Though the latter models often attempt to comprehensively assess determinants at all levels, they privilege the meso- and micro-levels, in which they particularly identify dynamism and contingency. Certain key dynamics are therefore located on these levels, such as dynamics of radicalization and of social movement splintering. For example, in the context of the 1960s and 1970s Northern Ireland, Robert White (1998), Lorenzo Bosi (2006), and others have found that the radicalization of tactics in the street by the civil rights movement, the Unionist countermovement, and the security forces amounted to an interactive process of radicalization which eventually created an opportunity for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to mobilize and jump-start its own campaign. Along the way, this radicalization process precipitated the splintering of not only the civil rights movement but
also of the IRA, creating the particularly violent Provisional IRA.

According to models of social interaction, however, radicalization – whether of ideological narratives, of political positions, or of tactics of contention – is expected to develop not only through interaction between the movement and its opponents, but also through interaction within the movement itself. Thus, for example, intramovement interaction helps explain the Red Brigades emergence out of the Leftist Movement in 1970s Italy, the Weathermen’s emergence out of the student movement in 1970s US, the Tanzim’s emergence out of the Fatah movement in the 1990s occupied territories in Palestine, and so on. Social movement splintering is part of intramovement dynamics as well, and is often the last step before the adoption of violence. But splintering need not always happen, as is the case when the mainstream organization of a movement radicalizes its tactics to the point of itself adopting violence. Examples of this particular phenomenon include the violence perpetuated by the Haganah, the armed section of the core Zionist movement in the British Mandate of Palestine, and EOKA, the armed section of the Greek Nationalist movement in 1950s Cyprus – examples which suggest that the phenomenon may relate most particularly to ethnonationalist movements.

Another general characteristic of the phenomena connecting social movements and violence regards changes in the stream of contention as violence enters the scene. On the most abstract level, the question raised is how, if at all, the process of contention changes with the introduction of violence? A series of more particular questions follow from this. With violence entering the scene, the claims and counterclaims originally initiated by a movement may be overshadowed by violence-related discourse and decision making. Hence a particular question asks whether there is a shift in the object of contention, and, if yes, of what kind and of what duration. The context of Northern Ireland provides an illustration of this issue as well, since the radicalization of the civil rights movement produced a shift in claims, from policy reforms claims to sustained antipolity claims, while from the side of the state, quite typically, counterclaims of law and order emerged to become prevalent and durable. Furthermore, the progression of violence may follow patterns of escalation and de-escalation, such that, for example, violence is met with more violence before yielding to negotiation, defeat, or other nonviolent developments. What are, then, the cycles of violence? And how do the forces sustaining violence compare with those precipitating the resort to violence in the first place?

An additional general question is raised in the same vein: Given that all social movements orient themselves towards an audience, how does the contention–public relation change once the repertoires of contention include violence? Here, too, an array of subquestions follows. How do a movement’s relations with supporters, opponents, or third parties open up or close down the option to violence? How do these relations change with the onset of violence? What are the moral answers offered in the discourse that emerges in the context of violence, and how do these answers compete with each other? How does the legitimacy of the movement and of the state change once violence becomes part of the contention? Regarding the last question, for example, research on the aforementioned EOKA campaign in Cyprus, waged against the British colonial authorities, found that the legitimization of EOKA vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots – as well as the increased delegitimization of the colonial state – pivoted on the ongoing certification of the armed group by the traditional leaders of the nationalist movement and by a broader collusion of forces valorizing the EOKA militants. This context bestowed on EOKA enough legitimacy to pursue a wide range of violent tactics (Demetriou 2007).

OVERLAPPING RESEARCH TRADITIONS

While a particular body of theory under the rubric “violence and social movements” has
not developed, there has developed in recent years a contradistinction at the conceptual level between this broad form of inquiry and the broad form of inquiry under the rubric “terrorism studies.” Developed mostly in subfields of political science, mainstream terrorism studies are typically extensions of security studies and build on previous research on internal war (civil war, insurgency, urban guerillas, etc.). Though they overlap empirically with studies in social movements and violence, mainstream terrorism studies tend to avoid the term social movement and to eschew systematic usage of the social movement literature.

In terrorism studies, there is a burgeoning polyphony of what terrorism is – psychological effect on a public; acts intended to generate such an effect; coercive diplomacy using violence; categorical violence; violence against democracies; socially and politically unacceptable violence; violence within asymmetric contestation; and so on (Thackrah 2004). To many scholars of social movements, including most notably Charles Tilly and those subscribing to his school of thought, terrorism studies are problematic precisely because they treat as uniform a varied group of phenomena. Thus, the critics hold, instead of acknowledging the diversity of their subject matter, terrorism studies presume its cohesion, failing along the way to identify terrorism as a distinct set of phenomena featuring coherent cause–effect relations. Furthermore, these critics find fault in many substantive accounts within mainstream terrorism studies, most particularly with regard to a tendency to essentialize the groups that are said to employ terrorism. Even when terrorism is defined as a tactic or a strategy, the argument goes, there is a tendency to slide into synecdoche of sorts – that is, to build the description of the organizations that utilize terrorist tactics around these tactics first and foremost, thereby ignoring or downplaying their other tactics, strategies, or organizational scope. This is particularly problematic, the critics maintain, because in the overwhelming number of cases of so-called terrorism, terrorist tactics are not the group’s main – or at least, not consistently the main – means of contestation.

More fundamentally, social movement scholars fault terrorism studies on account of (un)critical thinking. These scholars recognize quite readily that the term terrorism is value laden with political meaning, particularly pejorative meaning which partisans in a contention, most typically the state, attach to the behavior of their opponents. To many social movement scholars, therefore, adopting such a heavily political term as an analytical category is inappropriate. To be sure, a nascent group of terrorism studies scholars has advocated what it calls “critical terrorism studies” exactly as a way to check on such lack of reflexivity (Jackson, Smyth, & Gunning 2009). Having maintained the term “terrorism,” however, this group of scholars may in turn be criticized for extending the life of a dubious term.

In short, scholars of social movements and violence reject the conceptual distinction between terrorism and political violence, whether a genus–species distinction or otherwise. Instead, they take the position – sometimes explicitly, sometime implicitly, and always with exceptions – that the term “terrorism” should be abandoned in favor of the more abstract and politically neutral term “political violence” (cf. Goodwin 2009).

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Given the wide scope that characterizes the study of violence and social movements, the issues which future study can tackle are many and varied. To single out but one issue here, there is the question of comparisons between violent and potentially, but not yet, violent movements. This area of research has been understudied due to the predilection of comparativists to select cases on either violent or nonviolent social movements, but not on both. Yet even the limited comparison of exclusively violent social movements provides hints about the merits of the more comprehensive form of comparison, because in it – and, indeed,
in some case studies too – one may find cross-temporal comparisons of violence and nonviolence. For example, studies of left-wing protest in West Germany in the 1980s analyze both escalation and de-escalation of violence, the latter arriving as both the movement and the state developed tactics of violence avoidance, hence an implicit comparison of violence with potential-but-not-yet violence (della Porta 2008). Such is also the case with Hafez’s (2003) comparison of Islamic movements. While his research design sets up a comparison of exclusively violent social movements, his analysis allows us to see the movements’ trajectories before and after the onset of violence. Thus we see that in Algeria and Egypt protracted and expansive episodes of Islamic political violence took place in the 1990s but that the movements’ ideological and organizational formation was in place long before that. The violent and nonviolent phases of the movement trajectories are therefore explained, according to Hafez, by increases in institutional exclusion and suppression of the movements by the respective predatory governments, a change happening in the early 1990s.

If implicit comparisons of violence and nonviolence in processes of contention are useful, therefore, such comparisons carried systematically by design promise to be particularly profitable. However, there is a hurdle in advancing such a comparative research direction: sophistication regarding patterns of radicalization is required, for what needs to be compared are precisely patterns which lead to violence with patterns which are potentially conducive to violence but do not generate it. Generalizations and widely accepted conceptualizations about such patterns are yet to be established.

SEE ALSO: Factions/factionalism; Irish Republican Movement; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Radicalism; Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany); Red Brigades (Italy); Strategy; Tactics; Terrorist movements; Violence against oneself; War and social movements; Weatherman (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Violence against oneself
OLIVIER GROJEAN

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, self-injury or self-harm that is not related to cultural or religious norms has been distinguished from suicidal practices and associated with various pathologies. Thus, following Durkheim’s work, suicide became a social fact that sociology could not ignore, but deliberate self-inflicted violence without suicidal intent (e.g., cuttings and burns, body modifications) remained until recently mainly a concern for psychiatry. This probably explains the rarity of sociological research on self-inflicted violence with a political dimension, such as hunger strikes, self-mutilation, or immolation, while there have been dozens of publications on suicide bombings, especially since 2001.

From a social movements’ perspective, “violence against oneself” can be defined as deliberate action that consists in damaging or even destroying one’s own body to protest or support a cause. This rough definition is based on three premises. First, it considers that these actions, often understood as nonviolent (Gandhi), can actually be analyzed within the frame of violent practices. Second, it does not strictly distinguish modes of action that inevitably lead to the death of activists and those that imply only “controlled” violence; the survival rate after immolation seems to be very significant, while hunger strikes can lead to the death of dozens of activists. Finally, it does not exclude suicide attacks, which really encompass a dimension close to the phenomenon of self-destruction (Gambetta 2005). In this respect, violence against oneself can be part of an “action repertoire” (Tilly 1978).

But contrary to modes of action generally studied, violence against oneself is exercised on an individual scale, and aims sometimes to defend strictly personal causes. This is the case of a civil servant on hunger strike against an administrative decision, of a self-mutilating prisoner demanding to be cleared of a charge, or of a dismissed worker hanging himself in his factory. Notwithstanding, violence against oneself can support an individual cause with a collective purpose, a collective cause, and can even be collectively organized (this is less often the case for self-mutilation). Thus, oral explanations, written statements, or martyrs’ testimonies, constitute a way of “building collectiveness” and of publicly demonstrating the political aspect of the endured suffering.

Another specificity of violence against oneself is its frequent use by resourceless actors. It is the case of prisoners (Bourgoin 2001), of undocumented migrants (Siméant 1998), or of soldiers who try to be declared unfit for fighting. But, sometimes, resourceful actors engage in a hunger strike; individuals with various competences immolate themselves to protest against a military intervention; or radical activists with a broad action repertoire cease to eat, set themselves alight, or blow themselves up, trying to reverse the course of history (Grojean 2006). Violence against oneself then appears to be a “strategic move” (Schelling 1960: 160), used when resources are inappropriate to change an intolerable situation.

This perspective first questions the cultural component of action repertoires.
Self-mutilation was already a way to avoid military service under the Roman Empire, but some forms of violence against oneself derive from pre-existing social practices. Techniques of fasting in common use in Ireland or India were used as a means of protest by the British suffragettes and then became widespread all over the world. Buddhist rituals of immolation became charged with political meaning after the famous action of Thich Quang Duc in 1963 in Vietnam, and then became more frequent. Recounting the genealogy of these techniques, from their politicization to their appropriation in very different contexts, can be helpful in order to analyze processes of learning, reinterpretation, and adaptation that go with “tactical innovations” (McAdam 1983).

Second, violence against oneself invites us to think of the links between demands and modes of contention. Indeed, it mostly emerges when claims are related to the fundamentals of the social, political, ethnic, or religious identity of the engaged actors. The demand or contestation of a status, the will to be treated with dignity, are not only expressed in a symbolic way, but embodied in this self-inflicted torture. Stigma reversal (Goffman 1986) fits into the scheme of negotiation when the strategy spreads over time: actors are calling out to public opinion and trying to reveal the opponent’s guilt. But when demands are (suddenly) less likely to receive a positive answer, a non-negotiation strategy can prevail and take the form of a unique move, meant to show determination.

Finally, this perspective makes more complex the notions of cost and risk. The soldier who mutilates himself to escape a quasi-certain death seems to act according to a cost-benefit analysis, yet actors can be engaged in more complex logics, that imply self-esteem and relation with their group, values and rewards systems, and relationships with the opponent. The point is no longer to minimize cost, but to build it in as a legitimating element of the struggle (Biggs 2003); the aim is not to alleviate risks, but to control them (self-mutilation), to shift them onto the opponent (hunger strikes and some immolations) or to suppress them (suicide attacks, cf. Bozarslan 2004).

SEE ALSO: Commitment; High and low risk/cost activism; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Rational choice theory and social movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Voluntary associations and social movements

EDWARD T. WALKER

Voluntary associations are “organized, named collectivities in which the majority of participants do not derive their livelihood from their activities in the group” (Knoke & Wood 1981: 8; see also Berry 1977; Walker 1991). The concept of a “voluntary association” has deep roots in the history and thought of American political development. Indeed, as de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America (1838), his celebrated account of his 1831 visit to the US, “no country in the world has made better use of association than the United States and nowhere has that powerful instrument been applied to a wider range of purposes” (de Tocqueville 2004: 215). Indeed, long traditions in US political thought have held that associations are schools of self-reliant citizenship and democratic practice through which interests and preferences are newly formed rather than predetermined. Associations offer a space outside the bureaucratic and electoral demands of the state, while also remaining relatively insulated from the pecuniary interests and competitive pressures of the market. Scholars of voluntary associations have highlighted the means by which nonpolitical forms of civic organization, such as neighborhood groups, fraternal organizations, and, in a well-known instance, choral groups, provide not only social integration and the participatory norms, social networks, and feelings of trust that accompany it (Putnam 2000), but they also indirectly socialize participants into active and engaged citizenship.

Although also firmly established in the American tradition going back to the Boston Tea Party and American Revolution, the concept of a “social movement” has focused scholars’ attention on a largely different set of concerns. The most direct difference is that a social movement is broader than any given association, whether political or nonpolitical: above all else, a social movement is an interaction among multiple parties. More specifically, social movements involve “a sustained interaction between a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those authorities” (Tilly 1984: 305). As such, they represent an episode of dynamic, public interaction between established authorities and activists seeking change in an institutional context. Organizations active in voicing such claims against authorities are social movement organizations (SMOs). These share many characteristics with voluntary associations, but are often distinguished by their commitment to using tactics outside of established channels of influence within the institutions they seek change (for a contrasting perspective, see Burstein 1999), although voluntary associations often become active in movements and provide a foundation for transgressive action, and mature SMOs often operate in a very similar fashion to established voluntary organizations. I return to these points shortly.

A growing body of scholarship has sought to integrate research on social movements with insights from studies of voluntary associations. This research has highlighted: (1) whether SMOs – especially large, national organizations – promote the social capital of participants to the extent that traditional voluntary associations do; (2) the similarities between SMOs and other kinds of voluntary associations in their concerns over resources, staffing, and legitimacy pressures; (3) the means by which voluntary associations often provide a crucial foundation for movement mobilization.

First, do SMOs promote the social capital of those they mobilize? Many analysts of public participation overlook social movements as sources of social capital, either because...
they assume that movements promote incivility and public mistrust, or because the episodic nature of participation in social movements may not build the long-standing ties that benefit communities and facilitate democratic governance (for a critique of this position, see Foley and Edwards 1996). In addition, certain social movements are exclusive in nature, thus providing participants with the inwardly focused form of social capital (“bonding”) rather than an inclusive and open (“bridging”) form. Analysts often worry that highly politicized organizations, beyond the concern about their exclusivity, promote civic mistrust and polarization.

This question, of course, is rooted in the context of declining civic participation in the 1970s and 1980s, which took place at the same time as a vast expansion of national SMOs focused on federal policy domains (Walker 1991; Berry 1977; Walker 2009). How is it possible that our society underwent an expansion of advocacy organizations simultaneous with decreasing levels of public engagement and civic trust? Or, more directly, how could an expansion of advocacy be compatible with a contraction of civic activism? The most widely accepted solution to this problem was found in arguments by Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003), both of whom, with some variation in evidence and tone, pointed to the fact that many of these new SMOs lacked structures for facilitating deep member engagement. Many of these groups have no membership in the strict sense, in that constituents’ engagement with the organization is limited to participation via the web or direct mail, through which such groups would request that participants write checks or advocacy letters. Although the evidence is clear that there was a numeric growth in these “associations without members,” their proportional representation in advocacy fields has been remarkably stable since the 1960s (Walker, McCarthy, & Baumgartner 2011). Thus, while it may be the case that national SMOs today do not promote the social capital of their members in the same way as comparable organizations did two generations ago, this change does not appear to be due to the growth of so-called checkbook organizations.

In addition, despite the concern that SMOs—especially national organizations—are less directly participatory and that they do more to agitate conflicts rather than establish societal cooperation and consensus, others have argued that such organizations build particular kinds of social capital that traditional voluntary associations neglect. For instance, as Minkoff (1997: 615–16) argues, such SMOs bring considerable benefit to socially marginal groups whose interests might have remained ignored, they provide a channel outside traditional routes of public claims-making, they promote political participation and the generation of identities, and they offer a model to others whose voices would otherwise be excluded from public debate.

Second, a well-established yet still expanding body of research investigates how SMOs and other kinds of voluntary associations, as organizations, face similar sorts of processes in their operations. Although their goals, identities, practices, and ideals may be worlds apart, organizations from labor unions to fan clubs to radical environmentalist organizations face considerable organizational pressures to maintain legitimacy, cultivate external resources, recruit and train staff, and be responsive to external publics. Organizations in the peace movement, for instance, were found to have faced strong age-based liabilities of organizational collapse, similar to local community groups in low-income areas (Walker & McCarthy 2010). Importantly, much of this research has successfully imported frameworks from organizational theory into studies of advocacy, including organizational ecology (with its focuses on resource partitioning, niches, and density dependence), neo-institutionalism, and resource dependency theory. Whether called an SMO, nonprofit, interest group, or voluntary association, such groups in civil society nonetheless remain formal and complex organizations and can productively be analyzed as such (Andrews & Edwards 2004). And, while such ideas are recognized in resource mobilization approaches
to social movements, some have gone further in suggesting that organization-theoretic approaches particular to the corporate sector should be applied to organizations supplying advocacy “products” (Prakash & Gugerty 2010).

Third, although scholars of civic engagement have long recognized the role that voluntary associations play in political socialization, for their part they have paid less attention to how voluntary associations may either transform into SMOs or may simply provide infrastructures for movement mobilization. It is clear, however, that in political mobilization by community groups and civil rights activists, movement entrepreneurs rely upon the existing structures of civil society such as religious congregations, labor unions, local charitable groups, nonprofit service providers, and other associations in order to facilitate institutional change. Rather than build structures out of whole cloth, social movement actors often do their best to co-opt ready-made social network ties on behalf of movement purposes, just as they engage in a form of cultural bricolage in constructing new organizational forms.

There continues to be room for expansion in these lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry, as scholars increasingly acknowledge that social movements and voluntary associations are overlapping rather than merely independent, parallel areas of investigation. Scholars, then, should recognize that both of these types of action in civil society generate forms of social capital, share similar organizational processes, and yet are uniquely implicated in mobilizing civic and political activism.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Interest groups and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Organizations and movements; Social capital and social movements; Social movement organization (SMO).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


War and social movements
PAUL D. ALMEIDA

Social movements operate under a variety of political environments. One of the fundamental tasks for movement scholars in the twenty-first century centers on classifying a delimited number of political climates and corresponding forms of mobilization likely to emerge. This entry analyzes the political context of war and the multiple ways students of collective action approach social movement activities in relation to hostilities between nations and internal civil wars. Interstate and civil wars generate a wide variety of social movements related to different dimensions of violent conflict, while civil wars may originate at times from the repression and radicalization of more conventional forms of collective action.

A common means to examine social movements and wars between at least two nations involves analyzing anti-war movements. Indeed, advancement in theory construction from the late 1970s through the early 2000s has benefited from using antiwar movements as empirical case studies (McAdam & Su 2002). Early research on youth and social movements and applications of resource mobilization theory examined the anti-Vietnam War movement in the US and Europe. These studies found that the motivational mechanism of the threat of being drafted pushed many young people and students in the US into active mobilization against the war. Indeed, Flacks (1988: 164) asserts that by 1965 the student antiwar movement in the US was organizing the largest student demonstrations in 30 years in reaction to conscription and the escalation of hostilities in Southeast Asia. Antidraft movements in the US go back at least to the New York City Drafts Riots in 1863 against conscription into the Union Army during the American Civil War (Meyer 2007). More recent work on the peace movement has examined popular mobilization against the wars between the United States and Iraq (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown 2005; Coy, Woehrle, & Maney 2008) where mobilization is based less on the threat of the draft (since conscription is voluntary) and more on moral and humanistic concerns. Hence, peace and antiwar social movements may derive from direct grievances (fear of mandatory conscription) or from principled moral sentiments against war and its accompanying violence.

The emerging peace movement literature in the 2000s has added to our knowledge on rainbow coalitions and the transnational mechanisms of coordinating international actions. In short, these studies investigate how peace movements overcome the fundamental collective action difficulties of cooperation between disparate social groups (Van Dyke & McCammon 2010) and generate wide and diverse coalitions across multiple nations. For instance, the February 15, 2003 antiwar demonstrations against the imminent invasion of Iraq occurred in nearly 800 cities in dozens of countries on every continent with millions of participants, making it the largest coordinated day of protest in world history (Walgrave & Rucht 2010). Transnational peace activist ties on the Internet likely facilitated this unprecedented outpouring of global opposition. An interesting area of future inquiry would be to explain the cross-national variation in mobilization against the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which could examine a range of important theoretical propositions such as national level Internet connectivity, religious affiliations, past transnational mobilization, a country’s level of participation in the invasion, and so on. Transnational social movements have also appeared over conflicts in Northern Ireland (Maney 2000), Central America (Perla 2008), and many other world regions whereby diaspora immigrant communities and political exiles play fundamental roles in establishing peace and/or solidarity organizations to influence the outcomes of
wars in their distant home countries. Con-
science adherents and constituents (McCarthy
& Zald 1977) that do not benefit directly from
an end to foreign wars may also play major
roles in solidarity and peace organizations
attempting to end violent conflicts and external
interventions by more powerful nations. These
groups and individuals may be motivated to
participate on religious, ideological, and moral
grounds (Smith 1996; Erickson-Nepstad 2004).

Social movements in relation to civil wars
can be broken into two dimensions: (1)
social movements and cycles of protest that
escalate into insurrectionary and revolutionary
forces that may result in prolonged civil
wars with the established authorities; and
(2) social movements pacifically mobilizing
within a country to end civil wars. Cycles
of protest have largely been investigated in
democratic contexts (Tarrow 1989; McAdam
1995). However, when waves of protest
occur – heightened periods of mobilization
by multiple social groups across a national
territory (Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 2004;
Almeida 2008) – in a nondemocratic state,
the wave may become increasingly radicalized
by the onset of state repression leading
insurgents to take up arms and slide into civil
war, including ethnonationalist movements
(Johnston 2008). For example, protest waves
in Guatemala and El Salvador in the late
1970s resulted in both nations falling into
civil war when heavy state repression pushed
popular movements into more insurgent and
violent forms of collective action (Brockett
2005). The actions of the insurgent army in
relation to the civilian population may be
determined by the resources of rebels on
the eve of civil war. For example, Weinstein
(2007) found in a comparison of guerrilla
armies in Mozambique, Uganda, and Peru that
insurgents with natural resource endowments
and wealth (e.g., diamonds, coca, etc.) or
foreign support abused civilian populations
via looting and forced recruitment while
resource poor antistate insurgents were more
likely to draw civilian support via solidarity
incentives and nonmaterial motivations.

Antistate insurgents may also demonstrate
a decline in their armed activities with a
return to democratization either brought on
by the insurgents themselves or other external
forces. Goodwin (2001), in an examination
of dozens of third world insurgencies during
the cold war, predicts fewer successful armed
revolutionary insurgencies in the twenty-first
century with the growing infrastructural power
of the state and the increasing number of
at least nominal democracies in developing
countries.

Often social movements emerge within civil
wars striving to halt political violence and
achieve a long-term peace. In the 1990s and
early 2000s, a variety of women’s organizations
(including Protestant Christian and Muslim
market women) coalesced into a powerful
oppositional social movement in Liberia (the
Liberian Women’s Initiative) demanding an
end to the country’s horrendous civil war that
involved child soldiers, mutilation, and rape
as common strategies by multiple warring
factions. The women organized dozens of
street demonstrations and held sit-ins outside
the prolonged peace negotiations, insisting that
the male-dominated armies terminate the civil
war that had cost 250,000 lives and nearly one
million displaced (African Women and Peace
Support Group 2004). The Liberian women’s
sit-ins outside peace negotiations in Accra,
Ghana, and their boycott of sexual relations
with male partners acted as especially assertive
tactics in pushing a final peace agreement to
end the second civil war in 2003. In El Salvador,
a wide civil society alliance of 70 civic organi-
zations originally coordinated by the Catholic
Church – the Permanent Commission of the
National Debate for Peace (CPDN) – emerged
on the political scene in the late 1980s and
early 1990s to also effectively pressure the
government and guerrilla forces to end the
12-year long civil war via social movement
actions such as educational workshops, public
assemblies, and street demonstrations.

Peace movements and social movements
operating inside countries experiencing inter-
nal wars also find themselves subject to violence
and accusations that they are sympathetic to or even a front for one of the warring factions (Brockett 2005). Social movements in these special contexts must strike a delicate balance to avoid serving as the targets for governmental or insurgent violence. They must choose tactics and symbols that demonstrate their autonomy, pacific nature, and independence from the armed groups embroiled in conflict. Finally, both civil and interstate wars result in a whole host of new social movements as a consequence of large-scale violence and displacement of populations. Such collectivities include movements for the rights of war refugees, relatives of victims of war violence, and other human rights groups (e.g., mothers and families of the disappeared in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s), as well as a multitude of issues associated with veterans of the conflict (e.g., disability services, pensions, and other social benefits) whereby at times these demands become expressed via social movement type campaigns.

SEE ALSO: Antiwar and peace movements; Citizen peacebuilding movements; Guerrilla movements; Terrorist movements; Transnational social movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


World-system and social movements
ROBERT K. SCHAEFFER and L. FRANK WEYHER

Proponents of the world-system perspective have argued that the modern world-system first took shape in Western Europe and the Americas between 1450 and 1650, the "long sixteenth century" (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989). Although social conflict was endemic during the early modern period, "antisystemic" movements emerged only in 1848 (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989). Class and status-based movements subsequently seized state power as a means of changing the inequalities associated with the capitalist world-system during the next century. However, they found it much more difficult to reduce structural inequality or transform the system than they had imagined, which led to a new round of global protest in 1968. This time movements directed their anger not only at powerful capitalist states in the core but also against states where antisystemic movements had taken power and antisystemic movements that had organized labor unions and political parties. To appreciate these developments, it is useful to recount the history of struggles by social movements in the modern world-system.

During the long sixteenth century, a capitalist world-economy emerged in Western Europe and the Americas. Unlike previous empires in Rome or China, which consisted of a single, self-contained world-economy administered by a single state or "empire," the modern world-system consisted of a single world-economy administered by multiple states. This allowed profit-seeking capitalists, not tax-seeking bureaucrats, to organize the economic system (Wallerstein 1974: 257). "Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the world-economy has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems," Wallerstein argues (1974: 348). From the outset, capitalists and states in Western Europe, what Wallerstein calls the "core" of the world-economy, organized a global division of labor that allowed them to obtain a disproportionate share of the wealth produced by people who contributed to commodity production in the "periphery" and "semi-periphery" (1974: 349). This structural inequality, which resulted in "the concentration of advantages in one zone of the world-system [the core] and the concentration of negative effects in the other [the periphery]," has been a durable feature of the modern world-system, which subsequently expanded and incorporated the rest of the world (Wallerstein 1996: 312).

During the early modern period, oppressed peasants, workers, sharecroppers, slaves, and indigenous people "were all rambunctious in their various ways" (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 29). But their riots and rebellions were often short lived and "served as safety valves for pent-up anger or ... as mechanisms that ... set minor limits to exploitative process" (Wallerstein 1974: 357, 1996: 65). Workers did not then have the capacity to organize sustained opposition to the emerging system or the ability to think strategically about how to press for "fundamental social change" (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 29; Wallerstein 2004: 65). As a result, "spontaneous violence had the effect of throwing paper on a fire. The fire flamed up but just as quickly went out. Such violence was not a very durable fuel" (Wallerstein 2004: 64).

Although workers were unable to organize sustained opposition to the system of inequality, the ruling classes struggled successfully to expand the world-economy and create effective states that could secure their wealth and power. Although the "crisis of feudalism" had earlier threatened ruling class factions – landed aristocracy, urban bourgeoisie, state bureaucracy – their struggles...
to create a multicontinental, multistate world-economy enabled them to weather the crisis (Wallerstein 1996: 42).

Of course, ruling class factions also often fought ferociously with other factions, struggles that resulted in Dutch, English, American, French, and, later, Latin American “revolutions.” But during the early modern period, factions of the ruling class struggled against each other more or less on their own, without much interference from the lower classes (Wallerstein 1974: 354). Their struggles were not “revolutionary” because they “marked neither basic economic nor basic political transformation” nor altered the structure of the world-economy (Wallerstein 1989: 52). Still, these “intrabourgeois” struggles, which “were internal to the ruling strata,” were important because they gave ruling class factions the opportunity to create states that could provide them with economic assistance, military protection, an efficient bureaucracy that did not burden them with excessive taxes, and a mechanism to settle their internal disputes (Wallerstein 1980: 113, 120, 1996: 50–57, 63). Ruling classes in the Netherlands and England managed to do this better than ruling classes in France, Spain, or Poland, and the latter were subsequently assigned subordinate economic and political roles in the world-system.

Although popular insurrections generally proved ineffective during the early modern period, in 1848 workers for the first time created both durable organizations and political strategies that enabled them to struggle effectively against ruling strata (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 256). Wallerstein describes the discovery of organization as “the great innovation in the technology of rebellion,” an invention that helped “prepare the ground politically for fundamental social change” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 30; Wallerstein 1991: 20–21, 1996: 66, 2004: 65). Organization made it possible for oppressed people to keep the flame of struggle burning and, sometimes, to ignite a wider conflagration.

After 1848, antisystemic movements developed organizations based both on “classes” and on “status-groups,” which included both ethnic-religious “nationalist” groups and “feminist” women’s groups (Wallerstein 2004: 68, 73). Because each of these three movements “insisted that its grievances be dealt with first,” they did not “find much common ground” (Wallerstein 2004: 70). But while socialist, nationalist, and feminist movements had important ideological differences, they all set the seizure of state power as a strategic goal because they thought that state power would enable them to “transform societies” and end inequality (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 37; Wallerstein 1991: 30, 2004: 73). Of course, each of these movements debated how state power might best be achieved. Some adopted peaceful means (obtaining the franchise and using the vote to acquire power), while others advocated violent insurrection.

Between 1848 and 1968, antisystemic socialist and nationalist movements took power in a number of states around the world: social democratic movements in the core; communist and nationalist movements in the decolonized periphery and semi-periphery (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 33). Although women have become heads of state, they have done so as leaders of socialist or nationalist movements, not feminist ones. As Arrighi and colleagues noted, “Seen from the vantage of 1848, the success of anti-systemic movements has been very impressive indeed” (1989: 33).

But while a number of antisystemic movements “have come to power in a large number of states,” Wallerstein argued that “post-revolutionary regimes continue[d] to function as part of the social division of labor of historical capitalism” (2004: 71). The seizure of state power was an “unfulfilled revolution” because while “changes in state structures have altered the politics of accumulation [they] have not yet been able to end them [emphasis added]” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 34; Wallerstein 1996: 71–72).

Wallerstein suggests that antisystemic movements failed to alter the structure of inequality for two reasons. “First of all, state structures are embedded . . . in the interstate system, and their
degree of autonomy is strictly limited” (1991: 35). As a result, whatever their ideological goals, state officials quickly discovered that “control of the state machinery of a state . . . affords less real power in practice than it does in theory” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 57; Wallerstein 1991: 27). This should not be surprising, given the fact that capitalist states were “one of the central institutional achievements of historical capitalism” in the early modern period (Wallerstein 1996: 48).

Second, when antisystemic movements took power, they typically became more concerned with keeping power than making change, a process akin to Robert Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy,” and this made them more “reformist” than “revolutionary” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 102; Wallerstein 1991: 25). The determination to hold power at all costs transformed the social movement cadre into bureaucrats, and they became, in effect, “betrayers of the cause” (Wallerstein 1996: 68–69).

As a result of these two developments, “antisystemic” movements proved either unable or unwilling to use state power to promote revolutionary change. In retrospect, Wallerstein suggests that movements should have viewed the seizure of state power as a tactical goal, not a strategic goal (1991: 36). They should instead have been prepared to relinquish power and maneuver politically, as Antonio Gramsci recommended, “since it is in the process of movement, of mobilization, that the really constructive power of movements lies” (Wallerstein 1991: 36).

Although Wallerstein views the strategy adopted by antisystemic movements after 1848 as problematic, he argues that the eruption of “new” antisystemic movements in 1968 demonstrated that oppressed people understood this. So they revolted not only against capitalist states in Western Europe and the US, but also against “old” antisystemic movements that had seized state power or had organized bureaucratic labor unions and political parties (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 113, 98). “We cannot understand 1968 unless we see it simultaneously as a cri de coeur against the evils of the world-system and a fundamental questioning of the strategy of the old left opposition to the world-system” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989: 101).

The world-system approach can provide a wider context for the study of social movements, a field that has become narrower in recent years (Dickinson & Schaeffer 2008: 29). The collapse of communism, the rise of China as a capitalist state, and the decline of the labor movement have persuaded many social movement scholars to abandon the study of “big” movements organized broadly along class and national lines, and focus instead on the particular organizational forms and public activities of identity-based movements that mobilize more selectively (Dickinson & Schaeffer 2001: 3–158, 2008: 12–13). Postmodern critiques of “universalism” further encouraged many scholars to eschew big ideas and look instead at movements that adopted more modest goals, such as obtaining civil rights (Dickinson & Schaeffer 2008: 29–31). Although the labor movement has been largely written out of social movement scholarship in recent years, labor scholars have urged consideration of “social movement unionism,” that mobilizes people not just as workers but also as members of diverse communities (Clawson 2003; Weyher & Zeitlin 2005: 29). The study of social movements would benefit not only from a reconsideration of “old” social movement traditions but also from an analysis that places movements in the kind of broad historical context that the world-system perspective can provide.

By the same token, world-system scholars might explore how social movements contribute to change, even if the change they seek does not result in world-systemic “revolution,” a standard set very high. Moreover, they might pay more attention to the emergence of female-centered social movements, which emerged in response to changes in the global, gendered division of labor (Dickinson & Schaeffer 2001: 161). These female-centered movements have not only challenged capital and the state, they have also tried to “organize independent work
and social relations outside the system,” what Tamdgidi calls “other-systemic movements” (Dickinson & Schaeffer 2001: 252; Tamdgidi 2001: 326). By “combining the conceptual frameworks of world-system and social movements” and “integrating feminist insights,” scholars would better understand “social movement dynamics and … [their] tactics and strategies” (Moghadam 2009: 11–12).

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Antiglobalization movements; Anti-World Bank and IMF riots; Global Justice Movement; Globalization and movements; Nationalist movements; Political economy and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Aboriginal peoples’ movements (Australia)

MAGGIE WALTER

Australian Aboriginal peoples’ movements have been central to Aboriginal resistances to disposessions and discriminations since European colonization began at the turn of the nineteenth century and continue into present times. Aboriginal organized protest has coalesced around three political and social criteria: the articulation of a direct claim; the organization of activities involving Aboriginal community members around this claim; and the adaptation of the colonizers’ socio-legal practices as tools to advance these claims. An early example is George Walter Arthur and other Tasmanians’ campaign to reverse the forced dispossession and exile of the Tasmanians. Activities included the establishment of a newspaper to voice their claims and, in 1847, a petition to Queen Victoria claiming breach of promise by colonial authorities. The Tasmanians remained imprisoned on Flinders Island, but with the legacy of documentary evidence that the Tasmanians never relinquished sovereignty. Petitions against dispossession and living circumstances were also made by a number of Aboriginal protest movement leaders in New South Wales and South Australia in the latter part of the nineteenth century, again unsuccessfully (Attwood & Markus 1999).

The first formalized Aboriginal activist movements emerged in the early twentieth century. In 1924 Fred Maynard led the formation of the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association which appealed, unsuccessfully, to the New South Wales and Commonwealth governments and King George V for the recognition of Aboriginal citizenship rights (Maynard 1997). In the 1930s the Aborigines Progressives Association (APA), organized by William Cooper, William Ferguson, and Jack Patten, coordinated the 1938 National Day of Mourning. This action protested the formal celebration of the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of Australian colonization and included the presentation of an Australian Claim of Civil Rights Manifesto to King George VI and a ten-point plan to Prime Minister Lyons to remediate the lack of legislative reform to provide Aboriginal rights.

In the mid twentieth century Aboriginal protest movements focused on achieving civil and social rights. The most well known, and successful, was the political movement aligned with the 1967 referendum to change the Australian Constitution. The referendum sought to repeal section 51 (xxvi) to allow the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to Aboriginal people and section 127 to allow Aboriginal people to be counted in the national census. Led by activists such as Faith Bandler, and organizations such as the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (FAATSI) this movement achieved an unprecedented 90 percent “Yes” vote. The positive result was built on a platform of earlier social movement actions demanding change. The 1965 “Freedom Rides” organized by Charles Perkins and Sydney University students had highlighted entrenched racial discrimination and the 1963 bark petition to the Federal House of Representatives by the Yirrkala people protesting at the excision of their land for mining demonstrated continuing dispossession.

In the 1970s and 1980s Aboriginal movements focused on extending citizenship rights using a variety of activities and campaigns. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy in the national capital of Canberra was set up in 1972 and remains today despite being torn down, raided, and declared illegal almost continually since its establishment. The courts have also been used by political movements, with at least initial success, to reclaim Aboriginal sovereignty. In 1992, the Australian High Court legally recognized

the claims of Eddie Mabo and other claimants to the possession, occupation, use, and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands. The legislative response to this ruling, The Native Title Act (1993), however, places substantial barriers to their achievement. Aboriginal protest movements were also instrumental in the 1989 establishment of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the 1997 Bringing Them Home, National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families.

The activities of Aboriginal social and political movements have been circumscribed during the latter 1990s and 2000s. The incursion of market forces ideology has not only limited Aboriginal rights advancement, it has effectively rolled back some of the gains already achieved. In 1996 the Wik people’s case in the High Court confirmed that the granting of pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native title. This 1998 legislative response, however, reversed the intent of this ruling and largely extinguished land rights entitlement under leaseholds. The policy formation acceptance of the concept of self-determination has also been formally rejected and made manifest by the 2005 abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). The result is the effective elimination of the formal Aboriginal political voice. In 2007 Aboriginal civil rights were overturned again via the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act (1975) to allow the military-led intervention into 72 Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. The on-going intervention has seen compulsory acquisition of Aboriginal land and unprecedented control of multiple aspects of Aboriginal peoples’ lives (Walter 2010). Contemporaneous Aboriginal social movements in Australia, therefore, are currently preoccupied with defending basic human rights. Yet, while many, if not the majority, of Aboriginal social and political movements were not immediately successful their legacy is critical to current and future action for Aboriginal rights, recognition, and sovereignty in Australia. Now as then, social and political movements largely develop from the grassroots of Aboriginal communities and organizations. Scholarship in this area focuses on the capacity of Aboriginal protest movements, historically and contemporaneously, firstly to challenge injustices and dispossessions and secondly, to make use of the apparatus of the nation-state within these challenges (Attwood & Markus 1999; Walter 2010).

SEE ALSO: Decolonization and social movements; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Racist social movements; Rights and rights movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)

BRETT C. STOCKDILL

Outraged by the lack of concerted effort to fight the AIDS crisis, queer activists formed the direct-action AIDS organization, ACT UP, in 1987. They were enraged because tens of thousands of people, disproportionately gay and bisexual men, had died of AIDS, yet governmental, mass media, medical establishment, and other institutional responses were characterized by homophobia and genocidal neglect. Beginning with the first chapter in New York City in March 1987, activists soon established over 80 chapters in the United States, including Puerto Rico, and over 30 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, and Europe. ACT UP’s repertoire of innovative, confrontational tactics was decisive in publicizing myriad aspects of the HIV/AIDS crisis, increasing government HIV/AIDS budgets, preventing new HIV infections, galvanizing research, reshaping clinical drug trials, securing access to services and treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS, and fighting repressive legislation including calls to quarantine people with HIV/AIDS. ACT UP empowered people living with HIV/AIDS and challenged homophobia, racism, sexism, and other inequalities fueling the AIDS crisis. In the process, the organization ignited gay and lesbian pride, cultivating rebellious queer identities and political action that celebrated sexual difference and envisioned a more just and inclusive world. Most ACT UP chapters declined in the early to mid 1990s but a few continue to do vital AIDS activism today.

EMERGENCE

Massive AIDS deaths fueled by systemic homophobia and other inequalities during the 1980s catalyzed the creation of ACT UP. During the first five years of the AIDS crisis, gay men and lesbians channeled their horror and anguish into service provision and nonconfrontational AIDS activism, such as lobbying and candlelight vigils. However, as deaths rose, the 1986 US Supreme Court’s *Bowers v. Hardwick* ruling, which upheld the criminalization of homosexual sex, ignited rage in gay and lesbian communities and prompted widespread street protests in cities across the country. Gay and lesbian activists formed new militant organizations – such as Citizens for Medical Justice in San Francisco, Dykes and Gay Men Against Repression/Reagan/the Right Wing (DAGMAR) in Chicago, and the Lavender Hill Mob in New York City – that linked the Supreme Court ruling with the AIDS crisis and subsequently grew into the first ACT UP chapters in 1987 (Gould 2009).

PARTICIPANTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

ACT UP members were predominately lesbians and gay men, and largely white and middle class, but included significant numbers of people of color and working-class people. Many joined ACT UP in response to the grief of watching loved ones die of AIDS. Many members, particularly gay men, were living with HIV/AIDS and refused to merely sit back and die. Some participants, particularly middle class, white gay men, had little prior activist experience. Others, particularly lesbians, had participated in earlier leftist organizing efforts including the gay liberation movement, the women’s movement, lesbian feminism, and anti-imperialism. This activist experience, combined with an embrace of gay and lesbian culture, shaped ACT UP’s egalitarian organizational structure and practices, defiantly queer political analysis and savvy, provocative, in-your-face tactics.
ACT UP’s organizational structure was, “non-hierarchical, decentralized, and democratic” (Gould 2009: 190). Much of the strategic planning occurred in committees, caucuses, and affinity groups. While these smaller groups brought ideas for campaigns and actions to be discussed at general meetings, they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy provided they adhered to the organization’s core principles of nonviolence, participatory decision making, the positive valuation of lesbian and gay sexualities, the empowerment of people living with HIV/AIDS, and defiance of institutional and cultural bigotry driving the epidemic.

In a homophobic, AIDS-phobic society, shared experiences such as sexual and gender outlaws grappling with illness and death bolstered solidarity among members. Public expression of affection and eroticism – particularly homo-affection and homoeroticism – as well as the common use of campy humor further strengthened bonds between participants. In turn, the collective experience of being in the streets and putting their bodies on the line together forged intense cohesion in ACT UP.

TACTICS

ACT UP’s membership and organizational milieu produced deep and sophisticated scientific expertise that informed an array of direct-action tactics. Through extensive research, ACT UP members acquired vast knowledge of the epidemiology, science, and sociology of HIV/AIDS. Armed with data and analysis, members utilized protest to secure meetings with government and other officials, such as those in the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), to demand more concerted responses to the AIDS crisis. Their expertise developed to the point where scientists felt compelled to read ACT UP fact sheets, background papers, and other documents (Epstein 1996).

ACT UP’s direct-action tactics included phone and fax zaps, marches, rallies, die-ins, and civil disobedience. One illustrative example is the ACT UP/Chicago-led protest against the Cook County Board of Commissioners for their refusal to admit women into the AIDS ward at Cook County Hospital. ACT UP’s Women’s Caucus, supported by the PISD (People with Immune System Disorders) Caucus and People of Color Caucus, blocked traffic in the center of a busy downtown Chicago intersection by creating a symbolic AIDS ward with 16 mattresses displaying slogans about women and AIDS. The women lay on the beds and refused to move. Police arrested over one hundred protestors. The Cook County Board agreed to open the AIDS ward to women the next day.

ACT UP was particularly innovative in utilizing art, video, agitprop (agitational propaganda), and street theater to highlight the injustices of the AIDS epidemic (Crimp & Rolston 1990; Bordowitz 2004). ACT UP/New York’s 1987 gay and lesbian pride parade float, trimmed with barbed wire and driven by a man in a Ronald Reagan (then US president) mask, depicted an AIDS quarantine camp. Internment camp guards on the street wore gas masks and yellow rubber gloves. The organization was also extremely sophisticated – and successful – in securing media coverage of their grievances and actions.

ACT UP challenged the homophobia undergirding the AIDS crisis. Their cultural defiance included publicly embracing the right to be queer. Activists spoke openly and explicitly about lesbian and gay sex, publicly displayed queer affection, distributed thousands of condoms and dental dams, and unfurled banners promoting safer sex at public events such as major league baseball games and the US Republican Party national convention. As a symbol of queer pride, ACT UP popularized the pink triangle, which gay men were forced to wear in concentration camps during the Nazi holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s. The ACT UP slogan SILENCE=DEATH, placed below the pink triangle, encapsulated their mission to value queer lives and defy the status quo.
Though much of its organizing focused on confronting homophobia, ACT UP also challenged systemic gender and racial oppression that further exacerbated the AIDS crisis. Women’s and people of color caucuses conducted educational outreach among women and communities of color, sponsored conferences, worked with community-based AIDS organizations, and led workshops on sexism and racism within ACT UP. Women’s caucuses criticized the framing of AIDS as a gay male disease, demanded increased research on and services for women, and led several protests that forced the US Centers for Disease Control to expand its definition of AIDS to include common AIDS-defining opportunistic infections among women. Lesbians played a pivotal role in women’s caucuses; they educated people both in and outside ACT UP about the roles of sexism, racism, and classism in the AIDS crisis and spearheaded campaigns around related issues such as HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users and prisoners (ACT UP/New York 1992).

OUTCOMES

ACT UP’s tactics led to a number of significant victories such as the expansion of government AIDS budgets, the speedup of medical research, and increased access to life-prolonging experimental therapies. ACT UP activism led to the transformation of governmental HIV/AIDS research – and scientific research in general. ACT UP forced the US Food and Drug Administration to expedite its drug testing process and to provide people with AIDS with access to experimental drugs before their approval. These changes were coupled with ACT UP’s success in securing the involvement of AIDS activists in the design and implementation of clinical drug trials (Epstein 1996). In turn, the organization forced pharmaceutical corporations to reduce the cost of AIDS drugs. ACT UP and other AIDS activists secured increased funding for HIV prevention and more compassionate AIDS-related health care and services for people living with HIV/AIDS, including women and people of color. ACT UP worked with community-based organizations to establish needle exchanges, a critical means of preventing HIV transmission among intravenous drug users. ACT UP also collaborated with prisoners and former prisoners to improve prisoner access to prevention and treatment information, social support, and drug treatments.

ACT UP also effectively challenged the tremendous stigma and bias against those affected by HIV/AIDS, including repressive AIDS legislation, workplace discrimination, and refusal of medical treatment. The organization also exposed the distorted and inadequate media coverage of the crisis as well as the vilification of people living with HIV/AIDS by right-wing ideologues, providing a counter-narrative that humanized and empowered HIV-positive people while simultaneously promoting queer sexualities.

DECLINE

Despair and internal conflict within ACT UP coupled with increasing political conservatism on the national level and state repression targeting the group contributed to ACT UP’s decline in the early 1990s. Despite ACT UP’s stunning victories, effective treatments were still lacking, and intense despair resurged amidst the ever-increasing deaths of friends and lovers. Many members were dead or dying by this time, and survivors grew increasingly burnt out – physically and emotionally – from the daily onslaught of the AIDS crisis. Deborah Gould (2009: 396, 424) argues that while ACT UP had effectively harnessed grief to collective anger and collective action, its “... emotional habitus prohibited despair, and that made it difficult to deal with that bad feeling ... [Despair] depleted many ACT UP members’ activist energy, replacing their rousing desire and forward momentum, sometimes even their anger, with frustration, exhaustion, and immobility.”
Without an outlet for feelings of despair, political differences intensified among members, leading to polarization in the organization. A significant number of members, typically but not exclusively HIV-positive white gay men, were reluctant to focus energy and resources on the racism and sexism intertwined with the epidemic. Instead, they prioritized getting “drugs into bodies” and resented the efforts, primarily by members of women’s and people of color caucuses, to address the impact of HIV/AIDS on women and communities of color. Factionalized conflict between the two camps led several chapters to splinter. For example, some members of the Treatment and Data Committee – which pushed scientists and government officials to speed up drug testing and approval – left ACT UP/New York to form other organizations such as TAG (Treatment Action Group).

The surging conservative backlash against gains by civil rights, feminist, and lesbian and gay movements aggravated internal conflicts, particularly as reported HIV/AIDS cases climbed among people of color. Jeffrey Edwards (2000: 487) writes that, “the withering of a broader ‘rainbow politics’” was accompanied by “an expanding white racial backlash in the larger [US] society” that spilled over into ACT UP and the broader lesbian and gay community, galvanizing infighting, shattering solidarity, and isolating the organization politically.

Within this context, political repression took an increasing toll. Police brutality, criminal prosecution, and surveillance and harassment by the FBI and other US law enforcement entities drained time, energy, and resources from fighting AIDS and intimidated AIDS activists. For example, echoing earlier efforts to quell dissident movements, the state used a grand jury to divide queer/AIDS activists in Colorado and to indict three members of ACT UP/Denver in 1993 for protesting the AIDS-phobia and homophobia of the Catholic Church (Stockdill 2003).

These and other factors, such as a decrease in mainstream media coverage of the AIDS crisis, contributed to the decline of ACT UP chapters across the nation. The early 1990s saw a shift in many lesbian and gay communities away from radical street protest and toward a politics of respectability. In part driven by sheer exhaustion, some framed the access a few AIDS activists gained to the scientific research establishment as evidence that confrontational tactics were no longer necessary. This perspective was buttressed in the United States by then newly elected President Clinton’s seeming support of both AIDS and lesbian/gay rights activists’ demands. Some members left the group to work in the burgeoning AIDS industry and/or in more assimilationist political campaigns such as gay marriage and gays in the military (Gould 2009). By the end of 1995, most ACT UP chapters were defunct, though ACT UP/New York and ACT UP/Philadelphia persevere today.

LEGACY

ACT UP’s legacy is considerable. Many HIV/AIDS organizations in the fourth decade of the AIDS crisis have roots in ACT UP, including the Treatment Action Group (TAG), Housing Works, and a number of needle exchange programs. To the extent that millions globally now have access to life-saving treatments, ACT UP deserves some of the credit. In challenging the shame and stigma connected to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender identities, as well as linking AIDS to other issues such as housing, incarceration, sexism, racism, capitalism, and militarism, ACT UP provides a model for confrontational queer political struggles against crisscrossing oppressions. Its imprint can be seen in the proliferation of queer pride, theory, studies, and collective action as well as the use of art and film/video in antiglobalization and other movements in the 1990s and 2000s. Mainstream social movement scholars have largely overlooked ACT UP despite the fact that much of its history has been archived (e.g.,
ACT UP Oral History Project). This history provides crucial lessons for social movement scholars as well as contemporary and future activists.

SEE ALSO: AIDS activism; Civil disobedience; Emotion and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Health movements (United States); Moral shocks/outrage; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Repression and social movements; Stonewall riots (United States); Women’s movements.

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Penal abolitionist movement
RENÉ VAN SWAANINGEN

There have been abolitionist movements against slavery, torture, prostitution, capital punishment, and prison. This entry focuses on the latter alone. When the term abolitionism is used in relation to criminological issues, it generally dismisses penal definitions and punitive responses to criminalized problems, and proposes their replacement by dispute settlement, redress, and social justice. More generally, it refers to the abolition of state (supported) institutions that are no longer felt to be legitimate. The word abolitionism as currently understood in criminology is adopted from the North American antiprison movement of the early 1970s. Here Quakers, most notably, take up their historical mission from the antislavery movement. They see prison as an institution that today fulfils the same social functions as slavery did till the late nineteenth century: disciplining the (mostly black) underclass. This American penal abolitionism is mainly grounded in religious inspiration, and less in considerations of the counter-effectiveness of criminal justice, as is the case in Europe (Bianchi & van Swaaningen 1986). The European abolitionist social movements of that era were prisoners’ unions and more intellectual radical penal reform movements (van Swaaningen 1997). This more academic abolitionism has its roots in symbolic interactionism and social constructionism, with a strongly Foucauldian focus on discipline in a carceral society.

Despite what the literal meaning of the verb ‘to abolish’ suggests, penal abolitionism cannot be conceived in absolute terms. Abolitionists do not argue that the police or courts should be abolished. The point is that crime is not to be set apart from other social problems and that the social exclusion of culprits seldom solves any problem. The penal system itself is seen as a social problem, and “penality” is rejected as a metaphor of justice. Abolitionists question both the ethical calibre of a state that intentionally and systematically inflicts pain upon other people, and the credibility of the penal system, partly because generally accepted goals of general and special prevention cannot be supported with empirical data.

Penal abolitionism knows a negative and a positive momentum. It implies a negative critique of the fundamental shortcomings of the penal system to realize social justice, and aims at the prevention and control of criminalized problems by social means. In this negative phase, depenalization (pushing back the punitive character of reactions) and decriminalization (against the labelling of social problems as crimes) are the central topics. Cohen (1988) characterizes abolitionism’s destructuring moves as: decarceration, diversion (away from the institution), decategorization, delegalization (away from the state), and deprofessionalization (away from the expert). In the positive phase, a distinction is to be made between penal abolitionism as a way of thinking (an alternative way of understanding crime and punishment) and as a way of acting (a radical approach of penal reform). In the first sense, abolitionism is an example of a replacement discourse (Henry & Milovanovic 1996). In the second sense, it moves between Pepinsky and Quinney’s (1991) “peacemaking criminology” and Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming. It is more modest than the first, for it is oriented toward mechanisms of social control rather than toward rebuilding community spirit in a broader sense, and is embedded in a more radical, dismissive position on the penal system than the latter.

Initially, penal abolitionists pointed their arrows at the prison system. Around 1980, the attention shifted to (the pros and cons)

of noncustodial alternatives. Warnings against the net-widening effects of such sanctions were contrasted with their potential value in the attrition of the penal system. In this respect, Mathiesen’s (1974) penal action theory has been quite influential, as it argues that alternatives to prison should remain “unfinished” in order not to be absorbed by a penal rationale. He distinguishes between positive reforms, which ultimately strengthen the penal system, and negative reforms, which are of an abolishing kind.

Other penal abolitionists have focused on the penal procedure. In the early 1960s, Bianchi (1994) concluded that anomie is partly caused by criminal law’s false pretension to reflect consensual opinions on norms and values, and by the fact that decisions are forced upon people without paying attention to the question whether these correspond with their own vision of the problem. In order to overcome such a hegemonic definition of the problem, Bianchi proposes an assensus model: a palaver-like session where the directly involved parties in the dispute themselves define the nature of the problem during the procedure, rather than starting from legal categories and “objective” truth-finding. Assensus is a way between the consensus model of criminal law and the dissensus embedded in conflict models. These two perspectives imply a fight over the representation of the facts instead of a focus on the follow up. With these contentions Bianchi rejects both functionalist and conflict sociology. Instead, he adopts a normative position oriented to informal justice and argues, in quite the same line as Christie (1981), for a model of participatory justice. By accusing the penal system of intentional pain delivery, Christie compares it with torture. Today, we find the rejection of torture self-evident. In the future we may look at prisons in quite the same way.

The development of (counter)criteria for penal intervention is another theme abolitionists deal with. As absolute criteria against penalization, Hulsman mentioned in the early 1970s the tendencies to (1) impose moral convictions and to (2) use criminal law as a stick behind the door for social work interventions. He also rejects penal intervention (3) when the frequency of the act implies that it cannot be controlled because the system’s capacity will be exceeded, or (4) when it does not contribute to any form of welfare, dispute settlement, or redress. According to Hulsman, we do not need to wait for radical political reform or structural analyses in order to start with decriminalization: coercion needs legitimation, giving up on coercion does not. This pragmatic, political approach makes Hulsman’s perspective an interesting challenge for those “intellectual sceptics” who advocated radical penal reform but were paralyzed by all the structural configurations it implies, which leads them to the idea that nothing works.

According to Hulsman, the main change lies in a transformation from a top-down vision of reform within the limits of penal rationale to an approach from below, in which the language from the “life-world” is adopted. Hulsman rejects the idea that crime would consist of any ontological element. It is just a label selectively applied to some problems, whereas crimes are not fundamentally different from non-criminalized social problems. Real solutions are blocked as soon as you call a problem a crime. Crime is an inadequate social construction. Next to Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism, Hulsman is also notably inspired by Gusfield’s ideas on the culture of social problems and Galtung’s distinction between blue (liberal-capitalist), red (socialist), and green (post-material environmentalist) developments in society. Hulsman places his penal abolitionism in this latter strand. He focuses on the organic and small-scale, life-world level of society (van Swaaningen 2010).

It is often argued that penal abolitionism would be a postmodern perspective of criminology. In respect to its rejection of the grand narrative of law and its replacement discourse of smaller narratives of dispute settlement in the life-world, abolitionism is indeed postmodern avant la lettre. Some of these postmodern tendencies are, however, confusing and
problematic. Even if we accept that crime is no category that reflects an ontological reality, it remains a historical and sociological reality. As long as social problems are criminalized, “crime” remains a social construction that deserves a specific research attention. Yet the inclusion of smaller narratives rightly adjusts the dominance of critical criminology’s macrosociological focus.

Abolitionist ideas on dispute settlement are based on weaker empirical ground than the critique of the penal system. A lot of trust seems to be put in people’s communicative capacities, through which conflicts can be settled in a rational way. Penal abolitionists stress the importance of a human input in legal procedures, and challenge the dominant focus on technical legality, which excludes nonexperts from the process which should be oriented to the settlement of social problems. In order to do justice to this inclusive, participatory character, people must be able to tell their own story, be listened to, have a say in the way of settlement, be able to question the universality of norms, before any formal element becomes actually relevant. It seems, however, realistic to assume that people will not always come to an agreement and that someone will probably have to overrule an endless palaver. This raises as a minimum the yet unanswered questions of who is going to do this, according to which standards, and how a solution can be advanced without coercion.

In today’s academic debate, penal abolitionism is mainly discussed as one of the many critical criminologies of the twenty-first century. This does not mean, however, that it has become insignificant. Many of its visions have been adopted by and integrated into other criminological perspectives. Now popular perspectives, such as constitutive criminology (Henry & Milovanovic 1996) or restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989) are grounded in abolitionist thought. Penal abolitionism’s major merit is that it offers a fundamentally different vision of crime and justice (cf. Ruggiero 2010). Its epistemology provides a useful basis for creative empirical research into penal and social control.

SEE ALSO: Antislavery movement; Science and social movements; Social control.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Agrarian movements
(United States)
DONNA A. BARNES

No comprehensive treatment of social movements would be complete without attention to the rich tradition of agrarian movements throughout American history. Organized protest by farmers goes back to the 1600s and extends to the present. This entry aims to provide a general overview of the major movements initiated by farmers in the United States, with attention to the commonalities and differences among those movements.

The first notable protest on the part of farmers goes back to the 1670s in the Chesapeake area of Colonial America where tobacco was grown as an export crop. Overproduction led to dramatic declines in the market price of tobacco. The economic plight of tobacco farmers intensified when Britain imposed a tax on colonial tobacco. In 1676, discontent led to Bacon’s Rebellion, an armed insurrection of backcountry farmers.

In the eighteenth century, there were several significant agrarian revolts aimed primarily at tax policies. The Regulators movement emerged in North Carolina as a result of the anger of small farmers over their less productive farmland being taxed at the same rate as the alluvial, coastal lands owned by wealthy planters. They blamed the excessive taxation for the growing number of farm foreclosures. Eventually the conflict led to the Battle of Alamance in 1771 where the militia decisively defeated a force of about 2000 Regulators. There was a similar armed uprising in Massachusetts in 1786 known as Shay’s Rebellion where small farmers protested taxes, court seizures of the property of indebted farmers, and imprisonment as a punishment for nonpayment of taxes and debts. Unsuccessful in achieving relief through political or legal channels, Shayites turned to violence before being defeated by the militia.

The Whiskey Rebellion was directed toward the unpopular Whiskey Act of 1791, which imposed an excise tax on whiskey to service the national debt. Whiskey producers were given two options: a flat fee or a per-gallon fee. Small farmers adopted the injustice frame, protesting that the huge distillers were the only ones who could afford the flat fee, which significantly reduced their tax burden. Furthermore, most small producers were too far from markets or lacked the farm-to-market roads to get their grains to market. They had no choice but to turn their grains into spirits, but often did not have sufficient cash reserves to pay the tax. Another armed tax revolt known as Fries’s Rebellion was organized by small farmers in Pennsylvania to protest new taxes imposed by Congress on real estate in the late 1790s. The militia was used to crush both rebellions.

Organized protest by small farmers became much less common in the first half of the nineteenth century for several reasons: First, the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 provided vast new expanses of land, which served as an escape valve for agrarian discontent. Second, the election of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency ended the rule of the Federalists who had favored merchants and bankers over agriculture. Government policy shifted to selling farmland in small parcels to homesteaders, rather than land speculators, and excise taxes on commodities such as whiskey were repealed. Finally, the extension of voting rights to all white males during this time period bolstered the perceived efficacy of addressing grievances through individual action on election day.

Colonial and pre-Civil War agrarian rebellions shared some common characteristics. First, they shared commonalities in terms of both their diagnostic and prognostic or strategic frames (Snow & Benford 1988).
source of their problems, they focused on hardships created by taxation and debt repayment during times when profits from commercial agricultural production were minimal or in areas where agriculture was largely subsistence-oriented and underdeveloped in terms of a cash economy. In regard to the strategic framing process, they initially sought redress of their grievances through legal and political channels. But when such efforts were unsuccessful, they shifted to violent tactics. Second, they faced a political opportunity structure (McAdam 1982) that made it difficult to address their problems through legitimate political channels. Property qualifications for voting rights meant that most politicians were from affluent backgrounds and were indifferent, if not hostile, to the problems of small farmers. Finally, farmers in small rural communities often shared a common church and social life in local inns and taverns, which facilitated the mobilization of collective action by making a refusal to participate in protest activities awkward. However, the suppression of agrarian rebellions was aided by their localized character, which was largely due to the limited nature of communication networks during this era.

In the post-Civil War years, the closing of the frontier eliminated an escape valve for agrarian discontent, and persistently low agricultural commodity prices led to a resurgence of agrarian movements. One of the first movements to emerge was the Grange. In terms of its diagnostic frame, it argued that the most serious grievances facing farmers were rooted in the insufficient competition in agricultural purchasing and marketing systems and the monopolies that existed within the railroad industry. To address these problems, it proposed farmer-owned cooperatives and government regulation of railroads.

The success of the Grange was undercut by a deepening agricultural depression and by its anemic protest ideology that cautioned farmers not to abuse other classes since all classes were essential to the proper functioning of society. Internal conflict also arose due to its efforts to stymie discussions of politics. It fared poorly once a competing farmers’ organization, the Farmers’ Alliance, emerged and embraced a more insurgent ideology. The Alliance marked the beginnings of a massive protest movement by small farmers that eventually led to the emergence of the People’s Party. The Farmers’ Alliance and People’s Party are collectively referred to as the Populist movement, the largest agrarian movement in American history.

At its peak in 1891, the Alliance had about three million members. Its growth was fueled by an insurgent diagnostic frame that attacked the lack of sufficient competition in agricultural purchasing and marketing systems and, unlike the Grange, blamed local merchants, middlemen, bankers, and an increasingly oligopolistic manufacturing sector for the high cost of goods and high interest rates.

In regard to strategies, the Alliance pushed for trade agreements wherein it promised the business of its membership to the merchant who agreed to the lowest mark-up on wholesale prices. Such agreements improved the well-being of its members only marginally, and the Alliance soon pushed for the creation of farmer-owned cooperative stores, as well as cooperative action in marketing. It established cotton yards to bulk the cotton of its members in hopes of securing a better market price and advocated withholding cotton from the market if better prices were not forthcoming. It also pushed for a boycott of jute bagging for cotton bales when the price of jute soared due to the machinations of the “jute trust.”

While achieving short-term success, the cooperative strategies floundered as the agricultural depression deepened and more farmers became dependent on crop-lien financing. With this financing, farmers were advanced supplies and goods throughout the year in return for a lien on their cotton crop. They were typically charged interest on their credit line for the entire year, even though some of the credit was not used until close to harvest. The annualized interest rate was 20 percent or higher. They were also charged “time prices” on goods and supplies, which were considerably
higher than cash prices. Crop-lien financing established a condition of peonage, with farmers delivering themselves to the control of the lien merchant until their account was paid in full. They could only trade with the lien-holder and lost flexibility in the marketing of their cotton because the lien came due at harvest, which precluded their participation in Alliance cooperative endeavors.

The growing inability of farmers to participate in cooperative activities pushed the Alliance toward a bolder plan. Its subtreasury proposal called upon the federal government to build warehouses and elevators in every county that produced $500,000 or more of farm commodities where farmers could store nonperishable farm products as collateral for a low-interest government loan. If implemented, it would have shattered the crop-lien system of finance. However, the proposal was harshly attacked, and Democratic politicians steadfastly refused to endorse it. Their refusal was the single most important factor pushing the small farmer movement to support a third-party revolt.

The Alliance, however, was a rickety bridge to the People’s Party. Many southern Alliance-men were slow to endorse the third party, choosing instead to extend efforts at pressure politics within the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the People’s Party became a sufficient threat to push elites in many southern states to restrict suffrage on the basis of educational and/or property qualifications. As a result, in many rural areas where the Populist movement had once thrived, the electorate shrunk significantly. This, coupled with successful efforts by Democrats to coopt the movement by endorsing its “free silver” monetary reform demand, ensured the movement’s demise.

The cooperative vision of the Grange and Alliance movements, however, survived and awaited a time where different economic conditions allowed for its successful implementation. Consistent with the tenets of the Resource Mobilization theory, times of greater prosperity provided the resources to properly capitalize farmer-owned cooperatives. The National Farmers Union (NFU) adopted a strategic frame focused on cooperative marketing. By its peak in the south in 1912, it had bought or built more than 1500 cotton warehouses and had bypassed middlemen to secure sales contracts directly with US and British textile manufacturers. While crop-lien dependency limited its growth potential in the South, its growth among wheat and corn farmers in the Great Plains and Midwestern region was phenomenal. In addition to its successful cooperative ventures, it used its large membership as leverage to secure legislation advantageous to its members. It persists as an organization to the present, and has chapters in 31 states.

Declining crop prices once again prevailed in the 1920s. Fearing a return to the agrarian rebellions of earlier times, the federal government pushed for a county-agent extension system allied with land-grant colleges. The county agents were organized into state Farm Bureaus and eventually a nationwide American Farm Bureau that survives to the present. Its primary focus is on political lobbying on behalf of agriculture. During the Great Depression, it was instrumental in developing and implementing the New Deal farm program, which entailed production quotas with disproportionate benefits for large farmers. Given its ties to the government and its determination to stand against agrarian radicalism, it is often depicted as a large farmer, agribusiness organization rather than a grassroots farmer movement.

Despite efforts to forestall agrarian radicalism, during the Great Depression two grassroots agrarian movements emerged, the Farmers’ Holiday Association and the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU). Both faced unfavorable political opportunity structures, with governmental authorities often complicit in the use of violence against movement participants. The former called for withholding crops from the market until farmers could obtain a cost-of-production price. It harassed farmers who did not participate in its withholding actions and patrolled farm-to-market roads to prevent goods from reaching market. It also called
for tax and mortgage relief and intimidated buyers at foreclosure sales. In regard to the STFU, it emerged to address the dire effects on tenant farmers of the New Deal production quotas. In a stunning break with tradition, it created a biracial union to protest the injustices of the New Deal programs, which were disproportionately benefiting large landowners. It pressured the Department of Agriculture and Congress to stop tenant evictions, which violated the terms of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It also utilized direct action tactics such as wage negotiations for cotton pickers, strikes, and picketing. It would remain a presence in the South until cotton production was significantly mechanized in the 1940s.

Greater mechanization of crop production and the so-called Green Revolution increased agriculture productivity in the post-World War II era in a sector long plagued by overproduction. The National Farmers’ Organization (NFO) emerged in the mid-1950s amid collapsing prices on many farm commodities. Its major goal was to ensure that its members recouped the cost of production, plus a reasonable profit. Its primary strategy was withholding, and its withholding from cooperatives drew attention to the fact that they were often run by managers whose business practices were indistinguishable from those of large agribusiness conglomerates. It received considerable media attention for slaughtering hogs in defiance of low prices and for milk dumping during its dairy campaign in the late 1960s. Its involvement in cooperative marketing continues today.

Rollercoaster pricing on farm commodities during the 1970s and 1980s created a serious farm crisis. Many farmers were caught in the downward spiral of crop prices and rising debt loads as a result of having borrowed heavily to expand the size of their farms. They had been advised by farm experts that the survival of the family farm depended on reaping benefits from economies of size. The American Agricultural Movement (AAM) was founded in 1977 to pressure the government to increase commodity price supports. It used tactics such as tractorcades, whereby farmers clogged roadways with their tractors, to focus media attention on the farm crisis. But in the end, price supports were only modestly increased. It continues to lobby for higher farm price supports and a ban on agricultural imports until “100% parity” is achieved. The 1980s also saw the creation of the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC), which politically lobbies for a reduction of corporate control of agriculture in favor of a more sustainable, economically just food and farm system. Presently, it represents 24 grassroot organizations in 32 states.

The major challenge to contemporary farm organizations like the AAM, NFFC, NFO, and NFU lies in the contraction of political opportunity as a result of the fact that less than 2 percent of Americans now earn a livelihood from farming. In an effort to address this challenge, they engage in frame-alignment efforts (Snow et al. 1986) whereby they stress to non-farmer audiences the message that vibrant rural communities are best built upon a solid foundation of strong family farms, and that economically viable rural communities are vital to the health, security, and economic well-being of the nation.

Agrarian movements will continue to play a role in American society. The research focus on increasing production, such as the development and use of bovine growth hormone to increase milk production, will almost certainly create excessive supply relative to demand. Falling prices, which have periodically plagued agriculture since the 1600s, will be a recurrent problem. When protests arise, leaders will have a rich repertoire of strategies from which to choose: cooperatives (both for purchasing and marketing); political advocacy for farmer-friendly legislation, such as higher price supports or a moratorium on farm foreclosures; third-party advocacy; and direct action tactics, such as tractorcades, boycotts, withholding, striking, picketing, and even armed rebellion.
SEE ALSO: Co-operative movement; Framing and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Populism/populist movements; Resource mobilization theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


AIDS activism
OLIVIER FILLIEULE

The AIDS epidemic first appeared as a public issue in the USA during the summer of 1981. It was then that the first stories were published in medical journals and in the gay press reporting the emergence of mysterious new illnesses among gay men, and it is the gay community, perhaps to a unique degree, which mobilized first and took part in all aspects of the management of the epidemic. This included the provision of social aid and healthcare to people with AIDS, gay or not, the conduct of research, lobbying for funds and other government intervention, the creation of educational programs and negotiations with legislators and health insurers (Altman 1994; Kramer 1994; Fillieule & Duyvendak 1999).

AIDS activism falls into the broad category of HSMs (health social movements) (see Brown et al. 2004). It has given way to research in the areas of social movements, medical sociology, and social studies in science. AIDS movements, like other types of HSMs, centrally address a common health-related interest, and seek to bring about social and political change by challenging political and professional authority and cultural norms. They have engaged in many different types of collective action, including legal challenges to discriminatory laws, public health education campaigns, advocacy, protests, strikes, and boycotts. Altogether, AIDS movements in Western countries have produced change in healthcare policy, delivery, and regulation; they have pushed medical science toward innovation and encouraged changes in funding; they have struggled to democratize institutions that shape medicine. In that respect, social studies in science have been crucial to understanding how AIDS movements have contributed to the re-framing of medical science to advance their causes, challenging the science of health and healthcare (Epstein 1996).

One can underline two striking features of AIDS movements compared to other HSMs: First, a great number of them orient their action simultaneously toward greater access to healthcare, highlight health disparities and inequality, and challenge the underlying science of health and healthcare, blurring the usual HSMs’ typology proposed by the literature (Brown & Zavestoski 2005). Second, because they had to fight the double stigmatization of homosexuality and disease in a context of great institutional homophobia, they depend more than other movements on a highly politicized collective identity (Broqua 2005), as well as emotional underpinnings of moral outrage, anger, and indignation to motivate action (Gould 2010).

SOCIAL RESPONSES TO AIDS

The AIDS literature distinguishes a number of major phases in the structuring of the struggle over time, which more or less correspond to the epidemic’s evolution (in terms of its prevalence and scientific advancement but also in terms of public framing of the disease), the pace of state intervention (and its consequences in terms of public funding, political representativeness within public agencies, development of employed work, and professionalization), and the creation of a multi-organizational field (see Epstein 1996 and Gould 2010 on the USA; Fillieule & Duyvendak 1999, Pinell et al. 2002, and Broqua 2005 on France; Rosenbrock et al. 2000 on Europe).

Five distinct phases in the social responses to AIDS so far can be distinguished. The boundaries between these are not clear cut. Each country exhibits around a generally shared trajectory its specific configuration and some features recur throughout, though with different
emphases. Nevertheless, each period has its own distinct characteristics.

The emergence of AIDS as a public issue: 1981–1982

This phase is characterized by two major features. First, an awakening sense of anxiety amongst those most immediately affected (the so called four H’s): homosexual men, heroin users, members of the Haitian community, and haemophiliacs. However, with the causes of the illness unknown, and the fear of the possible effects of AIDS on the achievement of gay liberation increasing, the responses remained contested and confused. Those who advocated sexual abstinence or safer sex were denounced for encouraging discrimination and delivering the community back into the embrace of medical discourse (Weeks 1989). In the USA, for example, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) was thus opposed to health measures which, in their view, restricted their sexual freedom, for instance the banning of saunas (Shilts 1988). Second, this period saw the development of the characteristic style of governmental response that was to dominate the subsequent years: widespread indifference and what could be called “institutional shadenfreude.” Many factors explain this situation: In the United States and the United Kingdom (and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Europe) the AIDS epidemic occurred at the very moment that the state was reducing government expenditure. There was also the overwhelming fact that AIDS was a disease that seemed to be confined to marginal communities at a time when the view that the gay revolution had already gone too far had become more widely prominent (Weeks 1989). Above all, the virulent homophobia of political elites prompted the earliest negligent and punitive institutional responses in the 1980s (Crimp 1990; Patton 1990) and contributed to blinding society to AIDS among women and people of color because it was only seen as a “gay disease.”

Moral panic: 1982–1985

The stigmatization of people with AIDS and its identification as a “gay plague” or “gay cancer” were central to the second phase (Weeks 1989). Now identified as a distinctive set of diseases with definable modes of transmission, AIDS became the bearer of a number of political, social, and moral anxieties, including issues such as sexual promiscuity, permissive lifestyle, and drug use. This period was characterized by three main features: First, the rapid escalation of media and popular hysteria which fed potent streams of homophobia and racism, and facilitated the development of “rituals of decontamination,” with lesbians and gay men being refused service in public venues, children with the virus being banned from schools, and the dead being left unburied (Weeks 1989). Second, in 1983–1984 the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) was at last identified and in 1985 a test for HIV was developed. This opened new opportunities for responding to the disease, offering a way to build “diagnostic,” “prognostic,” and “motivational” framings (Snow & Benford 1988). Indeed, these events made tens of thousands of people aware for the first time of the deadly threat surrounding them. Previously, the only people really interested in the discovery of an effective treatment were those positively diagnosed as having AIDS, many of whom could not actively engage in the campaign due to the state of their health. Those diagnosed HIV positive, but not yet showing symptoms of full-blown AIDS, were obviously more strongly motivated to campaign. In the end, the discovery of HIV lead to anti-viral research, and then to a new and attainable demand that medical treatments be made available as soon as possible. As a consequence, this period saw the emergence of a massive self-help response from the lesbian and gay communities. Organizations such as the Gay Men’s Health Crisis in New York, the Terrence Higgins Trust in London, or Aides in France became, in the absence of coherent national strategies, the main vehicles of health education, social
support, and political lobbying for the cause (Altman 1987: esp. ch. 5; Pinell et al. 2002; Chambré 2006).


This phase is reflected in increasing involvement of public authorities in the struggle against an epidemic the public image of which started to change as a result of the first data emanating from AIDS tests. Because of the fear that AIDS might infiltrate the so-called general population, governments begin to respond on a larger scale by setting up public campaigns aimed at preventing the spread of the virus, as well as significantly increasing the funding of self-help groups. As a consequence, voluntary groups underwent a dual process of differentiation and of institutionalization with the multiplication of associations orientated toward specific groups of people (hemophiliacs, blood-transfusion patients, drug-addicts, and children), in addition to a significant “professionalization,” as paid staff increased and demands upon their services increased. In this context, a new alliance between the medical profession and the communities at risk began to be forged. The desire to integrate into the decision-making structures of the state and the diversification of the groups of people under its charge had several effects: First, the increasing enrollment of heterosexual women, participating in a spirit of solidarity, motivated by their professional involvement in the (traditionally female) field of health and social services (Patton 1990). As a result, homosexual volunteers started to feel a sense of dispossession, as much from the growing de-homosexualization within the associations as from the fact that AIDS sufferers had been deprived of a direct voice in deference to professionals speaking on their behalf (one starts to speak of an “AIDS establishment” and of the “AIDS business”). Second, the methods of managing the AIDS problem through associations went hand in hand with a political neutrality which prevented the adoption of any critical stance vis-à-vis the numerous and obvious deficiencies of governmental politics, especially in terms of prevention (Fillieule & Duyvendak 1999; Gould 2010).


In the fourth phase, which ran up to the middle of the 1990s, AIDS turned into a chronic affair, which led to the first erosion of its special status. This phase is also marked by the establishment of new associations, with the objective of giving the sick back their voice, of clearly establishing a link between homosexuality and AIDS, and of refusing to cooperate with the political authorities who were clearly not doing everything they could to fight the epidemic. This regeneration of the associational set-up is mostly due to the creation of ACT UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power), an agit-prop style radical group formed in New York City in March 1987 that used theatrical, direct-action tactics. ACT UP chapters soon sprouted up across America, quickly forming a national direct-action AIDS movement, totaling more than 80 chapters in the country and around 30 internationally at its peak (Stockdill 2003; Broqua 2005; Gould 2010). ACT UP chapters used direct action tactics (marches, die-ins, sit-ins, phone and fax zaps) to target antiviral drug prices, poor government funding for research and prevention, the slow development of AIDS medical research, and inaccessible clinical trials (Epstein 1996; Stockdill 2003; Broqua 2005; Gould 2010). The coalition also challenged cultural norms that condemned homosexuality. This cultural defiance included throwing condoms at public officials, same-sex kissing in public places, and unfurling banners promoting safer sex at public events. ACT UP’s mission to emphasize the value of queer lives and vocally defy the status quo was encapsulated in the powerful slogan “silence=death” which appeared on T-shirts, banners, and posters, along with the symbol of the pink triangle that gay men were forced to wear in Nazi
concentration camps during the second World War.


A fifth phase began, more or less, with the discovery and marketing of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapies (HAART) in 1996–1997, with numerous political and social consequences. First and foremost, new antiretroviral therapies extended potential lifetime dramatically, offering new perspectives to People Living With AIDS (PLWA), based both on hope for a better and longer life, and the return of material constraints (mainly in terms of work and bread and butter issues). HAART considerably modified the public image of the epidemic. This gradually shifted from that of a fatal illness to that of a chronic disease, resulting in a certain social and political demobilization. In terms of activism, the period is characterized by a tendency of long-term activists to burn out, often exhausted by the intense demands of their total investment in the cause (Maslanka 1996; Fillieule & Broqua 2005), which they then replaced with more sporadic involvement of diminished intensity. This “burnout” phenomenon, combined with growing despair due to the absence of significant progress in finding a cure and/or a vaccine largely explains why after 1995/1996 there are no longer national, mass-based grassroots movements in developed countries. For example ACT UP was largely defunct after 1995 in the United States (Gould 2010), and if it still exists in France, it has experienced a dramatic decrease in terms of volunteer flux, as well as mediacial and political influence (Broqua 2005). In turn, many grassroots AIDS service organizations became increasingly institutionalized during this period. The end of the 1990s witnessed further bureaucratization and a parallel shift away from protest within many AIDS agencies.

Another important trait of the fifth phase is the growing awareness of the AIDS epidemic as affecting certain people more than others. In the USA, AIDS strikes minorities more than whites (Stockdill 2003), and around the globe those who are poor or disenfranchised. Indeed, it is one of the most catastrophic phenomena that has impacted, and continues to impact, people’s lives in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. Large numbers of NGOs are now working in prevention, support, and care projects funded by international donors and in collaboration with Western grassroots movements. Each organization implements a combination of intervention strategies, depending on their funding base, ranging from condom distribution to posters and providing care for PLWAs. These organizations work typically in the context of poverty and are concerned with poor people’s well-being. They try to deliver better services by building partnerships with other actors. However, partnerships often mean that NGOs construct themselves in regular and predictable ways to benefit from the international resources relations. In the near future, one can expect the emergence and development of advocacy-oriented groups, more activist-oriented groups engaged in direct action, and pursuing democratic participation in scientific or policy decisions of the most deprived populations of the south.

LESSONS FROM AIDS MOVEMENTS

It is quite astonishing that social movement researchers have remained largely uninterested in AIDS movements considering their political importance and socioeconomic impact all around the world. Another striking fact is that most of the research has been conducted by gay and lesbian researchers, pointing to the existence of a latent homophobia in the academy and the fear of being stigmatized as homosexual and/or living with AIDS. However, research on AIDS movements has greatly helped to pose new theoretical questions and to constructively criticize the dominant paradigm in the field. Above all, by widening their definition of social movements’ strategies and tactics, scholars in the field have blurred distinctions between insiders and outsiders and, as a consequence,
challenged the utility of the “political opportunity” model.

The diversity of AIDS movements can be summarized by a strategy and agenda continuum. At one end of the continuum are advocacy-oriented social movement organizations, working within the existing system and biomedical model, using smooth tactics (e.g., education), and tending not to push for lay knowledge to be inserted into expert knowledge systems. At the other end of the continuum, activist-oriented groups engage in direct action, challenge medical practices, and pursue democratic participation in scientific or policy knowledge production by working largely outside the system. Because of this diversity, AIDS movements involve a degree of collaboration that blurs the distinction between experts and lay people, movement insiders and outsiders, and between challengers and the state. They merge as state officials, scientists, and others who may not typically be thought of as “within the movement” but can work together (Brown et al. 2004: 64). In the same vein, one cannot easily explain the birth or the decline of AIDS movements by mobilizing the political opportunity model. AIDS movements are strongly rooted in the illness experience and the exigency of health demands: “Those with ill health and/or limited access to needed medical services do not have the luxury of waiting for ripe political opportunities before mobilizing, and they often organize despite political constraints. Furthermore, by emphasizing change in science and medicine, [these movements] focus contention against arenas other than State and political bodies” (Brown et al. 2004: 59).

Finally, the strongest contribution of AIDS research to social movement theory certainly lies in the emphasis put on the personal, lived experience of social movement activists. As a matter of fact, as Morgen stated (2002: 230), one cannot “understand the agency of political actors without recognizing that politics is lived, believed, felt, and acted on all at once. Incorporating the experience of social movement involvement into analysis and theories about social movements may be difficult, but it adds a great deal to what we can learn about politics, social transformation, and political subjectivities” (see also Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001 for similar remarks). This emphasis on the transformation of personal experiences into collective action and how identities can be shaped by these experiences has been central in AIDS movement research, introducing the subjective experience of the disease and the biological body as the source of movement identity (Stockdill 2003; Broqua 2005; Fillieule 2010; Gould 2010) and by vividly illustrating the importance of “intersectionality” (i.e., interlocking systems of oppression generated by class, race, gender, and age differences). Hence internal movement divisions are often influenced by activists’ own experiences with inequality as well as their prior political experience (Stoller 1998; Stockdill 2003).

SEE ALSO: ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power); Activism; Emotion and social movements; Framing and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Health movements (United States); Political opportunity/political opportunity structure.

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Ainu indigenous rights movement (Japan)
Kiyotaru Tsutsui

Social movements by the Ainu, an indigenous people in Japan, started in earnest in the 1970s, influenced strongly by the expanding global indigenous rights movement, and have achieved some significant successes since then. The Ainu today are descendants of populations that have inhabited northern parts of Japan for thousands of years but have been pushed northward by mainland Japanese governments throughout history. As the Meiji Restoration (1868) established a modern state in Japan, the Meiji government incorporated northern islands in Japan as the Hokkaido prefecture in 1869, making official the Ainu’s subjugation to mainland Japanese. The government encouraged mainland Japanese to move to Hokkaido and implemented policies to assimilate Ainu populations into the Japanese mainstream. This policy, symbolized by the 1899 Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, destroyed the traditional Ainu ways of life and their communities and threw them into severe poverty. Although the Japanese government took remedial measures to improve their living conditions, these measures were not a result of Ainu activism. Some Ainu associations emerged during the democracy movement in Japan (mid-1920s to early 1930s), but the Ainu’s ethnic/indigenous identity was confined primarily to cultural spheres, such as in novels and poetry. Heavily reliant on government welfare, their political voice was largely muted, especially as Japan entered World War II.

Even after the end of the war, the Ainu’s dependence on the government did not fade immediately, as many Ainu leaders of the time still had the mentality that assimilation was the best way to improve their lives. Ainu leaders formed the first truly Hokkaido-wide Ainu organization, the Hokkaido Ainu Association in 1946, but the organization was not so much a political organization as a mutual assistance association to funnel government welfare. The Hokkaido Ainu Association’s activities fizzled out fairly soon, and in 1961 it even changed its name to the Hokkaido Utari Association, fearing that the term “Ainu” (a neutral term that means “human” in Ainu language) had such derogatory connotations that it reflected negatively on the members. This symbolized the lack of indigenous/ethnic pride, much less political activism, among the Ainu in this period.

In the 1970s, as waves of leftist activism in Japan slowly reached Ainu communities and as Ainu leaders traveled to indigenous communities abroad and learned about the indigenous rights that they could claim, Ainu indigenous rights activism emerged for the first time. Several Ainu movement organizations were founded that were more politically active and focused more on indigenous rights than previous Ainu associations. The most influential movement organization, however, was the Hokkaido Utari Association, which was by far the largest Ainu organization. In 1984, reversing its long-term support for the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act on the ground that it provided minimum welfare protection for the Ainu, the Hokkaido Utari Association proposed a Draft New Ainu Law, which claimed many indigenous rights, such as protection of indigenous culture and attainment of economic and political autonomy. From this point on, the goals of Ainu social movements shifted from assimilation and acceptance into the Japanese mainstream and the attainment of greater welfare provisions toward acknowledgment as an indigenous people and the pursuit of indigenous rights. As indigenous rights movements were expanding globally, Ainu activists used international forums and networks to pressure the Japanese government. While they lobbied
politicians and staged protests domestically, they leveraged international forums effectively to pressure the Japanese government. Most prominent such examples include an appeal to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1986 and a speech by the Director of the Hokkaido Utari Association in the UN General Assembly in 1992, as well as many statements made by Ainu leaders at the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. These activities bore fruit as the Japanese government first recognized the Ainu as a “distinct” group in 1987, then as an “ethnic minority” in 1991. Then, after years of deliberation on the Draft New Ainu Law, the government legislated the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act in 1997, taking only the cultural component of what the Hokkaido Utari Association had proposed. The government still refused to acknowledge the Ainu as an indigenous people, for fear that such a recognition would entail significant material compensations. The government agreed, however, that when a declaration on indigenous rights passed in the UN, it would change its position on the Ainu’s indigenousness. When the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted in the UN General Assembly (and which Japan voted for) in 2007, the government moved quickly to pass a resolution in the Diet (national parliament), recognizing the Ainu as an indigenous people in 2008. The government has established committees to examine appropriate policies for the Ainu since the Diet resolution. In the meantime, the Hokkaido Utari Association changed its name to the Hokkaido Ainu Association in 2009, reclaiming its old name and affirming its indigenous pride.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal peoples’ movements (Australia); Globalization and movements; Identity politics; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Rights and rights movements.

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Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972)

MARIA K. DILLARD

Saul David Alinsky (January 30, 1909–June 12, 1972) was one of the most influential social reformers in post-World War II US history. The legacy of his work and his writings are considered to be foundational to modern community organizing in the United States. Alinsky’s ideas about organizing for change have come to be known as his own method. Alinsky is the author of *Reveille for Radicals* (1946), in which he details a political philosophy and methodology for radicalism, and *Rules for Radicals* (1971), in which he sets forth principles of community organizing through a call for revolution. Alinsky’s contributions, particularly his work with the poor, have earned him international recognition and notoriety.

Alinsky grew up on the South Side of Chicago, where he received his education at the University of Chicago. He did graduate work in criminology and then went to work as a criminologist for an Illinois state prison (Alinsky 1971). During the 1930s, Alinsky started the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in Chicago. This coalition brought together the Catholic Church and the Meatpackers Union and was able to achieve major landmark concessions from the meatpacking industry. His organizing work was focused on improving the lives of the poor and working-class communities of Chicago, California, Michigan, New York City, and elsewhere in the United States (Horwitt 1989). In 1940, he started the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), which remains active today within the United States and internationally (IAF 2010). Alinsky and his foundation started a training institute for organizers and shifted their focus to organizing the American middle class during the 1970s (Alinsky 1971).

ALINSKY’S IMPACT

Alinsky’s ideas are believed to have altered American democracy (Time 1970). His teachings have influenced professional community and labor organizers and leaders, disciples like Fred Ross and Edward T. Chambers, movement leaders like César Chávez and Dolores Huerta, and prominent national leaders like Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, among many others. His impact has been compared regularly to that of Thomas Paine. Paine, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, is known for his radical vision for society. As an author, intellectual, and revolutionary, he was among the first to advocate against slavery, war, and poverty, and for social programs for the working class and elderly (Bernstein 2009). The writings of both Paine and Alinsky have inspired change and created controversy. In part, this judgment of his impact is a result of the influence of Alinsky’s work on the civil rights movement, the farm-workers’ movement, and the political protests of the Vietnam era, as well as many modern movements that evolved from the grassroots political organizing of the 1960s. During nearly four decades of organizing for social change, Alinsky was a polarizing figure because his methods were extremely confrontational and were aimed at empowering the poor and people of color to act against the enemy and change the conditions of their lives. His ideas continue to create controversy today (Vogel 2010), serving as further testament to his lasting legacy.

THE ALINSKY METHOD

In *Rules for Radicals* (1971), Alinsky laid out basic principles to guide radical organizers and the “People’s Organizations” they established. The principles of his organizing method begin with an emphasis on the education of...
organizers and communication, an organizer’s most essential quality. Alinsky (1971) identified the organizer’s function clearly: “to agitate to the point of conflict” (117). The organizer is also charged with cultivating a unified opposition to a clearly identified enemy, which includes the organizer being clearly in solidarity with the people being organized. Organizers were encouraged to focus on a limited number of strategic targets, in part to ensure success. An organization that experiences more small victories was better able to gain the confidence of community leaders. The members of the “People’s Organizations” should be convinced of a great and unbridgeable distance between the enemy and themselves. In this way, compromise was not an acceptable goal. For Alinsky, the ultimate goal of the process is simply to “crush the opposition” (1946: 150).

Alinsky also proposed 13 specific rules for direct action tactics that serve as guidance for the interaction of People’s Organizations with their opposition. These rules include never going outside of the experience of the people who are being organized, while going outside of the enemy’s experience as often as possible. Alinsky (1971) believed that an organization’s tactical choices should be informed by the people using them, the amount of time required for deploying the tactic, the strength of diverse tactics and actions, and the degree to which a tactic contributes to the strategic pressure placed on the opposition.

THE ALINSKY IAF LEGACY

In the later years of Alinsky’s life, the IAF became stagnant. However, following Alinsky’s death, the IAF underwent a significant transformation that included a revision of the IAF method of organizing and the pioneering of the congregation-based organizational form. The new leaders of the organization, Edwards Chambers, Richard Harmon, and Ernie Cortes, analyzed the successes and failures of the IAF and through this process discovered patterns of movements and community organizations (Rogers 1990). They used this information to rebuild a stronger, more solid organizational force, relying on relationship building and an emphasis on values as key strategies.

Faith-based values conferred critical resources on congregation-based organizations (CBOs) operating within the IAF. CBOs benefited from dense community networks, an improved ability to reach consensus on issues, and additional legitimacy based on ties to religious organizations (McCarthy & Walker 2004; Swarts 2008). These benefits are part of the story provided by Mark Warren (2001) in a rich account of the successful replication of the congregation-based organizational form within the IAF’s Texas network.

Despite the importance of CBOs, the IAF remains essentially a political organization, focused on issues related to community life and not on controversial social issues. Its targeted political base is within all types of voluntary institutions (e.g., religious congregations, homeowner groups, recovery groups, parents’ associations, immigrant societies, schools, seminaries). This base is used to compete, confront, or cooperate with leaders in the public and private sectors. As efforts to recreate the IAF’s approach to organizing emerged, the use of Alinsky’s radical direct action tactics remained a part of the IAF’s repertoire. Today, this legacy continues through the IAF’s active presence in multiple states and countries and through the work of approximately 150 professional IAF organizers (IAF 2010).

Alinsky’s method of organizing represented a departure from previous conceptions of community organizing in which professional agencies were externally imposed on the community only to play a superficial role in the community’s life (Alinsky 1941). According to Alinsky, the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council was an experimental demonstration of his method that represented “the mobilized sentiment of the community as articulated through their indigenous organizations” (1941: 802). When a community is organized and moved to act, Alinsky believed it became a movement (1941).
SEE ALSO: Chávez, César Estrada (1937–1992); Community organizing (United States); Direct action; Organizations, community-based; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
American Revolution

PATRICK GRIFFIN

The “American Revolution” has confounded historians since the late eighteenth century. It still does. The term, usually unbounded by quotation marks, is freighted with a great deal of baggage. It always has been. In their famous debates on the eve of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas portrayed the revolution as the touchstone of American identity, the event that made Americans exceptional. The freed slave turned abolitionist Frederick Douglass also saw the revolution as an event that made Americans exceptional, but in his eyes, exceptionally hypocritical. For Americans today, it still conjures up all sorts of images ranging from muskets and Betsy Ross, to the states’ rights and the pursuit of happiness. More critically, it still serves as focus for the basis of civil life. It still frames debate of who Americans are and what they would like to become. The modern Tea Party movement is a vivid example. So too those who argue that the Tea Party gets the revolution wrong. They have, critics suggest, picked the right event to understand what makes Americans American, but they have interpreted it incorrectly.

Historians see things in a similar light. They have debated whether it was a failure or not, and whether it focused on the struggle for home rule or who was to rule at home. Some have argued that it was a measured revolution, one less radical and violent than the French Revolution. Others believe, because it did not liberate slaves, Indians, or women, that it was not a revolution like, say, France’s. Progressive in language and intent, it failed to live up to its promise. Americans may have gained political independence but not personal independence. These are still the terms of debate, as they have been ever since the revolution itself. In effect, scholarly debate about the meaning of the American Revolution reflects broader cultural debates within American society. What all of these voices – popular and scholarly, past and present – have lost sight of is what made “the American Revolution” a revolution.

If it is viewed as a process, the American Revolution appears like a revolution, in that it had a beginning, a middle, and an end. It also remade the face of society even if it did not transform society as some hoped. That transformation, it should be added, ran more deeply than the transition from British to American rule. The process of revolution revolved around the idea of sovereignty: where ultimate power was to be located, how it would be legitimated and exercised, and upon what ideas it would be based. The origins, outcomes, and progression of the process centered on sovereignty. Moreover, the idea of an “American Revolution” emerged from the ways the process played out in America, or how the process cohered to distinctive American characteristics. The revolutionary process canonized contradictions that had animated this society from the colonial period. In many ways, viewing America’s revolution as an American process offers a way to integrate different scholarly views of the American Revolution and to pull together some of the monographic work done on the American Revolution over the past generation.

ORIGINS

America’s revolution began in many ways as a struggle over how Britain’s North American colonies would be integrated into the British state after the Seven Years’ War. In fact, the events leading up to revolution resembled a British civil war. In many ways the American colonies were some of the most British places in the world. Over the course of the eighteenth century, what had been English colonies strewn up and down the Atlantic coast
were becoming British provinces. Through the movement of peoples, goods, and ideas, the colonies were coming to resemble Scotland and Ireland, that is marchlands with distinctive histories and peoples also tied together through and to the English center. In the seventeenth century, English men and women had migrated to America. In the eighteenth, Scots and Irish immigrants streamed into port towns. Planters and merchants built English-style Georgian houses. Men and women from all stations increasingly imported consumer goods from England, Scotland, and Ireland. Moreover, the first experience colonists had as “Americans” involved the movement of English preachers such as George Whitefield traveling from colony to colony. The event or phenomenon we know as the “Great Awakening” was an Atlantic-wide phenomenon that drew all ranks of Americans from all of the colonies to the British center. Americans, especially Benjamin Franklin, also consumed British ideas. A number of prominent men became members of Britain’s Royal Society. All in all, Americans were growing closer to Britain by the 1750s. Their culture, like that of Britain’s other provinces, drew its cultural inspiration from the center.

This is not to say that the colonies were carbon copies of Britain. Like each of Britain’s provinces, the colonies were more like variations on a common rule. Slavery was the defining institution of economic, social, and political life in the southern mainland colonies, in much the same way it was for the Caribbean colonies. Indians lived on the edges of white settlement to the West. Throughout British North America, land was more readily available, and because of this, common men had greater access to political participation. Nonetheless, these were British provinces in much the same way Scotland and Ireland were; that is, societies with distinctive tensions and social configurations sharing officially sanctioned cultures centering on Protestantism, maritime commerce, and political freedoms.

With the Seven Years’ War, this dynamic became more pronounced. Beginning in 1754, the British fought the French on every known continent of the world. America, particularly its frontier regions, became the central theater of operations for what would be known in America as the French–Indian War and to the British and the French as the Seven Years’ War. British officials dispatched armies and material to American port towns. Local American militia units fought side-by-side with redcoats. The effect of wartime experiences was to yoke the colonies more closely to Britain. By the end of the war, Americans, like their fellow subjects in England, celebrated the victory over France. Americans such as Franklin and the Boston minister Jonathan Mayhew prophesied that the empire would grow in strength, power, and unity.

The war, however, also created unforeseen problems. Land and debt proved the two most pressing issues. The British national debt had ballooned by the end of the war. Meanwhile, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, which brought the war to a formal conclusion, Britain now controlled land from Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi. They divided this empire into two parts by drawing a “Proclamation Line” down the Appalachians. West of the line, they would rule indigenous peoples as part of a territorial empire. East of the line, they would look to incorporate colonists politically into the British state. The Proclamation Line, then, dealt with the issue of space. Legislation would address the question of revenue. The passage of revenue provisions such as the Sugar Act and Stamp Act were meant to address the issue of debt while treating Americans exactly like other provincials.

Colonists, of course, exploded. The Stamp Act, in particular, drew their ire. The act was designed to tax stamped paper that would be used for official documents in the colonies and for everyday goods, such as newspapers. With even the rumor of its passage, colonists rioted, remonstrated, and wrote pamphlets championing their rights as Britons to consent and contesting parliament’s authority over them. On the one hand, resistance to what parliament
was trying to do emerged from principle: taxing colonists without their consent was un-British, flying in the face of the ideological bases of Britishness itself. On the other hand, rioting in cities revealed how local tensions, many socio-economic and tied to a postwar recession, were finding a release through taking to the streets. Up and comers, like Samuel Adams, who encouraged active popular resistance, hated the well-connected officials who governed the colonies. The lower sort despised the well-heeled. Similar sorts of tensions animated every British province. It should be noted, however, that the passage of similar measure in Ireland and Scotland also occasioned violence. America, however, lay 3000 miles away. Coercing the colonies would be difficult. Because of distance, moreover, British patronage had its limits. And Americans did not fear an “other” like Scottish lowlanders fretted over highlanders and Irish Protestants feared Catholics. The equivalent in America – Catholic France – had been banished by the Treaty of Paris. Making America British politically, in other words, would be a difficult proposition.

In 1766, parliament relented, repealing the Stamp Act but passing in its place a Declaratory Act. The passage in 1766 of this Declaratory Act, which made the point that the British parliament was supreme in America, declared that the ideal of sovereignty that tied England to Scotland and Ireland would be extended to the American colonies. This act, like its Irish counterpart passed in 1719 made the case that parliament could legislate for American affairs “in all cases whatsoever.”

Parliament continued to pass laws, which the colonists continued to resist. The Townshend Duties resulted in more riots and pamphlets. These measures, named after the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, placed taxes on the goods of empire, those things not produced but consumed in the colonies, such as glass, paint, and tea. In these years, Americans also created local committees of correspondence to coordinate inter-colonial resistance. They also made the first halting steps toward non-importation and boycott. Tensions, in other words were not relieved. Nor were they tamped down by coercion, though the British made such gestures in 1768. In the wake of further unrest, troops were dispatched to Boston to try to defend parliament’s prerogative. The “Boston massacre” was the result. For a few years after British troops killed a few American subjects – whom John Adams referred to as “a motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes, and mulattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish jack tars” – quiet returned to much of America. That state of affairs ended in 1773 with the passage of a Tea Act designed to resurrect the fortunes of the failing East India Company. The company would be able to sell tea directly to consumers, at a cheaper price. Americans, decrying monopoly, took to the streets again. A small number dumped some of the tea into Boston Harbor. What would be later called the “Boston Tea Party” proved the last straw for parliament. Now pressing for more effective measures, most of its members voted to pass a series of Coercive Acts to bring Americans to heel. The port of Boston would be closed until the tea was paid for; the military would govern the colony of Massachusetts; and democratic privileges were revoked.

The act spelled the end of British rule in America. In 1774, Americans met as part of a Continental Congress to discuss common strategy. Although some moderates still insisted on sending olive branch petitions to the king, more believed that British sovereignty was compromised. Congress also passed “the Association,” a plan to ensure that Americans did not consume British goods or export American goods to the British Isles. Meanwhile, each of the colonies sent goods to relieve the beleaguered Bostonians. What had been ad hoc associations were playing quasi-sovereign roles.

Similar dynamics gripped the West. As soon as the British passed the Royal Proclamation of 1763, poorer settlers took advantage of the measure to squat on lands beyond the reach of civil law. Speculators hatched new plans for the West as well, figuring it was just a matter of time before a more pliant ministry allowed settlement or the creation of new western colonies.
Indians struck back. Violence seethed in the western areas. Soon officials in America suggested bending the line to relieve pressure. In 1768, Crown officials, who were also principals in speculative schemes, signed a treaty with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix, ceding the Kentucky country to future settlement. The Indians who regarded the region as theirs, especially the Shawnees and Cherokees, began launching new raids on settlements. Although the ministry in Britain tried to disavow the treaty, the West teetered in an unmanageable direction. As the violence escalated, and as the British proved unable to contain it, the ministry decided to abandon the West. In 1772 and 1773, as more troops were needed in the East, a number of key western forts were abandoned. The West devolved then into a state of nature. The British parliament tried to reassert some control of the vast space they inherited after the Seven Years’ War, passing in 1774 the Quebec Act, which allowed Catholics in the province to practice their religion freely. More critically, the act also tried to establish a civil government for the western regions north of the Ohio River. American colonists considered the act odious—after all, it too flew in the face of the ideology of Britishness. But by this time, the West was lost. Like the East, the British program of sustaining sovereignty in America had failed.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY

When British authority had effectively collapsed, Americans vied with one another to restore sovereignty. They also vied with the British. The period between 1774 and the mid to late 1780s was defined by this dynamic. As different groups competed, some people began finding their voices for the first time. Women played disproportionately important roles in non-consumption and in policing compliance with resistance to British rule. They did not do so as progressive revolutionaries but as guardians of a moral order as deference was collapsing. Slaves ran away in unprecedented numbers, many to join the British cause. A number of commanders offered the slaves of “rebels” the opportunity to support the British cause—some as soldiers, most in supporting roles—if they ran away to British lines. Thousands of slaves, then, saw the tumult of revolution as a way to declare their own independence. Indians, particularly young men, also saw the chaos of the period as an opportunity to assert their claims to land. This was the case with Cherokees and Shawnees. Delawares at first vacillated, but with time most cast their lot with the British. And, of course, poorer white men were playing important political roles as members of local committees. In other words, in the years of war, Americans were becoming politicized, and as this happened the older deferential attitudes that tied society together were coming undone.

The War of Independence was part of this process. Indeed, the American and British causes were the two most viable programs for reconstituting sovereignty in this fallen American world. In 1776, after violence had broken out throughout the colonies, members of the Second Continental Congress declared independence. In so doing, they suggested that the British had turned their backs on the ideals of Britishness itself, and the king, far from being a protector, was acting as an aggressor. Parliament had overstepped its bounds. The social compact, in other words, had been annulled. In its place, Congress—now a sovereign entity—was reconstructing the social compact. Congress also created an army with George Washington as its commander. He was one of the few Americans with substantive military expertise and, as a Virginian, Washington could testify to the fact that independence was not only a New England affair. Americans of all stripes, particularly young men who were worrying about their future in a world pinched by economic woes, allied to the cause. This trend was pronounced throughout the colonies, from Virginia to Philadelphia, and Maine to the countryside around Boston. Indeed, the first months of the war were defined by what
was called the *rage militaire*, a moment of mania for all things military.

All Americans did not agree. About 20 percent of all Americans remained loyal to the Crown. Highland Scots tended to remain loyal, as did Anglicans from the North and those who had served as British functionaries and officials. The numbers fluctuated with the fortunes of war and differed from region to region. In parts of the backcountry of the Carolinas, for instance, the decision to remain loyal or not depended on how one’s neighbors went. Because the region was fraught with tension before the war, the stakes for choosing were high, and would explain the appalling levels of violence in the region during the war years. But ultimately, the decisions of individuals to support the American cause or to remain loyal were tied into the contest for sovereignty. Most loyalists saw the rebellion as unnatural. They saw the rebels as those who were shredding the social fabric with no regard for order. They also thought that many of their neighbors were choosing the losing side. Loyalists encouraged the British ministry to believe that American hearts and minds could be won back to the Crown. If regions could be militarily secured or isolated, America could be brought into the fold.

The British more or less followed this strategy. After early losses around Boston, they set their sights on New York and securing the Hudson River corridor. Holding this would isolate New England from the other rebellious colonies. Early commanders also hoped to land a *coup de grace* against the symbol of American pretensions to sovereignty, the Continental Army. The British failed on both counts.

In fact, the weaknesses of the American army ensured the British could not land a deathblow. Washington struggled to instill basic discipline in the first years of warfare. Unseasoned and undisciplined troops could not withstand the British, and at their first real pitched battle on Long Island, they were surrounded by the British and ran. But they lived to fight another day. Throughout 1776, Washington ran to stay one step ahead of the British, retreating up the island of Manhattan, through Westchester, and the finally across New Jersey. By the end of the year, his exhausted troops crossed the Delaware, burning their boats as they did so. A British force settled in for Christmas across the river in Trenton. Desperate for some victory, and worried as the enlistments of many of his troops were due to expire, Washington crossed the Delaware on Christmas Eve and surprised the British and their Hessian allies in the barracks at Trenton. Washington followed up this victory by defeating the British in a small skirmish at Princeton. Hardly the stuff of myth, but it did hold Washington’s army together.

The British also blundered their way to defeat. Most famously, a British army was surrendered to the American northern army, largely composed of local militia in 1777. In that year, General John Burgoyne tried to march down the Hudson River corridor from Quebec. As he tried to get to the Hudson River, his men ran low on supplies. His Indian allies began to desert him. The Americans, coming from a region rife with social tensions in which they viewed the British cause as the cause of powerful local landlords, attacked, defeating Burgoyne’s army. With his defeat, the French recognized the American republic and signed on to an alliance. What had been a colonial rebellion now became a war with a hated ancient enemy.

As the war years continued, many American communities erupted along their fault lines. In other regions, the war eased tension or gave them direction, muting violence. In regions of the South, for instance, white communities mobilized to raise slave patrols to ensure that violence and discord did not get out of control. Anxious that their labor force would flee, southern planters had a stake in order. In regions close by, such as the backcountry, violence escalated to almost Hobbesian dimensions. When British forces landed in the South after Burgoyne’s debacle, both dynamics were amplified. In others still, the war liberated people. With war, women took on roles as deputy husbands, acting in place of husbands and
fathers. They also gained greater visibility as society was thrown back on a subsistence basis. During periods of shortage, they ensured that merchants did not hoard or price gouge. The lower sort had also found voices. The poorest men, including immigrants, were serving in the Continental Army. For instance, more than a quarter of the army was Irish. One tenth was African-American. Frontier folk had to fend for themselves, especially as the war became more violent with the French alliance. After the early strategies had failed, policymakers in Britain began to turn to frontier warfare to sap American strength out East. They turned to some of the nations of the Iroquois and to disaffected Indians living along the western borders of the rebellious colonies. Washington responded by dispatching an army to destroy Iroquoia, creating a humanitarian crisis for Britain’s western forts. Most frontier settlers, however, had to fend for themselves. As the British began launching mixed Indian-ranger raids on isolated settlements, settlers began raising their own units, usually to savage nearby Indian communities. In one grisly episode, a force from Washington County, Pennsylvania, killed 96 peaceful Delawares. These people – like other groups – were, in effect, becoming self-sovereign in the crisis of sovereignty.

The British realized that they could not make good on their claims to the colonies in 1781. In that year, they lost another army, this time at Yorktown, to a combined American–French force. With the surrender, a British band played a seventeenth-century tune called “The World Turned Upside Down.” Referring to the English Civil War, during which normal relationships were inverted, the tune spoke to what had happened to America in the eighteenth century. Not only had an upstart army defeated a battle-tested European force, but, in addition, people who had been subjects in a world defined by deference had become, in the tumult of revolution, self-sovereign citizens. The Battle of Yorktown eventually led to a ceasefire. Finally, in 1783, a treaty was signed in Paris bringing the war to a formal end.

OUTCOMES

The war had ended, but not the revolution. Certainly, order did not prevail. The American United States were–not was–sovereign in a legal sense. Sovereignty, however, had little substantive meaning. The new multi-state state could not protect its borders; it could not enforce its laws; it could not secure domestic authority. It also struggled with a postwar recession and the stagnation of international trade. Debt proved perhaps the most confounding issue faced by all. Individuals had little money, states owed millions, and the federal government under the aegis of Congress owed tens of millions to its citizens and to other nations. In the West, violence continued almost unabated. Raids by disaffected Indians were sponsored in some cases by the British, who refused to leave some frontier outposts on American soil because of prewar debts that had gone unpaid and because loyalists had not been compensated for property confiscated during the war. Some settlers on the western and northern frontiers were threatening to secede. Perhaps most critically, men and women, black and white, settler and Indian, had been living in a society without legitimate limits for years. Violence had defined the tenor of existence for many places. Unrest was the rule of thumb in others. And throughout the states, people had been acting in self-sovereign fashion for more than a decade. Reconstituting order would not be easy.

In solving these vexing problems, the new nation had some advantages and disadvantages. On its side was the fact that America’s counterrevolutionaries had fled. Tens of thousands of loyalists, including former slaves who had served with the British military, had left for Britain, the Caribbean, and especially British Canada. Because of their flight, the terms of debate within the United States would be limited to participation in the struggle against Britain. Debate occurred within the context of sacrifice for the American cause, as a return to British sovereignty was literally out of the equation. On the minus side,
however, the nation was hamstrung by its political framework. Outside of organizing the West for future expansion into new states, the Articles of Confederation proved disastrous for efficacious government. They also did not inspire the confidence of legitimate government. The articles were stitched together during the war as a provisional league or alliance between sovereign states to prosecute the war. Like the quasi-sovereign institution that gave birth to them – Congress – the articles grew more from exigency than design. Each state had one vote in Congress, so that the smallest could thwart the wishes of the rest, the executive had no substantive power, and most damningly, the confederation government had no ability to tax. This meant that states maintained their autonomous and sovereign status in theory and in practice. Given the problems confronting the new republic in the 1780s – and debt was perhaps the most alarming one – a weak central government would not be able to bring order to a society crippled by war and reeling from revolutionary unrest.

The crisis came to head in 1786 in western Massachusetts. In that year, settlers in the region, most of whom had fought for the patriot cause, were struggling with high taxes, foreclosures, and eastern legal claims on their property. Under a former officer named William Shays, these self-styled regulators sought to overthrow local governance. Alarmed, easterners raised an army to dispatch the Shaysites. As many conceded that such disturbances were likely to continue, representatives from a number of states decided they had to act to secure the union and ensure that order would prevail. So in 1787, delegates met in Philadelphia to “re-vise” the articles. By the end of this convention, they had created a new constitution.

The Constitution was one part of an emerging revolution settlement that created a new, more efficacious governing structure for the United States. The new frame of government placed more power in the hands of the central government. Popular voices, though canonized with an invocation of popular sovereignty – “We, the People” – were muted through a division of powers and buffers such as the Electoral College. At the same time, financiers reorganized the nation’s debt. The central government would also assume this authority. The nation secured its border a few years later with treaties with the British and with the Spanish. Finally, in 1794 the nation also established its ultimate authority in the most vexing region, the West, by dispatching armies to destroy a Native American confederation and to suppress rebels who were threatening secession over an excise on whiskey. By 1800, with Thomas Jefferson’s election as president, the citizens of the United States had come to a broad consensus over a number of key issues: the nation’s political economy – one based on western expansion and on commercial and industrial development in the East; the limits of political discourse – a citizenry that knew the bounds of liberty and that feared French-style radicalism; and that through efficacious laws and the judicious use of violence, the new nation could and should enforce its sovereign status.

The outcomes of revolution reflected the constraints and possibilities of the period and of the colonial history of the states. Outcomes also involved negotiations that centered on bringing a disorderly process to a close. Some of these negotiations proved peaceful; others involved coercion. In this calculation, some people lost. Slaves would not be freed. Southerners, particularly elites from South Carolina and Georgia, would not accede to union without guarantees for their “peculiar institution.” The Constitution, to the contrary, put the institution in a virtual lock-box. Indians would be forced off their land to ensure tranquility in the East and commercial development for the new nation. Women would not be given rights equal to men – though they had not clamored for such rights – but would be considered the guardians of republican virtue. Poorer men would also cling to the margins of society, be it on the frontier one step ahead of speculators or in eastern cities as wage laborers. They would, however, gain unprecedented political rights. The cost of the revolution settlement, therefore,
was born on the backs of some groups, while others earned the proverbial half-loaf. The settlement of revolution, therefore, reflected the ways order had broken down in diverse societies, how the process played out in such locales, and the negotiations that took place to end the disorder of revolution and to knit these places with their distinctive histories together in an orderly and stable whole.

The idea of the “American Revolution” emerged from this dynamic. The notion of the “American Revolution” as the touchstone of identity took shape within a generation of the event itself. The earliest historians—most notably David Ramsay and Mercy Otis Warren—did not agree about the political implications of the revolution but agreed that it had made Americans an exceptional people. Both of these histories acknowledged the limitations of the revolution, especially as they pertained to slavery; but they believed that the necessity of union trumped freedom for all. The person of Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence and a slaveholder, epitomized this seeming contradiction. Indeed, a veneration for the founders—or their demonization—suggests that the idea of the “American Revolution” is bound up in the idea of paradox. But those paradoxes the “American Revolution” canonized were tied to the process of revolution. This had been a revolution. It had also been American.

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; French Revolution; Religion and social movements; Revolutions; Tea Party movement (United States).

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PIERRE MONFORTE

Amnesty International (AI) is probably the most important international nongovernmental organization acting for human rights. It was founded by a lawyer – Peter Benenson – in London in 1961, for the defense of the “forgotten prisoners” in Portugal and for freedom of expression. Soon, several national sections were created and the organization extended its activities to the fight against torture, disappearances, and the death penalty. Today, Amnesty International has 2.2 million members, supporters, and subscribers active in 150 countries. Its mission is the defense and promotion of “internationally recognized human rights.” It was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 for its international campaign against torture.

Amnesty International can neither be categorized as the constituent of an “old” or of a “new” social movement. It is not organized around a shared socioeconomic interest, nor around a shared ideology or identity. Also, it is centralized and professionalized, but it has a significant activist basis. This originality is mainly linked to its international character and it is visible in three main areas: its mission; its repertoire of collective action; and its organizational structure.

MOBILIZING FOR THE DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE “MORAL AUTHORITY” ARGUMENT

The nongovernmental organizations working for the defense of international human rights are among the oldest organizations active at the international or transnational level: for example, the International Society for the Abolition of Slavery originated in 1839. It is however in the 1960s and 1970s that most of the organizations of the “transnational human rights movement” (Smith, Pagnucco, & Lopez 1998) were created, in the context of the cold war and the decline of the international human rights order that emerged after the Second World War. Amnesty International (like Human Rights Watch or the World Organization Against Torture) was created in order to promote a universal vision of human rights. The objective was to defend human rights independently from states’ ideological and political considerations during the cold war, and so to denounce human rights abuses in the East and in the West systematically. In the view of these organizations, human rights abuses could be denounced without endorsing the political or ideological cause of those who were victims, and so without giving support to regimes which could also commit abuses. In this regard, the juridical instruments available at the international level – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular – provide a “moral authority” (Hopgood 2006) that situates individual rights above states’ politics. This strategy of “diplomacy of conscience” (Clark 2001) explains why AI traditionally refuses to take position in favor or against any form of political or economic system.

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN: A PRAGMATIC REPERTOIRE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Amnesty International’s repertoire is mainly based on the design and implementation of international campaigns. This repertoire is pragmatic because it is based on the formulation of concrete demands addressed to governments through a normative vocabulary (the respect of an international convention or the liberation of a prisoner for example). It is also pragmatic because all members are
Amnesty International asked to play an active role in its implementation. Three main modes of mobilization are interrelated in the definition of these international campaigns. The first – and most common – is the direct call against a particular case of human rights abuse. A good example is the monthly Postcards for Prisoners campaign launched in 1965. The second is to act through lobbying campaigns at various levels. At the international level, AI has a privileged access to international organizations thanks to its consultative status given by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO since the 1960s. This has permitted AI to play a crucial role in the adoption of new instruments such as the UN Convention against Torture, which came into force in 1985. At the national level, AI’s goal is to trigger a “boomerang effect” (Keck & Sikkink 1998): its sections lobby governments, demanding them to respect their international engagements or to adopt new international instruments. Finally, AI’s repertoire targets the public opinion. It launches global campaigns of consciousness raising through communiqués in the media, symbolic actions, or the distribution of educational material. Amnesty International’s work of investigation is fundamental in these three forms of collective action. Its research team launches regular public reports on specific cases (such as the Mumia Abu-Jamal case in 2000), or more general issues (such as the political killings by governments in 1983), which set the terms of the international campaigns.

Acting Globally and Locally

In organizational terms, Amnesty International’s originality lies in the fact that it conciliates a strong supranational professionalized and centralized structure with a wide local activist basis. The relations between both levels are guided by democratic principles. AI’s central structure is composed of the International Secretary and the Secretary General, the Senior Directors, and the International Executive Committee. They coordinate the work of 50 national sections, 20 committees, and hundreds of local groups. The biennial International Council Meeting gathers together representatives from all sections and committees and adopts AI’s general orientations. These are then translated into international campaigns by the International Secretary. Until recently, the autonomy of the national sections was limited: their role was to implement missions defined by the central agencies. For example, only the International Secretary could write a report and define a specific “case” (an individual defended by AI). This led to strict limitations about what a section could do about human rights abuses in its own country (the Work on Own Country Rule). It could also lead to tensions between the definition of the international campaign and national specificities.

Amnesty International’s Evolution in the 2000s

The International Council Meeting held in Dakar in August 2001 introduced significant changes in the organization and mission of Amnesty International. These changes were mainly motivated by many of its members who were also involved in the emergent global justice and peace movement and who urged AI to play a role in it (Poinsot 2004).

Concerning the organizational structure, more autonomy was given to the national sections and structures and to the local groups, who are now allowed to produce their own reports. More importantly, AI’s mission was extended to the promotion and defense of social, economic, and cultural rights. This led the organization to work against discriminatory practices concerning women or ethnic minorities, for example. This evolution is recent and AI’s mission is still essentially focused on the defense of civic and political rights. It is, however, a significant evolution as it could lead Amnesty International to become a generalist organization.
SEE ALSO: Globalization and movements; Human rights movements; Law and social movements; Rights and rights movements; Transnational social movements.

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Antiapartheid movement (South Africa)

INEKE VAN KESSEL

The origins of nationwide organized protest against first segregation and then apartheid in South Africa can be traced back to the founding of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912. After the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the political rights and economic security of black people came under increasing attack. Following the defeat of the Boer Republics in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) reconciliation with the defeated Afrikaners was achieved at the expense of black South Africans. Laws restricting African landownership and African mobility underpinned a system of racial segregation devised to compel Africans to become wage laborers on white farms or in white-owned mines and industries.

Organizations representing the interests of nonwhite South Africans began to appear in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Educated Africans founded newspapers and organizations to express their concerns. The Natal Indian Congress was launched in 1894, followed in 1902 by the African People’s Organization that represented the interests of educated colored people. However, the South African Native National Congress was the first political organization to be constituted on a national rather than regional basis, with the aim of extending citizenship and franchise to all South Africans on a nonracial basis. In 1923 it changed its name to the African National Congress (ANC).

In its first decades, the ANC’s leadership was mainly drawn from the educated elite, while traditional chiefs were also represented in its hierarchy. Most of the senior leaders had attended mission schools where they had imbibed the universalist ideals of Christianity, progress through education, and liberal democracy. The founding of the SANNC was a response to the Natives’ Land Act (1913) that restricted African landownership to the Native Reserves, about 7 percent of South Africa’s territory. The ANC’s preferred tactics initially consisted of petitions, publications, and deputations to London but these proved ineffective.

During the social upheaval of the 1920s, the ANC was eclipsed by more militant movements, notably the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU), which included dock workers and industrial laborers, as well as farm workers. The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), formed in 1921, was another catalyst toward more militant methods of protest and resistance. In 1927, the ANC’s new president, Josiah Gumede, traveled to Moscow with the CPSA’s James la Guma, which marked the beginning of a relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party that has endured in one form or another ever since (Dubow 2000: 13). Both African nationalism and communism became part of the political tradition of the ANC. The communist tradition stressed nonracialism and class solidarity, while the nationalists championed racial and national interests. The balance of power between the two would shift back and forth over the following decades but these competing traditions produced an ideology with broad popular appeal, offering a middle ground for an African nationalism with egalitarian ideals. The ICU and the CPSA did not, however, manage to sustain a mass following during the 1930s, and the ANC split into factions.

URBANIZATION

In the 1940s, the ANC entered a phase of mass politics under the leadership of Alfred Xuma, a medical doctor who had trained in the
United States and Europe, and the organization revived its organizational structures, improved its financial situation, and extended full membership rights to women. This decade saw rapid urbanization. As South Africa had joined the Allies during World War II, thousands of white soldiers and nonwhite auxiliaries left for the front, leaving the main urban centers facing a labor shortage. As blacks flocked to the towns, the strict controls on the movements of Africans were temporarily relaxed. Trade unions rather than nationalist organizations became the main mouthpiece for workers' grievances. In 1945, membership of the revived ANC stood at around 4000, while the Council of Non-European Trade Unions represented over 150 000 workers in more than 100 affiliated unions. The trade union movement however suffered a massive setback when a strike by more than 70 000 African miners in 1946 was violently suppressed by the police.

ANC YOUTH LEAGUE

A decisive push toward a modern, more radical nationalist movement came with the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944. Xuma was initially opposed to an autonomous youth branch and a more militant mode of action but the Youth League gained control of the ANC's National Executive at the ANC conference in 1949. Its Programme of Action bore the stamp of Anton Lembede, a young lawyer from Natal who emphasized the need for African pride and self-reliance while rejecting the paternalistic influence of both white liberals and communists. He dismissed communism as an ideology alien to Africa, a sentiment that for some years was shared by Nelson Mandela. Lembede's philosophy, which he himself had labeled "Africanism," was an impediment to the formation of broad alliances which involved non-African organizations, such as the Indian Congresses and the multiracial Communist Party.

The Youth League jealously guarded the principle of African leadership and was averse to joint campaigns with communists or Indian activists. In spite of some confrontational activity, pragmatism and flexibility tended to prevail, particularly after the 1948 victory of the National Party, which started implementing its rigid policies of apartheid or "separate development."

BECOMING A MASS MOVEMENT

The ANC then embarked on a campaign of boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience, which transformed it into a nationwide mass movement for the first time. However, peaceful protest and civil disobedience failed to stop the apartheid state’s repressive machinery. Crushing black protest served to increase the popularity of the National Party government.

A landmark in mass mobilization was the Defiance Campaign that was launched in 1952 in protest at unjust laws. This campaign of civil disobedience was largely inspired by Gandhi's principle of satyagraha, the nonviolent tactics of noncooperation and noncompliance, which he had first tested during his years as a lawyer in Natal. The Defiance Campaign was conducted by an alliance that became known as the Congress Alliance, a broad multiracial and ideologically diverse spectrum including the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the (Colored) African People’s Organisation, the SACTU trade union movement, the Federation of South African Women, and the communists. Anticipating the official ban in 1950, the Communist Party had dissolved itself and many African communists had shifted their energies to the ANC while white communists regrouped in the Congress of Democrats.

The Defiance Campaign was planned to coincide with the official celebrations in June 1952 of the tercentenary of Jan van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape of Good Hope. By defying unjust laws, notably the pass laws and the segregation of public transport, post offices, parks, and other public amenities, the ANC hoped to swamp the police stations and prisons with
volunteers and render apartheid unworkable. Between June and December 1952, over 8000 resisters were arrested and jailed. Participation was patchy, with the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal being the main centers of protest. The Defiance Campaign subsequently achieved iconic status in ANC historiography, producing much of the imagery and the repertoire of protest that would continue to inspire later generations of antiapartheid protest. But it failed to achieve its aim: no laws were withdrawn, the state apparatus continued to operate, and the government responded with more repressive legislation and measures.

FREEDOM CHARTER

The 1950s was a decade of unprecedented mass politics. Urban protest joined with rural uprisings through organizations of migrant workers and clan networks. Mass protest was not, however, translated into sustained organization. A celebrated moment in ANC historiography was the Congress of the People in 1955, a gathering of over 3000 who convened to adopt the Freedom Charter. The Charter lists a series of civil liberties and welfare provisions in housing, healthcare, and education. But two clauses would prove divisive. The Charter proclaims that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. This was contested by the Africanist tendency in the ANC who believed that Africans had prior rights. The other clause was that ownership of the mines, banks, and monopoly capital would be transferred to the “people as a whole.” Opponents argued that the process had been guided by communists who had managed to include this demand for nationalization of the pillars of the economy. ANC historiography stresses the broad participatory process that preceded the drafting of the charter, which was to become the founding document of the Congress Alliance.

RACE AND CLASS

The communists, now operating underground in the reconstituted South African Communist Party (SACP), developed an ideological underpinning of their alliance with the nationalists in a “two-phase strategy.” In the first phase of the liberation struggle, a broad alliance of workers and middle class would bring about the “National Democratic Revolution,” after which the forces of the left would continue to the second phase, the communist revolution. Africanists interpreted the multiracial message of the Freedom Charter as a betrayal of the Programme of Action initiated by the Youth League. In their view, the conflict had to be defined primarily in racial terms: oppressed Africans versus white domination. In 1959, the Africanists, led by Robert Sobukwe, broke away and founded the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). It would later fade into insignificance but in about 1960 it made a more propitious start in Africa and around the world than the ANC had. The Pan-African message and the glorifying of pure black nationalism was very much in tune with developments elsewhere on the continent, while the anticommunist message made the PAC more palatable in Western capitals.

While the ANC and the PAC embarked on a competitive drive for mass support, the state’s response to the Freedom Charter was a massive crackdown. By charging 156 activists of the Congress Alliance with treason, it succeeded in paralyzing much of the movement for five years. However, the accused did manage to use the courtroom as a platform to publicize their antiapartheid cause until the Treason Trial finally ended with the acquittal of all the accused in 1961.

Meanwhile, both the ANC and the PAC had been planning antipass protests. To preempt a mass ANC campaign, the PAC led a march by thousands of people who were going to hand in their passes at the police station in Sharpeville in the industrial triangle south of Johannesburg on March 21, 1960. But the police panicked and opened fire, leaving 69 people dead. In the next few days, waves of protest intensified in various parts of the country and, on April 8, both the ANC and PAC were banned and a State of Emergency enabled the police to crack down on
protesters with impunity. Initially, large-scale capital flight and fears of more revolutionary upheaval caused an economic downturn but confidence was soon restored and the economy embarked on a period of unprecedented growth. The limitations of peaceful protest had become all too obvious and the ANC and PAC started planning armed resistance.

ARMED RESISTANCE

The ANC initially limited itself to largely symbolic sabotage actions or “armed propaganda.” While the ANC attempted to avoid casualties, the PAC’s armed wing, Poqo, was not averse to attacking whites. Promising freedom by 1963, the PAC harbored a naive belief in the spontaneity of mass action, hoping that spectacular deeds of revolutionary violence would spark off a general insurrection. Although armed resistance would escalate later, it never became a real threat to the military might of the apartheid state but did lead to an atmosphere of insecurity. Only after neighboring states had achieved independence did armed incursions become a viable option.

The amateur nature of the ANC’s initial attempts at armed resistance was revealed in 1963 when the police arrested its leadership, which had gone underground, in a raid on a farmhouse in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia that served as their headquarters. The subsequent Rivonia Trial ended in life sentences for Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and the six others who were charged with sabotage.

BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS (BC)

In the early 1970s, a new movement emerged, initiated by students and radical clergy, notably Steve Biko and Barney Pityana. The first priority of the Black Consciousness movement was psychological liberation: freeing Africans of their sense of inferiority. BC followed in the Africanist tradition of the Youth League and the PAC but was more sophisticated. Black was now defined in an inclusive sense, accommodating coloreds and Indians too. It was influential among students in secondary and tertiary institutions and served as a source of inspiration for the Soweto high school students who on June 16, 1976, marched in protest at the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black high schools. Rioting spread and by the end of the year some 600, mostly young, people had died. In 1977 Biko was beaten to death in police custody, thus becoming a martyr to the BC cause. The Soweto revolt rapidly achieved iconic status in liberation history. Many graduates of the 1976 revolt were to play key roles in the revival of mass protest in the 1980s.

THE ANC IN EXILE

After his acquittal in the Treason Trial, the ANC sent Oliver Tambo abroad to set up an organization in exile. Under his moderate and inclusive leadership, the ANC remained a broad alliance. In exile, the alliance with the SACP became strategically significant as it assured a steady supply of military resources while Tambo’s diplomatic skills slowly paved the way for the ANC’s acceptance in Western capitals as well. The framework of the alliance solved the problem of accommodating non-racialism in an African nationalist movement. While the ANC emphasized African leadership, at the Morogoro conference in 1969 it opened up membership to “minority groups,” that is whites, coloreds, and Indians. Over the years, the ANC has cleverly managed to target a variety of domestic as well as international
REVIVAL OF INTERNAL RESISTANCE

The 1970s witnessed a revival of political activity, first on the labor front and subsequently in black high schools. Wildcat strikes in Durban in 1973 persuaded more enlightened employers that a trade union movement, even if militant, was preferable to spontaneous unorganized protest. In 1979 the government legalized the black trade union movement, which would later become a powerful force in the antiapartheid alliance.

While these instances of protest in the 1970s were largely isolated and spontaneous, diverse strands of protest in the 1980s coalesced into a broad alliance against apartheid, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was launched in 1983. Youth and students were the powerful driving force but they had realized that an alliance with workers’ movements was essential if they were to have any lasting impact.

The UDF was initially conceived as an ad hoc movement that was set up to contest the 1983 Constitution that had granted voting rights to coloreds and Indians while continuing to exclude Africans. The UDF’s boycott campaign of the elections for separate parliamentary houses for coloreds and Indians was a resounding success. Although the UDF had not planned its future strategy beyond this campaign, a series of rallying points arose when local township protests turned violent and were suppressed by a massive show of force by the police and the army. In July 1985 a state of emergency was declared but the massive crackdown did not end the waves of protest. Investors lost confidence in the future of South Africa, which led to a refusal to renew loans to the government and a collapse of the currency. The international solidarity campaign to isolate South Africa through boycotts and sanctions now gained momentum.

At its peak between 1984 and 1986, South Africa experienced an unprecedented explosion of often violent protest and harsh repression. Many instances of protest and revolt occurred spontaneously and were not controlled by the UDF or directed by the ANC in exile. As street battles escalated, the dividing lines between political activists and township gangs became blurred.

The UDF’s front-formula proved suitable for accommodating a wide variety of affiliates, including youth and student organizations, township-based residents’ organizations known as civic associations, church-related organizations, trade unions, and women’s groups, as well as the revived Indian Congresses. The UDF deliberately projected a rainbow image, ensuring a racially representative panel of Africans, Indians, coloreds, and whites was always present at important gatherings. Its inclusive strategy succeeded in attracting large numbers of colored people in the Western Cape as well as progressive whites in various parts of the country. Ideologically eclectic, the UDF nevertheless clearly identified with the banned ANC but also managed to absorb a significant part of the Black Consciousness generation. It developed an effective working relationship with the largest trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which was formed in 1985. Initially, the newly legalized unions focused on building a strong union organization but, almost inevitably, they found themselves drawn into the political arena.

A rival federation, the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), inspired by the legacy of the Black Consciousness Movement, was formed in 1986. Total union membership at this point stood at around 1.5 million. The trade union movement was a powerful ally
at the national level but members also played a prominent role in community organizations at township level. Their experience in mobilizing and organizing around workplace issues proved a valuable asset for community organizations tackling the rent crisis, insecurity on the streets, and public transport issues.

The UDF’s repertoire of actions proved suitable for mobilizing large numbers of nonpolitical followers. The civic associations focused mostly on bread-and-butter issues which were perceived as nonpolitical. Involvement in political activity was considered risky but participation in rent protests was seen as relatively low risk and could deliver immediate benefits. As township residents stopped paying rent increases and later stopped paying rent altogether, their disposable incomes grew. High school students also focused on immediately relevant issues, such as demands for free textbooks and an end to corporal punishment. Religious leaders provided legitimacy for challenging the apartheid state, something that was increasingly projected as a moral duty. The UDF infused bread-and-butter issues with a wider significance. It reintroduced the ANC as the prime focus of antiapartheid resistance by popularizing its imprisoned and exiled leadership, its symbols and colors, and its political program, as enshrined in the Freedom Charter.

As the 1980s progressed, a substantial number of UDF followers developed a millenarian perspective of a nonracial, egalitarian society based on participatory politics. The fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 provided the decisive push toward a negotiated settlement in South Africa as the government no longer feared that the ANC, if elected, would automatically bring the communists to power as well. While the ANC assumed power in 1994, the PAC and its offshoots were relegated to the margins and lost all credibility as a political alternative.

KEYS TO THE ANC’S ULTIMATE VICTORY

Saul Dubow succinctly sums up the factors that ultimately led to the ANC’s victory. First, for most of its history, the organization had exercised policies of moderation and inclusion, with its leadership disposed to seeking the political middle ground. It had been able to absorb militant Africanists and radical Marxists while sticking to its moderate policies. Second, as the oldest African resistance movement, the ANC had accumulated enormous reserves of symbolic capital: its survival for three decades in exile and imprisonment was an achievement that conferred authority and legitimacy on it. Of crucial importance was the powerful image of the imprisoned leadership on Robben Island, who were unwaveringly loyal to the cause and a shining example of moral authority. While imprisoned, they were not tainted with the inevitable foibles and mistakes of active politicians. Their long stint in jail made Nelson Mandela and his peers into larger-than-life symbols of the struggle for a just society (Dubow 2000: 107–109).

While the ANC became institutionalized when it became the ruling party, the mode of popular action that originated with the UDF continues to inspire a new generation of social movements that is addressing issues such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the housing crisis, and land issues.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Framing and social movements; Land movements in Africa; Mandela, Nelson (1918–); Nationalist movements; Rights and rights movements; Solidarity and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Anticolonial movements
KURT SCHOCK

Anticolonial movements (which may be referred to as national liberation or independence movements) are organized struggles to resist formal external subjugation and promote self-determination.

More militarily powerful societies have been subjugating less powerful ones throughout history – at least since the emergence of states in the horticultural and agrarian eras – and it continues to this day. The formal process of colonization generally refers to the conquest of the Americas, Asia, and Africa by European powers during the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries (Easton 1964). Colonization involved the coercive or violent expropriation of land and resources of indigenous societies by more militarily powerful countries. This was often accompanied by the exploitation of labor, the destruction of indigenous culture, and environmental degradation. Western forms of administration and extractive export-oriented economies replaced indigenous political and economic relations. Colonization was typically justified as a method for “civilizing” non-Europeans.

Colonization of the Americas by the Spanish and Portuguese began in the sixteenth century and continued through the eighteenth. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the English, and to a much lesser extent the French and Dutch, colonized parts of the Americas as well. Parts of Asia were first colonized in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese and Spanish, followed in the seventeenth century by Dutch colonization of the East Indies and English colonization of parts of South and Southeast Asia, and French colonization of Indochina in the nineteenth century. This was followed in the late nineteenth century by the era of “high imperialism” whereby European powers, which had controlled coastal enclaves in Africa for centuries, began seizing the entire continent. Seven European powers – England, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and Italy – divided the continent into 40 colonies without regard for indigenous states or societies. By 1914, only Ethiopia and Liberia remained independent of European control.

Colonization provoked anticolonial movements that varied with regard to ideology and strategy. Early anticolonial movements in the Americas adopted democratic ideals of the Enlightenment. Contact with Western ideas among the elite in Asia and Africa led to the adoption of nationalism as the most potent frame of anticolonial movements (Emerson 1960; Anderson 1991). In different places, nationalism was infused with liberalism and/or Marxism. Awareness of anticolonial movements in other countries promoted transnational solidarities, which were sometimes manifested in Pan-African or Pan-Asian blends of nationalism and internationalism. Strategies for self-determination ranged from petitioning for constitutional reform to mass-based nonviolent or violent direct actions.

THE AMERICAS

The earliest anticolonial movements occurred in the Americas. From 1765 to 1775 revolutionaries in the 13 English colonies organized numerous campaigns of nonviolent resistance against English rule, including boycotts, political noncooperation, and the formation of parallel political institutions (Conser et al. 1986). The struggle turned violent in 1775, when armed militias confronted English troops in the Battles of Lexington and Concord, and continued until the surrender of the English in 1781. The nationalist revolutionary movement was infused with liberal ideas of the Enlightenment and culminated in the formation of a democratic state.
Subsequent anticolonial movements in the Americas were inspired by the liberal ideas of the American and French revolutions, as well as by nationalism. The violent rebellion in Haiti against French rule, from 1791 to 1804, culminated in Haitian independence. Most Spanish colonies in the Americas – from Mexico to Argentina – attained independence between 1810 and 1825; however, these struggles were as much civil wars as they were anticolonial movements. The royalists, composed of Spanish and Spanish Americans, fought against the independistas, composed of Spanish Americans, mixed races, indigenous peoples, and slaves of African descent. Brazilian independence from Portugal in 1822 also resulted from a liberal movement that took up arms against the monarchy.

**Asia**

Anticolonial movements in Asia emerged in the nineteenth century and gained momentum in the twentieth, especially during World War II when imperial Japan challenged the rule of Europeans in Asia. In Southeast Asia, anticolonial movements mobilized against British rule in Burma and Malaya, Dutch rule in the East Indies, and French rule in Indochina. Ho Chi Minh, inspired by the liberalism and nationalism of the American and French revolutions as well as the anti-imperialist ideology of Marxism, led the anticolonial movement in Vietnam. The Vietminh, a broad national front, engaged in armed guerrilla struggle against imperial powers for four decades, defeating the French in 1954 and the Americans in 1975.

In British India, peasants and tribals sporadically waged local rebellions against the East Indian Company from the seventeenth century onward. The first major widespread revolt, the Rebellion of 1857, led to the dissolution of the East India Company and direct rule by the British Crown. From the 1850s onward, various elite-based organizations lobbied and petitioned the British for constitutional change. A nationalist independence movement began to take shape with the founding of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885, which petitioned and negotiated with the British for increased self-rule, gaining only modest concessions.

The anticolonial movement was transformed after the return of Mohandas K. Gandhi to India from South Africa in 1915. Gandhi differed from moderates, who pursued constitutional methods, and extremists who were willing to use violence to attain independence. Assuming a leadership position within the INC, Gandhi transformed it from an elite to a mass-based organization that became the vehicle for mass-based campaigns of nonviolent protest and noncooperation that contributed to Indian independence, attained in 1947.

**Africa**

Anticolonial movements in Africa emerged after World War I and gathered strength after World War II. At the Bandung Conference in 1955 leaders of independent states of Asia and Africa called for increased efforts to promote independence and human rights, which facilitated transnational solidarities and support for anticolonial struggles. The United Nations was also influential in promoting decolonization. The United Nations’ Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 1960, provided increased leverage to anticolonial movements.

In the British Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah led the struggle for independence. He was inspired by the Pan-African ideology of W.E.B. Du Bois, as well as by Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolent resistance. In 1950, through the Convention People’s Party, Nkrumah began organizing mass-based campaigns of “positive action” – nonviolent strikes, boycotts, and noncooperation. The campaigns gave momentum to the anticolonial movement, which culminated in the independence of Ghana under the leadership of Nkrumah in 1957.

In Portuguese Africa anticolonial struggles in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique were shaped by Amilcar Cabral, an influential theorist and activist who promoted Marxist ideology and a strategy of guerrilla warfare (Cabral 1979). The protracted struggles precipitated a coup in Portugal in 1974, which led to the overthrow of Salazar and a democratic transition. The democratic government subsequently withdrew from its remaining colonies in Africa and Asia.

Throughout Africa the indigenous elite denounced the hypocrisy of Europeans whose ideals of liberty and equality diverged sharply from their racist and oppressive colonial policies (Derrick 2008). Bourgeois nationalist movements in Africa that emerged in the interwar period became increasingly radicalized following World War II with the adoption of Marxist ideologies and strategies for social change. Frantz Fanon, who grew up in French-ruled Martinique and later participated in the anticolonial struggle in Algeria, was influential in this regard.

GANDHI AND FANON

Gandhi and Fanon were two influential theorists and practitioners of anticolonial movements whose political thought remains relevant today; the former for his theory of nonviolence and the latter for his analysis of the relation between racism and imperialism. Both Gandhi and Fanon criticized the hypocrisy of European powers, adopted nationalism, and mobilized direct action to promote self-rule. Yet they diverged sharply with regard to the strategies they promoted and their visions of postcolonial society.

In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon argues that violence is necessary for national liberation as the violence of the colonizers can only be defeated with greater violence (2005). He viewed violence as a legitimating force for newly independent nations. Fanon imitated the violence of the colonists and embraced Western “development” albeit in a Marxist variant. Gandhi, by contrast, attempted to break from the Europeans not only by attaining independence but also by rejecting Western violence and “development.” Gandhi promoted a decentralized and self-sufficient rural economy. He also maintained that the British ruled India not because of their superior violence, but rather because India had given herself to them. Gandhi identified the critical role of indigenous collaboration and cooperation in the subjugation of India. In Hind Swaraj he states the “English have not taken India, we have given it to them” (1997). This crucial insight was the basis of his mass-based campaigns of noncooperation and resistance.

RECENT AND CONTINUING MOVEMENTS AGAINST EXTERNAL SUBJUGATION

Although the formal process of European colonization ended, the subjugation of countries by more militarily powerful states continues. Racist ideological justifications have been disregarded in favor of justifications based on “national security.” These attempts at subjugation, however, have been problematic in an era of human rights and self-determination.

Subjugation has occurred through direct military conquest and incorporation of territory into more militarily powerful states, such as the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1975. Similarly, in the aftermath of World War II, Russia incorporated much of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Bloc. These subjugations subsequently led to nationalist “anticolonial” movements for self-rule. The nonviolent Solidarity
Movement in Poland in the 1980s contributed to the end of Soviet rule in Poland and triggered nationalist movements throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002). In East Timor, a guerrilla insurgency against Indonesian forces was ineffective, but after the movement shifted to nonviolent resistance and cultivated international grassroots support, independence was attained in 2002. The Tibetan struggle is ongoing.

Furthermore, the United States continues to engage in violent invasions and occupations, despite its failure to impose its will on Vietnam through military force in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the first years of the twenty-first century the United States invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, triggering ongoing violent insurgencies for self-determination that draw on nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization and social movements; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Indian Independence Movement; Marxism and social movements; Nationalist movements; Nonviolence/nonviolent action.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Anticrime movements in Latin America
DIANE E. DAVIS and GRAHAM DENYER WILLIS

Legacies of authoritarianism and contested state formation have left Latin America awash in violence (Davis 2010), with rates of homicide, murder, kidnapping, and robbery on the rise. Cities have been particularly hard hit, owing to unemployment, income inequality, and other structural causes including neoliberal economic reforms and drug trafficking (Astorga 2002). With minimal progress in curtailing violence despite government efforts otherwise and limited public trust in state capacities to reduce criminality due to high rates of police corruption (Davis 2006) or a weak judicial system (Ungar 2002), citizens take security matters into their own hands. Their actions coalesce in an array of anticrime social movements, broadly defined here as collective action targeted against the perpetrators or enablers of rampant criminality and insecurity.

Because anticrime social movements are a relatively new phenomenon, departing in conceptual, discursive, and strategic ways from Latin America’s long history of citizen mobilization around democracy and regime change, the field is in its infant stages. Only recently have scholars started to systematically identify the predominant strategies and tactics employed by citizens to fight against crime (Bergman 2006) with most attention to date focused on Brazil (Denyer Willis 2009), Mexico (Alvarado 2006), Colombia (Moser & McIlwaine 2004), and Central America (Cruz 2006). Initial concern with anticrime collective action traces to the 1990s when citizens adopted vigilante tactics like community lynching to punish criminals and establish social order in the face of an ineffective legal system (Goldstein 2004). First examined by anthropologists preoccupied with traditional forms of popular justice in village settings (Godoy 2006), vigilantism caught the attention of social movement scholars when increasing numbers of urban-based citizens engaged in neighborhood-based lynching, vigilantism, and other forms of community retribution. The turn to violence rather than formal criminal procedures and court processes soon became identified as a form of self-help collective action and a means of proactive protection against those who produced an environment of abuse and fear.

Despite its appearance in both richer and poorer parts of Latin America, ranging from Bolivia and Guatemala to Brazil and Mexico, lynching remains a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985) deployed primarily by the excluded and politically or economically marginalized citizens who lack political access to the state or have been denied other more conventional resources for mobilization or collective action. Those with more resources and a history of political influence prefer to employ traditional social movement tactics and organizational strategies in the fight against crime, ranging from marches and other forms of coordinated protest to public advocacy and the deployment of new media technology (Davis 2006). Many citizen-led anticrime organizations use web tools and social networking sites such as Orkut to mobilize social and political support. Because these organizations derive their influence from the numbers of citizens they can mobilize, they differ in form, content, and impact from citizen crime “watches,” community policing programs, and individual adoption of gating and other private security measures. These activities may enable individual citizens to make some headway in establishing security and reducing crime at the neighborhood level, but they neither attack the root sources of the problem nor ensure that problems of rampant criminality reach the larger public agenda. Anticrime movements, in contrast, engage a
wider constituency beyond the neighborhood, call attention to state failures in solving these problems, and seek a transformation in the political, economic, or social conditions that allow criminality to flourish unabated.

With concern about crime widespread and trust in government low, many anticrime social movements avoid the state in the search for partners in the struggle against crime (Fuentes 2005). Efforts to target or engage the legislative process also remain limited, given the weakness of the courts and the abuses of political parties (Ungar 2002), although those organizations with access to international NGOs and legal consultants, such as the regionally active Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, increasingly place such reforms on the legislative agenda. These trends have led to a bifurcation of anticrime movements into two distinctive camps: one concerned with social order and forceful criminal punishment, and the other with human rights and democratic accountability. The former are best seen in “hard line” citizen movements that target criminals and whose members are willing to work in tandem with local police or the business community in seeking legislation and resources for incarcerating perpetrators. This frequently means support for new laws that enhance police powers no matter the cost in human rights, often by criminalizing youth behavior and restricting access to public space. In contrast, the latter movement activists seek to guarantee human rights while also reducing violence (Goodale & Engle Merry 2007). They prioritize notions of democratic accountability and equality of gender and/or socioeconomic status, using an international legal regime of human rights and its attendant discourse. They are more willing to bypass the state and instead work with NGOs and multilateral agencies in the development and deployment of their anticrime activities and legislative aims (Fuentes 2005); and when they do engage the state, it is to seek increased accountability from government agencies and to argue for a democratic rule of law and a more responsive judiciary capable protecting both citizens and criminals.

To the extent that rights-oriented anticrime movements share elective affinity or organizational membership with those who in prior decades struggled for democracy and rights in the face of authoritarian excess, their appearance on the scene contributes to democratic deepening while also laying the foundation for a more legitimate, accountable, and democratic rule of law. But their efforts are countered by an increasing proportion of citizen movements that remain unmoved by human rights objectives and whose main goal is to reduce crime, even when it means sacrificing transparency and accountability, ignoring government abuses of power (Beckett & Godoy 2008), and tolerating “illicit” means of controlling criminals, including support for parallel state actors or local community leaders tied to criminal networks (Arias 2006).

SEE ALSO: Human rights movements; Law and social movements; Resistance; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Antiglobalization movements
JAMES GOODMAN

The “great globalization debate” began in the late 1980s with a series of proclamations as to the newness of the phenomenon. Ranging across multiple social science disciplines, globalization theory asserted that social relations were becoming increasingly deterritorialized (Held, McGrew, & Perraton 1999). Subsequent revisions forced recognition of historical parallels, thus historicizing the claims, and allowed a rereading of the accounts, in terms of their discursive foundations, as globalist ideology. The debate continues, with investigations of post-globalism, in the aftermath of a more unilateralist world politics, as a state of affairs beyond globalization, rather than simply a throw-back to pre-globalist conditions.

Along with other fields in the social sciences, social movement studies has itself undergone a 20-year process of globalization. Methodologically, as an interdisciplinary field crossing political and historical sociology, cultural studies and political science, social movement studies has been highly permeable. Nevertheless, from within this field, international social movements have generally been examined from a comparativist perspective. Rarely have movements been analyzed as in the first instance international or global phenomena, and addressed in terms of the transnational flows that they may generate. Only relatively recently has social movements studies become actively engaged with international relations debates (see Tarrow 2005). A shift can be tracked especially in the aftermath of the 1999 “Battle of Seattle,” widely taken to have announced the presence of “antiglobalization” movements on the world stage (Smith & Johnston 2002).

If we date the globalization of social movement studies from the 1990s, to what extent does that reflect a broader globalization tendency amongst movements themselves? Certainly, we can posit a wave of “antiglobalization” movements from that period, a transnational “cycle of contention” perhaps (Tarrow 2005). The foundations, we may say, were established in the 1980s with national mobilizations, north and south, against neoliberal prescriptions at the national level. In the context of a post-cold war wave of interstate institution-building, the revolt against neoliberalism shifted from national into transnational contexts. Connectivities across north and south are established in joint campaigns from the early 1990s against interstate neoliberal governance, such as through the “Fifty Years is Enough” campaign against the World Bank and IMF, the Other Economic Summit process in the EU, the APEC counter summits in the Asia-Pacific region and, certainly most powerfully, with the Zapatista’s 1994 uprising against the North American Free Trade Agreement.

A lineage can now be tracked from the Zapatista’s 1996 “International Encounter Against Neoliberalism,” to the creation of People’s Global Action, which itself initiated many of the key antiglobalization protest repertoires, to the development of the World Social Forum, and what came to be called the “Global Justice Movement,” led in the main by large northern nongovernmental organizations (see della Porta 2007). The upswing of the cycle built on existing transnational advocacy networks such as Jubilee 2000, but also led to the creation of new transnational and global activist networks, such as peasant international, Via Campesina, and the WTO-focused Our World is not For Sale network, as well as the Peoples Global
Antiglobalization movements (Reitan 2007). The cycle was partially demobilized with the US-led “War on Terror” in September 2001, but found new traction in the context of the war in Iraq, staging the world’s largest mass demonstration in February 2003. Subsequently, Global Justice movements have played a key role in the emergent Climate Justice movement, including its direct action wing in the form of Climate Camps, which themselves claim a direct lineage from the PGA (Goodman 2009).

Accounts of social movement globalization reproduce debates between hyperglobalist and skeptical globalists over whether globalism and its antiglobalizations are superseding nationally constituted frameworks for political community. Such preoccupations have tended to de-historicize the globalization phenomenon, assuming that we start with nationally constituted politics, and that sometime from the 1960s were witness to a process of globalization that may or may not affirm national politics. These accounts reify the national and treat contemporary “antiglobalization” as somehow a new phenomenon. As such they can be blind to the historical precedents and continuities. These are signified, not least, in the echoes of the early twentieth-century Mexican revolution for the latter-day Zapatistas: here, those often credited with initiating the protest cycle are themselves bound into an historical dynamic of peasant and indigenous uprisings centered on the Mexican state.

Viewed through the lens of history it is clear that successive waves of globalization are associated with global countermobilizations. If we define globalization as the extension of social relations across continents, then we can identify mercantilist globalization as perhaps the first substantial wave of globalization. Here, trading posts, militaries and missionaries extended the power of European countries across continents (Held, McGrew, & Perraton 1999). Yet, in the same breath, mercantilism was associated with the emergence of nationalism, the first and perhaps most powerful antiglobalization movement. Movements against empires in South America, as Benedict Anderson famously documented, coalesced around the idea of the nation, and from the seventeenth century became the “creole pioneers” of a global wave of nationalist movements (Anderson 1991).

A second great wave of globalization, from the eighteenth century, was centered on the extension of industrialism and the modern colonial state. In establishing globally disseminated antagonisms, between industrial classes and between the colonized and the colonizers, this wave of globalization laid the foundations for the rise of international socialist and communist movements and anticolonial movements. These movements were centered on the national state, but also transcended it, in promulgating universalizing cosmopolitical norms of socialism, communism, and anti-imperialism. These “antisystemic” movements, as Wallerstein calls them, transformed global politics with the remarkable extension of postimperial welfarism, communist statism, and postcolonial developmentalism through the twentieth century (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989).

Finally, in the latter decades of the twentieth century we were witness to a third wave of globalization, taking the form of corporate-led neoliberal globalization. Antiglobalization movements in this period targeted a particular kind of globalization, with its own vehicles and drivers, quite distinct from its antecedents. Viewed from a vantage point that recognizes earlier waves of globalization, we can appreciate both the potential role of contemporary antiglobalization, in terms of world historical agency, as well as its inherent limitations. Clearly, globalism sets the pace: the process of coalescing into what are best characterized as “Global Justice movements,” and the consequent emergence of justice globalism, as Steger calls it, is predicated on the globalization of corporate power, and its projection on a world scale, as exemplified in the hegemony of neoliberal globalism. From a political process perspective, the opportunity structures for antiglobalization are defined by globalization: how that structure of power is targeted by movements and how opportunities are thereby
DEFINING ANTIGLOBALIZATION

Antiglobalization movements politicize the exercise of power, and force new visions and aspirations into play, and as such can be constitutive of world political relations. The historical record suggests that antiglobalization movements may be defensive or oppositionalist, but it also suggests that by challenging the global projection of power they prefigure the necessity for new forms of political community, embodied in new ideological claims. Debates about this creative power of antiglobalization, as a transformational force as well as an oppositional force, are reflected in terminological disputes over how to define the current movement.

Movements that challenge contemporary globalization are often pejoratively labeled as “antiglobalization” in order to marginalize their critiques (Ayres 2005). Taking “globalization” as a fact of life, the “anti” label suggests an orientation that is backward-looking: to act against globalization is to act against the future, to be new-age luddites, or worse, defensive xenophobes. There are a variety of attempts at shedding the “antiglobal” label, by asserting a universalizing aspiration. Often a different globalization is asserted, a “peoples globalization,” a globalization-from-below perhaps, geared to global justice (della Porta 2007). The “alter-globalization” concept encapsulates this position in calling for “alternative” globalizations, explicitly rejecting defensive forms of antiglobalization in the form of communalism, localism, or nationalism (Hardt 2002).

In practice, though, antiglobalization begins with the refusal of globalist ideology, and as such has strong oppositionalist elements. That opposition is framed by specific institutions and identifications, and is never immediately “global.” Antiglobalization may be inspired by universal norms and produce shared transnational agendas, but in practice is always embedded in immediate social relations and struggles. The process of mobilization is consequently much less smooth than some cosmo-political models may suggest it to be. Indeed, defining antiglobalization exclusively as a universalizing impulse can erase, or worse, condemn, nonglobal alternatives.

Analysis of possibilities for challenge and transformation requires a broader scope, to understand alternatives to globalization, through deglobalizing localisms or nationalisms, as much as alternative globalizations (Bello 2006). As Castells notes, globalizing forces and associated legitimating identities are in the first instance opposed through particularist resistance identities, which may or may not prefigure more transformative “project” identities (Castells 1997). These “militant particularisms” are the foundation for broader-based social movements capable of instigating revolts against the assertion of abstract globalism, whether in its neoliberal or justice modalities (Harvey 2000).

The point is borne out in the practice of antiglobalization, which has centered on the refusal of globalism. For antiglobalization, the assertion of veto power has been central, and may be seen as a precondition for building alternatives. It is important, then, to adopt a definition of “antiglobalization” that encompasses universalist and more particularist expressions, allowing a broader scope for theorization and engagement. We may, then, arrive at a definition of “antiglobalization” movements that embraces the full panoply of oppositionalist localism to reformist cosmopolitanism. Such an inclusive approach does not impose pre-set criteria for inclusion in the movement, and foregrounds the realm of mobilization that stands at its center.

PERSPECTIVES ON ANTIGLOBALIZATION

Reflecting political traditions, perspectives on antiglobalization are rooted in particular places. This is clearly demonstrated in the
field of social movement studies, which bifurcates between the American political process school and European new social movement approaches. In part the divide is epistemological, between positivist and interpretivist traditions: while US social movement scholarship is centered on the development of conceptual tools to be deployed across history and place, European counterparts are more concerned with interpreting the historical trajectory of movements and to produce general theories of social change (della Porta 2007: 235).

Both traditions are defined against the Marxist lineage of social movement studies, with the political process school adopting a broadly non-Marxist stance, while new social movements approaches are more clearly positioned as post-Marxist. The political process school rejects the project of exploring the structural foundations of social movements, and dwells instead on the institutional “superstructure,” thus embedding recent “antiglobalization” struggles in institutional formations rather than social relations. New social movement approaches embed interpretations in cultural relations, breaking with Marxism in arguing the “new social movements” of antiglobalization originate in the cultural hierarchies of globalized postindustrial society. Neo-Marxist approaches retain a focus on material power and how it is manifest through mobilizing structures (giving neo-Marxism a special explanatory power under the most recent wave of corporate-led globalization).

The three orientations center on conflicting interpretations of the dominant sources of power in globalizing late-modern society, and replicate wider fault-lines in globalization studies. These macro-theoretical disputes between the intellectual traditions of liberal-institutionalism, post-Marxism, and neo-Marxism generate disputes over whether the key global power-sources are institutional, cultural, or material, and produce diverging predictions about the likely sources of contestation and transformation.

Institutional power

A focus on institutional power interprets antiglobalization mainly in terms of the interstate political process. Weakly legitimated international organizations are seen as offering political opportunities for movements, to extend accountability and participation in these newly empowered sites of political decision-making (della Porta et al. 1999). Like their counterparts in the early days of state formation, social movements exploit these opportunities and engage in “strategic framing” to contest institutional power. In the process, new transnational mobilizing resources become available. New realms for widened participation may be opened up, diffusing transnational repertoires, and transforming movements from national into transnational actors (Smith & Johnston 2002).

The question of political process, not surprisingly, most clearly reflects the more institutionalized components of antiglobalization. These are led by the large international non-government organizations (INGOs), presenting themselves as civil society representatives at odds with interstate structures. These organizations integrate cosmopolitan values with a relatively privileged worldview to enable critical accommodation with dominant sources of institutional power. Instead of limiting the power of intergovernmental agencies, INGOs attempt to change the way it is exercised, persuading interstate negotiators to incorporate compensatory side agreements into the policy framework. At the same time INGOs are engaged in constructing and institutionalizing alternate global norms, for instance, in relation to the regulation of the environment, the workplace, the status of women, or the administration of justice (Guidry, Kennedy, & Zald 2000). Here, the experience of the World Social Forum is perhaps most instructive.

Taken together, these groupings are said to constitute a relatively institutionalized “Global Justice Movement” (GJM), grounded in national contexts and networked internationally through “Transnational
Advocacy Networks” (TANs) (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In its more formal roles the GJM takes on a series of mediating roles, communicating policy failings to elites, engendering policy adaptation, legitimizing institutional power, and normalizing dominant discourses. Confrontation between globalizing elites and subordinated peoples is displaced into intra-motion conflicts, and “antiglobalization” is institutionalized, perhaps creating a transnational “movement society.” There is, though, a question of whether INGOs, and the TANs they establish, can in any meaningful sense be understood as social movements. Some elements of national “movement society” may translate to the transnational level, in a scale shift that creates new sites for transnational contention (Tarrow 2005). The challenge this leaves is to explain why some sites emerge, as against others.

Cultural power

Social movements that contest the cultural power of globalization are especially emphasized by post-Marxist sociologists, such as Melucci, who focus on cultural conflicts of postindustrial societies, and their transition to “programmed,” “information,” or “network” societies (Melucci 1996). As national information society is globalized it is increasingly confronted by cross-national communities of resistance. Antiglobalization is seen as exemplifying these conflicts, as movements for autonomy against globalized info-society. The process whereby movements construct “communal heavens” against globalizing forces can be mapped across the globe: the resistance identities on which these movements are based are likely to be highly defensive; although, as some claim, these may develop in a more open-ended way to produce project identities geared to broader social transformation (Castells 1997). Across these movements the urge for autonomy valorizes the embedded experience, of embodied and affective collective action. As such, for instance, MacDonald characterizes such movements as “experience movements,” where the core of collective action is not some relatively fixed communal identity, but more the process of experiencing collective action itself (MacDonald 2006). These types of resistance are relatively open, governed by “fluidarity,” not “solidarity,” ranging across subjective moments rather than tied to a specific collective identity. Here collective action is enacted not so much through movement organizations as through embodied and affective experience in movement actions, what McDonald calls the “public experience of self” (McDonald 2006).

Many antiglobalization movements conform to this model: their key task is to regain subjectivity, to engage in “subjectification” as Touraine characterizes it, against cultural domination of globalization (Touraine 1995). Wherever globalization is experienced as a threat to existing subjectivities, rather than as an opportunity for new global orientations, the response is likely to manifest in efforts at marking-out and constructing personal, communal, local, or national autonomies as alternative foundations for political legitimacy. These autonomy movements are defined as ends in themselves, not as means to broader goals, and are aimed at securing a radical break with dominant ideologies, with liberalism as well as with neoliberalism. There are limits to this privileging of autonomy, and situations where it may become counter-productive, as a barrier to broader cross-cultural agendas and solidarities. To understand how movements have gone beyond a process of endless particularist skirmishing on the fringes of globalized power, we need to theorize less contingent connectivities.

Material power

In contrast with the political process school and with new social movement interpretations, the neo-Marxist approach has focused on material power under globalization. Here antiglobalization is interpreted as principally a revolt of subordinated classes against the political manifestations of globalized corporate power. Rather than “scaling-up” models developed for the national level, neo-Marxists have tended to take an explicitly global frame, interpreting capitalism since its inception as by definition a globalizing force. Since the 1970s, for instance,
World System theorists have sought to show how state power and the social power of dominant classes has combined to stabilize global capitalism. Shifts from one world order to the next, or from one globalization to the next, were linked in these accounts to conflicts in the mode of accumulation (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein 1989). Here, specific forms of resistance are seen as shaping the capacity to accumulate and the direction of change – a dialectical reading that sees the world capitalist system locked into battle with a range of antisystemic movements.

Others apply concepts of the Marxist Antonio Gramsci to the same problematic, focusing on how material contradictions shape ideological conflicts between hegemonies and counter-hegemonies (Gill 2002). The key process of forging a counter-hegemonic bloc capable of challenging globalism is then directly linked to movement structures for deliberation – such as through dialogic social forums, or through the creation of media hubs or convergence centers. The capacity to define commonality within diversity becomes a central preoccupation (Stephen 2010).

Other rereadings of the Marxian tradition in terms of globalism recognize the individuated character of revolt: for Hardt and Negri, for instance, antiglobalization manifests as a “multitude,” which (paradoxically) agglomerates mass individual reflexivity into revolutionary agency. Within this “distributed network . . . each struggle remains singular and tied to its local conditions but at the same time is immersed in the common web” (Hardt & Negri 2004: 217). Here the extension of a common field strengthens rather than undermines the singularities of its participants, displacing both institutional hierarchy and fragmented difference politics.

Whether antiglobalization is interpreted as an antisystemic movement, a counter-hegemonic bloc, or as a multitude, this articulation of different orientations into a shared movement is the central concern. A transnational capitalist class may be evident (Sklair 2000), but does this prefigure resistance? Global capitalist unity may be strengthening, but this does not necessarily generate a global anticapitalist response.

CONCLUSION

In 1998 Tarrow asked whether there is a transnational dynamic to contention (Tarrow 2005: 193): perspectives outlined here suggest at least three dynamics. These reflect contrasting interpretations of the primary source of power under globalization, that drive diverging predictions about the likely levels, modes, and vehicles of contestation. It may be that one perspective can and should be privileged over the other two. One source of power – be it institutional, info-cultural, or material – may play a constitutive role in global politics. Indeed, given the corporate character of the contemporary wave of globalization, neo-Marxist approaches may offer much in terms of an explanatory frame that addresses the current power play.

Yet, as noted, in many respects a focus on material power can fail to theorize the required counter-bloc. Sensitivity to the cultural logic of mobilization, and to institutional targets, may be vitally important: mobilizing collective identity may well be more meaningfully addressed through a cultural lens. Likewise, in practice the political institutions of corporate globalization are often most immediately visible, and the question of how such institutions are contested is a central conundrum.

At a certain level of abstraction it is possible to separate out the three approaches, and pose their explanations one against the other. In the concrete practice of antiglobalization, though, the tools they offer may be overlapping, and selectively deployed. In practice each perspective responds to a particular dimension of power under globalization, and there is ample evidence that all three forms of contestation have a role to play in reshaping global politics. Each approach has its own built-in limitations, and it may be that these can only be overcome if all three channels for contestation are related. It may be argued that a key factor
in challenging corporate globalization is this ability to concertize contestation.

SEE ALSO: Anti-World Bank and IMF riots; Global Justice Movement; Globalization and movements; Social Forum, World; Transnational social movements; Transnational Zapatism; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Antifeminist movements refer to organized opposition to group activism for women’s rights. They are examples of countermovements, which typically mobilize in reaction to perceived successes of the initial movement (Mottl 1980; Lo 1982; Zald & Useem 1987). Antifeminist mobilization is an indication that the feminist movement has begun to be taken seriously as a threat to the status quo. Perceived feminist successes alter the political opportunity structure, forcing opponents into public activism to halt movement momentum (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). Antifeminist movements are also a form of protest movement, challenging the legitimacy of the feminist movement as women’s representatives and rejecting feminist goals as antithetical to women’s interests. As reactive movements, antifeminist movements explicitly counter feminist claims. In contrast, the tactical position of the feminist movement is to ignore the opposition so as to minimize its importance. As the countermovement grows and becomes increasingly difficult to disregard, the feminist movement may change tactics and dismiss the opposition as insignificant and illegitimate in order to present the appearance of strength relative to emergent rivals. The ensuing competition forces interaction between the movement and its countermovement as each seeks political advantage.

The relationship between feminism and its opponents manifests some unique features compared to other historical examples of movements and countermovements. Unlike segregationists and civil rights groups or prohibitionists and liquor interests, the leadership and membership of feminist and antifeminist organizations are overwhelmingly drawn from the same female constituency. While there are many examples of minority group ambivalence or fear of reprisals from the powerful in pursuit of equal rights, the organized opposition of beneficiaries to group rights is rare. Feminist confrontation with antifeminism presents a strategic dilemma, for highlighting divisions among women undermines movement legitimacy. Partly for this reason, feminist organizations have been much less likely than antifeminists to identify women as their opponents. Histories of the women’s movement have often characterized the opposition as composed primarily of corporate interests and men’s organizations, an assertion that went unchallenged for decades.

The constraints of societal gender norms constitute another distinctive feature of the relationship between feminist and antifeminist movements. By asserting its right to equality in public life, the feminist movement challenges deeply embedded customs and values; to achieve popular support, feminist rhetoric may reframe their demands as consistent with women’s traditional responsibilities and recast movement goals from self-interest to societal improvement. On the other side, political activism thrusts women antifeminists into the contradictory position of engaging in the very behaviors they denounce among feminists. Both groups negotiate these social norms, seeking ways to cast themselves as true exemplars of womanhood and their opponents as imposters.

Scholarly investigation of antifeminist movements has been scant relative to research on feminism. It generally focuses on two periods of antifeminist mobilization, corresponding to the main waves of feminist activism. The first phase of sustained antifeminist activity in the United States emerged in the 1890s, following the unification of the suffrage movement into one national organization focused on the vote (Marshall 1997). The challenge confronting women on both sides of the suffrage question was how to make...
claims on the state as outsiders to the political process. Antisuffragists at first resolved this dilemma by using men to represent their position in legislative hearings. While this tactic enabled early women antisuffragists to remain in the background consistent with traditional gender norms, it hindered their effectiveness in challenging suffragist claims of majority support among women. Women’s antisuffrage organizations were nonetheless very active behind the scenes, monitoring suffrage progress through state legislatures throughout the country and sending money, literature, and paid organizers to speak against enfranchisement. Despite their admonishment of suffragists for conspicuous behavior, most opposition leaders were active in the women’s club movement, including patriotic-hereditary societies that emphasized the superiority of their social class. They used these networks to great advantage to monitor suffrage activity and recruit new members. Extensive kinship ties linked the antisuffrage leadership to prominent male politicians, lawyers, bankers, and industrialists, which provided funding for their activities and informal access to political elites. These channels of political influence partly explain why antisuffrage rhetoric claimed repeatedly that women had substantial political influence without the ballot.

Antifeminist rhetoric made the case against woman suffrage by rebutting the movement’s claim that enfranchisement was a woman’s right. They countered that suffrage was desired by only a small minority of women and thus violated democratic principles. In their view, suffrage was a radical experiment that would prove harmful to society. Antisuffragist writings dismissed the suffrage argument that voting would uplift their gender by countering that it would impose an undue burden on women’s important family responsibilities. Politics demeans rather than elevates, they argued, and woman’s political participation would only undermine her moral influence on family and society. During the Progressive Era, as suffragist rhetoric switched to the expediency argument that female enfranchisement would reform society, antisuffrage writings maintained that women’s traditional charitable works produce more social benefits than does the ballot. Changing with the times, antisuffragists switched from religious support for their position to increasing reliance upon scientific evidence, appropriating the evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer, the nascent eugenics movement, and modern views of scientific motherhood. As the suffrage campaign adopted more overt political tactics and switched its goal to passage of a federal amendment, the antisuffrage movement had little choice but to escalate its level of activism. The antisuffragists established a national antisuffrage organization, rented storefronts, lobbied Congress, and largely imitated their opponents while blaming their suffrage sisters for forcing them from their homes. With women’s enfranchisement in 1920, a reduced legion of antisuffrage activists reorganized into self-proclaimed patriotic societies and helped defeat feminist-sponsored social welfare legislation by tainting it with the socialist label. The political activation of conservative women that began with suffrage continued in opposition to the federal programs of the New Deal and participation in the isolationist movement leading up to the Second World War.

The second wave of antifeminist mobilization similarly followed perceived gains by the feminist movement. In the United States, two 1973 Supreme Court decisions legalizing abortion are widely regarded as judicial responses to feminist demands that abortion is a woman’s right. Large numbers of women, many motivated by religious values, quickly mobilized into a “pro-life” movement that asserted the sanctity of motherhood and framed abortion legalization as degrading rather than liberating women. Women activists on both sides of the abortion issue held distinctive worldviews on a wide range of issues, including women’s roles (Luker 1984). At the same time, the feminist movement was making rapid progress toward
ratification of a federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) that Congress had recently passed; in just its first year of eligibility, 30 states ratified the ERA. With passage imminent, new women’s organizations formed to halt feminist momentum. Phyllis Schlafly, who became the national leader of the anti-ERA movement, was a longtime conservative activist who labeled the Equal Rights Amendment the “extra responsibilities amendment.” According to antifeminist rhetoric, the ERA was a threat to women’s privilege; it would force women out of their homes and liberate men of the responsibility to support their families (Mansbridge 1986). They described feminists as women who wanted to be men and as radical subversives whose proposals like childcare services for employed mothers promoted a socialist agenda. This time the antifeminist movement had greater success; as they shifted public debate from equal rights to controversial changes in women’s roles, political support waned and the amendment was defeated.

The activation of antifeminist women in the 1970s achieved greater political influence as part of the New Right movement (Himmelstein 1990; Lienesch 1993). A focus on social issues distinguished this latest form of right-wing mobilization, described by some activists as a culture war. This expanded conservative agenda encompassed antifeminist and antiabortion positions as well as traditional women’s issues such as education, which concentrated on monitoring textbooks for liberal bias, returning prayer to school, and revising sex education curricula to focus on abstinence. The rhetoric of the New Right is explicitly antifeminist, claiming that changes in women’s roles are responsible for a host of social problems, including increases in divorce, nonmarital childbearing, and juvenile crime (Klatch 1987). They blame the feminist agenda of women’s independence for rendering men superfluous and confused over their roles, opening the door to deviant behaviors such as homosexuality. According to right-wing women, feminist demands for equal rights legislation have produced a bloated government bureaucracy that is expensive to maintain. While the New Right has become a strong force in electoral politics, one downside of its success is the eclipse of women’s contributions to the coalition by more visible men’s groups.

The contemporary antifeminist movement has changed over time, as the New Right appropriated liberal rhetoric and tactics to broaden its appeal (Moen 1992). Antiabortion organizations such as Operation Rescue borrowed sit-ins from the civil rights movement as a method of political protest and reframed the pro-life message to parental choice, defense of the rights of the unborn, and even women’s health. School prayer is portrayed as an issue of religious freedom, while liberal opponents are accused of bigotry and intolerance toward a persecuted religious minority. The rhetoric of choice extended to the campaign against homosexual rights; the right-wing argument that homosexuality is a chosen lifestyle has been incorporated into public debate on whether homosexuals merit the same legal protections as other minority groups. While continuing to uphold traditional values, antifeminist organizations have demonstrated an ability to innovate in pursuit of their goals. Still to be investigated is the recent appropriation of the feminist label by right-wing women politicians whose policy proposals remain solidly antifeminist.

SEE ALSO: Equal Rights Amendment (United States); Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Right-wing movements; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements.

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Anti-Japanese colonization resistance (Taiwan)

WAN-YAO CHOU

There were two stages in the Taiwanese anti-Japanese colonization resistance. The first stage was armed struggles against Japan’s takeover which took place between 1895 and 1915. The second was characterized by nonviolent movements led by intellectuals from 1920 to 1936. In terms of methods, goals, and participants, very few connections existed between these two modes of anticolonial activity.

In April 1895 the Ch’ing court ceded Taiwan to Japan under the terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty. Amidst chaos and the chagrin of islanders, Japan sent an army to claim this new colony in May of that year. The islanders resisted Japan’s takeover furiously. It took the Japanese army more than four months to bring the entire island under its control. But underground anti-Japanese activities continued and rebellious “plots” were sporadically discovered by the colonial authorities. In 1915 there occurred the Ta-pa-ni Incident, which was bloodily suppressed. In its aftermath, 866 of the 2000 or so people prosecuted were sentenced to death, though their sentences were reduced to life imprisonment later on. This was the last, and also the largest, anti-Japanese armed struggle on the part of the Han Taiwanese, while the fierce revolt known as the Musha Jiken (Wu-shé shih-chien in Mandarin) by aboriginals came as late as in 1930.

The bloody crushing of the Ta-pa-ni Incident made continued armed struggle infeasible. The majority of those involved in armed “riots” came from the lower strata of society. Meanwhile, a new generation of Taiwanese intellectuals who had a Japanese modern education had emerged in the colony. Many of them were studying in Japan itself, and especially in Tokyo, in the early 1920s. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination and other modern political ideas, young Taiwanese in Japan proper, with the support of leaders from the landed gentry – Lìm Hi‘an-tông (Lin Hsien-t’ang in Mandarin) and Chhòa Húi-ju (Ts’ai Hui-ju) – founded the New People’s Society (Shinmin kai). Its members, persuaded by the arguments of Lìm Têng-lók (Lin Ch‘eng-lu), initiated a movement that sought to establish a parliament in the colony – the Taiwan Parliament (Taiwan gikai). Home rule was the ultimate goal, and the proposed parliament aimed to counter the autocratic rule of the general-governor of Taiwan. The movement resorted to using the citizens’ right of petition guaranteed by the Imperial Constitution. It was named “The Petition Movement for the Establishment of Taiwan Parliament,” and was warmly supported by Taiwanese back home. In order to gather momentum for the movement as well as to improve the cultural qualities of the islanders, an organization called the Taiwan Culture Society (Taiwan bunka kyókaig) came into existence in 1921 under the leadership of Chiu‘Éi-súi (Chiang Wei-shui) and Lìm Hi‘an-tông. The society offered various events and activities, and had a tremendous impact on all parts of the populace.

The Taiwan Parliament movement suffered a setback in December 1923 when the majority of leading activists were arrested by colonial policemen on the accusation of violating “police security law.” The prosecution was widely viewed as a political suppression of the Taiwan Parliament movement by the colonial authorities, and in the end it only increased the visibility of the movement. Popular support reached its highest point in 1928 when the annual petition, containing more than 2000 signatures, was submitted to the Imperial Diet. However, a year earlier the split of the Taiwan Culture Society had dampened the solidarity of anticolonial communities.

As in most colonies, anticolonial forces in Taiwan consisted of leftists (communists, anarchists, etc.), liberals, and conservatives. The members of the New People's Society already demonstrated differences in their intellectual outlooks and there was conflict within the movement. In 1927 the Taiwan Culture Society was taken over by leftists and discontinued its support for the Taiwan Parliament movement. Meanwhile the farmers' movement was in the process of being formed. In 1926, the Taiwan Farmers Union (Taiwan nōmin kumiai) was established and enjoyed island-wide support. It had a membership of 25,000 in 1929. A year earlier, in 1928, the Taiwan Communist Party had come into existence in Shanghai, China. Some leading figures now returned to Taiwan to promote communism, though secretly as it was illegal, and founded a united front with the Taiwan Farmers Union and the Taiwan Culture Society. In 1929 and 1931 the three groups encountered iron-fist suppressions by the authorities and were reduced almost to nonexistence.

Having lost the Taiwan Culture Society to the leftists, core advocates of the Taiwan Parliament movement founded the Taiwan People's Party (Taiwan minshū-tō) in 1930 and continued to promote the movement. The party was disbanded the next year. The petitions repeatedly failed to be accepted in the Imperial Diet, resulting in decreasing enthusiasm on the part of islanders. With no prospect of success and the rise of rightists in Japan proper and on the colony, the leaders of this movement and decided to end the movement in September 1934. By then, they had submitted 15 rounds of petitions in 14 years to no avail. In 1936 the highly respected Lim Hián-tông was hit by a rightist Japanese activist at Taichū Park, and this symbolized the end of the anticolonial activities of the colonized. What awaited the islanders was the “Becoming Imperial Subjects” movement (kōminka undō) imposed by the General-Government of Taiwan, and which left no room for any kind of anti-Japanese resistance.

In sum, the Taiwan Parliament movement was the most important channel of nonviolent anticolonial resistance on the island. The establishment of the movement was the first time the intellectuals of the colony had regarded Taiwan as a single unit in their discourses and political projects. Thus, the movement helped crystallize the concept of “Taiwanese.” But the legal, if not conservative, method (i.e., via petition) limited the advocates’ imagination of home rule. The independence of the colony never emerged on the proclaimed anticolonial agenda, which perhaps had a far-reaching impact on the postwar history of Taiwan.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Repression and social movements; Resistance; Social control.

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Antinuclear power movements (in general)

WOLFGANG RÜDIG

OVERVIEW OF MOVEMENT DEVELOPMENT

Opposition movements against the civil use of nuclear power can be found as early as the late 1950s but it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that mass movements against ambitious nuclear construction programs were mobilizing in many Western democracies. Conflict intensity varied between countries; particularly fierce conflicts involving violence could be found in France and West Germany. By the early 1980s most countries had either abandoned plans for nuclear power or had successfully implemented their construction programs. While the Chernobyl accident of 1986 provided the background for a brief movement revival, the absence of new construction projects had removed the main stimulus behind the movement, and activity specifically targeted against nuclear power had effectively ceased in most countries by the early 1990s.

The exact effect of the antinuclear movement on the implementation of nuclear programs remains a matter of debate. Several countries abandoned all nuclear activities following protest; elsewhere, individual projects were stopped or delayed but many nuclear facilities were successfully completed, with electricity generated by nuclear power forming an important part of the energy economy. Beyond effects on the completion of nuclear construction projects, a number of other impacts can also be identified. In some countries, a climate of public opinion was created which made further nuclear activities difficult. This applies particularly to any projects concerning the disposal of nuclear waste but also provided an obstacle to a potential revival of the construction of nuclear power stations. The movement against nuclear power also had a strong impact on the organization of ecological movements. In many countries, nuclear power was a defining issue for a new generation of radical, modern environmental campaigning organizations. After the end of antinuclear mobilization, they embraced other issues and often have dominated the environmental field of social movement organizations since the 1980s. In some countries, the antinuclear movement also provided the main focus for the foundation of a new type of party, called ecologist or green parties, that campaigned on radical antinuclear positions. Green parties proved to be diligent followers of an antinuclear agenda, placing not just new construction but the phasing out of all nuclear activity on the agenda of government when these parties entered coalitions in some Western European countries in the late 1990s. While antinuclear movements have largely disappeared from public view in most countries since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the prospect of a revival of nuclear power construction in the late 2000s has reignited interest in the study of opposition to nuclear energy.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON ANTINUCLEAR POWER MOVEMENTS

Sociologists and political scientists started to research antinuclear movements from a social movement perspective in the late 1970s following the high profile of antinuclear mobilization earlier in that decade. The main approach at first was that of the case study, with several authors who later were to become major figures in the field publishing their first monographs on case studies of antinuclear conflicts in Germany and Switzerland (Kitschelt 1980; Rucht 1980; Kriesi 1982). The work of Alain...
Touraine, whose team had examined a range of social movements and turned their attention to the (French) antinuclear movement in late 1970s, first introduced a distinctively sociological perspective (Touraine et al. 1980). Touraine saw the antinuclear opposition potentially as “the” social movement in a process of social transformation to create a postindustrial society. While his methodological approach of “sociological intervention” found few followers amongst students of antinuclear movements, his work placed the movement firmly on the sociological agenda.

More influential became the interpretation of antinuclear movements as part of a new generation of so-called “new social movements.” This European approach to social movements sought to integrate their study into a theoretical framework inspired by authors such as Habermas and Offe who regarded “new social movements” as evidence of the legitimation crisis of late capitalism. While this approach provided a new theoretical perspective, its empirical use was limited and it was unable to explain the wide variety between countries in the strength of antinuclear mobilization.

Cross-national analyses trying to explain the strength and weaknesses of antinuclear movements had started to appear in the early 1980s. These studies were at first predominantly descriptive overviews not informed by specific theoretical approaches whose authors came to the field as experts on technological controversies and energy policy rather than social movements. This had changed, however, by the late 1980s when the first of a series of systematic attempts to explain the international development of antinuclear movements were published by European social scientists.

Of seminal importance was Herbert Kitschelt’s (1986) article using the concept of “political opportunity structure” to explain the differences in mobilization and impact of antinuclear activities in four countries. This reflected the strong influence that “resource mobilization” approaches by that time had exerted on European social scientists interested in the study of social movements. Kitschelt’s analysis has stood the test of time very well, and his basic insights have not been superseded by later analyses.

A rival approach was pursued by Rüdig (1990) who sought to draw on older social movement concepts such as “relative deprivation” to explain differences in the emergence of antinuclear movements, focusing in particular on the incidence and strength of local opposition movements. An alternative way to analyze the emergence of antinuclear movements could have been provided by the idea of movement “frames”: Gamson and Modigliani (1989) carried out a detailed analysis of media discourses of nuclear power in the United States, suggesting that the rise of antinuclear public opinion was associated with a “reframing” of the nuclear issue. No comparative efforts, however, were made to test the usefulness of the framing perspective for the explanation of cross-national differences in the emergence of antinuclear movements.

The 1990s saw a range of more sophisticated comparative efforts. Joppke (1993) carried out a detailed comparative study of antinuclear movements in the United States and West Germany, using a range of theoretical approaches as a heuristic framework. Joppke argued that “collective behavior” approaches had been unjustly neglected and added important insights into the dynamics of antinuclear movements. Fuchs and Rucht (1994) reported results of four surveys in five European countries carried out in the 1980s with data on the support for and probability of joining antinuclear groups. One of their findings was that the mobilization potential for the antinuclear movement was declining, but that there was significant overlap with other “new” social movements. This appears to be the only published study drawing on this dataset whose results are mainly interpreted in a qualitative way.

Moving beyond comparative case studies, Hanspeter Kriesi and his research group engaged in the theoretically and empirically most sophisticated effort thus far to explain new social movements in Western Europe, based on
the “protest event” methodology. Comparing data from four countries (Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), Kriesi and his team confirmed a series of hypotheses derived from “resource mobilization” approaches. With specific reference to the antinuclear movement, they found no or little support for alternative approaches based on grievances (such as relative deprivation) or frame alignment (Kriesi et al. 1995).

While the comparative case study and protest event approaches dominated attempts to understand the cross-national differences of movements, other systematic efforts to collect data on antinuclear activists and explain participation in such movement remained confined to studies at the national level.

In the United States, the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 stimulated a number of empirical inquiries. Apart from analyses of local opposition in the vicinity of TMI (Walsh 1988), a number of surveys of participants in antinuclear demonstrations were carried out in 1979 (Ladd, Hood, & Van Liere 1983; Scaminaci & Dunlap 1986) and 1984 (Jasper & Poulson 1995). However, compared with the huge body of empirical studies of other social movements in the United States, such as the civil rights and peace movements, work on nuclear energy remained rather limited and marginal in scope. Apart from Downey’s (1986) ethnographic study of the Clamshell Alliance, Kowalewski’s (1995) survey of the dynamics of a local movement opposed a nuclear waste facility, and Jasper’s (1997) exploration of the emotional aspects of antinuclear activism in California, there appear to be no published studies involving detailed empirical inquiry of antinuclear movements and their supporters. The main reason appears to be that antinuclear mobilization, and the salience of the nuclear issue in the national political debate, did not reach the high level that could be found in some West European countries – with the possible exception of a brief period after TMI.

Despite the high political salience of the issue in Europe, one struggles to identify seminal empirical studies going beyond qualitative case studies with the exception of those following the protest event methodology based on media reporting of protests. The main exception is the work of Karl-Dieter Opp, who managed to carry out a number of surveys which included radical opponents of nuclear power in Germany throughout the 1980s. These data, collected mainly by carrying out general surveys of public opinion in areas which had experienced significant nuclear conflict, were the basis of a series of high profile publications. Opp’s work is mainly inspired by rational choice theory which is employed in a number of variations to try to explain the participation of individuals in antinuclear activities (Opp et al. 1984; Opp 1986).

With the exception of a survey of members of a local Swiss antinuclear group carried out by Kriesi (1982), there appear to be no empirical studies that have been made in Europe of members of specific antinuclear organizations. The relative weakness and marginality of antinuclear movements in Britain, as in the case of the United States, contributed to a lack of detailed empirical research.

In Continental Europe, where nuclear energy had a higher political salience, one reason for this absence of empirical work based on survey data gathered from movement activists and groups themselves can be found in the high degree of confrontation and violence in the antinuclear movements. It would have been difficult if not impossible to survey demonstrators in countries such as France and West Germany, particularly as many antinuclear activists in the 1970s and 1980s strongly rejected empirical social science approaches as “positivist” and likely to favor the interests of the “state” or the nuclear industry. Kriesi (1982: 274–287) reported how his proposal to carry out a survey of antinuclear activists in Switzerland generated strong opposition and his great difficulty convincing at least one group to cooperate with the study. Opp circumvented this problem by identifying opponents with the help
of general attitude surveys in locations that had experienced a high level of antinuclear opposition rather than approaching antinuclear groups directly (Opp et al. 1984). A critical attitude to survey research also extended to parts of the social science community, with some researchers preferring to pursue qualitative approaches or concentrating on the theoretical refinement of interpretations of the wider social significance of antinuclear movements.

While the emergence and development of antinuclear movements, and the processes of micro-mobilization that attracted activists to it, are thus under-researched, one area that has been the subject of continuous systematic attention after the effective end of antinuclear mobilization is the policy impact of antinuclear movements. An early attempt to assess the impact on the basis of a careful comparison of cases (Flam 1994) has more recently been supplemented by more systematic empirical studies. Giugni (2004) provides a rigorous attempt to analyze the policy impacts of antinuclear movements (as well as ecology and peace movements) relying mainly on time-series analysis. Comparing the United States, Italy, and Switzerland, Giugni found the overall policy effect (operationalized in terms of government spending) of antinuclear movement mobilization to have been weak. Italy is the only country having experienced a direct effect of antinuclear activity. Taking account of the interaction between mobilization, political alliances, and public opinion, Giugni also diagnosed an impact for the United States, but not for Switzerland. Overall, antinuclear movements have had less of an impact than ecology movements but a higher impact than peace movements.

A far wider range of countries, 18 in total, is analyzed by Kolb (2007) who applies qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to understand movement impact in terms of the development of nuclear energy programs. Kolb shows that public opinion on nuclear energy was the most important predictor of movement impact, particularly after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. The strength of movement mobilization by itself was not sufficient; its role was conditioned by the opportunities that movements could take advantage of.

One limitation of these impact studies is that they quite narrowly focused on policy outcomes, and furthermore only considered the impact of these movements up to the mid-1990s at best. The late 1990s introduced a new dimension, with green parties negotiating limitations on nuclear activities as a condition of entering national governments, particularly important in Germany (Rüdig 2000). Also largely unexplored are the long-term impacts of the antinuclear movement on individual and collective behavior. This would be particularly important in countries which have experienced mass mobilization, for example in Germany where a fairly high degree of antinuclear activity had been sustained up to the late 2000s and government plans to extend the lifetime of nuclear power stations produced an instant surge of protest in 2010.

Finally, a further limitation that applies to the literature on antinuclear movements has been its concentration on a relatively small number of countries, essentially the United States and selected Western European countries. Social movement scholars have generally not analyzed antinuclear mobilization in the rest of the world. Many incidents of mobilization may have gone unnoticed and unstudied. There are some notable exceptions, however, which could be indicative of a far wider degree of mobilization outside of Western Europe and North America: Dawson (1996) compared antinuclear movements in three Eastern European states in the context of the collapse of communism, García-Gorena (1999) presented a detailed case study of a local antinuclear movement in Mexico, and Ho (2003) provided a detailed analysis of the development of antinuclear protest in Taiwan. Beyond the study of actual mobilization, the analysis of cases with a lack of protest activity, particularly focusing on countries with a high level of nuclear
generation such as Canada, would also enhance our understanding of antinuclear movements.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

The antinuclear power movement in the 2000s can be seen as a movement “in abeyance.” While issues of nuclear waste disposal continued to provide stimuli for protests over the years in several countries, the main period of antinuclear mobilization appeared to have ended by the late 1980s. The 2010s could possibly see the beginning of a new wave of movement activity in response to the relaunch of nuclear construction programs in Western democracies. New nuclear power stations are under construction in Finland and France, and governments in the United States and the United Kingdom have announced their intention of stimulating such construction projects in the near future. Furthermore, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan in March 2011 has reignited nuclear debates in several countries.

Faced with new programs of nuclear construction, how likely is a revival of the antinuclear protest? General public attitudes in the 2010s are probably more pro-environmental and critical of nuclear power than some 40 years ago, when movements had to revolt against an apparent pro-nuclear social and political consensus. Environmental groups and green parties have established a major foothold in many political systems. Major events, such as nuclear accidents, are also one way to revive opposition. Other factors, however, could make strong opposition less likely. An important aspect is the new “framing” of nuclear power in the twenty-first century as a contribution to combating global warming. Furthermore, there is the existence of a large number of long-standing nuclear host communities which are likely to welcome further nuclear construction, thus limiting the potential of strong local opposition that tends to emerge from “green field” sites. Both renewed mobilization and a possible failure of the movement to reemerge provides social movement scholars with interesting analytical challenges, making the study of antinuclear power movements not just an historical task but also an enterprise with contemporary relevance.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Antinuclear movement in Japan; Antiwar and peace movements; Framing and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; New social movements and new social movement theory; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Relative deprivation.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

antinuclear power movements (in general)


Antinuclear movement in Japan

DANIEL P. ALDRICH

Japan remains the only nation in the world to have experienced the horrors of atomic weaponry at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the government initially suppressed public debate on the topic and the postwar occupation authorities temporarily banned research on nuclear power (Yoshioka 1999; DiFilippo 2003). Thus, there was a lag between the bombings and the start of broader antinuclear movements, which began in the 1950s as a result of widespread anger over the deadly exposure of Japanese fishermen to radioactive fallout. Antinuclear power movements evolved alongside antinuclear weapons associations as Japan’s commercial atomic program moved forward. Japan’s unique history created broad sympathy for antinuclear ideologies, with many prominent authors writing about the victims of the atomic bomb, known as *hibakusha*, in works such as Ibuse Masuji’s *Black Rain*. This sympathy did not prevent the Japanese government from creating an advanced commercial nuclear program with attempts at a closed fuel cycle and the use of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Although the government promotes nuclear power domestically and sells nuclear technology and training to other nations, it has stood by its Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not possessing, manufacturing, or permitting nuclear weapons in Japanese territory) and has not pursued nuclear weapons.

The focusing event for antinuclear social movements came in the mid-1950s, after which a number of organizations formed at the national level; some have supported nuclear power while opposing atomic weapons, and others have opposed both. In March 1954, radioactive fallout from a hydrogen bomb test in the Marshall Islands exposed 23 crewmen onboard the fishing boat Lucky Dragon Number 5 to high doses of radiation. As radio operator Kuboyama Aikichi passed away from radiation sickness in September 1954, housewives in Tokyo were mobilizing a petition—the Suginami Appeal for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs—which garnered more than 30 million signatures (more than half of Japan’s voting population) by August 1955. In September 1955 *Gensuikyō* (*Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai*, the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) organized as the earliest national antinuclear movement; connected to the Japan Communist Party (JCP), it has opposed nuclear weapons while often supporting nuclear power. In 1965, the Japan Socialist Party and Šōhyō split off from Gensuikyō to form the Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikinin*) which opposed both nuclear energy and weapons. Under public pressure, Prime Minister Eisaku Satō laid out the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1967 which were adopted (but not written into law) by the Diet in 1971. The year 1969 marked the first large scale antinuclear demonstrations from fishermen, who mobilized 1000 boats to protest the government-run nuclear facilities at Tōkaimura. In 1975 nuclear chemist Dr Takagi Jinzaburo founded the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC, *Genshiryoku Shiryō Jōhōshitsu*) and soon afterwards the *Hangenpatsu Undō Zenkoku Rengakai* (National Liaison Conference of Anti-Nuclear Movements) began publishing the *Hangenpatsu Shinbun* (Anti Nuclear Newspaper) (Tabusa 1992). These movements tapped broader concerns about nuclear technology in general; such suspicions came to be known as *kaku arerugi* (nuclear allergy).

While national level organizations regularly hold rallies, marches, and protests against both nuclear weapons and plants, local civil
society organizations have proved the most effective at altering nuclear power schemes. Regular surveys have confirmed that more than three-quarters of Japanese citizens oppose nuclear weapons and annually more than one million visitors – many of them Japanese children – come to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. In potential host communities for nuclear power plants, fishing cooperatives (gyogyō rōdō kumiai) – which hold property rights that must be acquired by developers – derailed a number of siting plans due to concerns about the effects of hot waste-water discharge from the plants (Lesbirel 1998).

To counteract concerns about atomic energy, the Japanese government worked with the regional utility companies using a two-pronged strategy: developers sought to site nuclear plants in rural coastal villages where civil society was diminished and potential resistance weakest, and government agencies like the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy used a multifaceted set of central government policy instruments to move local residents toward accepting nuclear power (Aldrich 2008). These tools include the institutionalized redistributive mechanism known as Dengen Sanpō (The Three Power Source Development Laws), which provides millions of dollars in subsidies, loans for attracting business and job retraining, and infrastructure projects to often impoverished and depopulated rural villages (Aldrich 2005).

Toward the end of the twentieth century, a fatal accident at the Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company (JCO) and cover-ups of accidents at multiple reactor sites amplified concerns about the safety of nuclear power, as have admissions that US military craft have brought nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. Protests against the use of MOX fuel and fuel recycling facilities continue, as seen in October 2009 when more than 7000 citizens mobilized in Tokyo’s Meiji Park. Overall, the Japanese antinuclear movement has slowed the government’s trajectory for commercial nuclear power (so that lead times for nuclear construction have more than tripled since the 1970s), but has not stopped its momentum; on the other hand, US–Japan security arrangements in combination with broader sympathy for hibakusha have reinforced the government’s abstention from nuclear weapons.

SEE ALSO: Antinuclear power movements (in general); Antiwar and peace movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Antiracist movements in Europe
CARLO RUZZA

In Europe, antiracist protest activities are a relatively less frequent and durable manifestation of a strong and fairly institutionalized cultural current of legally embedded antiracist values. Antiracism as a value informs a number of social arenas in which different types of actors contribute to defining and expanding conceptions of citizenship and antiracist policies, sometimes using contentious political repertoires. Their efforts also include judicial activism, advocacy at different levels of governance, initiatives in the public sphere, and sensitizing campaigns in social organizations such as workplace organizations, churches, and educational establishments. Antiracist activities also emerge in specific professional contexts, as with the police and probation professionals.

Antiracism has traditionally focused on biological racism but it increasingly responds to cultural essentialist definitions of racism, and to the ethnic and religious discrimination manifest, for instance, in the Islamophobia and anti-Semitism that characterize several European societies.

Historically, antiracist mobilizations have at times intensified and accompanied momentous societal restructuring, as in the case of the civil rights movement in the United States or that of the South African struggle against apartheid. However, in recent years, antiracist mobilizations in Europe have been more limited. Social and political actors are often only occasional participants in protest events and remain focused on furthering antiracism in the broader context of a set of interrelated cultural and policy initiatives inspired by related movements, which also include a focus on expanding human rights and enhancing social justice in specific policy sectors. As European societies absorb growing numbers of refugees and migrants and deal with the resulting tensions represented by extreme right formations, European antiracist mobilization has become increasingly and distinctly defined in terms of a countermovement advocating social integration, access to public services, and the legal entitlements of radicalized minorities.

Hence, in order to understand European antiracist mobilizations, it is necessary to review their (1) countermovement character, (2) their fragmentation of action repertoires, objectives, and philosophies, and (3) their distinctive supranational opportunity structures.

COUNTERMOVEMENT CHARACTER

The countermovement character of antiracist mobilization lies in its oppositional stand against the diffusion of culturally racist frames in the popular press and in mainstream center-right parties, and in its reactions to a public opinion that sees the new citizens of European countries as competitors and threats to security. Antiracism is therefore a countermovement because it opposes a strong current of opinion. It is also a countermovement because it opposes the right-wing movements that perpetrate concerted attacks against minorities. In recent years a composite family of social movements of the right have appeared in Europe. The uniting nationalism that characterized earlier right-wing movements has expanded to incorporate related frames which include ethno-nationalist xenophobic groups yearning for a revival of ethnic community. In this context, antiracism has, on the one hand, remained defined in relation to a set of state-supported legal entitlements connected to discourses of human rights, and thus has come to function partly as
an institutionalized ideology. On the other 
hand, antiracism has become increasingly 
mapped on the left of the left–right axis as 
a countermovement embedded in militant 
antiracist groups, left-leaning political parties, 
and social institutions such as the trade unions. 
It is in relation to this aspect of antiracism that 
contentious action repertoires have been more 
likely to emerge, and consequently antiracist 
mobilization has often been characterized as 
a countermovement. This countermovement 
character has been colored by distinctively 
national philosophies which have, for instance, 
differentiated the United Kingdom and 
French expressions, in one case adopting a 
multiculturalist philosophy and in the other 
an assimilationist one (Lentin 2004). 

The constituencies involved in these anti-
racist mobilizations are, on the one hand, 
resource-poor migrants, and on the other, con-
science constituencies of left-liberal activists 
whose activities are weakened by the diffi-
culty of establishing links with the migrant 
population and the awareness of an unsup-
portive public opinion climate. This coun-
termovement ethos has been strengthened by 
key geopolitical episodes of recent decades. 
The September 11 attacks and related events 
have sparked anti-Islamic sentiments which 
have been interpreted in antiracist terms by 
the entire left-liberal social movement sec-
tor (Alleyne 2010). However, as a reactive 
movement, antiracist mobilization has often 
emerged in contexts of social isolation – facing 
a relatively unsupportive public opinion which 
sees nonwhites as unwelcome migrants and 
as competitors for jobs and resources of the 
welfare state.

FRAGMENTATION AND COMPETING 
CULTURAL FRAMINGS

Limited mobilization effectiveness is also 
related to the movement’s internal cultural 
fragmentation. Scholars have identified several 
competing cultural framings of antiracism that 
are thought to hinder its viability (Gilroy 1990). 

This particularly applies to framing tensions 
resulting from lack of solidarity between the 
different movement components which are 
too fragmented in terms of occupational, 
religious, and ethnic background to agree 
on objectives and methods (Bonnett 2000). 
In recent decades, in several EU countries, a 
revival of ethnic assertiveness has occurred, 
a consequence of which has been a rejection 
of the previous antiracist’s unifying category of 
“black” as insensitive to cultural and religious 
diversity. This has divided the movement, 
with some advocating a curb to self-defeating 
multiple ethnic identities, and others arguing 
for separate ethnic identities to unite in 
a coalition of mobilized groups. A related 
debate takes place regarding the connection 
of antiracist mobilization to class and gender 
conflicts. For some, antiracism is a primary 
goal, and for others it needs to be addressed 
in the context of the struggle against other 
forms of exclusion. Antiracist frames are also 
widely used by other movements such as peace 
movements – particularly in relation to their 
activities to protest against ethnic wars – but 
they play an role auxiliary to these movements’ 
main frames.

In recent years, movements have to some 
extent overcome their internal divisions when 
a response to racial attacks has newly uni-
ted them, reinforcing their countermovement 
character and strengthening countermovement 
organizations and unaffiliated groups of indi-
viduals. Antiracist urban riots have occurred 
in poor urban neighborhoods in France and 
the United Kingdom: notably in the United 
Kingdom poor areas like Peckham and cities 
like Bristol and Birmingham in the eighties 
and, in France, Paris in 2005 (Begag 2007). 
They consist of confrontations between the 
police and youth generated by simmering eth-
nic tensions related to poverty and social exclu-
sion. The organizational setup that supports 
them is often relatively weak and short-lived 
because stable organizations do not have time 
to develop because grievances emerge in pop-
ulations lacking the resources to produce such 
organizations.
Antifascist antiracism has also emerged in restricted contexts, such as football, a sport in which racism is frequently manifest. There are coordinated national campaigns like the “Show Racism the Red Card” initiative in football, which has retained relevance for decades (Long & Spracklen 2011).

To sum up, it has been argued that European antiracist movements are fragmented along a set of dimensions. Some seek to attain coalitions of separate ethnic identities, others more overarching identities. There is at times a focus on institutional arenas which clashes with a focus on antifascist protest. A focus on education and cultural initiatives targeting majority culture clashes with the goal of strengthening community-based organizations aimed at politicizing ethnic and religious identities. However, whilst antiracism is a fragmented movement, there are also broadly ranging generalist organizations that unite the movements' various components, such as “SOS Racisme” in France, which focuses on both militant antifascism and cultural and institutional initiatives.

Although thematic and organizational fragmentation has hindered mobilization, it has helped to diffuse antiracism throughout the institutional fabric of European societies. One then finds a wealth of grassroots organizations campaigning against “institutional racism” in various domains, organizations engaged in policy advocacy, migrant organizations acting as public interest groups and lobbies, government-sponsored organizations that are often semi-autonomous, and institutional mediators that exert antiracist functions in specific contexts such as health institutions (Fella & Ruzza 2012). Some of these organizations are integrated into umbrella groups represented at the EU level. However, the relative distribution of these types of organizations is differentiated within Europe, with France expressing a less institutionalized tradition, the United Kingdom exhibiting both institutionalized and un-institutionalized groups, Scandinavian countries exhibiting strong state-sponsored antiracism, and the Mediterranean rim exhibiting a strong contribution of conscience constituency activists with bases in the Catholic Church or in leftist parties (Flam & Lloyd 2008).

SUPRANATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

A diffusion of antiracism has also occurred in supranational contexts where issues of legal legitimacy and human rights are paramount. One such context of particular importance is constituted by supranational and transnational institutions such as the European Commission and Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations. At the EU level, a powerful coalition of institutional actors and human rights activists has spearheaded antiracist legislation and successfully contributed to the diffusion of antiracist concerns in all European institutions. With the approval of two specific antiracist directives, the antiracist movement has found in the EU distinctive opportunities for mobilization and for judicial activism connected to the creation of a Europe-wide legal base to engage in and legitimize antiracist action. In the EU context, antiracist activities are utilized by a set of bureaucratic actors to gain legitimacy, and are therefore supported and resourced. This has also had a particular enabling impact on the political opportunities of the Mediterranean rim countries, where a relatively recent migrant population is still unable to mobilize itself. Antiracist activities are then often supported by an indigenous base of conscience-constituency activists empowered by the legitimacy and resources that EU support furnishes.

SEE ALSO: Antiapartheid movement (South Africa); Civil rights movement (United States); Framing and social movements; Human rights movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Racist social movements; Right-wing movements; Urban riots in Europe, post-2000.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Antislavery movement
MARISSA D. KING

The movement to abolish slavery and end the slave trade, which began first in Europe and then the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, was one of the first modern social movements. The abolition movements in France and Britain, which sought to end the slave trade among the colonies, and the movement to end slavery in the United States shared critical qualities that set them apart from earlier reform efforts. In the early eighteenth century, social protests were primarily short-lived outbursts mounted by loosely connected groups that were geographically constrained and emphasized local demands. In contrast, the antislavery movement was sustained, formally organized, transcended disparate geographies, and often directed their claims toward the state. The birth of the modern social movement was defined by a shift in the repertoires of contention – the set of actions activists use to assert their claims – from parochial, bifurcated, and particular to cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous (Tilly 1995; Tarrow 1998). The antislavery movement’s innovative early utilization of the media, religious organizations, and formal organizations in its organizing efforts was key to the movement’s ability to develop a sustained geographically dispersed movement that transcended national boundaries and acted as a catalyst for the abolition of slavery, thereby making it one of the most significant modern social movements. Moreover, it was one of the first social movements to transcend national boundaries, making it one of the earliest transnational social movements.

In both the United States and Europe the earliest efforts to abolish slavery and the slave trade were undertaken by elites who sought reform through judicial appeals. The movement to abolish slavery can be traced to 1542 when Spain enacted a law to abolish slavery in its colonies. The law was repealed shortly thereafter and further attempts to end the slave trade in Europe would not gain momentum again until the late 1700s. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, antislavery reformers in the United Kingdom once again began efforts to end the slave trade through legal means. The trial of John Sommerset, a captured runaway slave, in England in 1772 drew considerable media attention to the antislavery cause and marked the beginning of concerted antislavery organizing in Britain. While several attempts were made to end slavery through legislative means in the late 1770s and 1780s, an organized antislavery effort in Britain did not take root until 1787 with the establishment of the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Many of the early antislavery organizing efforts in Britain relied on informational campaigns and mass petitions. By 1792, the year after slavery was outlawed in the French Empire (this was later repealed by Napoleon), the antislavery movement had gained momentum throughout the British Isles with over 400,000 people participating in petitioning efforts. The war between Britain and France, which began in 1793, slowed the momentum of the antislavery movement. However, attempts to end the slave trade through legislative means continued and the efforts were finally met with some success in 1806 with the passage of the Foreign Slave Bill. The Foreign Slave Bill outlawed the export of slaves from Africa to any colony that was recently acquired, substantially reducing the size of the slave trade. The following year the General Abolition Act was passed and its enactment in 1808 ended Britain’s participation in the slave trade. With the end of the slave trade in the British Empire, British abolitionists and the British government began using political and economic power to end slavery in other countries. Through a series of treaties and negotiations, Britain convinced Spain to curb its slave trade in 1817, followed shortly
thereafter by Portugal and France. British anti-
slavery organizers were also closely aligned with
and committed to helping antislavery activists
in the United States.

Much like early antislavery societies in
Britain, members of the earliest antislavery
societies were often prominent white politi-
cians, lawyers, philanthropists, and business-
men, including such notables as Benjamin
Franklin and Alexander Hamilton. The first
antislavery societies in America, which consti-
tuted the center of antislavery organizing in the
United States, were the Pennsylvania Abolition
Society founded in 1775 by a group of promi-
nent Quakers, the New York Manumission
Society, founded in 1785, and the American
Convention of Abolition Societies, founded in
1794. These early societies supported a pre-
modern social movement, one that depended
on the peculiarities of local resources and
whose targets were often local slave owners.
The early antislavery organizations advocated
gradual abolition of slavery and their tactics
emphasized voluntary manumissions, legal
aid for blacks, and petitions to state gov-
ernments. This style of local legal activism
and elite organizing dominated the early
years of the American antislavery movement.
The antislavery movement in the United
States became increasingly modern with the
founding of the American Anti-Slavery Society
(AASS) in 1832. The AASS adopted a regional
federated structure comprising nested local,
state, and national chapters. This federated
model, which first became popular among
civic organizations and temperance societies in
the 1820s, enabled a franchise-like expansion;
it reduced mobilization and coordination costs
by providing a template for organizing and a
way to link local groups to a nationwide effort.

With organizational changes came changes
in ideology and tactics. In contrast to ear-
lier elite-based antislavery societies that sought
manumission and gradual abolition, the AASS
initiated a popular grassroots campaign to pro-
mote immediate abolition. Rather than having
prominent citizens sign petitions or bring law-
suits, the AASS sought to build widespread
support among the citizenry to end slavery
through a moral transformation that would
turn the entire populace into abolitionists. To
that end, the AASS relied on emotive appeals,
traveling agents, the propagation of literature,
and the formation of local societies. A con-
tinual tension within the American antislavery
movement that was not faced in other coun-
tries was whether to gradually get rid of slavery
through manumission or through a large scale
antislavery effort. Over time and under the aus-
pices of the AASS, immediate abolition gained
in popularity.

The number of antislavery societies re-
ained quite small from the 1790s to the
1820s because early antislavery societies had
a narrow membership base. There were never
more than 20 antislavery societies in the years
before 1820 and fewer than 65 before 1830.
The number of antislavery societies grew
explosively in the 1830s: from 47 in 1825 to
429 in 1835 and over 1600 in 1839, at which
point the organized antislavery movement
peaked. In 1840, the antislavery movement
began to fragment over what role women
should play and whether abolitionists should
engage in political action. This fragmentation
happened, in part, because antislavery societies
embraced a broad and therefore heterogeneous
constituency. After 1840, the antislavery move-
ment never regained its earlier organizational
unity. After 1840, the antislavery movement
became increasingly intertwined in politics
and eventually war. Slavery would be abolished
in the United States due to political action at
the end of the Civil War in 1865.

Both in the United States and in Britain,
the antislavery movement grew from a limited
movement that relied on elite-based antislavery
societies, petitions, and lawsuits to a large-scale,
geographically dispersed movement that tran-
scended national boundaries. The transition in
both continents to becoming a modern social
movement was aided by changes in organi-
zational structure and tactical repertoires. In
the early decades of the antislavery movement,
there were few resources and little infrastruc-
ture to support, sustain, and coordinate social
movement organizations. But over the next six decades, many supportive institutions began to flourish: the press exploded, and religious revivals contributed to the largest expansion of organized religion to date. Without the resources and infrastructure provided by these social institutions, organizing for reform would have proved formidable, if not impossible. Antislavery organizers benefited from and utilized extensively the burgeoning press, religious institutions, and formal organizational structures. In doing so, they not only helped the antislavery movement develop into one of the earliest modern social movements but also deployed many of the organizing tactics that would be central for many later social movements, including the civil rights movement.

In an effort to transform into a social movement with a broader base of support, antislavery organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom increasingly utilized traveling agents, the media, and local societies to gain support for their cause. Religious organizations were also critical to the spread of the antislavery movement. The movement both in Britain and the United States first took root among Quakers and then spread to and through other religious organizations. Churches were extremely powerful because they provided an extensive preexisting organizational infrastructure, a platform for making a compelling moral case against slavery, and they provided legitimacy and resources for the movement. These worldly religions, which were undergirded by a principle of disinterested benevolence in which the faithful have a moral responsibility to reform society as a whole, were particularly central to the antislavery movement. Similarly, the propagation of literature, petitions, and other forms of print media were critical for the development of a broad-based sustained antislavery movement. Hundreds of publications devoted to the antislavery cause were developed throughout the movement. These publications were supported and circulated beyond regional boundaries through the efforts of antislavery agents, who traveled from town to town espousing the antislavery cause. Agents actively courted the press, particularly local newspapers and magazines, and wrote articles that would appeal to local audiences because periodicals could spread the cause faster and farther than lecturers. Finally, the efforts of antislavery organizers to transcend local boundaries and develop a sustained movement was facilitated by a federated organizing structure that spread the movement in a franchise-like expansion. The organizational and tactical innovations deployed by the antislavery movement that allowed it to become one of the earliest modern social movements and one of the first modern social movements were not unique to the abolition movement. Both the temperance and early women’s movement, contemporaries of the antislavery movement, employed similar tactics and repertoires of contention. Thus, the tactics that diffused within the antislavery movement across national borders also transcended movements.

SEE ALSO: Ideology; Media and social movements; Penal abolitionist movement; Religion and social movements; Repertoires of contention; Slave rebellions; Suffrage movement, international; Tactics; Temperance movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Antiwar and peace movements
DAVID S. MEYER

INTRODUCTION

War built the modern nation-state, and the modern nation-state made the modern social movement possible. To maintain (or extend) borders and wealth, the modern state developed a bureaucratic structure to extract its citizenry’s sons and dollars, and that bureaucratic structure provides both a target and an interlocutor for challenging movements. Often, those movements challenge war and preparations for war. Peace and antiwar movements mobilize for a variety of goals, ranging from stopping the prosecution of particular military campaigns to stopping the preparations for war to creating a more just and pacific world through social services and citizen diplomacy. Antiwar and peace movements seek to constrain their own states and often reach outside national borders to cooperate with those who share their beliefs. Although some people are so committed to peace politics that they are virtually constantly mobilized, larger and more social movements emerge only when the costs and threats of war and war preparations become particularly visible.

Peace activists rarely win outright victories by preventing wars, but their actions often matter in other ways, changing public opinion, forcing policymakers to alter their goals, or undermining the institutional or political infrastructure that supports war-making. They can also build transnational ties that can serve as the basis for stronger campaigns in the future, making the prosecution of war more difficult. They have also provided the infrastructure for campaigns on other issues; the historic peace churches, for example, provided the infrastructure for the abolitionist movement, and antiwar activists advocated both women’s rights and state-provided social services – as well as international cooperation.

Campaigns against war, including both protest and grassroots efforts at international cooperation, have a history that is, at least, as long as the history of war. The end of World War II, however, marks a significant change in their history. The introduction of nuclear weapons into world politics through devastating attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki made great wars seem less and less possible. They also moved the international system from one in which several great powers competed for dominance, cresting and declining in influence, to one in which superpowers maintained a permanent military presence (and threat of war), organizing the world system around a great military and ideological conflict, while (mostly) replacing wars among the great powers to proxy wars in less powerful and less wealthy states. World War II changed not only the international political order and the possibilities and conduct for war, but also the opportunities for activists to fight against it. The permanence of the threat and preparations for war meant that activists found cause to challenge governments even in the absence of actual fighting; like war, the possibility of peace mobilization was also always imminent.

While the possibility of nuclear war has remained a constant presence in world politics, antiwar movements and antinuclear movements have waxed and waned in response to political conditions. For the most part, vigorous antiwar movements have been limited to democratic states, which afford internal opponents sufficient political space to organize and mobilize, although even liberal democratic states have used the excuse of war to limit political freedoms. Until recently, antiwar movements have grown as the costs, both human and fiscal, of conducting wars grew and became more evident. Antiwar movements become more
powerful when well-established, but generally marginal, pacifist opponents of war in general join with larger groups who oppose a particular war — often for a wide variety of reasons.

The story for antinuclear movements is broadly similar. Movements against particular weapons systems and the arms race in general have waxed and waned in response to the visibility and volatility of nuclear weapons policies. During much of the nuclear era, their efforts were largely invisible, sustained by a core of pacifist, anti-interventionist, and international humanitarian organizations with relatively small constituencies. On occasion, however, opposition to nuclear weapons policies has spread beyond these relatively marginal groups to engage large sectors of the population and mainstream politics.

Paradoxically, peace movements played an important role in maintaining a relatively stable nuclear balance, growing and diversifying when authorities threatened to escalate the arms race. In recent years, for example, as the number of nuclear weapons deployed by superpowers has declined rather steadily, peace movements have been largely absent from the debate. In contrast, the movements were most visible when the West was visibly and actively augmenting its nuclear arsenals. Governments work to manage their opposition by using the resources of the state to legitimate a particular war and discredit their opponents as disloyal and naive. Activists have to work to maintain a sense of urgency while simultaneously demonstrating their patriotism and good sense (Woehlre, Coy, & Maney 2008). This is a difficult balance to maintain, possible on a large scale only in unusual circumstances.

Opportunities for peace movement mobilization are characterized by visible splits among policymakers and strategic experts that spill outside the boundaries of political institutions. The peace movement takes advantage of splits among elites and exploits anxieties in the broader public by stoking public fears of the dangers of war and criticizing the costs and risks of more aggressive foreign and military policies. Movement activists have been far more successful at opposing state policies than promoting alternatives.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

During the relatively brief episodes of wide public attention and extensive mobilization, we see broad coalitions of activists emerge and alternative policies seem possible. As movement actors mobilize, they forge coalitions with more institutionally oriented actors. Although these alliances make it easier for a movement to get alternative perspectives out to a broad public, they also limit the extent of just how alternative those perspectives will be. These periods end when government makes some kind of accommodation with public concerns, often by moderating the policy disputes that provoked mobilization in the first place. We can see the general process through which peace campaigns grow and decline by offering a broad historical background and then sketching the most significant instances of broad mobilization since World War II.

Dating back to the 1600s, the historic peace churches — the Quakers, Church of the Brethren, and Mennonites — served as the core of a peace movement, and advocated social justice as well as nonviolence (DeBenedetti 1980; Chatfield 1992). Religious activists also worked for the abolition of slavery, fair treatment of native Americans, and the rights of women. Stopping war was only one part of the faith-based reform agenda. Beginning in the 1800s, secular peace societies focused on the issue of international war and its prevention, and organized international meetings to coordinate their efforts.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, peace activists tried to imagine and effect a new international framework that could prevent wars. At the individual level, activists organized young men to sign “peace pledges” signifying their refusal to fight for their countries. And they pushed for greater international coordination, sometimes advocating a supranational organization or even a world government. The
failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, and the new security era occasioned by the aftermath of that war, altered the political circumstances for activists permanently.

The first political opponents of nuclear weapons were the scientists who had helped develop them. Even while working to create atomic weapons, many scientists had misgivings about their use, but saw the threat of Hitler’s Germany as so great that they put their doubts aside (Herken 1987). Formal efforts to share scientific data internationally and to use the first nuclear bomb as a demonstration strike rather than an attack on a city were unsuccessful, and then the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki spurred a broader public debate. Several groups of scientists formed by the end of 1945 to focus on public education about nuclear weapons, most notably the Federation of Atomic Scientists, which published The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists featuring a “doomsday clock” assessing the threat of nuclear war on its cover. They sought to inform the public debate.

Initially, mass media, politicians, and clerics focused debate on the weapons’ destructiveness and potential applications. Norman Cousins’ influential essay, “Modern Man is Obsolete,” published in the Saturday Review just a week after the bombing of Nagasaki, helped to frame the debate and critique of atomic weapons. For Cousins, nuclear weapons represented a new problem for which there was only one solution: world government. This remedy found limited support which declined as the United Nations developed. Efforts to create an international regime for the control of nuclear weapons failed because of Soviet intransigence and American disinterest and took a back-seat to less focused discussions of the morality of nuclear weapons. By 1948, the cold war struggle crowded out most of those concerns, as the West sold nuclear weapons as a tool to combat global communism in general, and the Soviet Union in particular (Divine 1978; Boyer 1986; Wittner 1997–2003, vol. 3). In essence, fear of communism overshadowed fear of nuclear weapons, and the promise of nuclear energy legitimated ongoing research on weapons.

THE TEST BAN

If peace protests in the immediate aftermath of World War II lacked a clear policy agenda, this was assuredly not the case for the movement’s reemergence in the 1950. A new provocation, specifically the public discovery that dangerous radioactive fallout was a product of nuclear testing, combined with a more open political environment occasioned by the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War. This pattern of opportunities, threats, and organization coinciding repeats in stories of successful mobilization (Meyer 1993). Antinuclear protest would come from leaders internationally, expert scientists in the United States and Europe, and radical pacifists at the grassroots.

In March 1954, radioactive fallout from the BRAVO tests in the Bikini Islands covered “The Lucky Dragon,” a Japanese tuna trawler, contaminating its crew and catch, and drawing international attention to the hazards of atomic testing. Pope Pius XII, Jawaharlal Nehru, the British Labour Party, and the Japanese Diet immediately appealed to the United States to stop nuclear testing and negotiate a test ban, and opposition to testing was a leading edge in making broader claims about the wisdom and morality of nuclear arms in general (Divine 1978).

While the Eisenhower administration, internally divided, temporized on test ban proposals, activists focused on the dangers of radioactive fallout, as scientists published their research on fallout in public venues, including the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. A group of international scientists issued the “Einstein–Russell Manifesto,” which called for an end to testing and the arms race, and this effort led to a series of more than 200 Pugwash international meetings of scientists that continues to this day.

Even as international figures made moral and political arguments grounded in science,
Grassroots activists staged dramatic actions to protest the nuclear arms race. Groups of activists publicly refused to cooperate with civil defense exercises in the United States, and worked hard to trespass on nuclear test sites, including, most dramatically, Albert Bigelow’s effort to sail a yacht, *The Golden Rule*, into a South Pacific nuclear test site. In 1956, British citizens staged an Easter demonstration in Aldermaston, where Britain was developing its own nuclear weapons. The newly founded British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) would stage annual marches from Aldermaston to London to protest the arms race generally, and Britain’s participation in it, and activists in other English-speaking nations formed sister CND groups that staged protests and marches as well (Wittner 1997–2003, vol. 2).

Activist efforts bounced in and out of electoral politics, depending upon the prospects of success. To quiet political opposition, by 1957 officials in the United States and Great Britain moved toward negotiations on a test ban. Eisenhower and Khrushchev presided over a testing moratorium 1958 to 1960. In the 1960 presidential campaign both Richard Nixon and John Kennedy promised, if elected, to secure an arms control agreement on testing. When negotiations stalled, President Kennedy presided over a series of visible nuclear tests that reawakened the antinuclear movement. Nobel prize winning scientist Linus Pauling, who was a visible antinuclear activist, pressed the issue both at a White House dinner in 1962 and outside the White House in protest the following evening. Antinuclear activism spread throughout Western Europe. Kennedy used antinuclear activist Norman Cousins as a conduit for negotiations with Khrushchev, securing an agreement to ban atmospheric testing. This Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 made it very difficult for peace activists to make broad claims and build coalitions, and many activists turned to other issues, including student activism on free speech, civil rights, and economic justice in the United States (Meyer & Whittier 1994).

**Against the Vietnam War**

By 1965, longtime peace activists in the United States and elsewhere turned their attentions to the Vietnam War. As the American commitment to the war grew, so did the need for draftees to fill military billets, and so did opposition to the war. As the numbers of troops deployed increased, media coverage of casualties, particularly on television, drew public attention to the risks and costs of war (DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990). A war that was clearly costing more lives and money than policymakers promised generated increased opposition. The draft meant that a substantial slice of political opposition to the war was directed around the interests of young men who would be forced to fight. Civil disobedience grew, as increasing numbers of young men refused to register for the draft, burned their draft cards, or fled the country, most commonly to Canada. Opposition to the war, in a context of increasing activism, stoked a radical wing of the movement which included fringe groups willing to use violence. Large-scale campus-based teach-ins and protests, augmented by smaller and even more dramatic actions, made it increasingly politically costly to conduct the war. The political splits in the Johnson administration and the Democratic Party more generally, also fed by conflicts over civil rights, helped Republican Richard Nixon win the Presidency in 1968.

Although the antiwar coalition grew broader, opposition to the war never commanded a majority of support and the most dramatic and disruptive protests were polarizing. By 1972, the US Congress effectively legislated the end of the war by withholding funding to continue the draft and provide supplies to continue fighting the war. The antiwar movement can claim substantial credit for provoking opposition to the war, raising the costs of conducting the war, and serving an agenda-setting role in which the merits of US foreign policy received an unusual degree of scrutiny. The difficulties of conducting the war, both abroad and at home, eventually led to US withdrawal. Once again, the peace movement dissipated, after
an apparent victory, but also like the earlier episodes, the movement left behind an enlarged residue of peace movement organizations and trained activists potentially available for new rounds of mobilization.

THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEBATE

Overlapping the antiwar movement was a narrower campaign against the deployment of antiballistic missile systems. When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a “light” missile defense system, he engendered opposition from both hawkish critics who demanded more and peace activists who opposed missile defense – or, minimally, didn’t want to live near nuclear missiles even if they were ostensibly designed for defense.

Scientific opponents of the ABM publicized their differences with the administration through journal articles and testimony before Congress, working in groups founded in the test ban campaign. They also worked to educate and mobilize citizen activists, nationally in groups like SANE, and locally in cities slated to be protected. Unable to achieve their goals through conventional politics, institutionally oriented scientists turned to mass politics (Primack & Von Hippel 1974). Activists sponsored teach-ins and rallies in cities where ABMs were to be deployed, including Chicago, Seattle, and Boston. These efforts were coordinated by groups like the new Union of Concerned Scientists, formed to organize scientific opposition to the war in Vietnam. Surprised that it was facing criticism from the cities due to be “protected,” rather than those left “undefended,” the Nixon administration redefined a narrower mission for the weapons system, relocating missile sites from metropolitan areas to more remote – and less visible – locales. Nixon also began negotiations to limit ABM systems as a precursor to the 1972 SALT treaty (the ABM treaty stayed in effect for nearly 30 years, until President Bush announced the United States’ withdrawal from the accord).

While American activists questioned the costs and effectiveness of missile defense, European political leaders publicly worried if a “defended” United States would be less committed to their defense. NATO called for a sign of a strategic United States commitment to European defense. The 1977 “dual track decision” to deploy intermediate range nuclear weapons in Western Europe provided a target for peace activists that ultimately unified European and American activists, and refocused activist attention on peace issues.

END AND THE NUCLEAR FREEZE CAMPAIGN

As European activists opposed the NATO dual track decision, American activists sought a unifying focus for their own efforts. The pacifist American Friends Services Committee commissioned Randall Forsberg to draft a proposal to unify a variety of goals and campaigns, as President Carter’s foreign policy grew increasingly bellicose and costly. Forsberg’s “nuclear freeze” proposal, advocating a “bilateral” halt to the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weaponry, became a catalyst for uniting diverse opposition. Ronald Reagan’s landslide election in 1980, bringing Republicans to control of the Senate, ushered in efforts to implement a dramatically more aggressive and expensive security posture, eschewing arms control efforts to focus instead on an aggressive military build-up (Meyer 1990). But the election offered activists a bit of encouraging news; in three Western Massachusetts electoral districts, voters endorsed a referendum supporting the nuclear freeze (a campaign organized by a draft resister, Randy Kehler).

Activists in Western Europe used the planned dual track modernization as a vehicle for criticizing superpower politics that threatened European security and sovereignty. New antinuclear movements in Western Europe emerged strongly in 1981, focusing specifically on stopping the so-called “Euromissiles,” but offering broader criticisms of the conduct of the cold war (Thompson & Smith 1981). Demonstrations in Amsterdam,
Brussels, Paris, London, Rome, and Bonn each attracted hundreds of thousands of activists. European activists, most notably historian E.P. Thompson, appealed explicitly to their counterparts in the United States for help. Peace activists surrounded NATO bases and threatened to physically disrupt the introduction of these new weapons onto the bases. The deployment issue set off massive protests and a new generation of peace organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy, forcing new national elections and party realignment. Although the conservative parties won reelection and the intermediate range missiles were deployed, the decision took its toll on the alliance. Further modernization plans were abandoned as previously allied Western European conservative parties became unwilling to risk further opposition.

Activists in the United States used the freeze proposal, frequently offered in state and local referenda and town meetings, as an opportunity to conduct public education campaigns. By 1982, the freeze movement commanded broad public attention, winning numerous referenda, demonstrating overwhelming support in public opinion polls, and rallying one million people in Central Park (Meyer 1990). The broad movement coalition made it difficult for activists to define consensual goals and, as the movement grew, they were increasingly divided on the meaning of the proposal (Benford 1993) that so many supported. Responding, the administration announced a new commitment to arms control, signaling the beginning of the end for the movement (Meyer 1990).

Reagan’s arms control proposals, offered more for domestic political reasons than international response, had unexpected effects. When Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev accepted the disproportionate cuts in nuclear forces Reagan had proposed, the administration was cornered: it could not reject its own proposals. This forced flexibility on arms control proved to be critical in ending the cold war (Kaldor 1990; Meyer & Marullo 1992). The movements won far less than they hoped, yet turned out to be more important than they imagined.

ORGANIZING FOR PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR: PERSIAN GULF WARS AND BEYOND

Acknowledging the importance of public support, and the risks of opposition, the United States adopted a posture that strictly limited the possibilities of American use of force abroad: all deployment of American forces had to be easily explainable to the public, extremely likely to succeed, limited in time, and with easy and quick exit strategies. The Persian Gulf War, conducted by President George Bush, demonstrated both the influence and the limitations of the peace movement. Bush’s military buildup in the Gulf, a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, quickly generated an antiwar response, organized by the longtime pacifist core of the peace movement. The immediate threat of war afforded groups with different ideologies – pacifist, anti-interventionist, and multilateralist – to join forces quickly in opposition to pending military hostilities. Despite a rapid movement response, the administration conducted a military campaign that effectively marginalized the peace movement, negotiating support from European allies and, once battle started, overwhelming the severely outmatched Iraqi armed forces through air attacks.

The peace movement virtually disappeared as soon as bombing began, and the full-scale war lasted little over a month.

In 2002, however, as President George W. Bush prepared for a second war against Iraq, opposition grew globally, including critics of the war, as well as those who had a range of other grievances with the Bush administration. Activists formed broad coalitions in the United States (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown 2005; Heaney & Rojas 2008) and internationally (Walgrave & Rucht 2010). Massive demonstrations were coordinated in major cities around the world, and were largest in countries that supported the war. Although the efforts affected
the rhetoric and military strategy of the initial war campaign, they did not stop the bombing, as the United States led a coalition that defeated, and occupied, Iraq in 2003. President Bush maintained a commitment to an all-volunteer army and refused to seek taxes to fund the war, making it difficult for activists to maintain a mobilization as attention shifted to other issues. Many activists against the war refocused their efforts into broader campaigns against corporate globalization. As with previous campaigns, opposition to the war has waxed and waned since it commenced. Paradoxically, the election of President Barack Obama bought the United States more space to conduct the war, as opponents of the war have been unable to stage a broad challenge to the Democratic government that they supported on many other issues.

Peace and antiwar movements respond to the broader political context and the policymaking process. Elite actors, particularly scientists and strategic experts, mediate between the state and protest movements, identifying which aspects of policy are most vulnerable to assault, legitimating and sometimes aiding insurgent movements, and proffering solutions to the political problems movements cause. Peace movements emerge when institutionally oriented actors lose faith in the efficacy of institutional politics, and the movements that emerge contain great diversity. The cyclic nature of movement challenges reflects the shifting attention of elite actors from institutional venues to extra-institutional ones. Successful movements win access to policymaking for some of their allies, but not necessarily the policies they seek.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Antinuclear movement in Japan; Antinuclear power movements (in general); Citizen peacebuilding movements; Interest groups and social movements; Pacifism; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Antiwitchcraft movements in Africa
JULIEN BONHOMME

Movements aimed at the eradication of witchcraft periodically sweep across Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the best documented is the Mcape, which has been observed in different parts of Eastern Central Africa throughout the twentieth century by anthropologists such as Audrey Richards, Max Marwick, and Roy Willis. As opposed to witchdoctors who provide individual protection against witchcraft, these movements operate on a larger scale and aim at more radical objectives: they offer protection for the whole community and claim to root out all evil once and for all. Witchcraft is addressed as a general and collective threat, rather than being related to interpersonal conflict stemming from the family. The excessive ambition of antiwitchcraft movements explains their transient and recurrent nature. New movements are constantly emerging, rapidly gaining, then losing popularity when they fail to fulfill their promise, hence paving the way for the next movement to appear on this highly competitive marketplace. Compared to more structured cults, antiwitchcraft movements have little formal organization and rely on their leaders’ charisma and reputation. They are deterritorialized movements, often led by itinerant witch-finders who cross ethnic and national boundaries. Antiwitchcraft movements are centered on mass cleansing (and must therefore be distinguished from more brutal witch-hunts). When the witch-finder arrives in a village, he authoritatively lines up all the inhabitants and proceeds to identify the witches by divination. He then asks the alleged witches to confess their evil deeds and surrender their harmful “fetishes” or “medicines.” These paraphernalia are publicly destroyed or piled up at crossroads as a demonstration of the witch-finder’s supremacy. The accused are sometimes “branded” with razors, but are not put to death nor banned from the community. Finally all villagers are administered a witch-cleansing treatment, which is said to protect the innocent and kill those who will attempt to revert to witchcraft.

The literature dealing with antiwitchcraft movements in Africa revolves around two main questions: Are these movements essentially modern? Are they proto-political movements? Since Audrey Richards’ seminal article, anthropologists and historians have tended to consider antiwitchcraft movements intrinsically modern. These movements incorporate many Western elements as icons of modernity. The witch-finders dress in European clothes (unlike traditional witchdoctors), use mirrors for divination and imitate colonial bureaucratic practices, such as stamps, written documents, and waiting lines. In French Equatorial Africa, the Ngol movement appropriated the figure of General de Gaulle, viewed as a “fetish that overcomes all other fetishes.” Antiwitchcraft movements are considered to be inherently associated with the colonial situation: the brutal and rapid social change brought about by colonization causes anomie, which results in an increase of witchcraft, which in its turn leads to the emergence of antiwitchcraft movements. Following Jack Goody’s critique of the anomie explanation, historians have shown that twentieth-century movements in fact continued precolonial traditions. Antiwitchcraft movements predate colonial times and, one should add, extend as well to postcolonial times. Yet colonial rule has undeniably stimulated the rise of new movements by prohibiting the traditional methods of witchcraft control, notably the poison ordeal, which was widespread in Africa. As Mary Douglas has claimed, antiwitchcraft movements have
emerged to fill the gap left by the suppression of precolonial ordeals. Colonization has encouraged a shift from judicial procedures controlled by local headmen and centered on punishment toward more popular movements centered on confession, healing, and purification.

Witch-cleansing movements have a strong millenarian dimension. They announce the imminent revitalization of society and give hope of a morally regenerated life and a new order free of all tensions. Roy Willis has described the “impression of incipient revolution” when witch-finders take over villages to perform mass cleansings. This atmosphere of “miniature revolution” raises the issue of the political potential of witch-cleansing movements. According to Willis, antiwitchcraft movements are proto-institutions specific to rural Africa, while more structured institutions, such as independent churches and political parties, developed in urban centers. Authors like Georges Balandier and Terence Ranger have even argued that antiwitchcraft and other millenarian movements represent “the prehistory of modern nationalism” in Africa. Ranger has however reconsidered his position and acknowledged that these movements cannot be reduced to a proto-political stage in the evolution of anticolonial protest. Directed against native witches and not colonizers, antiwitchcraft movements have more to do with local politics. They most often express conflicts between generations. Young men – those with low status in traditional society – are the ones who press to call in a witch-finder (usually an enterprising young man himself) to cleanse the village. Conversely, village elders are scapegoated: they are the ones accused and publicly humiliated during the witch-finding ceremony. Moreover, the so-called evil objects confiscated are in fact paraphernalia of the old cults controlled by the elders, which were commonly used as protections against witchcraft. By asserting the superiority of new antiwitchcraft medicines over old ones disguised as witchcraft, witch-finding movements thus give young men the opportunity to challenge the elders’ authority and overturn – if only temporarily – the social order.

SEE ALSO: Age and social movements; Anti-colonial movements; Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Cults; Decolonization and social movements; Social change and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Anti-World Bank and IMF riots
LESLEY J. WOOD

Anti-World Bank and IMF riots are sometimes called “austerity protests.” These are large collective actions that include political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots triggered by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization urged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as conditions on obtaining loans. These “structural adjustment” conditions may involve the reduction of government subsidies and/or the increasing price of basic staples like food, water, and domestic gas. Most of the time the participants demand lower prices, restored government subsidies, wage increases that will compensate for higher prices, or jobs. Sometimes they demand the rejection of foreign debt.

There have been several waves of these demonstrations. The first wave took place between 1976 and late 1992, in 39 of approximately 80 countries that had loans from the IMF, peaking between 1983 and 1985 (Walton & Seddon 1994: 42). During this time, some 146 incidents of protest occurred. In the late 1990s there were a series of austerity protests in the Central American countries of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, as well as Colombia, Brazil, and Bolivia. This wave lasted into the early 2000s, especially in Latin America – and included episodes in Argentina (2001), Peru (2002), Costa Rica (2000), and Guatemala (2001) (Almeida 2007). The latter part of this wave coincided with a series of disruptive protests that took place at the summits of the International Monetary Fund in Europe and North America from 1999–2001. These summit protests were combined with simultaneous global days of action against the IMF and World Bank. Most recently, there have been a series of austerity protests during the economic crisis of 2008–2009, most notably in Eastern Europe and the Philippines.

CHARACTERISTICS

Walton and Seddon (1994) examined the features of the first wave of IMF and World Bank riots and found that they were typically large, urban actions – ranging in size from thousands in Cairo and Sao Paulo to hundreds of thousands in national strikes in Argentina, Yugoslavia, and India. Usually, the protests began in the largest cities and sometimes spread to other cities.

IMF and World Bank riots typically target the institutions perceived as responsible for the changes. These may include government buildings, treasuries, or national banks. At times, looters may attack supermarkets and clothing stores. In the cases where fuel and transportation subsidies are part of the austerity package, buses and gasoline stations may be burned. International dimensions of austerity are recognized symbolically in attacks on travel agencies, foreign automobiles, luxury hotels, and international agency offices (Walton & Seddon 1994: 43). Participants are usually a cross section of urban poor and working class. Much of the time, other segments – students, teachers, church groups, public employees, shopkeepers, or professional groups – join them. Once mass discontent is evident, political parties may adopt the anti-austerity cause in bids for national office (Walton & Seddon 1994: 44). Occasionally, these protests have become political crises that topple the national government (Sudan, Turkey, Philippines, Haiti, Poland).

CAUSES

Walton and Seddon argue that the reason for the emergence of these protests is an
increasingly integrated global system – that was exacerbated by the international debt crisis and a regimen of institutionally coordinated austerity policies or structural adjustment programs – tied to the policies of the IMF and World Bank (Walton & Seddon 1994: 23). Walton and Ragin (1990) and Walton and Shefner (1994) show that countries with multiple IMF agreements, large urban populations, dense civil-society organizational networks, and high rates of unionization are the most likely to experience popular unrest.

The debt crisis developed in the 1970s, when many international banks were attempting to find sites for investing their reserves. At the same time, many newly independent nations needed to borrow funds in order to finance their development. However, by the late 1970s, many of these nations were unable to pay back their loans because of a worldwide recession, increasing interest rates, oil price shocks, and declining world commodity process (Walton & Seddon 1994: 40). As a result, these governments needed to borrow more money. However, by this time, the IMF had embraced a neoliberal framework that involved imposing stringent conditions on borrowers in order to restructure their economies along neoliberal lines (Klein 2007). These conditions included currency devaluations, reduced public spending, privatization of state-owned corporations, elimination of protections and subsidies of local agriculture and industries, wage restraints, and higher interest rates to reduce inflation and enhance competitiveness. The effects of these changes were felt quickly and intensely by wide sectors of the population. As a result, protests erupted.

Joseph Stiglitz, the chief economist from the World Bank who was fired in 1999 for his criticisms of bank policy argued that the IMF riot was a predictable response to structural adjustment. When a nation is “down and out, [the IMF] takes advantage and squeezes the last pound of blood out of them. They turn up the heat until, finally, the whole cauldron blows up” (Palast 2001). Naomi Klein (2007) argues that the speed and severity of such reforms was a form of “shock treatment.” Such transformations necessitated increased militarization of these societies in order to ensure that the adjustment policies were implemented.

SEE ALSO: Antiglobalization movements; Globalization and movements; Global Justice Movement; Riots.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


ANUC (Colombian peasant movement)
LEON ZAMOSC

To end the Colombian civil war known as La Violencia (1948–1957), the Conservative and Liberal parties agreed in 1958 to reconcile under the National Front, a 16-year coalition regime based on administrative power-sharing and presidential alternation (Kline 1980: 71–72). In 1961 Congress passed an Agrarian Reform Law but, bowing to the landowners’ interests, the first two governments of the National Front took no serious steps to redistribute land (Tobón 1972). Determined to implement the reform, the next president, Liberal politician Carlos Lleras (1966–1970), promoted legislation granting land rights to tenants and sharecroppers and boosted the capabilities of INCORA, the Institute of Agrarian Reform. In 1967, he also launched an initiative to establish ANUC, the National Peasant Association of Colombia, as a state-sponsored organization that would promote peasant involvement in the provision of rural services and in the agrarian reform program (Zamosc 1986: 50–54). From the start, it was clear that Lleras expected that, as a peasant force pushing for land redistribution, ANUC would exert the pressure that was needed to overcome the landowners’ opposition and facilitate INCORA’s work. In the organizational campaign, promoters from the Ministry of Agriculture scoured the countryside instructing peasants about their rights, forming local and regional peasant associations, and grooming promising activists into a national leadership (Zamosc 1986: 54–60). When ANUC’s national congress met in 1970, the number of registered members was about one million. The response had been especially strong in the areas of traditional haciendas (large estates), where tenants and sharecroppers wanted land of their own; and in the piedmont forest frontiers, where peasant colonists demanded infrastructure and services (Zamosc 1986: 61–62).

Initially, ANUC fulfilled its official role sending representatives to the state agencies and channeling demands from all the peasant sectors. It also expressed readiness to support the next National Front government on condition that it would maintain the agrarian reform policy (Escobar 1982: 11–14). Then, when it became clear that the new Conservative president Misael Pastrana (1970–1974) was not keen on land redistribution, ANUC went on the offensive. In February 1971, thousands of peasant families participated in a wave of coordinated land invasions affecting hundreds of haciendas throughout the country (Zamosc 1986: 74–91). The confrontation strengthened the more radical leaders, activists, or sympathizers of leftist parties who saw the peasant struggles as part of a revolution and exhorted the grassroots to continue the expropriation of the landowners through direct action (Zamosc 1986: 114–115).

Facing the radicalization of the peasant movement in a country in which revolutionary guerrilla movements were expanding their presence in the countryside, the elites of the National Front closed ranks to stop ANUC in its tracks. With the endorsement of Conservatives and Liberals (including many former reformists), Congress called for a national accord on agrarian reform. In January 1972, politicians and entrepreneurs met with government officials and agreed to pass legislation hardening the criteria for land expropriation and favoring the development of capitalist agriculture (Zamosc 1986: 97–99). To curb ANUC, Pastrana’s government stepped up harassment against the radical leaders and encouraged Conservative and Liberal activists to split and set up a parallel ANUC with official support (Zamosc 1986: 100–104).
Land invasions, previously handled through INCORA’s mediation, were now severely suppressed by the rural police, and a blind eye was turned to the activities of armed gangs organized by landowners.

For the rest of Pastrana’s administration, the struggle for land was accompanied by mobilizations in the areas of colonization, where ANUC staged rallies, blockades, and civic strikes aimed at forcing the government to respond to demands for roads, bridges, and basic services (Zamosc 1986: 93–94). Adopting a more contemporizing approach, the first post-National Front president, Liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974–1978), showed willingness to negotiate these demands. He was also proactive in the areas of established peasant economy, where the government and international financial agencies launched an Integrated Rural Development Program that offered credit and other supports to smallholders’ services (Zamosc 1986: 124–125). In the regions of land struggle, he warned against new land invasions and pushed legislation that was intended to alleviate the peasant pressure by enabling landowners to admit sharecroppers without risking expropriation (Zamosc 1986: 126). Denouncing the 1975 Sharecropping Law as an attempt to circumvent the land issue, radical ANUC called for a renewal of the invasions. But the weak response confirmed that the movement had entered a decline. In addition to repression and ANUC’s internal political divisions, other factors contributed to defuse the land conflicts, including the fact that the most contentious groups had received land after the previous invasions, increasing rates of rural–urban migration, and new occupational alternatives in the marijuana economy and in Colombian and Venezuelan capitalist agriculture (Zamosc 1986: 130–139).

To adjust to the changing conditions, radical ANUC focused on championing the demands of the agricultural proletariat and the peasant cooperatives established after the previous land struggles. But these attempts failed, the former because of the difficulties in organizing itinerant workers under piecework pay, and the latter because the movement insisted on unrealistic stances such as rejecting government credit or titles that implied any payment for the land (Zamosc 1986: 139–145, 165–178). After an unsuccessful attempt to create a peasant political party in 1978, ANUC’s leaders acknowledged that they had been cornered and proclaimed that the only option was reconciliation with the pro-government ANUC, a goal that was eventually accomplished when Liberal president Julio César Turbay (1978–1982) sponsored a reunification congress in 1981 (Zamosc 1986: 196–200). From then on, ANUC languished as a bureaucratic shell of state-paid leaders who uncritically supported the policies of all incumbent governments. In the second half of the 1980s, independent peasant organizations, including some splinter groups of the former radical ANUC, protagonized a brief cycle of struggles as part of a broader national wave of civic protests (Zamosc 1990: 47–56). By then, however, conditions for peasant organizing were rapidly deteriorating as a consequence of the aggravation of political conflicts and the expansion of cocaine trafficking (Zamosc 1990: 56–62, 67–70). Caught in the crossfire between the military, leftist guerrilla organizations, and paramilitary groups, the Colombian peasantry would not be able to return to the national political scene as an organized social class.

SEE ALSO: Guerrilla movements; Peasant movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


April Revolution (Korea)
JAESOK SONN

The April Revolution refers to the protest movement against the dictatorship in South Korea, which took place in April 1960, and its aftermath. It is also known as the April Uprising or simply by the date of the peak day of the revolt, the “4.19.”

The government of Syngman Rhee, the first democratically elected president in Korea, performed poorly in all aspects of administration. It failed to defend the south from an invasion by the north in 1950 which developed into the three-year Korean War. War survivors had to live in one of the poorest countries in the world, suffering high unemployment and soaring consumer prices while the ruling Liberal Party and bureaucrats enjoyed wealth and power. The regime seriously undermined its legitimacy by revising the Constitution in 1954 – without going through a proper process – in order to allow the president to serve three terms.

Rhee ran for the third term while his trusted colleague, Yi Ki-bung, became a vice-presidential candidate. Their landslide victory, in particular the fact that 80 percent of the vice-presidential votes went to Yi, in the election of March 15, 1960, was considered fraudulent. In fact, there had already been citizens’ protests against government-sponsored campaign activities even before the election, and the police clashed violently with the protesters by the end of election day.

University students began to organize protests. On April 18, students at the Korea University held the first major rally since the election, protesting against election fraud. This rally prompted student activists in other universities and high schools to organize their own demonstrations the next day. On the morning of April 19, the student protesters of the Seoul National University, the nation’s most prestigious university, began to march downtown and thousands of citizens quickly joined them.

While demonstrations occurred across the country, Seoul held a particular importance. Downtown Seoul hosted major national institutions including a few university campuses, the National Assembly Building, and the presidential residence within a radius of 2 kilometers. News of the protests quickly spread through the busy streets but also through the radio network which carried the news of the protests. The people flooded into the National Assembly Building and another group moved onto the presidential residence. As the protesters overwhelmed the police, the police fired live bullets at citizens, especially near the presidential residence. Martial law was declared in Seoul and other cities in the afternoon.

By the end of the day, the crowd dispersed, but the protest continued after April 19 in those cities where the martial law had not been declared. Four days later, Yi resigned as vice-president-elect. On April 25, some of the university professors held their own march to the National Assembly Building and issued a statement explicitly demanding that Rhee step down. As one of the most respected social groups, the professors’ participation morally certified the protests. The next day Rhee announced his resignation. Approximately 186 civilians were reportedly killed and 1600 wounded nationwide during this period (Kim 1983: 5).

When the first elected president became a dictator, and his 12-year rule was exacerbated by a war and poverty, there was no civic life in Korea that cultivated civic mindedness or political consciousness. There was hardly a national civic association that connected citizens across region and class. Naturally, protests were mobilized without any formal organization or coordinating agents. Demonstrations developed spontaneously from preexisting institutions and informal networks with
little or no preparation. Although students played a pivotal role, the participants came from all walks of life who shared a sense of anger at the injustices in society and the poor performance of the regime. However, their goals beyond kicking Rhee out of presidency were as vague as their rhetoric of “justice” and “democracy.” As soon as Rhee resigned, citizens cleaned up streets and went back to their normal life while political reforms were largely left to existing professional politicians.

Despite these crucial weaknesses of the uprising, the regime fell rather quickly. The state apparatuses were still poor at this time meaning there was no efficient communication or execution of decisions. The police were not ready for large-scale demonstrations and they were exhausted by a single-day protest. This authoritarian state also did not control the media, so immediately after the election the newspapers began to publish editorials criticizing the ruling party. The martial law commander, General Song Yo-chan, prohibited the army from opening fire without his specific order, released most of the detained demonstrators, and maintained the military’s political neutrality, all of which effectively incapacitated the Rhee regime. Some other military officers also tried to avoid harming citizens, and this played one of the key roles in bringing a successful end to the uprising with no additional bloodshed. The ruling party leaders were fragmented over what to do, while the Cabinet resigned in the middle of the crisis. Rhee himself showed poor understanding and judgment of the situation.

The immediate aftermath of the revolution was somewhat chaotic. The new ruling Democratic Party was far from a revolutionary political force and it proved to be quite ineffective in political and social reforms. Even worse, it failed to bring political stability by engaging in factional fights, and eventually split into two parties.

The April Revolution nevertheless had “revolutionary” impacts, as its experience turned some citizens to mobilize organized, persistent movements for political and social reform. Political parties based on progressive or leftist ideologies reappeared. Reunification with North Korea had been a taboo subject because the memories of the war were still fresh, but some youth groups began to advocate it actively.

These revolutionary potentials, however, were never realized, as they were ended abruptly by a military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee on May 16, 1961. The junta immediately took control of the media and banned all political activities. This marked the beginning of three decades of military dictatorship in South Korea.

SEE ALSO: Democratization and democratic transition; Ecological conditions/determinants; Repression and social movements; Revolutions; State breakdown and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Asylum rights protest campaigns
PIERRE MONFORTE

Immigration and asylum are, by definition, global issues which concern transnational actors. However, the definition and implementation of immigration and asylum policies relate to state borders and are therefore traditionally entrenched in national contexts. For this reason, even if social movements mobilizing to defend the rights of migrants and refugees have regularly used international norms to increase their rights at the national level (Soysal 1994; Guiraudon 2000), they have rarely organized collective actions across borders: they have limited their action to the national level and have mainly addressed their demands to state authorities. However, since the mid-1990s, these movements have increasingly mobilized in order to address international – and in particular European – institutions. Groups and networks have constructed networks, discourses and collective actions which go beyond borders, and they have organized significant and regular transnational campaigns.

The first transnational mobilizations for the inclusion of migrants and refugees were constructed by groups that seized opportunities to influence national policies at the international level. They followed a path toward the “externalization” of collective action (Balme & Chabanet 2002): the mobilization of networks targeting supranational institutions and advocating for the emergence of European and international competencies in order to put pressure on nation-states. As they claimed that international institutions would define more liberal standards than nation-states, they organized beyond borders and worked in close cooperation with them (in particular, the United Nations and the European Commission), with the aim to increase their influence. They are composed of vast networks of member-associations coordinated by a centralized and professionalized European or international social movement organization. This organization has the double task to maintain permanent contact with supranational institutions and to coordinate regular transnational campaigns targeting numerous national actors simultaneously. These campaigns are based on institutionalized forms of collective actions: they use lobbying techniques to influence national actors and they bring expertise to international institutions in order to support their work.

A good example of these campaigns is that organized during the negotiations for the ratification of the Tampere program for the European integration of immigration and asylum policies in 1999. A network of NGOs and lobby groups established close contact with the European Commission and provided it with legal expertise and legitimacy in order to gain more influence vis-à-vis member states. Simultaneously, they lobbied member-state representatives to advocate for increasing delegation of competencies to the Commission. This campaign was influential as the negotiations resulted in an extensive program of harmonization of immigration and asylum policies in which the Commission was led to progressively become the central actor.

At the global level, a good example is the international campaign for the ratification of the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. It is organized by a network of organizations working in collaboration with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and which coordinates the lobbying for the ratification of this convention by northern states.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, new networks have developed new forms of
transnational campaigns for migrants’ and refugees’ rights. They construct “European (or international) social movements” (della Porta & Caini 2009): they organize across borders and target both supranational and national institutions and policies. These networks are mainly composed of grassroots organizations and they only cooperate sporadically with the networks active around European and international institutions: their campaigns distinguish in terms of strategies as well as in terms of objectives. Differently than the groups mobilizing since the 1990s, they are more reactive than proactive; their campaigns do not promote international policies on these issues; they react to their definition and implementation, and, for them, supranational institutions and policies are a target rather than a support. Their campaigns aim to draw public attention to the role of European (including the EU Commission) and supranational institutions (such as the IOM), alongside national governments, in the definition of restrictive immigration policies. They mobilize, for example, against the detention of migrants in Europe, and for freedom of circulation. In comparison with the first groups, these networks are less centralized and professionalized. Moreover, they base their mobilizations on both pluralist and contentious repertoires of collective actions with the aim to mobilize public opinion at large. Finally, differently than the first group of transnational actors, they construct links with transnational movements mobilizing around related issues such as the peace movement or that against precarious working conditions. Consequently, their campaigns often have a broader focus than just immigration and asylum policies, and thus, they have more general objectives than those organized by the first group of networks. Even if campaigns defined around a specific goal (such as the withdrawal of the European directive on the return of undocumented migrants in 2007–2008) exist, most of them have more general objectives. In fact, their main goal is to raise public awareness regarding the consequences of northern countries’ immigration and asylum policies.

A good example of these campaigns is the “European action-day for the right to stay and freedom of movement” which was organized annually in several European cities simultaneously in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s. It was organized by grassroots activists and consisted of symbolic – and sometimes violent – street demonstrations against “Fortress Europe.” This campaign was directly linked with the “Euromayday” movement against precarity, as many activists were involved in both networks.

At the global level, a good example is the organization of the annual World Social Forum on Migration since 2005. In line with the World Social Forum, it aims to bring together grassroots mobilizations and it links the defense of migrants’ and refugees’ rights with a critique of the global economical order.

The progressive definition of mobilizations across borders shows that transnational campaigns for the rights of migrants and refugees are accompanying, and are also the result of, the increase in supranational competencies regarding immigration and asylum policies. These campaigns thus illustrate the emergence of new action fields for social movements at the European and international levels. They represent, therefore, an illustration of the general trend toward Europeanization and globalization “from below” (della Porta et al. 2006).

SEE ALSO: Advocacy networks; Asylum, refugee, and immigration movements in Australia; Immigration, protest, and social movements; Nongovernmental organizations; Social Forum, World; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Asylum, refugee, and immigration movements in Australia represent distinct, as well as overlapping, repertoires of collective action on behalf of others who are often silent, or silenced in public debates. Various categories of newcomers have differential rights as noncitizens, residents, or “illegals” and these differences are also reflected in the emergence and vigor of social movements in defence of the “rightless” (Agamben 1998; Dauvergne 2008). These movements have formed, engaged in forms of protest, advocacy, and collective action, and subsided in various waves in reaction to public policy that seeks to restrict the rights of migrants. In Australia such restrictions have manifest in forms of border control, in limiting access to courts and judicial review processes, through detention, and through deportation. Often the most vulnerable groups of migrants have been the targets of such measures, and it is these groups that movement actors have been engaged in defending.

Social movements on asylum and refugee issues proliferated in number and in range of activities from the early 1990s. These movements are distinct from political networks and lobby groups that formalized through movement activity and civil society organizations in the era of “new multiculturalism” from the early 1970s as advocates for migrant groups and migrant voices. As a “classic country of immigration,” Australia has long had a proactive approach to immigration with a yearly quota for newcomers including a quota for refugee and humanitarian entrants. Individuals who meet the criteria of the United Nations Refugee Convention are selected for entry to Australia on an annual basis. In distinction from this process, asylum seekers arrive by air and by sea in a spontaneous fashion, fleeing conflict and various forms of persecution, and subsequently apply to engage Australia’s protection obligations. That is, asylum seekers have fled their country of origin, but have not yet had their claim for refugee status tested and substantiated through the administrative and legal processes of the country they are entering (DIAC 2009). While Australia has not received large numbers of asylum seekers compared to other Western countries, the response of successive Australian governments to asylum arrivals since the early 1990s has been among the toughest in the world. Those people arriving by boat have been subject to particularly harsh treatment. In 1992 Australia introduced mandatory and non-reviewable detention for all asylum seekers who arrive without authorization (usually without valid travel documentation). The policy extended to children and unaccompanied women. In addition, by 2001 Australia had adopted “off-shore” processing, where asylum seekers who arrived by boat were sent to third countries to have their asylum claim processed (MacCallum 2002; Marr & Wilkinson 2003; Corlett 2005; Tazreiter 2006). More recently some of these approaches have been softened, though detention remains as an enforceable “deterrent” for asylum arrivals.

These harsh and punitive approaches of successive Australian governments to the arrival of asylum seekers has been the trigger for the emergence of social movements, coalitions, and the strengthening of civil society. Indeed, civil society organizations have proliferated into both national and transnational networks, triggered by a suite of interrelated human rights issues including asylum, refugee, and immigration issues, as well as human trafficking and the rights of temporary migrants. Some movements also focused on a number of broadly related issues under the umbrella of human rights, including indigenous rights, racism, and
discrimination against minorities, and linked with human rights-oriented movements such as Amnesty International.

The major issue that has galvanized movement activity and indeed was the impetus for a range of new social movements in Australia is the issue of immigration detention and the related practices of forced removal or deportation of individuals (ERC 2004; Corlett 2005). In the early years of the detention regime, such movement activity was limited to relatively small groups of Australians who were well informed about the detention regime and its effects on detainees: lawyers, nuns and priests, and researchers. This close-knit group had active links with networks and movements outside Australia, but could rely on little support from the wider population within Australia (Tazreiter 2010). Some vibrant social movements emerged in this early period on specific issues. For instance, the sanctuary movement was a highly mobile and effective movement that emerged in the early 1990s to protect East Timorese asylum seekers who were threatened with return to a then unstable East Timor, under the control of Indonesia. The sanctuary movement worked through a network of “safe houses” that could be activated to protect individuals from deportation. Eventually this network of safe houses numbered some 15,000 around Australia.

A range of asylum- and refugee-oriented movements emerged over the last two decades in response to the policies, procedures, and political rhetoric outlined above. It is noteworthy that many of these movements have also worked on defending the human rights of other vulnerable groups and as a result have contributed to debates on Australian values and Australian identity. Some of these movements have had longevity, others have abated, and some have transformed into nongovernmental organizations. Social movement activity on asylum and refugee issues peaked from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Some of the most powerful movements to emerge in this period include the Refugee Action Coalition, Children out of Detention (ChilOut), A Just Australia, Rural Australians for Refugees, and GetUP (O’Neill 2008). Many faith-based organizations and loose coalitions also strengthened the grassroots base of social movements.

It is noteworthy that Australian movements and more formalized organizations on asylum, refugee, and immigration issues have had a long-standing presence and influence in international forums such as the various organs of the United Nations. Australian movement actors have also influenced and participated in repertoires of action by transnational movement actors. In turn, Australian social movements on refugee, asylum, and immigration issues have been strengthened at various points in history by the external pressure from transnational social movements on the Australian political process.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal peoples’ movements (Australia); Asylum rights protest campaigns; Ethnic movements; Human rights movements; Immigration, protest, and social movements; Racist social movements.

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ERC (Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education and Australian Catholic University) (2004) Deported to Danger: A Study of


The Black Power movement emerged in the mid-1960s United States inspired by the victories of the civil rights movement, and responding to its limitations. Civil rights mobilization had successfully pressured the federal government to dismantle de jure segregation, but was incapable of redressing persistent black ghettoization. Black Power activists sought to combat institutionalized racism characterized by poor-quality education, a lack of jobs, political marginalization, and containment policing.

Beginning in 1964, as the federal government touted the end of legal segregation, violent ghetto rebellions broke out in cities across the country. Usually triggered by incidents of police brutality, these uprisings targeted both government institutions and white-owned stores. The most notable rebellions took place in Watts in 1965, and Detroit and Newark in 1967. There were over 160 uprisings in 1967 and almost as many again in 1968 following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

The ideas of Malcolm X became the key reference for many young black activists. Criticizing moderate civil rights leaders, X argued that black Americans were a colonized people who needed to fight back by acquiring economic and political power. He embraced black nationalism, supported armed self-defense, and looked to the black masses as the agent of the “Black Revolution.” Important antecedents to Black Power include Robert Williams’s efforts at armed self-defense in North Carolina, the Lowndes County Freedom Organization’s campaign to build independent black political power in Alabama, the civil rights struggle in the North, which oriented itself around such issues as employment discrimination and unequal education, as well as the Nation of Islam and Garveyism.

The slogan “Black Power” entered the popular lexicon in June 1966, when hundreds of civil rights activists, led by Stokely Carmichael and Martin Luther King, Jr, converged in Mississippi. In the course of the demonstration, divisions arose between the younger activists, who wanted the march to be black-only and to be protected by a militant group of armed blacks, and the old guard led by King. After Carmichael was arrested and subsequently released, he addressed a rally, proclaiming, “What we gonna start saying now is ‘Black Power.’”

The Black Power slogan posed the question of how broader African-American liberation could be achieved. SNCC, which had played such an instrumental role in the movement against southern segregation, led the ideological turn toward Black Power, but failed to connect this with effective action. CORE, another leading civil rights organization, embraced Black Power in 1966, promoting black capitalism and separatist nationalism, but soon collapsed. RAM propagated revolutionary nationalist thinking, but had little organizational following. Cultural nationalists, most prominently Ron Karenga’s “US” organization, looked to the potential for a black cultural renaissance that recaptured African traditions, but minimally engaged in politics. Black Power activists were loosely linked ideologically by their advocacy of black nationalism, popular insurgency, self-defense, cultural pride, and their critique of the civil rights movement’s orientation around nonviolence, gradualism, and integration, but initially lacked a coherent practical politics.

The idea of Black Power came to life politically in Oakland, California in late 1966, when community college students Bobby Seale and Huey Newton garnered a small
following by arming themselves, patrolling the police, and promising to prevent police brutality. Soon, hundreds of armed “Black Panthers” were rallying on street-corners to protest the police killing of an unarmed young black man. The Black Panther Party rejected the legitimacy of the US government and saw itself as part of a global revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Following the assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968, the Panthers quickly became the center of black politics nationally. By the end of the year, the party opened offices in 41 cities, from Seattle to Chicago to New York, and from Winston-Salem to Omaha to Los Angeles.

The FBI and local police nationwide responded to the Panthers with an unparalleled campaign of coordinated and brutal repression and vilification. They fed defamatory stories to the press. They wiretapped Panther offices around the country. They hired dozens of informants to infiltrate Panther chapters. The FBI forged documents and paid provocateurs to promote violent conflicts among Black Panther leaders— as well as between the party and other black nationalist organizations—and congratulated themselves when these conflicts yielded the killing of Panthers. Often, they put down all pretense and simply raided Panther establishments, guns blazing. In one case, equipped with a map of the apartment drawn by an informant, police and federal agents assassinated a prominent Panther leader in his bed while he slept, shooting him in the head at point blank range.

In late 1968, the party shifted focus to organizing free breakfast for children and other community programs. In 1969, every Panther chapter organized community services, and these programs soon became the staple activity for party members nationwide. The programs gave party members a way to address the basic needs of their constituents as they challenged the legitimacy of the government in their communities. The party also forged alliances with New Left radicals, and embraced a cross-race anti-imperialist politics. In the face of the most virulent direct repression, the party continued to expand.

The liberatory spirit of Black Power left few social and cultural spheres unaffected. Black students led struggles for educational self-determination. Black militants in the labor movement challenged both the companies they worked for and their own unions. The Black Arts movement developed new aesthetics that promoted cultural pride and celebrated blackness. Women within the Black Power movement challenged patriarchy, contributing to the broader women’s liberation movement.

But revolutionary nationalism could not be sustained. As the federal government rolled back the Vietnam War and instituted affirmative action programs—while continuing to deploy intense repression against black activists—the movement unraveled. In the early 1970s, Black Power organizations spiraled into violent factional conflicts and fell into decline.

The Black Power movement left a lasting legacy, including huge growth in the number of black elected officials, greater access to higher education, the creation of African-American studies programs, improved federal hiring practices, and increased social service funding. But the persistence of stark economic inequality and institutional racism is a reminder that the movement’s emancipatory vision remains unfulfilled.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Civil rights movement (United States); Factions/factionalism; Repression and social movements; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States); Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Buraku Liberation Movement (Japan)
JOHN H. DAVIS

During the roughly nine decades since its inception, the Buraku Liberation Movement (Buraku Kaihō Undō) has worked to eliminate the social prejudice and structural inequities that characterized life for many burakumin, residents of former outcast districts. Although official caste designations were abolished in 1871, many burakumin continued to be targets of discrimination. The Buraku Liberation Movement emerged as a national phenomenon in 1922 with the establishment of the National Levelers Association (Zenkoku Suiheisha). This organization adopted a strategy of direct confrontation known as tetteiteki kyūdan or “thoroughgoing denunciation” against individuals accused of discriminating against burakumin. The focus of the group gradually expanded beyond critiquing the actions of individuals to scrutinizing systemic discrimination manifest in institutions such as the military, police, school, and government administrations. The activities of the organization came to a close in 1942 as one of several organizational casualties resulting from domestic pressures stemming from the intensification of the ongoing war effort. Following the end of World War II, the Buraku Liberation Movement was rekindled in 1946 with the establishment of the National Committee for Buraku Liberation (Buraku Kaihō Zenkoku linkai), which changed its name in 1955 to the current Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei). The movement continued to focus its attention on systemic manifestations of discrimination and ratcheted up pressure on governmental entities to accept responsibility for eradicating prejudice against buraku residents. During the postwar years, much of Japan experienced improvements as the country went through a period of rapid economic growth. Progress rarely extended to buraku areas, however. National surveys revealed significant gaps between the general population and buraku residents, who experienced higher levels of poverty exacerbated by high unemployment and low educational attainment. Moreover, social prejudice against those residing in buraku districts continued to manifest itself in areas such as marriage and employment discrimination.

One of the most significant political achievements of the Buraku Liberation Movement was spurring national and local governments to pass the 1969 Law on Special Measures for Dōwa Projects. During the 33 years of its enactment, funds allocated to officially recognized dōwa districts, the administrative term for buraku, were used to pave roads, replace dilapidated housing with new apartment complexes, and establish facilities such as clinics, gymnasiums, and senior citizen centers to deliver a range of services to community residents. The economic position of many buraku households was improved thanks to programs such as housing subsidies, employment assistance, and scholarships for youth designed to boost education levels and thus facilitate a transition into better paying jobs. Remarkable progress has been made overall, but hundreds of buraku across the country were not officially designated as dōwa areas and, consequently, were not able to benefit from the various programs underwritten by the government.

The Buraku Liberation Movement has used a variety of strategies over the years to combat discrimination. The most controversial continues to be thoroughgoing denunciation, the tactic inherited from the National Levelers Association. Participants confront those accused of committing a prejudicial act against burakumin and submit them to a series of
questions aimed at clarifying the facts of the matter and ultimately securing an apology if a transgression is revealed to have taken place. In response to a number of false claims made by those masquerading as burakumin and a couple of rare cases in the past when the confrontations sparked violence, the process has been streamlined and brought under the supervision of the organization. Also, government representatives are present to witness formal proceedings which typically take place only after a number of fact-finding sessions between interested parties in order to ascertain whether or not there are sufficient grounds for convening a denunciation session.

Though less well known than denunciation sessions, one of the most effective aspects of the Buraku Liberation Movement has been the regular access they have had to local levels of government through negotiation sessions designed to bring continuing needs of buraku residents to the attention of various governmental entities. The annual meetings represent a sustained dialogue that frequently results in clarification of not only lingering problems but also the various policy limitations and bureaucratic hurdles that exist and, potentially, how they might be circumvented.

The recent trajectory of the Buraku Liberation Movement has moved increasingly in the direction of articulating its concerns through a human rights framework, something which has allowed it to seek support for its cause from a larger audience at home and abroad. For example, for more than four decades movement participants have mobilized to protest the arrest and conviction of Kazuo Ishikawa as an example of anti-buraku prejudice in the criminal justice system. The annual protest marches in Tokyo have expanded to include not only representatives from buraku communities across the country protesting anti-buraku discrimination but also several citizens groups who advocate reconsideration of the Sayama case due to the human rights infringements which seem to have occurred at various junctures. The case has also been brought to the attention of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on a number of occasions, including most recently in 2008 when Ishikawa himself got special permission to leave the country and affirm his innocence in person before the committee. The Buraku Liberation League has also been more active on the international human rights stage. In 1988 the organization founded a human rights NGO called the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR) which was granted consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1993.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic movements; Human rights movements; Rights and rights movements; Strategy; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The Bolivarian Revolution is the name for the democratic social revolution occurring in Venezuela. It is named in honor of Latin American liberator Simón Bolívar and loosely defined is a populist revolution aimed at achieving democratic socialism and offering an alternative to the perceived destructive powers of unbridled imperialistic global capitalism. Since 2005, it is also often referred to as twenty-first-century socialism. The Bolivarian Revolution began in Venezuela during the presidency of President Hugo Chávez. Although Chávez is often mistakenly credited as its sole engine, the movement, due to its democratic nature, is powered largely by the people. This is not to say that Chávez has not been its most influential advocate and a necessary (though not sufficient) requisite for its viability so far, but rather that the movement has since taken on an independent nature and is proving to be truly people-driven.

Although started in Venezuela, the Bolivarian Revolution has since swept through much of Latin America and the Caribbean, largely via a number of international coalitions, primarily ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the People’s of our Americas, in the English translation). There are currently eight member nations of ALBA—Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Honduras was also a former member but withdrew after President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup). ALBA has been successful in setting up a number of non-traditional trade deals—the exchange of oil for doctors, for example—and has also instituted its own currency—the SUCRE—to replace the US dollar for all electronic transactions between member nations.

### IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency of the Republic of Venezuela on February 2, 1999. That same day, in his first act as president, he decreed a referendum to convene a Constitutional Assembly for rewriting the Constitution. On April 25 of that same year, the citizens of Venezuela, with a 92% majority of those voting, said “yes” to a Constitutional Assembly. The next step was the election of the members of the assembly. Perhaps most telling of the widespread endorsement of Chávez at that time is the fact that 125 of the 131 elected members were allied with Chávez. The Constitution itself was then subjected to another national referendum. On December 15, 1999, the new Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela was approved by an overwhelming 71.8% of voters. This marked the first time in Venezuela’s history that a constitution was approved by popular referendum and, more importantly, the dawn of a new era in Venezuelan life and politics. On December 20, 1999, the National Constituent Assembly in Caracas proclaimed the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and with it, the legal foundation of the ideological tenets of the Bolivarian Revolution.

The 1999 Constitution is among the world’s longest and most inclusive and is also considered by many to be among the world’s most “advanced” (Wilpert 2007). There are a number of innovations in the 1999 Constitution that merit this categorization, including gender inclusiveness (the language includes both the male and female forms, not simply neutered forms, women’s work in the house is recognized as economic activity and thus is eligible for social security, etc.), protections...
for the environment, recognition and political guarantees for indigenous populations, two “non-traditional” branches of government (the Citizen’s and Electoral), a decentralization of power from higher levels to lower levels (public planning councils, popular referenda, etc.), a commitment to regional integration, a distinction between law and justice to imply that the law is not always just, and it “guarantees the right to life, work, learning, education, social justice and equality, without discrimination or subordination of any kind” (Constitution 1999: 5). These are just a few of the many features that make the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela (henceforth called simply the Constitution) innovative not just in the history of Venezuela, but in the history of the world.

The best understanding of the economic foundation of the Bolivarian Revolution can perhaps best be found in the Constitution itself. Title VI – Socioeconomic System – Chapter 1 – Socioeconomic Order and the Function of the State in the Economy – is the real heart of the Constitution in terms of presenting a potential alternative to capitalist forms of economic globalization. It is here where the foundations of the new socioeconomic order are most explicitly addressed (although the support for the foundations is to be found throughout much of the rest of the Constitution). It is thus in this section where one will find the bedrock of the legal tenets for twenty-first-century socialism.

The economic regime of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is based on the principles of social justice, democratization, efficiency, free competition, protection of the environment, productivity and solidarity, with a view to ensuring overall human development and a dignified and useful existence for the community. The State, jointly with private initiative, shall promote the harmonious development of the national economy, to the end of generating sources of employment, a high rate of domestic added value, raising the standard of living of the population and strengthen the economical sovereignty of the country, guaranteeing the reliability of the law; the solid, dynamic, sustainable, continuing and equitable growth of the economy to ensure a just distribution of wealth through participatory democratic strategic planning with open consultation. (Constitution, Article 299)

This article is arguably the heart of the Constitution, and of the economic foundations of the Bolivarian Revolution itself.

MATERIAL RESULTS

Instantiation of the Bolivarian ideology has occurred first through the sweeping changes in political power holders, then through Plan Bolivar 2000, and finally, and most completely, through the vision of twenty-first-century socialism and the ever-growing number of social missions devoted to carrying out and making real the promises made in the Constitution. The Constitution represents a twenty-first-century vision of socialism, one that builds from its capitalist roots rather than trying to destroy them. "In other words, the 1999 constitution has become more than ‘just’ a constitution. It is a political project towards which pro-Chávez Venezuelans want to move the society” (Wilpert 2007: 43).

The prime years of the implementation of the neoliberal economic model in Latin America (early 1980s to early 1990s), saw a general reversal in growth rates, increasing poverty, and increased social inequality. Previous to the 1980s, Latin America had been enjoying relative growth and a continuously declining poverty rate (for example, from about 65% in 1970 to about 25% in 1980). The 1980s, however, have come to be known as the “lost decade” both because there was little to no economic growth and because many of the gains in social equity made during previous decades were reversed. For example, the years between 1980 and 2006 saw the GDP per capita grow at only about 15% while the years 1960–1980 saw a regional average of over 82%. Moreover, inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased dramatically during this time so that by the 1990s there was unanimous consensus that Latin America was suffering the highest levels of
inequality in the world (Korzeniewicz & Smith 2000). In essence, “The new regime of open markets has, by and large, favored those with the recourses to succeed in them, leaving the rest to fend for themselves” (Portes & Hoffman 2003: 75). During the 1980s, Venezuela experienced a marked decline in the standards of living of most people. For example, the real GDP peaked in 1977 but declined by 26% per capita between 1978 and 1986. Additionally, poverty rose from 17% in 1980 to 65% in 1996. The effects of neoliberal policies in terms of declining GDP per capita were stronger and longer lasting in Venezuela (Weisbrot & Sandoval 2008).

So how successful has the Bolivarian Revolution been in reversing the negative trends brought by neoliberalism? We can begin by examining the macroeconomic indicators of traditional importance to those at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, who are generally considered the guardians of the global economy. Since 2003, the GDP has grown by over 87%, there have been 17 successive quarters of economic growth with an average increase of GDP of 11.2%, unemployment has been reduced from 18.4% in 2003 to 8.3% as of June 2007, the minimum wage (the highest in Latin America) has overtaken the inflation rate since 2004, only 7.35% of the GDP is directed toward foreign debt, which has been cut in half, the poverty rate has decreased from 55.1% in 2003 to 24.2% by the end of 2009, the extreme poverty rate has decreased from 30.2% in 2003 to 9.4% by first half of 2007, and the Gini coefficient has decreased from 0.487 in 1998 (the year Chávez took office) to 0.420 in 2007. As a point of comparison, the Gini of the United States increased from roughly 0.40 to 0.47 during that same time period.

While macroeconomic indicators provide a useful means of comparison, perhaps more important to our understanding of the Bolivarian Revolution is an examination of the more material consequences of the economic policy for the people (although all of the above also have direct effects on the people). During the Chávez administration, social spending per capita has increased 218.3% (so, more than tripled), and has increased from 8.2% to 18.8% of GDP in 2008. Further, there are now 12 times as many primary care physicians in the country, access to potable water has increased from 80% to 92%, daily caloric intake increased from 2200 in 1998 to 2700 in 2008, while the rate of malnutrition dropped from 21% in 1998 to just 6% in 2007. In terms of education, preschool attendance has increased from 40.3% to 54.6%, high school attendance has increased from 82.8% to 93%, more than 1.4 million adults have participated in literacy campaigns (including Mission Robinson and the “Si, Yo Puedo” program of Cuba), there are more than 3600 new schools, university enrollment has more than doubled to 1.6 million under the Chávez administration, and UNESCO has declared Venezuela among the top five countries in the world in terms of access to universal education. Additionally, there are now more than 16 500 food stores throughout the country that offer subsidized food to the poor, the proportion of people receiving old-age pension has increased from 19.6% to 32% between 1999 and 2006, the infant mortality rate has declined from 21.4 to 13.7 deaths per 1000 between 1998 and 2007, formal employment is up from 44.5% in 1998 to 49.4% in 2007, and there has been an increase of 2.3 million jobs (1.8 million in the private sector alone). These indicators highlight the types of material gains to the predominantly poor of Venezuela.

PARTICIPATION IN THE MOVEMENT

One of the key goals of the Bolivarian Revolution is to build and enhance a direct participatory democracy. The Bolivarian Movement, and the Chávez administration itself, seem to have the support of the people. Chávez first ascended to the presidency in 1998 with 56.2% of the vote, the new Bolivarian Constitution was approved in 1999 by 72% of the vote, Chávez was elected under the new constitution with 59.8% of the vote, won a
recall referendum in 2004 with 58% of the vote, and won the 2006 election with 62.9% of the vote. It is also worth noting that in the 2006 election Chávez won a majority in each of the 23 Venezuelan states, including the home state of his opponent, Manuel Rosales. And although the Chávez administration lost a constitutional referendum in December 2007, it was by less than 1% of the vote. Overall, it seems Chávez has enjoyed clear and sustained support.

Although such statistics provide an indication of support, they say little about actual political participation. Thus, what is even more significant than his statistical victories is that Chávez managed to double his support in raw numbers of voters from 3.7 million in 1998 to 7.3 million in 2006. Indeed there are great indications that the people, both pro and anti, have felt an increasing surge of political participation. There were 9 million registered voters and 7.5 million votes cast in 1998, numbers that increased to 16 million and 12 million respectively by 2006. The years between 2004 and 2006 alone saw an increase of 1.7 million registered voters. And in 2006, voter turnout was 75%, making it the highest percentage in Venezuelan history. Thus, regardless of political orientation, the Chávez administration has witnessed a significant boom in democratic participation. Some have argued that the transformation has been from a right to participation to an obligation to do so (Ellner 2008).

It isn’t just the number of registered voters and the number of people actually voting that is on the rise in Venezuela, it is also the opportunities to engage in electoral activity. From the time Venezuela first became a representative democracy on January 1, 1959, until Chávez took office in February of 1999, there had been 15 electoral contests in the country. In the 13 years Chávez has been in office, there have been 11 electoral contests. Thus, and perhaps most key to a true democracy, not only are participants in the process increasing, but so are the opportunities for participation.

It is also worth noting that under Chávez, Venezuela’s elections have received unprecedented attention and scrutiny. In order to ensure smooth democratic functioning and appease international concerns, the government of Venezuela has opened their election process up to international observation. During the 2006 election, for example, there were 1400 observers on hand including 10 representatives from the US-based Carter Center, 130 from the European Union, 60 from the Organization of American States, and 10 from the Mercosur Common Market of the South countries. All observers, even those from opposition sources, declared that elections in Venezuela were free and fair.

Social support for many of the programs put forth by the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela is no doubt due, in part, to the increasing social inclusion of the people. Women (for a while four of the five national branches of government were headed by women – all but the executive branch), Afro-Venezuelans, indigenous peoples (according to Article 125 of the Constitution, native peoples will be included in the National Assembly, where they are guaranteed at least three seats, as well as in federal and local entities with a native population), the elderly, disabled, and most notably the poor have all seen an increase in social protections via the new Bolivarian Constitution, attention via the missions, and inclusion through community councils. These minorities, in turn, appear to be the true engine of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, and elsewhere.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Globalization and movements; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Labor movement in Latin America; Movement Toward Socialism (MAS–IPSP) (Bolivia); Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Recyclable materials collectors movement in Brazil and South America

MARIA CECILIA and LOSCHIAVO DOS SANTOS

Increasing joblessness and homelessness in Brazil in the last 20 years has led to the development and spread of a new strategy of income generation among some poor and homeless individuals: collecting and recycling discarded mass produced objects and materials.

The activity of recyclable material collectors on Brazilian city streets has been visible for several decades, but it was only in the early 1980s that the first initiatives arose to organize them through associations or cooperatives. In the city of São Paulo, at that time, a group of church workers began helping the homeless, some of whom were facilitating their subsistence by collecting and selling the waste discarded by homes, industries, and commercial establishments in the downtown area. These homeless people began holding meetings at a community center, which became the meeting point for these collectors. The idea of collecting was initially pursued for the purpose of obtaining money to afford a religious party during Easter.

The history of the organization of the collectors and the homeless includes numerous violent confrontations and evictions. In 1985, in a political conflict with the municipal administration of the city of São Paulo, the collectors marched through the main streets of São Paulo, demanding the right to circulate with their carts in the downtown area, thus manifesting their political voice.

The first recyclable collectors cooperative in Brazil was founded in 1989 by 20 groups of collectors. They called themselves the Cooperative of Autonomous Paper, Cardboard, Scraps, and Reusable Materials Collectors (COOPAMARE). In 1990, the Association of Collectors of Paper, Cardboard, and Recyclable Materials (ASMARE) was created in Belo Horizonte, based on sociopedagogical work developed by the street pastoral of the Belo Horizonte archdiocese. In 1993, the Belo Horizonte project of selective collection was implemented in partnership with ASMARE by the superintendency of urban cleaning (SLU), helping give a “semipublic status” to the work of the collectors’ cooperative (Dias 2007). Today, ASMARE is one of the largest Brazilian cooperatives and the only one to have a recycling plant run by the collectors themselves (Silva 2006; Rutkowski 2008).

The organization of the work of these collectors gradually began to generate income and, throughout the 1990s, motivated the articulation and expansion of cooperative work in several Brazilian cities. Thus, the collectors, the majority of whom are now formally organized into work and income generation cooperatives, established the basis of the National Movement of Recyclable Materials Collectors (MNCR) in September 1999, at a meeting in Belo Horizonte with nongovernmental organizations, the government, and the private sector.

The national movement was officially created in June 2001 when more than 1700 collectors from all over Brazil attended the first National Conference of Paper and Recyclable Materials Collectors on the campus of the National University of Brasília. The attendees joined in writing a political agenda articulating and advocating their rights, as well as establishing partnerships with different sectors of civil society.

During the congress, the Letter of Brasilia was written: “For the end of trash dumps, recycling by collectors, at once!” It summarized the main guidelines and demands of the MNCR: proposals for MNCR actions to be taken concerning the executive branch of government, the productive chain of recycling (includes the process of managing solid wastes from the moment they are discarded, triage, packing in

bales, sale of material, transport logistics, processing by industry, and developing the market for the new product; Gonçalves-Dias 2009), and the citizenship of the homeless.

The collectors demanded that the executive branch guarantee that they would receive funds and subsidies with a view to their social inclusion through work. They also demanded qualification for their work, proposing the inclusion of their militants in the federal government’s national plan for professional qualifications, the adoption of policies and measures that would enable their technological improvement, as well as the eradication of trash dumps in the country.

As for the productive chain of recycling, the requirement was to create institutional devices that would ensure that recycling was performed as a priority by social companies of recyclables collectors. And as regards the citizenship of the homeless population, one of the main points was the requirement that the homeless be recognized by including them in the national demographic census performed by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

In 2003, in Caxias do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, the first Latin American Congress of Collectors took place. Collectors from Uruguay and Argentina participated, thus demonstrating the strength of the organization among the movements in South America. During this event, the statement known as the Letter of Caxias do Sul was written, spelling out who the collectors are in the throwaway society:

This struggle is not new. It is the result of a long history of women and men who, working as collectors, ensured survival from what society discards and throws away. It is a history in which we discover the value and significance of our work: collecting and recycling disposable materials, we are environmental agents and we help clean the cities. The organization of associations and cooperatives created the possibility of work and income for the more excluded sectors of society... recycling life itself. (MNCR 2003: 1)

In addition to spelling out the social identity of this collective, the Letter contained claims and guidelines for collaboration between government, cities and collectives, and one of its commitments was “to work for a greater integration of the communities of our cities with the collectors’ organizations, through policies and programs of environmental education, ensuring cooperation for separating and delivering recyclables, for controlling the actions of government, for valuing the work of collectors, for participating in public policy management forums” (MNCR 2003: 1).

In the opening session of this event Dona Geralda Marçal, who had been a collector since the age of eight, stated that “Collectors do not need cesta básica [basic food], we want to have our own factory for recycling materials.” This dream came true with the inauguration of the Plastics Factory – owned and managed by the collectors in the city of Belo Horizonte in 2005.

As to government initiatives, in the federal sphere, in 2003 the Interministerial Committee for Social Inclusion of Recyclable Materials Collectors was instituted by presidential decree. The purpose of the committee is to implement the interministerial project: “Trash and Citizenship: Fighting Hunger Associated with the Inclusion of Collectors and the Eradication of Trash Dumps,” with MNCR representing the collectors.

In 2003, the federal programs began the transfer of funds to municipalities for the eradication of dumps and for elaborating integrated management plans for integrated management of urban solid waste, with a component including collectors. Among the plan’s requirements was support for the organization of collectors and establishing selective collection partnerships. In 2005, the second Latin American Congress was held in São Leopoldo with the participation of 1050 collectors from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.

In 2006, the federal government instituted the rule that recyclable waste discarded by the agencies and entities of direct and indirect federal public administration must be
donated to collectors’ associations and cooperatives. A great achievement of the collectors was the creation in 2007 of a national policy of basic sanitation, which rules on contracts and bidding. The modification involves the authorization to employ recyclable collectors associations or cooperatives, without the need for bidding, to carry out recyclable solid waste collection.

In turn, the national policy on solid wastes proposed in 2007 is still going through channels. This project foresees the integration of the collectors into the recyclable wastes collection processes. It also foresees a form of integrated management, and the requirement for the municipality to elaborate the integrated management plan for solid wastes, including the recyclable collectors. Under discussion in the Brazilian parliament, this bill has undergone several changes.

The changes made in 2008 instituted principles such as “polluter pays,” and were limited to industries manufacturing agricultural pesticide, batteries, fluorescent lamps, tires, and electric and electronic products. They also make it mandatory for the municipalities to implement management plans for waste integrated to those of basic sanitation. In addition, fiscal incentives are seen as lines of credit, with lower interest for activities that generate less waste, and recycle or implement selective collection systems.

In 2008, in Bogota, Colombia, the third Latin American Congress was held, with delegates from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Haiti. And, in August 2010, the government signed the national law of solid waste, which has an impact on collectors’ work through the possibility of waste incineration.

From the beginning, the dynamics and characteristics of expansion of the recyclables production sectors in Brazil and elsewhere has depended on the labor force of thousands of collectors, working under precarious conditions. Collectors are turning their fragile situation into a relevant economic and social asset. Through their efforts, catadores (collectors) move from extreme vulnerability in garbage dumps to more socially secure, economically viable, and environmentally conscious citizenship.

Gradually the cooperatives have improved their physical situation and many now have electricity, running water, and bathrooms. Collectors are engaged in the development of an environment-friendly economy as they clean the city. The materials they find are sorted and reintegrated into the productive cycle. Although they play an important role in urban waste management, they receive no health, housing, social security, or education benefits. They are looked upon as dirty people, and even delinquents, rather than productive members of society. Yet they are better off than before they organized themselves into a growing trans-South American movement.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Collective identity; Homeless protest movements (United States); Poor people’s movements; Rights and rights movements.

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Chávez, César Estrada (1937–1992)

J. CRAIG JENKINS

César Estrada Chávez was a civil rights activist, community organizer, and founder of the United Farm Workers of America (UFWA), the first union to successfully organize agricultural workers in the United States. A self-educated follower of Gandhi’s nonviolent protest strategy and Catholic theories of penance, he began his organizing career in 1952 with the Community Service Organization (CSO), a civil rights organization for urban Mexican Americans in California. In 1958, he became executive director of the CSO but, due to an abiding commitment to organizing farm workers, resigned in 1962 to found the National Farm Workers Association, the predecessor of the UFWA. In August 1966, he became director of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), a merger of the NFWA and the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC/AFL-CIO), which he led until his death on April 23, 1993. Chávez’s major contribution was applying a nonviolent protest strategy to the challenge of organizing farm workers, a group that suffered intense discrimination, little community cohesion, and high levels of poverty, even as they labored in the most profitable sectors of American agribusiness. In 1994 Chávez was posthumously recognized with the Medal of Freedom, the United States’ highest civilian honor, for his work on behalf of Mexican-American civil rights and the rights of farm workers to organize, and in 2003 a US commemorative postal stamp was issued in his honor.

Chávez was born on a small family farm outside of Yuma, Arizona to Juana and Librado Chávez. In 1937, his family lost their farm and migrated to central California to work in the fields. Over the next decade, Chávez attended over 30 schools, eventually dropping out in the eighth grade when his father was no longer able to work. In 1952 he joined the CSO as an organizer in San Jose, California, working with Fred Ross, who had been trained by the famed community organizer and activist Saul Alinsky (1909–1972). Chávez worked on Mexican-American civil rights issues, especially racial discrimination in the schools and public facilities (including “whites only” restrictions in theaters and restaurants), conducting language and citizenship training, and organizing voter registration drives. A key tactic was the “house meeting,” in which volunteers used their personal networks to recruit others. Frustrated that the CSO was unwilling to organize farm workers, Chávez resigned in March 1962 and moved to Delano, California, to found the NFWA.

The NFWA focused on cooperative shopping, burial insurance, and a credit union. By 1965 there were several thousand members in the Delano area. In the summer of 1965, Chávez recruited student volunteers who had been involved in the southern civil rights movement and several clergy to organize rent strikes and school discrimination protests. Like Chávez, they were paid five dollars per week plus room and board. In September 1965, Filipino members of the AWOC called a strike in the Delano table-grape harvest. The NFWA joined the strike, with strong support among the workers, but the growers refused to negotiate, hiring immigrant workers as replacements. Chávez called for a boycott against Schenley Industries, a liquor conglomerate with a small grape ranch, and he organized a 340-mile march on the state capitol in Sacramento, California, to publicize the boycott. Media coverage led Schenley, which had major liquor trade labels to protect, to sign the first agricultural union contract. The next target was the DiGior- gio Corporation, an agribusiness giant with vulnerable grocery trade labels, which agreed to a union recognition election that the union

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won. The NFWA and AWOC then merged to form the UFWOC (AFL-CIO).

The UFWOC next organized a table-grape strike, which received broad worker support but was broken by immigrant workers, many of whom were undocumented. In fact, in the grape harvest, well over half of the labor force was undocumented. Mounting a three-year grape boycott energized by Chávez’s 25-day fast, farm workers picketed grocery stores across the country. This cut national grape sales by over a third and closed off foreign exports, leading to an industry-wide contract in August 1970. Strikes and a boycott against iceberg lettuce, however, failed to produce contracts. Lettuce was harder to target. Growers confused the issue by signing “sweetheart” contracts with the Teamsters, and they intimidated workers with violence. Chávez decided to support state collective-bargaining legislation to allow workers to be able to vote for their union of choice, leading to the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) of 1975, which created secret ballot elections and negotiations in the state of California. The UFWA won most of the elections, and by 1980 it had over 45,000 members. In 1983 California Governor George Deukmejian closed down the ALRA Board, and subsequent legislation weakened its authority, undermining many of the UFWA contracts. In 1986 Chávez kicked off a third grape boycott, focusing this time on the issue of pesticide use, which was a major health hazard to workers as well as to consumers of grapes. After Chávez’s death in 1992, the UFWA signed new contracts under more favorable political conditions.

Chávez’s tactical brilliance and commitment to “La Causa” (the cause) were legendary. Recognizing the organizational and political difficulties in organizing agricultural strikes, he and the UFW cadre devised a nonviolent protest strategy focused on boycotts, demonstrations, and publicity, including hunger strikes that enlisted broader community support. Countering frustrations that might lead to strike violence and violent attacks against strikers, Chávez conducted three major fasts framed in terms of religious penance and claims for worker dignity. In addition to appealing to the moral identity between workers and growers, his fasts called for personal sacrifice and discipline, which energized workers and garnered broader community support.

In the last decade of his life, Chávez became obsessed with internal control, using “thought control” tactics that drove out many of the original UFW cadre and undermined the innovative spirit that had made the UFW successful. Nonetheless, his dedication and efforts in the field of civil rights and community organizing provided a model for organizing the “unorganizable.”

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972); Boycotts; Civil rights movement (United States); Community organizing (United States); Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Hunger strikes; Leadership; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Strikes in US history.

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The Christian Identity movement (CI) is the product of a marriage between various marginalized knowledges and British Israelism (BI). The betrothal was consummated in Southern California during the 1930s and 1940s by recently arrived Dust Bowl immigrants carrying with them evangelical Methodist/Baptist enthusiasms. While there are many CI congregations, the most notable is the Church of Jesus Christ Christian (Aryan Nations (AN)). When AN was headquartered in Idaho, it spawned a number of terrorist activities in the decades after the 1980s, most notably those of The Order. The Order was implicated in murders, robberies, armored car heists, and arsons. It ended in a fiery shootout with federal agents in 1985.

The theology of BI holds that after their exile (circa 700 BCE), the tribes of Israel migrated over the Caucasus Mountains. Hence, their racial type: Caucasian. They subsequently settled in European countries, the names of which allegedly point to their tribal origins (e.g., Denmark = the tribe of Dan, Jutland = Judah, and Macedonia = Moeshe [Moses] + Dan + ia [land of]). The implication is that white Europeans (the Saxons) are Isaac’s Sons, not just the Jews; and the promises granted Isaac in the Bible are theirs. BI considers Jews a fraction of Israel, but not its entirety. Nonetheless, Jews are to be treated patronizingly as a “younger brother.”

BI was cultivated by English society matrons and retired colonial officers. It therefore evinces a characteristically understated British restraint. After it was transmitted to America, however, its chief carriers became self-educated “scholars,” non-ordained Bible thumpers, Klansmen, and McCarthyites. In their hands, BI was melded into the American cultic milieu of pyramidology, UFO cultism, “biblical economics,” alternative medicine, apocalypticism, conspiratology, and most notably, Judeophobia.

In CI Jews are viewed either as devotees of a “Satanic religion,” Judaism (regardless of their race), or as members of a non-white race (regardless of their faith). If the latter, they are said to be descended either from Cain (who was conceived by Eve after being impregnated by Satan) or from Mongol Khazars (whose forefather, Esau, sold his birthright for a bowl of lentils). Whatever the case, Jews are accused of involvement in a conspiracy to impose “ZOG” (Zionist Occupation Government) on the world. All recent historical “tribulations” are attributed to a cabal headquartered in “Jew York City” and in “Kosher Valley” (Hollywood): from equal rights for minorities (“His dream, our nightmare”) to 9/11 (“an inside job”); from global warming (“a hoax”) to feminism (and the “abortion holocaust”); from economic boom and bust (both of which are phases of a plot to indeb and eventually enslave white folk) to compulsory vaccination programs (“that sicken our youth”); from rock ’n roll (“the Devil’s anthem”) to the presidential election in 2008 of “Kenyan-born Muslim” Barack Hussein “Osama.”

CI prophecy maintains that these and related events are all signs of the Last Days. But unlike Christian fundamentalism, which claims that believers will be “raptured” into Heaven prior to Christ’s Second Coming (the doctrine of pre-millennialism), CI is post-millennial. It insists that Christ will come only after “God’s battle axe and weapons of war” (white people) have defeated “the sons of darkness” in a final battle. In the meantime, they are obligated to occupy secular institutions in order to reconstruct society on Old Testament lines: reinstating mandatory Sabbath, together with slavery and concubinage; putting an end to interest-taking on loans; stoning...
to death disobedient children; executing abortionists, “witchcrafters,” and sodomites (who “wait in their lusts to rape”); discontinuing public welfare programs for “Negro beasts who eat the flesh of men”; and either exiling nonwhites from the country or treating them as guest peoples without rights. Nonwhites are said to have no natural rights because, unlike white “spirit” people, they have no souls. This is “proven” by their lack of shame, as indicated by an inability to blush when blowtorches are put to their faces. According to CI, “not everything that walks on two legs is human.”

CI is broadcast through a variety of largely underground media: short wave radio, Internet web sites, blogs, taped sermons, pamphlets, local access TV, prison “outreach,” and self-published books. However, the most important vehicle for disseminating CI is the annual conclave, where “the great minds of the Aryan movement” gather. Here, activists learn about survivalism and natural pharmacopeia, as well as white folk songs, dance, and dress. They may also undergo paramilitary training where they shoot at “runnin’ Nigger” targets and at faces of prominent Jews.

Besides uniting the community, these media also offer opportunities to validate CI claims. There are four kinds of proofs: (1) Citation of ancient legends. One of these is that the coronation stone in Westminster Abbey is the same as that upon which Jacob laid his head the evening he was named Israel; (2) Numerology. One argument is that 1776, the year of America’s founding, occurred exactly 2520 years—in other words “seven Bible years”—after Israel was taken into captivity by the Assyrians; (3) Etymology. “British” is said to be a corruption of the Hebraic words brith (covenant) + ish (people). Thus, the British are the real “people of the covenant,” not the Jews; (4) Bible promises. God promises that if Israel remains faithful to this covenant, she shall be “a company of nations” that dominates the globe. That Britain was indeed the world’s foremost imperial power during the Victorian era “proves” that she is Israel. That Judah’s scepter has since passed to Manasseh (America)—“A city on a Hill, the New Jerusalem”—is due to the fact that Britain failed to uphold its side of the bargain with God. And if America does the same then, like Britain and the ancient Israelites before her, it too shall lose God’s favor.

SEE ALSO: Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Cults; Neo-Nazi movements in Europe and the United States; Racist social movements; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
The Central America Solidarity movement emerged in the early 1980s when US citizens sought ways to support Nicaraguans, Salvadoreans, and Guatemalans who were fighting for human rights, economic justice, and democratic freedoms. Solidarity activists also worked to obstruct US political, economic, and military intervention in Central America.

BACKGROUND

Central America’s conflicts stem from major inequalities created during colonization. Starting in the sixteenth century, Spanish settlers seized the best arable land and set up large plantations. Thus the land became concentrated in the hands of a small, wealthy, European minority who institutionalized policies to ensure their ongoing control of the region. In contrast, the majority of Central Americans were landless and lived well below the poverty level. By the 1960s, numerous popular organizations formed in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala to challenge these inequalities and improve the lives of the poor. Liberation theology, which posits that the Bible teaches liberation for the oppressed, contributed to this trend. But activists soon experienced severe state repression, including incarceration, torture, and assassination. Many concluded that social change could only be instigated through armed struggle and thus revolutionary movements emerged: the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Nicaragua’s revolutionary movement seized power in 1979, shortly before Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States.

Once Reagan assumed office, his top foreign policy priority was to stop the spread of socialist revolutions in Central America. Toward that end, he authorized the US Central Intelligence Agency to form a counterrevolutionary force, known as the Contras, to overthrow Nicaragua’s Sandinista government. Realizing that they could not defeat the Sandinistas through a direct military confrontation, the Contras began attacking the country’s economic infrastructure and destroying government projects aimed at improving living standards (such as schools and health clinics). The strategy was to create widespread social dissatisfaction so that Nicaraguans would oust the Sandinista government. While Reagan was working to reverse Nicaragua’s revolution, he also tried to defeat the Salvadoran insurgency. His administration sent billions of dollars in aid and weapons to the Salvadoran government, despite its horrific human rights record and sponsorship of paramilitary organizations that had killed numerous religious leaders including El Salvador’s archbishop, Oscar Romero, and four North American churchwomen (Nepstad 2004).

SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

The assassination of Archbishop Romero and the North American churchwomen in El Salvador mobilized religious communities in the United States. One of the most prominent faith-based organizations was the Sanctuary movement, which began in 1982 when a Presbyterian church in Tucson publicly announced that it was intentionally breaking immigration laws by helping Central Americans cross the border and then harboring them. Initially, Sanctuary activists assisted refugees in the asylum process. Yet over 97 percent of Guatemalan
and Salvadoran asylum applicants were denied, largely due to government policies favoring those fleeing communist regimes. Thus activists decided to invoke an ancient Judeo-Christian practice of creating a safe haven for those fleeing persecution (Cunningham 1995). They also recruited churches and synagogues throughout the country to participate. Eventually, 400 religious groups were involved in a “new underground railroad” that illegally sheltered those fleeing Central America’s violence and repression, preventing them from deportation (Coutin 1993; Smith 1996).

Another important faith-based solidarity organization was Witness for Peace. This organization began in 1983 when 30 US religious leaders traveled to Nicaragua’s war zone to gather facts about the Contra War. The group noticed that Contra forces did not attack while they were present, largely because the counterrevolutionary group did not want to jeopardize their US funding by killing American citizens. Realizing that their presence deterred attacks, the religious leaders decided to establish a long-term presence in the region (Griffin-Nolan 1991). Eventually, the organization developed a two-pronged strategy: (1) sending long-term volunteers to live and work in war-zone villages to decrease Contra attacks, and (2) sending thousands of short-term volunteers who would travel to Nicaragua and then return to do educational and media work to change US policies. Within a decade, Witness for Peace sent over 4000 people to Nicaragua on short-term trips and roughly 200 volunteered on a long-term basis (Smith 1996).

Secular organizations were also active in solidarity work. The most prominent were the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) and Nicaragua Network. CISPES formed in 1980 to oppose US support for the Salvadoran regime and to organize financial aid for grassroots groups in El Salvador. Nicaragua Network provided material aid, particularly to war-zone communities, and sponsored national speaking tours for FSLN representatives (Perla 2008).

In the mid-1980s, when Contra attacks in coffee regions devastated the Nicaraguan economy, Nicaragua Network started a program called Nicaragua Exchange that sent brigades of US volunteers to help harvest coffee (Nepstad & Smith 1999).

MOVEMENT DECLINE

The Central American Solidarity movement declined by the early 1990s, due to several factors. The Contra War had taken a severe toll on Nicaraguans, who voted the Sandinista government out in 1990. Additionally, a 1991 peace accord brought El Salvador’s civil war to an end. Finally, when George H.W. Bush became president, he shifted US foreign policy priorities toward the Middle East.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador); Human rights movements; Religion and social movements; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Chinese communist revolution

JIN XU and DINGXIN ZHAO

The communist revolution of China was led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded in 1921 in the wake of the May Fourth movement. The CCP began as a very small Marxist-inspired left-wing intellectual club, with little political influence prior to its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) in 1924. The GMD were motivated to ally with the CCP in order to obtain support from the Soviet Union in their fight with the northern warlords. With the help of the CCP, the GMD was remodeled from a loose organization into a Leninist party, and the GMD also received financial and other support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the CCP also developed quickly by infiltrating the GMD-controlled army and by expanding its organizations in the urban and rural areas of southern China. While the alliance between the GMD and CCP brought great success for both parties, tensions also grew as the parties pursued different agendas. After the initial military success against the warlords during the Northern Expedition, a growing number of the GMD’s leaders and generals became very unhappy about the CCP’s infiltration into the GMD-controlled army as well as about the CCP’s radical property redistribution policy, which was implemented in the territories recently occupied by the GMD’s Northern Expedition army. As a result they no longer wanted to share the power with the CCP. In early 1927, shortly after Northern Expedition troops occupied Shanghai, the GMD started to purge the CCP-controlled organizations in the city and labeled the CCP an illegal organization. The purge soon spread, with hundreds of thousands of CCP members and their sympathizers arrested and killed. In response, the CCP staged several military uprisings in late 1927 in places where they had strong influence. While all these uprisings were easily suppressed by the GMD army, the surviving members of the CCP were able to retreat to mountain areas and conduct guerrilla warfare.

The Chinese communist revolution can be roughly divided into three stages according to the nature of the warfare. The first is the guerrilla war stage from 1927 to 1936. In this period, while the CCP was initially able to greatly expand its base, it ran into problems with radicalism – its radical land redistribution policy hurt not only the landlords but also the well-to-do peasants, its ruthless internal power struggle led to massive purges and killings of its own cadres, and finally its overconfident military strategies were unable to withstand the assault of the GMD army. Many of these radical policies were, of course, initiated by the young radicals who had returned from the Soviet Union with minds full of theories but little practical experience. On the other side, the GMD was able to defeat or co-opt the northern warlords and unify a large part of China by the early 1930s. With their hands freed by this unification, the GMD launched two massive military campaigns against the CCP-led Red Army and finally forced the Red Army to abandon all their guerrilla bases in southern China and start the famous Long March in late 1934.

The Long March was initially just a poorly planned escape from the GMD army’s onslaught, but it turned out to have a long-lasting impact on the development of the communist revolution that was not intended by the leaders of either the GMD or the CCP. First, the CCP lost about 90 percent of its soldiers during the Long March. Yet, the soldiers who remained in the army were those who were most loyal to the communist cause and many of them were going to play a key role in the communist revolution. In other
words, the defeat actually helped the CCP to sieve out its core elements which were crucial to its later expansion. Second, before the Long March, the CCP was heavily dominated by the dogmatic leaders who had a Soviet Union background and were very much under the influence of Moscow. The war, and the pure needs of survival, severely tested the leaders of the CCP. As a result, those CCP leaders who were able to make more pragmatic decisions rose to the top while the dogmatic leaders with a strong Soviet Union background lost their complete domination. After the Long March, Mao Zedong rose to become the CCP’s most powerful leader.

The GMD was unable to wipe out the Red Army during the Long March. Its failure, however, had less to do with Mao’s wise leadership than with a set of conditions produced by Japan’s invasion. In the middle of the Long March, CCP propaganda gave a new meaning to the Long March – marching north to resist the Japanese invasion. This new frame was made possible by the heightened Japanese aggression in China and by the countrywide intensification of anti-Japanese feelings, and was thus sympathetically received even among some GMD leaders. Moreover, when the Red Army entered Shaanxi province, the GMD army stationed there mainly consisted of troops who had retreated from Manchuria after the Japanese occupied the region in 1931. Still humiliated by their nonresistance to the Japanese invasion, these soldiers were very reluctant to fight the Red Army, who now expressed their desire to unite with the GMD to resist the Japanese invasion. This situation greatly upset Jiang Jieshi, who believed that the Red Army could be eliminated in Shaanxi by just one more campaign. When Jiang went to Xi’an in the winter of 1936 to force the local generals to carry out his order, however, he was put under house arrest by the local GMD generals in what came to be known as the Xi’an Incident. The ensuing dramatic push for a peaceful solution to the incident ended in another GMD–CCP alliance between 1937 and 1945, after which the second stage of the communist revolution began.

The second stage was crucial to the success of the communist revolution. Soon after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in 1937, the Japanese occupied much of the northern and coastal areas of China. Yet, the Japanese only controlled the cities, leaving the countryside clear for the CCP to establish their guerilla bases. In only two years, the CCP was able to boost its army tenfold to 400,000 troops. By 1945, when the Sino-Japanese War ended, the CCP army had grown to over 1.2 million. Furthermore, in 1937, while Mao was already the most powerful leader in the CCP, the party was still very much under significant influence from the Soviet Union, through many of the dogmatic cadres who had returned from there. By 1945, however, Mao’s leadership was fully consolidated, in part thanks to the Yanan Rectification Campaign (Selden 1971). Finally, between 1937 and 1945, the CCP continued to expand its guerilla bases and established village-level government in places under its control. The Japanese attacks on the CCP bases and their atrocities in the end only helped the CCP to solidify its bonds with the local peasants (Johnson 1962; Chen 1986). By 1945, the CCP government already controlled a territory containing 130 million people and had a very effective taxation system as a result of its strong local bonds and the village-level government it had established during the war.

The GMD and CCP engaged in a showdown between 1946 and 1949, soon after the Japanese surrender. This final stage of the communist revolution ended with the defeat of the GMD army and the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The quick defeat of the GMD by the CCP was a surprise to many international observers. Even though the CCP had commanded over 1.2 million soldiers and a territory with a population of 130 million, the GMD had commanded 4.3 million soldiers and controlled a territory with 350 million people. Moreover, while the best CCP troops were only armed with Japanese weapons, 22 elite divisions of the GMD army were equipped with the best
American firearms. The military conditions were very much in favor of the GMD army at the beginning of the showdown. Yet, even though the GMD’s defeat was not inevitable, the following set of structural constraints and strategic mistakes fostered the quick demise of the GMD regime.

First, while the GMD regime controlled a much larger territory in the richer parts of China, it actually faced more resource constraints. The GMD regime did not have the highly effective village-level government that the CCP had established during the anti-Japanese war period, and thus had a much weaker extractive capacity in comparison with its communist counterpart. Moreover, whereas the GMD army needed money for military procurement and to pay for soldier stipends, the CCP army required very little to cover such expenses (the soldiers of the CCP army were volunteers, and the CCP army obtained most of its weapons from the defeated GMD troops). The GMD regime thus faced serious inflation and experienced a financial crisis as the war went on, creating conditions for communist success (Jin 2002). Second, after the Yanan Rectification Campaign, Mao rose to become the CCP’s paramount leader, allowing him to decide upon and implement coherent military strategies. The GMD leader Jiang Jieshi, however, did not wield as strong an authority over the GMD as Mao did over the CCP, nor did he have firm control of those GMD troops which originated from the warlords’ forces. The weaker leadership and the lack of cooperating spirit and fighting will of some GMD generals were always a big problem for the GMD army. Third, the GMD was a much looser organization in comparison with the CCP. The CCP agents could, therefore, easily infiltrate the GMD army and organizations in order to collect intelligence and even to influence the troops to change their allegiance to the CCP at a number of critical moments during the GMD–CCP showdown.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all the above issues were amplified because of the GMD’s poor military strategies. Between 1946 and 1948, the GMD changed its military strategies several times. In the first year, the GMD army waged a frontal attack on CCP bases, with the occupation of cities as a major goal. The GMD army also fought wars inside CCP-controlled areas and committed large numbers of troops to defend the newly occupied territories. On the other hand, the CCP made the elimination of GMD troops rather than territorial defense their primary goal. It also moved its troops around to induce the chasing GMD army to overextend itself and then launched surprise counterattacks. The GMD army’s manpower, supply system, and intelligence simply could not sustain this kind of war. It was not until 1947, after experiencing repeated defeats and the loss of over a million soldiers, that the GMD adjusted its strategy, now aiming at gaining the upper hand only in a few strategically crucial places. Had the GMD adopted this strategy earlier, it is more than likely that its major goal could have been achieved. By now, however, the CCP army had grown to almost two million and the CCP government had gained even wider support in places under its control, in part thanks to its popular land reform policy. The CCP army waged counterattacks in late 1947, and its offensive culminated in late 1948 when it staged three major campaigns, killed or captured about 1.5 million GMD soldiers, and wiped out almost all the elite units of the GMD army. Although this, for the GMD, disastrous end to the three campaigns, especially the Huaihai campaign, was not inevitable, the aforementioned weaknesses of the GMD regime were manifested in almost every step of the campaigns’ development. The GMD army became virtually defenseless after these setbacks. In April 1949, the CCP army crossed the Yangzi River and sacked the GMD capital, Nanjing. On October 1, Mao announced in Tiananmen Square the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, marking the success of the revolution.

The Chinese communist revolution had long-lasting impacts on the history of modern China. On the positive side, the revolution
had greatly strengthened state power and transformed China from a disintegrating empire into a modern nation-state. Although China was still a poor country up to the early 1990s, it could no longer easily be bullied by foreign powers as it used to be. The rise of communist China, thus, afforded great pride to the Chinese, especially the educated population which had a stronger national consciousness. Moreover, through a series of campaigns, the CCP targeted landlords, GMD loyalists, and other traditional elements of Chinese society. While these campaigns involved a high level of brutality and human cost that should never be ignored, they wiped out or greatly weakened many traditional elements that had blocked the Chinese modernizers’ dream of establishing China as a modern state with an industrialized economy. The CCP also took serious measures to improve public health, public education, and the status of women in China. While it is easy to point out the many limitations and side effects of these policies today, it should not be ignored that life expectancy, educational standards, and the status of women all experienced a huge improvement in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., the average life expectancy of the Chinese was only 35 years before the communists came to power but had increased to 68 years by 1978). These are not only good things in themselves, but they also prepared for China a population with the skills and qualities needed for the economic breakthrough after the 1980s.

The economic performance of the communist regime under Mao was rather mixed. On the one hand, before the death of Mao in 1976, China was able to develop an industry that could produce almost everything. This created for China a body of experienced workers and technicians for its later takeoff. On the other hand, its industry produced low-quality products and was run with very low efficiency. By the 1980s, when the economy of GMD-controlled Taiwan had already taken off, China remained a very poor nation. Like any social revolution, the Chinese communist revolution also went through phases of radicalism after the CCP took power and this resulted in a very high level of brutality and human cost. What especially bear mentioning are the state-initiated Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The Great Leap Forward was a radical industrialization movement and the direct cause of the Great Famine (1959–1961), during which about 30 million Chinese died of hunger. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was a movement supposedly aiming at those CCP power-holders whose mentality and actions had seriously deviated from the egalitarian communist ideals, but turned out to be a mass movement that induced the Chinese to struggle against each other at almost every level, resulting in millions of deaths and bringing China to the brink of economic and moral bankruptcy.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Revolution (China); Framing and social movements; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); May Fourth Movement (China); Revolutions; Strategies of the Chinese communist revolution; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Communication rights

The notion of communication rights encompasses a set of human rights as they apply to the contemporary communication environment. Communication rights represent an evolution of Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides for freedom of opinion and expression. They include the right to privacy, the right to participation, the right to speak one’s own language, the right to access and share knowledge and information, and the right to self-determination (CRIS 2005). They are believed to “support people’s capacity to communicate in their general interest and for the common good” (CRIS 2005: 13).

Historically, communication rights are linked to the idea of a “right to communicate,” which emerged in the 1970s, when Jean D’Arcy, a French diplomat and former director of the Radio and Visual Service at the Office of Public Information of the United Nations, wrote an article entitled “Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the Right to Communicate” (D’Arcy 1969). Although D’Arcy did not specify what he meant by the right to communicate, his utopian vision informed the debate on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The NWICO debate emerged in the 1970s within the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), spurred by a group of nonaligned countries concerned with the imbalances in global communication flows which were believed to contribute to underdevelopment. Following these concerns, in 1980 UNESCO appointed an International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, chaired by Irish Nobel laureate Seán MacBride. The Commission sought to analyze communication problems in modern societies and propose solutions to further human development through communication. The MacBride Commission filed a report entitled “Many Voices, One World,” identifying communication as a human right and supporting the recognition of the right to communicate. The report read:

Communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the extension of specific rights such as the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public communication – all elements of a new concept, the right to communicate. In developing what might be called a new era of social rights, we suggest all the implications of the right to communicate to be further explored.

(UNESCO 1980: 265)

The idea of a NWICO, however, was later abandoned as the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their support to UNESCO. Nevertheless the debate survived outside of institutional arenas, as progressive media professionals, journalists’ associations, and academics began slowly to regroup around the MacBride Roundtable, an advocacy group which met annually from 1989 to 1999 (Vincent, Nordenstreng, & Traber 1999). But it was not yet a grassroots mobilization, and experts and progressive intellectuals played a prominent role (Milan & Padovani 2011).

More recently, social movements and the organized civil society started again to champion communication rights both as independent initiatives and in institutional arenas. In 1993, a group of nongovernmental organizations and individuals concerned with communication rights launched the People’s Communication Charter: its 18 articles claimed that communication systems should serve “human needs and rights” and that people should be empowered through media access and possibilities for participation. Learning from the failure of NWICO, the Charter’s advocates tried to build up support among international
networks of grassroots organizations, calling for cooperation between nongovernmental organizations and governance institutions. By the end of the 1990s, several coalitions for the democratization of communication were formed outside institutions. They included the Platform for Democratization of Communication, created in 1996 and committed to the democratization of communication infrastructure and institutions, and the international campaign Voices 21. Observers called it “a new NWICO in the making which sees itself as a network of networks based in civil society” (Vincent, Nordenstreng, & Traber 1999: x).

In 2001, the Platform for Democratization of Communication initiated the Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS) campaign. CRIS gathered NGOs and individuals from different countries, and served as an umbrella group to represent civil society values and interests at the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The WSIS, organized by the International Telecommunication Union, was the first UN meeting to discuss communication and media issues in relation to development. It was a multi-stakeholder forum: civil society was called to participate on an equal footing with government and business actors.

CRIS was the most vocal supporter of the principle of the “right to communicate” at the WSIS (Thomas 2006). During the WSIS first phase (Geneva 2003) the CRIS campaign organized the World Forum on Communication Rights, a counter-event with the objective of showcasing what communication rights meant in the life of people (Padovani & Pavan 2009). In 2004, CRIS launched the Global Governance and Communication Rights project. The project resulted in a toolkit designed to help social movement actors to advocate for communication rights in their respective countries (CRIS 2005).

In November 2004, the European Forum on Communication Rights took place in London. A side event to the European Social Forum, it was organized by groups such as Indymedia concerned with the lack of debate on communication issues at the forum. It offered an occasion for both radical and advocacy-oriented media activists to network in the run-up to the second phase of WSIS, in Tunis. With the WSIS coming to an end in 2005, international mobilizations for communication rights became less prominent and less frequent. However, communication rights still serve as a crucial point of reference for communication and media activists across the globe.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Nongovernmental organizations; Rights and rights movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Consumer movements
FRANCESCA FORNO

The term consumer movement indicates a specific area of activism made up of individuals, informal groups, and organizations seeking to empower people both as buyers, enabling them to get the most for their money, and as a political force, striving to rewrite the rules of the marketplace.

Unlike other social movements, the consumer movement only rarely takes on the form of widespread and spontaneous outpourings of grassroots consumer discontent and tends to rely mainly on the actions of individual activists and groups whose goal is consumer welfare.

Within the consumer movement, a distinction is made between organizations for whom consumer issues are of primary importance and those for whom they are of secondary concern (Meyer 1989). Pure, or core, consumer organizations are groups that look upon the advancement of consumer welfare as their principal goal. This is the case of organizations such as consumer federations, consumer unions, antismoking groups, and the many single-issue consumer groups focusing on areas such as automobiles, airlines, health, energy, and insurance.

Secondary consumer organizations, on the other hand, are classed as all those groups with which consumer organizations occasionally form alliances. These may embrace a wide range of groups such as those campaigning in support of organized labor, farm workers, the elderly, the natural environment, corrupt government, corporate accountability up to and including members of a range of occupational and industrial groups.

Consumer organizations may also be differentiated with regard to their ideological views. For instance, certain groups claim that their primary duty is to promote the interests of low-income consumers, whereas others see their role as championing the interests of all consumers.

Groups within the consumer movement may also be distinguished between reformists and radicals (Meyer 1989). The reformist wing of the consumer movement is made up of those organizations focusing on a relatively narrow set of problems, such as a lack of information or hazardous products. Reformists believe that solutions to consumer problems may be achieved by working with businesses and through existing governmental institutions. This is why their main activities take place mostly in legislative, regulatory, and juridical settings.

Unlike reformists, radical-wing consumer organizations view consumers’ problems as indistinguishable from those of a broader class of “citizen” problems, such as the environment, pollution or workers’ exposure to dangerous substances or working conditions. In this view, the problem of consumers lies in governments’ lack of political capacity, or willingness, to manage private corporations so as to ensure that the social, environmental, and even the economic needs of their citizens are met. This distrust of government’s capacity leads radicals to shy away from legislative and regulatory arenas. Rather than lobbying and voting, radicals prefer actions which activate citizens’ purchasing power, such as boycotts, buyouts (affirmative buying), and consumer cooperatives.

While the repertoire of market-based actions were deployed by social movements of different types well before market capitalism and the consumer society were established (Freedman 1999; Glickman 2009), the birth of the consumer movement, as we know it today, was a result of the massive changes produced by the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, and dates back to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century attempt to control food and drug adulteration in the United States (Mayer 1989).
In the early days of consumer movements, consumer organizations concentrated on unsafe products and environmental hazards, and used lobbying, voting, and journalistic exposés in order to press for government protection. In the United States these initial efforts led to the passing of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act in 1906. A major role during this initial mobilization process was played by a number of citizen’s groups, especially those made up of women such as, for example, the National Consumers League (NCL), an organization originally founded to improve the working conditions of women and children through selective boycotts.

During the 1920s and 1930s the US consumer movement grew in response to the broadening impact of industrialization. In America these years saw the establishment of the Consumers Union (CU) and the attempt to provide consumer representation in federal government.

While the consumer movement began in the United States, after World War II consumer organizations gradually also took shape outside America. Before 1960, three major organizations had been founded in Europe: Consumentenhand in the Netherlands (1951), the Union Beige des Consommateurs (now the Association des Consommateurs) in Belgium (1957) and Union Federale de la Consommation in France (1961). Between 1947 and 1957, consumer activism also grew in Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Kenya, France, Hungary, Italy, Canada, and Belgium. Press campaigns in favor of consumers in these countries played a significant role in creating the concepts of consumer protection and consumer interests.

The economic boom in several countries after the war increased the standard of living, providing individuals with more leisure time to enjoy their purchases. Over these years, the efforts of consumer organizations concentrated on the methods through which products were promoted and in particular on the impact of advertising. Another important issue in this period was production safety. Especially in the wake of Ralph Nader’s experience in the United States, consumer protection associations significantly increased their credibility in the eyes of the general public, establishing themselves as defenders of individual purchasing power and the transparency of trade. The strength achieved by consumer organizations both in America and many other Western countries led to the recognition of a number of “consumer rights.”

The successes achieved by consumer organizations contributed to a further institutionalization of the movement. From the mid-1980s, consumer activism experienced a moment of stalemate. However, this did not entail a reduction in consumer organizations’ capacity to influence government decisions, but rather that many pro-consumer actions had become institutionalized in the form of governmental agencies as well as numerous laws and regulations.

In mid-1990s – through to the first decade of the twenty-first century – consumer activism once more started to take on a certain prominence in public debates. Among consumer organizations, radical groups began to gain centrality. The increase in boycotts, combined with the relative weakness of other forms of radical politics, has led some commentators to argue that the act of consumption was becoming increasingly suffused with citizenship characteristics and considerations (Scammell 2000). In late 1990s not only did the number of boycotts and buycotts considerably increase, but consumer activists also started to organize themselves around many apparently new topics, establishing alliances with a wide range of other groups.

The prominence of a more radical view within the consumer movement of these years should be understood in relation to a renewed enthusiasm for the “grassroots participation” as observed within the Global Justice Movement. The cycle of protests that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century not only favored the convergence of and collaboration among actors for whom consumer issues were of primary and secondary importance. During the mobilization process, the role of market-based actions gained prominence as
many movement organizations thought that these forms of pressure better adapt to a situation in which political institutions (both national and supra-national) were lacking in the political capacity to regulate and solve the serious environmental and human rights problems associated with corporate globalization (Micheletti 2003; Micheletti & McFarland 2010).

In order to draw attention to the poor working conditions of workers in developing countries, students and labor organizations organized several boycotts of sweatshop-made goods during these years. Movements such as the “fair trade” movement experienced an unprecedented success. Also a number of environmental movement organizations started to use market-based tactics to present their cases. By stressing the close relationship between overconsumption and ecological depredation, some environment-consumer organizations started to emphasize the importance of leaving a smaller carbon footprint by limiting purchases: either by returning to a “simple living” or “voluntary simplicity” or by purchasing environmentally friendly products.

Gaining support for their claims is always a difficult task for social movements of any type, but it is even more difficult for consumer organizations, as the benefits they try to deliver do not regard a specific segment of society but everyone in general and in a widespread fashion. While most people favor the general goal of enhancing consumer welfare, few really feel the motivation or obligation to become a consumer activist, assuming that the consumer movement will persevere with or without their contribution.

Although today there has been little systematic study into the factors that facilitate or hinder the potential of consumer movements to succeed, two general sets of factors have been indicated as connected to the outcomes of consumer organizations (Meyer 1989). The first are environmental-exogenous factors and refer to those sort of serendipitous events, such as scandals and accidental environmental disasters, which by setting the legislative wheels in motion have often opened up opportunities for consumer organizations to push for more general reforms in the areas of consumer rights and safety.

The way in which consumer movement organizations frame their aims and strategies is also important. Here it is often stressed that consumer organizations have two important levers: consumers’ fears and consumers’ pockets. Research by psychologists and economists has shown that people tend to be particularly sensitive to product risks that produce violent accidents, effect many people simultaneously, and are not fully known before one engages in the activity (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein 1982).

The capacity of consumer movements to build consensus around their claims depends also on social, economic, and political opportunities. Consumer organizations are more likely to prosper in a society of highly educated and wealthy consumers whose expectations regarding the quality of life are on the rise. The lot of consumer organizations may also be improved by increasing economic competition, which can lead to political divisions among businesses.

Differences in institutional settings also provide part of the explanation as to why consumer movements succeed and fail, or have not taken off at the grassroots level to the same extent in all countries. While nongovernmental consumer groups have long existed as a grassroots social movement in the United States, Canada, and Australia, in almost all European countries, consumer issues have traditionally been more institutionalized. In Northern Europe, for instance, stronger state involvement in consumer protection measures has meant consumers have not had to organize specifically consumer-based independent organizations in order to achieve their goals. To some extent, this has been because the government has taken the initiative on many consumer issues. In other countries, especially developing countries, business and commercial interests have clearly eclipsed consumer voices within national public and private institutions and thus large-scale grassroots consumer movements have never
emerged, and consumer organizations have had very little impact on economic and social policy (Darley & Johnson 1993).

SEE ALSO: Boycotts; Co-operative movement; Global Justice Movement; Postmaterialism and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Contemporary social and political movements in Russia
OLEG GUBIN

BASIC DATA AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Contemporary Russia appears to have a diverse and pluralistic social and political movement society. According to the Russian State Statistical Committee, there are 119,247 public associations registered with the Ministry of Justice as of January 1, 2010, with 5303 of them registered in 2009. Most of these associations are represented by 54,113 public organizations and 43,542 trade unions. The data also show a continuous growth of social movements, the number of which was 1808, with 117 emerging in 2009. In addition, the state statistics point out the existence of 746 national-cultural associations, of which 96 came into existence in 2009. These ethnicity-based groups reflect the complex multi-ethnic composition of the Russian Federation. And finally, 253 branches of international NGOs operate in Russia, including human rights watch groups (Russia in Figures 2010). These data indicate that Russian people actively exercise their constitutional rights on assembly, association, and peaceful joint actions. The Russian Constitution (particularly articles 29, 30, 31) and various federal laws (the Federal Law on Public Associations, the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activities, the Federal Law on Political Parties, and the Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Processing, and Picketing) grant those rights and provide a legal framework for collective actions. The Federal Law on Public Associations defines social movements in terms of mass public associations that pursue jointly social, political, and other socially useful purposes, supported by the participants of the movements. According to the Law on Public Associations, social movements must have: (a) a governing body in the form of congress, conference, or general meeting; and (b) a permanent governing elected body which, in the case of state registration, shall exercise the rights of a legal entity on behalf of the social movement. The public organization represents the membership-based voluntary association, established on the basis of joint action to protect the common interests and achieve the statutory goals of the associated people. The law requires a formal registration of the social movement with the Ministry of Justice in order for it to pursue its activities legally. The authorities may ban social movements for extremist activities and for fueling ethnic and racial hostilities. Also, the law requires the permission of local authorities to be gained in order to engage in collective action in public places.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Post-communist Russia demonstrates constant growth of new social movements, such as LBGT, sports fan movements, environmentalists, and antiglobalism. The Russian antiglobalists regularly participate in anti-capitalist actions during G-8 summits. In 2005–2010, the movement attempted consolidation into the Antiglobalist Resistance Initiative, held social forums and conferences, and launched the webpage anti-glob.ru. The growth of the environmentalist movement is evidenced in the increasing numbers of student ecological squads. In 1959–1960, the first student ecological squad emerged in the Faculty of Biology, Moscow State University. For 50 years, student-ecologists established over 120 protected ecological zones, conducted more than 15 scientific-practical conferences, promoted 12 government environmental acts,
chased and prosecuted about 5000 poachers, and developed conservation programs for rare species of plants and animals. In 2010, over 40 student environmental-defense squads, the Russian Ecological Movement Green (formerly the Green Party), the EcoDefense of the Moscow Region, and the Russian chapters of Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Foundation actively pursued environmental agendas in Russia. In 2010–2011, the new ecological Movement for Protection of the Khimki Forest, the largest forest park north of Moscow, came to the fore. The movement, supported by many Russian environmentalist groups, Yabloko Party activists, and New Lefts, is determined to halt the construction of the Moscow–Saint Petersburg shortcut highway. The Khimki Forest movement, due in part to considerable domestic and international resonance, has become comparable to the famous Baikal movement.

The rise of LGBT communities appears no less impressive (Baer 2009; Kondakov 2010). During the Soviet era and until the early 1990s, homosexuality was outlawed and homophobia flourished. The first LGBT organizations emerged in Moscow in the mid-1980s. In 1989–1993, LGBT activists published a newspaper, Theme, held an International Gay and Lesbian Film Festival, and openly protested against the criminal prosecution of gays. In August 1993, 27 local organizations created the nationwide Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Association Triangle, but the Moscow authorities denied the group registration, stating that its activities were “contrary to public morals.” However, the Russian federal authorities, under pressure from the European Union, modified their position. On October 9, 1991, the Ministry of Justice – after lengthy litigation – registered the LGBT organization Wings, which provided assistance to LGBT people, was concerned with the prevention of HIV, and sought the elimination of the criminal prosecution of male homosexuals. On May 27, 1993, the Russian authorities overturned the prosecutions of homosexual men. In January 1999, homosexuality was removed from the official list of diseases, and homosexuals were granted the right to serve in the army. In 2005–2006, the human rights project GayRussia.ru came into existence and the Russian LGBT Network lgbtnet.ru, the first all-Russian interregional LGBT organization, also began to function. In 2005–2009, the LGBT network held gay parades, festivals, marches for equality, and pickets on a broader scale, despite failing to obtain permission from the authorities, disruption by police, and beatings by Nazi skinheads. In October 2010, the LGBT organization Equal Rights for the first time obtained court recognition of the illegality of the ban on LGBT public mass rallies.

Unlike the steady growth of the LGBT movement, the women’s movement, another minority social movement, experienced ups and downs. It reached its height in 1991–1995. In 1993, the party Women of Russia, with 8.13 percent of the vote, finished fourth in the parliamentary elections and formed its own faction of 23 deputies in the state Duma. However, in 1995, the women’s party finished fifth, with 4.61 percent of the vote. Failing to cross the 5 percent barrier, the party Women of Russia lost the status of an independent parliamentary faction. After 1995, the women’s movement fragmented and localized in gender studies centers. It attempted to revive as the all-Russian movement in 2008 at the Second All-Russian Women’s Congress, the first congress having been held a hundred years ago in 1908. In February 2010, the gender faction of the Yabloko Party, Council for Consolidation of Women in Russia, and the regional public organization Women and Information held the conference “Women’s Movement in Russia: Past, Present, and Future” (Михаилова 2010). The conference materials indicate that despite its uneven development, the women’s movement in Russia fought for equal constitutional rights with men, against sexism and domestic violence, and in favor of greater representation of women in the political establishment and top managerial positions. However, as compared to the Soviet-era, women in post-communist Russia have lower political representation, and
more problems with employment opportunities and the glass ceiling (Малахов and Романов 2006), and experience a greater degree of sexual harassment at work. Also, Russian women carry the main burden of household work and child rearing. The skyrocketing divorce rate, which surpassed that of the United States, has made the living conditions of women more difficult and contributed to the expansion of gender inequality in post-communist Russia. All of these factors contributed to the left turn in the contemporary Russian women’s movement, as evidenced at the Third All-Russian Women’s Congress, “The Hope of Russia,” held in April 2011.

Another type of social movement that gained strength and popularity in contemporary Russia grew out of sport fans associations, especially soccer derbies, with their particular subculture, characterized by dressing in colorful clothes, singing hymns and songs, talking and yelling in slang expressions, expressive crowds, and often aggressive behavior. The soccer derby movement was already strong in the USSR and during Perestroika. Then, in the early 1990s, it declined but revived after 1995. In 2011, almost every notable soccer and hockey team in Russia has its own movement of rapid fans. The mass media and Russian sociologists often link soccer fans with hooliganism and with nationalist and homophobic behavior (Гапиев 2010). Thus, in December 2010, thousands of Moscow soccer fans, in response to the murder of one of their fellows by visitors from the Caucasian region, launched a series of aggressive protests (known as December 2010 Interethnic Unrests), loaded with anti-immigrant slogans like “Russia for Russians,” “Moscow For Moscovites,” and “Russians-Forward.” In order to calm down the soccer fans’ protests, Prime Minister Putin met with them and attended the murdered soccer fan’s tomb.

Several other contemporary Russian social movements are seen to be unique Russian phenomena. The Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers monitor violations of their sons’, who are serving in the Russian Army, human rights. The All-Russian Association of Car Drivers fights corrupt police patrollers and driving rules violations by VIP persons, and provides independent expertise on car crashes which involve top ranking businessmen and public officials. The Association in Defense of the Rights of Consumers constantly monitors and publicizes the quality of goods and services provided by private corporations and department stores. The social movement Business Russia represents the interests of the struggling medium and small businesses. Overall, contemporary social movements in Russia reflect a plethora of interests and aspirations of newly emerged social groups and communities.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS: MEANING INCOMMENSURABILITY, SOCIAL CHOICES, AND LEXICONS

Political movements Left Front, the Vanguard of the Red Youth, and National-Bolsheviks, nationalist Russian All-National Union and Movement Against Illegal Immigration, right-wing Russian Image, and militant-fascist Slavic Union-Slavic Force together with Nazi skinheads, anti-Kremlin coalition Strategy-31 and PARNAS (Party of People’s Freedom “For Russia without Arbitrariness and Corruption”), and pro-Kremlin Ours, Youth Guard, and Young Russia all actively participate in the Russian political process. Their encounters with political opponents imbed meaning incommensurability that occupies the center-stage in the Russian political movement sector. The concept itself stems from Kuhn’s methodological and semantic incommensurability (Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey 2001). According to Kuhn, competing paradigms imbed incommensurable meanings, or meaning references, of the same theoretical and empirical phenomena. Proponents of incommensurable paradigms profess opposite worldviews and constitute irreconcilable scientific communities. Later Kuhn developed the concept of structured lexicons and their partial incommensurability,
which denotes that competing paradigmatic lexical structures, while excluding each other in substantive meaning references, may partially overlap in secondary meaning references (Gubin 2009). By analogy, we view political movements developing complete or partial incommensurable political paradigms. The hard core of political paradigms is constituted of lexically structured social choices. The accent on the “social choice” emphasizes, in accord with Sen’s Nobel Prize winning lecture (Sen 1998), the communal and joint nature of the political movement’s aspirations and intentions. In sum, social-choice paradigms develop distinct worldviews, offer social choices to the Russian public, provide self-identification and identification of opponents and allies, and produce joint actions and encounters—all glued together by political lexicons and labels that carry on manifest and latent meaning incommensurability.

The meaning incommensurability has been noted in the homophobic labeling of LBGT movements as immoral by the Moscow city authorities that appeared incommensurable with LBGT’s self-identification and LBGT’s definition by the European Union and, apparently, by the federal Russian authorities. The meaning incommensurability has been no less intense in the political movements sector. In a sign of political meaning incommensurability, Russian authorities banned several ultranationalist organizations, including four of the most visible: the National Bolsheviks, Russian National Unity, the Slavic Union, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration. These movements emerged in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the immigration of Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia to traditionally Christian Orthodox and Slavic regions. In order to legitimize themselves, the Russian nationalists appeal to the patriotic rhetoric, refer to the crimes committed by immigrants, and claim that over half of Russians support or sympathize with regularly held Russian marches and such demands as “Russia for the Russians,” “Russian Order on Russian Soil,” and “Deportation not Naturalization.” However, the Moscow City Court, which banned the four most popular nationalist movements, did not find anything patriotic in their ethnically hostile and racist discourse and extremist actions. In May 2011, the local Moscow court included slogans “Russia for Russians” and “Orthodoxy or Death” in the Federal List of the Extremist Materials, published by the Russian Ministry of Justice. In banning the most notorious nationalist political movements, the Russian authorities acted incommensurably with human rights groups, which claimed that emblems with swastikas, right-wing extremist discourse, and militant actions of the above-mentioned political movements were fascist and racist and fueled ethnic hostilities and animosities. In addition, the Russian authorities, in efforts to breakdown the Nazi Skinheads movement (Belyakov 2011), put behind bars many Nazi skinheads, including those from the murderous Shultz-88 (founded on the anniversary of Hitler’s birthday on April 20, 2001), the White Wolves, and Mad Crowd, all known for terrorizing people of non-Slavic appearance. Overall, the Russian authorities sent a zero tolerance message to the remaining nationalist political movements, such as Russian All-National Union, Russian Public Movement, Slavic Image, Slavic Force (emerging from the remnants of the banned Slavic Union), and the Union of the Russian Folk, that glorification of the supremacy of the white race and scapegoating immigrants are incommensurable with Russia’s commitment to multiethnic, multinational, and multicultural state building.

Another heated focus of the incommensurability of political meaning in the Russian political movement sector deals with the assessment of Yeltsin’s era compared to Putin’s social-choice paradigm. Pro-Western liberal democratic movements and associations like the Moscow Helsinki Group, Solidarity, the United Civic Front, the recently founded PARNAS, the youth wing of the Yabloko Party, and the anti-Kremlin coalitions Other Russia and Strategy-31 interpret Putin’s paradigm shift in terms of authoritarian-corruptive
departure from the liberal democratic 1990s. Commensurably with the liberal-democratic lexicon, the banned National Bolsheviks as well as the leftist Vanguard of Red Youth, Defense, and Left Front also emphasize the rise of authoritarianism and corruption under Putin and Medvedev’s presidencies. These anti-Kremlin political movements, self-identified as antisystemic oppositions, regularly organize protests such as the Marches of Dissent, Days of Wrath, Days of Anger, and monthly rallies of Strategy-31 for freedom of assembly without the authorities’ permission. These joint actions are held under such banners as “Putin Must Go,” “For Russia without Corruption,” “Down with the Police State,” and “Down with Autocracy.” However, the anti-Kremlin protests attract small numbers of people – only between a few hundred and a couple of thousand. Such low participation, together with miserable voting for Gorbachev in the 1996 presidential elections (he scored half a percent of the votes) and for the liberal Union of the Right Forces and Yabloko Party (which together scored less than 3 percent of the votes in the 2007 parliamentary elections), underscore a dramatic decline of popular support for the liberal movement in Russia.

On the other side, the self-proclaimed democratic and antifascist pro-Kremlin youth movement Ours and its allies the Youth Guard, Young Russia, Locals, and New People, interpret Putin’s social-choice paradigm as Russia’s pragmatic-restorative breakthrough from the oligarchic-criminal capitalism of 1990s on the one side, and as a valuable starting point for constructing new Russian sovereign democracy and economic modernization on the other. The Manifesto of Ours (published on the website nashimol.ru.) partially represents the new Russian democratic lexicon. In this discourse, Russian liberals, while in power during the 1990s, pursued – acting on the advice of Western advisers – economic and political shock therapies that destroyed the Soviet institutional system. However, such a necessary departure from state socialism happened without its synchronous replacement by an efficient democratic infrastructure. Lack of a synchronous replacement and adequate democratic state-building caused system and social disintegrations, undermined national security, sent the economy into freefall, flooded Russia with immigration, and instigated interethnic violence. The Russia of the 1990s deteriorated into oligarchic-criminal capitalism, and fell into the hands of mafia syndicates, corrupted plutocratic regional elitist clans composed of former communist apparatchiki, and semi-criminal oligarchs (Gubin 1995a; Kagarlitsky 2002). Privatization led to the concentration of the most profitable oil, gas, and natural resources industries in the narrow circle of oligarchs, creating skyrocketing inequality and feelings of social injustice (Gubin & Kosttioutchenko 1997). Instead of transforming Soviet Russia into a democratic core country in the global economy, the liberals of the 1990s pushed Russia toward the economic periphery that lost the country not only the status of superpower but also drastically reduced its influence in neighboring regions. Moreover, the Russia of the 1990s, unlike rising China, became a country in decline with declining global influence, a downsizing population, and system-wide corruption. In sum, Russia in the 1990s was rapidly falling down into a failed Weimar-type of statehood with fascism and neo-communism on the rise (Gubin 1995b).

In the Pro-Kremlin youth movement’s lexicon, Putin’s pragmatic-restorative breakthrough saved Russia from the systemic failure of its statehood, prevented a communist takeover of Russia, and undermined right-wing nationalist political movements. The malfunctioned and chaotic multiparty polyarchy of the 1990s – from which communists on the one side, and right-wing nationalists of misspelled Zhirionovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party and fascist movements on the other benefited the most – was replaced by the sovereign democracy system. The term “sovereign democracy” was invented by the Kremlin to label the new Russian political organization. The hardcore of this system, also called “managed democracy,” constitutes the superpresidential vertical of
power (Fish 2005) and a modern multiparty system, with the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party in the center-right, Justice Russia and the Communist Party on the left, and Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party on the right wing. The Kremlin initiated a legal prosecution of criminal nouveau riches. Khodorkovsky, the richest of the oligarchs, was accused of tax evasion and put behind bars. Others, like the notorious financier Berezovsky, fled from Russia to the West. Industrial and financial oligarchs, who stayed in Russia, began to pay taxes, repaid owed salaries to employees, and so began the industrial revival of Russia. The state-owned Russian corporations Gazprom, RosNeft, and Energy System of Russia regrouped Russia’s massive oil, gas, and energy resources in the hands of the state. With their active involvement, Russia under Putin accumulated about half a trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves. In 2009–2011, the Kremlin launched a circulation of regional elites aimed at removing the most corrupt regional barons of the Urals region, Moscow, and the autonomous republics, and began breaking down corrupt regional political dynasties and the privatization of public offices by Yeltsin’s liberal-democratic era officials. Finally, the Kremlin launched youth movements with the purpose of cultivating cadres capable of modernizing Russia and protecting Russia’s sovereign democracy from fascists and communists on the one side, and Western liberalism on the other. These youth movements, such as Ours and the Youth Guard, actively pursue social activities, ranging from holding patriotic rallies that bring together from tens to hundreds of thousands of people, to caring about kids and veterans, demanding the closure of illegal casinos, and monitoring the quality of goods and services in supermarkets.

In response to the downgrading liberal-democratic reforms of the 1990s and the glorification of Putin’s social choice paradigm, Russian liberals fought back with pro-Kremlin lexicon on almost every front. The Russian liberals argue that Putin’s authoritarian turn prevented Russians from attaining the quality of life in Western democracies, and that the relative economic revival of the first decade of the twenty-first century happened not due to Putin’s economic policies but was predetermined by the free-market economic reforms of the 1990s and by high prices for oil and other natural resources. Most notably, the liberal political movement – through gazeta.ru, Radio Freedom, Radio Eco of Moscow, and anticorruption pamphlets (Немцов 2009; Немцов, & Милов 2010) – points out that the corruption level during Putin and Medvedev’s presidencies far exceeded that of Yeltsin’s era, and that Putin’s friends – former KGB associates, and relatives of members of the Putin/Medvedev administrations – occupy, without merit, top managerial positions in private and state-owned companies and thereby enrich themselves immensely. Moreover, Russian liberals denote that the so-called sovereign democracy lacks most of Dalh’s (1982) democratic features and represents a parody of true democracy, as evidenced by the abolition of direct elections for governors and senators and by the oligarchic power transfer from Putin to Medvedev. Among other things, liberals point out that the new Russian multiparty system is reminiscent of communist Eastern Germany, that the ruling United Russia Party represents a worse copy of the CPSU, that the presidential and parliamentary elections were swamped by massive falsification, and that the pro-Kremlin youth movement Ours resembles the Chinese Red Guard of the Cultural Revolution. Liberals stand behind the civic movement to free Khodorkovsky from political imprisonment by Putin’s regime. They believe that Khodorkovsky’s trial was set up by the Kremlin and that this indicates that there is no independent judicial system in Russia. The website sova.ru of the Information-Analytic Center Owl reports that Russian authorities do not do enough to stop xenophobia and racist attacks on immigrants by Russian ultra-nationalists and neo-Nazis. In 2010, according to the Moscow Helsinki Group, Russian Marches were held in 30 cities and towns as compared to 20 cities and
towns in previous years. Over 5500 members of nationalist movements participated in the most populous single Russian March held in Moscow’s Lublino district. In November 2010, the Russian nationalists founded the Russian Civic Union with the dubious objective of forming a coalition of nationalists with anti-Kremlin democratic opposition (Костенко 2011).

In turn, the pro-Kremlin movements argue that the main problem is not the underdevelopment of Western-type liberal democracy in Russia, but Western liberal democracy per se. Liberal democracy, especially of the American type, is no less troubled than communism, as evidenced in high income inequality, multi-trillion dollar American debt, the 2008 global financial meltdown, Wall Street criminality and mismanagement, two-party dictatorship, and mass media control by big corporations and by proponents of the Republican and Democratic parties.

In the lexical-symbolic incommensurability between liberal democrats and pro-Kremlin youth movements, the new Russian socialist movement of the Left Front and independent trade unions, such as the Union of Socialist Trade Unions and Interregional Trade Union of Automobile Industry, also made a distinct antiliberal stand. The New Left and trade unions express great concern for the deterioration of social democracy, especially working-class living conditions, salaries, and benefits. The New Left discourse emphasizes that the liberal democratic reforms of the 1990s broke down the Soviet safety net of guaranteed employment and affordable housing as well as eroding socialized healthcare and world-class public education and science. The new Russian socialists are unhappy that the Russia of the 1990s copied the Western liberal democratic pattern of wealth accumulation in a small group of oligarchs at the expense of middle- and working-class well-being. They protest against transforming the socialized healthcare system into an American-type private healthcare system with millions of people uninsured and skyrocketing healthcare costs. Another concern deals with the expansion of paid education and the deterioration of public education. The New Lefts point to the unacceptably low wages of working- and middle-class professionals as compared to the unjustifiable skyrocketing wages and bonuses of top managers and the wealth multiplication of the oligarchs. In 2011, independent trade unions and new socialists successfully protested against the proposal by one of the richest Russian oligarchs, Prokhorov, to extend the working week to 60 hours and to allow workers’ firing due to deteriorated economic conditions. In the view of the new Russian Lefts and trade unions, the liberal-democratic 1990s undermined the equal opportunity structure for working- and middle-class professionals that existed in the Soviet Union, and the Putin/Medvedev regime did not do much to reinstate that system. Moreover, under the Putin/Medvedev regime income inequality increased, working-class control over production was not reinstated, and the healthcare system and public education continue to degrade. Also, Putin is blamed for missing the chance during the 2008 global financial crisis to either nationalize or buy back the companies which were privatized during the 1990s, and instead providing financial support to the oligarchs. In the view of the New Left, post-communist Russia did not come close to the European social democracies and continued to model itself on the American corporate-type of capitalism. While the Putin/Medvedev regime flirts with corporate capitalism, the physical and moral degradation of Russian society – evidenced in the drastic downsizing of its population, family deterioration with high divorce rates, and the growth of orphanages, prostitution, and drugs abuse – continues. Notably, the Russian New Lefts realize that their critique of the 1990s and Putin and Medvedev’s presidencies appears partially commensurable to that of the Russian communists. In order to delineate themselves from the communists, the new socialists indicate that the KPRF has become integrated into the Kremlin’s dubious managed-democracy
model, represents a pseudo-opposition to the Kremlin, and, therefore, is ill-suited to pursue European-type social democracy.

To summarize, incommensurability in Russian political movement society indicates that Russia continues its search for a post-communist political identity. In this search, the liberal democratic model, as well as its communist alternative, has lost legitimacy. The new Russia’s political identity is very much determined by the Kremlin-set distinct sovereign democracy model. In May 2011, Prime Minister Putin launched, ahead of the 2012 presidential elections, the People’s Front Movement – a coalition of social and political organizations, which are intended to continue Kremlin’s model of sovereign democracy and the restorative modernization of Russia. Right-wing political movements, weakened by the Kremlin, have regrouped and search for a way in to the political system. Liberal democrats, although in decline, are also regrouping vigorously and are trying to make a political comeback. The New Lefts and independent trade unions push Russia toward the European style of social democracy. Overall, corruption remains a major obstacle for Russia’s democracy and modernization. It is in this context that the various conflicting social movements described continue to thrive.

SEE ALSO: Antiglobalization movements; Eastern European social movements; Environmental movements; Fascist movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Hooliganism; Nationalist movements; Neo-Nazi movements in Europe and the United States; Postcommunism and social movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


By the time of Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse and the Chinese people were leading very poor lives. In this context, grievances mounted all over China. Facing this dire situation, the Chinese government embarked on market-oriented reform and an open-door policy in 1978. During the reform, the Chinese state was quickly transformed from a totalitarian regime to an authoritarian regime with growing toleration toward social diversities. Most Chinese no longer believed in the communist ideology, and the legitimacy of the state relied increasingly on the government’s performance, especially in its capacity to deliver a fast-growing economy and better life to the people (Zhao 2001, 2009). The legacies of the Maoist era and the post-Mao transformation of the state–society relationship opened up the space for and shaped the development of contentious collective actions (CAs) in post-Mao China.

The development of CAs in post-Mao China can be roughly divided into three phases. The first phase began with the Xidan democracy wall movement in 1978 and ended with the military crackdown of the 1989 Tiananmen student movement. After a few quiet years, Deng Xiaoping launched a new wave of economic reform in 1992. The new social problems brought about by the reform ushered the development of CAs in post-Mao China into the second phase. Hu Jintao became the president in 2002 and adopted a set of policies that were quite different from the previous administration. The new policies together with new social conditions brought the development of the CAs into its third phase.


Many CAs broke out between 1978 and 1989, the most famous ones being the Xidan democracy wall movement in 1978–1979, the sent-down youth movement in the late 1970s, and waves of student protests between 1986 and 1989. In comparison with the CAs breaking out after 1992, the CAs which happened between 1978 and 1989 were more likely to escalate into large-scale protests drawing millions of participants, and more likely to have central government as the target. The CAs acquired these characteristics for two major reasons. Firstly, the Chinese government under Mao’s leadership had implemented many radical policies. When a policy went wrong, it always affected a large number of people and generated state-centered grievances. For instance, millions of urban youths were sent to work in rural areas during the Cultural Revolution. They staged waves of CAs after the Cultural Revolution in order to return to cities. Secondly, the way the state responded to the rising CAs was also an important factor shaping CAs in the 1980s. Most top Chinese leaders at the time were veterans who joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1920s. Between the late 1970s and late 1980s, facing the challenges of the potentially antiregime prodemocracy movements staged by intellectuals and students, the CCP veterans opted for outmoded repressive measures out of their loyalty to the CCP. Yet, the reform environment did not allow the Chinese government to turn truly repressive because this would damage China’s international reputation and business environment. In the entire 1980s period, half-hearted state repression was always accompanied by further reforms. While the Chinese society became increasingly open, Chinese intellectuals and students were increasingly antagonized. This antagonism, in
conjunction with China’s late-1980s economic crisis, triggered the world-famous 1989 Tiananmen student movement (Zhao 2001).


After the military crackdown on the 1989 student movement, political control was greatly tightened and key leaders of the movement were either exiled or jailed. Most foreign observers at the time believed that the repression marked the end of China’s reform. Quite unexpectedly, Deng Xiaoping reignited a much bolder economic reform wave in 1992 that has lasted until today. The reform was overall a great success. China has now risen to become the world’s second largest economy and the living standards of most Chinese have greatly improved. New social problems have emerged with the success, however, including but not limited to growing inequality, official corruption, massive worker layoffs, heavy tax burden on farmers, environmental degradation, and the encroachment onto farmland for urban expansion. It was in the context of these new social problems that the CAs in post-Mao China entered a new stage. In comparison to CAs in the 1980s, CAs in the 1990s were mostly economic rather than politically oriented. They were also considerably smaller in scale and targeted local businesses and local government rather than central government.

The emergence of new forms of CAs had much to do with the change in state–society relations in the 1990s. With the rise of the market economy, other than the people who were working in large-scale state-owned enterprises, the lives of most Chinese were now less shaped by the policies of central government but more by the performance of local businesses and local government. Naturally, when things went wrong, people held local business owners and government representatives responsible. The less political and localized nature of the social conflicts also made central government less nervous. While the Chinese government had no general guidelines in dealing with the CAs in this period, it was clear that central government discouraged the use of violence by local government officials in dealing with CAs focusing on economic rather than political issues. In general, the Chinese central government’s attitude toward CAs in this period was rather hands-off—as long as a local government’s handling of a protest did not allow the conflict escalate to runaway proportions and attract strong international and domestic criticism, central government would not interfere. The attitude of the Chinese government further strengthened the new CAs’ localizing and nonpolitical tendency.

The localizing and nonpolitical tendency of the new CAs in the 1990s also resulted from changes in Chinese intellectuals. In the 1990s, while most intellectuals did not believe in the communist ideology and many of them also objected to the regime’s authoritarian rule, they were-by-and-large the beneficiaries of China’s economic success. After the mid-1990s, mainstream intellectuals in China were able to enjoy new middle-class or even upper middle-class lives. Naturally, they were no longer so eager to seek immediate and radical social changes as they were in the 1980s. Moreover, into the 1990s, Chinese society became increasingly complicated and the state gradually turned into a soft authoritarian regime giving intellectuals more freedom to express their views, particularly in scholarly venues. A more complicated society in conjunction with a freer environment fostered differentiation of social thoughts in China (e.g., liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, neoleftism) and decreased the possibility for the Chinese to be mobilized under a single antiestablishment ideology. This also contributed to the rise of small-scale economic-oriented CAs.

Yet, the rise of new forms of CAs did not mean that the Chinese state had gained the capacity to channelize social conflicts into institutional frameworks. The Chinese government strengthened its letters and petitions system and wanted to use this to placate social conflict. The effort was not effective, to say the least. As the Chinese society became increasingly complicated as a result of reforms, issues that
were raised in the letters and petitions sent by complaint-filers were too numerous, and in most cases they could not be dealt with by the administrative branch of the government. The Chinese government also placed various restrictions on free associations and sometimes punished those who made such attempts. Such government actions, however, greatly lowered the organizational capacity of those who were aggrieved, and prevented the Chinese from gaining a sense of political reality through protracted conflict and negotiation.

THE THIRD PHASE (2002–PRESENT)

The third phase of CAs took shape in the beginning of the twenty-first century and the pattern has become clearer than ever in recent years. In comparison with the CAs of the second period, CAs in this period acquired the following characteristics: (1) NGOs have mushroomed and played more important roles in urban-based middle-class CAs; (2) CAs take on much wider issues than before and have overall become more proactive and better organized; (3) riots and ethnic violence have increased in scale and rate of occurrence; (4) rights and citizenship have emerged to become the master frames of many CAs (Zhao 2010).

These new developments are the result of many social changes brought about by China’s most recent development, including but not limited to a general increase of the level of education accompanied by the quick rise of the new middle class, the widespread use of the Internet and cell phones, a great expansion of Chinese media’s coverage on protests and riots, mutual learning and the spread of effective protest strategies, and the rise of rights consciousness among ordinary Chinese people. Most importantly, however, the new phase was also shaped by the Chinese government’s patterned behaviors in dealing with CAs. In recent years, violent repression is increasingly less of an option for the Chinese state because of international pressure and domestic public opinion. The Chinese government could not even use legal means to regulate the protests and riots effectively because government officials have done many things not in accordance with the law, and consequently ordinary Chinese have little respect for many aspects of it. On top of this, the Chinese government still places various kinds of restrictions on free association and tries hard to prevent interest-group politics from achieving full-scale development. Many CAs in China today are thus still poorly organized. Rioting is frequently the outcome when an injustice frame (norm) emerges among a large number of aggrieved people who circulate rumors following an incident.

If we are asked to use one word to capture the Hu Jintao administration’s new strategy in dealing with CAs, that word would be paternalism. We do not want to portray the outcome of this strategy as a total failure because it has, at least for now, prevented the rise of large-scale protests, an outcome that the regime very much desired. On the other hand, the paternalistic strategy also meant that the Chinese government missed an opportunity to institutionalize protests into the less destructive, reform-oriented, interest-group politics form of social movements we see in the United States today.

In part for the purpose of dealing with the rising tides of CAs, the Chinese government under the Hu Jintao administration has tried hard to improve its performance, including its capacity to deliver more and better public goods to the people. Such efforts have in fact made the current Chinese regime a very effective government in many respects and have greatly contributed to China’s superb economic performance and to a quick and general rise in people’s living standards. Yet, most Chinese do not appreciate much of what they have gained in recent years. What is worse is that as the government becomes increasingly active in taking care of the people’s welfare, more and more issues in China are re-politicized, in the sense that the Chinese people are again starting to hold the state responsible whenever something goes wrong. In the end, while the Chinese live much better lives in recent years, they are not satisfied.

The Chinese government under the Hu Jintao administration employs a wide range of
strategies to pacify a CA once it breaks out. Yet, the only effective measure that it has at this stage is to distribute money to satisfy people’s demands. The Chinese government still has the luxury to do so, thanks to the revenues they have generated from China’s superb economic performance. On the other hand, this strategy further increases people’s demands and leads to the rise of populism. This is certainly not a unsustainable strategy.

In conclusion, if the Chinese government holds on to its current strategy of dealing with CAs, another revolution-like turmoil similar to the 1989 Tiananmen student movement will very likely break out when the Chinese economy slows down. Yet, to make a bold policy change, the Chinese government must take the risk of engaging in more fundamental political reform and shift the foundation of state power from performance legitimacy to legal-procedure legitimacy (Zhao 2009). For the Chinese government, whether to take on bold political reform or to maintain the status quo is a very difficult question.

SEE ALSO: Chinese communist revolution; Collective action (collective behavior); Cultural Revolution (China); Emergent norm theory; Mandate of Heaven (China); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Riots; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Cuban revolution
SILVIA PEDRAZA

The triumph of the Cuban revolution in January 1959 was one of the most popular political events of the twentieth century. A social movement that the majority of the Cuban population initially applauded, and for which many risked their lives, the Cuban revolution captured the imagination. Romantic in its execution, expressing a call for social justice, it also had vast international support. Yet by the end of the century, 40 years later, around 15 percent of its population had left Cuba as a result of their process of political disaffection, disappointment, and sense of betrayal. Among those who sought refuge in other lands, many had once been ardent supporters of the revolution.

The changes – political, social, economic – that took place in Cuba in mid century were so dramatic, profound, and irreversible that they truly deserve the name of “revolution” in the original sense of “taking a full turn.” Two caudillos shaped the history of the Cuban revolution: Fulgencio Batista, who relied on the support of the army; and Fidel Castro, who relied on the support of the common people. They completely polarized the Cuban people. Some fought for or against Batista’s government; others fought for or against Fidel’s government; still others fought twice – first, against Batista, then against Fidel. In the end, it was the republic that fell – vanquished both by Batista’s and Castro’s dictatorships.

Initially, Cubans shared in the euphoria of the revolution’s success, but when the revolution entered a more radical phase the exodus of political émigrés increased dramatically. With breathtaking speed, in a couple of years the revolution moved through distinct stages. Amaro (1977) captured them as: first, democracy; then, humanism; followed by nationalism; thereafter, socialism; culminating in Marxism–Leninism. The United States’ punitive policy – cutting the sugar quota, instituting a trade embargo, and backing the exiles’ invasion of Cuba – no doubt aided the rapidity of this transition. If we define revolutions by their outcomes (cf. Goldstone 2001), the Cuban revolution initially was a political revolution that aimed to restore the republic, to achieve democracy. It became a social revolution under Fidel Castro’s leadership – a radical transformation of the total structure of Cuban society.

In the initial stage of democracy, Cubans who fought for the revolution wanted to restore the rhythm of constitutional elections that Batista’s 1952 military coup had brought to a halt soon after the promulgation of the new 1940 Constitution, in which Cubans took pride. Cuba then had a multi-party system with a strong Christian, social-democratic ideological current. Batista became aware that he would not win the national elections and usurped political power. Oblivious to the cruelty his police force was able to inflict on the students and the peasants, Batista became most unpopular. This stage began with the 26th of July Movement that brothers Fidel and Raúl Castro organized and spearheaded, and which took its name from the day in 1953 when they attacked the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. It lasted until the first few months of 1959, when the provisional government issued the first social reforms. While at that time Cuba enjoyed one of the highest socioeconomic standards of living in Latin America, social inequality (social class, race, city/countryside) was vast. Cuba’s economy mostly centered on sugar production; the middle classes eschewed politics; the labor movement was strong; and most Cuban trade was with the United States.

The revolutionary armed struggle encompassed two major movements. One was the 26th of July movement, centered in Oriente province, where the rebel barbudos (bearded men) fought in the Sierra Maestra, under the
undeniable charisma of Fidel Castro, and, later, in the Escambray Mountains, in Las Villas, under el Ché Guevara. The other was the student movement, organized as the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, whose university student combatants fought in Havana and other cities, under the leadership of José Antonio Echeverría. A committed Catholic who fiercely upheld constitutional principles, Echeverría’s life and leadership were extinguished during the Directorio’s suicidal attack on the Presidential Palace in 1957. The death of Frank País in Oriente province had a similar effect. Thus, Fidel Castro emerged as almost a legend, and the undisputed leader of the opposition. His entrance into Havana in a caravan in the first few days of January 1959 was an apotheosis. For many years, the acme of the public plaza, the euphoria of the crowds chanting in the revolutionary plaza, characterized the revolution when most of the institutions of civil society tumbled. There was a profound transformation of Cuba’s political culture. Fidel Castro insisted that such vast popular support was a new source of legitimacy, a form of democracy. In a mostly Catholic country, initially the Catholic Church supported the revolution. But increasingly the church became divided, and ultimately it opposed the revolution, not because of its Christian aims of helping the poor, ending racial discrimination, and alleviating extreme social inequality, but because of the communist means by which it sought to achieve them, harming the rights of others.

The second stage of the revolution was characterized by its insistence on humanism: “bread with liberty,” as Fidel Castro described it. When he visited the United States in April 1959, Castro emphasized that the revolution was not communist but authentically Cuban – not red but green, green as Cuba’s palm trees. With the Provisional Government in place, the moderates in the government instigated important social reforms – agrarian reform, tax reform, rent control – to integrate the socially marginal groups in Cuba, such as the peasants and the blacks. But soon the Catholic Church was silenced by the government after denouncing the communist course of the revolution, independent television and newspapers were taken over, and the electoral system collapsed when jubilant crowds chanted around Castro “What do we need elections for?” Under the weight of Castro’s enormous popularity, Cubans allowed civil society to collapse.

This second stage came to an end when Huber Matos – a comandante who had fought for the revolution – wrote Castro a letter in October 1959, denouncing the fact that the revolution was being handed over to the communists. For this, he was arrested and served 20 years in prison. The rule of the moderates had come to an end (cf. Brinton 1965). Thousands of Catholics protested in a National Catholic Congress march, during which the patron saint – la Caridad – was carried in a procession, while shouting “Social justice, yes; communism, no!” To Matos and many others who had fought for the restoration of democracy in Cuba, the revolution had been betrayed. Cuba by then lacked civil liberties, dissent was not tolerated, and terror reigned with the swift executions of the opposition.

The third stage of the revolution was that of nationalism, emphasizing “Yankee” imperialism, which until then had been a minor theme in the revolution (cf. Domínguez 1978). In 1960 the Cuban revolution set out on its definitive course – the diplomatic and economic war between the US and Cuba ensued, culminating in the hemispheric trade embargo, and the Soviet Union became Cuba’s protector. This political and economic relationship lasted 30 years, during which the Soviet Union buoyed Cuba’s sinking economy with a very generous subsidy, in exchange for Cuba helping to spread communism in the third world. A profound confrontation between the church and the state developed, as did the armed opposition to the Castro government. The government called the opposition “counterrevolutionaries”; they called themselves “revolutionaries.”

The fourth stage was that of socialism, which began when large Cuban and American enterprises, latifundios, and private property were
nationalized in 1960. The exiles’ Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961 failed under President John F. Kennedy’s ambivalence about the operation he had just inherited. Months later, Castro for the first time declared he was and had always been Marxist–Leninist. From then on, the Cuban revolution was consolidated and politics was shaped into the single vanguard Party behind the charisma of the maximum leader (Pérez-Stable 1999). With the influence of the United States effectively counterbalanced, the Cuban nation became firmly embedded in the Soviet orbit. Nationalism, the fight against US imperialism, and the nation under siege became major themes in the Cuban revolution, themes that Fidel Castro regularly fanned the flames of in his speeches, and which gave him a newfound source of legitimacy (Domínguez 1978).

Amaro and Portes (1972) portrayed the different phases of Cuban political immigration, showing how the exiles’ principal motivation for leaving changed over time. With the unfolding of the Cuban revolution, over the years “those who wait” gave way to “those who escape,” and they to “those who search.” Bringing the analysis up to date, one can add “those who hope” and “those who despair” (Pedraza 2007). In the first wave of the exodus, those who left were Cuba’s elite: “those who wait” waited for the United States to rescue Cuba from the consolidation of communism only 90 miles away. The refugees of this first wave came to the United States driven by Cuba’s overturning of the old order and sharp turn toward communism. In the second phase, still largely a middle-class exodus, now it was more middle than upper: middle merchants and middle management, landlords, middle-level professionals, and skilled unionized workers. At the same time, over 14,000 children left alone through Operation Pedro Pan, their parents afraid that they would be educated by the state in the Soviet Union (Torres 2003). “Those who escape” wanted to escape an intolerable new order. Fidel and Raúl Castro labeled them gusanos, or counterrevolutionary “worms.” The October Missile Crisis in 1962 ended the first wave of the exodus (Thomas 1977). Thereafter, emphasis was placed upon the enemy within and all criticism was considered a “counterrevolutionary activity” (Amaro 1977). The Cuban revolution had multiple causes: Batista’s illegitimate dictatorship; the vast inequalities of class, rural poverty, race, and gender; Castro’s enormous charisma; and an anti-American nationalism. Under their multiple impacts, the political revolution became a social revolution.

With the revolution consolidated against its external enemies—the exiles and the US government—in the next stage the revolution was consolidated against its internal enemies. The new communists (led by the Castro brothers) wrestled power away from the old communists, men and women of high ideals who had belonged to the Party for nearly 40 years, as well as Che Guevara, despite them having the Soviet Union’s support. Moreover, the new government successfully discredited the counterrevolution, imprisoning those who challenged it. Major debates took place between Che Guevara and Fidel Castro with regards to the best course for the revolution (whether to incentivize work via moral or material incentives; whether to spread revolution throughout the third world). This resulted in Che Guevara’s guerilla warfare in Bolivia, where he died isolated. Though Cuba’s foreign policy failed in Latin America, it was a success in Africa from the 1970s on, particularly in Angola and Ethiopia. Victory there, the Castro brothers expected, would decide whether communism or capitalism would rule the world.

During these years the second major wave of the Cuban exodus was initiated. In the fall of 1965 a chaotic period ensued when hundreds of boats left from Miami for Camarioca, where they picked up thousands of relatives to come to the United States. In response to President Lyndon Johnson’s “open door” policy that welcomed refugees from communism for eight years, the United States and Cuban governments administered an orderly air bridge, the Freedom Flights which brought to Miami more than a quarter of a million Cubans, whom
the Cuban Refugee Program swiftly processed and relocated. Cuba barred from exit young men of military service age, as well as professionals, and technical and skilled workers, such as doctors (Clark 1992).

This wave of immigration was largely composed of the working class and “petite bourgeoisie”: employees, independent craftsmen, small merchants, and skilled and semi-skilled workers. To spread access to a basic education and healthcare, young, educated Cubans went to live in the countryside, working in literacy campaigns to educate the poor, illiterate peasants, and in public health campaigns to provide basic healthcare. At the same time, the impact of the hemispheric trade embargo imposed by the Organization of American States in 1964 resulted in profound economic dislocations; the exodus drained technical and administrative skills and Cuba failed in her attempts to cease being a sugar monoculture, and to industrialize and diversify. According to Amaro and Portes (1972), “those who search” sought better economic conditions. Yet their distinction missed the reality that while life in Cuba grew harsh for all, it turned particularly bitter for those who had announced their dissent by declaring their intention to leave. Not only were they unemployed, but they also lost all their belongings, were ostracized as enemies, and were forced to do “volunteer work” in agriculture.

After the air bridge ended, the émigrés came from Cuba’s “middling service sectors:” cooks, domestics, hairdressers, taxi drivers, and small retail merchants (Portes, Clark, & Bach 1977). They left Cuba during the period in which Castro launched a new “revolutionary offensive” in Cuba, confiscating many thousands of small businesses, “pushing” out the little entrepreneur and his employees. The Cuban government labeled them parásitos, or “parasites.”

The social transformations the Cuban revolution effected were so pervasive that they always “pushed” Cubans. America, in facilitating the migration, always “pulled” them. Together, they set in motion a system of political migration. The loss of the educated, professional middle classes indeed proved erosive to the Cuban revolution, but it also served the positive function of externalizing dissent. At the same time, in the United States the arrival of refugees who “voted with their feet” also served to provide the legitimacy necessary for foreign policy actions during the tense years of the cold war (Pedraza-Bailey 1985).

With the economic transition to socialism achieved, in the seventies the Cuban government established the shape of the political system. In 1970, Fidel Castro staked the honor of the country on achieving the national goal of cutting 10 million tons of sugar. The failure of the massive mobilization of Cubans all over the island to cut sugar cane began this new phase.

In America, there was a chasm between Cuban exiles of different political generations: those who came of age during certain critical periods of Cuban history (cf. Zeitlin 1966), and those who came of age during the time of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. In December 1977, 55 progressive young people broke through 19 years of hostility, abuse, and isolation. Grouped as the Antonio Maceo Brigade, their visit to the island left behind a profound mark. In Cuba, Jesus Díaz filmed it: the film 55 Hermanos (55 Brothers and Sisters) captured their search for cultural identity and, for some, their political identity. Widely shown in Cuba, it proved heartrending: evidence of the suffering that exile had brought both those who left and who were left behind.

In 1978, a “Dialogue” took place between the Cuban government and representatives of the Cuban community in exile, as a result of which the Cuban government agreed to the release of political prisoners, to promote the reunification of families rent apart by the exodus, and to allow Cubans in the United States to visit their family and their homeland. The gusanos respectfully became “members of the Cuban community abroad.” The Cuban community split into the opposing camps of those who supported and opposed the Dialogue. Exile violence erupted in Miami and New Jersey, against those who were trying to build bridges
with Cuba. Still, close to 4000 political prisoners were released as a result of the Dialogue. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have returned to the island every year, seeking the family they loved and the vestiges of the life they once led.

After the Cuban Refugee Program ceased in 1974, and the political prisoners were gradually released, few expected the chaotic flotilla exodus that burst in April 1980 and lasted until September, bringing over 125,000 more Cubans to America. From Miami, thousands of boats manned by relatives sped across the 90 miles of sea to Cuba’s Mariel Harbor. At times they succeeded in bringing their families, other times they brought whomever angry officials put on the boats. Toward the end, this included Cuba’s social “undesirables”: those who had been in prisons (whether they had committed real crimes or had only succeeded in challenging the state), mental patients, and homosexuals. The Castro government called them “antisocial elements” – escoria, or “scum.” No longer the immigrants of the transition from capitalism to communism, they were the children of communism itself. President Jimmy Carter’s ambivalent government policy both welcomed them “with open hearts and open arms” and delimited the flow. Most were young men who were single or without their families; the proportion blacks was higher than ever before; and they were overwhelmingly working class (Bach 1980). Many had been in prison. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, of the 124,789 Mariel refugees around 19 percent, or 23,970, admitted they had been in jail in Cuba. Of those who had been in prison, 5,486 were political prisoners, while 70 percent had been jailed for minor crimes, such as vagrancy or participation in the extensive black market, that were crimes in Cuba but not in the United States. The Cuban Ley de la Peligrosidad (Law of Dangerous Behavior) made some forms of dissent, such as participating in the black market, dodging military service or desertion, or refusing to work for the state, “anti-social” behavior, punished by prison terms. Of those who had been in jail, the immigration service considered only 7 percent to be serious criminals (Montgomery 1981).

Given their youth, the Marielitos clearly constituted a different political generation (cf. Mannheim 1952), one whose coming of age happened long after the early revolutionary struggle, at a time when problems of freedom of expression were particularly acute for artists and intellectuals, and at a time when homosexuality, particularly, was scorned and dealt with by prison sentence. “Those who hope,” is what I termed them (Pedraza 2007).

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, on which Cuba had been enormously dependent for trade and economic subsidies, ushered in a new period in Cuba, which Fidel Castro euphemistically called “a special period.” From 1989–1993, a decline took place in gross domestic product of one half and in investment by two-thirds (Mesa-Lago 1994). Coupled with the tightening of the embargo (the Torricelli Law) in 1992, the impact was felt in deteriorating healthcare and education, both of which had been the pride of the revolution. As the twenty-first century opened, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez came to the rescue, as Cuba opened up its economy to trade, investment, and tourism. But abject need and hunger became the reality of Cubans’ lives and remains so today. At the same time, the dissident movement grew and developed into a social movement. Despite different political thrusts (e.g., democratic socialist, environmentalist, Christian Democrat), all dissidents in Cuba increasingly called for a new democratic opening, and a liberalization of the political structures that both Fidel and Raúl Castro adamantly refused. Hence, both economic and political want drove the emigration of the “new Cubans,” together with the ever-present desire for the reunification of families still rent apart.

The new Cuban exodus took several forms (cf. Rodríguez-Chavez 1993), with illegal emigration being the major one. Cubans became so desperate that they left on balsas – rafts, tires, or other makeshift vessels – risking death due to starvation, dehydration, drowning, or sharks. In the summer of 1994, the political
crisis deepened when the Cuban coastguard overturned a tugboat of people who were trying to escape with powerful shoots of water, killing over 40 adults and children. This was followed by massive riots on August 5th, when thousands of Cubans protested in the streets in the center of Havana, the largest protest event of its kind to date. Castro gave orders to the Cuban coastguard not to discourage illegal emigration from Cuba’s shores. Immediately, thousands of balseros put out to sea, hoping to reach Miami. The US coastguard rescued close to 34 000 Cubans at sea. “Those who despair” is how I categorized them (Pedraza 2007).

Abrupt policy changes made the Cubans – for the first time – unwelcome in the United States. Under orders from President Bill Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno, the US coastguard blocked their progress and directed them to Guantanamo (the US base in Cuba), where over 30 000 people lived in tents until they were allowed entry to the United States and were relocated. “Cuba bleeds,” headlined Liz Balmaseda (1994), “and the drops are called rafts.” Data from the 2009 American Community Survey show that of the 991 385 persons born in Cuba, 46.3 percent arrived from 1990 on, in total about 459 000 people (US Census Bureau 2009).

Cubans are now beginning to build a civil society that is independent of government. Still weak and fragile, one of its pillars is religion. After years of being silenced, beginning in the mid-1980s, a significant religious revival gradually took place in the churches and synagogues. This was spurred by Pope John Paul II’s visit in 1998. The new religious institutions became much closer to the common people than before. As Hirschman (1970, 1993) underlined, the relationship between exit and voice is usually inverse. Certainly over the years the massive exit out of Cuba impeded the development of voice-protest. But in recent years the dissident movement sought to have Cubans’ voices heard. It found expression in magazines such as Vitral and Convivencia, edited by Dagoberto Valdés, and in documents such as La Patria es de Todos (Our Nation Belongs to All) and the Proyecto Varela. They demanded change in Cuba, including: the right to free expression and a free press; the right to free association; amnesty for political prisoners; the right to form small, private enterprises; and a new electoral law and free elections. As Osvaldo Payá, leader of the Movimiento Cristiano Liberación (Christian Movement for Liberation) expressed it, “Let no one else speak for Cubans. Let their own voices be heard in a referendum” (Payá-Sardiñas 2001). Moreover, intellectuals and artists began to carve independent paths, and independent labor unions sought to form. But the Castro brothers replied with derision – calling them grupusclos (infinitesimally small groups) – and with increased repression. Many citizens who challenged the state were imprisoned in what came to be called “the Cuban Spring” of 1993. Writing in the mid-1950s, Merleau-Ponty (1973) expressed it succinctly: “Revolutions are true as movements but false as regimes.”

The women who were relatives of these political prisoners engaged in a nonviolent protest. Every Sunday Las Damas de Blanco (The Ladies in White) walk throughout Havana, dressed in white, drawing attention to their demand for their men to be released. Early in 2010, the tragic death of Orlando Zapata took place. Zapata was a black, working-class Cuban who was imprisoned for founding a nonviolent, independent political group. His death laid the repressive political conditions in Cuba before the whole world. Soon thereafter, the courageous hunger strike of Guillermo Faríñas (a sociologist and journalist from the city of Santa Clara) on behalf of these prisoners pushed the Cuban government to release many of them. Half a century after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, it is evident that the seed out of which democracy will once again spurt has been planted in Cuba.

SEE ALSO: Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Marxism and social movements; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Revolutions.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Culture jamming
ASA WETTERGREN

Culture jamming is a movement answering to the characteristics of contemporary movements suggested by, among others, Alberto Melucci. It concentrates on symbolic forms of protest and resistance, struggles for personal autonomy and diversity, and is active in a subsystem of a complex global society. Culture jammers are generally organized in networks of small friendship- and/or skill-based groups, or individual “solo” activists. There is a shared cultural framing in the assessment that commercial media and culture support mega-corporate interests and power by manipulating and subjugating a creative and freedom-craving human nature, undermine democracy by making people politically disinterested, exploit limited social and natural resources, and colonize public space. The latter includes media space, to which access is largely governed by financial resources. In addition the proliferation of unsubstantial commercial messages such as ads, commercials, and entertainment drowns the voice of politically engaged citizens.

There have been groups of activists adhering to the term culture jamming since the American audio-collage band Negativland coined it in 1984 (Dery 1993; Klein 1999; Lasn 1999). The mobilizing frame and the key techniques of “semiological guerrilla warfare” (Eco cited in Dery 1993) date further back, to the 1950s and the French Situationists. From the leading Situationist intellectual, Guy Debord, who delivered a fiery critique of the “society of the spectacle” in his book with the same title in 1967 (Debord 1994), through American cultural critic Mark Dery’s “culture jammer’s manifesto” in 1993, and ex-marketing man Kalle Lasn’s book Culture Jam – The Uncooling of AmericaTM in 1999, the key theme is a call to revolt against the expansion of the commercial “mono”-culture, the proliferation of commercial media, the entertainment industry, and the “seduction” of democratic citizens into alliterate, politically ignorant “consumer drones” (Lasn 1999).

The Situationists advocated détournement (“turning around,” “turning upside down”) as a tool to create “situations” – ruptures in the commonly shared reality illusion created by capitalist media (Best & Kellner 1997). In a similar vein, culture jamming in a broad sense embraces groups and individuals who deconstruct the messages of corporate power by targeting key symbols – consumer objects, brands, chain stores, websites, or other symbols vital to the discursive framing of the world that underpins corporate domination – and tampering with them in ways that uncover the hidden logic of power and simultaneously state the autonomy of the protester(s) from “corporate mind control.” The political message of culture jamming, as it may be extracted from Dery and Lasn, advocates radical democracy, grassroots participation, community building, social and cultural diversity, and sustainable development. The Situationists were a group of neo-Marxist artists and intellectuals rejecting the separation between art and politics. The fusion of culture, politics, and economy is characteristic of culture jammers who make their political statements through art, music, theater, graphic design, technological inventions, and so on. Jammers, however, avoid positioning themselves in the political left–right spectrum and they rarely condemn capitalism, consumption, or the contemporary media and communication technology development on the whole. In line with many contemporary movements jammers are unlikely to deliver any wholesale ideological packages. Dery’s manifesto and Lasn’s book are exceptions but they are also very inclusive, regarding participants, means, and ends. Culture jamming thus sustains a fluid and cosmopolitan sense of collective identity. Focus is on the dissemination of ideas (Wettergren
2 CULTURE JAMMING

that in the long run is hoped to create a social and political impact.

While culture jamming is primarily an American/Western phenomenon, the largest effort to advocate culture jamming as a worldwide movement against global corporations and commercial culture so far has been made by the Media Foundation Adbusters, founded by Lasn in Vancouver, Canada, in 1989. Other well-known groups are the San Francisco Billboard Liberation Front, Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, the Yes Men, Electronic Disturbance Theater, and the Bureau of Inverse Technology. These examples represent a typical broad span of action repertoires, inherent to the idea that a jammer uses his/her skills and symbolic capital, whatever they are, to convey the message.

A prominent feature of culture jamming is the use of fun and humor (Wettergren 2005; Wettergren 2009). Humor eases the transmission of messages as it makes audiences laugh and awakens curiosity. By successfully provoking “the enemy” with humorous actions, culture jammers harvest micropolitical victories that reinforce their point about the “real” face of corporate power. In activist networks humor is also a recognition signal and a celebrated sign of ingenuity; successful examples are widely disseminated and commended.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; Globalization and movements; Media framing and social movements; Networks and social movements; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

The Cultural Revolution, the full name of which was “the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” was a political movement launched by Mao Zedong, the supreme leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Its goal was to rectify the CCP, which Mao considered to have become over-bureaucratized since it took power in 1949. Mao also wanted to revive the revolutionary spirit of the war period in order to maintain his personal charisma and domination within the CCP. The movement, however, took on a momentum of its own as a large number of the Chinese masses participated in it and became entangled in factional fights.

After taking power, and especially after adopting the Soviet Union’s economic model, the Chinese communist party-state went through rapid bureaucratization in the first half of the 1950s. This development not only contradicted Mao’s vision of a good society but also undermined his personal power. Criticizing the whole trend of development as conservative, Mao pushed for his radical populist strategy of modernization – pursuing miracle-like economic goals through continuous mass campaigns. With his unchallengeable charismatic authority within the CCP and among the Chinese population, and through shrewd political maneuvers, Mao could always get his radical policies adopted by the CCP. However, these policies produced only disastrous results. Mao’s Great Leap Forward movement, for example, induced a severe famine between 1959 and 1961, during which over 30 million Chinese died. In the early 1960s, in order to get out of this economic disaster, Mao’s designated heir apparent Liu Shaoqi and his other colleagues adopted a set of more moderate economic and social policies, which brought rapid economic recovery and greater social diversity. These new policies offended Mao both ideologically and personally. In the meantime, the relationship between China and Soviet Union worsened further, and this convinced Mao that the communist revolution in the Soviet Union had gone astray and that China faced the same danger. Discontented with his colleagues’ deviation from his radicalism and his own marginalization in the daily operation of the state, Mao believed that Liu Shaoqi and other party officials had abandoned his revolutionary direction and turned to Soviet Revisionism. For these reasons, he radicalized Chinese politics in 1962 by emphasizing the imminent danger of capitalist restoration and the predominance of class struggle in China. Meanwhile, under his own advocacy, his personality cult escalated. This radicalization led to the launch of the Cultural Revolution, through which Mao attempted to reverse the trend of bureaucratization and routinization in his regime and to revolutionize Chinese society in order to ensure his absolute domination and the pursuit of his vision of communism.

Mao’s Cultural Revolution can be roughly divided into two stages. The first lasted from 1966 to 1968, during which time Mao officially endorsed a quasi-free mass mobilization against the party-state authorities in order to root out the so-called “capitalist roaders in power.” It was also a strategy to dismantle the quasi-absolute political authority of the party-state bureaucracy. This stage ended with the military repression of the radical mass organizations. The second stage lasted from late 1968 until Mao’s death in 1976, during which time Mao abandoned free mass mobilization and conducted his movement through the party-state bureaucracy. In other words, the Cultural Revolution took a semi-institutionalized form.
On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao secured the backing of two groups at the top of the Chinese leadership. The first were the Maoist intellectuals such as Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao. They later became the core members of the so-called Cultural Revolution Small Group (CRSG) and acted as Mao’s personal apparatus during the Cultural Revolution. Mao also had the support of the defense minister Lin Biao, who controlled the Chinese army and had played a major role in boosting Mao’s personality cult in the early 1960s. The movement started in November 1965 when Mao secretly authorized Yao Wenyuan, a party propagandist in Shanghai, to write an essay attacking a historical play written by Wu Han, deputy mayor of Beijing, as counterrevolutionary. In the following months, several top military and civilian party officials considered to be the obstacles to the launch of the Cultural Revolution were purged. Meanwhile, the CRSG was established to control the CCP’s propaganda machine and guide the Cultural Revolution. On May 25, 1966, under the manipulation of the Maoists, Nie Yuanzi, a party cadre at Peking University, posted a big-character poster attacking the school party leadership. A week later, Mao secretly ordered the broadcast of the content of this poster, accompanied by high praise, through the national radio network. This instantly incited student rebellion against school authorities in Beijing. Soon Mao ordered that classes be suspended in order that the students could make revolution. The mass upheaval was launched.

Facing unprecedented chaos in schools and universities in June 1966, Liu Shaoqi, who was the Chinese president at the time, and other top party leaders including Deng Xiaoping, were at a loss about the direction of the movement. They dispatched “work teams” – groups of party officials organized from the top – to campuses, in part to suppress the radical tendencies of the movement. But Mao soon denounced Liu and Deng’s handling of mass mobilization as a bourgeois repression of the mass movement and praised a quasi-autonomous middle-school student organization called the Red Guards as the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution. Soon, student Red Guards were organized across the country. The movement was formally announced at the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress convened at Mao’s initiative in early August 1966. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were criticized and lost their power, while the Maoists gained domination. Meanwhile, Mao designated Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, to take charge of the daily running of his regime amid the chaos created by his movement. A document titled the Sixteen Articles was issued as the guideline of the movement, whose ambiguities and contradictions concerning the movement’s targets bred confusion and division among the masses and the party officials in their understanding of the nature and target of the movement.

In August and September 1966, student Red Guards rushed to the streets to smash the so-called “Four Olds” (old culture, old customs, old thoughts, and old habits). Many historical relics and cultural objects that were regarded as traditional and Western by the radical students were destroyed, and many people, from intellectuals to ordinary people with “bad” class labels, were persecuted and even beaten to death by the combative students. In October 1966, the movement took a more radical turn when Mao denounced the party authorities for their resistance to attacks by those most radical Red Guard organizations. From then on, student attacks upon local party authorities became the movement’s new direction, and new Red Guards of different political agendas mushroomed. In late 1966, dissatisfied with the Red Guard factionalism, Mao lifted the ban on free worker mobilization. Soon the workers took to the streets and divided into pro- and anti-local authority factions. Mao gave official support to the latter. The party-state authorities had to formally abandon their defenders and “support” the rebels. Disappointed, the former pro-authority mass organizations also put on the banners of rebellion. By the end of 1966, the party-state authorities across the
country had become largely paralyzed. Political and economic disorder prevailed. The regime was in crisis.

In January 1967, under the support and manipulation of the Maoists, the radical rebels in Shanghai seized power from local government. Mao was inspired and called on the rebels across the country to seize power from their local party authorities and to establish a new revolutionary order. But the power seizure soon resulted in nationwide chaos as the rebels split into opposing factions in their fight over power. The crisis deepened and Mao had to order the local military to intervene and support the "leftist" mass faction. Meanwhile he abandoned Shanghai’s “Paris Commune” model and opted for a Three-in-One Revolution Committee (i.e., the Revolution Committee should be composed of local military officials, former civilian party officials, and representatives of the mass rebels) as the new model of authority organization.

In February 1967, taking advantage of Mao’s moderation, some top veteran officials protested against the chaos and persecution brought by the Cultural Revolution. Mao was deeply offended and turned against them. The CRSG then replaced the CCP Politburo to become the CCP’s decision-making organ. In the provinces, during February and March 1967, facing chaotic mass factional struggles, the local military tended to support the former pro-authority mass forces and severely repressed the unruly rebels in order to restore order. Meanwhile, the resumption of economic production brought back former civilian party officials. The pre-Cultural Revolution order seemed to be on the way back in the provinces. Discontented with this development, Mao removed military control of the mass forces and gave a huge boost to the otherwise suppressed rebel factions in April 1967. Nevertheless, the movement did not develop in the direction that Mao had apparently expected. The reenergized rebel factions’ violent confrontation with the mass forces associated with the local military led to a state of civil war across the country in the summer of 1967. Faced with this crisis, Mao had to denounce the local military leaders and dispatch the Field Armies in the name of supporting the local rebels. In most parts of China, the mass forces associated with the local military were denounced as the “conservative faction” and declined.

From August 1967 to April 1968, in a general climate of moderation, Revolution Committees began to be established in large numbers in the provinces under the leadership of Field Army officers. Yet in the process of forming Revolution Committees, largely due to the issue of the division of power within each committee, the rebels in many parts of China further split into pro-military and antimilitary factions. After various failed co-optation attempts, the military suppressed the latter. Unhappy with this development, Mao radicalized the direction of the movement again in late March 1968. This gave the suppressed rebel factions an opportunity to attack the military leaders and the newly formed Revolution Committees. A new round of factional war between opposing rebel factions ensued in many parts of China. Facing the return of crisis, Mao had to order the military to repress the antimilitary rebel factions and restore order to his regime. By then, Mao seemed to have become completely disillusioned with the faction-ridden anarchic mass movement. As a result he ordered the disbanding of all mass organizations.

In late 1968, middle and high school students were sent to the countryside in the name of receiving reeducation from the peasants. Meanwhile, a Clarifying Class Ranks Campaign was waged, which allowed the local military leadership to purge and repress all non-obedient forces. The movement thus concluded with the ascendancy of the military. By August 1971 military leaders presided over 22 of the 29 provincial Revolution Committees. In the meantime, Mao turned to the reconstruction of the party organization. The Ninth Congress of the CCP was held in 1969. During the Congress, Mao’s theory of Continuous Revolution was elevated as the regime’s official guideline. Mao’s cult became ritualized and he was able to get a
series of radical policies implemented. Though the CRSG was formally disbanded as an organization, its members became a prominent political force under Mao’s aegis. The Politburo was restored as the CCP’s decision-making organ.

Though the country had become relatively stabilized by 1971, the power struggles among the elite became increasingly fierce as Mao grew old and the traditional balance within the CCP broke down due to the struggle among the different Cultural Revolution forces. By 1971, Mao became increasingly wary of Lin Biao’s power and the military domination of his regime as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s power balance tactic led to the ascendance of Zhou Enlai and some of the moderate veterans. Yet, as the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution became part of the past, the radical Maoists of the CRSG felt increasingly marginalized when normalization set in. Indeed, both Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai agreed that the Cultural Revolution had finished and that the current task was to stabilize the political order and pursue national economic development. The radical Maoists, whose power depended upon political radicalization and mass mobilization, could feel that the pre-Cultural Revolution order was being restored, so they tried to interfere with the daily work of the government and assert their radical power. This infuriated Lin Biao. The conflicts between the CRSG members and Lin Biao’s military faction, which had started as early as 1968, escalated with Lin Biao’s military faction immediately gaining the upper hand. This result, however, generated great anxiety in Mao. The CRSG members were the carriers of Mao’s ideology of Continuous Revolution. Their marginalization actually meant the negation of the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s denouncement of Chen Boda, who had shifted to the side of Lin Biao from the CRSG groups, signaled Lin Biao’s fall into disfavor. Mao began to make public remarks along the lines that the military needed to be rectified; he also restored the CRSG’s formal organizational status. With the atmosphere becoming increasingly portentous for Lin Biao, he and his family tried to flee to the Soviet Union and died in a plane crash in September 1971. Lin Biao had been a major symbol of the Cultural Revolution. He was even praised as the “closest-comrade-in-arms” of Mao and his status as successor to Mao was written into the CCP constitution. His fall caused the immediate questioning of the Cultural Revolution by the population. People even began to doubt Mao’s personal quality as a supreme leader. Negative opinions of the Cultural Revolution were on the rise. The whole development dealt a fatal blow to Mao. He became extremely anxious about people’s judgment of the Cultural Revolution as well as its legacy in Chinese history. Lin Biao’s death and the ensuing denouncement of him thus signaled the bankruptcy of the Cultural Revolution.

Lin Biao’s fall also led to a large-scale purge of military leaders and the demilitarization of the regime. The civilian bureaucracy headed by Zhou Enlai ascended in 1972. Taking advantage of Mao’s moderation after the death of Lin Biao, Zhou made great efforts to bring the Chinese government back into normal operation. He brought back large numbers of veteran CCP cadres who had been denounced during the Cultural Revolution, and implemented a series of educational and economic policies that were the opposite of the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. The most symbolic event of this reversal was the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, the second biggest “capitalist roader in power,” to assist Zhou in managing state affairs in 1973. These new developments made those CCP leaders who had benefited greatly from the Cultural Revolution increasingly uneasy. Their struggles with the old CCP veterans headed by Zhou Enlai intensified. Mao himself was also wary of Zhou’s policies, fearing that these new developments would not only contradict the values of the Cultural Revolution but also undermine his historical legacy. With Mao’s approval, the Maoists launched the “Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius movement” in late 1973, a movement that was actually aimed at
Zhou Enlai. But it incited a mass mobilization similar to that of the Cultural Revolution, for which Mao no longer had the stomach. Mao had to stop the campaign to restore order.

Increasingly disappointed with the Maoists for their lack of day-to-day administrative experience, Mao designated Deng Xiaoping as the successor to Zhou in December 1974 when Zhou’s health was in a serious condition. Mao even asked Deng to take charge of both the CCP and the government when he became increasingly disillusioned with his administratively inexperienced loyalists. But Deng was not Mao’s ideological successor. He was determined to pursue economic development rather than the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Mao was finally convinced by the Maoists that Deng’s policies were actually against the Cultural Revolution. Mao demanded that Deng officially display his support for the Cultural Revolution, but Deng refused. This angered Mao. A campaign against Deng was immediately launched across the country to criticize Deng and the so-called countrywide rightist tendency. The country was radicalized again. But Mao died just a few months later, in September 1976. After his death, the major Maoist members, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, the so-called Gang of Four, were removed from power by a military coup in 1976. Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, was put in power but soon lost it due to his determination to continue Mao’s politics of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping took power again and China turned in a direction very much opposite to the ideals of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao’s Cultural Revolution had brought enormous negative consequences. Politically, the frequent oscillation between radicalization and moderation created political instability and unpredictability. Under the radical discourse of class struggle, to be on the losing side of a political struggle was extremely costly. Thus political instability, added to radicalism, created a political culture of life-and-death factional power struggles in Chinese politics, which also induced widespread political apathy and cynicism among the Chinese population at large. Institutionally, the Cultural Revolution caused systemic chaos. In order to de-bureaucratize the party-state, Mao artificially cut off bureaucratic functions and offices, and sent cadres to labor camps for re-education. But in reality, these offices and functions had to be filled in other ways so that the system could still operate. Moreover, Mao’s antibureaucratic campaigns usually resulted in the growth of the bureaucracy because political activists had to be rewarded and the usual reward was to be promoted into the bureaucracy. Altogether, Mao’s antibureaucratic policies created a kind of administrative chaos within the party-state. Under the radical Maoist ideology and repeated antibureaucratic campaigns, the bureaucrats lived in insecurity.
and fear while their privileges had to be kept hidden or at least disguised. Hence the bureaucracy in the last years of Maoist rule was burdened with a heavy ideology and an aberrant functioning logic.

The Cultural Revolution also generated disastrous economic and social consequences. First, political instability and radicalism produced economic stagnancy. People lived in poverty during the Cultural Revolution. Both psychological fear and economic scarcity forced people to use personal networks and bribery to obtain benefits. Second, the radical practice of class struggle during the Cultural Revolution destroyed social ties and trust, and bred a general ethos of fear and distrust in Chinese society. After the destruction of any sign of traditional or Western culture and the installation of the hegemony of Maoist ideology, the Chinese people lived in cultural poverty during the Cultural Revolution. During the movement, millions of young people were sent to the countryside because of, among several other factors, the lack of job opportunities in cities. These sent-down youth suffered greatly from ideological disillusion and the absence of a decent education. They became the losers during the post-Cultural Revolution period when education was emphasized.

The Cultural Revolution had brought China to the brink of economic collapse by the time of Mao’s death in 1976. It compelled the CCP, under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping, to initiate economic reform and an open-door policy that effectively ended the Maoist radical strategies of modernization. Yet, the negative legacies of the Cultural Revolution lasted. Largely as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese during the 1980s increasingly no longer believed in communism and the regime lost its ideological legitimacy. Meanwhile, some Chinese people started to question the root cause of the Cultural Revolution and many of them found the solution in democracy. Pro-democracy movements in China never ceased in the late 1970s and 1980s, and they culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen student movement. The Cultural Revolution has other legacies as well. As the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution gradually become a remote past, and as social inequalities and government corruption become rampant, the idealism of Mao’s Cultural Revolution has gained new ground since the late 1990s. In today’s China, leftist intellectuals write articles and books to give new interpretations and meanings to the Cultural Revolution. Some poor people dream about an egalitarian and uncorrupted Cultural Revolution past that they have conjured up in their minds. Some of the old Red Guards have become more and more nostalgic for their idealism and youthful devotion during the Cultural Revolution, whether or not they are successful in this increasingly materialistic world. But the Cultural Revolution was a disaster in Chinese history, though as with any revolution its meanings are going to be redefined by those who are unhappy with the current authorities and who have a strong desire for utopia.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Chinese communist revolution; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Revolutions; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Most sources agree that the contemporary disability rights movement began sometime in the 1960s or perhaps the early 1970s (Percy 1989; Stroman 2003). Unlike the African-American civil rights movement, the disability rights movement has not been characterized by concentrated periods of time where many large-scale and/or violent protest events occurred (Barnartt & Scotch 2001). Instead, disability activism has tended to come in the form of service provision, lobbying, and other exercises of traditional and institutional political influence. While much disability activism is directed at improving funding and availability of services to the disabled community, it is important to understand that there is often a significant divide, and sometimes even real conflict, between the goals of the community of service providers and those of disability rights movement activists.

While the civil rights-based stream of the movement is often treated as if it is synonymous with the entirety of the disability rights movement, in fact the disability rights movement is actually the product of the convergence of three different streams of reform efforts. The three areas of mobilization are: (1) deinstitutionalization, which focuses on reducing the number of people with disabilities living in state-run or charitable, residential facilities or hospitals; (2) independent living, which fights to increase the capacity of the individual, whether in institutions, community settings, or personal homes, to live as independently as possible; and (3) civil rights activism, which attempts to protect and expand civil rights and antidiscrimination policies to cover people with disabilities in the realms of education, employment, criminal justice, and other areas.

The primary constituency of deinstitutionalization activism tends to be people with developmental, psychological, or severe physical disabilities or some combination of them. Activism in this vein is a direct response to the fact that throughout much of the twentieth century parents of children with physical and especially developmental disabilities were typically encouraged to place their children in state-run or charitable institutions (Dybwad & Herr 1979). The only alternative for most families was to find some way to provide financial and other support for the person’s entire life. People with developmental disabilities and their advocates (the most common advocates were parents whose offspring had these disabilities) were particularly critical of residential hospitals and care facilities, since such institutions were characterized by diminishing returns over the long term. That is, while such facilities might help an individual develop coping techniques in their youth, by the time someone reached adulthood the facilities no longer taught new skills but rather were holding facilities for these “patients.” Increasingly, people began to argue that most of these “patients” could live on their own in far less restrictive environments and that they had a right to do so. Thus, for these activists the role of government should be to fund programs that allow people to live outside of institutions and to restrict the power of the residential institutions as much as feasible for those individuals who must reside in them.

People with developmental and severe psychological impairments are behind people with physical impairments in terms of gaining freedom and independence. This gap is largely due to the fact that scientific understanding of these impairments and technologies for “treating/rehabilitating” people with these sorts of impairments has been slower to develop...
disability rights movement (United States)

than for people with physical impairments. Whereas there were tremendous advances in treating people with a variety of physical disabilities (e.g., better prosthetics and motorized wheelchairs) in the period around the two world wars, effective treatment of mental illnesses, particularly severe and/or recurrent episodes of depression and anxiety or acute illnesses like schizophrenia or bipolar disorders, was lagging behind far into the late part of the twentieth century. As treatments improved, people began to advocate both for improvements in residential institutions and hospitals, and against the idea that these institutions should be life-long placements for most people. Rather, the goal of these facilities should be to provide people with care that would allow them to return to mainstream society as soon as possible. While professionals who provide services to people with disabilities in community settings (noninstitutional or collaborative community housing) are often regarded as allies in this stream of activism, service professionals who run state and charitable facilities tend to be the targets of reform. Policymakers are encouraged to put into place strict oversight of the facilities so as to encourage a high level of care and protection of the rights of residents with disabilities.

INDEPENDENT LIVING ACTIVISM

Independent living activism is an outgrowth of a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century stream of disability-related activism that focused on the rehabilitation of people with disabilities. Rehabilitation focused on healing the body “as much as possible” and then helping the person to get a job. Almost all of the activists involved in the movement for independent living had themselves been beneficiaries of rehabilitation programs. These programs often offered them opportunities that many agreed defined adulthood, such as the ability to drive, to go where one pleased, and to be an active member of civil society. Independent living focused on how a person could accomplish this with the least amount of outside help. But, as activists focused on living independently, they simultaneously recognized that active interpersonal discrimination as well as institutionalized arrangements made such involvement more difficult. For example, architectural barriers represented a significant problem for the wave of post-polio wheelchair users who provided a lot of the organizational energy of the nascent disability rights movement centered in Berkeley in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The leading institutions for the advocacy of independent living have been the Centers for Independent Living across the country, especially the Berkeley Center for Independent Living in Berkeley, California, and the National Center for Independent Living (NCIL) in Washington, DC. As a movement, the push for independent living has found the most support among the elderly and those with physical disabilities. While it is an outgrowth of the rehabilitation movement of the earlier period, the independent living movement differs in that it is a service-based movement that focuses on the control of such services by people with disabilities. The idea that it is consumer-driven has two implications. First, advocates hold that people with disabilities who use the services are the best judge of what they need and should have control over hiring and firing aides, as well as determining what kinds of assistive technologies best serve them. Second, most believe that the providers of such services should be people with disabilities whenever possible. Perhaps the most influential aspect of independent living is that it treats access to assistive technologies and home aides not as a benefit of charity but as a right of all individuals.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM

Influenced by the focus on human rights in both deinstitutionalization and independent living, the third arm of the disability rights movement is comprised of activists mobilized
around creating legal institutions that establish and protect the civil rights of individuals with disabilities. Activism in this area has consisted of the use of lawsuits and lobbying to extend civil rights to people with disabilities as a category – the rights of people with disabilities to vote, hold jobs, and otherwise participate in mainstream life – and to remove the stigma of second-class citizenship from people with disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act is the culmination of work in the area of disability policy. A leading organization in this struggle has been the Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund (DREDF) – a legal and advocacy group that fights for the rights of people with disabilities. Disabled activists, including both lawyers and nonlawyers, founded DREDF in 1979. DREDF maintains offices in Berkeley, CA, and Washington, DC, and was originally affiliated with the Center for Independent Living. As such, DREDF represents a link between the civil rights and independent living branches of the disability rights movement.

DIFFERENCES AND LINKS AMONG THE THREE STREAMS OF ACTIVISM

The primary way in which the three streams of activism might be differentiated is that (at least historically) individuals with developmental and mental impairments were far more likely to argue that the issue of deinstitutionalization (or in the language of many in the independent living movement, deincarceration) was their primary concern or focus. On the other hand, groups that traditionally had not faced institutionalization on account of impairment, like the blind and deaf, were less likely to begin their activism from within the independent living movement and more likely to begin with the issue of civil rights. The impairment group that provided the biggest link between the three were people with physical disabilities, especially a large population of polio survivors, who often had severe mobility impairments and required significant mechanical and medical assistance. The polio survivors were highly likely to have experienced institutionalization after sustaining their impairment and many regarded themselves as fortunate for having managed to escape these facilities. But being reintegrated into their homes and families made them aware that other young people in their families or neighborhoods were being groomed for lives that included work and family, whereas they were assumed to have a lifelong dependency on their parents/family. As a result, many of these individuals felt that without substantial government help they faced a future of institutionalization when their primary caregiver (usually a parent) was no longer able to look after their needs. So they were interested in independent living as well. Finally, their experiences in having difficulties in being admitted to mainstream schools and/or finding employment after completing rehabilitation programs led to their commitment to civil rights activism.

It is true that these three streams of activism continue to have somewhat distinctive organizational bases and, as such, differ in the particular policy focus they adopt. Nevertheless, they are united in defining their constituency as people with disabilities and by their common adoption of the civil rights discourse as an ideological resource for organizing and justifying their goals and rejection of the medicalization (people with disabilities are patients subject to the authority of medical and other service professionals), and, to a lesser extent, rehabilitation frames, which prior to the rise of the civil rights frames had been the dominant frameworks in the area of disability policy. These frames continue to be influential but are often either challenged or supplemented by claims based on the civil rights of people with disabilities. An advantage of the civil rights frame is that it offers a way to overcome cost–benefit analyses, which have historically been used as an argument against creating or expanding programs to the most severely disabled individuals. If one gets rehabilitation or other assistance based on whether or not one will make enough money to become fully dependent, then many people with disabilities will be excluded, in part because officials can use the likelihood of
facing discrimination and continuing to need assistance in the future as a reason not to enact particular laws and policies. However, the civil rights framework treats access to services and protection against discrimination as basic human rights and can thus neutralize the cost–benefit framework.

The most famous acts of civil disobedience in the disability rights movement were a number of sit-ins in 1977 at Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW) offices protesting the Nixon administration’s failure to promulgate regulation for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Percy 1989; Scotch 2001). While the 1973 Act had four parts, Section 504 was (and is) generally regarded as the most important aspect of the law as it was the first general disability rights legislation in the United States. It states: “No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” and is directly modeled on Title VI, Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The pro-regulation protests began on April 5, 1977, when disability activists gathered at the Capitol building in the morning and marched to the HEW offices in the afternoon. On the same day activists held demonstrations outside HEW offices in nine other cities. The longest sit-in was the one in San Francisco that ended on April 30, 1977, two days after HEW Secretary Califano signed the regulations for Section 504.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, culminating with passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, the disability rights movement succeeded in getting a number of new laws passed, including those protecting the rights of children with disabilities to receive high quality, and when possible, mainstream education, as well as laws insuring access to housing and public transportation for people with disabilities. The most comprehensive policy achieved by the disability rights movement is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The law establishes that people with disabilities have a right to equal opportunities in the realms of employment, public transportation, public accommodations and communication.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Civil disobedience; Civil rights movement (United States); Framing and social movements; Health movements (United States); Law and social movements; Rights and rights movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Defending Diaoyutai Islands movement and pan-Chinese nationalism (Taiwan)
A-CHIN HSIAU

It was not until the 1970s that the authoritarian rule of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in postwar Taiwan met significant challenges and major political and cultural changes occurred. The “Defending Diaoyutai movement” (Baowei diaoyutai yundong) launched by college students in northern Taiwan in the spring of 1971, which was originally started by Taiwanese students in the United States, was part of the turning point.

In 1945, when Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan ended, the KMT government took the island over and declared it a province of the ROC. As the KMT lost the civil war that raged on the Chinese mainland to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, the defeated regime relocated to the island of Taiwan, where more than one million mainland refugees flooded in. Postwar Taiwanese society under the KMT was profoundly shaped by the mainland exile experience.

For the KMT government, which kept reiterating its determination to fight against the CCP-ruled People’s Republic of China (PRC) and retake the Chinese mainland, the 1960s was a decade of consolidation and the successful repression of the opposition. Like many countries, Taiwan experienced a surge in the youth population and the rapid growth of higher education in the early postwar period, especially in the 1960s. As a result, a new, highly educated generation, including members of local Taiwanese and mainland background, was emerging. Since the rise of modern Chinese nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, the Taiwanese youth that came to maturity in the 1960s was the first generation that the KMT state had successfully imbued with its particular version of Chinese nationalism in a peacetime situation. The KMT doctrine dominated the younger generation’s education and exerted a powerful assimilating effect on their political attitudes. Government-initiated patriotism and anticommunism prevailed. Unlike in the United States, Europe, Latin America, Japan, and other places in the world that experienced the upheavals of the sixties caused by student movements, college students and young intellectuals in Taiwan did not create any of the significant turmoil which typified this decade. The KMT’s tight political control created a politically docile younger generation.

At the end of 1969 Taiwan and Japan began to dispute the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands (called the Senkakus Islands in Japan), a group of small uninhabited islets about 120 sea miles northeast of Taiwan, at a time when the United States was preparing to return them to Japan together with Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with its reversion settlement with Tokyo. A report that there might be vast undersea oil reserves in this area further compounded the controversy in which the PRC also laid claim on the Diaoyutais. Although the KMT government kept asserting sovereignty, the United States sided with Japan. Meanwhile Taiwanese overseas students in America began discussing, disseminating, fund-raising, and organizing for an overseas movement to protect the Diaoyutais. They held marches in major US cities from January to April 1971. In Taiwan, in April 1971 college students, mainly in the north, began holding campus meetings and marches and writing letters to the government, showing strong Chinese nationalist sentiment. On the day in June when America and Japan signed the transfer of sovereignty over the Ryukyus...
(including the Diaoyutais), students organized an off-campus protest march in Taipei that drew about a thousand people. The march reached the American and Japanese embassies, where letters of protest were delivered. College students in other places in Taiwan also held on-campus marches and issued written protests. However, the agreement had already been signed, and the local movement to protect the Diaoyutais quickly vanished.

The loss of the contest against Japan for Diaoyutai was only the beginning of the dramatic diplomatic failures Taiwan experienced in the 1970s, including the loss of the seat representing all of China in the United Nations to the PRC and the beginning of the normalization of US–PRC relations through the signing of the Shanghai Joint Communiqué (February 1972). Taiwan severed relations with an increasing number of countries, such as Japan, when they recognized the PRC. Domestically, the KMT government encountered acute social problems caused by rapid economic growth, such as uncontrolled urbanization, the decline of rural areas, an unequal distribution of wealth, and labor disputes.

Although the Defending Diaoyutai movement died away, college students and young intellectuals awakening to Taiwan’s crises began to openly challenge the political establishment and cultural traditions. They became a new social force that demanded democratically driven sociopolitical reforms based on a “return-to-reality” (huigui xianshi) ideology. Developing a clear generational consciousness, they also occupied a central role in a rising “return-to-native-soil” (huigui xiangtu) cultural trend. Despite its enthusiasm for advocating political reforms, the KMT adjusted itself to a limited degree and rejected demands such as the full election of central government representatives. After two years of reformist discourse following the Diaoyutai incident, the college students and young intellectuals were suppressed into silence by the authoritarian government. Still, many of them had tried to find alternative ways to realize their reformist aspiration, such as engaging in the emerging opposition movement led by young local Taiwanese politicians Huang Xinjie and Kang Ningxiang, which, along with new cultural trends, in turn brought about political democratization and cultural “indigenization” (bentuhua) that cast off the “exile mentality” in the ensuing decades.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Japanese colonization resistance (Taiwan); Nationalist movements; Student movements; Taiwan Independent Movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Social movements in Eastern Europe have a long history. Despite problems with defining the region, most scholars tend to locate it in the postsocialist countries of Europe, which re-gained independence after the fall of the Iron Curtain. One of the most significant movements in the world during this period was Solidarność, which emerged in Poland in 1980. Solidarność developed from a trade union and reportedly had 9–10 million members (approximately 25% of the population). In the Fall of Nations in 1989/1990 hundreds of thousands of people went into the streets protesting against the communist regimes, and this contributed to the collapse of the Iron Curtain. A large variety of movements evolved from that time, with some becoming quite vibrant. Although there are important differences among the countries in Eastern Europe that shape social movements, some parts of the movements’ histories and characteristics are common. These differences and commonalities, crucial for the composition of the movements and their repertoires of action, are a result of the movements’ histories, legal systems, and political situations.

PACIFIST MOVEMENTS

Some of the movements that emerged in Eastern Europe during the communist era did so in response to the communist regimes and associated problems. For example, in the mid-1980s pacifist movements began to grab the attention of the public in Eastern Europe. Peace marches in Dresden were soon followed by similar actions in other parts of the region. At the same time many groups emerged that demanded the abolition of compulsory military service. The military draft resulted in at least two years in the army and abandoning compulsory military service was not raised by the pro-democratic dissidents. Addressing the needs of young people resulted in support for this campaign and the creation of an objectors’ movement. After abandoning the compulsory military service, some of the groups raised antimilitary claims connected to the current political situation: protests were organized against the war in Iraq, the enlargement of military bases (Hungary 2004), or the installation of US military bases (Poland and the Czech Republic 2008–2010).

HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENTS

Calls to respect human and citizens’ rights were one of the main concerns of the pro-democratic opposition in the region. Activists facing charges for political reasons were presented as prisoners of conscience. Demands that governments respect human rights were a call for political rights and freedoms. After the regime changes and democratization took place, many human rights groups developed into NGOs, shifting their focus mainly onto ethnic minorities. Some groups focused on the citizens’ rights of excluded groups in society (LGBT people, disabled persons), and there is a growing interest in migrants’ rights which are threatened by new policies as well as by the actions of the radical right-wing groups. Many of the actions are carried out nowadays by local chapters of international non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

Environmental movements in Eastern Europe have a growing history, reaching back to the
mid-1980s, when they became part of the anti-authoritarian movement, though they were skeptical also toward some ideas proposed by opposition groups. Earlier there had been nature conservation groups, which were sanctioned by the regimes and were without political claims. Due to their involvement in the anticommunist movement they were trusted throughout society. During this era two events had a major impact on the formation of the environmental movement: one was the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986, and the second was the plan to build a hydro-power plant on the Danube River, which led to the establishment of the famous Danube Circle. In the mid-1990s certain trends emerged and became visible in the environmentalist movement: the most radical referenced such Western groups as Earth First! or the Animal Liberation Front, and created radical wings of the movement, often associated with social centers and other alternative groups. They not only engaged in clashes with the police and security personnel while blocking highway construction sites, but also refused to compromise in many cases. Others chose the organizational model of NGOs, providing expert knowledge in conflict situations and introducing educational programs. In some countries attempts were made to establish Green parties, however without any major successes.

Many of the ecological groups in Eastern Europe have strong ties with their Western counterparts, using their models of organization, having access to their resources, or participating in international networks. Some of them transformed into local chapters of organizations like Greenpeace.

LGBT MOVEMENTS

Relatively new are the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) movements. Spreading across the region, they call for equal rights (regarding inheritance, taxation, medical information, and the like) for LGBT people. They also use symbolic actions, in particular a constant presence in the public sphere, to mark their position within society. Their annual demonstrations, called equality marches or parades, are often attacked by right-wing extremists and football hooligans, and in some cases are banned by the authorities. Because of the social controversies these groups engender, they receive little political support from the mainstream political parties. Many of the claims of LGBT movements resemble the claims of human rights movements as they call for equal rights and equal protection from the state.

FEMINIST MOVEMENTS

Women’s issues are raised mostly by NGOs and more organized groups. However, grassroots movements raise these issues on the occasion of particular protests/campaigns. For example, every year on March 8 (International Women’s Day) there are demonstrations organized by women’s groups and slogans relating to women’s issues are chanted. One of the best-known feminist groups from Eastern Europe is Femen from the Ukraine, which caught the attention of the mass media through the use of naked bodies in their actions, even though this tactic is criticized by many feminists. Occasionally women’s issues are brought to public attention by other social movements in relation to other issues, such as workers’ rights or social exclusion.

OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(ALTERGLOBALISTS)

In Eastern Europe there are also many less structured social movements. Arguably the most significant one is the alterglobalist movement that emerged after the demonstrations that accompanied the meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization in September 2000. These protests, involving around 30,000 demonstrators, were one of the biggest protest events in the region
since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Since then, the alterglobalist movement seems to be in decline in Eastern Europe, with the demonstrations and actions mobilizing fewer people. However, the networks and modes of action established during the peak of the movement’s activities still seem to be somewhat influential, as they have provided the foundation for further actions and campaigns, including the introduction of a novel repertoire of actions in the region. Through its networks, culture jamming, street parties, and ad-hoc-formed coalitions became part of the activists’ everyday lives.

POPULAR MOBILIZATIONS

Eastern Europe has also experienced many spontaneous social mobilizations in which many pre-existing groups took part. Campaigns such as Impuls 99 in the Czech Republic at the end of the 1990s and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine in 2004 mobilized many people, but left few structures afterward. They should be regarded as social reactions to political problems; however their impact and the methods used link them closely to social movements. What is interesting is the emergence of right-wing social movements. From the skinhead movement that is present (more or less visibly) in the region, to groups connected with political parties, these mobilizations are becoming increasingly important. The right-wing-inspired mobilizations in Hungary after the political crisis in 2006 resulted in the rapid growth of Magyar Garda – a paramilitary organization closely cooperating with a right-wing political party. There have also been many spontaneous mobilizations that were rooted in economic factors, especially in the early 1990s as a response to reforms of social welfare systems and taxation (Kubik & Ekiert 1999). These mobilizations, although mobilizing large numbers of people (in particular workers) in strikes and demonstrations, have not resulted in stable formations after the time of contention. Small and radical trade unions have been established but their impact on workers is unnoticeable, and the larger trade unions have much more politicized and moderate agendas.

CHALLENGES FOR THE MOVEMENTS

Low level of mobilization. There are few main challenges that are common for the various social movements in Eastern Europe. One of the most often mentioned issues is the low level of mobilization within society. Mostly in relation to civil society, many authors point to the decline in mobilization, social participation, or trust toward social institutions. What is interesting is that the low level of trust toward institutions and politics (cf. Howard 2002) is used for mobilizing people by the populist and right-wing political parties. All of them have in common slogans against the old regime, unclear connections with the communist era, and proposals to build not only new structures, but new societies based on nation and tradition.

Dependency on local issues. Another challenge for social movements in Eastern Europe is the problems they have with universalizing their claims. Most of the mobilizations have local character and nationwide campaigns are sporadic and rare. Many of the groups are focused on problems in their neighborhoods rather than on national or regional policies that might cause these problems. Even the alterglobalist movement – by definition transnational and cosmopolitan – varies largely from country to country depending on local characteristics and political opportunities. Occasionally the local issues raised by the movements are linked to global problems and the effects of global changes, as has often been the case with campaigns against gentrification or environmental campaigns.

Dependency on big cities. Nearly all social movements in Eastern Europe are located in big cities, mostly capitals. Metropolitan areas provide both the proximate population necessary for protest actions and the audience to receive the claims of the movements. Some
of the movements are strictly connected with urban life: critical masses (McDonald 2006) focus on problems of urban transportation and gather cyclists who ride together in big groups (the biggest is held in Budapest with thousands of people cycling through the city center) that paralyze the traffic. And, because mostly young people get involved in social movements in Eastern Europe, proximity to high schools and universities determines the area of action. The rare examples of social movements active in smaller towns relate either to a local conflict (for example over environmental protection of a certain area) of a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) nature, or are an action of a group coming from a big city. In the case of environmental protests at Mt Zengő (in Hungary in 2004) or in the Rospuda valley (in Poland in 2007/2008), local citizens were neutral or even against the activists protesting for environmental protection of the area.

Professionalization and turning into a “third sector.” Another of the challenges is the process of professionalization of social movements, when groups move from being grassroots mobilizations to becoming rank-and-file organizations. Because of the dominance of the NGO model and the preferences for a third sector way of functioning, many groups become economically dependent on granting authorities. Most of the resources come from national or local authorities and the European Union, and less from big business. Competition over grants and formal (legal) limitations tends to de-radicalize the actions of the social movements that move into the fields of education or expertise provision. According to the critics of this situation, it leads to de-radicalization of the groups and de-politicization of their claims. Such critics claim that the focus is now more on finding the cure for the symptoms than looking to make changes at the source of the problem (i.e., politics).

Links with subcultures. Many of the social movements have strong ties with subcultures or countercultures. This process started in the mid-1980s and continued over the years, linking radical ecologists, antimilitarists, anarchists, and squatters with music scenes and subcultural environments. This linkage has two consequences: the first is the challenge of reaching broader audiences and making their claims more visible. Many people do not support the statements of these movements because of their subcultural connections. The second consequence is the enclosure of the social movements in their own environment. What often becomes most important in these cases is the orthodoxy of the movement; following principles rather than strategically and/or pragmatically pursuing policy or social change. This is also often the reason for movements not cooperating with other actors in the social sphere, such as, for example, political parties which are the “enemy” for some subculturally oriented groups. For many of these groups being an activist is a choice of lifestyle rather than action; for instance most of the ecologists are also bicycle-activists and almost all of them are vegetarian. Rather strict expectations toward newcomers result in a big circulation of participants and small numbers of activists. In addition, the conflicts between the neo-Nazis and antifascists are framed as clashes among two subcultures, since both seem to be closely connected with music scenes. Even in the case of radical right-wing parties their militant factions are close to the subculture; on the other hand the most popular form of organization, the Antifa, emerged from the punk and hardcore music scene.

Difficulties for the left-leaning movements. Because of the socialist path and the rejection of it by the post-transitional elites, being defined as leftist became problematic in Eastern Europe. Besides Die Linke in Germany, which has the strongest support in the former DDR, and the Communist Party in the Ukraine, most of the mainstream political parties prefer more neutral labels. Formally being social-democratic, most of their programs are liberal, leaving some space for the social claims of the right-wing parties. Because of anticommunist sentiments, many usually left-oriented groups, such as the autonomist groups, have not emerged in Eastern Europe,
or are marginal. In addition, struggles over the hegemony of language can be observed on the left–right axis, which is mostly won by the right. The same situation is evident with economic and social claims: right-wing parties and groups have developed a broad range of claims that would be more appropriate for leftist movements.

*Relations with the rest of the civil society.* Relations between social movements and other segments of the social and political scene are complex. First, most of the tensions arise around the concept of independence. Many of the groups are dependent on local or national authorities for their financing or other resources, such as offices. Also the popular system of competing for grants for particular projects makes it more difficult for these groups to run long-lasting campaigns. Social movements tend to be more independent and this autonomy is regarded as one of their main virtues; cooperation with actors is thought to undermine this independence. These independent social movements are also often antisystemic (often inspired by anarchism), which results in the rejection of political parties as potential partners. Coalitions are formed within the same types of groups, with the occasional support of marginalized extraparliamentary political parties. Also, cases of investigation and infiltration of social movements by the police and intelligence services generate suspicion toward cooperation with social movements. However, many of the reported cases of surveillance and counter-actions seem to be exaggerated. Most of the movements are left alone by police forces, and legal systems impose few restrictions on activism and public protest. The aforementioned connection with subcultures results in the exclusion of social movements from public debates and mainstream politics. The use of violence (in particular the alterglobalists, anarchists, and antifascists are accused of this) or its potential use marginalized some movements in an area that some (Kopecký & Mudde 2003; Kotkin 2009) call the “uncivil society,” characterized mainly by the use (or the will to use) violence.

*Changes in modes of operating.* The opening of the borders with Western Europe had an impact on the organization and repertoires of action for social movements in Eastern Europe, even though many groups were supported by organizations from the West before 1989 (e.g., human rights groups, environmentalists) and there was a diffusion of tactics and ideas between the two sides of the Iron Curtain (e.g., the Situationist-inspired Orange Alternative in Poland, and the actions of the Danube Circle in Hungary and Czechoslovakia). But the 1990s brought a significant change in cooperation, allowing for a more intensive flow of resources, ideas, and organizational patterns. For many movements, the most important date was the alterglobalist protests in Prague in 2000; for the first time large-scale protests were being organized in Eastern Europe with the input of activists from Western Europe. Since then it is possible to observe the changes in the repertoires of action, moving the focus from street protests, sit-ins, and strikes to more creative actions such as culture jamming, street performances, and the use of Internet-based communication. In addition, many of the initiatives have moved to the Internet in the form of independent media portals (copying the style of Independent Media Centers – the indymedia, not necessarily using the same name). Cooperation with foreign partners has also been seen in the participation of groups from Eastern Europe in global events, in particular in counter-summits and European and World Social Forums. In this case, the limited resources of the groups from Eastern Europe resulted in declining participation (mainly because of the costs involved) in these events, but the organizing modes were adapted locally. Nearly all of the countries of Eastern Europe held local Social Forums, and local counter-summits or antiborder camps were held in many places around the region.

**SEE ALSO:** Amnesty International; Civil society; Culture jamming; Environmental movements;
Greenpeace; Human rights movements; Indy-media (the Independent Media Center); Music and social movements; “Orange” and “colored” revolutions in former Soviet Union; Protest event research; Social Forum, World.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Earth’s Color March
(Mexico)

AQUILES CHIHUI AMPARÁN

The Earth’s Color March was the name of the journey made by 24 leaders from the Zapatista Liberation Army (EZLN), including Subcommander Marcos. The Zapatista delegation was accompanied by Mexican men and women from various ethnic groups, members from domestic and international civil organizations, and celebrities such as Portuguese writer and Nobel Prize winner José Saramago. The delegation departed in a convoy of over 60 buses from Chiapas on February 24, 2001, and arrived in Mexico City on March 11. The marchers were pushing for a reform to the Constitution to have the rights of the indigenous peoples of Mexico recognized, the establishment of an autonomous government, and power over the resources in the areas where they live.

As early as 1996, a Law Initiative on the Constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights, prepared by a joint commission of deputies, senators, and the Peacemaking Commission (Cocopa), was completed as part of the San Andrés Treaty agreements between EZLN and the then government, at that time presided over by Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León. Although the EZLN had approved the bill’s draft as presented by Cocopa, Ernesto Zedillo’s administration had a number of reservations about it, claiming passing it would be equal to endangering the country’s territorial integrity. This opposition led to the breakup of negotiations between Mexico’s EZLN and the federal government.

The situation changed with the 2000 presidential election, where victory was on the side of the conservative opposition party, Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), whose candidate was Vicente Fox Quesada. During his inaugural speech, Fox said he would have Cocopa’s bill draft sent to Congress as one of the first measures of his government. The draft was sent to Congress on December 5. The EZLN responded on December 2 announcing they would send a delegation to Mexico City which would consist of EZLN male and female commanders, including their military chief Subcommander Marcos so as to endorse the passing of Cocopa’s bill in Congress.

The delegation left San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, on February 24, just after a demonstration consisting of some 20,000 indigenous people, representing the Zapatista grassroots. During the demonstration, Commander Marcos delivered a speech explaining the march’s name: “Ours is the march for indigenous dignity. The march of those of us who are the color of Earth and those who are all colors at the Earth’s heart.” The metaphor “Earth’s Color March” was given at least three connotations: it is a demand for the recognition of the multiplicity of indigenous identities (Earth’s color is just another color in the globe); it references the prime role of indigenous peoples as the earliest inhabitants of the land now called Mexico; and finally, it references the elementary identity shared by indigenous peoples and “Mother Earth,” highlighting a symbiosis between indigenous cultures and nature.

The march’s itinerary was intended to allow the EZLN to symbolically and physically meet most indigenous communities in the country. In fact, the rally passed through the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Querétaro, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Estado de México, Guerrero, Morelos, and Mexico City. During the march, different mass meetings were planned, gathering thousands – according to the press, the number was somewhere between 5000 and 30,000 – mainly indigenous people. In addition, at each mass meeting it was common to have a spokesperson from the indigenous organizations in the community. One of the
high points of the march was the participation of Zapatista delegates at the National Indigenous Council’s (CNI) 3rd National Conference held from March 2–4 in the Purhépecha community of Nurio, in Michoacán. At the mass meeting in Mexico City’s main square, the Zócalo, on March 11, the support shown to the EZLN was overwhelming, gathering some 200,000 people who welcomed the Zapatista delegation.

The Zapatista delegation met with members of the Congress on March 21, 2001, in the midst of such expressions of support. One of the peak moments of the encounter was Commander Esther’s speech from the lower house’s stand to demand the passing of Cocopa’s bill of law. The Zapatistas left Mexico City on March 30 to return to Chiapas following the meeting. Shortly after, in April, 2001, the deliberation process for Cocopa’s bill was begun. Later that month, the Congress approved a constitutional amendment related to indigenous rights and cultures. The multicultural nature of the Mexican nation was recognized, as well as the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy. However, this right was only limited to the mediation of internal conflicts, through internal arbitration, but the right to have administrative control over resources and territories was not included. The constitutional amendment was contested by the CNI and the EZLN as they considered it did not confirm the spirit of Cocopa’s original bill and because it, in fact, did not recognize the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy.

As a result, despite being one of the largest collective actions ever undertaken by indigenous peoples, the Earth’s Color March failed in its demand for the provision of self-government to Mexico’s indigenous peoples. Hence, the claim for the constitutional recognition of autonomy for indigenous peoples continues to be a matter of contention for Mexico’s indigenous movement.

SEE ALSO: Indigenous movements in Latin America; Marches; Peasant movements; Transnational Zapatism; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


ETA: Basque nationalist and separatist organization

DIEGO MURO

ETA is the acronym for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom), a separatist armed group seeking an independent socialist state for the Basque Country. According to ETA supporters, the Basque homeland (Euzkadi or Euskal Herria) is made up of seven provinces (Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Álava, Navarra, Basse-Narre, Soule, and Labourd) currently under Spanish and French sovereignty. ETA is mainly operative in Spain where it has been responsible for over 820 deaths, many of them members of the Spanish security forces or politicians who oppose ETA’s separatist demands.

ETA was formed in July 1959 by a group of young middle-class nationalists dissatisfied with the passivity of the historical party of Basque nationalism, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), against the Franco Dictatorship (1939–1975). Initially devised as a student resistance movement, the members of ETA (etarras) came to the conclusion that the Basque homeland was oppressed and needed to break free. At the ideological level, ETA combined traditional Basque nationalism, revolutionary socialism, and anticolonialism. The ideological corpus was gradually built up during ETA’s assemblies, gatherings at which ETA adopted tactical, strategic, and ideological positions. At the strategic level, ETA adopted the theory of “action-repression-action” in 1964. The tactic would start a cycle in which every action was followed by state repression that, in turn, would encourage a larger revolutionary action starting the cycle all over again (Sullivan 1988).

During the Franco dictatorship, popular Basque opposition coalesced behind the armed group, especially after the organization came to prominence during the Burgos Trials (1970) when 16 ETA members, among them two women and two priests, were brought before a military tribunal. Their trial sparked off an avalanche of national and international protest that included pleas from various European governments and the Vatican. ETA’s most noteworthy action (ekintza) during Francoism was the 1973 assassination of the president of the Spanish government and political heir of Franco, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco.

When the Spanish transition to democracy (1975–1978) got under way after the death of General Franco in 1975 most observers hoped ETA would renounce violence. On the contrary, ETA became fiercely opposed to both the democratization and devolution processes and killed 284 people between the years 1975 and 1980. ETA leaders argued that the Spanish democracy was nothing but a cosmetic change to the authoritarian nature of Spain and gradually increased the number of killings, bombings, and kidnappings. Basque separatism also expanded from a clandestine armed group to a complex network of organizations also known as Basque Movement for National Liberation (MLNV; Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional Vasco). The central organizations of the MLNV were the armed group ETA, the political party Herri Batasuna, the trade union LAB, and other political and cultural groups representing feminists, youth, ecologists, prisoners’ relatives, and so on (Muro 2008: 10).

During the 1980s, authoritarian practices within Spain gave ETA’s legitimacy a boost. Judicial investigations confirmed that the Spanish state had funded a paramilitary organization called GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación; Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups) which committed assassinations, kidnappings, and torture against alleged ETA members. Between 1983 and 1987 the “dirty war” against ETA claimed a total of 27 lives, including ten people with unclear connections to ETA.
Most of the incidents occurred in the cities of the French Pays Basque. In addition to state terrorism, international NGOs such as Amnesty International denounced cases of ill-treatment and human rights abuses of prisoners in police custody.

In 1992, the arrest of three top commanders in southern France started the military decline of ETA and marked a turning point in the bilateral counterterrorist cooperation between France and Spain. The Spanish government later decided to target ETA’s support structure and judicial procedures were initiated against organizations suspected of financing or supporting ETA operations. During the 2000s, different political wings of ETA were banned (Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok, Batasuna, Acción Nacionalista Vasca, Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas), while other building blocks of the MLNV network were accused of the crime of connivance with terrorism (Jarrai-Haika-Segi, Egin, Euskaldunon Egunkaria, Egin Irratia, Xaki, Ekin, Askatasuna, AEK, Udalbiltza, etc.). ETA’s social support was also eroded by shifting Basque public opinion which believed that political violence had become the main obstacle for the separatist cause. A series of controversial killings and the toughening of antiterrorist measures at the global level following the attacks by Al-Qaeda resulted in a steady loss of support.

Official peace negotiations have been held between the Spanish government and ETA on at least four occasions. The first round of negotiations took place during the Spanish transition in the late 1970s; the second round happened in Algiers between 1986 and 1989; the third round in Zurich in May 1999; and, finally, the fourth round in 2006 in Loiola (Basque Country). The last peace talks were called off by the government in December 2006, immediately after ETA exploded a van loaded with over 200 kilograms of explosives in the car-park of Madrid’s Barajas international airport. All these processes of dispute resolution failed to find any common ground. Whereas the Spanish government was willing to discuss “technical” issues (prisoners, refugees, and so on) ETA wanted to enlarge the scope of the negotiations to discuss “political” issues such as the right to self-determination (Clark 1990: 226). Under increasing pressure to lay down its weapons, ETA last declared a temporary ceasefire on September 5, 2010.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Identity politics; Nationalist movements; Repression and social movements; Separatist movements; Violence and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Ethnic movements
DINA OKAMOTO

Organized by groups whose distinctiveness is based on national origin, culture, language, religion, territory, or phenotype, ethnic movements are enacted with the purpose of promoting or resisting social change. Ethnic groups express grievances or claims on behalf of the larger collective through organized group efforts which are often directed at governmental actors and institutions or other ethnic groups. The target of an ethnic movement can vary depending upon its goals, which can include improving the status of minority groups, influencing policy, or demanding independence. Like other social movements, ethnic movements are enacted, in part, outside of institutional channels and may threaten the status quo. While many ethnic movements are peaceful, those associated with secessionist and separatist movements may engage in ethnic violence. No matter what tactics and strategies are used, the emergence of ethnic movements within multi-ethnic states – the vast majority of countries around the world – presents a challenge to democratic nations and civil societies.

Early scholars considered ethnicity to be natural, biologically based, and inherent to social life. Moving away from this primordialist approach, Weber (1968: 389) defined ethnicity as “a subjective belief in common descent.” His definition emphasized the notion that ethnic attachments were not based on blood ties, but a belief in blood relationships, or what people perceived to be true in terms of common descent. Other scholars have added to this definition to include shared kinship and ancestry, a common history, and symbols which capture the core of the group’s identity (Shibutani & Kwan 1965; Horowitz 1985). This conception of ethnicity reflects a process where group members define their own self-concepts, histories, and identities, which suggests that ethnic boundaries are not rigidly ascribed (Barth 1978). Thus, ethnic movements are built upon real or imagined shared attributes and experiences related to ancestry, history, language, and culture. This shared sense of “we-ness” can be referred to as a collective identity which defines ingroup and outgroup members, and reflects the potential for collective action in pursuit of common interests (Snow 2001).

PANETHNIC MOVEMENTS

In the United States, some of the largest and most successful ethnic movements have been pan-ethnic, where different national-origin groups organize a collective movement, often along racial lines, to improve their social and economic status. Despite differences in language, culture, religion, and phenotype, ethnic groups build a shared panethnic identity that emphasizes shared experiences and histories vis-à-vis the dominant group in the United States. Ethnic groups have learned that organizing along particular lines – those that are recognizable to the state and create strength in numbers – can bring visibility to their claims and interests, as well as material benefits in social, economic, and political arenas. Not only do pan-ethnic movements represent an expression of collective identity, but they also serve as a political strategy aimed at cultural or instrumental goals.

As an example, Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans built a Latino ethnic identity and organized to fight for access to housing, employment, and education (Padilla 1985). Similarly, Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans organized as Asian-Americans and developed pan-Asian institutions to counter violence and hate crimes against their communities (see Espiritu 1992). Changes in immigration, citizenship, and civil rights legislation in the 1970s represented new sociopolitical opportunities for these ethnic movements to build
new identities and organize to address issues of social and economic inequality. Despite the fact that these national origin groups had very different histories of immigration and patterns of adaptation in the United States, they participated in a series of successful pan-ethnic protests, and were able to improve the status of their respective groups. These ethnic movements highlight the fact that taken-for-granted, broader groupings assigned by the state are composed of multiple, diverse ethnic groups, and that a certain level of agency and coordination among ethnic group members is necessary to create such an identity and grouping.

Ethnic movements in the United States typically involve minority groups who are attempting to address issues of racial and ethnic exclusion and discrimination. Majority or dominant group members, such as whites in the United States, have developed movements based upon a racial status and identity, but because overt racism is not considered legitimate in public arenas today, claims are not often made upon the basis of a white racial identity, which tends to be associated with privilege and power. Instead, claims are made on behalf of a group’s civil rights and at times upon a shared culture and identity that immigrants or racial minorities threaten. Studies of right-wing extremists and racist movements may be considered ethnic movements if they are associated with an ethnic claim.

THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC MOVEMENTS

When ethnic groups face inequalities that are sanctioned, legitimated, or ignored by the state, they may collectively organize to remedy them, leading to the emergence of ethnic movements. But such movements do not simply arise when economic and political demands are unmet by the existing institutional arrangements; ethnic groups must also develop distinctive social identities (Hechter & Okamoto 2001).

The state often plays a role in the formation of durable group identities through its state building efforts, the categorization of minority groups, and the implementation of policies targeted at ethnic groups. When a dominant group creates a new administrative category comprised of distinct groups, this sets the stage for broader group identities. Colonial-era and contemporary state policies and practices categorized ethnic groups on the basis of race, language, or culture and treated them accordingly. In turn, this encouraged ethnic group members to form new, broader identities.

In the US case, official census classifications for race helped to create a sense of group membership and constitute groups who may engage in collective action efforts. When social and political institutions adopt these official racial categories and implement policies based upon them, this can also facilitate the group formation process. During the 1970s and 1980s, Native Americans began to identify across tribal boundaries in response to successful land-claim awards, affirmative action policies, and other racially based set-aside programs. These new policies increased the symbolic and material value of racial identities, and affected how ethnic group members saw themselves when navigating mainstream institutions and everyday life. Ethnic group members reshaped their identities to be based upon a shared history and culture, paving the way for a renewed ethnic identity among Native Americans and a visible pan-tribal movement (Nagel 1995).

Other conditions can encourage the development of distinctive ethnic identities and also increase the potential for ethnic groups to engage in collective action. In particular, when labor markets are segmented on the basis of ethnicity, a shared identity may arise among group members who are concentrated in similar jobs and occupations (Hechter 1999). Centralized workplaces and cooperative work strategies often contribute to high levels of interaction where group members come to depend upon one another for successful work outcomes, reinforcing ethnic boundaries. Additionally, group solidarity will increase if the positions
in the labor market are only available to ethnic group members because they live and work together in an ethnic economy or have sole access to particular occupations because of closed social networks. These dynamics lead to the development of shared interests and experiences, and provide a basis for group solidarity, especially if the institutional arrangements reinforce unequal access to resources and opportunities and disadvantage group members. Thus, the segregation of ethnic groups can encourage group formation and lead to ethnic movements.

Ethnic group inequalities clearly provide incentives for collective action, but political opportunities must be available for ethnic movements to emerge. Shifts in power that disrupt the normal functioning of society can often create such opportunities. When the state is perceived to be in crisis, insurgents and ethnic entrepreneurs can take advantage of the resulting instability and encourage ethnic groups to participate in movement activities. Barring regime changes or other dramatic shifts in power, other kinds of political opportunities can encourage the emergence of ethnic movements. National political contexts and configurations of citizenship shape the possibilities for ethnic groups to collectively organize on a sustained basis in the public arena. Specifically, institutional openings in the formal political structure such as ease of access to naturalization, voting rights, and state-sponsored antidiscrimination agencies should constitute a supportive political environment which can improve the prospects for collective organizing among groups who traditionally do not have access to political power (see Koopmans et al. 2005). But ethnic movements are not simply a response to the state; they can also be a response to other ethnic groups who represent threats or challenges to a current group’s dominance in social, economic, or political arenas. When ethnic groups come into contact with one another in labor markets and other social institutions, competition for scarce resources heightens ethnic group boundaries, and encourages ethnic movements (Olzak 1992). For example, when the US government mandated the racial integration of public schools in the late 1960s, whites felt threatened. A breakdown in racial segregation resulted in higher rates of black–white contact within a context of scarce resources – good public schools, safe neighborhoods – and in response, whites participated in protests to defend their all-white spaces (Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney 1994). Thus it is when local environments begin to integrate that established groups are likely to feel that they are losing out, and in response may engage in protest and exclusionary activities. But when examining ethnic movements associated with minorities in the United States, competition does not seem to be the driving factor. For ethnic and racial minorities, increasing intergroup contact and integration are typically equated with social mobility and new opportunities. Ethnic and racial groups may organize and participate in protests, but it is not because they are defending their group boundaries in social and economic arenas against new groups who are encroaching upon their access to scarce resources; instead, they are responding to threats from the dominant group (see Okamoto 2003).

THE IMPACT OF ETHNIC MOVEMENTS

Ethnic movements can address historical inequalities and affect state policies, but they can also gain recognition or acceptance for stigmatized ethnic groups. Ethnic collective action efforts can raise the social status of ethnic groups and transform the meanings associated with them. Participating in ethnic movements based on a shared culture, language, or territory can also encourage a sense of belonging, citizenship, and pride among ethnic group members.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Dual identity; Identity politics; Nationalist movements; Native American movements (United States); Racist social movements; Right-wing movements; Separatist movements.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Equal Rights Amendment (United States)
JANE MANSBRIDGE

The movement for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the constitution of the United States promoted a policy change central to the liberal branch of “second wave” feminism in the United States. That movement illustrates several dynamics, including those of abeyance structures, communicative distrust, the politics of contingency, the role of moral incentives in collective action problems, “deafness” in social movements, decision by accretion, participatory decentralization, and movement/countermovement interaction.

The Equal Rights Amendment was originally introduced into the US Congress only three years after women won the suffrage in 1920 in the “first wave” of the feminist movement. The militant branch of the suffrage movement, the National Woman’s Party (NWP), proposed the amendment, which read, “Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and in every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

Proponents and opponents agreed, after many drafts trying to avoid this outcome, that in this wording, “equal rights” meant “ending special protections” (Zimmerman 1991). This feature alienated the more socialist, Progressive, and labor union women, who had struggled in the absence of a strong working-class movement in the United States to achieve hour and wage laws that applied at least to women and children.

As issues like this split the suffrage movement and as the momentum of the first wave faded on having attained its goal, a dwindling number of the highly educated, mostly professional, women of the NWP who clustered around Alice Paul in Washington continued to introduce the amendment in Congress every year. The deep commitment demanded by the NWP, the exclusivity of its membership, its political centralization in Washington, and its culture of gender separatism, extreme mutual loyalty, and devotion to Paul, combined with a small continuing resource stream from bequests, allowed the organization to persist through a period otherwise unfavorable to feminism. Verta Taylor (1989) terms such persistent nodes abeyance structures. Their continuity allows some pre-existing activist networks, a repertoire of goals and tactics, and a collective identity to pass on to the next generation. Although the US Department of Labor Women’s Bureau, established in 1920, opposed the ERA until 1969, it also served as a feminist abeyance structure within the federal government. Working in tandem with formal advisory bodies that could set agendas and pass resolutions, it provided the financial and convening resources that helped sustain and legitimate feminist ideas over time. Women from these bodies helped initiate the National Organization for Women (NOW) (Duerst-Lahti 1989).

In the 1950s and 1960s momentum slowly built for an ERA among Republicans and even among some Democrats, as Eleanor Roosevelt and others came to support the United Nations charter, which affirmed the “equal rights of men and women.” The passage in 1964 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act marked a crucial turning point. The NWP had suggested and lobbied for adding a ban on discrimination against women to the proposed act, designed to prevent discrimination against blacks (Rupp & Taylor 1987). Southern congressmen supported this amendment while many progressive members opposed it, both thinking it surely would kill the act. Yet although the amendment succeeded, the act itself passed narrowly. Its effects on women had not fully emerged in 1967, when the fledgling National Organization for Women adopted the ERA as its cause and several union members resigned in protest.
But by 1970 the federal courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had interpreted Title VII to invalidate protective legislation. The main reason for Democrats and labor to oppose the ERA was now removed.

In 1970, the Pittsburgh chapter of NOW disrupted Senate hearings to insist on action on the ERA. Proponents then struggled to remove crippling amendments in the Senate, having to work with Birch Bayh on the Judiciary Committee, which had no women members. The activists exemplified the communicative distrust common in the absence of descriptive representation when they rejected with little discussion Bayh’s strategic advice for wording that paralleled the Fourteenth Amendment (Mansbridge 1999). Yet when the ERA with its original wording finally reached the Senate floor for a vote in March 1972, the big congressional battles had been successfully fought backstage or earlier and the amendment passed overwhelmingly.

When the amendment went to the states, it passed almost all of the first 30 with votes that were unanimous or almost unanimous. By late 1973 it had stalled. The countermovement, led by Phyllis Schlafly, had begun to organize, focusing on the unratified states. Having begun with bases primarily in Washington and the large cities, ERA proponents had few state coalitions. In 1973 the Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade that state laws forbidding abortions in the first and second trimesters violated the “right to privacy” implicit in the Constitution. Opponents linked the abortion issue to the ERA as parts of a feminist attack on the family. Fundamentalist churches, ending their longstanding decision not to become involved in politics, played a major role in the opposition. By 1977 only 35 of the required 38 states had ratified, leaving proponents with the need to achieve majorities in the legislatures of three of the remaining states: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. All were Mormon or Southern states, except Illinois, which required a three-fifths majority for ratifying constitutional amendments and had a Southern culture in its lower third, surrounded by Missouri and Kentucky. When the extended deadline for the ERA passed in 1982, none of these states had ratified.

The ERA and abortion battles together brought fundamentalist churches into politics and greatly strengthened the rise of the “New Right,” placing gender issues in its core (Spruill 2008). The Republican Party, having been the main support of the ERA in its early history, began to reduce its ERA sponsorship in Congress in 1971 (Costain 1992). By 1980, Ronald Reagan actively opposed the amendment in his presidential campaign.

While the amendment was before the states, support for the ERA in public opinion surveys split along lines that would become familiar in the new “culture war” politics of the 1980s: Southerners vs. the East and West coasts; large households vs. the childless; old vs. young; country vs. city; religious fundamentalists and heavy churchgoers vs. agnostics and Jews. Older divisions disappeared. Men supported the ERA as much as women, blacks as much as whites, and in many surveys the working class as much as the middle class. Under the impact of the countermovement, support for the ERA did not rise over this period, but the number of people with no opinion dropped slightly and those opposed correspondingly rose (Mansbridge 1986).

Subsequent analysis revealed that both pro-ERA and anti-ERA organizations in the states had an independent direct effect on ratification, but that effect was amplified by having Democratic or Republican majorities respectively in the state assemblies – an interaction that Soule and Olzak (2004) called the politics of contingency. The effects of movement organizations on the legislature show up particularly in the first stages of the policy process, in the introduction of legislation, while the effects of public opinion on the legislators are greatest in the highly consequential final voting stages (Soule & King 2006).

After the ratification attempt had failed, Mansbridge (1986), writing from the perspectives of movement organizing and deliberative democracy, argued that one cause was the
tendency of social movements to be trapped in a dynamic of deafness, in which the very moral and solidary incentives that lead participants to work hard for a cause also keep them from hearing, crediting, and believing they have to respond to, opponents’ arguments. Yet the dynamics of collective action problems, with their nonexcludable “public goods,” make selective material incentives almost impossible and moral and solidary incentives invaluable. A prime example was the proponents’ decision by accretion to interpret the ERA as requiring Congress to draft and send women into combat on the same basis as men, even though the Supreme Court would almost certainly not have interpreted the amendment that way. That decision was not made consciously but rather incrementally, without explicit discussion, through the mutual interaction of many actors driven by moral, not strategic, considerations. Because less than a quarter of the US adult population at the time favored sending women draftees into combat, the opposition seized on this interpretation. The voluntary and polycephalous, or many-headed, nature of social movements also generated the common pattern of participatory decentralization, in which no central organization can control what enthusiastic volunteers might do. For example, in Hawaii feminist constitutional lawyers were arguing that laws denying funding to abortions were unconstitutional under their state’s ERA at the same time that ERA proponents were arguing in Illinois and the other unratified states that a federal ERA would in no way promote abortion.

Reva Siegel (2006), analyzing the productive roles of conflict and movement/countermovement interaction in creating constitutional culture and change, later pointed to exactly the opposite dynamic, in which the ERA proponents moderated their interpretations of the amendment in reaction to the countermovement. Asking why the US courts faced little opposition when they eventually adopted an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that did “virtually everything” the ERA would have done, she credits the accommodations both the movement and the countermovement made in their presentation of the issues. Her prime examples are abortion and same-sex marriage, which proponents were forced again and again to deny would be affected by an ERA (and therefore presumably also by the weaker Fourteenth Amendment). Meanwhile, opponents had to approve of the Fourteenth Amendment being applied to gender in order to show that the ERA would be superfluous.

Both analyses are right because both dynamics were going on at the same time. ERA proponents were tempted to deafness, which triumphed in the combat example, but were sometimes forced to hear, as in the abortion example. After the ERA died, the National Organization for Women, freed from a need to appeal to middle America, scrapped the ERA and devised in its stead a Constitutional Equality Amendment (CEA) that, being purely aspirational, required no accommodation. With clauses stating broadly and in a form that courts would find hard to interpret that “through this article, the subordination of women to men is abolished,” and that prohibited discrimination and stereotyping on account of “indigence,” the CEA had no prayer of passing Congress by the two-thirds of each house required for a constitutional amendment. Yet the CEA responded to the needs of the activists themselves, who wanted an amendment they could believe in (Mansbridge 2004). Maryann Barakso (2004), studying the National Organization for Women, and Diana Mutz (2006), studying the general tension between actively participating in politics and “hearing the other side,” have confirmed and built upon the analysis of the dynamic of deafness. After the ERA, no other issue directed a significant part of women’s movement organizing toward making a feminist case to mainstream women in the public sphere.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Collective (public) goods; Feminism and social movements; Moral incentives; Movement/countermovement dynamics; National Organization for Women (NOW)
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

WILLIAM AVILÉS

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) is the largest guerrilla army in Latin America and has waged a military campaign against the Colombian state since 1964. The tactics involved in their guerrilla war have ranged from the defense of isolated rural communities from military assaults, ambushes of military and police patrols, and militarily complex offensives destroying entire military bases, to the planting of landmines to protect coca crops or militarily sensitive areas. Since the mid-1960s FARC has expanded from a few hundred combatants in a few departments to a military presence in more than half of the country and approximately 20,000 combatants by 2002. As of this writing their numbers have declined from this height to estimates of 8000–9000 combatants. Neither the end of the cold war, the demobilization of guerrilla armies in Central America nor the relative democratization of the Colombian state with the 1991 constitution have led FARC to give up its armed struggle. FARC’s commitment to take power to establish a socialist society remains an officially stated goal. However, a specific political and social agenda short of a socialist revolution has been clear for some time. In different failed peace processes during the 1990s and 2000s FARC has demanded agrarian reform that eliminates large landholdings, the earmarking of 50 percent of the national budget toward welfare, education, health, and housing, a moratorium on the foreign debt, alternative development in the “war against drugs,” and the substantial reduction in the size of the Colombian armed forces (Kline 2007: 72–73). In almost five decades of war its military strategies have thus far been unable to bring these reforms about, let alone take national power.

FARC’s origins rest in the bloody internal conflict of La Violencia which involved partisans of the Liberal and Conservative parties waging a war for regional and national power throughout the country. The exclusionary politics of both parties as well as the country’s longstanding inequality in land ownership were central preconditions for La Violencia. Approximately 200,000 died in this conflict which was partially resolved with a military coup in 1958 and an agreement (the National Front) which divided political power between the Liberal and Conservative parties excluding other parties from the political process. The failure of this agreement to address rural poverty, land inequality, the exclusion of radical parties, and the lack of security guarantees led some armed militias affiliated with the Communist Party to retain their weapons while securing a degree of autonomy/authority over a few rural enclaves. In 1964, with the extensive assistance of the US military and guided by the anticommunist National Security Doctrine, the Colombian government sought to militarily wipe out these communist-defended communities, referred to by conservatives as “independent republics.” However, the approximately 48 armed guerrillas commanded by Pedro Antonio Marín (a.k.a. Manuel Marulanda) survived this attack and within two years officially established FARC in the 1966 Second Guerrilla Conference with an estimated 350 recruits (Rochlin 2003: 98). It was at this conference that FARC committed to a prolonged armed struggle and to guerrilla warfare that would extend throughout the country (Leech 2011: 16). FARC’s relative success in continuing this struggle to the present day and its refusal to unilaterally demobilize is the result of a number of factors.

First and foremost, Colombia’s geography has facilitated the continuation of this armed insurgency. The country is divided by different...
mountain ranges and much of the eastern and southern regions of the country are lowland tropical jungles. FARC’s structure has taken advantage of this geography, decentralizing its forces throughout much of Colombia’s sparsely populated rural regions in different “fronts” consisting of anywhere from 50 to several hundred soldiers each. FARC is organized in a relatively well-structured army with a respected line of command headed by the group’s central seven-member secretariat and a central high command made up of approximately 30 commanders.

The rise of the illegal drug economy in Colombia, especially the growth of coca production in the 1980s and 1990s in regions of Colombia where FARC historically has had a presence, has also been an important contributing factor to their continued struggle. FARC has and does act as an informal governing authority in those areas of the country relatively untouched by the formal state. They are involved in establishing law and order, adjudicating disputes and taxing the legal and illegal enterprises operating in these zones. The lucrative nature of the illegal drug industry and Colombia’s rise as the number one producer of coca and cocaine in the world by the end of the 1990s facilitated the growth of FARC’s military capabilities, strengthening a belief amongst some of the leadership that a military victory was possible. This belief was strengthened between 1996 and 2000 as FARC successfully destroyed important military bases and captured scores of Colombian military personnel as prisoners of war. The growing military capacity of FARC was not simply a product of increasing resources, but also reflected the large pool of potential recruits that Colombia’s infamous land inequality and rural poverty continues to provide to FARC. Colombia is one of the most unequal countries in the world and the concentration of land ownership has steadily increased in the more than three decades of Colombia’s economic opening to capitalist globalization.

State and para-state repression has also been important to the continuity of FARC’s armed struggle. Since the 1980s FARC has not only been engaged in a conflict with the formal state, but they have also fought right-wing paramilitary groups. These paramilitary groups were financed by narco-traffickers, cattle ranchers, and other large landowners frustrated with FARC kidnappings, extortions, or demands that traffickers pay coca growers a higher price for their product. Paramilitary groups targeted individuals and members of social movements and labor unions viewed as politically suspect. These groups were primarily responsible for the destruction of the leftist political party the Union Patriotica (UP) which emerged during the 1980s peace process as a potential vehicle for FARC’s re-entry into politics. In the five years after its creation in 1985 the UP lost over 2000 of its members, including its presidential candidate for the 1990 election. The experience of the UP convinced many in FARC that a ceasefire without pre-conditions, or FARC’s demobilization without obtaining important political concessions, would be a mistake given the history of state and para-state repression of the unarmed revolutionary Left in Colombian politics.

The expansion in the power of paramilitary groups and the continued use of kidnapping as a tool to raise funds for FARC’s war were key factors in ending the last serious attempt at a negotiated solution to the internal conflict in 2002. Since 2002 the Colombian state has been dedicated to the military defeat of FARC on the battlefield. With the aid of billions of dollars in military aid from the United States progress has been made in reducing FARC’s territorial presence, reducing the number of its combatants, and in disrupting its line of command through the targeted assassination of members of FARC’s secretariat. FARC has been weakened by this extensive military campaign and has faced general repudiation from a majority of Colombians (as reflected in nationwide anti-FARC protests in February 2008) due to their continued reliance upon kidnapping to help finance their activities. FARC’s continued recruitment of minors and its use of landmines and rudimentary “cylinder bombs”
that have maimed/killed innocent civilians have also contributed to the group’s loss of political legitimacy in the eyes of many.

Nonetheless, by 2011 there were again signs that FARC was at least still militarily relevant. Between 2007 and 2010 FARC’s military activities increased from a little over 1000 actions (such as military ambushes, sniper fire, and bombing of electric pylons) to over 1900 actions. These military actions represented more “hit-and-run” guerrilla tactics as opposed to the concentration of large units of guerrilla forces that took place in the late 1990s. At the time of writing FARC is still able to inflict important losses upon the Colombian military and police, maintain a degree of popular support in certain rural regions, and access financing from the legal and illegal economies operating in their zones of influence.

SEE ALSO: Geography and social movements; Guerrilla movements; Repression and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) was officially established in El Salvador in October of 1980 as a coalition of five left-wing political factions – the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance (RN), the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), and the Central American Workers’ Party (PRTC). Augustín Farabundo Martí was a communist organizer in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He was executed along with other political leaders in January of 1932 by the regime of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. Each of the five FMLN political forces maintained their own armed militias by late 1980. With this unification of the armed left in El Salvador, the FMLN launched a general offensive against an unelected military-civilian junta in January of 1981. The offensive failed to dislodge the prevailing regime after two weeks of heavy fighting on a national scale. However, the FMLN was able to secure rearguards in eastern and northern provinces and garner enough civilian support to sustain an armed conflict against the government until a United Nations-backed peace accord was signed and put into place in January 1992. The formation of the FMLN and its political existence since the peace accords demonstrate its indispensable relationship to social movement mobilization.

The origins of the FMLN can be traced back to the 1960s. After 30 years of one-party rule (1932–1962), military administrators liberalized the political system by allowing relatively competitive elections and legalizing the existence of several important civil society organizations. A national teachers’ association was legalized (ANDES-21 de Junio), and two major labor federations and several agricultural cooperatives founded by the Catholic Church. At the same time, three new universities were built, and the national university student population quintupled in the 1960s. This political opening or “apertura” launched an unprecedented wave of nonviolent collective action between 1966 and 1972, including major strikes and street marches by the newly legalized social sectors. The protest campaigns usually centered on basic economic rights and policy reforms such as teachers’ pensions and salaries and expanded university budgets. By the early 1970s, hundreds of thousands of people were reported to be participating in social movement activities (Almeida 2008). In 1972, the military government closed down this period of political liberalization by holding fraudulent presidential and parliamentary elections and then occupying the public universities with the army and national guard.

In the early and mid-1970s, new radical revolutionary organizations began to surface on the political landscape, such as the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance (RN), the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), and the Central American Workers’ Party (PRTC). A majority of the leaders of each of these new revolutionary organizations played vital roles in the nonviolent protest wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s. They served as leaders in labor unions, teachers’ associations, student organizations, Catholic youth groups, and agricultural cooperatives. In the 1960s state repression was more selective, targeting particular social movements and participants. By the mid-1970s a clear upswing in state coercion was taking place. The use of political “disappearances” was becoming more common and a series of major massacres of unarmed civilians by the security forces occurred between late 1974 and 1976. The civic organizations established in the 1960s began to form umbrella structures in alliance with the
clandestine revolutionary parties representing social movements from several social sectors (students, peasants, shantytown dwellers, labor unions, human rights campaigners, women, and teachers) in single organizations. The new umbrella organizations unleashed a more militant wave of disruptive protest between 1977 and 1980 that involved the occupation of churches, embassies, worksites, and government ministries to escape state repression and demand the release of political prisoners. Semi-proletarianized agricultural wage workers also seized plantations during this period. By the middle of 1980, the level of state repression reached such alarming levels that street protests were too dangerous and the revolutionary parties increasingly moved to an insurrectionary strategy, culminating in the solidification of the FMLN in October 1980. Hence, the formation of the FMLN was brought about by a decade-long interaction between social movement radicalization and state repression.

By early 1981, El Salvador had fallen into a protracted civil war. The newly elected Reagan administration viewed the Salvadoran insurgency through the lens of cold war geopolitical control and greatly ratcheted up the amount of financial and military support for the extremely repressive Salvadoran government. The FMLN spent the next ten years as primarily an insurgent guerrilla force battling the government army to a standstill. In the mid-1980s, state repression eased from the near genocidal levels of the early 1980s, an estimated 40,000 people having been killed between 1979 and 1984 (Stanley 1996). Social movements began to reappear in the city (human rights groups and labor unions) and the countryside (agricultural cooperatives), demanding human rights, an end to economic austerity policies, and the deepening of agrarian reform. The loose ties of some of the emerging social movements to the FMLN made them susceptible to targeted government repression and harassment until the end of the civil war in 1992 (Brockett 2005).

With the signing of the Peace Accords in early 1992, the FMLN transitioned into an electoral political party for the first time, although the Communist Party of El Salvador had participated in elections before the civil war. As the political environment transitioned from civil war to a neoliberal democracy, the FMLN gradually shifted to electoral politics. The FMLN competed in its first election cycle in 1994, winning a few municipal governments and 21 seats in the 84-member legislature. The leftist party slowly evolved into the largest opposition party, winning more votes in each election cycle. The dominant party in executive power, the National Republican Alliance (ARENA), began a series of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, including the privatization of the banking system, telecommunications, electricity, and pensions. In late 1999, the ARENA government moved to begin a partial privatization of one sector of the public health system, the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS). Doctors and healthcare workers in the public health sector immediately launched a social movement campaign against the impending privatization. The public health workers enlisted the support of public sector unions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women’s groups, and the FMLN political party in the protest campaigns against privatization.

The healthcare antiprivatization crusades had two phases: 1999–2000 and 2002–2003. Each campaign was marked by massive demonstrations and strikes (Almeida 2012). Both waves of antiprivatization protest occurred during the parliamentary election cycle. The FMLN took up the privatization issue as its own and won more seats than ARENA in the legislature in 2000 and 2003 in the heat of the antiprivatization protests. The FMLN also provided organizational resources to the antiprivatization campaign by encouraging its rank-and-file members to join the protests during the party’s weekly public gathering in downtown San Salvador (the Tribunas Abiertas). Finally, FMLN mayors and members of parliament personally protested in the street marches and road blockades during the antiprivatization campaign. This relationship between the FMLN and social movements
on the streets continued throughout the first half of the 2000s in campaigns against the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), water privatization, and the rising cost of living. This dynamic of a political party participating in collective action outside of parliament is akin to social movement unionism and has been termed “social movement partyism” (Almeida 2006; Almeida 2010). In 2009, the FMLN also successfully channeled this social movement momentum as an important component in winning the presidential elections, displacing the 20-year long reign of the neoliberal ARENA party.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Genocide and social movements; Guerrilla movements; Repression and social movements; Violence and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Falun Gong (China)

YANFEI SUN

Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, started as a qigong movement but increasingly acquired a stronger religious character. It organized the largest demonstration since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, which precipitated the Chinese state’s crackdown on Falun Gong. However, Falun Gong activists inside China persisted in protests over the years. Meanwhile, Falun Gong groups outside China have used diverse means to publicize their cause and attack the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese state relaxed its control of society; the Chinese people, with their new found freedom, were exploring and experimenting with alternative ideologies and practices outside of the state orthodoxy. Subsequently, all kinds of “social fevers” swept across China. It is in this context that qigong, a breathing and movement exercise with ancient roots that promises healing power and the development of human potential, as well as spiritual enhancement, aroused the Chinese people’s enthusiasm. The development of “qigong fever” also benefited from the support from high-level officials and scientists as well as enthusiastic media coverage. Back in the 1980s and most of the 1990s, thousands of people exercising qigong in parks or other public spaces were a daily scene in Chinese cities. Renowned qigong masters traveled extensively in China to give lectures and lead training sessions, and built a national network of practice sites. Falun Gong emerged during the late part of qigong fever.

Falun Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi in 1992. Initially following the path of other qigong groups, Falun Gong soon distinguished itself from the rest of the qigong movement by acquiring a strong religious character. Combining qigong practices with his own idiosyncratic understanding of Buddhism and Daoism, and the kind of parascience concerning prehistoric civilizations and extraterrestrials that was popular in China at the time, Li created a new syncretic religious system. Truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance were declared as the fundamental characteristics and principles of the cosmos. Practitioners were supposed to cultivate these characteristics in their pursuit of enlightenment. They were also urged to study Li’s writings, in particular Zhuan Falun, intensively. Li claimed that he was not just a qigong master with supernormal physical and healing powers, but a god-like figure capable of assuming countless incarnations to protect his followers and installing a spinning wheel of energy in the abdomen of each Falun Gong practitioner, as well as a savior figure holding the key to the secret of the cosmos and human salvation. More than any other qigong group, Falun Gong resembled a moral community with strong bonds between Li and his followers. It also developed a nationwide hierarchical network with local practice sites, instruction centers, main instruction centers, regional branches, and national headquarters. These characteristics not only facilitated the rapid expansion of the group with many millions of practitioners prior to the state’s crackdown, but also contributed to Falun Gong’s extraordinary mobilization capacity and perseverance in the face of outside critiques and state suppression.

Starting from the early 1990s, the voices of qigong critics and detractors, most of them with a strong scientific mentality, were increasingly heard in the media. In comparison with other qigong groups, Falun Gong responded to media criticism with much less intolerance and more militancy. Between June 1996 and April 1999, it organized letter-writing campaigns and staged some 300 demonstrations, demanding corrections and apologies from the media responsible. On April 25, 1999, some
10,000 Falun Gong practitioners went to Beijing and demonstrated outside Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of the top Chinese leaders, following a clash between the Tianjin police and local Falun Gong demonstrators. Alarm ed by the mobilization potential of the Falun Gong group, the Chinese state, instead of yielding to the demands of Falun Gong demonstrators, waged a nationwide crackdown: a special agency was created to deal with Falun Gong, Falun Gong paraphernalia were confiscated, Falun Gong leaders were arrested, practitioners were coerced to recant their beliefs, and those who refused to renounce their beliefs were subjected to detention and imprisonment. The state declared Falun Gong a “heretical cult,” and launched a massive propaganda campaign to denounce it.

While many Falun Gong practitioners discontinued practice in the wake of repression, the situation certainly did not go as China’s top decision-makers might have expected. Disregarding the danger, some Falun Gong activists in China engaged in acts of protest by distributing Falun Gong materials door-to-door, lodging appeals at local, provincial, and central petitioning offices in Beijing, staging protests in Tiananmen Square, and even hijacking state television broadcasts to replace regular state-run programming with Falun Gong content. In short, state repression energized the Falun Gong activists with a strong sense of martyrdom.

Falun Gong groups outside China responded to the suppression with demonstrations, street exhibitions, lobbying Western governments, staging protests during Chinese leaders’ visits, filing human rights lawsuits against certain Chinese leaders whom they held responsible for masterminding the suppression, and denouncing the CCP. To publicize its cause, Falun Gong also created its own media outlets – the Epoch Times newspaper, New Tang Dynasty Television, Sound of Hope radio station and multiple websites, and formed a performing arts company that gave performances around the world. In December 2004, Falun Gong launched a campaign to urge CCP members to renounce their membership to avoid the apocalyptic calamity. According to the Epoch Times, the number of people who have disavowed association with the CCP had reached 91,053,834 as of March 13, 2011. While this figure can in no way be true because the total CCP membership only amounted to 77,995,000 by the end of 2009, it must have given Falun Gong believers a sense of invincibility and sustained their morale. In conclusion, the Chinese government’s repression has created for itself a most pugnacious and tenacious enemy, thousands of times more powerful than the overseas democracy movement. This is certainly not what the Chinese government anticipated.

SEE ALSO: Cults; Cultural Revolution (China); Religion and social movements; Repression and social movements; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Fascist movements
SVEN REICHARDT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Political and long-term causes

Fascism belongs to the “family” of right-wing authoritarian and radical nationalist movements and regimes. Fascist movements regard the state as an organic whole and omnipotent principle transcending class interests, economic tensions, and ethnic conflicts. Fascism and authoritarianism rejected and repressed Marxist socialism, liberalism, ethnic minorities, and laissez-faire capitalism. One may distinguish between authoritarian, reactionary, corporatist, and fascist movements and regimes according to the degree of mass support used to mobilize society and the forms of violence and murder used to dominate society.

Fascist movements gained significance mainly within right-wing authoritarian forms of government, especially when conservatives failed to establish broad social connections and gain acceptance by means of moderate nationalism and/or respect for their economic competence. Fascist movements also arose where the parliamentary system developed late and, thanks to oligarchic traditions, was not fully established even after World War I. Lack of acceptance for a multi-party system, free elections, and corresponding changes of government, as well as skepticism toward free and rational political debate, characterized this right-wing authoritarianism, which provided fertile ground for fascist movements.

The destruction of the multi-ethnic empires after World War I, the weakening of traditional conservatism, the intensification of state interventions in technology and business, as well as the strengthening of aggressive nationalism against wartime adversaries, promoted a new nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, especially in the Mediterranean and East-Central Europe. Fascism aimed to cleanse a purportedly unitary and indivisible nation of enemies, developing organicist and racist notions of society.

Socioeconomic preconditions

It is now generally accepted that fascist movements did not draw on the support of the “panicking” middle classes (Falter 1991). The three major socioeconomic explanations for the rise of fascism – late industrial and democratic development and/or economic backwardness; sudden and profound economic crisis; and social tensions caused by heightened class conflict – emphasize that fascist movements did best in countries that were neither particularly backward nor had completed a steady and protracted modernization process.

Recent scholarship has questioned the assumption that class should be central to our understanding of fascism. Instead it stresses that explanations for its rise need to incorporate a set of complex social preconditions like youth, military experience, education, religion, and regional peculiarities (Mann 2004). The rise of fascist movements is poorly understood as the product of material and status-based interests of social groups. Social contexts were not causal explanations, but merely created opportunities. Fascist collective action cannot be derived from psychological dispositions or social problems. Fascists were neither the puppets of capital nor the rejoicing (or more aptly, thrashing) third party in societies rent by class struggle. Instead of deriving fascism from social circumstances we should look instead at what fascists actually did.

Short-term causes and the impact of World War I

The following political and social changes after World War I and the Russian Revolution played a key role in the process of supporting fascist
movements: a widespread acceptance of social welfare models influenced by eugenics; fantasies of a potentially total and state-directed shaping of society, fueled by planning for war; radical populist nationalism oriented toward communal ties; the spread of anticommunism and antifeminism; the deployment of violence and militarism as political instruments; and the attraction of theatrical politics with charismatic elements.

The mass mobilization of society during World War I made elitist political forms less tenable; social conflicts erupted in the class-stratified army and on the home front in response to hunger and hardship. Young soldiers’ experience of violence, the sometimes extreme flows of refugees, and territorial shifts within the European nations created important preconditions for fascism’s emergence.

The period following World War I witnessed a militarization of public opinion and the political culture, in which the “metamorphosis of the political” expressed itself in a dramatization and emotionalization of the political, stoked by the mass media. World War I engendered a “fundamental crisis of representation” (Weisbrod 2000) through mass media transmissions of glorious promises invoking heroism and sacrifice. This visual, dramatic, and violent charging of the political corresponded to social distribution battles and rationalizing tendencies, culminating in the “compulsively normalized society” of fascism, which propagated “introspection instead of intellect, feeling instead of analysis, community instead of social contradictions, ideals instead of interests.” The utopian model of a society pacified in this manner thus highlighted the repressive features of social norms and discipline (Peukert 1989).

The young men who had experienced the front only in the accounts of fathers and older brothers succumbed to the propaganda of unflappable superiority in the face of mortal danger that flourished after 1918. The image of cool masculinity parted with the nineteenth-century cult of conscience. The martial absoluteness of the heroic, determined, and violent man was attractive particularly for nationalist youth, who sought to shield themselves from the presumed unmanly weakness of returning shell-shocked veterans. The fascist movements’ glorification of youth fell on fertile ground, given the socioeconomic problems of young men and the changes in and crisis of the male image (Herbert 1996; Wildt 2010).

International constellations

Between the Convention of Lausanne of January 1923 and World War II, more than 40 million people were forcibly resettled according to ethnic, religious, or linguistic criteria (Aly 1999). The massive frontier shifts after World War I, some of which conflicted with ethnic self-attributions and promoted or “invented” this ethnicization, not merely spawned a number of irredentist demands, but also fostered a new type of nationalism and racism. Particularly in the new nations in Southern and East-Central Europe, the combined economic, military, political, and cultural crisis after World War I inspired calls for order, security, and hierarchy as well as the emergence of a value system oriented more toward the sacred than the secular, and more toward national than class interests, which promoted the advent and development of fascism (Mann 2004).

The thesis that fascist movements succeeded in establishing themselves in countries where the communist and socialist movement had been especially powerful and class conflict particularly intense no longer holds up to scrutiny. In all European countries – with the notable exception of the Soviet Union – the violence of fascist movements surpassed the violence of socialists in the immediate postwar period. But fascist activities and successes in the various European countries were not consistently an immediate response to communism, since most fascist coup attempts and violence occurred only in the 1930s, far too late to be considered responses or even “understandable reactions” (Nolte 1987) to left-wing violence. Yet it was more the demonization of the socialist foe and the virtually hysterical (liberal) bourgeois bewilderment and fear, conjured up by memories of the Russian Revolution and
the unrest of 1918–1919, that continued to lend the violent fascist politics of the 1930s the appearance of communicative appeals to the bourgeoisie and heightened its intransigence. This was the source of fascism’s image as a nationalist force for order and a militant protector of capitalist property relations.

All classifications for comparing fascist movements aside, neither Nazism nor Italian fascismo, the Hungarian Arrow Cross under Ferenc Szálasi, or Zelea Codreanu’s Romanian Iron Guard can be understood in isolation. Italian fascism’s function as a “historic indicator” (Schieder 2008: 149–249) in the 1920s and early 1930s was as significant for European fascist movements as the cultural transfer and linkages between fascisms. At the time of the Great Depression, with widespread anxiety about the future and disgust with the present, Italian fascism, in particular, appeared to offer a model. People sought stability and orientation in an authoritarian alternative to the parliamentary system and democracy, in the introduction of corporatism, which supporters hoped would provide a third way between capitalism and socialism. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck’s 1922 dictum “Italia docet” was on everyone’s lips (Schieder 2008: 149–184).

A European network of fascist movements had emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. A transnational history of these diverse mutual receptions, contacts, and exchange relationships that explores the chronology of their reciprocal influences and transformation processes remains to be written, but such an inquiry is certainly needed in order to understand the divergences and convergences of European fascisms (Woller 1999; Reichardt & Nolzen 2005).

FASCIST MOVEMENTS AS POLITICAL PRACTICE

Overall, in its movement phase, fascism was characterized by a combination of five traits:

1. A high degree of violence and militancy. Particularly in their early phase, fascist movements adopted a violent style, and their combat groups embodied vitality, intransigence, youth, militarism, camaraderie, discipline, virility, and physical violence. Violent actions were the actual meaning and object of fascist combat groups. The struggle against “Marxism,” communists, and social democrats was their central purpose. Paradoxically enough, it was frequently also this very violence that appeared to promise the middle classes peace and order.

The violent destruction of traditional groupings and the “rapid reintegration [of their members] into a wholly new group formation” were key characteristics of the fascists and their “gospel of violence” (Mannheim 1952: 150–156). Violence became the “decisive principle” (Neumann 1988: 467) of their social organization and an expression of fascist volition. The violent acts themselves performatively produced a myth that represented their self-image and served the purposes of mobilization. For the fascists, acts of violence were indicative of a creative will to live, an act of freedom, collective decisiveness, and heroic deeds. The intellectual misgivings of critical reflection were sacrificed to aestheticized action. Fascist street fighters presented themselves as diffusely dangerous and aggressive, targeting not one particular group, but anyone outside the martial manliness in their own ranks. A propensity toward racism and a cult of violence, camaraderie, and the glorification of danger and adventurism as revolutionary gesture belonged to the fascist repertoire (Reichardt 2009).

Violence, as a polyvalent manifestation of fascist movements, lent them their unmistakable stamp: thematically in political attitudes, symbolically in propaganda style and movement/party aesthetic, organizationally in the paramilitary combat
groups, physically at movement/party events and everyday “party work” in the streets. Violence enhanced group cohesion within and propaganda outward. It was intended to show that fascists were not all talk and no action. The cult of violence and action as well as the violence-prone lifestyle demonstrated intransigence and mocked any willingness to compromise or rational modes of the finding of justice. Even fascist regimes were incapable of a regulated resolution of political conflicts, belligerently oriented towards foreign expansionism.

2. The absence of stable organs of decision-making or a bureaucratic movement structure. Fascist organizational work concentrated on propaganda to mobilize the base and foster aggressiveness. The polycratic rule within fascist movements, marked by constant rivalries, did not, however, prevent a strong attachment to the movement among the core membership. The integrative principles of Bund (Schmalenbach 1922: 35–105) meant that their entire lives increasingly took place within the organizational life of the movement. The largely informal but effective organizational structure formed a new type of political entity as social movement, which integrated the whole person with all aspects of his/her existence.

Fascist movements were characterized by the nonformalized, highly personalist organizational form of communion, combined with a quasi-military organization of the masses. The initiation process, isolation from the outside world, uniforms, lists of regulations, systems of privileges and penalties, informal control by comrades, pressures to conform, and use of specialized jargon all created an informal normative code alongside official instructions, which acted as a second, disciplinary sublife. The propensity for violence and the emotional and romanticized ideal of camaraderie were not in conflict, but mutually reinforced each other.

The high proportion of paramilitaries within fascist movements—half of all fascists in Germany and Italy, for example, and a good deal more in Romania—almost inevitably led to tensions between the paramilitary lifestyle and cult of violence and the strategy for taking power through parliamentary elections. This created polycratic power relations and inner instability, for which fascisms had to compensate with the figure of the charismatic leader, increased militarization and hierarchy, the redemptive promise of quick success, perpetual momentum, and violent activism.

The fascist movements were thus marked by two permanent and paradoxical pairs of tensions: First, the tension between the centrifugal force of polycracy and the significance of the charismatic leader, which had no regulated relationship with each other and required continual renegotiation. Second, there was the tension between the increasingly routine nature and perpetuation of violent acts and the propagandistic trumpeting of their extraordinary nature. In order to balance this tension, fascist movements were virtually obliged to radicalize their violence constantly.

3. Affinity between the “leader principle” and the movement’s structures. In contrast to the compromise politician, the charismatic leader was eminently suited to embodying the movement’s faith in the future. The emotionalization and aestheticization of politics was accompanied by the ornamentalization of the masses and the closed crowd, as well as a sacralized glorification of violence. In many respects, fascist movements assumed the character not of a “political religion” but of a form of sacralized politics (Gentile 1996). The constant use of religious terms such as sacrifice, faith, resurrection, or spirit was directed against the alleged moral decay of a society branded as hedonistic, skeptical, and rationalist. A mystical certainty of salvation and victory
and repeated reminders of the necessity of struggle characterized the sacralization of fascist politics. This attitude of redemption by ruthless combat, as well as proclama-
tions of immortality and the impending advent of a destined everlasting dominion, constituted two sides of the same sacralized mode of politics.

In fascism, the figures of the uncanny, the sublime, and the adventurous mingled with a leader/follower relationship that has been characterized as a “paradox of mutual subordination” (Gumbrecht 1998: 383–389). While the leader had to embody the collective whence he emerged, he also remained lofty and isolated from the masses. His propagandistically polished solitude became a condition of his political charisma. The leader existed between the poles of his followers’ trust and affirmation and elevation above the mass. Paradoxically, the leader had an at once rigid and loose power relationship with his adherents, since his charisma proved itself only in interaction with, and in the faith and acknowledgment of, his followers. The opportunity for charismatic rule and the charismatic formation of community were rooted in the connection between mass body and individual heroism (Gumbrecht 1998). Fascists presented and staged themselves as “totalitarian democrats,” they combined populism and hierarchy.

4. An asserted monopoly on male youth and a self-image as the “organized will of youth” against the “gerontocratic” and “effeminate” democracies. This propagandistic thrust, which the generational conflict in postwar societies intensified and stylized, was effect-
ively underlined by the fact that fascist par-
ties could claim the lowest average age and the largest percentage of male members of all parties of their day. Fascist propaganda associated the elements of maleness and youth with dynamism, energy, and future. The cult of male youth underlined the fascist claim to represent a new, fresh force, an awakening, and an avant-garde. Like palingenetic nationalism and the charis-
matic cult of the leader, youthfulness was strongly aestheticized in fascism and, like integral nationalism, assumed a compensatory function that consisted of papering over the tensions and conflicts within the socially heterogeneous fascist movements.

5. Fascist movements assumed an eclectic, vague, and sacral political stance marked by an emphasis on nation and race. Fascism manifested itself not in a unified ideology graspable in terms of the history of ideas, but far more in the historical protagonists’ bodily behavioral routines, collective interpretive models, symbols, and subjective assignments of meaning, which were in turn anchored in their actions. Fascism focused on the “political field” (Bourdieu) in which what counted were power struggles, affects, and emotions as well as strategic aims, while its implementation in the “intellectual field,” where what counted were coherent ideologies, doctrines, and ideas, remained secondary (Breuer & Bach 2010).

A key element of fascist meaning systems was racism and an extreme, palingenetic and integral nationalism, which fostered chiliastic attitudes. The masculine, military, and hier-
archical image of a community marked by fanatical anticomunism and racism as well as (male) homosocial sociability manifested itself in fascism’s radical nationalism, which was rehearsed practically in daily marches and funeral ceremonies, and cemented by symbols from flags to uniforms. The reference to vio-
ence and the will, to military tradition, the army, and the comradely community belonged to this circle of organic, integral nationalism, whose obsession with purification and unifor-
mity constructed a clear image of the enemy both within and outside the nation.

This connects to the racism of all fascist movements, which made “ethnic cleansing” a main objective against the “inferior” races. Racism was explicitly installed as a counter-
model to class-based social hierarchy, and
expressed itself often in anti-Semitism, which permeated not just the Nazi movement, but also Romanian fascism under Zelea Codreanu, Hungarian fascism under Ferenc Szálasi, the Croatian Ustasha under Ante Pavelić, and (to a lesser degree) Italian fascism. Although a convincing integration of racism, ethnic cleansing, and genocide remains a desideratum in theories of fascism, it has become unmistakably apparent in recent years that Italian fascism also had racist and anti-Semitic traits and in this respect differed from Nazism not structurally, but only as a matter of degree.

CONCLUSION

Fascism may be understood as a form of political and social practice that articulated itself in the symbols, rituals, and world-views of a racist and "ethnically" homogeneous society (Paxton 2004). Nationalist militarists organized in mass organizations and allied with traditional elites enforced the fascist cult of unity and purity, community and will.

Fascist street politics successfully occupy the newly vacant field of political relationships in historical situations of a profound crisis of democracy, in which the legitimacy of political parties, government, and the state were increasingly tenuous. In such situations fascists transformed previously loose contacts with traditional power elites into alliances. Because alliances with traditional elites did not succeed everywhere, many European fascisms failed to develop beyond the movement phase.

Fascism was a type of social movement that adopted a radical opposition to the parliamentary system and the socialist labor movement, not least in violent public propaganda. In their political style and techniques for capturing power, fascists coupled repression with acclamation.

Fascism underwent changes, and needs to be (re)defined according to its founding, movement, implementation, regime, and radicalization phases (Paxton 2004; Schieder 2008: 7–28). Nonetheless, strong similarities between the fascists existed in ideologemes, propaganda forms, organizational structures, militarism, and the practice of violence, particularly in the movement phase (Kershaw 1994).

Fascism was a political paradox because it combined populist mass enthusiasm with civil subordination, order with destruction, conservative stability with dynamic, youthful mobility, and fanaticism with opportunism. The rejection of liberal democratic society and socialist movements alike was expressed in the massive use of violence to “purify” the nation, with the ultimate aim of foreign expansionism. Fascism’s radicalness was fostered by a structure of rule stabilized by charismatic leadership, permanent propagandist mobilization, and a shared attitude toward life (Broszat 1970, 1983). While the capacity for open discussion and compromise was limited among communists by ideological dogmatism, among fascists it was the intransigent lifestyle and cult of the will that hampered these mechanisms. What united fascisms was above all a certain political practice, which made use of an aestheticized cult of the will and of violence. This expressive side of fascist cultural practices influenced its ideological side. Both were tightly intertwined and mutually influential.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Culture and social movements; Nationalist movements; Nazi movement (Germany); Racist social movements; Right-wing movements; Strain and breakdown theories; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


First Nation sovereignty movements (Canada)

RIMA WILKES

Most of British Columbia is Aboriginal territory. It is Aboriginal territory because indigenous peoples have never ceded their land or rights via treaties. According to the 1763 Royal Proclamation, treaty-making is the only way the crown (or government) can acquire territory. Despite this legal rule, the government in British Columbia has sold Aboriginal land, and rights to the resources contained on this land, to third party interests, with the justification that this land is “crown” land. The ongoing situation in British Columbia provides one example of the grievances of First Nations peoples in Canada. Elsewhere in the country, both federal and provincial governments have also sold indigenous people’s land and resources to third-party interests, expropriated land for roads, military bases, and military training exercises, failed to provide adequate compensation for land use, as well as failed to provide sufficiently for housing, health, and education as spelled out in the terms of the Indian Act. Indeed, since 1973 although hundreds of claims have been formally submitted to the federal Claims Commission, an average of only four per year are settled (Ramos 2006).

Indigenous peoples in Canada have mounted a significant challenge to this state of affairs. Since the late 1960s, they have affected a sustained program of collective resistance. Nineteen sixty-nine is considered a key date, and the beginning of the contemporary phase of mobilization, since this was the year when indigenous people used mass protest to block the White Paper, federal legislation designed to eliminate “Indian Status” (Sanders 1985). Research quantifying actions finds over 500 separate events have taken place since this time (Blomley 1996; Ramos 2008). Event analysis shows that the number of events began to rise steadily throughout the 1980s and peaked in the 1990s, with over 100 events in 1990 alone (Wilkes 2004, 2006). Since then there have been about 10 to 20 of these kinds of collective events in Canada per year.

These events are especially remarkable for their use of dramatic tactics such as road and rail blockades and land and building occupations. Many of these tactics and the strategies used in these events have been chosen as a means of emphasizing the sovereignty of First Nations. For example, in 1985, Haidas used road blockades to prevent Western Forest Products from logging Lyell Island, part of their traditional territory in what was then called the Queen Charlotte Islands (now called Haida Gwaii) in British Columbia. They also emphasized their nationhood and land rights by dispensing travel permits to tourists visiting the region (York 1989). Later that decade, the Lubicon people of Northern Alberta and the Temagami First Nation of Northern Ontario also engaged in road blockades in order to stop resource extraction on their land (Ferreira 1992; Hodgins, Lischke, & McNab 2003).

Tensions between the government and indigenous peoples mounted during the 1990s. Most notable is the Oka Crisis, a 78-day standoff from July 11 to September 20, 1990, between Mohawk warriors and the Quebec police and Canadian army. The roots of this conflict dated back several hundred years but came to a head when the town of Oka sold land that was to be held in trust, to a golf course developer. Mohawks from Kanesatake set up a barricade and, when it was stormed by Quebec police, one police officer was killed (Smith 2000). The federal government later sent in the army. This event is generally considered a catalyst signaling a new kind of militancy in indigenous resistance movements in Canada. It led to hundreds of support protests and, at
many subsequent events, people continue to fly the Mohawk flag as an important symbol of indigenous rights. The wearing of military fatigues by warrior societies is also now standard practice, designed to emphasize that indigenous-state disputes are between nations (see e.g., Alfred & Lowe 2005).

Since Oka, there have been numerous other major events. Among them are the 1995 Ipperwash crisis, 1995 Gustafsen Lake Standoff, 2001 Sun Peaks Dispute, and the ongoing dispute at Caledonia (see Edwards 2001 and Lambertus 2004 for detailed accounts of the first two events). Although these events have successfully drawn media attention to the issue of indigenous rights, this coverage is often less than favorable (Miller 2005). Still, these events have clearly forced the hand of governments, who have had to quickly negotiate and settle numerous issues, many of which had been dragging on for decades. For this reason, these and other collective action events have and continue to be essential and important components of social change.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal peoples’ movements (Australia); Anticolonial movements; Direct action; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Native American movements (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

The Free Speech Movement (FSM) was a protest by students at the University of California, Berkeley during the 1964–1965 academic year. The events, an early instance of sixties student activism, were the first case of large-scale unrest on a college campus.

An impetus for the FSM was a letter – dated September 14, 1964 – that dean of students, Kathleen Towle, sent to student organizations. It stated that university property could no longer be used “for the purpose of soliciting party membership or supporting or opposing particular candidates or propositions in local, state or national elections” (Pierovich 1965: 35). Specifically, administrators were clearing a strip of university land at the main entrance to campus, no longer allowing posters, tables, fund raising, and other efforts to “support or advocate off-campus political or social action.”

The letter touched off negotiations between the student organizations and university administration, as well as student protests. While students argued for constitutional free speech and the ability to put academic ideas into action, administrators stressed upholding university and state law, countering that political recruitment and fundraising were not intellectual endeavors. Over the next several months, the protesters established a formal group, the “Free Speech Movement,” that met with university administration and student government. In addition to these negotiations, the protests involved student petitions, all-night vigils and sit-ins, demonstrations and rallies, and a strike by teaching assistants. The group also distributed an FSM Newsletter. Furthermore, protesters organized actions on other California college campuses. The movement gained support from celebrities, including Joan Baez, James Baldwin, and Bertrand Russell.

These events happened in the context of an increasingly tense political atmosphere on the Berkeley campus, as well as an increase in student protest in general. A key player in the FSM was the university chapter of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), especially its main spokesperson Mario Savio. Also, the protests began just weeks after the culmination of the Freedom Summer activities in Mississippi, from which many of the activists involved in FSM – including Savio – had just returned (Savio, Walker, & Dunayevskaya 1965).

The FSM was highlighted by two dramatic “sit-ins.” On September 21, Dean Towle established a new area near the administration building, Sproul Hall, for student organizations to gather. Soon students began to defy regulations against collecting funds, with officials punishing detractors. On October 1 at noon, university police arrested former student and FSM activist Jack Weinberg for soliciting money at a table. After police placed Weinberg into a patrol car, a crowd quickly surrounded them. The protesters – at times numbering into the thousands – remained around, and atop, the car and inside Sproul Hall until the next evening, when student leaders negotiated a resolution with university administration. Weinberg was inside the increasingly drooping vehicle the entire time. “He was fed sandwiches and milk through an open window” (Pierovich 1965: 41). Weinberg was then booked, but the university did not press charges.

The second sit-in occurred in early December. On November 28, the university administration sent letters to two student protesters, accusing them of inciting the crowd during the October 1 and 2 protests. The letter also requested their presence at a disciplinary hearing. In response to this action, the FSM held a rally on December 2, where students occupied all four floors of Sproul Hall. The sit-in lasted until early the next morning, when more than
600 police officers disrupted the rally, then entered the building and emptied it floor by floor. Most arrestees “went limp,” with police either dragging or carrying them out. It took 12 hours to completely empty Sproul. The police reported 716 arrests, while the university reported 814, and 768 people appeared at the arraignment (Pierovich 1965: 66).

The events largely concluded on December 8, when the Berkeley Academic Senate passed a resolution that political activity should not be restricted, on or off campus, unless it disrupted university functions. Also, the resolution stipulated that students involved in FSM protests would not face discipline from the university. A brief “Filthy Speech Movement” occurred in March 1965, when relatively small protests took place the day after campus police arrested a student displaying an obscene sign.

Outcomes of the FSM include the growth of the New Left, as it was a defining event influencing future campus protests and student activism (Gitlin 1989; Cohen 2009). It was also a polarizing event that, in 1966, ironically helped propel conservative Ronald Reagan into office as California governor (DeGroot 1996; Dallek 2000). Yet many conservative and religious student organizations at Berkeley were supportive and involved in the protests. Today, the University of California, Berkeley campus contains several memorials to the events, including a “Free Speech Movement Café” in their Moffitt Library.

SEE ALSO: Freedom Summer (United States); New Left and social movements; Student movements; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Freedom Summer (United States)

DOUG MCADAM

Freedom Summer is the colloquial term by which we now refer to one of the major campaigns in the US civil rights movement. Known at the time simply as the Mississippi summer project, Freedom Summer was the brainchild of Robert Moses, veteran field secretary for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Though officially sponsored by a coalition of civil rights groups, the SNCC was the driving force behind the 1964 project. The ostensible goal of the project was to register as many black voters as possible in advance of the 1964 presidential election. But there was perhaps a more important underlying aim. At the time of the project the SNCC had been working in Mississippi for three years with little to show for its effort. The organization’s work in the state was at a stalemate. By bringing a large number of Northern, mostly white student volunteers to the state to work during the summer, the organization hoped to break the stalemate. More to the point, they hoped that the presence of the white volunteers would bring the national media as well, helping to dramatize the continued denial of civil rights to black Mississippians as well as the ongoing violence against civil rights workers in the state.

The project proved to be a watershed event in the civil rights struggle. In the end, more than 1000 mostly white, Northern college students participated in the project. Three workers were kidnapped and later killed during the first week of the project. In all four volunteers died during the summer. Another 80 suffered serious injuries and more than 1000 were arrested. Sixty-seven black churches, homes, and businesses were burned or bombed over the course of the summer. But the violence insured the media’s presence and its sympathetic coverage of the project increased the pressure on the federal government to take more decisive action in support of civil rights. In addition, the mountain of evidence collected by the project of systematic obstruction and intimidation of would-be black voters helped to underscore the need for, and generate crucial momentum on behalf of, the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

There was more. In a brilliant strategic move, project organizers took an alternative delegation to the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and challenged the seating of the regular, lily-white, Mississippi delegation. In the end the challenge failed, but it eventually led to a series of reforms that opened up the delegate selection process and brought much-needed diversity to the party. In the immediate aftermath of the project, however, the SNCC’s disillusionment at the failed convention challenge accelerated the organization’s move toward separatism and Black Power.

Beyond the project’s “real world” impact, Freedom Summer is important to social movement scholars for another reason. It was the focus of a unique study of movement recruitment and the longer term impact of activism. Seeking only a list of project participants, in 1982 McAdam stumbled upon the original applications for 720 volunteers and another 300 students who had been accepted by project organizers but, for whatever reason, never made it to Mississippi. The discovery of “before” data on both the volunteers and “no-shows” allowed McAdam to systematically study the process of “differential recruitment” to the project. Among other things, his findings (1986, 1988, 1993) highlighted the critical role that prior organizational and interpersonal ties played in mediating the recruitment process. Applicants who had ties to civil rights organizations and/or knew others who made it to Mississippi were themselves more likely to participate in the project. Conversely, lacking
ties to such groups and/or knowing another “no-show” decreased the applicant’s chances of taking part in the project.

Using information on the applications, McAdam then tracked down as many of the applicants as possible and using survey and interview data systematically assessed the longer term biographical effect of participation/nonparticipation on the lives of his subjects. In a number of publications (1988, 1989, 1992), including the 1988 book, *Freedom Summer*, McAdam showed that for all their similarities going into the project, the volunteers and no-shows looked very different 20 years later. In general, the volunteers remained far more leftist in their political orientations and far more active in movement politics in the mid-1980s than the no-shows. In addition, their personal lives also seemed to bear the enduring imprint of their commitment to the politics they had espoused 20 years earlier.

Finally, the study offered powerful evidence of the critical role played by the volunteers in some of the other major New Left movements that emerged in the mid-1960s. McAdam presents evidence of the important pioneering roles played by the volunteers in the antiwar movement, the emerging women’s liberation struggle, and the 1964 Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. His was thus one of the first systematic empirical demonstrations of “movement spillover” to appear in the literature.

SEE ALSO: Biographical consequences of activism; Civil rights movement (United States); Networks and social movements; New Left and social movements; Participation in social movements; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
French Revolution
ANDREW WERNICK

In the cascade of uprisings that followed Louis XVI’s reluctant convening of the Estates General to address a fiscal and political crisis precipitated by imperial overreach, failing harvests, and the bankruptcy of the French state, the monarchical, feudal, and ecclesiastical pillars of what was immediately dubbed the ancien régime were swept away. By the end of 1789, spurred on by great popular enthusiasm, the Estates General had transmogrified into a unicameral National Assembly, the privileges of the nobility and clergy had been abolished (willingly for some), and an interim body had been set up to draft a new constitution, to be modeled, at first, on that of post-1688 England. As well, the Assembly had proclaimed a charter of Rights and Duties of Man and Citizen, including religious freedom, and formally ended feudalism and serfdom. While Paris was the center of these activities the revolution had spread to other urban centers like Lyons and Marseilles, and the rural poor had taken matters in their own hands, refusing taxes, tithes, and seigneurial dues, and looting châteaux and religious houses. The capital itself was awash with section committees, political clubs, agitational newspapers, and, beginning with the July Days and the storming of the Bastille, the increasingly radical actions of the laboring and artisanal sans-culottes.

Still stronger measures followed. A Civil Constitution was imposed on the clergy, then a loyalty oath; the property of self-exiled aristocrats was confiscated; local militias were formed to defend the revolution. Finally, the king and queen, reluctant to cede powers and after an attempted flight from Versailles, were dragged to the Tuileries by an immense crowd. After a renewed revolutionary upsurge, a National Convention was elected to replace the National and Constituent assemblies and settle the constitutional question once for all. This it did by trying and executing the king, abolishing the monarchy, and (on September 22, 1792 – the zero point of a new calendar) declaring a republic. Assuming executive authority in a perceived national emergency, the Convention and its committees (principally the Committee of Public Safety) ruled till the Thermidorean reaction led to its demise in 1794. Besides such measures as wage and price controls, conversion to metric, and educational reform (the Grandes Écoles), the Convention vigorously pursued war against the republic’s encircling continental enemies. War was declared against Austria, the Dutch Republic, Spain, and England. Mass conscription was introduced, as well as revolutionary tribunals for traitors within. All this came amidst growing divisions in the revolutionary camp while a conservative backlash spread in rural areas like the Vendée, and the court and exiled aristocrats intrigued with Austria and other European powers to restore order through military intervention. The climax came in 1793–1794 with the Terror, the Jacobin ascendancy, and Robespierre’s Republic of Virtue, replete with a new, deist, civil religion.

After an army-backed coalition of moderates and conservatives joined forces to overthrow first the Jacobins then the Convention, the radical phase was over. A new constitution in 1795, replacing the more forthrightly democratic one that the Convention had drafted, gave governmental power to a five-man Directory. In 1799 this in turn was pushed aside in Napoleon’s coup of 18th Brumaire, leading to his installation as emperor in 1802, a Concordat with Rome, and the formal end of the first republic. Napoleon’s ascension marks the point at which not only the republic but the mass activism in which it was born came to an end. At the same time, however, the revolution was continued externally in military campaigns that swung from defense to offense and were infused with

enthusiasm for bringing French reason and law as well as French domination to conquered territories. It is not easy to say when, in fact, the French Revolution ended. The one solemnly celebrated by the modern French state is that of May to October 1789, with the “second revolution” of 1791–1792 left in the shade. For Marx it ended with Thermidor; for Comte with the overthrow of the Directorate. There is a case for saying that it did not end even in 1815 with the defeat of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration, in that a republican form of government was not established in France until 1871, and then only after five further regime changes and three insurrections.

Outside as well as inside France the historical impact of the French Revolution was immense, especially in the century prior to the earthquakes of the twentieth century. In addition to the geopolitical effects – a weakened France, British naval supremacy, the rise of Prussia, the revolutions of 1848, and further afield, the slave revolt in Ste-Domingue, the modernizing Egypt of Mehmet Ali, and the beginnings of Ottoman decline – the revolution and its bewildering succession of tableaux burned itself into the European imaginary. Causes and consequences were hotly debated and a multitude of meanings could be read in. Clashing interpretations, as in the work of Burke, de Maistre, Guizot, de Tocqueville, and Marx, provided a crystallization point for modern political ideologies. For Kant, the international wave of disinterested sympathy that greeted the events of 1789 validated his optimistic understanding of the prospects for public enlightenment; for Hegel, Napoleon embodied the Weltgeist and the whole revolutionary episode revealed the dialectical movement of matter-mediated spirit. Chou En Lai’s quip concerning the historical significance of the French Revolution, that “it’s too early to tell,” suggests that the reverberations (not least in China) continued well into the twentieth century.

For sociology, the French Revolution has a three-fold significance. First, as an endlessly fascinating and controversial topic for analysis and reflection, both ideographic and comparative; secondly, as an epochal event which can serve as a marker for the emergence of modern industrial society, and thus of its own field; and thirdly as an important, indeed agenda-shaping, factor in the emergence of sociology itself as a distinct area of inquiry. In the post-classical period – after the further ruptures of 1914, 1917, World War II, and 1989 – the revolution’s impact has faded, and these three orders of significance have become easier to disentangle. But for classical sociology they were very much bound up together. Indeed, major schools of nineteenth-century sociological thought in large measure defined themselves through their different interpretations of, and positions taken toward, the French Revolution and its legacy.

This is most evident in France, where sociology – which in Durkheimian form became official doctrine during the Third Republic – arose explicitly in response to the revolution and the chronic instability left in its wake. For Durkheim, modifying a framework he had taken over from Saint-Simon and Comte, the revolution had been a watershed event in the structural transition from one social type to another. However, its work had been mainly negative and reconstructive institutional reforms – most notably, professional associations to replace the guilds, and a secular-republican-educational replacement for the church – were needed to complete the process and resolve the grand crise. On the moral-religious side, at the same time, the passionate mass eruption of 1789 had been a founding moment, a “collective effervescence,” in which new, socially renovating, values and symbols were born. These, with some liberal and Kantian inflection (to emphasize the sacredness of the morally autonomous subject), provided the cornerstone for a unifying and integrative morale whose quasi-religious reproduction, through commemorative ritual (like Bastille Day) and civic education, was vital to the solidarity of a highly individuated and task-differentiated industrialism. Sociology itself, in this scenario, was both the scientific
explicator of the scene, and the logos, not to say theology, of (post-revolutionary) society itself.

Keen to distance himself from the socialism of Saint-Simon and the “absurdities” of the later Comte, Durkheim stressed the liberal Enlightenment pedigree of this new science, with Montesquieu and Rousseau important forerunners. However this is not the whole story. As Robert Nisbet pointed out in his notable 1943 essay, the formation of French sociology owed a great deal also to the Catholic organicism of counterrevolutionary thinkers like de Maistre and de Bonald. Besides developing, in individual/society terms, an integralist concept of social order and its maintenance through time, they had been the first to thematize la société itself as an irreducibly trans-individual plane of reality with its own discoverable laws. If this debt is passed over by Durkheim, it is not so in the sociologies of St Simon and Comte who had sought, explicitly, to synthesize what could be learned from de Bonald and de Maistre about social integration with Condorcet’s progressivist account of anthropological and social development.

But it was not only via the conservative reaction and the problematics of order (and, with Burke, of custom and tradition) that the French Revolution brought society and the social onto the modern intellectual agenda. The revolution also made salient a host of issues to do with inequality, class, and the distribution of wealth. Those issues sharpened of course with the rise of the market, factory production, and large-scale capitalism, and not only in France. Indeed, whether from the angle of social administration and state policy, or from that of critique and action from below, the study of social inequality and its consequences came to be a prominent element in the development of sociology everywhere. With further axes of inequality (ethno-cultural, sexual, etc.,) coming under scrutiny, they remain so today. Nonetheless it was the French Revolution that initially, and indelibly, brought these issues into play. What began as a revolt in the middle strata of the Third Estate, and ignited the justice demands of every section of the population, revealed the social question underlying what had been thought of (in the American Revolution for example) as a political one regarding law and the form of the state. It was in France, too, from Rousseau’s Second Discourse and Siéyès’ What Is the Third Estate? to Saint-Simon’s proto-class analysis of the revolution itself, that concepts and language for examining social inequality were forged, thence through Hegel’s and Marx’s appropriations, to become embedded in the dialectical sociologies that developed across the Rhine.

For Durkheim, and Saint-Simonianism generally, post-revolutionary turbulence and its persistence was to be explained in terms of the revolution’s incompleteness. Conflicts and crises in the new industrial society were ones of transition, occasioned by vengeful or dysfunctional survivals from the displaced feudal order, or by the insufficient development of organization and moral culture in the now more central activity of production. For Marx, however, the French Revolution had been only the penultimate transformation. The transition it marked was not simply to industrial (production and science-centered) society but to capitalist society: a formation in its own right, with its own potentially transformative contradictions and antagonisms. The year 1789 and its sequel was – giving the term a greater precision than it had for contemporaries, or for liberal historians like Guizot – a bourgeois revolution: the overthrow of a lingering feudalism’s dominant land-owner class, and of the state that expressed/protected that dominance, by a new ruling class rising to power on the basis of capitalist property and production relations. Social conflict did not end, then, with the abolition of the aristocracy and the establishment of a formal (and limited) democracy. In wage labor the capital-owning class was raising up an antagonistic force which could overthrow it in turn, paving the way for a socialized industrialism in which class and class conflict would finally disappear.

Marx’s fine-grained account of modern French history (e.g., in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon) was by no means as
schematic as this may sound. He attended to cultural and semiological elements like the Roman symbolism in which republican and Napoleonic politics were dressed, as well as the specific complexities of class and class conflict at each of the moments he examined. More formulaically, however, and in its linkage of class with democratic/republican politics, the French Revolution became a model for the wider category of “bourgeois revolution” which, in one form or another, was seen by orthodox Marxists as necessary in a society’s successful transition to capitalism. In certain respects it even served as a model for the proletarian revolution itself, for example in the *Communist Manifesto*’s characterization of a pre-revolutionary situation, of the struggle for state power, and of the way in which a portion of the ruling class (including elite-trained intellectuals like Marx and Engels) moves to the side of the one rising against it.

Among the classical founders of sociology, Weber’s relation with the French Revolution was the most complicated. The Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser – in which, tenaciously but without illusion, he supported the liberal party of reform – linked a fast developing capitalism in the West with an autocratic order dominated by the Junker/landowners of the East. With a politically and ideologically weak bourgeoisie there had been no bourgeois revolution, nor was there a prospect of one. When parliamentary democracy arrived with the Weimar Republic (whose constitution Weber helped draft) it came as the result of a catastrophic military defeat followed by an abortive socialist uprising, amid a rising tide of nationalist fanaticism.

At issue for Weber in promoting expanded powers and legitimacy for the Reichstag was not only – in line with the Third Estate moderates in 1789 – the need for democratic control over the arbitrary policies of Kaiser-appointed ministers. There was also a need to counter state bureaucracy and the reduction of politics to administration, an issue to which he considered the socialist Left, and the whole legacy of republicanism, to be blind. Freedom and substantive reason were both at risk, threatened in politics as in other spheres by the seemingly ineluctable course of rationalization, that is, the domination of thought and action by formalism, calculation, and instrumentalism reason.

For Weber rationalization was the key to Western modernity, defining both its historical uniqueness – whence his *Protestant Ethic* and comparative study of civilizations – and its deepest problem. The French Revolution had itself advanced the process, in for example the centralized reorganization of the state, the civil code, the reform of weights and measures, the new calendar, technocratic schools, and the weight of lawyers (reflecting the “rationalization of trials”) in the new political class. The French Revolution also offered a cautionary example of the three ideal types of authority and their dynamic – the traditionalism of the *ancien régime* giving way to the legal rationality of constitution making, and then to the charismatic authority of Napoleon. In effect, Weber provided a sociological translation of Hegel’s critique of the one-sidedness of the French Cartesian and objectivist form of reason. However, Weber departed from Hegel not only in making Calvinism rather than Lutheranism the key bridge to modernity, which de-privileged Hegel’s “German” path to modernity. He also emphasized the historical contingency of chains of social action, the irreducibility of the “war of values,” and the impossibility of any epistemologically privileged perspective, whence his favoring an ethic of responsibility over any moral absolutism. Thus like Nietzsche, but as a post-Enlightenment liberal, Weber broke from all teleologies, religious and secular, including those that drew energy from the French Revolution as Idea.

While the themes of classical sociology left their imprint on the sociologies of the twentieth century, the European transition to capitalism and modernity receded as a preoccupation, and subsequent reflection on the French Revolution was shadowed by different events. Against the displacing backdrop of the Russian Revolution, and for its partisans, 1789 was viewed through
the prism of 1917, with Robespierre and the Jacobins playing the part of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. For Trotsky, the rise of Stalin was Thermidor. In a parallel way, but on the Right, Carl Schmitt’s influential notion of a “state of exception” drew from the writings of Rousseau and the Abbé Sièyes to provide a jurisprudential framework for Germany’s national-socialist revolution, with the emergency powers seized by the Convention as a paradigm. In a cold war context, after the eventuating horrors of the thirties and forties, the revolutionary government of the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety could also be seen (by Talmont for example) as the modern forerunner of totalitarianism, in both communist and fascist forms. In which regard, for liberal political theorists, the Terror and its genesis were important material for considering the complex links between liberal democracy and its opposite; just as, for military historians, the Convention’s lever en masse and the grande Armée of Napoleon merited examination as foreshadowing the twentieth century’s mass armies, total war, and ideologically driven projects of world conquest.

Interest in the dark side of the revolution is also evident in the post-World War I vicissitudes of the Durkheim School, that is, if we trace a line through Mauss on potlatch and Halbwachs on sacrifice to the Collège de Sociologie and Bataille. For Bataille, the regicide and decapitations of the Terror served as reference point for thinking through – with the aid of ethnography, Freud’s Totem and Taboo, Marx, de Sade, Nietzsche, and much else – the contemporary significance of (human) sacrifice, and its place in the symbolic founding and renewal of (a) community. From a Left-existentialist angle, but still in the French tradition of thought about social being, the Terror provided Sartre’s Critique de la Raison Dialectique with a model for the pledge group in his typology of modes of collective praxis. For the Christian anthropologist Girard, it provided an instance of the scapegoating mechanism at the heart of originary violence. With respect to large-scale macronic themes, lastly, the virulent negativity that Comte, following the Catholic counter-revolutionaries, dubbed négativisme has a place in the genealogy of nihilism, and in its Nietzschean deployment as a critical cultural category.

Speculative in nature, these lines of thought have been pursued around, rather than in, the more circumscribed forms of sociology that became established in the United States and elsewhere in the decades after World War II. Within mainstream sociology itself, empirical study of the French Revolution became, in effect, a topic within the sub-fields of political sociology and the sociology of social movements. To this latter development Charles Tilly’s work on social movements and Theda Skocpol’s comparativist approach to the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions made a pioneering contribution, as did Barrington-Moore’s study of peasant movements and their place in modern state formation. Overlapping with renewed sociological interest, and enriched by archival research, the detailed course of the revolution, and the conditions in which it occurred, has received fresh scrutiny by historians as well, leading to further debate about its specific historical character and significance.

On the Marxist side, Georges Lefebvre’s and Albert Soboul’s examination of the successive but interacting uprisings of aristocrats, bourgeois, peasants, and sans-culottes complexified the orthodox account while maintaining its main lines. However, Alfred Cobban’s 1964 critique of “the social interpretation of the French revolution” challenged both the centrality accorded to class struggle and the very notion that it was a “bourgeois revolution.” This initiated a revisionist interpretation whose most prominent proponent was François Furet. Pointing to the underdevelopment of French capitalism, the absence of a real bourgeoisie, and to the incorrectness, on the other hand, of any analysis of the ancien régime as feudal, Furet argued that, with all its complications and unintended consequences, the revolution should be taken at its word, namely as an Enlightenment-inspired revolution against despotism. It was a
political not social revolution, concerned with the establishment of a new kind of state and political discourse. For Habermas, relatedly, what the revolution instantiated, with its free press and endless assemblies, was the rise of the (bourgeois) public sphere, a process that had begun with the salon society and “Republic of Letters” that had intellectually fueled it.

A focus on modernity and democracy led also to a reconsideration of de Tocqueville’s argument that the revolution, while democratic, was also centralizing, continuing a process that had begun with Versailles and the ministries of Louis XIV. How continuous has been a matter for debate. For Tilly, there was a sharp contrast between the venal and localized administrative apparatus of the ancien régime, with its sale of offices and commercialized tax-farming, and the rationalized system of departments, civil service training, and Civil Code that the revolution firmly installed. Further challenges to established interpretations came from those who insisted that “internalist” accounts were insufficient and that the international context had also to be taken into account. The external background to the fiscal crisis of the 1770s and 1780s, Theda Skocpol reminds us, was France’s defeat by England and Austria in the Six Years’ War. Support for the winning side in the American War of Independence only worsened the incapacity of the monarchy to meet the costs of defense and empire. France was in decline as a Great Power. What was apotheosized in the revolution was “the nation”; what swept onto the stage was a movement of national regeneration. For Immanuel Wallerstein the revolution needed to be understood in the still-wider context of capitalism as a developing world system. Framed in these terms, the question of its class character, and whether it was essentially social or political, was beside the point. It was not, in principle, a “bourgeois revolution,” for France was already, however unevenly, integrated into the Atlantic-centered world capitalist economy. For that system the revolution was nonetheless an important event, on the one hand ushering in what became the dominant modern forms of political ideology, popular movements and (adaptively oriented) social sciences, and on the other hand helping to normalize change and the problems of its management as a constant of capitalist development.

More recently, attention has turned to the prominent role of women in the revolution and to its contradictory gender politics, in which, for example, a masculinist definition of “active citizenship” was sustained against a suffragette movement (led by Olympe de Gouges) that was suppressed in the Terror. Lynn Hunt’s The Family Romance of the French Revolution introduces to this a psychoanalytic dimension. Among other previously sidelined areas, the aesthetic side of the revolution – its neo-classicism, allegorical style, propaganda art, theatrical spectacles, and so on – has been greatly studied but largely as a specialty within art history, and awaits a more fully sociological treatment. For the future, the growing importance of issues to do with secularism and the public sphere, and clashing forms of universalism within an emerging global polity, may prompt further examination of the revolution’s significance in relation to modern state formation, globalization, and civil religion. Despite its slippage into pastness there is nothing to suggest, in short, that the echoes are silent, or that the French Revolution’s productiveness as a site for sociological reflection is yet exhausted.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution; Barricades; Culture and social movements; Marxism and social movements; Outcomes, cultural; Outcomes, political; Paris Commune; Revolutions; Russian Revolution; Social class and social movements.

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MONICA THRELFALL

Friedan is widely considered to be the founder of modern US feminism, and as this ushered in the second wave of feminism in Europe and later sparked off new first waves in many other countries until it became a worldwide movement, it is not surprising that Friedan sometimes claimed to have changed the course of human history. Certainly Friedan, born soon after World War I, was well in advance of her era’s thinking when she undertook her original project to examine whether housewives were happy with their lot. But her first book containing the bombshell of women’s pervasive discontent was also timely as it was published in the same year as the official Kennedy Commission on the Status of Women’s report American Women, which also questioned women’s exclusion from nondomestic life. The discrimination of women was on the agenda, and the moment for sex equality had come.

Born Elizabeth Goldstein in Peoria, Illinois, on February 4, 1921, Friedan experienced ostracization at school for being Jewish, retreating into the world of books – her father was said to have limited her to five a week. She became active in Marxist and Jewish circles from an early age. Upon attending Smith (1938–1942), an elite women’s college, Friedan felt snubbed by fellow students. A prize-winning scholar, she edited the college magazine and graduated summa cum laude as one of the best students of the year. After another scholarship to undertake graduate work in psychology, Friedan left academia for journalism, writing for left-wing and trade union publications, publishing scathing articles about women’s unequal pay and opportunities. Yet she was sacked by the United Electrical Workers Union in 1952 when discovered to be pregnant.

In the late 1950s Friedan made the discerning decision to get back in touch with her unloved Smith College contemporaries with a questionnaire about their lives. A classic piece of inductive research with no set hypothesis to test, the 200 responses revealed how 90 percent of these highly educated women felt empty. Living as housewives, they regretted using their minds so little – a frustration Friedan called “the problem that has no name.” Her initial article went unnoticed but her book about these revelations, The Feminine Mystique (1963), exposed the lie of feminine fulfillment as wife and mother, and went on to sell three million copies.

Friedan not only became one of the major activists for women’s liberation, but arguably had the highest national profile, as she was co-founder and first president of NOW, the National Organization for Women (1966); organizer of the nationwide Women’s Strike for Equality (1970); part of the team led by Gloria Steinem that established the National Women’s Political Caucus (1971); and one of the leaders of NARAL-National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (1969). The latter successfully pushed for the legalization of abortion, obtained through the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade decision.

After these groundbreaking successes, Friedan’s politics diverged from that of other leading feminists, tending toward conciliatory stances on abortion, lesbian rights, and pornography, in a bid to make the women’s movement more mainstream, to address employment issues, and to avoid divisive topics that generated political animosity and laid the movement open to the charge of extremism. She led NOW to distance itself from lesbian causes, which she is alleged to have called “the lavender menace” in 1969. As Marilyn French wrote of Friedan’s next book, It Changed My Life (1976), Friedan became a bridge between the conservative and radical elements of feminism because the movement she was instrumental in launching moved
toward a politics with which she could no longer fully identify. Her call for a dialogue between the sexes became clearer in *The Second Stage* (1982), in which Friedan expressed her conviction that heterosexual women should feel free to love men and be centrally involved with their children and family life. “Our failure was our blind spot about the family,” she claimed (203). It was “the new feminist frontier.” She was certainly prescient about the family problem, at least for European feminism as it turned in the 1990s to focus on family-friendly policies, reconciling employment with family life through extended maternity and parental leave schemes. By the turn of the century, the politics of care was key to feminism, as reflected in the slogan “Mothers Matter, Caregivers Count,” as NOW currently proclaims.

By the time of *Beyond Gender: The New Politics of Work and Family* (1997), Friedan had read and responded to the new economic era – controversially – by envisioning feminism leaving sexual politics behind to become part of a wider movement and discourse that would foreground the needs of women, men, and children against the forces that were making family life ever more difficult. She called for a more livable society in the face of corporate downsizing, joblessness, and diminishing incomes. Nonetheless, in her concern to address the majority of the public, she underplayed the oppressive side of family life and its frequent violence. But 15 years and a world crisis later, her perceptiveness regarding the deteriorating environment of family life in the United States remains well evidenced.

Friedan also used her exceptional intellectual powers on her own ageing process. At 72 she published the encyclopaedic *The Fountain of Age* (1993), some 700 pages that have the “readability of a novel,” as one reviewer put it. It too launched into new territory, configuring a new problem without a name, the age mystique. She decried the medical model of age that equated aging to overall decline, calling it an injustice to older workers that precipitates lost opportunities for all, and denounced the media’s blackout of images of anyone over 65. She developed psychotherapist Eric Ericson’s term *generativity* – the wholeness of age that enables the elderly to see their life in the image of a single branching tree, and to affirm all of it, surmounting past obsessions and delusions (614). She believed “The new explosion of human age has to have some function in the survival of the whole community, stretching into the future. In evolutionary terms, the function of age has to go beyond reproduction to contribute in some other way to the survival of the species” (637) – which contrasts markedly with the current paradigm.

Friedan made her definitive impact as a US civil society leader bolstered by her originality – being the first of her era to have key insights into women’s oppression, by her leadership ability to found nationwide organizations, and by her combination of scholarly brilliance with straightforward written expression. She possessed a journalistic openness to taking in facts on the ground – even when they were unpalatable to society (exclusive homemaking frustrates educated women) or to the US women’s movement (women want to marry men, bear their children, and nurture their family). With a powerful intellect fully at the service of the political cause, she pushed ahead of feminist contemporaries in her thinking. Katie Roiphe called her (US) feminism’s foremost visionary and thinker.

But unfortunately for feminism, she was unable to make lasting alliances with the leading US feminists and her political career was closed off by early disappointments. Though reputed to expect too much deference from others, over-emphasizing her singular personality – as Germaine Greer famously did in her hyper-critical 2006 obituary – is to miss the point. The respect due to Friedan lies in her perceptiveness regarding the problems she saw besetting society and her creativity in dealing with them, always seeking to throw light, avoid obfuscating language, and focus on political solutions. But by confining herself to writing she was unable to influence the socioeconomic trends she perceived as damaging to the lives...
of average women and men from the 1980s onward. Friedan died on February 4, 2006, aged 85, and is survived by her three children.

SEE ALSO: Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Leadership; National Organization for Women (NOW) (United States); Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Friends of the Earth
CLARE SAUNDERS

Now an international network with chapters in 76 countries uniting 5000 local groups and over two million members, Friends of the Earth (FoE) was first established in the United States in 1969 by David Brower. Brower was motivated by his disenchantment with the more moderate Sierra Club and the Audubon Society, which he considered were co-opted by corporate interests and weakened by the “wise use” agenda. Consequently, academic commentators have noted that the foundation of FoE marked the beginning of a “second wave” of environmentalism, more politically oriented and anticorporate than the “first wave” conservation organizations that preceded it (Dalton 1994).

In 1971, Brower set off across Europe to network FoE, beginning in Paris. Les Amis de Terre was the first European FoE organization to be founded, followed shortly afterward by FoE England. Although Brower would have liked the organizational structures of FoE US to be imported directly to the English chapter, the founders – drawn from existing green networks, including those behind the publications Resurgence and The Ecologist – resisted. They eventually agreed that so long as the organization worked within a remit conducive to the broader FoE agenda, they would be allowed to be a part of the network (Lamb 1996: 35–36). According to Sandbrook, FoE England’s first director, “the deal was simple, just ‘railway lines’ to live within” (in Lamb 1996: 38). The “railway lines” principle has continued to distinctly shape Friends of the Earth International (FoEI).

FoEI was established in 1971 by newly formed groups in France, Sweden, England and the United States to facilitate joint campaigns, initially against nuclear power. In 1981, the joint secretariat, which is currently based in Amsterdam and has around 15 staff members, was established to improve capacity for transnational campaigning.

The minimal requirements upon prospective members of FoEI are that they: have mechanisms for internal democracy; adhere to FoEI’s general mission; can and will contribute to at least one of FoEI’s campaigns; and that they have campaigning experience (Doherty 2006). These fairly nonprescriptive membership requirements result in stark differences between national FoE chapters. For example, BUND (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland), otherwise known as FoE Germany, and Amigos de la Tierra (FoE Spain) are both federations of previously existing environmental organizations, which, in the 1970s, expressed a willingness to take on board the more radical ambitions of second-wave environmentalism. Yet they drastically differ in size – FoE Germany has over 2000 local groups, and FoE Spain has only six. In contrast, FoE Philippines, also known as the Legal Rights & Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan, consists of a group of environmental lawyers, which networks with grassroots campaigners. This diversity is part of what makes FoE so distinct from other transnational environmental organizations like Greenpeace and WWF, which are much more hierarchical and considerably more prescriptive about the characteristics of their national chapters.

Not only is there organization diversity within FoEI, but there are also a range of ideological positions, different geographical settings and political climates, and variable degrees of power in the network. For example, many southern groups are ideologically opposed to the World Trade Organization, whereas others, such as FoE Canada, have entered into dialogue with it. Some country groups – like Colombia – are heavily repressed, and others are welcomed to sit on governmental round tables. Thus, it is hardly surprising...
that, despite the one-country one-vote policy in FoEI annual general meetings, some southern FoEI organizations have historically felt marginalized by what they had perceived to be a northern-dominated agenda. Doherty (2006), however, clarifies that, in practice, there is no simple north–south divide in FoEI. Indeed, some northern FoE organizations have overtly promoted southern agendas for some time (Rootes 2006). Despite disputes, the FoEI network has managed to sustain itself through its open, honest, and transparent conflict resolution and decision-making processes (Doherty 2006) and through having a broad mission statement.

The current mission of FoEI is to “mobilize, resist, transform” around its key campaigns on climate justice, food sovereignty, economic justice, forests and biodiversity, resisting oil and gas mining, and water. Its vision is:

A peaceful and sustainable world based on societies living in harmony with nature . . . This will be a society built upon people’s sovereignty and participation. It will be founded on social, economic, gender and environmental justice and free from all forms of domination and exploitation such as neoliberalism, corporate globalization, neo-colonialism and militarism. (www.foei.org)]

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Environmental movements; Greenpeace; Prefigurative politics; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Gandhi, Mahatma
(1869–1948)

LESTER R. KURTZ

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, often known as Mahatma Gandhi, is widely cited by contemporary activists as a source of inspiration and strategies. Gandhi was arguably unparalleled at mobilizing resources, taking advantage of – and creating – political opportunities, and effectively framing such messages as justice, equality, and independence or freedom (Swaraj, self-reliance). His legacy has almost become a cliché among movement organizers worldwide.

Raised in an Indian household, Gandhi was trained as a lawyer in London. His father was the diwan (chief minister) of a small princely state in the British Raj and his mother a pious Hindu with a tolerance for other traditions; this combination of faith and politics shaped his activism. Experiencing raw racism in South Africa while working as an attorney for a Muslim trading firm, Gandhi developed a repertoire of resistance that became a mainstay of social movements. On September 11, 1906, he launched his first campaign of nonviolent noncooperation with a new law that required all Indians to carry an identity pass manifesting their second-class citizenship. He transformed the traditional Hindu idea of a spiritual community, the ashram, into a base for movement organizing, bringing together people across religious, cultural, class, and caste divisions in a way that decades later inspired civil rights activists in the United States.

Gandhi was traditional, although far from orthodox. He incorporated multiple traditions into his worldview and strategies – Hindu, Christian, Islamic, Jain, Buddhist, and ironically, secular British legal theory. He was, as Erikson points out, always a “counterplayer,” a scathing critic and paradigm challenger, not only of the British Empire but of Western industrial civilization. His drawing from these cultural traditions was not just a matter of ideology but a use of cultural capital for mobilizing institutions on behalf of social movements, primarily the Indian independence movement, but also on behalf of women’s liberation and the reform of the caste system, as well as the construction of a new nonviolent, just social order. Central elements of his strategies came from those spiritual traditions, refashioned for purposes of movement mobilization: the tactics of the fast (hunger strike) and pilgrimage-marches, daily prayer meetings to mobilize and inform adherents of ongoing actions and to build movement solidarity, and the frames he used to reach out to multiple audiences from the Indian masses to Hindu and Muslim communities, British Christians, and others, were all transformed elements of these traditional cultures that he made revolutionary.

At the root of Gandhi’s success in mobilizing against British colonialism in his native India, the “Jewel in the Crown,” was his concept of noncooperation and nonviolent resistance, what he called Satyagraha, literally holding fast to the Truth (Satya) or nonviolent struggle – sometimes called Truth Force or Soul Force. This approach synthesizes the two contradictory ethical traditions about how to respond to injustice, the warrior and the pacifist. The Gandhian activist fights like the warrior but, like the pacifist, avoids harming.

Armed only with this idea of nonviolent struggle and a set of strategies and tactics for noncooperation with the colonial system, Gandhi mobilized the great mass of the Indian population. He transformed the independence struggle from one between a small group of indigenous and colonial elites, plus a few marginal armed insurgents against the military might of the British Empire, into a mass struggle of the Indian people, testing the
ability of occupying forces to control an entire population that refused to cooperate. In the end, people power prevailed, as it more often does, as Stephan and Chenoweth demonstrate in their book *Why Civil Resistance Works* that compares success rates of Gandhian-style nonviolent resistance with violent insurrections over a century. The major determining variable for success of campaigns to end a foreign occupation, overthrow a dictator, or secede, was the level of participation. Gandhian nonviolent resistance was more successful in mobilizing activists because of lower physical, moral, and information barriers to engagement in a campaign for change.

Gandhi’s strategies and tactics were skillfully framed to create opportunities in the face of overwhelming political and military control of the British Empire. The two key campaigns—the Cloth Boycott and the Salt March—were highly symbolic but also “framed,” as Snow et al. (1986) put it, to confront the power structure. At the core of his approach was an understanding of power that challenged political realism: power grows out of multiple sources, not just the state and its military, and even the tyrant cannot rule without the consent of the governed. By refusing to cooperate, a system is rendered ungovernable.

Gandhi’s call for a boycott of British cloth in 1920 strategically attacked the British system built on the technological advances of its textile industry that relied on raw materials from and markets in its colonies. Rather than buying British cloth, Gandhi declared, Indians should make their own, simultaneously giving people an opportunity to resist British exploitation, participate in the independence movement in a low-risk but visible way, and benefit themselves, the movement, and Indian society at large economically. The spinning wheel became a low-risk symbol of resistance while simultaneously mobilizing unused labor resources for economic development.

Gandhi’s Salt March in 1930 was dramatic and symbolic noncooperation, strategically focused on a specific goal that mobilized widespread participation and prompted civil disobedience that overloaded the colonial system and its prisons, all the while inspiring and empowering people to act. Marching through the Indian countryside with an entourage that increased daily, Gandhi was met by spinning freedom fighters and local officials whom Gandhi called upon to resign their posts in the Raj. He involved women and “untouchables” in the movement, crossing gender and caste lines to transform fundamental aspects of Indian society in a way that far outlasted the movement, although some criticized him for broadening the agenda beyond independence, bringing in other issues.

The marchers arrived at the Indian Ocean on the anniversary of a bloody massacre of unarmed demonstrators by British troops at Amritsar a decade earlier. As Gandhi picked up salt from the shore in defiance of British law, he engaged in a type of repression management that takes advantage of what Smithey and Kurtz (1999) call the “paradox of repression,” in that efforts to clamp down on a movement often backfire against a regime, creating internal divisions and moving public opinion in favor of the opposition. The march itself became a memorial highlighting the injustice of the massacre and British rule itself, which attempted to control even the daily lives of South Asians who relied on salt as a preservative.

Gandhi’s rethinking of conflict and power had an impact on social movement theory and strategies for decades to come. Noted conflict scholar Johan Galtung argues that Gandhi is to conflict what Einstein and Newton are to physics—he gave us an altogether new paradigm for thinking about contentious politics as something positive. Conflict is not necessarily to be resolved, but can be creative and should sometimes be provoked, although carried out nonviolently. His understanding of power involves a similar challenge of conventional thinking. Moreover, one should (1) respect one’s opponents as people, fighting the structure rather than those who represent it; (2) refuse to cooperate with unjust power (noncooperation); and (3) create alternative
systems of power through nonviolent civil resistance.

Gandhi’s legacies in the field of social movements are iconic, if often misunderstood and debated, they are used to legitimate campaigns by everyone from Martin Luther King Jr and the American civil rights struggle to the 1989 East European revolutions, the 2011 Arab uprisings, and the 2011 Occupy Movement, but were also quoted at the United Nations by US President Ronald Reagan.

The Indian Freedom movement inspired anticolonial movements elsewhere, with some movements explicitly modeled after Gandhi’s, notably Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere’s, the latter claiming that Gandhi’s success “made the British lose the will to cling to empire.” A. Philip Randolph, Mordecai Johnson, Benjamin Mays, and other African-Americans began exploring Gandhi’s mobilizing techniques as early as the 1920s and a Yale Seminar on the Negro Church in 1931 passed a resolution contending that African-American churches should develop “a type of leadership that would do for America and the Negro race what Gandhi has done for India and what Jesus has done for the world.” Gandhi-mentored activists George Houser and Bayard Rustin tutored Dr King and the Montgomery Improvement Society on Gandhian tactics, and the American Friends Service Committee sent the Kings to India to consult with Gandhi’s colleagues. Human rights and ecological movements drew upon Gandhi’s inspirations, strategies, and tactics worldwide, disseminated through religious institutions (especially churches), NGOs, and various committed activists.

Whereas King baptized Gandhi’s nonviolence, giving it a Christian frame, American scholar Gene Sharp secularized and systematized it after spending time studying Gandhi in India in the 1940s. Coretta Scott King wrote the foreword to his first book on Gandhi as a political strategist, and his three-volume outline of The Politics of Nonviolent Action published in 1972–1974 analyzed Gandhi’s theory of power and change, providing historical examples of 198 categories of nonviolent actions that had had some impact when used by various movements worldwide.

Sharp criticized Gandhi for his religious rhetoric and spiritual aura, as well as his personal charisma, claiming they were counterproductive, especially when trying to diffuse civil resistance strategies and tactics to other resistance movements globally. His later elaborations of nonviolent civil resistance were translated into many languages and used by activists to challenge dictators and shake power structures; his From Dictatorship to Democracy continued to guide many of those who shaped the 2011 insurgencies from Cairo to New York.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Boycotts; Charisma; Civil disobedience; Civil rights movement (United States); Decolonization and social movements; Direct action; Framing and social movements; Indian Independence Movement; King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Pacifism; Satyagraha; Social control errors; Social movements in India; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Gay and lesbian movement

STEPHEN VALOCCHI

The gay and lesbian movement refers to the manifold collective efforts to benefit people with same-sex desire. A movement for gays and lesbians could not have happened until “the homosexual” emerged as a distinct person rather than just a set of acts. This occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the result of the efforts of sexologists to define and control nonnormative sexual and gender practices in Europe and the United States. Although an organized movement to reverse the negative discourse of the sexologists first appeared in Germany in the late nineteenth century, this effort was short-lived. The first sustained activities, organizations, and network-building for the positive recognition of lesbians and gays and the improvement of their social and political conditions appeared in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s with the establishment of three organizations: the Mattachine Society, the organization for men which devoted itself mainly to social support in a climate of profound public hostility; the Daughters of Bilitis, the organization that concerned itself with the unique challenges of women with same-sex desire at a time when women were supposed to be dependent on men for economic and social support; and One Inc. which existed only as a monthly magazine and promoted the view that gay people, rather than psychiatrists or lawyers, are the most qualified to speak for themselves. With the exception of One Inc., these organizations stressed respectability and the desire to be accepted into mainstream society.

In the 1960s, the gay and lesbian movement entered a new phase as social movements created a more militant climate for disenfranchised groups in the United States and forced the movement to shift its focus, strategy, and goals. Although this shift happened at different rates in different locations, the iconic event credited with this shift to a more liberation-based social movement was the Stonewall riots of late June 1969 when a routine police raid on a gay bar in Greenwich Village in New York City met resistance by the patrons and sparked several nights of rioting. In its aftermath, the movement devoted itself to two somewhat conflicting goals: the pursuit of civil rights reforms such as the passage of antidiscrimination legislation and the elimination of sodomy laws, as well as demands for more fundamental social change aimed at eradicating heterosexism and sexual repression. By the end of the 1970s the liberationist impulse dissipated but a rights-based approach proved somewhat more successful. Regardless of the particular goal – liberationist or reformist – the movement embraced the strategy of “coming out of the closet,” making public one’s identity as gay or lesbian. This assertion of a collective identity proved beneficial to the movement since it gave gays and lesbians access to the language of pride, history, and shared oppression used by other minority groups.

The development of the movement during this time cannot be told without reference to the tensions between men and women in the movement and to their subsequently different trajectories of community building. Post-Stonewall collaboration between men and women was sporadic as women experienced homophobia in women’s liberation groups and sexism in male-led gay groups. Nonetheless, the profound influence of the women’s movement led many women to build lesbian feminist organizations defined more by women’s resistance to patriarchy than by women’s sexual desire for other women. This tendency led in the 1980s to the development of women-identified institutions, from bookstores and cafes to sexual assault and rape crisis centers. During this
same time gay men were building their own networks of community institutions but these were of a more commercialized nature in the form of bars, nightclubs, neighborhoods, and sex clubs. Both types of community building proved useful in creating an infrastructure for future mobilizations.

Given the association of gay men with a liberalized sexual culture and lesbians with feminism it is not surprising that the visibility of the gay and lesbian movement in the late seventies and eighties led to the rise of a significant countermovement in the form of the religious Right. This countermovement complicated the terrain of the movement and forced it to re-orient its rhetoric, strategies, and goals to respond to the claims of this organized opposition. Perhaps more important, many of the campaigns by the religious Right directed at state and local civil rights laws and ordinances were successful in reviving the rhetoric of immorality from the earlier pre-Stonewall era. The election of a conservative Republican administration in 1980 also left the gay and lesbian movement vulnerable and the community without political support when AIDS starting killing thousands of gay men.

The AIDS epidemic had several consequences for the movement. First, issues of treatment, care, and funding came to dominate the agenda of the movement in the eighties and early nineties. Second, it led to the establishment of a dense network of AIDS service, advocacy, and treatment organizations that emerged fairly rapidly due to the already established community- and health-based resources of the gay and lesbian community. Third, its widespread impact brought many more people “out of the closet” and into the movement and propelled the movement into a period of heightened mobilization. Fourth, because of the involvement of many lesbians in this new mobilization and in those care-giving organizations, it led to a closer association between men and women in movement initiatives than had been the case since the 1970s.

The epidemic was also partly responsible for a brief but notable shift in focus for some segments of the movement in the 1990s. Dissatisfied with the narrowly rights-focused, assimilation-based goals of the movement, a new militancy invigorated the movement, first in the form of ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), then with organizations such as Queer Nation and the Lesbian Avengers. These organizations rejected the standard definitions of gay, claimed the more nonnormative moniker of “queer,” and embraced direct-action strategies that were directed both at social institutions like the government and the medical establishment and at the general culture seen by these activists as homophobic, sexist, and anti-pleasure.

Various internal challenges also characterized the movement at this time all of which signaled a loosening of the dominant identity categories of gay and lesbian. Women and men of color, bisexuals, and transgendered activists challenged the white middle class nature of the movement and its notion of a fixed identity defined by sex of object choice and insisted the movement take their concerns seriously. These fissures became visible in the organizing for the national marches on Washington, DC in 1979, 1987, and 1993. Many women in the nineties also rebelled against the rigid definitions of lesbian feminism by rejecting the androgynous styles and sex-negative attitudes of some segments of this community, embracing leather and s/m sexual repertoires, and reviving and re-eroticizing butch-femme modes of style and embodiment.

The most recent developments in the lesbian and gay movement can be understood against the backdrop of the somewhat more favorable political climate of the 1990s and 2000s, the repeal of sodomy laws in 2004, the heightened cultural visibility of gays and lesbians in the media, and the growth of centralized advocacy organizations. Taken together these developments led the movement to pursue several top-down policy initiatives. The issue of gays in the military consumed much of the movement’s attention throughout this period,
first in organizing to push President Clinton to make good on his campaign promise to end discrimination against gays and lesbians, then in trying to undo the damage done by Clinton’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy which had the effect of expelling from the military men and women who expressed any statement of same-sex desire or affiliation. These efforts continued until 2010 when Congress finally voted to repeal the directive; implementation, however, has been delayed pending “further investigation.”

The movement and the nation have also been captivated by the push to legalize same-sex marriage in the United States. Partly in response to court challenges in Hawaii and Massachusetts, the movement has marshaled tremendous resources to support these lawsuits, but also to prevent anti-same-sex marriage bills from being introduced into state legislatures and in Congress, and more recently to push for legally recognized “bona fide” same-sex marriage. Both of these policy initiatives – gays in the military and same-sex marriage – signal a return to a rights-based, assimilation-focused orientation to the gay and lesbian movement. This shift has also relegated other pressing issues of concern to the margins of the movement.

Until the late 1980s with a couple of exceptions (Altman 1993; Adam 1978), the gay and lesbian movement was not systematically studied by sociologists. Until that time homosexuality was mainly studied in the context of deviance, subcultural formations, and the formation of a homosexual identity via symbolic interaction. It was mainly the impact of the social movements of the sixties that transformed sociology’s understanding of homosexuality from a deviance perspective to the study of a minority group. It was also due to the development of theoretical frameworks that viewed collective action not as a consequence of collective alienation and irrational exuberance but as (organized and rational) politics by other means. The resource mobilization and political process approaches to social movements called attention to the structure of opportunities in the political environment and the quantity and quality of resources of the constituency which in turn affect the emergence and success of social movements directed mainly at the state. New social movement approaches emphasize a wide array of post-scarcity movements sometimes organized on the basis of social identities and directed not primarily to the state but to challenge “stigmatizing public discourses and representations” (Seidman 1993: 108). More recently, social constructionist perspectives that emphasize the symbolic and interactive nature of all aspects of social movements have been revived and revised as a corrective to the overly rationalist basis of these earlier approaches.

Since the 1980s sociologists who have studied the movement have focused on five sets of issues. The first set involves research on the structural conditions that led to the emergence of an organized movement. This research has stressed the importance of the rise of industrial capitalism, changes in the nature of the family accompanying capitalism, the impact of bureaucracy on intimacy among men, and the rise of medical science. These factors taken together had contradictory consequences: on the one hand, they created the contexts whereby individuals with same-sex eroticism could turn desire and practices into an identity and find others in urban areas that did the same. On the other hand, these same factors named the identity as pathological, established a medical and regulatory apparatus to police the identity, and created the (homo)phobia regarding expressions of same-sex emotional intimacy or sexual expression. These conditions generated the political opportunities or threats, resources and organizations, and grievances that led to mobilization on the basis of a sexual identity.

A second set of issues involves research on the goals of the movement. The initial impulse of the movement had been the desire to change the way the culture views homosexuality: the movement emerged in a society that saw homosexuality as sin, sickness, or crime. Later, the movement shifted to working for civil rights through the state and other social institutions.
This dual emphasis of the movement on changing culture and changing laws and policies makes it an interesting case study for sociologists since it allows them to engage issues of reform versus structural change, assimilation versus transformation. Work on this issue has focused on specifying the historically variable conditions which influence whether movement actors will focus on politics, culture, or some combination of the two. This research strategy brings together the concerns of political process and resource mobilization approaches with political climate, resources and networks, and the concerns of new social movements’ and social constructionist perspectives on changing norms and belief systems and with building a collective identity.

The third set of research issues involves the ways that the movement constructs and reconstructs collective identity. Collective identity refers to the “shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences and solidarity” (Taylor & Whittier 1992: 172). Another unique feature of the gay and lesbian movement derived from the socially constructed nature of sexuality is its concern with defining the constituency: who is the “we” that the movement represents? This feature has proven more pressing as conflicts between men and women, between whites and people of color, and battles over the inclusion of bisexuals, transgendered, and intersexed persons have taken place. These battles are about the collective identity of the movement. Research on this issue seeks to explain how the boundaries are established and who gets to police them. It focuses on the material, organizational, and symbolic factors such as the class interests supporting the collective identity, the organizational structure that prevents other competing definitions from taking shape, and the symbolic messages embedded in the collective identity about “respectability” that is then communicated to the larger culture.

Related to this set of issues is a fourth focus on framing. Framing refers to “an interpretive schemata” (Snow & Benford (1992): 137) that distills the message or messages of the movement for several purposes: to recruit a constituency, create a collective identity, craft strategy, and gain outside support. Framing is fraught with dilemmas for all social movements since frames try to satisfy a number of potentially conflicting agendas. For the gay and lesbian movement this is particularly significant given its framing as both a political and cultural movement, the fractious nature of the collective identity, and the strength of the countermovement. Research on this issue has typically demonstrated the tensions occurring between a civil rights framing strategy – a dominant frame of many social movements – and other strategies derived from the varied nature of the movement. Frames such as sexual liberation or institutional heterosexism have competed with the civil rights frame and these competing frames rise and fall in tandem with internal struggles around collective identity and the external opportunity structure. More recent research on the “decision-making processes” of the movement has rejected the overly rationalist assumptions of the framing approach and has reintroduced anger, shame, frustration, grief, and other emotions as important determinants of the shape of collective action.

A fifth focus is the impact of queer theory and politics on the study of the gay and lesbian movement. Queer theory has called attention to the instability of sex and gender categories and stresses the performative nature of identities thought to be rooted in anatomy or culture. Queer politics extends this deconstructive analysis and critiques the gay and lesbian movement for its essentialist definition of sexual identity and its stabilization and normalization of the identities of gay and lesbian. According to this critique, identity-based strategies for social change deny the fluidity inherent in sexuality and invalidate the experiences of others with nonnormative sexuality that may not easily fit the class and race or Western-inflected definition of the identity. In addition, identity-based strategies reinforce the boundaries between gay and straight, man and woman, and thus reproduce the hierarchical relationship between the dominant and
the subordinate terms of the sex/gender system. This challenge to the essentialist model of sexual identity of the traditional gay and lesbian movement was first made by ACT UP with its boundary-crossing and label-disrupting tactics and by bisexual and transgendered people who exemplify the kind of boundary-crossing embraced by queer politics.

Research on the movement that has used queer insights has focused on the internal and external pressures that influence when identity-stabilizing and identity-deconstructing frames and strategies will be used noting both the concrete gains made through interest-group politics and the cultural challenges made through identity blurring queer politics. These insights have also been used to assess the subtle but effective normalizing work that takes place inside gay and lesbian politics and organizations. A queer-inflected understanding of social movements has also broadened the repertoire of collective action to include strategies such as political theater, performance art, music, and drag. This broadening dovetails with the cultural concerns of the movement as well as with the deconstruction of sexual and gender identities that now inform some segments of the contemporary movement. The challenge for sociologists in our future work is to extend, refocus, or alter our theoretical models of emergence, development, and impact to explain collective action repertoires as diverse as the sit-down strikes of the 1930s and the drag shows of the twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO: ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power); Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; Identity politics; New social movements and new social movement theory; Political process theory; Resource mobilization theory; Rights and rights movements; Stonewall riots (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Global Justice Movement

CHRISTOPHER ROOTES and NIKOS SOTIRAKOPOULOS

The “Global Justice Movement” (GJM) has been employed as an umbrella term to denote a diverse constellation of organizations, groups, and networks, working with varying degrees of cooperation on a broad range of issues – from the indebtedness of the world’s poorest countries, the inequities of the global trade in goods and services, international peace and environmental degradation, to the human rights of workers and immigrants, especially in less economically developed countries. These issues are linked by an emerging consensus amongst activists that their root cause is the neoliberal agenda, or “Washington consensus” (George 2003), that dominates global economic arrangements.

The term does not command a consensus among analysts and commentators, but coexists with a variety of others frequently used to denote all or part of the same range of issues, actors, and forms of action. Thus the terms “antiglobalization movement,” “alterglobalization movement,” “alternative globalization movement,” “movement for democratization from below,” and “movement of movements” have been and continue to be used, especially, but not only, by activists. Each of these terms, however, has disadvantages: “antiglobalization” is insufficiently discriminating insofar as it suggests opposition to all the dimensions of globalization when, in fact, GJM activists embrace and celebrate many aspects of globalization, including intercultural communication and relatively unfettered migration; it is specifically neoliberal globalization to which they object. GJM activists are then enthusiasts for a different or alternative globalization, hence the term “alterglobalization,” whose principal disadvantage is that it has no meaning in colloquial English.

“Alternative globalization movement,” however, is too imprecise to have meaning beyond activist circles. The “movement for democratization from below” adequately characterizes only one aspect of the movement, and is silent about the element of just distribution of resources and opportunities that animates most GJM activists, while “movement of movements” is insufficiently specific about the range of movements that are embraced by the GJM.

If the constellation of groups and concerns that is embraced by the GJM is broad, so too is its action repertoire – or, more precisely, the action repertoires of the various groups and individuals who are networked in the movement. These range from the direct and sometimes illegal, occasionally even violent, actions of autonomous “affinity groups,” to the organized lobbying of conventionally organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Following Diani’s (1992) “consensual” definition of a social movement, we conceive of the GJM as a network of formal and informally organized organizations and individuals who have in common a concern to campaign or protest, in one way or another, against the global neoliberal agenda, and who are engaged in collective action toward that end. This definition allows us to cast the net fairly wide, and allows for cross-national and temporal variation in the composition of campaign coalitions and activist networks, and the forms of action in which they are engaged, and the specific targets to which their action is addressed.

While this conception of the GJM may differ from activists’ views of the “direct action” or “anticapitalist” movement, it allows us to chart important changes in NGOs and other movement organizations as they have become increasingly aware of the nondemocratic nature of the institutions of the international financial, economic, and trading system that relentlessly pursue the neoliberal agenda, and its effects upon the issues with which those NGOs and
movement organizations are particularly concerned. NGOs working on trade, development, aid, racism/immigration, human rights, environmental, and peace issues are increasingly networked one with another, within nation-states and transnationally, and increasingly they challenge the key institutions of global capitalism. Although their linkages with more informal activist groups and “disorganizations” may not be close or stable, to restrict our conception of the GJM to such less formal activist groupings would be to omit from consideration organizations that give continuity to the movement between major protest events and that act as intermediaries in the translation of popular and activist opinion into formal politics.

The movement is, then, pluriform and diverse, a heterogeneous network linking local, national, and international campaigns on various issues arising from or associated with the numerous alleged evils of neoliberal globalization, which include: intensified exploitation (a global “race to the bottom” in wages and social welfare); increasing social inequality; political inequality (within states and among them); cultural homogenization; and increased environmental destruction (Kiely 2005: 166).

THE GJM: BEGINNINGS

The roots of the GJM extend far back into European history. The international socialist movement can be seen as a precursor; not only was it centrally concerned with justice for those who were disadvantaged by the capitalist system and the terms of trade that capitalist states imposed upon the world, but it was virtually global in its reach, mobilizing, or attempting to mobilize, not only the industrial workers of the most industrialized capitalist states, but extending solidarity to the colonized peoples of the capitalist periphery, actively recruiting intellectuals and activists from among them, and seeking to mobilize on a truly global scale. If the international socialist movement was compromised and divided by the pathologies of Soviet communism, it survived in most countries as a significant current in intellectual and activist life, if only rarely as a major player in mainstream electoral politics. Some of its influence was, nevertheless, continued in dilute form in the politics of social democratic and labor parties and trades unions, notably in Western Europe. The influence of the socialist, social democratic, and labor movements is apparent in the modern GJM, but it is conjoined with other strands.

The modern GJM has often been dated from the “Siege of Seattle” of November 1999, when between 30,000 and 90,000 people, drawn from or mobilized by a broad coalition of campaigners, including anarchists, leftists, trade-unionists, environmentalists, religious groups, NGOs, local and international activists, and violent and nonviolent protesters, besieged the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference. Seattle was, however, the sensation that caught the attention of the mass media rather than a true beginning. In the immediately preceding years, there had been mobilizations against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the recourse of transnational corporations to sweatshop labor to produce consumer goods, and numerous protests in the global South against privatization and corporate exploitation. The battle in Seattle may have taken the media by surprise, but it was the product of months of planning and organizing, had antecedents in various prior campaigns, and reflected broader social, economic, and political changes (Bhaskar 2011).

A major inspiration for these acts of rebellion in the global North and, for many, the symbolic starting point of the GJM, was, however, a movement in the global South: the Zapatista uprising in the Mexican province of Chiapas. The transnational Zapatista solidarity network both helped to sustain the rebellion in Chiapas and, in its opposition to the NAFTA, was one of the bases from which other protests against neoliberal globalization were organized, often with the aid of the then
new communications technologies of the Internet (Olesen 2004). The international Zapatista encuentros (encounters) in 1996 in Chiapas and 1997 in Spain attracted activists from over 40 countries and forged links between Mexican peasants, landless Brazilians, and Indian farmers, amongst others. One development from these was People’s Global Action, a network dedicated to unmediated interaction, diffusion of information, and coordinating actions globally among autonomous groups and grassroots movements committed to direct action and civil disobedience as the most effective form of struggle against encroaching capitalism.

THE RADICAL STRAND OF THE GJM

For some critics, the anticapitalist and direct activist strand of the GJM, having borrowed many elements from earlier new social movements, is essentially antipolitical, focusing on symbolic and cultural forms of resistance because that, its advocates believe, is where the relations of power are rooted, rather than in conventional political arenas and institutions (Morland 2004: 32). As John Holloway (2005: 17), a writer influential in radical circles of the movement, put it: “what is at issue in the revolutionary transformation of the world is not whose power it is, but the very existence of power.”

For such observers, the central locus of the GJM is not the realm of the political but that of civil society, indeed that of a global civil society constituted by “a supranational sphere of social and political participation in which citizens, groups, social movements, and individuals, engage in dialogue, debate, confrontation, and negotiation with each other and with various governmental actors – international, national, and local – as well as the business world” (Anheier, Glasius, & Kaldor 2001: 4). This global civil society is contentious and open-ended, and it is itself a product of globalization.

From the point of view of an activist, this global civil society “refers to active citizenship, to growing self-organization outside formal political circles, and expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure” (Mary Kaldor, cited in Kiely 2005: 198). One can understand the movement only by seeing how “its dynamics have been shaped by an underlying and quite ferocious contest over people’s interpretations and understandings of the supposed benefits of neoliberal economic policies” (Ayres 2004: 11). This “ferocious contest,” it is suggested, finds fertile ground in the emergent global civil society, for the movement considers the “mobilization of popular opinion” against the elites of the globalization process to be its most successful weapon.

The foundation of this global civil society is a transformed political economy. In the era of immaterial labor, biopolitical production by labor is characterized by autonomy (workers not needing capital in the course of immaterial production, irrespective of whether capital then comes and parasitically appropriates the products of such production) and cooperation (drawing from and at the same time producing common knowledge), a cooperation which is facilitated by rhizomatous horizontal networks. It follows then that these three – autonomy, cooperation, and horizontal networks – will also be the characteristics of the movement that challenges the neoliberal political-economic order or “Empire” (Hardt & Negri 2009: 353).

Similarly, for Chase-Dunn and Gills (2005: 53), the characteristics and values of the movement are: the struggle for social justice; inclusiveness (especially of those marginalized in or by the dominant neoliberal order); solidarity; equality; diversity and unwillingness to be subsumed under a single identity; peace and nonviolence; loose organizational networks; and its ad hoc nature.

These characteristics are mirrored in the movement’s distinctively prefigurative politics (Carter & Morland 2004: 87). The movement is not a means toward an apocalyptic utopian end; rather, it is mostly an endless process
of experimentation and a quest for ways in which tomorrow’s dreams can be realized in the present and how the movement itself can be a model for a free world. The by now clichéd motto “be the change you want to see in the world” is embodied in this radical strand of the GJM.

It is this creative, prefigurative politics that led Hardt and Negri (2009: 102) to argue that the best term to denote the movement was not “antiglobalization” but “alterglobalization,” as it embodies not only resistance to globalization, but also an alternative to it. The movement has not, however, proposed a holistic alternative model to the neoliberal capitalist paradigm. Its major slogan – “another world is possible” – signifies that the movement does not purport to prescribe a model for the future. Certainly, parts of the movement have made specific proposals: Attac (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l’Aide aux Citoyens or “Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens”) proposes a global tax on financial transactions in order to fund the alleviation of poverty and inequality; and the participatory economics project, PARECON, has detailed plans for the organization of society and economy in a future free society (Albert 2004). The inherent problem with these projects, however, is that they appear as isolated plans lacking any structural and holistic strategy for change. The radical camp is not lacking in plans and ideas for the future. What it seems to lack is a strategy for realizing such plans.

This is not to suggest that the movement has not been tactically innovative. Graeber (2002: 66) celebrates the novelty and the imaginative aspects of the movement because, through its organizational characteristics, it paves new paths for activism: “The effort to destroy existing paradigms is usually quite self-conscious.” Where once it seemed that the only alternatives to marching along with signs were either Gandhian nonviolent civil disobedience or outright insurrection, groups like the Direct Action Network, Reclaim the Streets, Black Block, or Tute Bianche have all, in their own ways, been trying to map out a completely new territory in between. They are attempting to invent what many call a “new language” of civil disobedience, combining elements of street theater, festival, and what can only be called nonviolent warfare. Graeber mainly refers here to the anarchist strand of the movement, but this new language of civil disobedience is indeed one of the main characteristics of the GJM.

The result is a rich and growing panoply of organizational instruments – spokescouncils, affinity groups, facilitation tools, breakouts, fishbowls, blocking concerns, vibe-watchers and so on – all aimed at creating forms of democratic process that allow initiatives to rise from below and attain maximum effective solidarity, without stifling dissenting voices, creating leadership positions or compelling anyone to do anything which they have not freely agreed to do. (Graeber 2002: 71)

Predictably, as also happened with the radical movements of the 1960s onward, such a movement comes with its own subcultural expression, one distinctive characteristic of which is the carnivalesque and grotesque attitude in protest (Langman & Halnon 2005: 273).

In many respects, the radical strand of the GJM marks a conspicuous revival of anarchism as a political philosophy and practice: “Anarchism is the heart of the movement, its soul; the source of most of what’s new and hopeful about it” (Graeber 2002: 62). From the mid-1990s, the world has seen “the full revival of a global anarchist movement on a scale and on levels of unity and diversity unseen since the 1930s. From anti-capitalist social centers and eco-feminist farms to community-organizing, blockades of international summits, daily direct actions and a mass of publications and websites – anarchy lives at the heart of the global movement” (Gordon 2008: 3). Indeed, the three key elements of modern production presented by Hardt and Negri – cooperation, autonomy, and network organization – immediately bring to mind anarchist principles (Juris 2008).
The anarchist strand of the GJM has undoubtedly given fresh air to radical movements, as it triggered an international wave of protest which was probably unique in its geographical extent and the hopes it inspired. The movement consciously attempted to learn lessons from the struggles of those in the South, notably the Zapatistas, who might be considered to constitute an informal vanguard of the movement. The movement thus became a platform where the South met the North, a forum where various radical ideologies coexisted and co-developed. But did it have any tangible success? In the short term, its aim was the blocking of the conferences of economic elite institutions such as the IMF, WTO, and G8. Partially successful though this was, elite summits keep happening, the only difference being that for some time they were held in places such as Qatar, which are comfortably remote from any possibility of significant protest. Although many considered this a victory, it did nothing to impede capitalist elites from making decisions and continuing to affect the fates of billions of people. The second, midterm target was the destruction of the consensus around neoliberalism and the delegitimization of organizations such as the IMF. Yet, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, although it is not uncontested, neoliberalism appears as vigorous as ever and the role of the IMF has been enhanced. The long-term aims – the smashing of capitalism and the state – seem as remote from realization as ever.

What prevented the radical antiglobalization movement from achieving even limited victories? Chase-Dunn and Gills (2005: 54) point to four interrelated absences: of coherent ideology, of strategy, of formal organization, and of a political platform. The movement spent a lot of time dealing with issues of internal organization and its prefigurative politics, thus avoiding such “dangerous” questions and, despite its rhetoric, set the threshold low. It celebrated the fact that it posed a degree of resistance, without actually examining how successful this resistance has been. There was considerable emphasis on big events such as counterdemonstrations at large elite meetings but such “summit hopping” (Gordon 2008: 3), whilst it produced some powerful images, neither produced any politics nor ensured any continuity. Even Naomi Klein, one of the main instigators and voices of the movement, lam- pooned “summit hopping” protesters as “a movement of meeting stalkers, following the trade bureaucrats as if they were the Grateful Dead” (cited in Kiely 2005: 215).

The ad hoc coalitions that took their names from the dates of the protests they organized – J18, N30, A16, S11, S26 – left little trace beyond archived web sites. However, although summits such as those at Seattle, Genoa, Gothenburg, and Prague were moments when the radical movement was most visible, the GJM includes many other less demonstrative forms of protest, campaigns, and activism, such as those for relief from or cancellation of international debt, the rights of indigenous peoples, environmental protection and justice, protests against the construction of roads and dams, Internet activism, the building of co-ops, infoshops, and alternative media (Kiely 2005: 160).

**NGOs**

To focus upon the direct action networks that have engaged in protest at international summits is to overlook the long process of development of humanitarian, aid, trade, and development NGOs that gathered speed in the years following World War II, and the stages through which such NGOs went as they developed successively more radical analyses of the poverty and injustice they sought to relieve, and correspondingly more ambitious and more overtly political interventions to address those ills (Saunders 2009).

It also overlooks the more proximate development of Jubilee 2000, a Christian-inspired transnational campaign to cancel the debts of the poorest countries and its successors (Rootes & Saunders 2007), which combined lobbying
with mass activism, and inspired the Drop the Debt campaign leading up to the G8 Summit in Genoa in 2001. Aid, trade, development, and humanitarian NGOs were also involved in street protests as well as lobbying at subsequent summit meetings, media coverage of which focused upon the more contentious protests of radical activists.

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION

The GJM has not had the same character or followed the same trajectory in every country in which it has developed.

One of the more prominent of the new organizations association with the GJM, the Attac network, was founded in France in 1998 but thereafter spread to over 40 countries. Campaigning for the introduction of a “Tobin tax” on financial transactions, and for “the regulation of financial markets, the closure of tax havens, the introduction of global taxes to finance global public goods, the cancellation of the debt of developing countries, fair trade, and the implementation of limits to free trade and capital flows” (www.attac.org/en/overview, accessed Sept. 10, 2011), Attac quickly became important in France and, after a false start, in Germany (Kolb 2005), but not in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the most distinctive organizational innovation of the GJM was the development of the World Social Forum (WSF) and its national, regional and local derivatives. The WSF was set up as a deliberate riposte to the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland. An umbrella embracing all the diverse strands of the GJM – including Old Left parties, new movements, human-rights organizations, environmental NGOs, and others – the first WSF in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001 attracted 12,000 people. Supported by substantial funding from the Ford Foundation, by the mid-2000s, WSFs in various locations in Asia and Africa as well as South America, were attracting up to 150,000 participants, drawn mostly from countries of the global South, but also including many from the global North. These social forums assembled the many strands of the movement for discussion and to share information, but they were also occasions for demonstrative protest according to timetables set by the movement itself.

From their beginnings in the global South, social forums spread first to Europe, where European Social Forums have been held at least biannually since 2002, and later to the United States. Despite their success in the South, their progress in the North has been uneven: in Italy they flowered briefly before declining, and in the United Kingdom they never became established. Nevertheless, social forums persist at local level in many countries.

It has been suggested that the movement in the United States was cut short by the refo-cusing of media attention and the challenge of mobilizing in the wake of 9/11 (2001), the War on Terror, the allied military intervention in Afghanistan, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. There is no doubt that many activists who had previously been involved in antiglobaliza-tion protests were drawn into antiterror protests and that opposition to the war in Iraq became a strand of the GJM (the call for a February 15, 2003, global day of action against the Iraq War was made at the November 2002 European Social Forum and reiterated at the January 2003 WSF), but the antiterror movement did not simply subsume or eclipse the GJM. Even in the United States, substantial protests were mounted in Miami in 2003 on the occasion of negotiations designed to introduce a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which subsequently collapsed. Moreover, social forums also developed in the United States: local or regional social forums emerged in the United States as early as 2004; the first US Social Forum was held in Atlanta in 2007 and the second, in Detroit in 2010, attracted over 15,000 people.

Whatever its impact in the United States, renewed warfare in the Middle East did not inhibit the development of the GJM in Europe. Even in the United Kingdom, the United States’
closest ally in Iraq and Afghanistan, the development of the GJM continued, with the supporters of aid and development NGOs far outnumbering radical activists. Jubilee 2000, whose most dramatic act was the encirclement of Birmingham in 1998, was succeeded by the Jubilee Debt Campaign many of the affiliates of which, in 2005, spearheaded the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign. MPH was remarkable for several reasons. Its massively successful pop concerts in London, New York, and other cities were politically ambiguous; the concerts, for many who attended them, were just spectacular pop concerts. Similarly, the ubiquitous white plastic wristbands, soon to be replicated in a variety of colors, quickly became a fashion item rather than a declaration of support for the campaign. But the concerts were belated outcomes of a campaign that had been building for more than a year in anticipation of the meeting of the leaders of the G8 nations at Gleneagles in Scotland in July 2005, which was immediately preceded by a march in Edinburgh of nearly 250,000 people, the largest demonstration in the history of the Scottish capital.

If the GJM appeared in many countries of the North to be in abeyance after 2005, the protests of 2011 might be seen as evidence of its revival. Inspired by the most celebrated protest of the Arab Spring – the occupation of Cairo’s Tahrir Square – the movement that began on May 15, 2011, with the indignantos encampment in Puerto del Sol in Madrid was soon followed by a similar occupation of Syntagma Square in Athens. On September 17, Occupy Wall Street began in New York, quickly gained numbers, and on October 15, was emulated by over 950 protests in over 80 countries. Although the numbers of participants varied from a few hundred in Tokyo to tens of thousands in Madrid and Rome, this was a convincing demonstration of the emergence of a global movement against the social inequalities that have grown increasingly massive with the pre-eminence of transnational corporations and that have since 2008 been made even more extreme by the consequences of the global financial crisis. The novel element of these latest protests against neoliberal globalization is the demand for intergenerational justice sparked by sharply rising rates of youth unemployment, especially among college and university graduates, but the extensive transnational solidarity, aided by electronic communications, testifies to its continuity with earlier manifestations of the GJM.

CONCLUSION

Whatever its contradictions, the GJM does not so much contest modernity as oppose a particular, neoliberal conception of modernity with an alternative vision of modernity that insists upon three fundamentally modern principles: participatory or deliberative democracy; democratically accountable international and supranational political and economic institutions; and the critique of injustice and pursuit of social equality on a global level. It is thus not antimodern so much as it articulates a crisis in the forms of politics and democracy during the present epoch of modernity (Wennerhag 2010).

Its forms of action extend beyond the protests at international elite summits on the one hand, and the mobilizing efforts of humanitarian and environmental NGOs on the other. Most conspicuously in the World Social Forum and its regional, national, and local iterations, the GJM has sought to mobilize “transnational counter-publics” and to construct “forms of popular deliberation that would be democratically more legitimate than the global institutions that are criticized by the movement” (Wennerhag 2010: 29). Often organized across national borders, the social forums have challenged nation-state-based politics and, because, unlike the summit meetings of the global institutions, the World Social Forums have been organized in the global South and, because of the linkages among local, national, and regional social forums, they make a credible claim to be truly global. Because they have brought together so many diverse strands of civil society they have been genuinely and broadly pluralistic.
Contrary to claims that it is “antipolitical,” the GJM articulates a demand for the democratization of global political and economic institutions; it draws political attention to the democratic deficit of global institutions and the simultaneous weakening of democratic nation-states, as well as making a political issue of the increasing social inequality produced by market-oriented global policies.

The GJM presents some difficulties to analysis in terms of social movement theory. The movement has been so widespread and diffuse that it is difficult to fit comfortably to schemas that were mainly constructed to describe and analyze different kinds of movements mobilized within single nation-states. Yet despite its theoretical and strategic flaws, the GJM can be seen as a continuation and development of the new social movements that sprang up in the aftermath of the turbulent 1960s, though adapted to a different sociopolitical environment and with its own distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless, in terms of the formal requirements for the existence of a social movement, the episodic character of GJM activity is troublesome. The requirement of durability and continuity over time (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004: 10–11), imprecise though it is, may appear too demanding to accommodate a movement that was generally barely visible outside moments of spectacular protest. This problem is, however, acute only if one’s focus is restricted to the radical direct activist strand of the movement. If one adjusts one’s optic to encompass the plethora of aid, trade, development, humanitarian, and environmental NGOs, campaigns, and social forums that, from the 1990s onward, converged upon questions of global social justice, the existence and persistence of the GJM is less problematic.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Antiglobalization movements; Arab Spring; Attac; Civil society; Coalitions; Ideology: New social movements and new social movement theory; Participatory democracy in social movements; Prefigurative politics; Repertoires of contention; Social Forum, World; Social movements; Strategy; Transnational social movements; Transnational Zapatism.

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Global Justice Movement in Europe
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA

Composed of supra-national networks of individuals and organizations, the Global Justice Movement (GJM) has developed at the turn of the millennium, mobilizing in transnational events and demanding social justice and participatory and/or deliberative democracy. Especially since the second half of the 1980s, international summits were often accompanied by protest counter-summits, that took place in the same locality as the official intergovernmental gathering. Transnational mobilizations of this type have also targeted European Union (EU) institutions. One of the first of them was the European Marches against unemployment, insecurity, and exclusion addressing the Amsterdam summit in 1997; two years later, 30,000 mobilized on the same issues at the EU summit in Cologne (Mathers 2007). These marches played an important role in the emergence of the European wave of protest that became visible in the July 2001 anti-G8 demonstrations in Genoa (della Porta et al. 2006). In fact, since Amsterdam and Cologne, counter-summits have contested all of the main EU summits.

Since 2002, protesters have also met yearly in European Social Forums, which developed as macro-regional experiences of the World Social Forum, but then gained autonomy. The first European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002 was followed by a second one in Paris in 2003, a third in London in 2004, a fourth in Athens in 2006, and a fifth in Malmo in 2008. The large success of the first European forum – with 60,000 activists from all over Europe participating in three days of debate, and between 500,000 and one million activists in the closing march – was the result of networking among groups and individuals with different political and social backgrounds – unionists, feminists, environmentalists, pacifists, and so on – that continued in subsequent years (della Porta et al. 2006).

Comparative research indicated that the GJM is made of different constellations in different European countries (della Porta 2007). In the first (in countries such as France, Italy, Spain), disruptive protest dynamics appear as more dominant; networks are denser and more decentralized, with participation of both informal groups and formal associations; and the issue of global justice is linked with a struggle against neoliberalism at home within a global discourse and a conception of radical participatory democracy. In all of these cases, although more traditional NGOs were also present, the transnational network developed as activist based and protest oriented. In the second constellation, including countries such as Germany and Great Britain, collective action relies largely on lobbying and media campaigns; strong associations and NGOs are more visible, although not unchallenged; global justice issues are framed especially, although not exclusively, in terms of solidarity with the South; and associational conceptions of democracy prevail. The GJM is supported by well-endowed NGOs, among which protest is “rehabilitated” thanks to the frustrating results of more moderate techniques.

By all these different actors, the criticism of the existing international organizations is, however, linked with the demands of different policies and politics at the European and global level. The European Social Forum presents itself as the first step in the construction of a critical public sphere for the critical discussion of the European Union. The policies of the European Union are criticized as essentially neoliberal, advocating the privatization of public services and the flexibility of the work market, with resulting increases in work insecurity. The consequences of the
global justice movement in europe

process of European integration are described as dangerous for solidarity, while on migration issues the European Union is accused of “building a fortress.” On these issues, European social democracy is criticized as supporting economic policies of privatization and deregulation of a neoliberal type.

The emerging critique is however not of “too much” Europe, but of not enough social Europe. Under the banner “another Europe is possible,” more social rights and social justice were demanded. A (stigmatized) “Europe of the market” is contrasted with the (desired) Europe of the citizens. Despite criticisms – even the most radical, leveled at the “Europe of markets” – social movement organizations that participate in the transnational activities of the Global Justice Movement express support for the construction of “a different Europe,” presenting themselves as belonging to “a European movement.”

This image of “critical Europeanism” is confirmed when looking at the attitudes of the activists of the Global Justice Movement. According to surveys at different meetings of the European Social Forum, activists from different countries express strong criticisms of the actual politics and policies of the European Union (della Porta 2009). There is consensus among activists that the European Union strengthens neoliberal globalization, with a shared mistrust in the capacity of the European Union to mitigate the negative effects of globalization and safeguard a different social model of welfare. The ESF surveys also indicate mistrust in EU institutions, with only a tiny minority expressing high levels of trust in them. However, the activists of the European Social Forum express both a high affective identification with Europe and a certain level of support for the building of a European level of governance. In this sense, social movement activists represent a “social capital” of committed citizens that, although critical, might represent an important source for the building of a European citizenship.

This complex attitude toward the European Union follows various evolutions. An important one is an increased Europeanization of social movement organizations. Research on hundreds of SMOs active on social, environmental, and civil right issues confirms that, although critical of the European institutions, they do address those institutions and even promote a European identity (della Porta & Caiani 2009). More and more, social movement organizations share a tendency to coordinate their action at the cross-national level and to address (especially via lobbying) the European institutions (Ruzza 2004; Balme & Chabanet 2008). They are also particularly well connected transnationally, in some cases even opening European offices, or acting at the European level through European partners.

The building of European networks and identity in fact follows the belief that the process of European integration has had and will continue to have a strong impact on civil society organizations. The (perceived and real) growth in EU competences has contributed to the politicization of the debate on Europe. The fact that national actors have held the integration process responsible for restrictive economic policies and cuts in public spending has contributed to increased worries about the consequences of European integration. In this situation, contrasting demands are addressed to the European Union, which is perceived as a relevant level of governance.

As the construction of the nation-state contributed to the focusing of protest at the national level, the construction of European institutions provides occasions for the creation of supranational networks and identities through continuous and contentious interactions of various political and social actors around EU institutions (Imig & Tarrow 2001; Tarrow 2005; della Porta & Caiani 2009). Networking has then an impact on identity building, contributing to the development of a European identity, with the symbolic construction of “another Europe.” Again as it happened with the labor and other movements during
the construction of the nation-state, the Euro-
pean GJM represents a critical social capital
for European institutions, contributing to the
emergence of a European public sphere (della
Porta 2009).

SEE ALSO: Europeanization and social
movements; Global Justice Movement; Global-
lization and movements; Social Forum, World;
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Grassroots movements
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Much research has recognized the increasing prevalence and importance of grassroots movements, particularly in contemporary struggles over globalization. A number of case studies explore the goals, tactics, and trajectories of specific grassroots mobilizations in such areas as environmental justice, indigenous land struggles, women’s rights, and slum dweller movements. While more systematic, comparative examination of such movements is relatively limited, it is possible to identify a set of common elements that broadly characterize grassroots movements. These include status of members, scope of activities, forms of leadership and participation, and global linkages. Grassroots movements also often experience tensions between their role as incubators of innovative, even radical, ideologies and practices and the necessity to further transform themselves into more institutionalized social movement organizations.

A key facet of grassroots movements is the shared subordinate status of members (Piven 2006). The subdominant position of grassroots movement members may be linked to social class, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other axes of inequality. In contrast to earlier perspectives that linked grassroots mobilization to emotional frustrations and irrational motivations, more contemporary studies suggest that grassroots actors mobilize in response to the intensification and widening of specific grievances (Turner & Killian 1987). Grassroots activists initially mobilize because they, their families, and communities are directly threatened or impacted by such issues as environmental contamination, sexist and racist beliefs and policies, and economic transformations linked to corporate-dominated globalization.

Along with subdominant status, grassroots movements have also been closely linked to specific, bounded localities such as rural communities, indigenous territories, and low-income urban neighborhoods. Such grassroots spaces are essential in the formation of identities, ideologies, and interests that precede collective mobilization (Polletta 1999). Shared local space enables movement members to develop and participate in dense, horizontal networks and facilitates sustained face-to-face interactions through which shared meanings are constructed and reinforced. Grassroots movements may arise in a more spontaneous manner in these spaces of everyday life. In other cases, they may be a more self-conscious project of members seeking to build alternative ideologies and practices from the bottom up. The local base and subdominant member status of grassroots movements also tend to limit their access to resources and they rely primarily on the unpaid labor of highly motivated and ideologically committed volunteers.

Research suggests that the recent expansion and high levels of activism of grassroots movements in a number of different countries are linked to both global structural transformations and specific national political processes. In particular, grassroots movements emerge in response to the advance of corporate-dominated globalization. In regions such as Latin America, such reconfiguration of state–markets relations—in particular the withdrawal of governments from past economic interventions, redistribution measures, and social supports—has deepened subsistence insecurity of the poor majority (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar 1998). In response, diverse grassroots movements have surged in recent years to challenge such market fundamentalism and the privatization and commodification of the commons. Castells (2004) emphasizes that the locus of such grassroots mobilization has shifted from the workplace to urban neighborhoods where
the lack of sufficient state investment in the means of collective consumption has fomented widespread protests.

While local, decentralized control is a central characteristic of grassroots movements, the global scope of these economic and social transformations has influenced some to develop coalitions and alliances with other social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) located in geographically and culturally distinct zones in processes of grassroots globalization (Appadurai 2000). In what Harvey (1996) terms “militant particularism,” the ideas and practices developed in localized movement spaces are expanded and universalized to potentially become effective on a transnational scale. Network participants share broadly inclusive precepts of alternative economic models and social and environmental justice, while keeping intact the diversity of the grassroots movements that form part of these coalitions. Participation in such global networks may enable grassroots movements to transcend the constraints of their local identities and immediate needs (Brysk 2000). Transnational allies provide information and resources not available at the local level. They implement advocacy campaigns directed at multiple countries and global institutions which grassroots movements would have difficulty accessing on their own (Keck & Sikkink 1998).

Research suggests that an important strength of grassroots movements is their efforts to bring about social change from the bottom up (Peet & Watts 2004). They attempt to embody the type of society that they seek to build, nurturing counter-hegemonic belief systems and developing innovative democratic practices. Community and neighborhood settings provide a social and conceptual space that enables subordinate groups to penetrate dominant beliefs and develop and appropriate alternative visions and practices. Tactics of grassroots movements often incorporate confrontation and direct action. Grassroots ideological commitments are particularly important in retaining members where movements have limited resources. In part because grassroots movements are less dependent on external resources they may also exercise a greater degree of autonomy to hold more radical and emancipatory ideologies. Such beliefs and values challenge dominant racial/ethnic, gender, and class hierarchies, and forms of development and capitalism. Important cultural work takes place inside of grassroots movements which seek to expose and destabilize dominant structures and beliefs.

Grassroots movements strive to keep the locus of control and movement leadership at the local level. Leadership structures are egalitarian, more dispersed and decentralized, and direct participation in decision-making is emphasized. Grassroots movements highlight and value local knowledge and direct experiences of their members which have often been devalued by dominant groups. Such practices of participatory democracy within social movements are not merely instrumental and often arise out of ideological commitment. Grassroots women’s groups, for example, have attempted to practice egalitarian, mutually supportive social relations that value emotion and empathy. Grassroots movements help construct the mobilizing structures that are available to activists. Within these movements members may gain self-respect, assertiveness skills, capacity to act collectively, and advance their proficiency in leadership and political organizing.

Other research, however, cautions against assigning an overly deterministic role to the particular structural forms of grassroots movements – dense, horizontal ties and face-to-face interactions – in shaping ideologies and normative movement goals. This approach suggests that cultural challenges and counterhegemonic ideas may also emerge through weak links with external actors. In developing countries, grassroots movements have linked, for example, with NGOs and religious organizations. Research also suggests the grassroots and local movements cannot automatically be equated with democratic practices. Rather local and community spaces
also incorporate unequal power relations, factionalisms, and corruption as is present at national levels (Hickey & Mohan 2004).

Social movement scholars characterize grassroots movements as an important initial emergent phase of collective action. Limited resources, outreach capacity, and reliance on volunteers suggest, however, that if grassroots movements are to be sustained and effectively advance their causes they need to develop more formalized organizational and leadership structures (Turner & Killian 1987). As grassroots movements institutionalize as social movement organizations they are better able to mobilize supporters and obtain the resources and external support that is often critical to long-term effectiveness.

Concerns have been raised, however, about such professionalization and bureaucratization of grassroots movements (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar 1998). As grassroots movements are more subject to government regulation and dependent upon external resources, pressures increase to conform to more reformist master frames. In addition, a shift to a more professional, hierarchical leadership may signify a loss of flexibility and responsiveness and the emancipatory and empowering daily practices of grassroots movements. There is also a risk that professional movement administrators, who are not directly vulnerable to or affected by social issues, may advance their own distinct perspectives and interests at the expense of movements’ less powerful participants. Likewise, to the degree to which grassroots movements engage more directly with state actors and political parties they may be caught up in clientelism and factionalism, co-opted, or placed in the role of providing state services (Hickey & Mohan 2004).

Grassroots movements have served as an organizational base for more sustained and formalized social movements. Despite their relative lack of resources, they play a role in bringing to the forefront the perspectives and needs of subordinate groups. They have provided a space for the development of counter-hegemonic and innovative practices and have contributed more broadly to processes of democratization on a global scale.

SEE ALSO: Globalization and movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Participation in social movements; Strain and breakdown theories; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Greenpeace
WILLIAM MARKHAM

Greenpeace is a large, highly visible social movement organization, which combines environmental goals with crusading for peace. It is a multilevel organization, with international, national, and local units. Its international reach and broad support allow it both to influence transnational corporations, international treaties, and regulatory agencies and to operate within nations.

Greenpeace originated in 1971 during the wave of social movement mobilization in Western Europe and North America when its Canadian-based founders attempted to sail ships into US nuclear weapons testing areas. Environmental issues soon came to dominate its agenda, and new chapters quickly formed in the United States and Western Europe. Greenpeace International was organized in 1979. Many chapters enjoyed rapid growth in the 1980s, but during the 1990s most chapters experienced significant declines, including a near collapse in the United States, followed by stabilization or slow growth.

Greenpeace’s national chapters are so tightly intertwined with Greenpeace International that their emphases and activities are difficult to distinguish. According to its Internet site, Greenpeace focuses on a limited number of areas, including energy and climate change, oceans, forests, toxics, sustainable agriculture, and disarmament and peace. In total, it has about 2.9 million supporters and a budget of €197 million, with 28 national and regional chapters. It is governed by a council elected by representatives from these chapters. Greenpeace Germany is the richest and most influential chapter.

Greenpeace is highly centralized. Individual chapters are bound to Greenpeace International by a contract, which entitles them to use Greenpeace’s name but imposes strict requirements, including nonviolence, nonpartisanship, independence from business and government, and participation in international campaigns. Individual chapters are also typically highly centralized. Greenpeace Germany, for example, has only 40 voting members, most from paid staff, Greenpeace International, and local activists; donors have no direct voice, and local groups of volunteer activists are closely controlled. Greenpeace justifies this model in terms of efficiency and quick decisions, its large size, and its international scope; however, lack of democracy has led to criticism from political opponents and Greenpeace staff and activists.

Greenpeace depends heavily on individual donors, which it believes guarantees its independence. Most contributions are small, and Greenpeace screens larger gifts for conflicts of interest. It accepts no funds from government or corporations, and its publications contain no advertising. Other important revenue sources include bequests and foundation grants, supplemented by revenue from interest on financial reserves and the sale of publications, logo merchandise, and green products. Greenpeace fundraising is highly professionalized, relying heavily on mass mailings, supplemented by Internet fundraising and donations at information stands. The great majority of supporters are passive donors; only a small minority become volunteer activists. Critics argue this strategy fails to deepen supporters’ knowledge or mobilize them. Instead, professionals plan and execute campaigns that are “marketed” to donors. They also criticize Greenpeace’s fundraising expenditures; however, these are actually comparable to similar organizations.

Greenpeace’s agenda is reformist, but the changes it advocates are more far reaching than those promoted by most peer organizations, and its methods, including sharp criticism of business and government, are often confrontational. Its trademark is spectacular actions designed to focus attention on environmental
abuses. These have included driving rafts between whalers and whales, sailing ships into nuclear testing zones, and climbing smokestacks to protest air pollution. These professionally planned, nonviolent protests are key for Greenpeace’s self-understanding and image. They provide striking, action-filled images and sometimes involve law violations.

To succeed, Greenpeace must capture media attention, and it works hard at this. Its actions make good copy, and many of its campaigns, for example, against genetically modified foods, also attract media attention. Its press offices are large and very professional. Greenpeace holds press conferences, answers inquiries promptly, provides contact persons, issues regular news releases, and offers striking visuals. When its campaigns receive favorable coverage and capture public sympathy, they attract supporters, generate pressure on government and business, and burnish Greenpeace’s reputation; however, confrontation and law violations are sometimes viewed skeptically by moderate environmentalists and the public. They also allow opponents to characterize Greenpeace as extremist and can lead to reprisals. In 1985, French agents blew up a ship Greenpeace intended to sail into a nuclear testing zone, and Bayer chemicals once sued Greenpeace Germany when it installed a faucet on a waste discharge pipe to draw samples. More recently, German authorities threatened revocation of its tax-free status.

Because its visibility and reputation are key, Greenpeace carefully monitors its image. Despite occasional gaffes, such as misstating the amount of oil in the Brent Spar platform, which Greenpeace occupied during its campaign against sinking it in the North Sea, Greenpeace generally enjoys a favorable press. Nevertheless, critics accuse it of choosing easily winnable battles and characterize its actions as stunts that cater to media preferences for striking, oversimplified stories. Greenpeace responds that it also takes on complex issues and that its campaigns focus attention on neglected problems and increase environmental awareness.

Greenpeace also publishes newsletters, magazines, and pamphlets, maintains a massive, professional Internet presence, lobbies national governments and international agencies, organizes petition drives and boycotts, conducts research about environmental problems, provides policy reports, sponsors demonstration projects for green technologies, and offers services such as green energy. Its involvement in traditional nature protection is minimal, and it shies away from endorsing political parties or candidates. It is represented at numerous international bodies, such as the International Whaling Commission. Although known for acting alone and prizing its autonomy, Greenpeace does sometimes cooperate with other NGOs through joint statements, press releases, joint campaigns, or participation in umbrella organizations, and it works with selected businesses.

SEE ALSO: Environmental movements; Media and social movements; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Social movement organization (SMO); Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Guerrilla movements
TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY

Major sociopolitical upheavals during the twentieth century brought vividly to our attention the role of guerrilla movements in (near-)revolutionary settings, and often led to a casual confabulation between guerrilla movements, as such, and revolution. The writings, theorizing, and biographies of Marxist revolutionaries often led to such a conceptual admixture, including those of Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara (Guevara, Loveman, & Davies 1997), and Carlos Marighella in his manual for the urban guerrilla. That confabulation remains strong, even if we recognize that precisely the same strategy has also been used by fighters of the right to attack left-wing regimes, notably against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1980s, but also many other instances of non-leftist, ethnic irredentist movements scattered around the world.

Yet the practice of guerrilla warfare—“guerrilla” literally means “little war”—antedated by millennia those twentieth-century revolutionary struggles, and even old military theories like those of Sun Tzu seem to be describing, even advocating, something like guerrilla warfare (aka “insurgency”). Typical guerrilla tactics include wide-ranging mobility and quick dispersal; ambushes; lightning attack-and-withdrawal tactics against columns and supply lines; waylaying messengers and in general denying the enemy intelligence about one’s own forces; and securing more and better weapons from defeated opponents. Thus, guerrilla warfare is likely the most ancient form of war, and humankind has consistently reinvented it whenever a people is faced with a violent struggle against a foe superior in numbers, technology, or both. Thus Laqueur (1976), in his sweeping historical review of guerrillas, draws our attention all the way back to the ancient Hittites, whose king angrily deplored those (“cowardly,” perhaps?) enemy forces who would attack his troops and people while they slept, yet melt away into the darkness before his own forces could respond.

Before proceeding we must banish a confusion. Guerrilla warfare is a strategy for eliminating and/or seizing state power, and its tactics are those just described. Terror and terrorism, by contrast are specific tactics, acts of violence that systematically injure or kill unarmed civilian populations, whether they consciously target civilians or simply engulf them indiscriminately (Wickham-Crowley 1991: ch. 3). Such actions in principle could be carried out by individual, collective, or institutional actors against their opponents. A single, powerful empirical generalization should end the intellectually sloppy conflation of insurgents with terrorists: governments already in power have been far more likely to inflict terror and indiscriminate death upon civilians than have the insurgents who oppose those governments, as Tilly pointed out on many occasions (Tilly et al. 1995). We need only look to the terror campaigns directed at their own peoples by governments during the French Revolution, in the Soviet Union under Stalin (including the “terror famine” and the great purges), and by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge once in power (1975–1979). As that last example also shows, however, guerrilla movements have historically varied in visiting terror upon civilian populations. Some guerrilla movements employed widespread terror even before their ascent to power, as did the Khmer Rouge; others a good deal of terror, yet not really of that scope (Peru’s Shining Path); while yet other guerrilla movements used almost no terror during the insurgent years (Fidel Castro’s 26th of July movement, 1956–1958).

Are recent, worldwide guerrilla movements, as they are understood and (nowadays) much studied by scholars, precisely the same thing
as our millennia-long exemplars of guerrilla warfare? There are evident points of convergence. First, both phenomena clearly involve (a) collective actors (b) engaging in nonquotidian activities, seeking (c) to transform a political system by means of (d) a selected tactical repertoire, which certainly includes massed and violent attacks on their opponents. Second, most variants of historical guerrilla warfare, and also “formalized” guerrilla movements of recent decades, seem to qualify as “state-seeking movements,” to use Tilly’s term, whether they are defending and/or attempting to restore a now-defunct political status quo or simply opposing an incumbent regime. In that respect, then, they both share with many (most?) social movements the goal of changing the political and social order of society. Yet one clear point of nonconvergence remains: the popular and automatic association of guerrilla warfare with revolutionary leftism is misguided given any number of insurgencies which have waved rightist political colors.

The truest divergence between centuries-old versus more recent variants of guerrilla activity lies elsewhere. In most historical instances guerrilla warfare emerged as a by-product of war/invasion involving two different peoples, and therefore one’s guerrilla forces could usually rely upon local knowledge and the guaranteed support of one’s own people to foster effective resistance against ethnic outsiders. With the increasingly common use of revolutionary insurgency by portions of the local populace seeking to unseat incumbent native rulers, those elements of ethnic solidarity no longer assure the silent consent (minimally) or the vigorous active participation (maximally) of one’s own people with the insurgents. Thus the modern revolutionary insurgency is, or intends to become, a civil war in which the populace will eventually (be forced to) side either with the guerrilla movement(s) or with the government in power, a choice that is not an obvious one, given the common ethnicity often shared by all parties. With support now problematic in all respects – and “support” for guerrillas can mean anything from failing to report armed insurgents in the vicinity to vigorous participation in the guerrillas’ forces – it is not surprising that twentieth-century revolutionary writing (and many nineteenth-century military theories) about guerrilla warfare have always focused on securing and maintaining popular support, and denying the same to the incumbent regime (and occasionally to other, competing revolutionary organizations as well).

HOW AND THROUGH WHOSE EFFORTS DO SOME GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS GROW AND EXPAND?

To analyze guerrilla movements of recent decades requires us to concretize the matter sociologically: just who are these insurgents? Since Weber’s writings on the world’s religions, sociologists have cautioned against confusing the social origins of the great religions’ prophets and founders with those of the ordinary believers. Most students of social movements likewise remain sensitized to such membership disjunctures for the movements they study, but the bifurcated social origins of the leaders versus the led within typical guerrilla movements are so deep as to warrant special attention and analytical care. The elite and leadership and commanding officers within guerrilla movements and other revolutionary organizations are almost everywhere drawn from highly educated persons whose origins are in the upper-middle or upper classes within their own societies, and many scholars have thus validated Mannheim’s classic analysis of the politics of the intelligentsia (Gouldner 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Colburn 1994). Yet the rank and file of arms-bearing guerrillas, stricto sensu, and even more so the entire social-support apparatus in the regions where they operate, are typically composed mainly, often overwhelmingly, of selected groups of agrarian villagers and cultivators. Some guerrilla groups in Colombia since the 1960s – peasant-based from their inceptions – provide the only clear, major exceptions to that rule. Even later groups
like the Zapatistas, who went into action in 1994 in Chiapas, Mexico, clearly echo this long-established pattern, despite their claims to novelty. Those other revolutionary groups, often labeled “urban guerrillas” in Germany, Italy, and several South American nations, have been even more strictly composed of the highly educated drawn from higher social classes (Russell & Miller 1977), but we will not consider that variant more closely herein since urban guerrilla tactics are really a special case of terrorism, rather than guerrilla warfare in its classic forms.

With regard to the gender and racial/ethnic composition of guerrilla groups, most began as overwhelmingly male-staffed organizations, whether in Latin America or elsewhere, with women often left in thoroughly marginal roles when permitted to join. Beginning with the urban guerrilla groups that appeared circa 1970 in both Europe and Latin America, there was a distinct shift: women entered in far higher percentages and many became more central to the overall command structure. By the 1970s and 1980s, the Latin American (and perhaps African) rurally based guerrilla organizations became ever more gender-egalitarian in membership and command opportunities, in both urban and rural wings (Wickham-Crowley 1992: chs 2, 9), even if many issues and conflicts about gender remained. The ethnic and racial composition of guerrilla groups often came to be slowly more aligned with the populations of the territories where the guerrillas operated most securely (as with the Guatemalan or Peruvian indigenous peoples who moved into these groups in the 1970s and 1980s). Yet, in many world conflicts the guerrilla movements’ foundations were often rooted in ethnic differences and conflicts as such, as in most of Africa and much of Asia (e.g., Sri Lanka’s “Tamil Tigers”). Hence an element of ethnic irredentism or separatist nationalism characterized these revolutionary civil wars, with corresponding echoes of those age-old, inter-ethnic settings for guerrilla warfare.

Wherever acute social distances separate a leadership and a prospective rank and file, such conditions merely intensify the modern problem of guerrillas trying to draw the heretofore uncommitted into what will be a civil war against one’s own co-nationals. The insurgents of our era cannot automatically and reliably secure popular support, provision of resources, or actual armed enlistment in their collective and armed campaigns against incumbent governments. Thus the question is raised: which guerrilla movements grow strong(er) and consolidate their support within (at least parts of) the national population, and within what time frames? That problem-feature of recent guerrilla movements dovetails very closely with themes that have always engendered the interests of sociologists and others who study social movements, and careful empirical studies of guerrilla movements in light of certain theories and their predictions may bring “bad news” for loyalists of several theoretical camps.

For example, Mancur Olson (1965) famously argued that large-scale social movements of all stripes would be bedeviled by “free riders” rather than active, resource-providing, deeply engaged participants. Yet Salert (1976) and Wickham-Crowley have argued that Olson’s theory badly predicts the actual (i.e., high) levels and sources of commitment witnessed among guerrillas and other revolutionaries (Wickham-Crowley 1991: 17–19). Since rational choice theory also lies close to Olson’s position, it follows that its proponents seem unable to do more than translate some small parts of existing theories into its own language (see Skocpol 1994: 321–326). Alternatively, Wood has shown, via her careful analysis of insurgency and the peasantry in El Salvador, how both rational choice theory and Olson’s specific perspective must be theoretically recast (and radically so) into a metric of nonmaterial values, if they are to be of any use for understanding mass recruitment into revolutionary organizations (Wood 2003: 226–274).

For their part, the theorists who propounded resource mobilization (RM) theory argued that the nature, extent, and depth of grievances are
not really all that important in fueling and helping to expand social movements. Such claims are partly supportable in the present topical context: guerrilla organizations clearly are “doing” the task of mobilizing popular resources and channeling them into certain directions and tactics, and their organizational failures (i.e., military or political defeats) do typically lead to movement decay. Yet RM theory’s earlier (if now abandoned) claim, that the scope and shape of grievances are not deeply critical for movement growth, is clearly insupportable if applied to the study of insurgencies. Many studies, often done with finely grained regional and temporal sensitivities, have repeatedly demonstrated the massive relevance of grievances to guerrilla movements and to their success or failure in recruiting and maintaining popular support, including economic grievances (Paige 1975; Scott 1976; Booth 1991; McClintock 1998), political grievances (Goodwin & Skocpol 1989; Goodwin 2001), or both (Wickham-Crowley 1991: ch. 5; Wickham-Crowley 1992).

There is greater promise in the literature about revolutionary and guerrilla organizing if we instead look to matters of culture. Smelser (1962) argued a half-century ago that the emergence or diffusion of a shared set of “generalized beliefs” is crucial to the formation of social movements in general. Despite persuasive critiques targeting some aspects of his concept, we should note there is nothing inherently “conservative” in pointing to the formation of shared beliefs as a crystallizing element in the formation of opposition movements (cf. Gramsci’s notion of “counter-hegemony”). Such shared beliefs do not have to typify all of the belief-elements nor all members within a guerrilla movement, but just enough to enable cooperation on some core goals (e.g., land reform and the end of government violence). And it is certainly not true that the rank and file of guerrilla movements went through a process of “consciousness raising” and moved toward the Marxist stance typical of their leaders. The literature now thoroughly confirms that peasants and other lower classes participate in guerrilla movements or engage in insurrection in pursuit of classically agrarian interests, not the Marxist aims of the intelligentsia who often lead such organizations (see Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1991: ch. 4; Wickham-Crowley 1992).

Yet human cultures do vary in their patternings, and that statement applies as well to regional subcultures within nations, which may predispose certain regional populations (but not others) toward rebelliousness and guerrilla sympathies. Wickham-Crowley (1992) pursued that issue with region-specific detail for multiple Latin American national insurgencies and found that guerrilla movements profited when they operated in areas with strong antigovernment rebellious histories. With more range and conceptual subtlety, Foran (2005: esp. 21–23) argued that historical experiences and emotion, formal ideologies, and cultural idioms collectively served to develop—or not!—political cultures of opposition across his several dozen cases, and those oppositional cultures serve as one of the linchpins of his overall theory of revolutionary failures, successes, reversals, and “non-attempts.” And with still more subtlety and depth, Selbin’s (2010) work now crystallizes more than a decade’s worth of research and writing about the power of social narratives and popular story-making in the making of revolutions themselves. So maybe “generalized beliefs” do matter in the making of guerrilla-based revolutions after all, albeit a modified and less magical conception of generalized beliefs perhaps more akin to master frames.

From a different perspective, many have argued for economic correlates of support for, and the success-rate of, guerrilla insurgencies. First, the overall living standards of rural populations can be damaged by global economic depressions felt locally (that is, a “world-system” condition), by the bite of the tax collector, and by the “take” of their harvests demanded by landlords; in the face of such intense material deprivation, peasants
may thus rebel, if opportunities arise (Scott 1976). Similarly, in trying to understand the peasantry’s (varied) support for and enlistment with the Central American and Peruvian guerrilla insurgencies, Booth (1991) and McClintock (1998) examined both the economic damages caused by landlord actions and by government (in-)actions and often the outright loss of land itself.

In a related vein, the expansion of export agriculture is seen by both moral economy theory (Scott 1976) and class conflict theory (Paige 1975) of agrarian revolution as a key prime mover behind massive and increasing forms of peasant discontent and rural uprisings. While neither theory focuses on guerrilla organizations, both theories can deeply illuminate the actual patterns of peasant support and nonsupport for Latin American guerrilla movements over the last half-century (Wickham-Crowley 1992: chs 6, 10), and the work of Foran (2005) suggests a broader, more global applicability of these ideas. Wickham-Crowley also confirms many of Paige’s correlations between sharecropping and migratory-labor forms of cultivation, and a predisposition to support and join guerrilla movements, but also suggests a similar pattern for squatters as well.

Goodwin (2001) has been the most persuasive advocate of the political interpretation of the (varied) success-histories of guerrillas who tried to unseat incumbent regimes. Although his work draws on the geopolitical and macrostructural ideas of Skocpol (1979), Goodwin’s work more narrowly has focused on guerrilla movements as such. Those movements include “persistent insurgencies,” a situation of regime-insurgent stalemate which occurs where regimes are able to rain terror down on specific regions and peasantierras within their national territories, but are unable to assert decisive “infrastructural power” and actually govern those regions. Strikingly, guerrilla movements might persist even in the face of democratization trends and the emergence of nationally competitive elections, conditions which usually have doomed insurgencies to progressive political irrelevance (cf. Wickham-Crowley 1992: chs 8, 11). From Goodwin’s perspective, the very structure of regimes and also the political actions taken by state managers (notably indiscriminate violence) are likely to predict whether or not insurgencies actually develop and mount an effective challenge to incumbent governments.

**WHICH GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS HAVE ACHIEVED GREATER SUCCESSES?**

Both general theorizing about social movements and specific studies of guerrilla movements can be brought together to better understand the latter, and perhaps to qualify some of the claims of the former. In a like vein, much attention has been given to understanding why some guerrilla movements—once they consolidate their strengths and secure supporters—succeed in seizing state power, while others do not. That important issue of failure/success nicely parallels Gamson’s classic study of historical social movements of all stripes in the United States (1990), wherein he sought to discern why some social movements “succeed.” The issue of insurgents’ failures/successes is often deeply intertwined with a related—but not identical—question, when scholars ask why some regimes experience social-revolutionary transfers of power while others do not. The difference between those two questions is an historico-empirical one: did the old regime face an insurgency which can be viewed as bringing about its collapse, or were other forces more fundamental to that transition? Such closely related questions can focus directly on insurgency-instigated regime collapses (Wolf 1969; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Goodwin 2001), on regime collapses in which the issue of insurgency is ancillary (Skocpol 1979), or some mix of those two types of situations for the past and/or future (Foran 2005).

Over more than two decades, Goodwin, Wickham-Crowley, and Foran all have essayed systematic comparative studies designed
specifically to explain both the successes and the failures of guerrilla-based revolutionary movements, following the “model” for such success/failure theorizing established by Skocpol (1979: esp. 155–158). Each author also makes some use of the Boolean-algebraic model of “Qualitative Comparative Analysis” espoused and explained by Charles Ragin (1987). Goodwin’s argument came earliest (in a 1988 dissertation), and was later condensed (in Goodwin 2001; but also see the Loveman and Davies contributions to Guevara, Loveman, & Davies 1997). In his consideration of four cases, each from postwar Southeast Asia and from 1970s–1980s Central America, Goodwin concludes that only “exclusionary dictatorial regimes” with narrow support-bases are likely to be overthrown by such revolutionary insurgencies, evidenced in the revolutionaries’ accessions to power only in Vietnam and in Nicaragua, but not elsewhere in those two regions. Wickham-Crowley (1991: ch. 7; 1992: chs 8, 11, 12) similarly concluded that the best predictor of whether or not Latin American regimes in the years 1956–1990 fell to guerrilla-centered insurgencies – only in Cuba and in Nicaragua – was not their own military power nor even the depth of US support for the incumbent regimes they opposed. Instead, only strong insurgencies (generated by conditions consider previously herein) confronting a “sultanistic” type of regime or (his term) “mafiacracy” actually seized state power. Whatever the particular label applied to them, such highly personalistic forms of civilian-cum-military rule are by some recent consensus uniquely vulnerable to overthrow by guerrilla-centered yet broad-based oppositions, if regime opponents are strong enough to complete the task. In contrast, Wickham-Crowley argues that collective military regimes supported by the upper classes and also competitive electoral democracies are likely to face down any insurgencies that confront them. Finally, Foran (2005) has greatly broadened both the analytical scope and the universe of cases under consideration, and thus his five-element theories which explain the “classic” social revolutions and also the successful anticolonial revolutions are correspondingly complex. Only the anticolonial revolutions were rooted in a broad-based yet guerrilla-centered coalition, and they succeeded where such an opposition “enjoyed” the advantages of a system characterized by dependent development, narrow and oppressive colonial rule, the formation of a nationalist and also socialist political culture of opposition, and a conjunctural downturn which favored the opposition. Foran’s further analyses of his failed cases, even those involving substantial guerrilla movements, reinforce his claim that all elements in his “five-factor” theoretical model were necessary for the revolutionaries to seize state power from the incumbents.

SEE ALSO: Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Lenin (V.I. Ylianov) (1870–1924); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Master frame; National Liberation Sandinist Front (Nicaragua); QCA and fuzzy set applications to social movement research; Rational choice theory and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Revolutions; Terrorist movements; War and social movements; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Central leader of the Cuban Revolution and iconic “heroic guerrilla,” Ernesto Guevara Lynch de la Serna was born in Rosario, Argentina to a well-read, left-of-center, politically active middle-class family. Life-long study of Marx, Engels, and Lenin began in the mid-1940s. Guevara explored a tumultuous, radicalizing Latin America before and after becoming a physician in 1953.

Events in Guatemala transformed Guevara into a revolutionary Marxist. Worker, peasant, and student mobilizations drew him and his first wife Hilda Gadea to Guatemala City in 1953, where elected president Jacobo Arbenz approved limited land reform. The radical couple studied Engel’s *Anti-Duhring* and Guevara met Cuban militant and Fidel Castro ally Antonio Lopez. In mid-1954 mercenaries backed by Washington entered Guatemala to oust Arbenz, and overturn pro-peasant land tenure policies. Guevara volunteered to fight the invasion. Arbenz refused to distribute weapons, resigned, and a right-wing dictatorship seized power. Ernesto and Hilda resettled in Mexico and continued in-depth study of Marx’s *Capital*.

In July 1955 in Mexico City, Guevara was recruited by Fidel Castro, whose July 26th Movement was organizing an urban underground and rural irregular army to topple Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. From December 1956 Guevara served the rebel army as physician, soldier, literacy teacher, and Marxist educator. He adopted the moniker “Che,” was the first promoted to the highest rank of *comandante* (major), launched Radio Rebelde – the insurrection’s official voice – and initiated agrarian reform in rebel-held territory. Guevara unified revolutionary forces in central Cuba into Rebel Army Column 8. It captured Santa Clara, the isle’s third largest city, on January 1, 1959, forcing US-backed strongman Batista to flee to the Dominican Republic.

In May 1959 the revolution challenged latifundista elite and foreign agribusiness prerogatives. Guevara coauthored the Agrarian Reform Law that protected small peasants, redistributed land, and limited ownership to 3300 acres. As National Bank president, he sold Cuban gold reserves in the US to prevent confiscation. Sweeping nationalizations in 1960 signified Cuba’s socialist transformation. Minister of Industry Guevara, responsible for 70 percent of industrial enterprises, conceived and applied a system of socialist political economy distinct from Soviet and Eastern European models employed elsewhere in the state-owned sector. Che shepherded scientific and technical research and development; and introduced advanced statistics, mathematical modeling, and computers to monitor the economy, reduce costs, and increase labor productivity. He championed voluntary labor.

Major Guevara created the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Department of Instruction to spread literacy and political education within FAR. During the October 1962 Missile Crisis he commanded troops in western Cuba. Che helped unify the July 26th Movement, Popular Socialist Party, and Revolutionary Directorate into the Communist Party of Cuba founded in 1965.

Guevara’s revolutionary internationalism synthesized the legacies of Simón Bolívar, José Martí, Marx, and Lenin, and Cuba’s radical global agenda placed it at the center of world politics. In tandem with Fidel Castro, Che was the audacious and frank voice of the Cuban Revolution, and he spearheaded official initiatives in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Cuban socialism challenged the West and

Guevara’s three diplomatic tours of the USSR cemented the alliance. However, by 1964 he was disenchanted with bureaucratized, vitiated Soviet socialism, and leery of Moscow’s foreign policy (Gleijeses 2002). In February 1965, Che was blunt, “The socialist countries have the moral duty to liquidate their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West” (Guevara 2000). He regularly met Third World militants and political leaders, reached out to independent Africa, aided its liberation movements, and condemned the US war against Vietnam.

On April 1, 1965, Guevara renounced his Cuban posts and citizenship in order to promote socialist revolution in Latin America. As extant political and military conditions were not yet favorable, he led a secret April–November 1965 Cuban military mission to Congo Brazzaville to aid the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Congo. The unsuccessful campaign prepared Cuban fighters who accompanied Che to Bolivia.

Cuba supported Guevara in Bolivia. He aimed to unify, train, and expand Latin American revolutionary forces. In November 1966 Che assumed command of National Liberation Army (ELN) combatants from Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru. ELN guerrillas hoped to lead a mass movement of workers, peasants, and youth to defeat Bolivia’s dictatorship, inspire anti-capitalist revolution throughout the Southern Cone, and drag Washington into a military quagmire, thus aiding the Vietnamese Revolution. On October 8, 1967, CIA-advised Bolivian troops captured Guevara. La Paz and Washington agreed to execute him on October 9.

Guevara theorized on building socialism and political-military strategy. He criticized Soviet and Eastern European political economy, predicting these societies were headed toward capitalism. “Socialism and Man in Cuba” (Guevara 2000) argues socialism cannot be built using “the dull instruments left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell, profitability, individual material interest as a lever, etc.).” The use of capitalist economic methods reproduces bourgeois behaviors and motivations. He identifies “the two pillars of the construction of socialism: the education of the new man and the development of technology.” Without human solidarity, political consciousness, popular control of the economy, and voluntary labor as a social duty, the transition to socialism is impossible. According to “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method” (Guevara 2000), “guerrillas are the fighting vanguard of the people . . . directed toward . . . the seizure of power. They have the support of the worker and peasant masses.”

SEE ALSO: Cuban revolution; Guerrilla movements; Lenin (V.I. Ylianov) (1870–1924); National Liberation Sandinist Front (Nicaragua); Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Hackers
JAMES E. STOBAUGH and B. REMY CROSS

Computer hacking and online protests have increasingly become options for social movement organizations (SMOs) looking to disrupt oppositional institutions or gain exposure for their cause. While many, and perhaps most, SMOs maintain at the very least an online presence in the form of a website, some groups have begun to use online communication as a means of advancing their own goals (Wray 1999).

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ATTENTION

Recently movement scholars have started to recognize that social movements are increasingly turning online for a variety of movement activities and, along with this recognition, has come an interest in online activism (Rohlinger & Brown 2009; Earl 2010). Much of this recent scholarship has overlooked the relationship between SMOs and how they use hacking and hackers.

This neglect may be due, in part, to the reluctance of many movement scholars to recognize less mainstream or marginal disruptive movement tactics. However, Cloward and Piven (2001) recognize the usefulness of hacking as a form of SMO disruption. They find that it was successfully used in protesting the WTO meeting in Seattle and could be used by other movements, especially as more business is increasingly done online. They warn though that as more commerce is conducted online, efforts to prevent disruption by hackers will increase.

MOTIVATIONS OF HACKTIVISTS

Not all SMOs make use of hacking as a tactic, but an increasing number are and the reasons for utilizing this tactic tend to fall into four broad categories of motivation. The first, and likely most common, motivation is that hacking allows the SMO to continue its stated mission and goal and that attacking an opponent via the Internet or their communications network reflects the sort of grievances that initially spurred mobilization.

However, many hackers engage in hacktivism out of the belief that “information wants to be free” (Brand 1987: 202). This belief sees privacy, and private information, especially that held by public officials and agencies, as being something that should be made public (Vaidhyanathan 2004). To hackers, the act of hacking, and hacktivism, is a way of bringing sunshine into a political system that is overly concerned with secrecy, so they often lend their talents to movements in need of their expertise.

Third, there are hackers for whom the political aspect of what they do is secondary. This includes hackers who do it for the thrill of the experience, the “seduction of the crime” as Katz (1988) has explained. And fourth are those hackers who work for SMOs but do so only as a job with no personal attachment to either the cause or the act of hacking. In both cases the hacking is not motivated by any sense of loyalty to a movement’s cause.

METHODS OF DISRUPTION

There have been numerous examples of hacktivism throughout the last three decades but they broadly fall into three different types: hacking that is intended to gather protected or sensitive information; hacking meant to expose or embarrass an opponent; and hacking meant to disrupt an opponent’s systems and communications. In the hacker community, what can often be viewed as acts of sabotage or vandalism are viewed as electronic civil disobedience (Critical Arts Ensemble 1996).
Hacking first developed as a means of accessing secure and private information and it is still used in this way by many groups who want inside or privileged information on their opponents. This type of hacking is most commonly done in such a way as to keep it under the radar so that the perpetrators can continue to monitor the communications of their opponents.

Closely related to the act of private information gathering are attempts to use this kind of data to publicly expose or embarrass opponents. Hacktivists expose misinformation or falsehoods perpetrated by their opponents by hacking into their private and protected networks and then posting this information to sites like Wikileaks, which hosts documents and information “liberated” by hackers.

Hacking meant to entirely disrupt an opponent often features the crashing of vital systems to disrupt communications. One of the most common methods used by hackers is the denial-of-service attacks. These attacks target a website with an excessive amount of Internet traffic which makes it impossible for legitimate requests from users to get through and results in the targeted website going offline. This method has been employed repeatedly by the Internet group Anon, an anonymous online organization comprised of internet pranksters, in their online battle against the Church of Scientology (Stobaugh et al. forthcoming).

CONCLUSION

Hacking, as a movement tactic, is a way for groups with less power to disrupt or invert the established relationships and systems that their opponents or state actors use and rely upon. While hacking can have many motivations, its rise and sustained popularity as a tactic has gone hand-in-hand with our increasing reliance upon digital networks of communication. As technology changes and evolves ever more rapidly, so will the ways that hackers attempt to challenge authority. The true worth of hackers, hacktivists, and hacktivism is in the jujitsu it allows small groups and individuals to use against larger and better-organized opponents, a tenet that has been the core of many social movements.

SEE ALSO: Electronic protest; Internet and social movements; Media activism; Tactics; Technology and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Hamas (Palestine)
JEROEN GUNNING

The Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym HAMAS, was founded at the start of the first Palestinian Intifada between December 1987 and January 1988. It began as the resistance wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, established in the mid-1940s as the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-1990s, Hamas had eclipsed its parent organization and had become the main opposition party to Fatah (Hroub 2000; Mishal & Sela 2006).

Hamas is neither a monolithic organization nor always internally consistent. Hamas’s declared goal is the liberation of all of historic Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state in the entire area. It has become best known for its suicide bombing campaigns against Israeli civilians, and it has waged a long and bloody struggle against Israeli occupation. However, it has similarly shown readiness to make tactical compromises, for instance by engaging in ceasefires, or standing in elections that were a direct result of the Oslo peace talks and thus implicitly premised on the notion of a two-state solution. Its supporters range from the Islamically conservative to the aspirational middle classes, and from the implacably militant to the more politically and socially pragmatic. It has a strong record of efficient social services provision and many of those who voted for it in the 2006 elections were secular Palestinians who had grown disillusioned with the divisions and corruption at the heart of the ruling Fatah party, and believed Hamas would be better at governing Palestine. Since the ousting of Fatah from Gaza in 2007, Hamas has both shown ruthlessness in suppressing opponents and concern for maintaining public legitimacy. In short, Hamas answers to multiple constituencies and many of its apparent contradictions stem from the heterogeneity of its supporters and their sometimes divergent interests (Gunning 2007; Sayigh 2010).

Contrary to popular depictions, Hamas is not strictly speaking a “religious movement” – although academic opinion is divided on this issue (cf. Gunning 2007; Hoffman 2006). While there are prominent clerics in the organization, its leaders are predominantly secular professionals, such as engineers, medical doctors, and lecturers. Its leaders are elected by internal ballot, rather than appointed by religious decree, and many of its supporters consider themselves to be average, rather than zealots, in terms of religious orientation. While Hamas’s ideology draws heavily on religious texts and imagery, its goals are just as much inspired by nationalistic notions of self-determination and modern political models, such as elected legislatures. The targets of its violence are largely secular and its campaigns of violence can be said to follow a predominantly secular logic, shaped by changing political opportunity structures, internal organizational tensions, and constantly contested frames.

In many ways, Hamas is a product of the socioeconomic, political, and ideological changes that rocked the Palestinian territories during the 1970s and 1980s. Its members are predominantly drawn from the new, university-educated lower middle classes, which emerged from the profound changes in the labor market resulting from the interplay between modernization and occupation (Robinson 1997). The rebirth of its parent organization in the 1970s was fueled by the reunification of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under Israeli occupation, the resurgence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the meteoric rise of the Gulf States following the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, and the success of the 1979 Iranian revolution. The regional Islamist resurgence provided existing local networks with the additional ideological impetus and resources necessary to compete against an
increasingly dominant Fatah. The ever more violent confrontations between the Israeli Defense Forces and the Palestinian resistance factions in the lead-up to the Intifada provided the context within which the Brotherhood’s youth became increasingly radicalized and averse to their elders’ opposition to violent resistance. Competition with Fatah, and fear of marginalization following the outbreak of the Intifada, was what finally triggered the internal “coup” that resulted in the formation of Hamas.

Fear of marginalization was similarly a factor in Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 elections – just as it was a factor in its turn to suicide bombing in 1993–1994. Having boycotted the 1996 elections on the grounds that they were a product of the Oslo peace process, by 2006 Hamas could participate without being seen to legitimize the by then all-but-dead peace process. For the first time, public opinion polls had seen the gap between Hamas and Fatah narrow to within a few percentage points, enabling Hamas’s pragmatists to persuade the hardliners that participation, even if it meant observing a ceasefire, would enable the organization to translate its popularity into political power. Hamas’s controversial suicide bombing campaigns during the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2005) had given it prominence, alongside its welfare provision. By contrast, Fatah was suffering from internal division, following the death of its founder, Yasser Arafat. Using a mixture of modern canvassing techniques and shrewd strategizing, Hamas won two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Council.

The international boycott that followed Hamas’s 2006 election victory reversed the gains the pragmatists had made and brought the hardliners back to the fore (Gunning 2010). Material support for pro-Fatah security forces fueled an arms race between Hamas and Fatah, culminating in the “pre-emptive coup” which saw Hamas oust Fatah from Gaza in 2007. Since then, Hamas and Fatah have ruled increasingly autocratically in their separate fiefdoms of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (although the Arab Spring has brought the two sides nominally closer in a “National Unity” government). Ideology (of both the secular and religious variety) has played a part in these dynamics. But one cannot understand Hamas’s evolution without also considering the changes in political opportunity structure (including the international opportunity structure), organizational dynamics (including rivalry between pragmatists and hardliners, and with Fatah and more radical Islamist groups), and changes in broader master frames (including the impact of the Arab Spring on popular perceptions of Hamas and Fatah).

SEE ALSO: Arab Spring; Ideology; Islamic movements; Israeli social movements; Master frame; Nationalist movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Religion and social movements; Terrorist movements; Violence against oneself; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Health movements (United States)

VERTA TAYLOR and MAYER ZALD

Health social movements are collective campaigns to bring about change in medical and public health policy, beliefs, research, and practice. In American society, social movements attempt to influence healthcare at many levels. At the macro level, movements historically have mobilized a range of interest groups and moral and political values both to advocate and forestall national health insurance and to modify existing programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Veteran’s healthcare benefits. Social movements also develop around alternative specializations and different systems of diagnosis and treatment, seeking to reshape professions, organizations, and modes of service delivery. Health-related collective action that addresses the way we think about, understand, and experience disease is also pervasive in American society; movements use and create emotions, identities, and ways of framing health issues to politicize the illness experience. Finally, larger social movements in the United States concerned with inequalities of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and sexuality target medical power and authority, campaigning for equal access and health equity.

Although health movements share many of the attributes scholars associate with other social movements, research on health movements has only recently begun to acknowledge the broader literature. In part this is because social movement scholars debate whether collective challenges that do not target the state can rightly be considered social movements. Over the past decade a less state-centered conceptualization of social movements has emerged rooted in a multi-institutional model of politics that recognizes that the government and state institutions are not the only source of authority in modern society. According to this perspective domination and power are reproduced in various institutions, such as religion, the family, capitalist markets, education, and healthcare through classification and meaning systems that determine the allocation of resources. Viewing society as a multi-institutional system, we should expect social movements to challenge not only the state, but any social group, organization, or institution in which authority is constituted.

While the state has a unique capacity to establish rules that govern other institutions, it is by no means the only source of authority in health systems, nor is it necessarily the most influential. Health movements have sought to challenge political power, professional authority, corporate interests, and personal and collective identity. Health-related social movements address the provision of and access to healthcare services, contest traditional assumptions and scientific research regarding disease diagnosis and causation, challenge the authority of science and medicine by promoting personal understanding and experience of disease, mental health, and disability, address health inequality based on race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sexuality, and challenge the authority of medicine, science, governments, and corporations such as the drug and hospital industries.

THE ORIGIN AND TYPES OF HEALTH MOVEMENTS

The healthcare system in the United States is permeated by social movements to a much greater extent than in most developed nations. The abundance of health movements can be explained, in part, by the state’s historical reluctance to develop a national health insurance system or single provider system guaranteeing access to medical services and, in part, by the larger sociopolitical context, which makes
the United States more movement prone than many nations. A multi-institutional approach suggests that to understand the emergence of health movements, we must examine the larger field of contention in which they operate because each institutional field has its own logic, rules, and regularities. Institutional boundaries, however, are vulnerable to political contestation, new practices, and even the development of new institutional logics. One aspect of an institution that structures the context of political action is how open or closed it is to challenges.

In the biomedical complex, power is reinforced by scientific authority, the standardized education and licensing of physicians and other health professionals, the structure of hospitals, managed care, the policies of health insurers, and the federal bureaucracy. If the bureaucratization and corporatization of healthcare would seem to make the biomedical complex resistant to change, the faith in medical and therapeutic approaches to human problems that underlies the moral economy of US healthcare together with disease-based and reductionist approaches to illness, which have led to medical specialization, provides the opposite impetus. Beginning in the 1980s, specialization, privatization, and the corporatization of health services began to erode the authority of physicians. These changes created political opportunities that have made the healthcare system more conducive to supporting the aims of movement actors.

Further, the fractionalization of authority across different levels of the public, private, and nonprofit divides produces multiple targets and levels for collective action. On the most macro level movements interact with professions, political parties, labor unions, insurance industry lobbyists, the pharmaceutical industry, managed-care organizations, and a variety of other groups to establish or forestall national and state-level plans, to authorize large new programs such as national health insurance or more limited national programs, and to modify existing programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Veteran’s healthcare benefits. Movements also develop around alternative specializations and different systems of diagnosis and treatment. At this level, movements attempt to reshape professions, organizations, and modes of service delivery. Movements also coalesce around the way people think about, understand, and experience disease, and they use emotions, identities, and new ways of framing disease and health-related issues to politicize the illness experience. Finally, larger social movements in the United States concerned with inequalities of race, gender, ethnicity, class, and sexuality spill over to the medical sphere, addressing issues of unequal access and health equity.

Analyzing the range and nature of health social movements in the United States, Phil Brown (2007) identifies three types: health access movements, which seek equitable access to health services; embodied movements, which address disease, disability, or illness experience by challenging science on etiology, diagnosis, and treatment; and constituency-based movements, which address health inequality based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality.

THE DYNAMICS OF HEALTH MOVEMENTS

The organizational and cultural logic of a particular institutional arena influences the structural forms through which a movement mobilizes. In addition, the women’s, civil rights, gay and lesbian, environmental, and other movements that emerged out of the 1960s and 1970s cycle of protest have spawned a variety of subsequent movements, and these movements have influenced the mobilizing structures, frames and collective identities, and tactics of health movements.

Mobilizing structures. The mobilizing structures, or forms of organization, that propel health movements range from formally structured national organizations such as the National Women’s Health Network, National Black Women’s Health Project, the National Asian Women’s Health Organization, and the
National Latina Health Organization, to more loosely structured local networks, such as direct action, self-help, and support groups such as the Boston Women’s Health Collective, creators of the bible of women’s health, Our Bodies Ourselves and ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). Broad-based health movements, such as the breast cancer movement, HIV/AIDS movement, environmental health justice movement, women’s health movement, disability rights movement, and psychiatric consumer movement mobilize through a variety of overlapping formal organizations, networks, and self-help groups. Because institutional movements adapt their organizational forms and tactics to the rules, practices, and discursive context of the institutional field, the hallmark of most health movements is hybrid organization, or mobilizing structures composed of a mix of lay and expert activists.

**Framing and collective identity.** Health movements mobilize through: (1) new frames or interpretations of problems that resonate with the beliefs and practices of adherents, constituents, the medical establishment, and other actors in a field of contention; and (2) collective identities around a disease and potential set of causes that becomes politicized through collective action. The collective frames used to justify health movements that target the state mirror the therapeutic state’s use of discourses of illness and health, but also draw upon core American values pertaining to freedom, choice, personal responsibility, and savings. Constituency-based health movements concerned with health inequality, which are often spin-offs from earlier broad-based movements, borrow from the master frames that shaped orientations and strategies of earlier movements and countermovements to justify their claims. For example, the language of gender and power in women’s self-help movements serves to punctuate and explain a host of problems that trouble women. In health movements, the reframing of illness, which allows people to cast off the passive patient role, counter stigma, resist treatments with dangerous side effects, and develop alternative explanations for the cause of their disease is central to collective identity construction. Brown (2007) describes the process of transforming an individual disease into a collective identity focused on health and social inequalities as a politicized illness experience.

**Tactical repertoires in institutional contexts.** Health movements develop insider and outsider tactics that mirror institutional rules and practices suitable for employment in relation to the elements of the institutional field most likely to give leverage in pursuing or resisting change. Professional groups attempting to change healthcare policies or programs tend to use insider tactics, such as strikes, petitions, courts, and legislative bodies to press their claims. Patient and consumer groups also create organizations to lobby physicians, corporations, researchers, and government agencies, such as the National Institute of Health and the National Institute of Mental Health, for the redefinition of disease categories. Health movements also originate among patient and consumer groups with a deep sense of mistrust of institutional authorities, and these movements have often resorted to outsider tactics, including street demonstrations, direct action, and boycotts. Three tactical innovations are associated with embodied health movements. First, is self-help or reliance on experiential knowledge and mutual support as an alternative to professional knowledge; second is coming out or strategic identity disclosure to empower people disenfranchised by disease classifications, reimbursement policies, and practices of health institutions; and the third is the use of lay knowledge, such as popular epidemiology and bibliotherapy, to challenge biomedical discourse and power.

**THE IMPACT OF HEALTH MOVEMENTS**

From self-help and disease-oriented patient groups, to groups organized to combat toxic environments, to movement-like activities of mobilized health professionals, to coalitions of groups organized to change national politics,
health movements interact with and sometimes come into conflict with the medical profession, health corporations, government health organizations, and interest groups. To say that health movements have had impact on the health system at many levels is not to say they always achieve their intended effects. Nor is it to say that movements are the most important drivers of change in health institutions. Over the past 50 years, health social movements have, nevertheless, played a major part in the medicalization of all sorts of human maladies and conditions – from childbirth and depression to gender identity disorder and erectile dysfunction – and this has contributed significantly to the expansion of the bio-medical complex in US society.

SEE ALSO: AIDS activism; Framing and social movements; Collective identity; Repertoires of contention; Self-help movements; Social problems and social movements; Spillover, social movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Hizb ut-Tahrir
EMMANUEL KARAGIANNIS

Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party – hereafter Hizb ut-Tahrir) was founded by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin in East Jerusalem in 1953 (Taji-Farouki 1996). The party gradually expanded to become a truly international movement with branches from Morocco to Indonesia. From the 1980s onward, Hizb ut-Tahrir has also managed to establish branches in Western countries which have sizeable Muslim communities, including Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, the United States, and Australia. Since the 1990s, Hizb ut-Tahrir has also become active in the former USSR and China. The current leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir is Ata Abu Rashta, a Palestinian civil engineer who studied in Cairo and served previously as party spokesman in Jordan, but his whereabouts are unknown.

Interestingly, Hizb ut-Tahrir views itself not as a religious organization, but rather as a political party whose ideology is based on Islam. In reality, it is a selective interpretation of the Koran that provides the basis for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology. The group claims that the roots of Muslim decline lie in the de-Islamization of the ummah (i.e., community of believers); namely a decline in spirituality and religious observance. Hizb ut-Tahrir has not only provided a straightforward explanation for the Muslim world’s problems, but it has also put forward a strategy for the revival of the ummah.

The proposed strategy consists of two parts. The first is the need for Islamic law, sharia that justly regulates all aspects of human life—politics, economics, and ethics. The second is the need for an authentic pan-Islamic state, because a just society can be established only within such a political entity. Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir has campaigned for the reestablishment of the Caliphate that existed in the seventh century under the Prophet Muhammad and his first four successors. For this purpose, the group has envisaged a three-stage program of action, modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced en route to the establishment of the first Islamic state in Medina:

• First stage: recruitment of members.
• Second stage: Islamization of society.
• Third stage: peaceful takeover of state and then jihad against nonbelievers (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 32).

Since Hizb ut-Tahrir operates largely clandestinely, its membership cannot be estimated accurately. Judged by the high number of individuals attending its events in countries where Hizb ut-Tahrir is legal (e.g., United Kingdom, Indonesia) and the number of arrested members in the Middle East and Central Asia, it is clear that the organization has hundreds of thousands of members and sympathizers. Despite being an international organization, most literature and communiqués are published from London. The group has also used the Internet to spread its messages. Hizb ut-Tahrir has increasingly played a leading role in many pan-Islamic issues, mobilizing large numbers of people to protest, for example, against the US invasion of Iraq or Israel’s actions in Lebanon and Gaza.

HIZB UT-TAHRIR AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

Hizb ut-Tahrir is more than just another Islamist group; it is a social movement organization (SMO) which is part of a larger social movement, namely political Islam. The latter is a diverse world of Islamic charities, political parties, violent and nonviolent groups. Dieter Rucht has drawn attention to those SMOs that have become transnational in terms of...
recruitment, issues, and organization (Rucht 1999: 207). According to Rucht, transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) consist of closely interrelated groups that originate from more than one country. In addition, Louis Kriesberg argues that TSMOs have two distinct characteristics (Kriesberg 1997: 16–17). First, they attempt to influence the public opinion, political elites, NGOs, and international organizations at the national, regional, or global level. Second, there is a division of labor within TSMOs with members from developed countries complementing the efforts of those from less developed countries. More specifically, TSMOs sometimes provide funds and safe havens in one country from which campaigns can be launched in another (Kriesberg 1997). Furthermore, Jackie Smith suggests that a primary aim of many TSMOs may be to forge a new global identity for their members in which loyalty to the organization prevails over loyalty to states (Smith, Pagnucco, & Chatfield 1997: 72).

Hizb ut-Tahrir certainly fits the description of a TSMO since it consists of many closely interrelated national branches that subordinate to an international organization. Although breakaway groups have appeared from time to time, Hizb ut-Tahrir remains remarkably united under the rigid control of the all-party leader. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s propaganda machine has targeted a diverse audience that includes the wider public, the media, human rights organizations, national governments, and international organizations. In addition, there is an apparent division of labor within Hizb ut-Tahrir, as illustrated for example by the British branch’s campaigns against the arrest and torture of members in Central Asia and elsewhere. By advocating the break-up of existing Muslim states, Hizb ut-Tahrir has forged a new transnational identity for its members, centered on the ummah (the community of believers).

SEE ALSO: Islamic movements; Religion and social movements; Social movement organization (SMO); Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Homeless protest movements (United States)
DANIEL M. CRESS

Protest activity by homeless people was arguably the most significant social movement by poor people in the United States over the three decade period, 1980–2010. Newspaper accounts of homeless protests were reported in over 60 cities during the 1980s with more than 500 protest events reported in 17 of those cities between 1984 and 1990 (Cress 2009; Snow, Soule, & Cress 2001). Beyond its empirical importance, homeless protest sheds theoretical insight into social movement activity because of the seemingly unlikely possibility of homeless people being able to sustain ongoing mobilization or achieve significant concessions. This entry examines the emergence, organization, and outcomes of homeless protest and concludes with a discussion of how protest by the homeless influences our understanding of social movements more broadly.

EMERGENCE AND PARTICIPATION

The emergence of protest by the homeless came on the heels of the significant increase in homelessness that followed the recession of 1982. An array of macro-level factors including the restructuring of job opportunities for the poor and working class, the decrease in affordable housing, and the erosion of social support contributed to a significant increase in homelessness in major cities throughout the United States (Rossi 1989; Wright 1989; Burt 1992). The policy response, both private and public, was to create an infrastructure of shelters and soup kitchens to meet the immediate and basic needs of homeless people.

The initial emergence of activism by homeless people in the mid-1980s was directed at both the prevalence of homelessness and the response to it. While advocates for the homeless pushed for increases in services, many homeless activists decried these approaches as institutionalizing the homeless problem and instead called for permanent, affordable housing, jobs, an end to police harassment, and more humane treatment in the services being provided (Cress 1993; Wagner 1997; Wright 1989). In addition, some homeless protest may be triggered by either the defense of marginal space in urban areas where the homeless have typically had greater access, or the right to prime space where the homeless have been harassed by merchants or the police (Snow & Mulcahy 2001).

This understanding is supported by work that suggests that variation in homeless protest around the United States was shaped in part by local levels of resources and economic strain (Snow, Soule, & Cress 2005). On the resource side, protest occurred at greater levels in communities with higher per capita incomes and higher levels of transfer payments to the needy. Yet, homeless protest was most likely to take place in cities that had greater disparity between income levels and housing costs, declining manufacturing jobs, higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates. These factors were translated on the micro level in that homeless activists who participated over the long haul were more likely to report higher levels of strains and grievances than those who did not participate or only did so in one event (Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009).

ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES

If the prerequisites for collective action require social networks, indigenous organizations, resources, and some modicum of social power, then the homeless would seem an unlikely group for sustained protest. Yet, homeless
protestors were able to organize widely and over several years as indicated above. How did this happen? In part, this was shaped by the organizational fields in which the homeless existed. Cities that had more service provider and activist organizations tended to foster a climate for ongoing homeless protest through the provision of resources.

For the most part, homeless social movement organizations (SMOs) that maintained viability had resource support from benefactor organizations. These groups, typically social gospel organizations like the Catholic Workers or American Friends, supported homeless protestors with an array of resources, the most important being strategic and tactical support and leadership. Some homeless SMOs that lacked benefactor relationships did maintain ongoing protest if they were able to secure these resources internally (Cress & Snow 1996).

Most of the homeless SMOs were informal organizations with a small leadership cadre that proposed ideas about actions that other homeless people then supported. Yet, roughly half of the homeless SMOs also incorporated as nonprofit entities (Cress 1997). In some cases, this incorporation was pursued to gain resources for charitable work or organizational legitimacy. In other cases, it was involuntary – the homeless group was a part of a larger organization that was already a nonprofit or the homeless SMO was required to incorporate as part of a settlement of protest in order to gain the outcomes. The pathway to nonprofit incorporation, rather than incorporation per se, had an influence on the tactical choices of homeless SMOs. Those whose incorporation was part of a plan for greater organizational legitimacy were more likely to maintain their militancy. Those who were part of a larger nonprofit organization or who incorporated for charitable reasons or as a condition of concessions were more likely to moderate their tactics or disintegrate.

OUTCOMES

Homeless protest ranged in its effectiveness from city to city. In some cases, the homeless had little to show for their efforts. In other cases, homeless people came to control tens of millions of dollars in housing and service assets (Cress & Snow 2000). In general, homeless protest was able to secure four types of outcome – representation, resources, rights, and relief. Representation refers to the homeless having input on policy task forces and service provider boards that have concern with their interests. As noted at the outset, homeless people were often not in agreement with the responses to their conditions. Representation gave them at least the ability to be heard and have influence on these responses. Resources refer to homeless protestors being able to secure assets for their SMOs. Given the centrality of resources to ongoing mobilization, obtaining office space, supplies and, in some cases, outright control of service provision was central to ongoing mobilization.

Homeless protest was also effective in securing basic civil rights for homeless people. These types of outcomes included protection from police and merchant harassment, and securing the right to vote, attend school, or obtain welfare benefits in the absence of a permanent address. Finally, homeless protest was able to secure some modicum of relief for the homeless. This relief came in the form of accommodative programs such as shelters and soup kitchens or access to showers and storage facilities. In some cases though, homeless protest was able to secure restorative programs that helped get homeless people off the streets. These included such things as jobs and permanent housing – the very things that motivated homeless protest in the first place.

So what contributed to the ability of homeless protest to obtain concessions? Two factors were most important: the first was maintaining homeless SMO viability through securing the requisite resources for ongoing mobilization; the second was having coherent and specific framing of the homeless problem and the solution contributed to SMO effectiveness. The tactics utilized by homeless SMOs were more complex in relation to obtaining concessions. Militant tactics were most effective in cities that
were unresponsive to the homeless issue, but where the homeless had political allies on city councils. However, militancy backfired in cities that had been more responsive to the homeless problem.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Collective action and protest by the homeless have made significant contributions to our understanding of social movements more generally. In regards to movement emergence, homeless protest has underscored the role of resources and strains. While resource flows have been posited as a significant factor in movement activity, this has more often been asserted rather than demonstrated. Ironically, resource-based approaches to understanding social movements tended to displace strain and grievance arguments, but in the case of homeless protest, strains and grievances have been equally important to understanding the emergence and level of protest.

Homeless protest has also raised issues about the underlying dynamics in social movement participation. In particular, the centrality of network connections and biographical availability has been less relevant to understanding homeless participation. Instead, a common collective identity and a sense of collective and personal efficacy combined with a heightened experience of strains and grievances were more important predictors of participation. The broader point is that it is important to understand the population in question and the micro-contexts of mobilization before assuming a general model of participation applies.

The role of organizations and resources in sustaining mobilization are also underscored by homeless protest. Again, this has been asserted but rarely demonstrated in other work. Additionally, Piven and Cloward 1977, writing specifically about movements of the poor, question the utility of organization building, arguing that it becomes an end rather than a means. While this may be the case for some movements they studied, it was clear in the case of homeless protest that organizational carriers were central to its ongoing mobilization and ability to secure outcomes.

Finally, homeless protest sheds light on understanding the conditions under which movements are able to obtain concessions. In particular, it underscores the importance of framing for obtaining concessions. Most work on framing has centered on its role in gaining participants, but it is clearly important for obtaining concessions as well. Homeless protest also underscores the complex interaction between tactics and the political environment. The debate over the influence of disruption (versus the political environment) on movement outcomes is more complex than the either/or scenario often presented. The success or failure of disruptive tactics is dependent upon the political environment that includes the sympathies of office holders as well as the responsiveness of public agencies (Cress & Snow 2000).

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; NIMBY movements; Outcomes, political; Poor people’s movements; Quotidian disruption; Resource mobilization theory; Squatters’ movements; Strain and breakdown theories; Tactics; Urban movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Human rights movements

ALISON BRYSK

Millions of human rights activists around the world have crafted a new way of doing politics, based on bringing principle into practice. These principles are summarized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are free and equal in rights and dignity.” It begins by using global communications to capture the hearts and minds of global publics. Coalitions of local and global activists pressure governments “from above and below,” and put new issues on the agenda – from forced disappearance to female genital mutilation. Human rights campaigns provide information on global suffering, affecting images that promote identification with victims, the formation of solidarity networks, and explanations that trace international connections.

Although they struggle against a massive and unceasing tide of war, exploitation, and “death by government,” human rights campaigns have saved the lives of countless refugees, political prisoners, and forced laborers. Such protests have contributed strongly to transitions to democracy in many Latin American countries, South Africa, and the Philippines, and former political prisoners became the first democratic leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, South Korea, and Timor. At the global level, nongovernmental groups drafted many provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, while indigenous movements played an important role in creating the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, the International Criminal Court is the result of a steadfast campaign by a coalition of dozens of movements advocating human rights, the rule of law, and global governance.

DEFINITION

Human rights movements are organizations, campaigns, and issue-networks that seek to enact the fundamental rights inscribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such movements run the gamut from local self-defense of vulnerable citizens (Argentina’s Mothers of the Disappeared) to national campaigns for regime change (Iran’s Green Revolution) to global movements for the universal defense of a fundamental freedom or social condition (the International Commission of Jurists). Local human rights movements generally seek to transcend partisan political identities, and derive their power from a combination of Gandhian nonviolent collective action and globalized information politics (Ackerman & Duvall 2000). Global human rights organizations like Amnesty International, and NGOs with a human rights focus, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, follow much of the generic organizational logic of mandate, leadership, and resource mobilization – like bureaucracies and firms (Hopgood 2006). Human rights campaigns are also often catalyzed by less institutionalized transnational issue-networks that include social movements, international organizations, and experts, in fluid habitual exchanges that pressure states from above and below (Keck & Sikkink 1998). An additional element of advocacy mobilizes transnational identities, such as trade unionists defending their threatened colleagues in Colombia, Christians pressing for religious freedom for their co-religionists in China, and women’s groups campaigning to have genocidal rape designated as a war crime by the International Criminal Court.

The unifying theme of these diverse movements is the pursuit of universal human rights. The overall rubric of human rights is
protection of the individual from the abuse of authority – especially but not only the state – as well as self-determination regarding fundamental freedoms of movement, expression, and social participation. While the citizenship traditions of established democracies usually claim to guarantee these rights within a state, universal human rights claim a wider spectrum of entitlements than civil rights, do not depend on membership in a particular society, hold all societies to a common minimum standard regardless of cultural and political history, and are inherent and inalienable. Universal human rights specifically protect noncitizens such as stateless refugees, victims of war crimes enacted by a foreign state, and subjects of nonstate authority such as workers.

HISTORY

The nineteenth-century trans-Atlantic movement against the African slave trade was one of the earliest principled international mobilizations for human rights, and secured the formal abolition of the traffic in human chattels. During the same century, growing costly collisions among rising European powers led to recognition of the horrors of war as a violation of universal standards, and the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a humanitarian service and advocacy group. The ICRC’s push for the Geneva Conventions led to a designated role as a monitor of war crimes – the first international legal recognition of a human rights movement. Decades later, the horrors of the Holocaust inspired a massive effort by NGOs to catalyze and monitor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and associated UN mechanisms (Korey 1998).

The flagship global organization Amnesty International, established in 1961 to advocate for “prisoners of conscience,” now comprises millions of members in over 150 countries. Amnesty International has secured the freedom of around one-third of its subjects from diverse regimes. Along with peers like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty’s nonpartisan annual reports on country conditions and monitoring of conflict situations and emerging abuses often influence global and bilateral condemnations and sanctions. Amnesty campaigns against torture and the death penalty as well as illegitimate detention, and a core membership activity is letter-writing campaigns by global mass publics to “name and shame” repressive governments.

A generation later, Human Rights Watch developed as an information-gathering and parallel advocacy centerpiece of the movement, centered in the United States (while Amnesty is headquartered in London). Human Rights Watch emerged in the waning days of the cold war as a global umbrella for national and regional committees such as the Helsinki Watch groups in Eastern Europe, which sought to shield local dissent through holding the Soviet Union to its international treaty commitment to civil liberties under the Helsinki Accords. Parallel efforts in the Americas during the 1980s struggled for accountability for abuse by US-backed military dictatorships, and eventually spread to Africa as well. Human Rights Watch has an expert rather than mass membership base.

From the 1980s onward, human rights movements have mushroomed in numbers, membership type, geographic reach, and claims. Thousands of nongovernmental grassroots organizations monitor and defend human rights, from Tibet to East Timor. Reaching beyond expert and legal advocates, Latin American activists pioneered campaigns by relatives of victims – a protest repertoire that diffused worldwide. While human rights began as a legal defense of the lives and physical integrity of political dissidents and religious or ethnic minorities from the malfeasance of dictatorships, its mandate has expanded to chronic deprivations of economic and social rights. Human rights organizations increasingly take on issues like labor exploitation, land rights, and access to essential medicines, while development NGOs like Oxfam have moved to adopt a rights-based approach (Nelson & Dorsey 2008). A growing number of human rights movements struggle for
collective identity rights and accountability of nonstate actors like multinational corporations for abuses connected with globalization. The unexpected take-off and impact of international indigenous rights movements illustrates both of these trends, with greatest strength in Latin America but worldwide diffusion (Brysk 2000). Since the 1990s, the subjects of human rights movements have been expanded to previously unrecognized groups such as children, people with disabilities, and sexual minorities. Part of the history of the human rights movement is the reframing of various forms of social problems and marginalization as a problem of human rights – thus, one of the leading gay rights organizations in the United States is now called the Human Rights Campaign (Bob 2009).

**TYPOLOGY**

In terms of function and origin, human rights movements can be roughly mapped as overlapping clusters of institutional reformers, advocates, affected populations, and norm-promoters (based on Brysk 1994). Institutional reformers are generally civil libertarians who challenge the legal basis or operation of a government that is discriminatory or repressive. Such movements are often founded by or comprised of lawyers and usually play a critical role in gathering data and documenting evidence and patterns of abuse. Examples range from Argentina’s CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales) to the American Civil Liberties Union.

The oldest tradition of humanitarian advocacy speaks for victims who cannot speak for themselves: one of the oldest human rights organizations is the Anti-Slavery Society, founded in Britain over a century ago. A variation on this arose during the 1980s, when solidarity or accompaniment was carried out by Witness For Peace and Peace Brigades International, whose members serve as “unarmed bodyguards” for local populations at risk of human rights abuse. These types of movements operate by a logic of solidarity rather than argumentation, are more likely to protest and lobby both target and home governments, and usually have a nonexpert “conscience constituency” based in democratic, developed countries. Prominent current examples include the Free Tibet movement and the Darfur campaign.

From the late twentieth century, directly affected populations began to organize on their own behalf, usually aided by the protection of international organizations and access to global communications. These are generally the most locally based movements, and are often focused on symbolic protest, agenda transformation, and standard-setting. The fastest growing movements of affected populations include relatives of the disappeared, women’s groups, and ethnic minorities or groups stigmatized by social status (such as India’s Dalit).

Finally, cutting across these traditional genres but with some distinctive identity and mode of operations, there are normative constituencies organized around religious or professional identity that come to mobilize as human rights movements. Church-based liberation movements were critical advocates against military dictatorships in Latin America, against apartheid in South Africa, and for development and indigenous rights worldwide. Newer movements that seek to project a professional ethos for the realization of rights protection and empowerment are exemplified by Doctors without Borders and the writers’ group PEN.

Meanwhile, globalization has generated novel forms of advocacy that span these genres, notably transnational professional self-defense networks and multi-movement coalitions across transnational issues. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, in this model, monitors and protests harassment, prosecution, and assassination of journalists worldwide. They have recently been quite active in Colombia, where dozens of journalists are assassinated each year. Similarly, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Scholars at
Risk advocate for academic freedom and the protection of threatened intellectuals.

Another growing form of internationalism consists of nonhierarchical coalitions of human rights organizations within regions. One of the first such coalitions was the Federation of Families of the Disappeared (FEDEFAM), founded in Argentina in the 1980s to unite national human rights organizations comprised of relatives of the disappeared. In Africa, one of the few NGOs credited with making some progress on the region-wide and culturally sensitive issue of female genital mutilation is a regional NGO network, the Inter-African Committee (Welch 1995).

There are also informal human rights partnerships between northern NGOs, including those that are not traditional human rights organizations, and grassroots groups. The Amazon Alliance, for example, unites northern environmentalists with Latin American indigenous peoples’ organizations. Along these lines, the Sierra Club, together with Amnesty International, has launched a campaign to protect environmental activists worldwide, with featured cases in Mexico and Ecuador, and a special focus on the responsibility of multinational corporations. In Mexico, anti-logging activist Rodolfo Montiel – winner of the 2000 Goldman Environmental Prize – was declared a prisoner of conscience, and as a result of this pressure was eventually released by the Mexican government. Networks often combine labor, religious, and human rights groups on the Northern side. The Texas-based Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, for example, is comprised of the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, the American Friends Service Committee, Human Rights Watch, and the United Auto Workers.

HOW THEY WORK

International human rights movements monitor, lobby, protest, and reform laws, governments, and institutions. Country-specific campaigns, increasingly mobilized via the Internet, shield some local advocates and bring pressure to bear on repressive regimes. Global advocates for human dignity also construct cosmopolitan institutions for prevention and accountability, such as UN treaty bodies, national truth commissions and tribunals following dictatorships and conflicts, and international prosecutions for genocide, torture, and war crimes. Human rights campaigns dedicated to identifying transnational abuse have also introduced new forms of leverage through boycotts, and new mechanisms of global governance such as codes of conduct for multinationals. New forms of standard-setting, like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, highlight new populations, construct new rights, inspire willing governments, and embarrass laggards.

How do these activities cause social change, in the face of governments’ monopoly of force? Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink depict human rights appeals as a “boomerang” launched by a powerless civil society that reaches around the state to secure transnational pressure “from above and below.” They outline particular pathways of symbolic politics, information politics, power-based leverage, and rule-based institutionalization (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In terms of symbolic politics, charismatic leadership, public intellectuals, and causes célèbres (famous prisoners or victims) often play an unusually strong role in mobilizing human rights movements: from Nelson Mandela to Aung San Suu Kyi. Alison Brysk further maps the conceptual political work of human rights campaigns as inserting new subjects such as women or noncitizens into existing rights regimes, crafting new mechanisms to secure accountability from various venues of authority, and discovering new norms to make rights claims for new or unrecognized forms of power relations (Brysk 2005).

ONGOING ISSUES

Rights to life, freedoms of expression and assembly, protection from torture and arbitrary arrest, remain powerful tools against
states and government agents. But globalization has brought the spread of corporations that violate employees’ rights in sweatshops, epidemic diseases like AIDS, new forms of conflict, and legacies such as landmines (which kill 70 people each day). To enforce these standards on global and private actors, activists also participate in global civic initiatives that bypass governments. For example, a human rights issue-network harnessed willing states and legitimate producers to set up an international certification scheme to stem the trade in “blood diamonds,” whose illicit export has contributed to war crimes in several notorious African conflicts.

New forms of communication allow victims to videotape their plight, advocates to flood governments with faxes, web sites to mobilize urgent action alerts. But the effectiveness of global consciousness and pressure on the states, paramilitaries, and insurgents responsible for traditional human rights violations varies tremendously. And access to the new global mechanisms of communication is distributed unevenly, so that some of the neediest victims – like the illiterate rural poor or refugee women – are the least likely to receive global as well as domestic redress.

While the growth of regional coalitions and issue-networks has increased participation of the global South, the human rights movement still struggles for ways to better reflect a global constituency. Incorporating the global South means introducing new faces, new issues, and new venues to the human rights struggle. International movements and institutions now usually try to include representatives of more societies, but they face ongoing barriers of finance, education, and freedom in the sending countries. And even appointed national representatives from developing countries are often relative elites who are unrepresentative of their own nation’s diversity of identity and opinion. For affected groups in the global South, human rights activism often requires a risky lifetime commitment, beyond the occasional boycott or letter-writing of the Northern advocate.

Another challenge for the global South is some divergence of the urgent issues of survival and interconnected dilemmas of development from the Northern-generated structures of international law. Rights conceived as individual, adversarial boundaries of nonintervention may not address threats to collective self-determination, or the enabling resources needed to access legal rights. A legalistic rights framework moves slowly, and still usually depends on a functional state authority to enforce it. The lingering legal heritage of human rights may be especially problematic for women, and others subject to discrimination and subjugation by nongovernmental authority (Merry 2006).

CONCLUSION

Human rights movements are a vital part of the struggle for fundamental human dignity worldwide. From their roots in episodic protest against repressive governments, thousands of human rights networks and campaigns have grown to constitute an uneven but significant global civil society. Such movements now advocate for every aspect of the human condition, using a combination of normative appeals, mass mobilization, and institutional reform at the global and national levels. Despite some limitations, this form of people power has become our best hope for a world in which all are “free and equal.”

SEE ALSO: Globalization and movements; Nongovernmental organizations; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Rights and rights movements; Social Forum, World; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Hunger strikes

JOHANNA SIMÉANT

Hunger strike can be defined as a public fast, combined with a claim aimed at confronting an adversary or an authority that is likely to satisfy this claim. Most of the time it endangers the health, and sometimes the life, of the hunger striker. British suffragettes and Irish nationalists are the two groups who had the most significant input into introducing hunger strikes within the repertoires of contention in modern nation-states at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the word appeared only in the nineteenth century, fasting as a form of protest has a longer history, either within the private sphere or in political matters. Significant precedents were the collective fasts of Virginia, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts performed against the United Kingdom before the American War of Independence.

Whereas more institutionalized and routinized forms of protest get academic interest, hunger strikes, along with other forms of violence against the self (mutilations, immolations, suicide bombings, etc.) have gained very little attention in social movement studies. This lack of interest is probably due to the fact that hunger strikes are considered as too individual, too residual and sometimes irrational, and relevant for psychological studies only, as they are often associated with anorexia (Orbach 1986). But those arguments are questionable. First, many groups (undocumented migrants, political prisoners, etc.) resort collectively and regularly to hunger strikes. The boundary between individual and collective protest is an issue, more than a clear-cut distinction, for all social movements. Second, although data-collecting on hunger strikes is difficult, a low estimate based on press data reveals that as many as 75 hunger strikes were carried out outside prisons in the year 2008 in France, and this level reaches 180 through Internet sources (Siméant 2009). Waismel-Manor (2005), also relying on press data, estimates that between 1976 and 2001 there were 164 hunger strikes in Israel and 312 in the United States. Hunger strikes are a central element of prison repertoires of contention all over the world (each year about a thousand hunger strikes occur in French prisons). Third, irrationality can by no means be a way to qualify and delegitimize hunger strikes: every protest action has its reasons – notwithstanding their not befitting a strict rational choice model.

Uses and meanings of hunger strikes are quite diverse. Any culturalist interpretation of hunger strikes should be considered with caution. Some traditions undoubtedly bear a particular affinity with hunger strikes in Irish and Indian history (cf. the practice of the creditor’s fast). But hunger strikes can be observed all over the world, in quite different religious and cultural settings. Moreover, hunger strikes oscillate between two different universes of meaning: one is linked to nonviolence (and here the Gandhian heritage and its diffusion seem significant), the other has more affinities with violence (often, previously suffered) in contexts where it cannot be used against authorities.

It is however true that resorting to hunger strikes is often associated with groups suffering different forms of domination: women having no access to voting, colonized people, national minorities and foreigners, prisoners and prisoners’ wives, isolated persons endangered by administrative decisions, and so on: all kinds of persons seeing, de facto or de jure, their access to conventional participation restricted. The prevalence of collective hunger strikes is more important in those groups, who often do not seem to enjoy enough social consideration to go it alone in hunger strikes. Hunger strikes therefore engage an idea of the lack of value of people who are reduced to their bodies (as working or reproductive bodies).
If they do lack political resources, those protesters however do not lack a significant political socialization that seems to let them feel authorized to protest in such a vocal way. Even in conflicts around the workplace, a biographical study of protesters shows an inherited propensity to individual protest, linked to a high conception some individuals can have of their social role, and that has led them to conflicts with different institutions.

Primary and secondary socialization (in terms of profession, religion, politics, speaking out loud, etc.) has therefore a link with hunger strikes, even if this socialization can be a late one, linked to an interactive radicalization process between the individual and the institution (that is why carceral socialization plays such a role here).

Hunger strikes are therefore frequently associated with status claims built as nonnegotiable. They cannot, however, be considered only as the weapons of the weak. Renowned protesters can also put their fame in the balance. Hunger strikes have to be studied synchronically within the global repertoire of contention. They call for an audience and a third party to question authorities, and rely on the possibility of a public opinion (be it international), and are closely linked to contemporary politics of pity, more than mass media only. Controversies about the reality of hunger strikes show that they are also perceived as an ordeal and a test of the protesters’ authenticity and commitment to their cause.

Whatever the reasons for a hunger strike, this means of action also has its own logic once begun: the handling of the strike’s credibility, the control of defections in the case of collective strikes, strategic interactions with authorities that try to confront the humanitarian strategy of hunger strikers by accusing their supporters, or to delegitimize hunger strikers when they can be accused of having resorted to violence, and so on. The policing of protest also takes another dimension, both strategic and symbolic: force-feeding, a method which has a double aim – avoiding deaths, and recalling to the protesters that they do not have the control they claim over their bodies. If most hunger strikes succeed at least partially, as they call attention to a cause, even on a very local level, they do not always obtain the substantial changes they claim. What is certain, however, is that if hunger strikes are not always effective, a death by hunger strike is always considered as a moral defeat for the contested power. It is a risk that states take when facing hunger strikers accused of terrorism.

SEE ALSO: Civil disobedience; Media and social movements; Policing protest; Repertoires of contention; Terrorist movements; Violence against oneself.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Indian Independence Movement
JOHN T. CRIST

Until Gandhi’s return to India from South Africa in 1915, protest against the British had been episodic and mostly localized. The era of the Indian Independence Movement (1917–1947) emerged as Gandhi assumed the leadership of the Indian National Congress – the INC, or Congress, the principal vehicle for nationalist opposition – and radically altered its composition and tactics. Through the INC and his own independent cadres of nonviolent activists, Gandhi forged a popular nationalist coalition of urban elites and rural masses against foreign occupation. Under his guidance, Congress adopted the tactics of nonviolent direct action, civil disobedience, and noncooperation in loosely structured national campaigns that together comprised a sustained challenge against colonial occupation over three decades.

The Indian Independence Movement evolved concurrently with the expansion of institutions of local self-government sanctioned by the imperial government. In 1919, the Government of India introduced a policy of “dyarchy,” which assigned administrative control of areas like public welfare, education, and agriculture to locally elected provincial assemblies. At the provincial level, elected officials served as ministers who were responsible to legislative assemblies for administration of provincial government. Dyarchy also established an Imperial Legislature, but it was much less powerful than the provincial bodies, and the viceroy held unrestricted powers to veto imperial legislation. In all new bodies, the administration of most revenue collection, banking and currency policy, foreign affairs, and police and military activities were reserved by the central (colonial) Government of India. Dyarchy was later abolished at the provincial level in 1937, and elected provincial ministers were given substantial control of provincial affairs, but India was left still without independence, and government preserved its imperial interests firmly.

Against this backdrop, Gandhi and the Congress embraced a mass direct action strategy to leverage their power to pressure for expansion of access to and control of government and eventually for independence. Founded in 1885, the structure of the Congress during its first several decades could accommodate neither a direct action strategy, nor mass participation. Gandhi reasoned that nationwide campaigns of nonviolent action were only feasible with a large, flexible, and diverse organization that penetrated India’s diverse cities and sprawling countryside, home to more than 700,000 villages. His restructuring of the formal Congress party organization in 1920 ranks among his most significant political accomplishments – “a landmark in the direction, composition and structure of institutional politics” (Brown 1972: 297). The new constitution aimed “to decentralize the party organization by constituting branches in every district and taluka of British India” (Frankel 1978: 28), even on down to the village in many localities. Thus under Gandhi’s presidency, Congress transformed from a stately association of English-speaking professionals to a mass-based, multilingual, and federated entity that reached “within the range of literate peasants, small town traders and lawyers in all parts of India” (Brown 1972: 299).

Under Gandhi’s direction and armed with a newly invigorated organization, Congress pursued a dual strategy of mobilization for votes and mobilization for protest. It regularly fielded many hundreds of candidates for offices in local, provincial, and national elections that it won consistently and overwhelmingly (when it did not opt for electoral boycott). At key points
in its struggle with the raj, and in alliance with a dense network of Gandhian activists and direct action organizations, Congress also opted for more contentious tactics.

The weapons of nonviolent protest, civil disobedience, and noncooperation – deployed on a scale unprecedented in human history – proved to be immensely popular with the Indian public. The first period of peak mobilization was 1917–1924, which included a prominent regional satyagraha (or resistance campaign) among peasants in Champaran, Bihar (1917), a limited nationwide satyagraha against wartime constrictions on civil liberties (the anti-Rowlatt Bill satyagraha, 1919), and the first mass national nonviolent movement, the Noncooperation Movement (NCM), 1920–1922. From a strategic point of view, the NCM was a highly successful “series of local protest movements, [but] not a withdrawal of collaboration at key points in the structure of the raj” (Brown 1972: 347), as its organizers originally conceived. Throughout the 1920s, as a result of lessons drawn during the NCM, Gandhians and Congress focused on building links between urban nationalists and India’s vast agrarian communities and small towns. In the pursuit of *sarvodaya* (“universal uplift”) – Gandhi’s ambitious agenda for social welfare, religious reform, and nationalist self-reliance – *satyagrahis* (adherents of satyagraha) and Congress workers fanned out across the countryside to conduct literacy training, health and sanitation education, and other “constructive work” among the poor. This foundational organizing greatly improved the participation of rural communities in mass protest and civil disobedience during the 1930s.

After the widely heralded success of the Bardoli antitax satyagraha among peasants in Gujarat (1928), Gandhi and the Congress were emboldened to return to a mass direct action strategy – the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930–1934 (CDM). This was the most dramatic and spectacular of Congress’ mass campaigns, involving many millions of Indians in protest aimed at ousting the British. The CDM was launched by Gandhi’s famous Salt March, a 240-mile trek on foot from Gandhi’s ashram in Ahmedabad, through hundreds of villages in Gujarat. Upon his arrest for an illegal public display of salt making on the beach at Dandi, organizers across India launched mass civil disobedience. In addition to thousands of demonstrations, rallies, and protests, Congress and the *satyagrahis* boycotted foreign cloth and liquors shops, broke the salt laws, refused payment of land revenue and local police taxes, broke laws prohibiting access to forest resources, published illegal newspapers, socially boycotted and harassed public servants and officials, picketed government schools, and so forth. Within the first year, according to official statistics, over 60,000 protestors had been jailed nationally (Brown 1977: 124).

In March 1931, nearly a year after the Salt March, Gandhi struck a deal with the Government of India that suspended civil disobedience in exchange for negotiations on constitutional reform, release of civil disobedience prisoners and properties confiscated during the CDM, the unbanning of the INC, and the end of the salt tax. Brown (1977) explains Gandhi’s move as an effort to salvage a direct action campaign that was running out of steam and to enhance the negotiating leverage of Congress. Other analysts – and many in the nationalist movement – saw suspension as a tactical blunder on Gandhi’s part. When the negotiations at the Round Table Conference of 1931 failed to result in a tangible outcome, Congress resumed civil disobedience in 1932, but it faced decisive repression from the Government of India and never regained its momentum. By 1934, the CDM had petered out.

While the use of nonviolent tactics during the CDM dramatically challenged British authority and delivered countless local successes to organizers, noncooperation tactics on a mass scale ultimately failed to pressure the British into retreat. Similarly, the withdrawal of the British in 1947 had little to do with nonviolent tactics. The Civil Disobedience Movement had ended with mixed results over a decade prior to the official decision to withdraw from India. From 1935 onward, Congress abandoned the
protest strategy and pursued electoral politics as the Government of India Act of 1935 greatly expanded the electorate and Indian control over the legislature (Low 1997). In 1942, the next (and last) nationwide civil disobedience campaign – the “individual satyagraha” strategy of the Quit India Movement – was formally disconnected from the Congress organization and was quickly and effectively repressed. The hurried retreat of the British from India in 1947 was rather the result of two developments that affected the political calculation among officials in London and New Delhi about the prospects for long-term rule: (1) the unexpected defeat of Churchill (a staunch advocate for continued empire) and the Tory Party to Labour in the first election after World War II; and (2) severe ethnic and military riots between 1945 and 1946 that necessitated massive government response and raised the entirely unpopular specter of a colonial war on the heels of the most devastating war in human history (Sarkar 1983).

Despite the failure of civil disobedience to deliver independence, the power to conjure millions of Indians into the streets in opposition to British policy and British rule left Congress “formidably positioned and armed to negotiate India’s future with the British” (Brown 1989: 215). On August 15, 1947, in a triumph for the nationalist movement, Congress elected Jawaharlal Nehru – Gandhi’s protégé, veteran of the nationalist struggle, and an ardent secularist who appealed widely to elites, intelligentsia, and youth – to lead independent India as its first prime minister. Congress’ popularity with the voting public remained supreme for 30 years of free parliamentary elections in independent India, until it lost the general election in 1977. Unlike many other postcolonial situations, the movement’s party-building strategy proved an asset for stable democracy long after colonial retreat.

But the Congress movement fell short in other regards. For instance, despite Gandhi’s deep commitment to Hindu–Muslim unity, and some early successes in cross-communal alliance building (for example, the early Khilafat Movement, 1920–1922), the Congress did not sustain a meaningful coalition with Muslim leaders or convince Muslim voters that it would protect their interests. Some contemporary critics argue that Gandhi’s own rhetoric – steeped as it was in Hindu tradition – significantly restricted the appeal of the nationalist message to Muslim audiences. Communal riots (i.e., Hindu–Muslim violence) swept India in the years before independence (especially 1946), a sign that Gandhi took to mean his movement had utterly failed.

Some critics saw Congress’ mobilization strategy as inherently conservative because it avoided confrontations with India’s indigenous capitalist and agrarian elites. This is not surprising since nationalists relied heavily on business and elite support to fund movement activities and election campaigns. Moreover, Gandhi “firmly believed that a direct attack on the propertied classes ... would in the long run have a disastrous effect” (Frankel 1978: 44), that is, uninhibited violence. This explains why for instance, Congress often led no-revenue campaigns among peasants to resist British land taxes, but refused to lead no-rent campaigns against exploitative landlords, even though rent was typically more burdensome than tax for the rural poor. Much scholarship has demonstrated that Congress frequently struggled to oppose, co-opt, or halt protest that happened outside of its orbit (Guha 1983; Amin 1995; Pandey 2002).

Quite apart from its impact at home, the Indian Independence Movement resonated in contexts well beyond South Asia. As the earliest, most celebrated victory in the wave of decolonization after World War II, many in the colonized world looked to India for inspiration as they devised their own strategies to pressure for independence. For example, Kwame Nkrumah adopted civil disobedience and other Gandhian tactics in the struggle for independence for Ghana in 1953. The successes of the Indian Independence Movement also influenced the evolution of strategic thinking among civil rights leaders in the United States, most notably Martin Luther King, Jr, but many others as well. Between 1919 and 1955,
the African-American press extensively covered developments in the Indian anticolonial struggle, regularly drawing parallels between the plight of India’s masses and blacks in the American South (Kapur 1992). Prominent civil rights leaders visited India throughout this time to meet with nationalist organizers (including Gandhi) and learn more about the politics of civil disobedience, and they hosted Congress organizers for tours of the United States.

Finally, the iconic figure of Gandhi has become a seemingly permanent fixture in global protest culture, not to mention global public discourse. Organizers invoke his name, his image, and fragments of his ideas in popular movements against unjust authorities around the world. Gandhi’s ideas have figured prominently in the US peace movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, among Christian pacifists, the antinuclear weapons movement, the vegetarian and animal rights movements, the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, in Europe’s Green movement, and the so-called “colored” revolutions of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hardiman 2003), among many others.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Boycotts; Civil disobedience; Civil rights movement (United States); Decolonization and social movements; Direct action; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Satyagraha.

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Indigenous movements in Latin America

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Indigenous resistance has been a central aspect of Latin American history since the Spanish invasion, and in the late twentieth century, indigenous movements emerged as one of the most significant social actors in the region. This was related to the collapse of leftist class-based politics as well as the use of extreme state violence against the indigenous in the context of civil wars and other struggles. Correspondingly, scholarship on the indigenous has shifted in focus from issues of cultural extinction and survival to the relationship of indigenous movements to nation-states, transnational networks, issues internal to indigenous movements, and methodological challenges.

Indigenous rights claims have long butted up against the limits of liberal democracy. Liberal citizenship is based on the idea that rights inhere in the individual. While indigenous citizens do seek equal protection in terms of civil, political, and social rights, many of their claims inhere in the collectivity. For instance, indigenous movements demand the return of their territories, control over natural resources, and the right to self-determination or political autonomy. Likewise, they seek cultural rights, including to speak their own language and learn it in schools, practice intercultural healthcare, and use their own customary laws and legal systems. Indigenous claims combine ethnic and class concerns, encompass political and cultural aspects of collective belonging, and address the need for redistribution (focusing on material claims related to ongoing colonial dispossession), as well as formal recognition (through legal and constitutional changes) of the status of the indigenous as peoples with rights as such.

Until the late twentieth century, mesticismo (racial and cultural mixing among peoples of European, indigenous, and African descent) was the dominant nation-building discourse in much of Latin America. While this ideology symbolically incorporated the indigenous into the nation, by asserting a universal citizenry based on individual rights, it also effectively silenced collective indigenous claims to land and political autonomy. In the mid-twentieth century, indigenous people throughout the continent joined peasant and revolutionary movements, attempting to address some of their claims through a class-based framework. Indigenous peoples and leaders were among the targets of repressive regimes across the region, which, often with CIA support, engaged in state violence (and, in the Guatemalan case, genocide) against them.

With the end of the cold war, indigenous movements had a window of opportunity. Wars and dictatorships throughout the region were settled by peace accords, democratic elections, and reconciliation processes, and indigenous movements often either had a seat at the table or found elites more willing to listen to their claims. Other trends and events between the 1970s and 1990s facilitated this opening. NGOs, the church, and the UN system appeared as ready allies for indigenous movements, providing some of the initial resources – both material and symbolic – to aid in building movements, framing demands, and attracting international attention. Additionally, class-based movements at least temporarily lost their salience in the post-cold war period. Indigenous movements expressed growing dissatisfaction with their earlier alliances with those movements, arguing that their claims were often sidelined. They thus endeavored to strengthen movements focusing on their own claims. This process became increasingly internationalized, culminating in the 500 Years of Resistance celebrations held in 1992, the indigenous response to the quincentenary of Columbus’s arrival on the
continent. Other events around this time drew worldwide attention to indigenous concerns and demands. In 1989, the International Labor Organization adopted Convention 169, recognizing important indigenous rights. In 1990, CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) began the Inti Raymi uprising, occupying public buildings and blocking roads in order to demand resolution to land conflicts. In 1992, Rigoberta Menchú, a K’iche’ Maya leader of the Comité de Unidad Campesina, a peasant organization targeted by the military during Guatemala’s civil war, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and the United Nations named 1995–2004 the International Decade for the World’s Indigenous People.

Nevertheless, indigenous peoples throughout the continent, already poorer than their nonindigenous counterparts, faced the impacts of neoliberal reforms, administered beginning in the 1980s, to a much greater extent. This fed into indigenous resurgence, as demonstrated most forcefully in the founding of the Zapatista movement in Mexico. At the same time, governments began adopting multicultural policies and constitutional reforms, including intercultural health and education programs, land regularization, constitutional recognition, ratification of international documents recognizing indigenous rights and, in some cases, even granted limited autonomy. These steps were taken at least partially in response to indigenous demands. Scholars and indigenous movements have argued, however, that multicultural discourses and policies are used to generate consent for the neoliberal project, and tend to emphasize cultural recognition and diversity at the expense of material restitution and redistribution of real control over the use of land and other natural resources (Hale 2006). After years of negotiating and engaging in dialogue with the state, some movements have turned inward, seeking solutions and alternatives from within indigenous norms, traditions, and worldviews.

Some scholars argue that at the beginning of the twenty-first century Latin American indigenous movements entered a “post-neoliberal multicultural” era. This position is advanced most convincingly in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, where sustained and often bloody protest against neoliberal states were led by CONAIE in Ecuador and a range of indigenous organizations and parties in Bolivia. These actors sought to expand their constituencies by making demands that encompassed material inequalities as well as ethno-national claims. Their efforts brought about the election of Movimiento al Socialismo candidate Evo Morales as Bolivia’s first indigenous president and the formation of constituent assemblies to write new constitutions in both countries. Both constitutions now recognize the countries’ plurinational character and guarantee a range of indigenous rights.

Transnational mobilization has been central to the growing strength of Latin American indigenous movements (Brysk 2000). As early as the 1970s, indigenous organizations from throughout the Americas have met in international forums such as the Primer Congreso Indio de Sudamérica, held in Peru in 1980. These interactions have facilitated the development of common discourses and strategies around autonomy and other rights. Transnational movements, such as COICA (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin), which coordinates actions among indigenous organizations from the nine countries that share the Amazon Basin, have been another product of these connections. The transnationalization of indigenous movements has been facilitated by NGOs and the UN system. A Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, set up by the UN Economic and Social Council, began working on a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 1985, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007. International documents such as the Declaration and ILO Convention 169 have become important tools for indigenous movements, which use them to pressure governments for change and to advance their cause in international forums such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. An example is the 2001 Awas Tingni case in which the IACHR
found the Nicaraguan government in violation of indigenous territorial rights after it granted a forestry company a concession on indigenous lands. Only at the end of 2008 did Nicaragua comply with the decision by granting land title to the community, indicating the difficulties of enforcing international law as well as its possibilities. Indigenous movements have also utilized contacts within the UN system, such as the Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Rights, and NGOs like Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights, to establish observational missions and submit reports pressuring governments to meet their indigenous rights commitments.

Issues and debates internal to movements, including the character of goals and demands (discussed above), as well as movements’ strategies and tactics, are another area of scholarly inquiry. While observing that indigenous identities, like all others, are socially constructed and reflect tradition as well as contemporary ideas and practices, some argue that focusing on cultural revitalization has led to essentialism on the part of movements, which can ultimately be detrimental to achieving their goals. For instance, tensions have erupted at times within movements when some members are accused of lacking authenticity because they have “Western” education, wear “Western” clothing, engage in “Western” practices, or do not speak the language. Movements’ emphasis on culture as a source of difference also may feed into the accusation on the part of the state and elites that those involved in advancing movement claims are not authentic Indians, which they define in terms of traditional practices and their own stereotypical ideas about what characteristics define indigenous identity. In response, some indigenous activists have sidestepped these debates by focusing on the political aspects of collective claims.

Substantial attention has also been paid to gender dynamics within indigenous movements. While feminist movements have sometimes accused indigenous women of being manipulated by men, beseeching them to concentrate on the interests they share with all women, male leaders have accused indigenous women who speak up about gender inequalities of being “Westernized” and disloyal to the movement. Likewise, governments have used the argument that women’s individual rights are violated by indigenous norms and justice procedures as a means of denying collective rights to indigenous people (Speed 2008). These pressures make it difficult for indigenous women, whose lived experiences and subjectivities lie at the intersection of these identifications, to express their own priorities in an unsplitterd way. Nevertheless, they have made creative use of indigenous norms of reciprocity, autonomy, duality, and complementarity to simultaneously make a case for gender equality in indigenous movements and insist that the rights of the people are also women’s rights.

The relationship between scholars and indigenous communities has, historically, been one in which the scholar extracts knowledge without reciprocation. Increasingly, indigenous movements and organizations demand that scholars develop their research agendas in conversation with movement actors and contribute to the wellbeing of the people. This has led to methodological innovations, including activist research aimed at decolonizing academic work and “co-labor” initiatives, in which indigenous and nonindigenous researchers work in teams in all phases of research and engage in critical reflection along the way (Leyva, Burguete, & Speed 2008; Speed 2008).

Latin American indigenous movements have relevance for all scholars interested in the content and future of democracy in a globalized world. Areas for future research and development include the continuing struggle to back up formal recognition with meaningful material redistribution, how alliances might best be utilized without resulting in marginalization of indigenous priorities, how autonomy might best be put into practice with or without the formal approval of existing nation-states, how the rights of indigenous nations that span existing geopolitical borders might be recognized, and how indigenous movements, many of which conceive of rights as not just possessed by
individuals or collectivities, but by elements of nature and Mother Earth herself, might form a leading force in efforts to protect a planet increasingly in peril.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Ethnic movements; Globalization and movements; Multiculturalism and social movements; Native American movements (United States); Transnational social movements; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
The Iranian revolution took many experts and scholars by surprise. Iran had been one of the most rapidly industrializing third-world countries and possessed a powerful, loyal army and secret police able to repress and demobilize all opposition. Compared to many other twentieth-century revolutions, armed struggle played little role in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, which came to power in 1925 when Reza Shah Pahlavi ousted the previous dynasty. Instead, Iran’s urban population, organized in part through mosque networks, carried out the mobilization and collective actions that formed the basis of the revolution.

More importantly, the revolution’s outcome diverged sharply from other modern revolutions where revolutionary movements fought in the name of secular ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism. Iran’s revolution, in contrast, produced theocracy.

In other ways, the revolutionary struggles in Iran resembled other recent revolutions. Major social classes and collectivities that had been excluded from the polity initiated the revolutionary struggles. They opposed the old regime’s repressive nature and demanded political freedom, democracy, and a greater egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. They also called for independence and an end to foreign domination and exploitation. During the revolutionary struggles, Ayatollah Khomeini, too, emphasized those same demands, promised political freedom and, once in power, repeatedly declared that the Islamic Republic would be egalitarian and serve the interests of the mostazafin, the downtrodden and the oppressed.

Most explanations of the revolution have relied on one of two themes. Some theorists emphasized the role of large-scale processes, such as urbanization, industrialization, and commercialization, which transformed the Iranian social structure and undermined traditional values and belief systems. According to these theorists, rapid social change led to dislocation, normative disturbance, and disorientation. To reintegrate themselves into the community and reaffirm their collective cultural identity, dislocated individuals and groups embraced an Islamic revival in the decade prior to the revolution. The second alternative theme highlighted the role of Islamic ideology. Some theorists focused on the importance of Shi’i revolutionary discourse in transforming social discontent into a revolutionary crisis. Others found in the Shiite belief system and, in particular, the story of Hussayn’s willing martyrdom in the just cause of resisting the usurper caliph, Yazid, inspiration for devout Shiites to oppose the regime in the face of repression and death. A third theme which is presented below accents the political vulnerability of the shah’s regime and the policies and processes that led to the eruption of conflicts, collective action, formation of broad coalitions, and the revolution.

The shah faced major challenges to his rule in the 1950s and again in the 1960s, but both times he succeeded in weakening or eliminating his opponents and establishing exclusive rule. The first round of challenges erupted in the early 1950s between liberal-nationalists, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, and the monarchists, under the leadership of the shah himself. The two camps clashed over many issues, including control of the state apparatus and the army, the extent of power exercised by the royal family and the monarch, the nationalization of oil, economic inequality, land reform, and civil liberties and democratic rights. With the help of the CIA-backed coup d’état, the shah succeeded in removing Mosaddegh and his allies from power. At the same
time, however, the shah antagonized supporters of the liberal-nationalists, particularly the important bazaaris, merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans who constituted the main base of support for the liberal-nationalists.

The shah’s reform policies provoked a second round of conflicts in the early 1960s. Many Iranians supported the reform measures but the policies antagonized two powerful groups. Not surprisingly, the landed upper class opposed land reform, which would have taken away a great deal of its resources. This class was politically powerful and controlled roughly 58 percent of the parliamentary seats in 1961. The second group that opposed the reforms was the Shiite clergy. A sizable segment was against the proposed land reform because the religious establishment and some clerics controlled extensive land holdings. Many other clerics opposed the proposed social reforms including greater women’s rights, which they deemed non-Islamic or anti-Islamic. Despite the eruption of protests in a few major cities, the shah succeeded in repressing the opposition and proceeded with the reforms. In the process, however, he lost the support of two key allies, the landed upper class and the clergy.

Although the social basis of the shah’s support was reduced, he was able to centralize power in his own hands. With a powerful army, a secret police, and support from the United States, the shah ruled Iran with an iron fist. Despite rapid economic development and the rise of a new middle class with modern education and professional skills, the shah centralized the power structure and maintained an exclusive state with a narrow base of support consisting of the military, the secret police, the bureaucracy, and a small class of capitalists in the modern business sector. The extreme centralization of power and formation of an exclusive polity rendered formal political institutions and elections irrelevant for the majority of the population.

With firm control over the power structure, the shah embarked on programs to develop the economy. Increased oil revenues enabled the state to intervene exclusively throughout the economy. The government became the nation’s single largest banker, industrialist, landlord, and employer. State-sponsored development produced impressive economic growth as the country’s GNP per capita rose from $450 in 1972 to more than $1987 in 1978.

Increased revenues generated robust economic development, but also produced economic disparities largely due to state development policies. Government policies favored the interests of large, modern manufacturing and ignored the small, traditional sector, which employed more than two-thirds of the urban industrial workforce. Committed to capital accumulation, the state repressed and demobilized the labor movement, banned strikes, and reduced workers’ capacity for collective bargaining. State development strategy also ignored the plight of the agricultural sector and the rural population. Combined with corruption and cronyism, these economic policies increased the uneven distribution of income in Iran and enabled the royal family to become the wealthiest in the country, owning and controlling a big portion of the modern business sector. The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, was higher in Iran in 1969–1970 than any country in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Western Europe, and equaled or exceeded Latin American countries for which data were available. The oil boom in subsequent years only worsened the inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income.

Declining oil revenues in the mid-1970s forced the government to initiate policy changes. By 1977, reduced government expenditures brought about an economic recession, as ambitious projects were scrapped, and access to bank credits was restricted. Recession and declining oil revenues affected the entire economy and society. The GDP, which had grown by 17.2 percent in 1976, suddenly sank to −1.3 in 1977 and then plummeted to −11.9 in 1978. Along with mounting economic inequalities, the recession adversely affected broad segments of the population and set the stage for the emergence of social conflicts.
External pressures in the mid-1970s introduced an element of vulnerability into the political situation. Amnesty International accused Iran of being one of the world’s “worst violators of human rights.” Jimmy Carter singled out Iran in the 1976 US presidential campaign as a country where human rights had been violated. American congressmen began to question the wisdom of selling so much weaponry to a regime where power resided solely in one man. In response to these pressures, the shah, dependent on US support, initiated small policy changes in the government’s treatment of political opponents. In March 1977, the government released 256 political prisoners and in May permitted the International Red Cross to visit political prisoners. The government also legalized civilian trials for political opponents who criticized the government. These changes in turn encouraged mobilization and political opposition against the government.

MOBILIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

Scholars of the Iranian revolution have often explained the 1979 overthrow of the Pahlavi regime in terms of the rise of an Islamic movement that inspired Iranians to challenge the shah, confront his powerful army, and embrace martyrdom to bring down the monarchy. These analysts ignore the complexity of revolutionary processes. They cannot account for the fact that various collectivities entered the revolutionary struggles at different times and presented diverse claims. The majority of individuals who participated in the struggles did not volunteer to give their lives, but instead expected to improve their lives. Their deaths were the result of political repression, not a desire for martyrdom. In fact, people mobilized through the mosque because it was a relatively safe, secure place to mobilize.

Analyses of the timing and context of revolutionary struggles can reveal much about their causes. If broad segments of the population had actually adopted an Islamic ideology and were willing to give their lives in its defense, then the 1975 uprising of Qom clerical students would have provided a prime opportunity for Iranians to demonstrate this ideological conversion and give their lives. Although most scholars of the revolution have ignored the clerical student uprising of 1975, it provides an excellent test case for the ideology hypothesis. On June 5, more than 1000 clerical students took control of the Madraseh-e Faizieh-e, a school for training clergy, in the religious city of Qom. Clerical students from an adjacent school, the Madraseh-e Khan, soon joined the rebellion. The protesters raised a red flag, a symbol of Shiite martyrdom, high enough to be seen throughout Qom. They also elevated a banner that read: “we commemorate the anniversary of the great rebellion of Imam Khomeini.” In a very daring act the students broadcast tapes of Khomeini’s fiery 1963 speeches against the shah. As news of the Qom events spread to other cities, protests also erupted in the religious city of Mashhad, where two clerics and approximately 30 clerical students were arrested. The students immediately received the support of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, who endorsed the clerical students’ protests from exile in Iraq. In a message of condolence to the Iranian people, he congratulated them for the “dawn of freedom” and the elimination of imperialism and its “dirty agents.”

Despite Khomeini’s support, press reports covering the events, and heavy casualties, the clerical student insurgency went completely unnoticed by most Iranians. Popular response to the Qom revolt was very limited. Although leftist students in Tehran and Tabriz protested the repression of Qom clerical students, no mourning ceremonies were held by the clergy or the public, and no bazaar shut-downs occurred anywhere in the country. The failure of the rebellion and the absence of broad support for the uprising, which took place barely two years before the eruption of revolutionary struggles, challenges ideological explanations of the Iranian revolution.

When the revolutionary struggles did erupt in 1977, it was not religious collectivities
but leftist students who initiated some of the most important collective actions that marked the beginning of the insurgencies that eventually culminated in the revolution. Most student activists in the 1970s subscribed to a secular, socialist ideology, which was expressed throughout the country every year in the observance of Shanzdah-e Azar. On that day, students commemorated the slaying of three students by the government in 1953 during the visit of then-Vice President Richard Nixon. Shanzdah-e Azar became the unofficial student day and was always marked by rallies and protests. Prior to the revolutionary struggles, university students never commemorated June 5, the date of the 1963 rebellion sparked in part by the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini. Student protests marking Shanzdah-e Azar in 1977 were so intense that by the end of the fall term, many colleges and universities were almost completely closed down. Student mobilization and collective action played an important role in promoting mobilization by other groups and collectivities.

Intellectuals, too, joined the struggles for change in the fall of 1977. With a few notable exceptions, the majority of Iranian intellectuals did not embrace an Islamic ideology but rather adopted some form of socialism or nationalism. Intellectuals’ ideological tendencies were evident during 16 poetry nights held in Tehran in the fall of 1977. Of 64 poets and writers who participated, 66 percent were secular socialist, 28 percent were liberal-nationalist, and only 6.3 percent followed some sort of Islamic ideology. The poetry nights, which attracted thousands of intellectuals, youths, and students, were eventually ended by government repression.

Bazaaris, adversely affected by the economic downturn and the government’s antiprofiteering campaign, soon joined the antigovernment movement. Concentrated in the historic business district of Tehran, bazaari supporters of Mosaddegh’s National Front illegally reestablished the Society of Merchants, Guilds, and Artisans of the Tehran Bazaar (SMGATB) in October 1977. Activists of the SMGATB promoted the cause of political freedom in Iran, were in the forefront of political mobilization, and even helped other bazaaris expand their struggles. Many of the SMGATB’s leaders had struggled for decades against the dictatorship and developed political skills to organize and mobilize bazaaris. They were also resourceful, possessed their own printing presses, and encouraged religious bazaaris to issue public statements, which they printed. They even distributed Khomeini’s statements and tapes through their trading networks. Leaders of the SMGATB provided space for special prayers on September 4, 1978, to mark the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. When leading members of the SMGATB met with Khomeini in France in the fall of 1978, he asked them to resist pressures to reopen the bazaar, thereby tacitly acknowledging their importance and position.

Bazaaris’ protests were primarily political in nature and directed against the dictatorial nature of the state, although they also spoke out against various elements of the government’s economic policies. All 15 protest statements issued by bazaaris from January to December 1978, mentioned government repression, evidencing a high degree of consensus. In addition, 53 percent of bazaaris’ protest statements condemned the despotic nature of the state. An equal number of statements protested imperialist influence and the government’s dependence on foreign powers.

The opposition was forced by government repression to mobilize through mosques, which provided some safety from attacks. People participated in the mosque-led 40-day cycles of mourning in 1978 and shuttered their businesses in large cities to protest government repression and killing of demonstrators.

A fresh opportunity for mobilization emerged in the fall of 1978 with the appointment of a new prime minister, Sharif-Emami, who promised liberalization and political freedom for all political groups except communists. Before the appointment of Sharif-Emami, approximately 70 cities had experienced some form of collective action. By the time he left office, antigovernment collective
Sharif-Emami’s proposed reforms offered nothing to the working classes, who seized the opportunity and began to mobilize and demand change. Workers who had previously been involved in strikes or been arrested or imprisoned used informal networks in the workplace to form secret cells and committees with trusted coworkers and organize collective actions. White-collar employees soon joined in with their own strikes.

Initially, the demands of workers and white-collar employees, unlike those of bazaaris, were mainly economic and primarily defensive in orientation. With few exceptions, economic issues were paramount, and job-related problems were a close second. All strikers demanded higher wages, and most also insisted on allowances or loans for housing expenses and medical insurance. Many complained of pay inequities, especially in sectors where foreign workers were employed. Some protested arbitrary promotion rules and secret “rewards” by heads of bureaucracies. Because most strikers worked in state-owned enterprises or were employed in government bureaucracies, their direct target was, of necessity, the state.

As strikes continued, economic issues gave way to political demands, notably by segments of the working classes who were more concentrated in large state enterprises and possessed greater skills and solidarity structures. Some striking oil workers, for example, demanded the expulsion of various department chiefs, while others demanded freedom for all political prisoners, the dissolution of SAVAK (the secret police), the lifting of martial law, dissolution of government-sponsored unions, the formation of independent labor unions, and freedom for all political parties. As workers became increasingly political, their demands were neither Islamic nor revolutionary in nature. They did not clamor to overthrow the state or form an Islamic republic. Nevertheless, within the Iranian context, workers’ demands for changes were radical.

In response to spiraling social conflicts, the shah returned to a policy of repression on November 6, 1978, and appointed a military government. The army occupied all strategic institutions, including oil installations, radio and television stations, and newspapers, which had just successfully concluded a strike. Military rule appeared to work for a brief period as most strikers went back to work.

Bazaaris, however, responded to the military government by initiating unprecedented, protracted shutdowns in major cities and disrupting trade, which electrified the conflicts. Labor strikes soon resumed, and committees sprang up everywhere to coordinate strike activities and demand political change. Oil workers were critical in the final stage of the conflicts. In late November, they announced their intention to establish a national oil workers’ organization to coordinate strikes and prevent their collapse. Once the organization was formed, they walked out of work on December 2 and announced that they would fight until victory.

Although early on the clergy had been slow to mobilize, the expansion of the struggles and the arrival of the month of Muharram enabled the pro-Khomeini faction of the clergy to play a leading role in the conflicts. With their control over mosques, the clergy succeeded in mobilizing a significant political force during the Tasoua march on December 11. The main non-leftist opposition groups drew up separate lists of individuals who could act as marshals for the Tehran processions. The National Front provided 2500 marshals, while the militant clergy were able to provide only 1400 people for the event despite months of struggles. The Freedom Movement supplied 800, and Mujahedin supporters provided a few hundred people. Because the numbers were not adequate for such a large march, organizers called on the public to volunteer as marshals. On the day of the march, more than 70,000 people, most of whom were not ideologically affiliated, showed up and volunteered to act as marshals. Organizers quickly distributed armbands to the volunteers and proceeded with the march. At the conclusion of the march, the pro-Khomeini clergy announced on loudspeakers that another march would be held
on Ashura, the following day, and directed the marshals to introduce themselves to their local mosques that evening. In this way, the militant clergy were able to absorb tens of thousands of ideologically unaffiliated volunteers into their own ranks. The following day, December 11, the pro-Khomeini clergy controlled the streets of Tehran during the Ashura march. With their enhanced capacity, they called for the shah’s overthrow and the formation of an Islamic republic during the march.

Labor strikes and bazaar closings disrupted all social and economic activities and paralyzed the government. At the end of December, workers and employees representing 23 state ministries and private sector organizations formed a central council to coordinate the strikes. The council rejected any compromise with Prime Minister Bakhtiyar who they charged represented “imperialism and dictatorship,” and instead they formally acknowledged Khomeini as leader of the people’s “anti-imperialist, antidespotic” movement. Employees of 11 other government ministries announced on February 7, 1979, that they would only obey a government nominated by Khomeini. The broad coalition created a revolutionary situation, destabilized the armed forces, and eventually ousted the monarchy on February 11.

In short, Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the undisputed leader of the revolution by emphasizing people’s principal demands for independence, freedom, and social justice. He carefully avoided doctrinal issues during the revolutionary struggles but, once in power, he imposed a theocracy that led to the breakdown of the revolutionary coalition that ousted the shah. The breakdown happened so swiftly that less than four months after seizing power Khomeini began urging the people and the intellectuals not to abandon the mosques. He was able to maintain power by promising greater economic advantages for the poor and by means of harsh repression. Between the summers of 1981 and 1985, Khomeini’s regime executed or killed approximately 12,000 opponents of the state. Repression has continued to be the key to the survival of the Islamic Republic.

**SEE ALSO:** Green Movement in Iran; Ideology; Islamic movements; Religion and social movements; Revolutions.

**REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS**


Northern Ireland civil rights movement
LORENZO BOSI

In October 1988, *Fortnight*, the leading and longstanding current sociopolitical affairs review in Northern Ireland, celebrated 20 years of the regional civil rights movement (hereafter, CRM), by offering a meticulous discussion on the topic. The editorial started like this: “For, warts and all, the Civil Rights Movement was the only moment this century when a politics that was defined by something other than unionism or nationalism seemed suddenly to be possible” (*Fortnight*, Oct. 1988: 3).

Inspired by the US civil rights movement of the 1960s, the CRM, in its early first stage (1963–1967), attempted to achieve reforms by publicizing, canvassing, documenting, and lobbying for expanded civil rights. With the regional population divided two-thirds Unionist (who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, mainly Protestant) and one-third Nationalist (who want to re-unite Ireland and bring an end to the Northern Ireland state, mainly Catholic), it was the minority who felt the brunt of discrimination. Nationalist interest groups, laborists, liberals, communists, traditionalists and Marxist republicans, and the “new” leftists despite their differences agreed initially on five main demands (Purdie 1990): one man, one vote, which meant the extension of the local government franchise from ratepayers to all those over 21; an end to gerrymandering (the deliberate practice of redrawing the electoral district or constituency boundaries with the aim of achieving electoral results for a particular party), which meant Unionists were elected even in districts with Nationalist majorities; an end to injustice in the system of public housing provision; an end to discrimination in public and private employment practices; and the disbanding of the B-Specials, a special constabulary, which many Nationalists viewed as simply sectarian. In response to a series of societal and political changes in the aftermath of the new political settlement that followed World War II (Bosi 2008), the above-mentioned different political actors started to challenge the institutional practices that favored the Unionist hegemony by pressing for equality of rights and social justice, whilst deliberately avoiding the traditional Nationalist and Republican aspiration to re-unite Ireland and bring an end to the Northern Ireland state.

The reluctance of the Unionist establishment to deal with the CRM’s demands together with the international situation in 1968, which saw widespread street protests across Europe and North America (Bosi & Prince 2009), moved the CRM’s leaders to challenge the sectarianism and the political immobilism of the region by marching into the streets. In this way they intentionally obliged the authorities to get involved in defending the marches from the growing Loyalist countermovement, or openly supporting sectarianism in front of the new mass media and consequently undermining Unionist hegemonic control. Peaceful civil rights demonstrations descended into violence in October 1968 when marchers in Londonderry defied the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and were violently beaten to break up the march (Peatling 2007). This provided recognizable instances of outrage and anger that galvanized both activists and supporters regionally and internationally for the CRM. The CRM organized then large-scale marches, sit-ins, and occupations that placed severe pressure on the state and provoked Westminster intervention to force the Northern Ireland government to make concessions (Bosi 2006).

The reforms introduced late in 1968 failed to deliver fully on the CRM’s program, including one-man-one-vote and the repeal
of the repressive Special Powers Act (or Civic Authorities Act), of 1922, which authorized the Minister of Home Affairs, in states of emergency, to order indefinite arrests and internment without an imminent charge or trial, to command searches of private property without a warrant, to issue curfews, to ban organizations, and to prohibit meetings and processions. After a brief cessation, the civil rights marches continued, organized at first by a group called People’s Democracy (PD) at the beginning of 1969. This was mainly a group of students. It represented the optimism of the postwar generation, which thought that change from below was possible. They felt part of a transnational community which was fighting imperialism and capitalism during the 1960s. Once again, the reaction of the Loyalist countermovement and the RUC was heavy-handed and only served to inflame the Nationalist community further. Heightened sectarian tension became more difficult to control, and civil disobedience events began to descend into occasions of civil disorder (Ó Dochartaigh 2005). As violence increased, moderates gradually withdrew from the CRM while Republicans came to particular prominence in the local defense committees that emerged in predominantly Nationalist working-class areas (Ó Dochartaigh 2005).

The street confrontations between civil rights activists, on the one hand, and the Northern Ireland police and the Loyalist countermovement, on the other, resulted in an increase in intercommunal violence by 1969. Further conflict in the summer of 1969 led to the British government taking the decision to deploy troops on the streets of Northern Ireland. The Troubles, which were to see the loss of 3700 lives and more than 40,000 injuries, had just begun. As events began to spiral out of control with the emergence of the Provisional IRA the British were convinced of the need to introduce internment by the Northern Ireland government (detention without trial). What remained of the CRM, under the main umbrella organization NICRA, campaigned against internment and at one of its rallies in Londonderry on Sunday 30 January, 1972, the British Army shot dead 13 demonstrators and injured another 14 (Ó Dochartaigh 2005). “Bloody Sunday” effectively marked the end of the use of mass street demonstrations to achieve civil rights.

The subsequent decades of violence cannot be explained solely in terms of the mobilization of the CRM, which clearly marked a watershed for the region, but neither can they be understood without a full comprehension of the development of the CRM during the 1960s in the regional context. On the other hand, the CRM was a determinant in introducing and legitimizing the themes of civil and human rights which are now at the base of the stabilization of the region with the Good Friday Agreement (1998).

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Demonstrations; Irish Republican Movement; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Rights and rights movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Irish Republican Movement  
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The Irish Republican Movement has its origins in eighteenth-century republican political philosophy, which also inspired the American (1776) and French revolutions (1789). In the 1790s, the United Irishmen tried to unite “Catholic, Protestant, and Dissenter” and create an Irish Republic independent of England. Unlike their American and French counterparts, the United Irishmen’s rebellion of 1798 failed. However, they remained an inspiration for rebellions against the British in 1803, 1848, 1867, and 1916, and insurgent actions by Fenians (including armed campaigns against the British in Canada and a bombing campaign in England) in the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s. Contemporary Irish Republicanism has organizational antecedents that date from the 1840s: Irish Republicans active as “Young Irelanders” in 1848 became Fenians; Fenians participated in the 1916 Rising and the Irish War of Independence (1919–1923); veterans of 1916–1923 were active in Irish Republican organizations into the twenty-first century.

Many organizations and individuals have claimed the label “Irish Republican,” including: constitutional political parties like Fianna Fáil: The Republican Party; a left-wing organization named Saor Éire (Free Ireland); paramilitary organizations named Saor Uladh (Free Ulster) and the Saor Éire Action Group; the militant women’s organization Cumann na mBan (Association of Women); and paramilitary/scouting organizations for young people, Na Fianna Éireann (for boys) and Cumann na gCailíní (for girls). However, the Irish Republican Movement is usually associated with two organizations: the Irish Republican Army (Óglaiigh na hÉireann – Soldiers of Ireland) and the political party Sinn Féin (Ourselves or Ourselves Alone).

Sinn Féin (formed in 1905) and the Irish Republican Army (dating from 1916) are separate organizations. Following the unsuccessful Easter Rising of 1916, an IRA guerrilla campaign complemented by a Sinn Féin political campaign destabilized British rule in Ireland. In response, with the Government of Ireland Act (1920), the British partitioned Ireland into the six counties of Northern Ireland – which remain a part of the United Kingdom – and the 26 counties of the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland’s population was predominantly Protestant and pro-Union while the vast majority of the Irish Free State’s population was Catholic and sought a united Ireland (they were “nationalists”). The Anglo-Irish Treaty (1922) confirmed partition and split the Irish Republican Movement. In 1922–1923, a pro-treaty government in Dublin, led by former IRA members and Sinn Féiners, won a civil war with anti-treatyites. Pro-treatyites formed the core of what would become the political party Fine Gael.

The anti-treatyites who remained in the IRA and Sinn Féin refused to accept the legitimacy of the governments of Northern Ireland (Belfast) and the Irish Free State (Dublin). This stance placed them on the political sidelines. In 1925 and 1926, respectively, the IRA and Sinn Féin split over the issue of participation in the Dublin parliament. Led by 1916 rebel leader Eamon de Valera, those who accepted the state formed Fianna Fáil: The Republican Party. In 1927, in an attempt to forestall repressive legislation, Fianna Fáil entered the Free State parliament. From the 1932 election, Fianna Fáil has dominated southern Irish politics. And into the 1970s many Irish political leaders were former gunmen who at one time rejected the Dublin parliament.

After 1926, Sinn Féin and the IRA were increasingly marginalized and isolated. In the mid-1930s, left-leaning activists formed Republican Congress as a socialist alternative.
The Republican Congress was short-lived, but several members, including Frank Ryan, fought on the republican side in the Spanish Civil War. Between 1939 and 1945, IRA veterans pursued a military campaign in England and Ireland. Fianna Fáil, in government, was especially active against the IRA; former comrades were executed and allowed to die on hunger strike. The IRA campaign was a dismal failure.

As a counter to Fianna Fáil, Irish Republican veterans led by former IRA Chief of Staff Seán Mac Bride (whose father the British executed in 1916 and whose mother was an inspiration for Yeats), formed the political party Clann na Poblachta. Clann na Poblachta participated in a coalition government (1948–1951) that included Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party, in Dublin. Under this government, and with Mac Bride as Minister for External Affairs, the Free State was declared the Republic of Ireland and the country withdrew from the British Commonwealth.

While they rejected the approach of Clann na Poblachta, Irish Republicans in Sinn Féin and the IRA recognized that they had to confront their political isolation. In the late 1940s, the two organizations were brought together. They remained separate, but with overlapping members, especially at the leadership level, and with the IRA as the dominant partner. In 1955, two IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland, put forward as Sinn Féin candidates, were elected (as abstentionists) to the House of Commons. The IRA’s “Resistance Campaign” (1956–1962) was supported by Sinn Féin, which was banned in Northern Ireland from 1957 until 1974. The IRA campaign ended in failure.

In Northern Ireland, Unionists (primarily Protestant) discriminated against Nationalists (primarily Catholic). In the 1960s, the US civil rights movement inspired a similar movement in Northern Ireland. Peaceful protests by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and a student-led organization, People’s Democracy (PD), were confronted by counterdemonstrations. The resulting conflict was exacerbated when officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Loyalist (loyal to the British Crown) vigilantes actively supported the counterdemonstrators. In August 1969, in the midst of widespread rioting, British troops were sent to Northern Ireland as peacekeepers. And the Irish Republican Movement split over how to best approach the situation.

The “Official” IRA and “Official” Sinn Féin, led by veterans of the 1940s and 1950s, argued that they could combine guerrilla war with radical, but constitutional, politics and achieve a united Ireland; they recognized the Dublin, Belfast, and London parliaments. The “Provisional” IRA (December 1969) and its political wing, “Provisional” Sinn Féin (January 1970), were also led by veterans of the 1940s and 1950s, but they maintained the tradition of rejecting constitutional politics. Based on past experience, including Fianna Fáil’s anti-IRA activities, they argued that involvement in parliament would lead to compromise, reform instead of revolution, and failure. The Officials are often portrayed as more left-wing and progressive than their Provisional counterparts and they did develop an interesting relationship with the Soviet Union. They also concluded that their armed campaign was a mistake and declared a unilateral ceasefire in May 1972. By this time the Officials were arguing that the ongoing Provisional IRA campaign was counterproductive, sectarian, and terrorist. There were deadly feuds between the Provisionals and the Officials in 1972, 1975, and 1977.

Late in 1974, the Officials split again, which led to the creation of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and its political wing, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). This split also was acrimonious and there were deadly feuds between the Officials and the INLA/IRSP in 1975 and 1977. Over time, “Official” Sinn Féin changed its name to Sinn Féin/the Workers’ Party (1977) and the Workers’ Party (1982). Members of the party were elected to the Dublin parliament in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, in part because of continuing allegations that there remained a military wing, the Workers’ Party suffered another split and was decimated. Several members left to
form a new party, Democratic Left, which was moderately successful and in the mid-1990s helped form a coalition government, with Fine Gael and Labour, in Dublin. In 1999, Democratic Left merged with the Labour Party. The INLA and IRSP are remembered for their involvement in prominent events that include the assassinations of Conservative MP Airey Neave (1979) and Loyalist paramilitary Billy Wright (1997), and for internecine feuding and splits.

From 1969 to 2005, the Provisional IRA and “Provisional” Sinn Féin (henceforth, Sinn Féin) were the key actors of the Irish Republican Movement. Their stated goal was a 32-county democratic socialist republic. As unrest escalated in the north of Ireland, the Northern Irish and British states responded with repression, including internment without trial (1971) and Bloody Sunday (1972; British soldiers shot dead 13 anti-internment protesters; a fourteenth died later). In defense of their communities, large numbers of young people joined the Provisional IRA. Between 1972 and 1994, the Provisional IRA was associated with several high-profile events, including: “Bloody Friday” (1972, 21 bombs killed nine people in Belfast); the Kingsmills massacre (ten Protestant workers were shot dead); the La Mon Restaurant bombing (1978, a firebomb killed 12 people); and, on the same day in 1979, the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the Warrenpoint Ambush (two strategically placed bombs killed 18 British soldiers).

As the founders of the Provisional IRA were arrested or killed, younger people moved into leadership positions. In 1981, Irish Republican prisoners on hunger strike for political status demonstrated that the movement had more support than the authorities claimed; IRA prisoner Bobby Sands was elected to the House of Commons (he later died after 66 days without food) and IRA prisoners Paddy Agnew and Kieran Doherty (the latter died after 73 days without food) were elected to the Dublin parliament. The electoral interventions brought new recruits and helped spur change. In 1983, Gerry Adams, from Belfast, succeeded Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, from Longford, as president of Sinn Féin, formally demarcating the transition to a younger, Northern-based leadership.

The IRA had been prosecuting a guerrilla campaign for more than a decade, but without success. Echoing the “Officials,” the new leadership considered the possibility of complementing that campaign with constitutional politics. This began the process of transforming Sinn Féin into a constitutional political party. At the 1986 Ard-Fheis (Convention), Sinn Féin’s constitution was changed to allow elected members to take their seats in the Dublin parliament; the new leadership – notably Martin McGuinness – promised they would never take seats in a Northern Ireland parliament and that they would support armed struggle until a united Ireland was achieved. A minority of the delegates walked out of the Ard-Fheis and formed Republican Sinn Féin (RSF). RSF’s leadership was largely the same people who had founded Provisional Sinn Féin in 1970. They held to their belief that constitutional politics would lead to compromise and failure.

Between 1969 and 1994, more than 3600 people died in the Irish conflict. Those responsible for the deaths were (approximately): Irish Republicans (2130); Loyalists (1050); the British army (300); the police (50); and others/unknown (80). Yet, there was no evidence that a united Ireland was on the horizon. In August 1994, the Provisional IRA declared a unilateral cease-fire, supported by Sinn Féin. Republican Sinn Féin accused them of compromising and selling out. About six weeks later loyalist paramilitaries declared a cease-fire and it appeared that the conflict would end. The Continuity IRA then revealed itself and it became public that the Provisional IRA had split in 1986. RSF is viewed as the political wing of the Continuity IRA.

Because of limited progress, the Provisional IRA renewed its campaign in February 1996, but in order to include Sinn Féin in an ongoing peace process, the cease-fire was re-instituted in July 1997. The Provisionals endorsed the Mitchell Principles, which mandated: nonviolence; weapons decommissioning; and that
Northern Ireland’s future would be democratically determined by its citizens – which would defer a united Ireland indefinitely, as the majority are pro-Union. This provoked another split and the creation of the Real IRA. Some Sinn Féiners publicly criticized the leadership and formed the 32 County Sovereignty Committee; they were expelled. The renamed 32 County Sovereignty Movement is viewed as the public face of the Real IRA. The Omagh Bombing (1998), which killed 29 people, is attributed to the Real IRA.

Sinn Féin supported the Good Friday Agreement (1998), its members took their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and former Provisional IRA commander Martin McGuinness became Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland. In 2005, the Provisional IRA formally ended their campaign and completed the decommissioning of their weapons. Today, Sinn Féin is the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland and has 28 (of 108) seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Party representatives hold four (of 166) seats in the Dublin parliament and five (of 646) seats in the House of Commons (from which the party abstains). Sinn Féin also has several councilors elected at the local level throughout Ireland.

The Continuity IRA, the Real IRA, and a small group calling itself Óglaigh na hÉireann are small but remain active. Republican Sinn Féin has one locally elected councilor, in the Republic of Ireland. The 32 County Sovereignty Movement does not contest elections. In 2006, a small group of Sinn Féiners in Dublin, concerned that the party was watering down its commitment to socialism, formed yet another Irish Republican political organization, Éirígí (Rise!). Two Provisional Sinn Féin councilors have joined Éirígí.

The Irish Republican Movement is important for many different reasons. Irish Republicanism has influenced Nobel laureates (William Butler Yeats, George Bernard Shaw, and Seamus Heaney), other important writers (e.g., Séan O’Casey, Brendan Behan, Roddy Doyle), and filmmakers (e.g., John Ford and Neil Jordan). Irish Republicans have become statesmen: Eamon De Valera, President of the (rebel) Irish Republic, Taoiseach (Chief) of the Irish Free State/Republic of Ireland (1932–1948; 1951–1954; 1957–1959), and President of the Republic of Ireland (1959–1973), was also President of the Council of the League of Nations (1932) and President of the Assembly of the League of Nations (1938). Seán Mac Bride helped found Amnesty International, served as Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1974) and the Lenin Peace Prize (1977).

The 1916 Rising marked the beginning of twentieth-century colonial insurgencies against the British imperial system. Irish Republicans of the 1916–1923 era influenced political activists as varied as Jawaharlal Nehru and V.I. Lenin. Tom Barry’s *Guerrilla Days in Ireland* is a classic account of an insurgency. Menachem Begin was influenced by Irish rebels and, through *The Revolt*, influenced later Irish rebels. In the 1950s, IRA volunteers saw themselves as part of a worldwide anticolonial struggle that included liberation movements in Algeria, Cyprus, and Vietnam, among other locations.

Women have played an important role in Irish Republican politics. In 1918, Sinn Féin candidate Constance Gore-Booth Markievicz became the first woman elected to the House of Commons. She did not take her seat in London, but did become Minister for Labour in the rebel government in Dublin, Dáil Éireann. In 1969, 21-year-old Bernadette Devlin (now McAliskey), of People’s Democracy, became the youngest (at the time) member of the House of Commons. The women’s movement influenced Irish Republicanism: whether or not women should have a separate organization (Cumann na mBan) or serve as IRA Volunteers remains an important question. Between 1969 and 1998, several Cumann na mBan Volunteers and women who were members of the Provisional IRA died on active service.

Irish Republican politics allow for interesting comparisons. In the United States, civil rights protesters, including students, engaged in high-risk activism that generated
some political violence but by the 1970s also brought significant social change. In Northern Ireland, civil rights protesters, including students, helped lay a foundation for a violent insurgency that lasted more than a generation that achieved a debatable level of social change.

For scholars and students, the Irish Republican Movement provides an opportunity to address fundamental issues: the efficacy of peaceful versus violent protest; the biographical consequences of activism; the role of state repression (between 1969 and 1998, the British army killed more Catholic civilians (138) than it did Irish Republican paramilitaries (121)); the causes and consequences of factions and splits; the pursuit of revolution or reform; and the transformation of armed struggle into constitutional politics.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Decolonization and social movements; Guerrilla movements; Northern Ireland civil rights movement; Repression and social movements; Rights and rights movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Islamic movements
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Broadly “Islamic movements” refer to the diverse religious trends in the Muslim world that want to reorganize society with reference to Islam. The complex and multifaceted nature of the phenomenon has stirred multiple designations, including “Islamic radicalism,” “fundamentalism,” “revivalism” or “resurgence,” “Islamic activism,” and “political Islam,” each stressing particular aspects of these movements. Thus, “fundamentalism” highlights the scripturist essentialism, pointing to the traditionalism of the movements, or a belief in the exclusive possession of a unique truth. “Revivalism” and “resurgence” underline the religious at the expense of the political content of these movements, and “Islamic activism” is intended to account for the inclusion of various types of activities – political, social, and cultural – that emerge under the rubric of Islamic movement.

Academic and policy circles are increasingly using the terms “Islamism” or “Islamist movements” instead of “Islamic movements” to underline the prevailing collectives with political underpinning and contemporary relevance. Islamist movements then are those which strive to establish some kind of an Islamic order – a religious state, sharia law, and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities. Association with the state is a key feature of the Islamist movements, one that differentiates them from such religiously inspired but apolitical collectives as the Jama’at-i Tabliq-i Islami, which is a broad transnational movement that is not interested in holding governmental power, but is involved in a missionary movement of spiritual awakening among Muslims. The primary concern of Islamism is to forge an ideological community; secular concerns such as establishing social justice or improving the lives of the poor are to follow only from this strategic objective.

The Islamists’ insistence on holding state power is framed in terms of the doctrinal principle of “command right, forbid wrong.” This broad Koranic dictum remains contested with varied interpretations about what constitutes “right” and “wrong,” who is to command or forbid them, and how. Historically, it was largely the Islamic jurists or Muslim zealots who took it upon themselves to command right and forbid wrong in, for instance, prohibiting wine, prostitution, or singing. But in modern times, modern movements and states have increasingly assumed that role. Islamist movements then are determined to control state power because they consider the state to be the most powerful and efficient institution that is able, whether through da’wa (preaching) or duress, to spread “good” and eradicate “evil” in Muslim societies. It follows that the Islamists’ normative and legal perspective places more emphasis on people’s obligations than their rights; people are perceived more as dutiful subjects than rightful citizens. In order to achieve salvation and true happiness, they are to abide by “Islamic values,” the meaning of which is determined by movements’ leaders.

VARIATIONS

But Islamic movements vary considerably – in terms of areas of activity, types of organizations, visions of an Islamic order, and different ways in which to achieve such an order. The reformist trend aspires to establish an Islamic state, but wishes to do so gradually, peacefully, and within the existing constitutional frameworks. This strand rejects the use of violence and hopes to operate within the nation-state by invoking many democratic norms; it focuses on mobilizing civil society through work in professional associations, NGOs, local mosques, and charities. The original Muslim Brothers in Egypt and their offshoots in Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Kuwait, Palestine, and Jordan represent this
trend. Others include the locally based Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, as well as Erbakan’s Rifah Party in Turkey. Many groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood seem to adopt a somewhat Gramscian strategy of establishing moral and political hegemony in civil society expecting that the state will turn Islamic in the long run following the Islamization of society. Yet, their actual cooptation within the legal political structures tend, to use Olivier Roy’s phrase, to “social democratize” these movements. The Islamic parties in Jordan, Morocco, or Indonesia are argued to have paved a reformist path similar to that of European social democracy (Roy 1998).

The revolutionary or militant trends, such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya in Egypt, the Algerian FIS, or Lashkar Jihad in Indonesia resort to violence and terrorism against state agencies, western targets, and non-Muslim civilians, hoping to cause a Leninist-type insurrection in order to seize state power which would then unleash the Islamization of the social order from above. But such militant Islamists differ from current Jihadi movements, such as the groups associated with al-Qaeda. Whereas militant Islamism represents political movements operating within certain nation-states and targeting primarily the secular national state, the Jihadis are transnational in their ideas and operations, and often represent apocalyptic “ethical movements” involved in “civilizational” struggles, with the aim of combating such highly abstract targets as the “west” or societies of “non-believers” (Devji 2005). For many of Jihadis, the very struggle itself or jihad becomes an end in itself. And on this path, they invariably resort to extreme violence both against the self (suicide bombing) and their targets.

A good number of Islamic-oriented groups are not in fact Islamist, strictly speaking. A growing trend that I have called post-Islamist wants to transcend Islamism as an exclusivist and totalizing ideology, espousing instead inclusion, pluralism, and ambiguity. In Iran, it took the form of the “reform movement” of 1997–2004 under President Khatami. Besides Iran, a growing number of Islamic groups also exhibit some aspects of “post-Islamism.” The pluralist strategy of the Lebanese Hezbollah since the early 1990s, which led to a split in the movement, the Egyptian al-Wasat Party, which emerged in the mid-1990s as an alternative to both militant Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ “authoritarianism,” the discursive shift in Indian Jama’at-i Islami toward more inclusive, pluralistic, and ambiguous ideological dispositions, Saudi Arabia’s “Islamo-liberal” trend of the late 1990s, which sought a compromise between Islam and democracy, and not to mention the fairly democratic approach of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) toward political participation, each of these displays some diverse aspects of post-Islamist trend in Muslim societies in recent years. Post-Islamist movements aspire to more or less secular democratic states, but wish to promote pious societies (Bayat 2007).

Global events since the late 1990s (the Balkan ethnic wars, the Russian domination of Chechnya, the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza under Likud, and the post-9/11 anti-Islamic sentiments in the West) created among Muslims a sense of insecurity and feeling of siege. This in turn heightened their sense of religious identity and communal bonds, generating a new trend of “active piety,” a sort of missionary tendency quite distinct from the highly organized “apolitical” Islam of the Tablighi movement in being quite individualized, diffused, and inclined toward Salafism. The adherents of such piety aim not to establish an Islamic state, but to reclaim and enhance the self, while striving to implant the same mission in others.

What constitutes the social bases of Islamist movements? Modernist interpretations view Islamism as a movement of “traditional” Muslims (e.g., the ulema or clerical class, merchants, and the urban poor) who forge alliances to resist Western-style modernization. Evidence, however, suggests that Islamism has received support more or less from different social groups – traditional and modern, young
and old, men and women, better-off and lower classes. But the core constituency of Islamist movements comes from the modern, educated but often impoverished middle classes – professionals, state employees, college students, and graduates. The fairly popular idea that the urban poor and slum dwellers become the natural allies of Islamism – because of their intrinsic religiosity, social dislocation, and their need for community – is exaggerated. Indeed, the relationship between the Islamist movements and the urban poor remains mutually utilitarian. The urban poor lend pragmatic support to Islamists in exchange for tangible gains (services, aid, or social protection) in more or less similar ways that they forge alliances with secular and leftist groups (Bayat 2010: 171–184). On the other hand, although some leaders come from the clerical class (like Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, Hasan Nasrullah in Lebanon, or the militant Jebha Ulema within the Egyptian al-Azhar), the bulk of the Islamist leadership in the Muslim world remains lay activists rooted in modern education and professions. In fact, the majority of the traditional and quietist clerics oppose Islamism for its politicization and secularization of “spiritual realm” and ulma’s place in it.

HISTORIES

Contemporary Islamism, therefore, is distinct from the premodern movements framed in Islamic idioms. Most premodern trends, notably those associated with the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century jurist Ibn Taymiyya, Indian Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi (1564–1624), and the eighteenth-century scholar Muhammad ibn Abdel Wahhab of Arabia, were concerned with retaining “purity” and disallowing innovation in religious ideas and practices. They opposed many rituals, such as worship of saints, which had become part of the religious culture. On the other hand, most of the late nineteenth-century religious movements developed primarily as a response to Islam’s encounter with the European colonial conquest and modernity in conditions where the Muslim Ottoman Empire was in decline. But the actual responses varied. Some, like the Indian Shah Waliullah, opted for preserving Islamic heritage in the face of encroaching modernity in the late nineteenth century; his ideas inspired the Deobandi movement of traditional Islamic thought which led to the establishment of thousands of traditional madrasas (schools) throughout the Indian subcontinent which continue today. Abul ala Mawdudi, a leader of Indian Jama’at-i Islami and one of the most influential ideologues of new Islamism, was a product of such Deobandi schools, the ideology of which, however, he later ceased to share. On the other hand, Jamal eddin al-Afghani (1837–1897), Muhammad Abdu (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), cosmopolitan Muslim leaders in the Middle East, not only mobilized Muslim resistance against European colonialism, they also spearheaded the modernization of Islam to coexist and flourish within this emerging modernity. They pioneered what came to be known as “Islamic modernism” or “Islamic reform,” advocating modern technology, modern education, and rationality in religious thought (Watt 1985).

The ideological tenets of contemporary Islamism may at best be traced back to the Society of Muslim Brothers, which called for the Islamization of both society and the state with the Koran as the Constitution. Established in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan el-Banna and invigorated later by the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), arguably the father of current militant Islamism, the Muslim Brothers fought against British rule in Egypt and campaigned for a nation governed by the tenets of Islam. In this fashion, the group formed the earliest strand of Islamism that came to overtake the Arab and the Muslim world in the last decades of the twentieth century. As an associational movement, the Muslim Brothers grew rapidly from only four branches in 1929 to 2000 in 1949, with some one million activists and sympathizers at its peak. It organized in
neighborhoods, NGOs, mosques, in youth and women’s associations, and sport clubs, as well as cooperatives both in urban and rural areas. It established branches in Arab countries and Europe. The group has survived intermittent waves of repression by Egyptian pashas and presidents. During Nasser’s rule, the movement was split into a revolutionary wing that subscribed to the views of Sayyid Qutb who advocated political action and revolution, and the gradualist reformist wing led by Hasan al-Hudaibi who called for da’wa or discourse to change attitudes and behavior in society. While the Muslim Brothers opted for a reformist strategy, Qutb’s political theology informed militant groups such as al-Jihad, Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and dozens of jihadi groups which have proliferated in recent decades (Qutb 1990). Qutb adopted some key concepts (e.g., jahili state and society; jahili society is one in which human, rather than God, is worshiped by human, and the jahili state is one that governs such a society) from Abul ala’ Mawdudi who in turn had been exposed to Marxist-Leninist ideas and the Indian Communist Party. But both lashed out at Western liberalism, secular nationalism, and imperialism which, according to Moroccan Abdul Salam Yassin, present themselves in the name of enlightenment, reform, nationalism, and rationality. The alternative social order was to be inspired by “Islamic principles.”

To this end, Mawdudi proposed some kind of “Islamic cosmopolitanism” to be governed by “theo-democracy” or a “divine democratic government,” the Iranian Ali Shariati offered “divine classless society,” and Sayyid Qutb, Islamic state and economy (Espósito 1983). Ayatollah Khomeini had spoken of “Islamic government,” but went along with an Islamic Republic in which valayat-i faqih (the rule of supreme jurist) assumed the central place – a “theo-democracy” Iranian-style.

Despite intellectual links to Mawdudi and Qutb, the current Islamist movements have been the product of a different era. In the Middle East, they have arisen largely since the 1970s – the decade of oil boom, economic growth, capitalist modernization, secular authoritarian regimes, cold war, and the aftermath of the 1967 Arab defeat from Israel. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran (with little connection to Muslim Brothers) bolstered a new global era of religious politics in the Middle East and beyond by offering a tangible model of Islamic rule. Thus, just months after the Iranian revolution, an armed militant group seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca to dislodge the Saudi rulers who in fact were pushed by such opposition to adopt more conservative Islamist policies. The Shia militants in Lebanon established Hezbollah in 1982 to fight Israeli occupation, evolving into a social movement/quasi-state wishing to create an Islamic regime. In Egypt Jihad and Gama’a al-Islamiyya expanded their operations, while the Iraqi anti-Saddam Islamist Party, Hizb al-Da’wa, received a big boost from the Iranian revolution. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan had already triggered the emergence of Islamic mujahedin who first fought the Soviet forces and then among themselves, paving the way for the rise of Taliban which in collaboration with al-Qaeda inaugurated a new era of radical Islamism at the global level.

INTERPRETATIONS

How then to interpret the rise of the new Islamism in the Muslim-majority countries? Some “modernist” interpretations perceive Islamism as a reactive antimodern entity. The encounter of Islamism (and Islam) with modernity, according to Bernard Lewis (and later Samuel Huntington) may even result in the “clash of civilizations” (Lewis 1990). Albert Melucci and Alain Touraine, for their part, view Islamist movements in terms of “regressive utopianism,” a sort of religious revival where actors seek their identity with reference to the past (Melucci 1996: 104). The second strand of interpretations views Islamism as signifying a quest for difference, cultural autonomy, alternative polity, and morality vis the universalizing secular modernity (Giddens 1987: 50). Islamist movements
denote a “quest for identity, authenticity, and community, and a desire to establish meaning and order in both personal life and society” (Esposito 1998: 20). Others interpret them as a search for certainty in this uncertain world, movements that attempt to “restore to the ‘post-modern’ world meaning, an ethic and an order which, it is claimed, have vanished in the collapse of all its certainties” (Kepel 1994: 3). Still other observers identify the emergence of new Islamism as the third phase (after political and economic) of anticolonial struggles – discursive struggles against Western modernity, struggles for cultural identity and independence (Burgat & Dowel 1993). These varied interpretations offer some valuable insights which allow us to explore the meaning of Islamist movements. Their difficulties, however, lie in their homogenizing tendencies, and in reducing the meaning of these multi-layered collectives to the discourse of leaders. The challenge is to discern what the different constituencies imagine and expect from their movement (see methodological issues below).

Broadly, the new Islamism emerged in societies with deep contradictions, where the opportunity for a massive educational expansion, economic development, virtual abundance of wealth (oil money), and a general social mobility went hand-in-hand with continuous political repression, marginalization, and a growing inequality. At this juncture the middle class marginals, now overwhelmingly educated, were becoming acutely aware of their exclusion, and so experiencing a strong “moral outrage.” Islamism came to mobilize those (largely middle-class high achievers) who felt marginalized by the dominant economic, political, and cultural processes in their societies. Having perceived both capitalist modernity and socialist utopia as failure, they opted for an “indigenous Islamic alternative.” In those cold-war conditions, the ruling regimes offered lip service and opportunity to Islamic alternatives for their anticommunist postures. Yet by adhering to their “authentic” model, the Muslim middle class discarded what they considered as their excluders – their national elites, secular governments, and these governments’ Western allies. So, they rejected “Western cultural domination,” its political rationale, moral sensibilities, and normative symbols, even though in practice they shared many of those traits as in their neck-ties, food, education, and technologies. In the Arab world, in particular, the political classes considered the long-standing occupation of the Palestinian lands by Israel and the US support for this, as further evidence of their subjugation at the broader global level. The way to liberation was the return to Islam (as Israelis had returned to Judaism). Thus Islamists endeavored to articulate a version of Islam that could respond to their political, economic, and cultural deficits. They imagined Islam as a complete divine system, with its superior political model, cultural codes, legal structure, and economic arrangement – one that could remedy all human problems. It could also offer Muslims a sense of self-respect, self-confidence, and autonomy in world views. And this maximalist construction of Islam went hand-in-hand with a populist language and social control, which inevitably otherized many citizens – including the non-conformists, seculars, ordinary Muslims, religious minorities, and many women. At the core of the Islamist paradigm, then, lay a blend of devotion and duty, virtue and exclusion (Bayat 2007: 6–7).

It is tempting to draw parallels, as some have, between Islamism and liberation theology in Latin America. The Islamists’ populist rhetoric and the religious frame seem to justify a comparison. But there are crucial differences. Liberation theology originally attempted to reform the church from within, but evolved later into a social movement in which the concerns of the dispossessed occupied a central place. Liberation theology originally attempted to alter the oligarchic control of the Catholic Church and its neglect of the poor, especially when socialist movements (e.g., the Cuban revolution) had undermined the church by fighting for social justice. Led by socially conscious theologians, the strategic objective of liberation theology was the
“liberation of the poor” which would frame the interpretation of the Gospel (Smith 1991). But Islamism has had broader social and political objectives than simply the welfare of the poor. The Islamists’ primary concern has been building an “ideological community” – establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islamic laws and moral codes which are expected to attend to such concerns as social development and the plight of the poor. In short, Islamist movements and Latin American liberation theology represent two distinct social and political trajectories. If anything, militant Islamism seems to have more in common with the Latin American guerrilla movements of the 1960s and 1970s than with liberation theology – not of course in their ideologies, but relative to their actors and the conditions under which they emerged.

CHALLENGES

Research on Islamist movements has flourished in recent years, in part because of its intellectual appeal but more for its global political significance. While we certainly know more today about Islamism than two decades ago, a number of methodological challenges hamper rigorous analysis. First, the subject of inquiry remains perplexing, for it refers to not the same but different things, of which only few may be characterized in terms of social movements. Thus, reference is made to revolution (Iran 1979), the state (Iran, Sudan, the Taliban), quasi-state (Hezbollah during the civil war), political parties (Rifah or Virtue parties in Turkey), guerrilla organizations (e.g., Jihad in Egypt), and clerical groupings (e.g., radical ulama in Iran or Egypt). Second, much of the analyses of the movements draw on discourse and little on practice. This is in line with Castells’ emphasis that social movements should be seen by their “own words” (1997: 71). The approach aims to correct structuralist reductionism by looking at what actors actually say they want, but it falls short of rectifying the gaps and even contradictions between what actors say and what they actually do. The challenge is to integrate and explain incongruent words and deeds. Third, such discourse-based analyses are usually informed by words of articulated leaders. This method assumes an image of social movements as homogenous and harmonious entities, ones which are identified with and represented primarily by leaders (who incidentally have an interest in presenting a coherent picture of their movements). But Islamist movements carry multiple discourses by their diverse fragments and constituencies (leaders, cadres, members, sympathizers, free riders, and so on), who often imagine shared perceptions with other adherents (Bayat 2005). Given the fragmented nature of these collectives, who speaks for the movements? How are we to integrate such disparate and possibly contradictory words, deeds, and perceptions to build a reasonable narrative of movements and their meanings?

SEE ALSO: Al-Qaeda; Arab Spring; Green Movement in Iran; Hamas (Palestine); Hizb ut-Tahrir; Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979; Islamic women’s movements; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Japanese “new” religious movements (1930–present)
GENTARO MIZUGAKI

The term new religious movements (NRMs) refers to religious movements that emerged worldwide in the twentieth century, as distinguished from institutionalized religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, or unorganized folk religions.

Although NRMs demonstrate different features in different parts of the world, most of them have some characteristics in common, such as an emphasis on lay people rather than clerics, globalized sources of doctrines and views of the world, and loose membership. There has been academic interest in NRMs in Africa, Japan, and in the West, where NRMs have played conspicuous roles.

In Japan, Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism in turn have manifested different ties with the regimes in different periods. None of them has been established firmly enough to make an exclusive monopoly of doctrines or teachings. This course of history provided the soil of religious tolerance in which hundreds of religious movements could be germinated recurrently. The earliest of the Japanese NRMs which have survived to the present, such as Kurozumikyo, Konkokyo, and Tenrikyo, originated in the feudal Tokugawa era in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Hundreds of NRMs emerged in the process of regime change and rapid social change after the Meiji restoration of imperial rule in 1868. While some NRMs such as Omotokyo (Great Origin) and Reiyukai occurred as charismatic or shamanic movements, some occurred as factional offshoots of another NRM, such as Honmichi from Tenrikyo, Sekai-Kyuseikyo (Church of World Messianity) from Omotokyo, and Rissho-koseikai from Reiyukai. Still other NRMs occurred as seceded from traditional religions, such as Soka Gakkai (Value Creating Society) from Nichiren Buddhism. Most of the NRMs stagnated or declined over the course of time due to gaps in successions, unsuccessful routinization of charisma, or failed prophecies, although some successful NRMs, such as Tenrikyo, grew to have millions of adherents.

Although the Meiji government encouraged modernization and westernization, it pursued social integration through theocratic state building. The imperial cult raised Shinto to a state religion, but magic practices or the healing cults of NRMs were kept under governmental control. Moreover, during rising militarism and totalitarian repression in the 1920s and 1930s, the traditional religions such as Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity were regulated under the Religious Organizations Law (enacted in 1939) and mobilized as part of the war-time regime, and apocalyptic or radical movements such as Honmichi and Omotokyo were suppressed under the pretext of lèse-majesté and violation of the Peace Preservation Law (enacted in 1925).

After World War II, full-scale religious freedom was guaranteed under the constitution. However, anomie, uncertainty, and loss of confidence as a result of defeat, as well as the questioning of the system of the emperor, brought about the explosion of NRMs of all sizes, which McFarland (1967) called “the rush hour of the gods.”

In the 1960s, high economic growth changed the environment for religion. On one hand, industrialization and population shifts eroded family and community cohesion on which the traditional parish system of the Shinto shrine and Buddhist temple was based. On the other hand, improved standards of living and the spread of higher education changed the backgrounds and religious needs of adherents.

Some NRMs met not only old religious needs, such as the alleviation of poverty, illness,
or family trouble, but also new ones, such as feelings of loneliness, uncertainty, or personal feelings of meaninglessness. Successful NRMs, such as Soka Gakkai (about 17 million) and Rissho Koseikai (6 million), absorbed a large number of followers among new urban lower-class people detached from their homeland. Soka Gakkai founded the political party Komeito in 1961 for the purpose of Buddhist theocratic state building. Komeito participated in the recent ruling coalition.

The mass media has been one of the main agents of social control over NRMs, along with anticult movements. The press has often criticized influential NRMs, such as Tenrikyo, and Omotokyo in prewar times, and Soka Gakkai, Sekai-Kyuseikyo, Reiyukai, Rissho-koseikai, and the Unification Church in postwar times. Anticult movements that occurred in the late 1960s mainly targeted the Unification Church. Since the terrorism carried out by Aum-sinrikyo in 1995, anticult movements have diffused, but have targeted more NRMs.

Foreign propagation in the early NRMs and traditional religions was originally related to emigration to Hawaii, Brazil, and the colonized Asian area in the first half of the twentieth century. Tenrikyo in particular appealed to non-Japanese people in prewar times. Since the 1950s, other NRMs have followed this trend, for example, Sekai-Kyuseikyo and the Perfect Liberty in America, Seicho-no-Ie (House of Growth) and Sekai-Kyuseikyo in Brazil. In contrast, foreign NRMs such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormonism, Christian Science, Scientology, the Hare Krishna Movement, and Rajneesh Meditation Center, have remained small scale.

From the 1970s on, however, a mystical and inner-directed attitude has grown little by little among the younger generation in Japan. Although the early NRMs survived stagnation, new NRMs which have emphasized miraculous experiences, such as Agonshu, Mahikari (True Light), Kofuku no Kagaku (The Institute for Research in Human Happiness), and Aum-sinrikyo, have been on the rise. These new religions are sometimes called “new-new religion” (Shin-shin shukyo), but not all of them originated at that time.

Researchers have pointed out the distinct features of the Japanese NRMs, such as female founders/leadership and a weak antigovernmental character (with the exception of Aum-sinrikyo). As globalization spreads, it is likely that different religious ideas and views of the world from different sources will affect the Japanese NRMs and make them complex and typologically diverse.

SEE ALSO: Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


King, Martin Luther, Jr
(1928–1968)
THOMAS F. JACKSON

Recent scholarship on Martin Luther King, Jr looks beyond King’s eloquence as a charismatic orator who inspired masses of people to nonviolently protest segregation in America. We now appreciate more fully King’s religious background in sustaining his leadership. More importantly, we see multiple ways in which King was shaped and inspired by larger movements for racial and economic justice around the world. King did not initiate any of the local protest movements for which he became a spokesman and symbol. He was nevertheless a brilliant strategist of protest confrontations; a master at reaching national and international publics and elites through print and broadcast media; a mobilizer who inspired thousands of people to risk life and limb against forces of violence and repression; and, finally, a coordinator and mediator among a range of protest leaders whose power and talents have been overshadowed by King’s fame. Recent scholarship has especially focused on King’s final years, when his lifelong commitment to opposing the “evil triplets” of racism, militarism, and economic exploitation were most fully put into action. King’s final crusades against the Vietnam War, against big city apartheid, and against poverty and low wages were less successful than the Southern movement to dismantle legal segregation. But the full amplitude of King’s radical challenge to America’s political economy and foreign policy has now become more visible.

King was born January 15, 1928 in Atlanta, Georgia. His father and grandfather were prominent Baptist ministers and leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). King was educated in elite institutions – Morehouse College, Crozer Theological Seminary, and Boston University, where he earned a PhD in 1955. These elite settings prepared him well for national religious and political leadership, especially in his bargaining with elites. Yet early on King also became committed to democratic empowerment among those whom Jesus called “the least of these.” Appalled by breadlines during the Great Depression and by the fierce competition for low wage jobs between black and white workers that he witnessed in Atlanta, King became as critical of capitalism as he was of racism. He absorbed several philosophies of social change from his many mentors: the African American social gospel, which called for an active, politically engaged, even revolutionary Christian ministry; Gandhian nonviolence, which opposed hierarchies of power within oppressed communities as well as racism and imperialism; and interracial trade unionism, with its attendant calls for sweeping social democratic economic reform.

In 1955, as pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, King rose to local leadership after his fellow NAACP activist Rosa Parks refused to relinquish her bus seat to a white man, and 40,000 black workers stayed off the buses for a year. President of the Montgomery Improvement Association, King sustained popular morale and became the movement’s spokesman and symbol through his deft handling of sympathetic media. King also coordinated support from northern liberals, churches, synagogues, and labor unions. Braving bombings and death threats, King rejected armed protection from supporters early in the struggle. He became an international symbol of a new southern militancy that favored nonviolent direct action protest over the strategies of litigation and lobbying practiced by the NAACP.

In 1957, King helped found the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), serving as president until his death. The SCLC
could not replicate the Montgomery protest elsewhere; this loosely affiliated organization of local ministers mainly focused on registering voters before 1960. In travels to Ghana and India, King referenced the American struggle as part of a global movement against white supremacy and empire. Critical of communism, he was even more critical of the cold war arms race and anticommunism at home.

In 1960–1961, black student activists sat in at lunch counters, rode interstate buses in interracial teams, and ignited the largest wave of protest since the 1930s. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) challenged King to follow them to jail, which he finally did in protests against Atlanta’s segregated department stores in October 1960. King inspired hundreds to go to jail in Albany, Georgia in December 1961. But students grew skeptical when he refused to join their freedom rides and when he mysteriously bailed himself out of Albany’s jail after promising to remain there with them. Ironically, King’s criticism of the FBI’s failure to protect civil rights protesters in Albany also provoked the ire of the powerful director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. The FBI campaign of intimidation and disinformation against King’s alleged communist affiliations lasted until his death in 1968. For all this, King increasingly advocated that poor people’s daily needs for economic justice must be incorporated into antiracist organizing. He strongly supported New York’s striking black and Puerto Rican hospital workers in 1959. And, in the South, SCLC’s Citizenship Education Program moved beyond literacy and voter registration to agitate for job training and disability benefits denied blacks by the local Jim Crow welfare state.

King’s distinctive strategy of mobilizing large street protests to publicize racism was perfected in 1963, when SCLC joined in protests against lunch counter segregation and job discrimination in Birmingham, Alabama. Horrific images of violent police repression spread around the world, and the Kennedy administration was compelled to mediate. Hundreds of black communities across the nation joined in protests that won sympathy and threatened mass disruption. President Kennedy introduced legislation to outlaw discrimination in public accommodations and employment. King stirred the nation with his “I Have a Dream” speech at the August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, which demanded even stronger civil rights legislation, massive public works employment for the unemployed, and higher wages for all workers. King later coordinated protests in St. Augustine, Florida, which kept pressure on Congress to pass a much strengthened Civil Rights Act of 1964. This legislation proved inadequate in protecting voting rights and ensuring economic opportunity, however. So King led a dramatic march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama for voting rights in March 1965, calling on his followers to take the next step, to “march on poverty.” In response, President Johnson introduced and Congress passed legislation that put federal registrars in southern counties. The Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles rose up in violent revolt against police in August. King traveled there to preach nonviolence and to pressure the mayor to release dollars from Lyndon Johnson’s new War on Poverty to the neighborhoods.

Poverty and big city segregation now loomed as the largest challenges to black equality. King took SCLC to Chicago in 1966 to join a coalition of neighborhood organizations calling for "an end to slums." He also called for national legislation that would make housing discrimination illegal and protect civil rights workers (this passed Congress only in the wake of his assassination two years later). King and SCLC organized marches on realty offices in white neighborhoods, where residents brutally attacked marchers. King extracted some small concessions from the realtors’ association and Mayor Richard Daley. But he also supported Chicago activists who built tenant unions and won jobs through mass boycotts. King mediated between moderate integrationist leaders and radical black power activists in an increasingly divided black freedom movement. Ever an integrationist,
now an avowed “democratic socialist,” King made concessions to Black Power strategies as conservative backlash gained momentum in the late 1960s.

As King explained to Congress in 1966, the struggle for “human rights” included the right “to live in a decent house” and the right to earn or receive “an adequate income.” In December 1967, after a fourth summer of urban violence and the election of conservatives to Congress, King announced the multiracial Poor People’s Campaign. Its aim was to pressure the government to strengthen the War on Poverty and wind down the war in Vietnam. In March 1968, 1300 Memphis sanitation workers demanded higher wages, safer working conditions, and municipal recognition of their union. A cross-class black coalition as remarkable as that of Montgomery in 1956 supported the workers, drawing national attention and the support of interracial unions. King lent his prestige and resources to their quest for economic justice. He was assassinated there on April 4, 1968.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Civil rights movement (United States); Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Leadership; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (United States); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (United States); Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Korean residents movement in Japan

DAVID CHAPMAN

In early 1945 approximately two million Koreans were living in Japan. At the end of World War II almost one and a half million returned to Korea and around 600,000 remained in Japan. In late 1945 the newly formed League of Koreans (Zainippon Chosenjin Renmei) called for the eradication of imperialism and militarism, the abolition of Japan’s Emperor System and the independence of Koreans in Japan. The first postwar large-scale protest of resident Koreans in Japan ensued, with a rally of many thousands held in Hibiya Park on December 28, 1945. Many of the protesters expressed grievances and demands relating to the protection of property, personal safety, salary payments, benefits, and the prosecution of those responsible for the massacre of Koreans during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake.

Other protests by this group included a call for the reinstatement of voting rights; Korean representation in Japanese politics, lost at the war’s end; and opposition to the introduction of the Alien Registration Ordinance in 1947 requiring Koreans to be treated as foreign nationals. In October 1948 the amalgamation of a number of other breakaway groups of Koreans formed an organization called the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Zai-Nippon Daikan Kyoryu Mindan or Mindan) that proclaimed itself to be nonpolitical. This phase in resident Korean history was not only a period of struggle for legal status but also the beginning of political division amongst Koreans in Japan. This division reflected the separation of the Korean peninsula into a communist north and a capitalist south, creating a highly charged political context. The Korean War (1950–1953) exacerbated already emerging ideological differences. In 1955, after the demise of the League of Koreans, the General Association of Korean Residents (Zai-Nippon Chosenjin Sorengō Kai or Sorengō) was formed. This group supported the regime of the north whilst Mindan, mentioned above, demonstrated allegiance to South Korea. Pressure to declare affiliation for either the north or the south increased within the Korean community as did friction between Mindan and Sorengō.

In April 1948, under pressure from the Allied Forces and their policies on communism, Japanese authorities closed many Korean schools in Japan. Demonstrations against the closure of schools in Kobe and Osaka, later referred to as the Hanshin Education Incident (Hanshin kyoku jiken) led to the deaths of two schoolchildren and injuries to numerous others (Koshiro 1999: 115).

Issues related to legal status for Koreans in Japan remained contentious. In 1965 Japan and South Korea normalized diplomatic relations. As part of this an agreement on the legal status and treatment of South Koreans in Japan was created and allowed for the application of permanent residency for all South Korean nationals residing in Japan (kyotei eijii). The stringent conditions of this agreement imposed by Japan met with protests from both sides of the Korean community. Mindan members held a rally in Hibiya Public Hall on June 17, 1965 to demand equality in employment, welfare, and education whilst Sorengō, concerned with the absence of any recognition of North Korea in the diplomatic discussions, believed the development to be an impediment to reunification of the Korean peninsula and detrimental to the fight for the ethnic rights of Koreans in Japan (Yang 1994: 209–215).

The issue of equal access to employment for resident Koreans was crystallized by a legal case in 1970 in which a Korean resident took legal action against the Japanese electronics giant Hitachi for discriminatory employment practices. The company had withdrawn their
offer of employment once they realized that the applicant was not a Japanese national. Those supporting the litigant held a group denunciation (kyūdan) at Hitachi. This case and the accompanying protests divided opinion within the Korean community. Those opposed to the case were mostly older generation resident Koreans claiming that this type of action supported assimilation into Japanese society which would lead to a loss of Korean identity (Pak Kun o Kakomukai 1974: 4–5). The 1970s was also a time when concerns emerged amongst some younger second- and third-generation resident Koreans about the domination of first-generation resident Koreans and differences in opinion regarding integration into Japanese society (Chapman 2008).

During the 1980s issues such as fingerprinting, political representation, and equal access to public service positions became central concerns. The inclusion of mandatory fingerprinting in the 1952 alien registration law was contentious for resident Koreans from the beginning and led to widespread protests in the 1980s. Over 10,000 people in Japan, the majority of whom were Republic of Korea (ROK) nationals, refused to be fingerprinted. The majority of those refusing only did so for the three-month grace period, after which they agreed to be fingerprinted. This protest was well publicized in English newspapers at the time. Later, in 1992, the requirement was abolished for special permanent residents (the majority of resident Koreans were in this category) and in 1999 (effected in 2000) the fingerprinting requirement was abolished for all foreign residents in Japan. Appeals to the United Nations and the outside pressure that these appeals created were essential in forcing the Japanese government to respond by abolishing practices such as fingerprinting (Tsutsui & Shin 2008).

Japanese nationality is still a requirement for the right to vote in national elections and most prefectoral and municipal assemblies. The issue is of importance to Mindan which has been campaigning for this right since 1992. A bill allowing foreigners this right has been stalled in the Japanese parliament since 2000 with no immediate resolution in sight. Nationality in public service positions also remains a contentious issue for some resident Koreans. The recent (2005) decision by the Supreme Court against the right for a resident Korean nurse to sit a promotion exam made clear the Japanese government’s position on senior civil service positions being only open to nationals (McNeil 2005).

SEE ALSO: Decolonization and social movements; Multiculturalism and social movements; Rights and rights movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Kwang-ju uprising (Korea)

SUN-CHUL KIM

Also known as the 5.18 Kwang-ju people’s struggle (Kwang-ju minjung hangjaeng), the Kwang-ju massacre, or officially as the 5.18 Kwang-ju democratization movement (5.18 Kwang-ju minjuhwa undong), the Kwang-ju uprising refers to the Kwang-ju citizens’ ten-day resistance to the newly emerging military leadership of South Korea from May 18 to 27, 1980. The uprising was first triggered by the military’s brutal repression of what might have been an ordinary demonstration, and evolved into an armed resistance and a brief period of self-governance analogous to the Paris Commune of 1871. In the end, the uprising was put down by special army units, producing many casualties. The Kwang-ju uprising served as a turning point in the pro-democracy movement and left a deep imprint on South Korean politics and society. With the establishment of electoral democracy in 1987, the uprising gained official recognition as a democratization movement and is commemorated every year.

The Kwang-ju uprising grew out of a series of unprecedented events. After the sudden assassination of the authoritarian leader Park Chung Hee (1961–1979) in October 1979, the political climate in South Korea swung toward liberalization. By the spring of 1980, political bans were lifted and politicians started debating the blueprint for democracy. Hopes were high. However, the head of the Army Security Command, Chun Doo Hwan, had different ideas. Taking advantage of the power vacuum that Park’s death had created and of his position as the officer in charge of the investigation of Park’s assassination, he emerged as the de facto ruler of the nation by taking control of the military and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency through an intra-military coup. Gradually, Chun’s political ambition became apparent to the public and mass demonstrations started to erupt all over the country demanding the lifting of martial law and a firm commitment toward democracy.

It was in this context that, on May 17, Chun Doo Hwan effectively suspended all talks of democracy by arresting key political leaders and extending martial law to cover the entire territory. While the student movement leadership in Seoul had made a tactical decision to retreat from the streets, fearing military clampdown, their counterparts in Kwang-ju were committed to continuing their struggle. Upon hearing the news of the May 17 decree, on May 18, students in Kwang-ju gathered in front of Cheonnam University, only to be greeted by fully armed special airborne troops. Merciless repression ensued. News of the first killing brought citizens to the city’s main boulevard, but this only signaled the beginning. Innocent citizens, including children, women, and the elderly, became victims of indiscriminate killing in the following days.

In response to the military’s menacing violence, Kwang-ju citizens supplied arms from local police stations. Armed citizens called themselves the citizens’ army, and swiftly engaged in battle with the military troops. As casualties increased, late on May 21, the military vacated Kwang-ju and cut off all transportation and communication lines, effectively isolating the city from the rest of the nation. For the next five days, Kwang-ju became a liberated zone where the citizens governed themselves autonomously and peacefully. Citizens from diverse backgrounds voluntarily participated in maintaining peace, order, and the livelihood of its people. Self-governing committees were set up to work from the bottom up, food and other necessities were rationed out of whatever resources available, and the provincial office building became a focal point of citizen assembly on a daily basis. Peace was short lived, however. On May 27 the
military sent in 20,000 paratroopers, headed by tanks, and reoccupied the provincial office and the city. In the course of the reoccupation, several hundred died, with more missing and injured. A congressional investigation in 1988 officially announced the death toll at 191, although the real number has been a subject of dispute among South Koreans.

Subsequently, the ruthless state violence became a huge liability for the authoritarian ruler while the heroic resistance of the Kwangju citizens provided an inspiration for the pro-democracy movement. Like the Soweto uprising, which helped rejuvenate the anti-apartheid movement under the leadership of the ANC in South Africa, and the Gdansk strike, which gave birth to the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland, the Kwangju uprising was a transformative event that contributed to the rise of new cycles of protest at unforeseen levels. Most importantly, the city-wide participation of Kwangju citizens, the sense of community they had created, and their determination for democracy paved a new way for the South Korean pro-democracy movement, as activists, mostly intellectuals, reformulated their strategy from an intelligentsia-led movement to organizing the masses as the movement’s main pillar. In the course of this, thousands of student activists gave up their privileged status and penetrated the life spheres of ordinary workers, farmers, and the urban poor. These efforts bore fruit in 1987 when a series of nationwide demonstrations finally forced the authoritarian Chun government to concede democratic reforms, including direct election and the expansion of civil rights.

Research on the Kwangju uprising has expanded to encompass various aspects of the event, and significant contributions have been made concerning the contentious dynamics that developed in its aftermath. These include studies on the struggle over the meaning of Kwangju and the various dilemmas that arose with democratization, or institutionalization of the pro-democracy movement. Nonetheless, investigation of this topic is still in an incipient stage and it holds great potential for future research employing comparative perspectives and innovative methods.

SEE ALSO: Antiapartheid movement (South Africa); Pro-democracy of 1987 (Korea); Repression and social movements; Resistance; Solidarity (Poland).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Labor movement in Latin America
JOEL STILLERMAN

During the twentieth century, the labor movement profoundly affected the politics and societies of Latin America, the region including Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. The labor movement is here defined as workers’ organizations with the capacity and willingness to engage in collective action. While labor protest dates back to slave brotherhoods and artisan associations formed after Spain and Portugal’s fifteenth-century colonization of the region, this entry focuses on the twentieth century, when trade unions were formed in many countries. Scholarship on the labor movement goes back at least to the 1920s, though it developed in earnest after World War II. Scholarly frameworks adopted in the study of the labor movement include modernization theory (Germani 1965), Marxism and dependency theory (Spalding 1977), social and cultural history (Levenson-Estrada 1994), comparative politics (Collier and Collier 1991; Murillo 2001; Burgess 2004), and social movements theory (Kay 2005; Almeida 2008).

HISTORICAL PATTERNS

During the twentieth century, labor politics and mobilization transformed in tandem with broad-scale economic and social change. From 1900 to 1930, when union activity was illegal in most countries and economies were based on mineral and agricultural exports, mutual aid societies and local anarchist- and socialist-led organizations staged sporadic strikes and protests. From the 1920s to the 1940s, in larger and more economically developed countries, conservative elites legalized collective bargaining and other labor rights to neutralize threatening mobilizations sparked by workers’ political exclusion, the Russian Revolution, and World War I.

With export decline during the Great Depression, many governments fostered a domestic industrial base and broadened public employment. Urban labor movements allied with dominant political parties or middle-class government reformers in support of improved wages, working conditions, and benefits. This period witnessed significant expansion and rising mobilization among workers’ organizations (Collier & Collier 1991).

As the “easy phase” of import-substitution industrialization ended after the Korean War, governments faced difficulties developing capital- and technology-intensive industries and economies faltered into inflationary spirals. During the 1960s and 1970s, domestic elites and middle classes rejected a highly mobilized working class, and supported military coups. The US military had trained these officials, promoting the cold war-based national security doctrine. Latin American militaries also feared that the ideas inspiring the 1959 Cuban revolution might spread throughout the region (Drake 1996).

Militaries took power in Argentina (1976), Brazil (1964), Uruguay (1973), and Chile (1973), and waged brutal counterinsurgency wars from the 1960s to the 1990s in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Colombia. Unions allied to leftist or populist parties were among these regimes’ principal targets. Furthermore, throughout the region, the aftereffects of the 1970s oil price hikes and governments’ accumulation of foreign debt led to debt crises throughout the region during the 1980s. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, most governments reduced government spending, weakened union protections and benefits, and opened national economies to imports and investment. The results were catastrophic for unions and their political allies as employment in the traditional strongholds
of manufacturing, mining, and the public sector declined; unions became more difficult to organize and sustain; unions’ traditional party allies were chastened; and employment became more precarious throughout these economies. Nonetheless, during the 1980s and 1990s, unions capitalized on regime openings to stage or coordinate pro-democracy protests that helped topple authoritarian regimes (Drake 1996; Roberts 1998; Almeida 2008).

NATIONAL VARIATIONS

This broad picture belies important national variations. Collier and Collier (1991) argue that the mode through which political elites incorporated unions into the polity in the early twentieth century fundamentally shaped modern labor movements, party systems, and political trajectories. They argue that elites incorporated unions into the polity through labor laws (Brazil and Chile), traditional parties (Colombia, Uruguay), labor populist parties (Argentina, Peru), and radical populist parties that included agricultural workers (Mexico, Venezuela). Populist parties represented members of multiple social classes but had a strong union base and espoused a nationalist, anti-oligarchic ideology.

Each path of incorporation had a distinct political outcome. State incorporation and repression of labor parties led to political polarization, ultimately producing a broad coalition supporting military coups against labor and the left. Traditional party incorporation permitted pacts between parties, though the state militarized in opposition to labor unrest. These conflicts did not disrupt the party system. Labor populism fueled the power of populist parties, producing a stalemate between these parties and other political actors. These conflicts resulted in coups designed to prevent populist electoral success. Finally, the decision by radical populist leaders to create a broad coalition including rural workers and to move toward the political center allowed these regimes to build legitimacy and survive without military intervention.

In Brazil, however, the story did not end with the military’s rise in 1964. First, the Brazilian military, unlike most other governments of the region, chose to develop capacity in heavy industry through state sponsorship and foreign debt. As a consequence of this “second industrialization,” independent unions with Catholic Church support carried out enormous strikes that split business leaders from the regime (Seidman 1994). They also formed a new political party (the Workers’ Party), and eventually elected one of their own to the presidency, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

In the current period in which free market democracies dominate most countries of the region, union responses to neoliberalism have varied. Mexican unions, under pressure from the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party and insulated from workers’ democratic demands largely supported neoliberal policies. Venezuelan union leaders felt pressure from the Democratic Alliance party to which they are allied, and their constituents, and hence supported the government at some points and protested free market reforms at others (Burgess 2004). In Argentina, a united union movement allied with the president initially mobilized and then used their alliance to negotiate the terms of neoliberal reforms (Murillo 2001). Elsewhere, union protests against neoliberal policies have been largely ineffective (Drake 1996). Organizations representing women, victims of human rights violations, ethnically and racially subordinate groups, students, or the unemployed have displaced unions as the principal protagonists of protest (Roberts 1998; Almeida 2008).

In Central American countries, unions faced a much more repressive context than elsewhere and had few bases for organization due to the late development of industry. However, in El Salvador between 1925 and 2005, periods of modest regime liberalization allowed labor and other civic organizations to develop and engage in nonviolent protest; while the repressive periods that followed provoked more radical, violent labor and popular activism (Almeida 2008). In Guatemala, Coca-Cola
bottling workers built on skills, networks, and frames developed through preceding organization by Catholic Church volunteers and US anti-communist unions as well as transnational activists to stage a successful unionization drive in the 1980s in spite of severe repression (Levenson-Estrada 1994). Rural workers expressed initial loyalty to the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza García, but shifted to the left after the mechanization of agriculture to join the broad-based Sandinista revolutionary movement that toppled the Somoza dynasty in 1979 (Gould 1990).

With few opportunities to oppose neoliberal policies at the national scale, activists in Mexico and Central America have built transnational alliances to demand rights from national and international authorities. The growth of these activist networks and strategies has different sources. In Mexico and Central America, the creation of free-trade zones for product assembly with US support has inspired the solidarity of US and European consumer movements, building on the legacies of human rights activism in Central America. Additionally, the North American Free Trade Agreement, passed in 1994, includes a labor-side accord, providing labor groups an incentive to develop cross-border ties. While the agreement itself offers unions little ground for enforcement of national labor laws, it has provided a forum and encouraged the creation of networks that have facilitated the use of legal and media tactics to gain influence over recalcitrant employers. Canadian unions promoted the creation of locally based nongovernmental organizations in Mexico, while US unions trained college students in union organizing, sparking the creation of United Students Against Sweatshops, a university-based organization that has battled global brands like Nike and Reebok in support of specific union campaigns in Latin America and elsewhere, and has pushed universities to develop codes of conduct prohibiting the purchase of athletic uniforms made by workers who do not enjoy internationally recognized rights to organize, assemble, bargain, and work in safe settings (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Kay 2005).

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future scholarship might consider the possibilities for union or other forms of collective organization in the growing sectors of Latin American economies – retail, education, healthcare, and other private services; traditional areas of informal employment such as street vending – and among the unemployed. Further quantitative historical studies of protest events might point to long-term shifts in the forms and intensity of collective action (Almeida 2008). Scholars might also continue an existing focus on women’s role in organized labor and/or women’s organizations based in residential communities (French & James 1997). Additionally, researchers could further develop the incipient discussion of racial and ethnic divisions and their implications for class-based collective action (Chomsky 1995). Finally, work on transnational activism might consider the possibilities of and dynamics shaping international alliances within Latin America rather than ties with organizations in the US or Europe.

SEE ALSO: Advocacy networks; Anarchism; Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Comparative research; Repression and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Labor protest in the European Union
LOUISA PARKS

The phenomenon of labor protest targeting the European Union remains relatively rare, yet the institutions of organized labor at the EU level (introduced below) have provided the infrastructure that protest requires – networks for communication (Gorges 1996: 310; Turner 1996: 327; on European Works Councils (EWCs), Erne 2008: 35). These in turn have helped overcome other obstacles to transnational protest (Gajewska 2008: 117; Parks 2009: 263). Imig and Tarrow, working with data from 1984 to 1997, note some increase in protest against the EU, and that 82.1 percent of these protests were by occupational groups (2001: 39), a trend that seems to be continuing.

The 1997 “Vilvoorde” protests against the closure of a Renault plant in Belgium were deemed a watershed (Erne 2008: 34), including a 100,000 strong march in Brussels (see Imig & Tarrow 2002), and General Motors workers participated in several transnational strikes between 2000 and 2007. Other examples of EU labor protests include the 2000 protests over the ABB Alstom Power (power generation plants) dismissal plan (see Erne 2008), and protests by dockers over the liberalization of port services in 2003 (for a detailed account see Turnbull 2006) and 2006. Protests organized through the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (see below) have also become more common since the latter has begun to distance itself from a more right-wing Commission (Erne 2008: 38; Parks 2009: 198–199). In 2000 the ETUC organized a 70,000-strong protest in Nice calling for the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the treaty. Indeed, the ETUC organizes regular demonstrations at European Councils. The ETUC was also a major player in the protests against the “Bolkestein” directive on services in the internal market in 2006 (see Gajewska 2008: 110–111; for a detailed account, Parks 2009: ch. 6). A new “social movement unionism” has also been noted with the participation of national trade unions in the European social forums. The most important expression of this was in the European marches against unemployment (Taylor & Mathers 2002).

A brief introduction to the largest institutions of organised EU labor is useful in approaching this subject, since low levels of protest are broadly due to the fact that the latter came about “in the absence of mass popular demand of protest” (Turner 1996). The most prominent of these is the ETUC, the peak trade union organization and a federation of national trade unions. Founded in 1973, the ETUC became an official legislative player in the social dialogue in 1991 (for a summary of the ETUC’s history, see Gorges 1996; Martin & Ross 2001). Divisions between member unions have often hindered the ETUC’s work (Gorges 1996: 77). Its semi-institutional role and distance from rank-and-file members helps explain the low levels of labor protest in the EU (Martin & Ross 2001; Gajewska 2008: 105). Taylor and Mathers argue that the ETUC’s “commitment to European integration has made it difficult for it to oppose its specific trajectory” (2002: 97). Other barriers to EU protest contribute – the EU has been found to discourage protest by actively encouraging dialogue with third actors (Marks & McAdam 1999). In addition, transnational protests are complicated by problems of distance, a lack of face-to-face communication and therefore trust and collective identity, and resources. Finally, national trade unions remain rooted in national arenas and problems (Turnbull 2006), and may seek to protect their advantages even to the detriment of workers in other member states (Gajewska 2008: 108–109). EWCs
are another important institution of organized labor at the EU level. Created in 1994, they provide workers with information and consultation rights on management decisions at the EU level. However, these bodies were also dismissed as facilitators of protest (see Erne 2008: 34). EWCs are often used as tools by company managers, who provide information designed to encourage the nationalist tendencies of unions and to provoke bases in different European countries to work against one another (Taylor & Mathers 2002: 99).

To conclude, the case for labor protest in the European Union must not be overstated – the phenomenon remains rare, and the main tools for influencing the EU remain conventional and institutional (e.g., Erne 2008: 36).

SEE ALSO: Demonstrations; Labor movement; Strikes within the European context; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Land movements in Africa

WILLIAM DERMAN

Land has become a major issue in Africa. However, the enduring importance of land has, for the most part, not been matched by social movements organized around land issues. Despite the vast dispossession that occurred due to colonial conquest, especially in the establishment of plantations in Central Africa and colonial seizure of land in eastern and southern Africa, anticolonial movements were based far more on the themes of independence and dignity in urban and union-based political parties. As noted by Bernstein there is little experience in modern African history of popular rural political organization centered on land and agrarian issues (Bernstein 2005: 88). This situation is distinct from that in parts of Latin America and Asia. This was less true of the later liberation movements struggling to end Portuguese, Rhodesian, and white South African domination where land was central to rural protests. As has been demonstrated by Isaacman, rural protests in Africa were an important part of political struggles but peasants engaged in subterranean protests, not social movements (Isaacman 1993: 263).

Having noted the more general point of rural protests, what have been land-based social movements? There was and is a diversity of social movements based on land in sub-Saharan Africa. These can be roughly divided between those in opposition to colonial rule or racial domination, and those in independent countries based on ethnic, class, or generational conflicts. More recent are new movements forming to oppose large-scale land acquisitions or landgrabbing and those based upon women’s land rights. The early movements were linked to struggles for national independence, with land having a varied importance in terms of the return of land from the colonizers as a core of a social movement, or land as one factor among many. The best known of these earlier movements is the Mau Mau (also, more appropriately, termed the Land Freedom Army). Without doubt the forcible expropriation of land from the Kikuyu was central to the independence movement. Transforming landowners and farmers into squatters was at the core of grievances and the restoration of land a key demand. The narrowness of the LFA among the Kikuyu and its allies led to their isolation after the negotiated independence, which saw land demands marginalized and the Kenyatta (and then other families) becoming the major landowners in Kenya.

For the two early self-declared revolutions in West Africa, that of Ghana and Guinea (Conakry), land was not a basis of organizing opposition to colonial rule. This was surprising for Guinea, since there was such a large population of serfs and slaves whose struggles for access to land were ignored by the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Derman 1973). Next to Guinea, Guinea-Bissau saw a long armed struggle for independence from the Portuguese. Amilcar Cabral, its leader, formulated a strategy based upon the peasantry linked to a small working class.

This conflict over land and political representation foreshadowed the guerrilla wars in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia (Southwest Africa), Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and South Africa. These have not been the only land struggles. The ongoing conflict in Darfur, the outbreaks of violence in Nubia, efforts to control pastoralist land in east and western Africa can partially be examined through a land lens. Hunters’ associations in Burkina Faso are organized to prevent Fulbe expansion in some rural areas (Hagberg 2007). And the new Kenyan constitution will permit long-standing communities to regain their land rights. What new movements will emerge around land remain to be seen. The linkages between colonial rule, political
opposition, race, and land have been well
documented, contemporary land movements
less so. The nature of land movements in
opposition to “landgrabbing” is just emerging.
In general terms, Africa, which had been
viewed as a land-abundant continent (with
some exceptions like Rwanda, Burundi, and
parts of Nigeria), is moving toward land
scarcity. This has introduced new dynamics
in rural areas, since the World Bank and
other organizations have been pushing for the
formalization of land rights while national
governments seek to maintain governmental
land ownership. From a gender perspective,
lineage systems have tended to become more
patriarchal as competition over shrinking land
and other resources has intensified.

The major contemporary debates revolve
around responses of rural peoples to the linked
processes of globalization, structural adjust-
ment programs, population increases, com-
modification of land, violent conflicts and
civil wars, inequalities in land ownership, and
women’s rights to land. Gender has now been
added to debates about the most desirable
forms of land tenure. Partially commercial-
ized agricultural production, the privatization
of land, land scarcity, urbanization, increased
commercialization, and the expansion of non-
agricultural incomes have lessened dependency
on kin-based land systems. This leads to con-
flicts over who has access and ownership rights.
Moreover, emerging social movements address
the causes of resource loss including forests,
water, land, and minerals. These movements
are likely to increase with the sale or leasing of
farming land to private or foreign government-
sponsored acquisition. This has also led to
new international efforts to protect land. The
most notable group is the International Land
Coalition, which is a global alliance of civil
society and intergovernmental organizations
to promote and secure equitable access to and
control over land for poor women and men
through advocacy, dialogue, knowledge shar-
ing, and capacity building. Through the web
they indeed organize globally (International
Land Coalition 2012).

There is another, longer, historical tradition
of social movements which seeks to know if
peasant movements can be revolutionary or
not. In the African contexts, one can ask how
and in what ways did social movements around
land contribute to anticolonial struggles, and
how and if they contributed to revolutionary
movements which aimed not just at over-
throwing the political rulers but sought eco-
nomic transformation. Independence move-
ments which relied on rural populations, often
glossed as peasants utilizing Mao’s classifica-
tion (Mao Zedong 1965) included the Partido
Africano da Independência da Guiné Cabo
Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau and Frente
de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in
Mozambique (Cabral 1969; Davidson 1981;
Mondlane 1983). A partial reworking of this
analysis forms the basis of Moyo and Yeros’
book (2005) on rural movements, which seeks
to link theories of resurgence of rural move-
ments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The
African examples they cite are Ghana, Malawi,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The only two
land movements that are actually discussed
in relation to the more general issues around
land alienation are the Zimbabwe National
War Veterans Liberation Committee and the
Landless People’s Movement in South Africa.

In the name of independence and revolution,
Zimbabwe and South Africa have chosen to
respond to the demand for land in very different
ways. In Zimbabwe the contrast in perspectives
couldn’t be greater. Moyo and Yeros argue that
the most important land reform since the end
of the cold war has taken place. They contend
that the social base for land occupations was
that of the rural semi-proletariat across gen-
der and ethnonational cleavages (2005: 189).
This “movement” was organized and led by
the war veterans’ association. The outcome has
been the removal of most white farm owners
from their farms, and the loss of employment,
homes, and schools for large numbers of farm-
workers, variously estimated between 150 000
and 300 000. Moyo and Yeros conclude that
the farmworkers were caught between sup-
porting landowners who were defending their
jobs or joining in with the land occupations in the hope that they would gain access to land. Debate around what happened to the farmworkers is essential in understanding the dynamics of how land was taken from white farmers and if the war veterans’ organization can be understood as a social movement or as an important vehicle for the implementation of the ruling party’s political program. Zimbabwean political scientist Sachikonye (2011) views the farm occupations as part of a strategy of coercive accumulation. In my view, the land expropriations were based on rewards to political followers, prevention of farmworkers and owners from voting in the 2000 parliamentary elections, greed, and corruption. Following the expropriation of farmland, Zimbabwe’s economy continued its fall and there was no ongoing national social movement to sustain land reform. Government imposed its two-tier program: A1, villagized, small-scale farms, and A2, or commercial farms combined with an unknown number of farms given intact to members of cabinet, the military, Supreme Court judges, and other powerful individuals with no accountability to maintain farm infrastructure or production. Debating the strengths and weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s land reform has intensified with the study by Scoones and colleagues (2010). While detailing successes by A1 farmers in the Masvingo Province, they ignore the violence, the dispossession, and the overall economic decline of Zimbabwe and do not provide evidence for a coherent land-based social movement.

Despite South Africa’s profoundly unequal division of land between whites and blacks, the absence of land-based social movements has been striking. This has not been for the lack of effort. Sihlongonyane (2005) describes and analyzes the efforts begun by the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) and the National Land Committee (NLC). In a series of efforts, the NLC and other land-focused organizations produced a Rural People’s Charter and Rural Development Policy Framework and Implementation Plan (RDI). These were to lay the groundwork for growing a social movement. Meeting in Bloemfontein in 1999, approximately 600 rural communities adopted it. However, the unexpected rise of the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), which sought to discredit the NLC and other land NGOs, and to push hard for land occupations, led to the unraveling of the national movement. According to Greenberg (2004), “the artificial, top-down character of the RDI, resting as it did on passive communities led by professional NGOs, led to its immediate collapse once funding for the big gathering in Bloemfontein was finished.” The creation of the LPM was founded on the basis that the land NGOs and the NLC were too close to government, too professional, too technocratic and, by implication, too white. In attempting to create a new oppositional movement to government and to the NLC, the LPM was unable to garner the support, resources, and broad leadership to be effective. In South Africa, the most dynamic responses to evictions come from urban activists, not from rural ones. Abahlali BaseMjondolo, Shack Dwellers, also known as AbM or the red shirts, is a new shack dwellers’ movement known for its campaigning for public housing. It is in alliance with the LPM in the Poor People’s Alliance. The Poor People’s Alliance refuses electoral politics under the banner No Land! No House! No Vote! Social movements around landlessness will be far more urban or periurban than rural in South Africa. For example, the case of Bokfontein blends farmland and urban and rural expansion. The residents of this community were evicted from nearby farms in Hartbeesfontein Dam in Northwest Province in 2005 to make room for commercial “development.” They were moved on to a farm known as Bokfontein. After only four years, the landowner wanted to sell the land to build expensive homes from which he would make millions. He said he would buy the community land nearby and the people were moved, forcibly, onto this new land which had no roads, toilets, or access to water. In August 2006 a neighboring community was forcibly removed by the municipality (local authorities) because its land was earmarked for low-cost housing. They were moved
in next to the first community in Bokfontein. The two communities became hostile to each other, creating no-go areas, but activists brought them together to force government authorities to provide services and jobs. Most of the services like education, electricity, water supply, and housing have been absent. This particular community used lobbying rather than violence to get their service delivery needs met.

Another set of land social movements have been established by women (Tripp 2004). These movements tend to be around issues of landownership, access, and inheritance. They do not occupy the land as a social movement tactic, but use a combination of tactics including lobbying, court cases, and demonstrations. They make their case for equality based upon three related grounds. First, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which most African nations have signed, which contains provisions which require states parties to modify social and cultural patterns which contain direct or indirect discrimination against women and to eliminate practices based on stereotyped roles for the sexes. Second, it is argued that the lack of landownership by women slows down development and contributes to poverty. Women would invest and improve agricultural practices more if they had security of tenure. Lastly, women should have the right to co-own land with their husbands as compensation for their labor in the fields, home, and caring for household members.

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Anticolonial movements; Guerrilla movements; Landless Workers Movement (MST) (Brazil); Mau Mau revolt (Africa); Peasant movements; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


land movements in africa


The Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra, or MST), for many years the largest and most active social movement in Brazil, organizes unemployed and landless farmworkers to take over idle, absentee-owned farmland. It challenges landowners and authorities and agitates for a broad agrarian reform. It grew out of land occupations beginning in 1978 in Brazil’s southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, led by activists from the Catholic Church’s Christian base communities and some Protestant churches under the inspiration of liberation theology. The movement was formally founded in 1984 near the end of a 21-year military dictatorship. It acts nationwide in a huge country with a great variety of local social, economic, and agricultural conditions, so its practice varies from place to place. Typically, however, the movement’s collective action can be described in three phases: occupation, camp, and settlement.

**Occupation.** Brazilian law provides that agricultural land that is not being farmed productively can be expropriated and redistributed to those who will farm it. Brazil’s vast size, unequal land distribution, rural poverty, and oligarchic domination assure that there is ample idle land and a large number of poor rural people seeking to work it. But the state does not typically initiate expropriation of eligible farmland. Instead, it only responds to direct action.

Though there are several competing occupation movements, the MST is by far the largest. It targets a property that appears to meet the criteria for expropriation, either because it is not being farmed productively or because the owner’s title is fraudulent; it also occupies public land. The movement recruits occupiers from among the rural (and sometimes the urban) poor. Several hundred families enter the targeted property at night and set up makeshift housing. They then seek to get the property expropriated. Joining a land occupation entails a high commitment, as occupiers leave their entire life behind and face discomfort and repression for a payoff that is uncertain and at best distant.

The occupation of a privately owned farm sets in motion a process of conflict among several parties: the occupiers, the landowner (and possibly allies on both sides), and various governmental authorities, including police, courts, and the federal agrarian reform bureaucracy. Typically, the landowner goes to court to get the occupiers evicted. An eviction may be peaceful or violent depending on negotiations between the occupiers and the police (Hammond 2009).

**Camp.** Evicted occupiers may be resettled on a different property, either state owned or already expropriated for agrarian reform. More often they erect a camp (acampamento) of shanties or tents nearby and wait for a decision on expropriation; if the camp is on public property they are usually safe from another eviction. The rural landscape is marked with dense groups of tiny shacks covered in black plastic where land occupiers are waiting it out. Expropriation usually requires a long legal process. Living in the camp for months or even years, occupiers undergo an intense process of politicization and discipline.

**Settlement.** If they win, the payoff is high: they get the property, create a settlement (assentamento), and farm the land, usually by some combination of individual and collective production. Successful settlements provide families a very good living compared to the rural poverty from which they come. Some even diversify production and sell their farm goods to multinational corporations to be marketed under nationwide brand names.
Weaker settlements struggle to survive or are abandoned. The settlers create not only a farm enterprise but a community. They build houses, supported by government credit. The movement establishes schools in its camps and settlements. The MST gives high priority to educating the settlers—who are generally poorly educated and often illiterate—and their children. The settlements provide work for men and women, and contribute to the movement’s national mobilizations. Though occupations are organized locally, the MST has a national presence. From its founding it has followed a militant strategy emphasizing the extralegal tactic of occupation to force expropriation and disruptive demonstrations in towns, cities, and the capital, Brasilia, rather than relying on more moderate, institutional forms of political pressure (Hammond 1999; Fernandes 2005). In many areas of the country police and privately organized goon squads have conducted violent raids on settlements. But the MST also takes full advantage of opportunities in institutional politics, most importantly to get land expropriated and win legal title, as well as enjoying government benefits like agricultural credit. The movement promotes a maximal program: each expropriation is viewed as a step toward a general agrarian reform of all latifundios (large agricultural property usually worked by seasonal wage labor) and, in the long run, socialism (Wright & Wolford 2003: 315–330). It is the most active land reform movement in Latin America and one of the leading national organizations behind Via Campesina, the international peasant movement.

Its practices are derived from Leninist and Christian base community principles, combining democratic centralism (Harnecker 2002: 271) and grassroots assemblies. Some have claimed that the MST organization is very democratic (Veltmeyer & Petras 2002), while others argue that it is highly authoritarian (Navarro 2007). According to Branford and Rocha (2002: 121), the MST has strong national leaders but the bases have a voice and relative autonomy.

That a rural movement in today’s Brazil can maintain a high level of mobilization and be (relatively) successful at winning land must be counted as surprising. The country is heavily urban, with a capital-intensive and highly productive agricultural sector that drives poor peasants off the land; though redemocratization spawned a vigorous wave of popular mobilization after years of repression, moreover, the cycle of protest soon peaked for urban movements, many of which—notably the women’s and community health movements—were co-opted into nongovernmental organizations implementing government policies. The MST, on the other hand, has maintained an independent, militant posture. Nor has it become too closely identified with the institutional left; though it supports Workers Party (PT) candidates and sometimes runs its own candidates on the PT ticket (and occasionally other parties’ tickets) for local office and parliament, it was highly critical of President Lula for reneging on the Workers Party’s historical commitment to agrarian reform and favoring large-scale agribusiness instead.

The fact that the MST stays mobilized despite fluctuations in governmental response can be attributed in part to its offering participants a chance at a valuable selective incentive in successful land occupations (Ondetti 2008: 226–227), and in part to the fact that the settlements have become vibrant communities that provide a base for ongoing politicization and mobilization of participants. The MST cultivates identification and commitment through political education and solidarity rituals such as artistic performances.

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Direct action; Grassroots movements; Peasant movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Vladymir Ilyich Ylianov (Lenin), the Russian revolutionary, is generally regarded as the founder of the Bolshevik social movement and the creator of the USSR. He realized Marx and Engels’ dream of a socialist revolution that would bring down capitalism and replace it with socialism – a society based, ideally, on the dictatorship of the proletariat, public property, and a centrally planned economy, with greater equality and social justice for working-class people. Despite the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent collapse of Soviet socialism in the 1990s, many Russians, especially those of 55 years and older, and those aged 18–21, view Lenin’s role in Russian history more positively (Ktdflf - wtynh 2011). Lenin’s cremated body remains in his mausoleum on Red Square, and Russian society is divided over its removal and burial according to the Christian Orthodox tradition.

Lenin was born on April 22, 1870 in Symbirsk (in the Soviet period renamed Ylianovsk), the provincial capital on the Volga River, into a family of the Russian educational intelligentsia. Upon graduation from his gymnasium with honors, he matriculated in the faculty of jurisprudence at Kazan University. His family came into the public eye after the execution of his older brother, Alexander, for participation in the attempted murder plot of Czar Alexander III by a small group of terrorist-revolutionaries. In response to his brother's execution, Lenin shouted the famous phrase, “We'll follow a different path!” He participated in student protests against samoderzhavia (Russian absolutism), for which he was arrested, expelled from university, and exiled. In exile, he became interested in Marx and Engels' revolutionary ideas. Marxism led him to pursue a “different path,” one based on an organized working-class social movement headed by its vanguard, the Communist Party. In 1895, Lenin became a founding member of the Union of the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1903, at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Working Class Party, Lenin became a leader of the Bolshevik faction, which seized power in the 1917 revolution. After the 1917 revolution, Lenin headed the Soviet government. In 1918, he survived an assassination. Under his leadership, Soviet Russia emerged victorious in World War I and the civil war of 1918–1924. In 1921, he orchestrated a politico-economic paradigm shift from war communism to the new economic policy (NEP), which quickly restored the Russian economy. Lenin’s death on January 21, 1924 prevented him from overseeing the overwhelming success of NEP and resulted in its disruption by Stalinism (Volkogonov 1994).

Lenin became the most prominent Marxist and, according to Soviet officialdom, transformed Marxism into Marxism-Leninism. His portrait appeared next to Marx and Engels on communist red banners worldwide and at congresses of the Third International. The Leninist part of Marxism-Leninism was compiled during the Soviet era in over 50 volumes of his philosophical, political, economic, and sociological essays, monographs, articles, notes, and letters. Lenin’s major works include: The Development of Capitalism in Russia; What Is to be Done; One Step Forward and Two Steps Back; Who are the Friends of the People and How They Fight against Social Democrats; Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism; The State and Revolution; The Vital Tasks of the Soviet Power; Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder; Materialism and Empiriocriticism; and Philosophical Notebooks. As Molotov, one of Lenin and Stalin’s interpreters, put it, “In every work by Lenin there is undermining of imperialism” (Ilyen 1991: 5).
Lenin’s contribution to social movement history and studies is manifold. The hard core of his sociopolitical doctrine constitutes class analysis and the construction of a class-based social movement of industrial workers. In his writings, especially in A Great Beginning: How to Organize Competition?, classes combine distinct economic, social, legal, and political features (Lenin 1978a). As economic phenomena, classes are determined by their relations to the forces of production, more specifically whether they own means of production and constitute the haves, the bourgeoisie-capitalists-exploiters, or own the labor power that throws them into the category of the have-nots, that is, laborers-proletarians-exploited. From a sociological point of view, classes are determined by their position in the social division of labor, which is distinct from technical–technological division into professional strata. The modern industrial society is divided into two major social classes of capitalists-employers and proletarians-employees, with capitalists appropriating and exploiting the labor of the proletarians. From a legal standpoint, Lenin argues, classes have a different “presence” in the construction of legal rights. In the bourgeoisie legal code, as Marx unveiled, the owners of the means of production appropriate surplus value produced by laborers-proletarians due to a legal trick, designed by capitalist-bought lawyers and legislated by capitalist-sponsored elected officials. The trick is concluded in the fictitious metamorphosis of “surplus value” – which is produced, as Marx discovered in Capital, by proletarians – into the so-called profit from private business activities managed and, therefore, owned by capitalists. This trick covers the secret of capitalist accumulation, exploitation, and injustice. Consequently, the first task of the communist vanguard is to unveil, through education, this bourgeois trick to the working people. The second task is to facilitate and lead the class struggle of proletarians that culminates in the socialist revolution. The socialist revolution not only establishes worker control over means of production (factories, plants, financial institutions) and provides universal employment, but also gives back, in the name of social justice and democracy, the surplus value to its producers, working people, in the form of real wages and pensions, on the one side, and free-of-charge housing, socialized healthcare, and public education, on the other. From a political standpoint, classes participate differently in the political process with capitalists included in, and proletarians excluded from, political organization and the policymaking process. In sum, classes appear in Lenin’s works as the distinct sum total of economic, social, legal, and political relations (Маркс, Ленин 1984).

Lenin’s famous motto, “Give us the organization of revolutionaries and we will turn around Russia,” outlines what is to be done to make the socialist revolution (Lenin 1969a). Lenin’s organizational theory revolves around two paradigmatic ideas: distinct membership structure and democratic centralism. At the Second Party Congress of 1903, which approved the Communist Party’s charter and program, Lenin argued that party members must formally join and register with one of the primary party organizations, follow the Party’s program and statute, participate in the activities of primary organizations, and be bound by party discipline. Lenin’s opponents viewed his membership concept as too strict and suggested a milder concept of membership based on support of, and participation in, the Party’s activities, but without formal registration with primary organizations and bondage to the Party’s program, statute, and discipline. Eventually, Lenin’s membership concept prevailed and scored the majority of votes, turning Lenin and his supporters into Bolsheviks, and his opponents, the supporters of the milder definition of membership, into the minority called the Mensheviks. Also, Lenin advanced the concept of democratic centralism, which meant: (1) collective decision making, (2) election of all party organs and officials from the bottom to the top, and (3) subordination of the lower party organizations to the higher elected organs. Both concepts of strict membership
and democratic centralism required full devotion and subordination of the individual to the party’s collective identity in the name of solidarity and efficiency of collective actions (Lenin 1980). Lenin’s opponents discovered in his organizational doctrine the totalitarian nature of Bolshevism and the Soviet state, while his supporters consider Lenin’s organizational theory as an efficient vehicle of building up a vanguard of the working-class movement capable to withstand and overcome the oppressions of the highly centralized capitalist state machine, with its secret police and military, its overarching surveillance, and oppressive legal code.

The concluding part of Lenin’s sociopolitical doctrine is made up of the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the working-class movement and their adjustment to the dynamic capitalist socioeconomic settings defined in terms of the political opportunity structure for socialist revolution. It is composed of theories of imperialism, revolutionary situation, and socialist revolution, and of class struggle paradigm shifts. Imperialism, according to Lenin, represents the highest and the last stage of capitalism, realized in its self-destructing tendency toward political and economic monopolies, volatility of financial markets, economic crises, and wars for the redistribution of sources of exploitation and surplus value (Lenin 1978b). The wars, like World War I, become an inevitable feature of capitalism, which exhaust its economic, financial, and human resources and bring it to the verge of collapse and the emergence of a revolutionary situation – the necessary precondition for the socialist revolution. The revolutionary situation, as Lenin states in the Collapse of the Second International, becomes evident in: (1) deep and overarching economic crises, depression, and recessions; (2) the people’s impoverishment; (3) the ruling capitalist clique’s inability to govern; and (4) the unwillingness of the lower classes – workers, peasantry, and soldiers – to live in the old way (Lenin 1969b). The revolutionary situation happens rarely and “ordains” the working class and its vanguard with a unique, once in a lifetime, opportunity for state power seizure. The Party must be fully prepared for that historic moment and act in unison and decisively. To be “fully prepared” meant, for Lenin, (1) to make an ideological and political paradigm shift from parliamentary work, demonstration, and street protests to the military power seizure; (2) to develop the party’s strongholds in the military and have militant mobile squads, like the Red Guard, in working-class communities to be deployed for the seizure of strategic infrastructures; and (3) to mobilize all primary party organizations for the quick takeover of the state machine, especially the executive branch, military command centers, police, and financial institutions. Upon power seizure, Lenin vowed to establish the dictatorship of proletariat and its vanguard party in place of the collapsed or dismantled old political institutions, accompanied by concrete measures meeting the vital demands of the lower classes (Lenin 1975). In the 1917 revolution, those measures included immediate distribution of land to peasants, establishment of workers’ control over industry and an eight-hour working day, a peace treaty with Germany, and promotion of social equality and justice – all implemented in the first decrees of Soviet power (Wade & Cummins 1991). These decrees secured the support of the working class, soldiers, and poorest peasants, who became major defenders of the revolution. Lenin rapidly instituted – on the basis of the soviets, self-governing and organizing bodies, founded and elected by spontaneous workers’ revolutionary initiative – the new socialist government. Also, he built up the Red Army and established a security and law enforcement apparatus. Methods of terror and exile, as well as military defeat of the Whites (the broad resistance, including military, to the soviets during 1918–1924), brought down the opposition and created the political stability needed for economic reforms. That reform came in the form of the NEP, which promoted a mixed economy, combining elements of the centrally planned and market
economy, state and privately owned enterprises, including joint ventures with foreign capital.

In the 1990s, a growing number of Russian historians portrayed Lenin, in line with Soviet-era dissidents and human rights activists, as a murderer and organizer of a state terror against its people. Those evaluations overshadowed the words of Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and George Bernard Shaw, praising Lenin — although disagreeing with some of his methods — for his fight for social justice, for his creative mind, and his extraordinary leadership. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the successor to the collapsed CPSU and Lenin’s ideas, constitutes the second largest faction in the State Duma. KPRF is largely viewed as the only oppositional faction to the reigning pro-Kremlin United Russia Party and its mingling with the Kremlin Justice Russia Party and misnamed nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party. Lenin tends to be forgotten in times of capitalist economic expansion and remembered in times of depressions and recessions. His paradigm shifts and ideas, especially that of the NEP, helped lay the theoretical and pragmatic foundations for communist China’s contemporary triumphant economic reforms, paving the way, according to Валуев (2010), for the possible revival of Leninism in the twenty-first century, after its stunning defeat at the end of the twentieth century, which culminated in the collapse of socialism in the USSR and the USSR itself.

SEE ALSO: Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Marxism and social movements; Revolutions; Russian Revolution; Social class and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Liberation theology/base communities (South America)
 ROBERT SEAN MACKIN

Liberation theology is a radical, predominately Catholic movement of theologians, bishops, priests, nuns, and laity that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s across Latin America. Bishops, gathering in regional conferences, called for the church to abandon long-standing alliances with the rich and powerful and instead take the side of the poor and oppressed. Theologians, who wrote books and presented papers using Marxian concepts, put forward a new way of doing theology – from the perspective of the poor. It was the poor, gathering in small groups to discuss the Bible, known as base ecclesial communities (CEBs), which offered a new interpretation of scripture based on their experiences, leading to unprecedented grassroots activism. In the 1970s and 1980s CEB members were actively involved in revolutionary movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and in other parts of Latin America they played important roles in democratization movements.

The turning point for the liberation theology movement occurred at the second meeting of the Catholic Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) at Medellín, Colombia, in 1968 (Smith 1991). The objective of the meeting was to apply the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) to Latin America. Three conclusions of the conference set the agenda for the movement over the next several years. First, the Latin American church committed itself to the plight of the poor and oppressed seen in the notion of making a “preferential option for the poor.” Second, the bishops suggested the best way for the church to be in solidarity with the poor was to promote the base ecclesial communities (CEBs), which had been experimented with, first in Brazil and Panama, and later in Chile and Mexico. Third, the bishops argued – clearly inspired by dependency theory – that Latin America’s structural dependence on more developed countries resulted in “a sinful situation” whereby inhabitants of the developed countries became wealthier while the poor of Latin America struggled to survive.

One of the foundational texts of the movement, A Theology of Liberation (1973), was written by a young Peruvian priest, father Gustavo Gutiérrez, one of a number of liberationists who assisted the Latin American bishops with the composition of the key texts of Medellin. He made three key contributions. First, he outlined a new way of doing theology which emphasized “praxis,” defined as “actively living one’s faith” (McGovern 1989: 32). The concept of “praxis” has Marxian roots; however, it was also inspired by father Joseph Cardijn’s “see-judge-act” methodology, first used among the Young Catholic Workers of Belgium in the 1920s. Second, Gutiérrez emphasized liberation as a core theme of the Bible, drawing especially on the Book of Exodus which “showed God acting in history through a political action, which liberated the people from misery and oppression in Egypt, formed them as a people, and led to the construction of a new and more just society” (McGovern 1989: 10, emphasis in original). Third, he argued the church could not be neutral; this would help sustain an unjust status quo. He noted: “In our times and on our continent, to be in solidarity with the ‘poor’... means to run personal risks – even to put one’s life in danger” (Gutiérrez 1973: 301).

Liberation theology offered a radical critique of society and called the Catholic church to take a new role, one that was on the side of the poor and the oppressed. Opponents quickly mobilized a countermovement. Once elected general secretary of CELAM in 1972, Archbishop (and later Cardinal) López Trujillo...
of Colombia sought to limit the influence of liberation theology by removing progressives from key posts in CELAM (Smith 1991).

By the time of the third CELAM meeting in Puebla, Mexico, in 1979, many expected the conservatives and the newly installed pope John Paul II to distance the church from the radical conclusions of Medellín. But, in a surprising move, John Paul II endorsed CEBs in an address to the Puebla conference. Soon thereafter the bishops who gathered affirmed many of the core conclusions of Medellín, including that the church should make a “preferential option for the poor.” This, however, did not settle the status of liberation theology in the church.

In 1984 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, head of the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, issued an “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation.” While acknowledging liberation as a legitimate topic for theologians, Ratzinger criticized three aspects of what he called “certain forms” of liberation theology which, he argued: (1) reduced faith to politics; (2) uncritically adopted Marxism; and (3) attacked authority in the church. Liberationists sought to downplay the chilling effect of the “Instruction,” noting that Ratzinger did not identify any individual theologian by name and that, in general, their ideas were consistent with those outlined by Ratzinger (McGovern 1989). For one thing, Gutiérrez had clearly indicated in his early writings that liberation was a complex process and should be understood at three interdependent levels: “at a socio-political level, as the full development of human persons, and, lastly, as liberation from sin” (Gutiérrez 1973; McGovern 1989: 224).

Much of the scholarly research on liberation theology has sought to explain the variability in liberation theology’s strength. Brazil, which emerged as a leading progressive church in the 1960s, has received extensive treatment. Mainwaring (1986) argues that the repression of the church by the military government which seized power from President João Goulart in 1964 was a crucial factor explaining the radicalization of the Brazilian church. Adriance (1986) explores how activists and priests from Catholic Action and Specialized Catholic Action movements, such as the Young Catholic Workers, played pioneering roles in the progressive Catholic movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Liberation theology has influenced Christians beyond Latin America. In the US, liberation theology inspired black and feminist liberation theology as well as the Central American solidarity movement of the 1980s. Elsewhere, liberation theology’s presence can be seen among Christians in India, the Philippines, Africa, and Europe (Smith 1991). And it continues to inspire a new generation of theologians (Petrella 2005). Ironically, this third world movement has even influenced Catholic social doctrine, seen in Pope John Paul II’s analysis of “structures of sin” and the legitimacy of “struggle” for change (McGovern 1989: 224).

SEE ALSO: Central America Solidarity movement; Marxism and social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Religion and social movements; Repression and social movements; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Lukang anti-DuPont movement (Taiwan)

MING-SHO HO

Originating as a seaport in the eighteenth century, Lukang is a commercial city and center of religious worship in central Taiwan (DeGlopper 1995). In March 1986, local residents launched a movement against the multinational DuPont company’s project to set up a titanium dioxide plant. The investment was welcomed by government officials and viewed as a major boost to stimulate the economy out of a recent recession; however Lukang residents, who knew of the 1984 Bhopal tragedy in India, were worried about the toxic hazard posed by another American chemical company. Under the leadership of a newly elected city mayor, who ran on an anti-DuPont stance, opponents organized the Changhua County Nuisance Prevention Association and staged a series of protests, including a local demonstration and a petition, in front of the presidential house in Taipei, which was unprecedented because Taiwan was still under the rule of martial law, which prohibited unauthorized mass gatherings. Despite the media campaign to showcase its safety commitment as well as an invited tour for local politicians to visit its US facilities, DuPont failed to win the confidence of the people of Lukang. In March 1987, the company announced the decision to suspend this controversial project. Upon receiving the news, Lukang people celebrated their victory by staging a religious festival to express their gratitude to their patron goddess, Mazu. Two years later, DuPont finally established their delayed plant in northern Taiwan (Reardon-Anderson 1992).

In hindsight, the Lukang protest played a critical role in the history of Taiwan’s social movements. Though not the first incident of anti-pollution protest, the unexpected victory of a small town over an American chemical giant enhanced the morale of Taiwan’s nascent environmentalism, which only began to flourish after the lifting of martial law in July 1987 (Ho forthcoming). Later, many Lukang activists participated in a number of environmental protests all over Taiwan, and thus were instrumental in spreading the technique of grassroots mobilization. Nien Hsi-lin, a former schoolteacher, was the chief architect of the Lukang movement, which in turn propelled him into an uninterrupted career of activism for more than two decades. Basically, the Lukang success consisted in the skillful mobilization of local identity to frame the industrial investment as a threat to the traditional way of life. Local identity became a powerful weapon because the Kuomintang regime had sought to eradicate indigenous culture and history in the name of Chinese nationalism. In addition, folk religion in the form of communal worship of a patron deity was also politically suppressed for the sake of modernization. Since the local resentment against these attempts of state control was endemic, the movement leaders were able to use the famous slogan “I love Lukang and don’t want DuPont” to secure broad-based participation by merchants, fishermen, and temple organizations. In other words, community solidarity expressed in religious rituals was highlighted in the struggle against a potential polluter, and this pattern of community mobilization was constantly repeated in the subsequent environmental protests in Taiwan (Ho 2005a).

The Lukang activists were also assisted by external allies. Though the Kuomintang still exercised strong censorship on the media at that time, the Lukang story was largely reported in a positive fashion, thanks to a number of environment-conscious journalists who also acted as informal consultants. Liberal college professors wrote sympathetic op-ed articles to urge moderation on the part of the government.
Due to the high visibility of the DuPont project, the embryonic student movement broke loose from the confines of the college campus. During the 1986 summer vacation, a contingent of National Taiwan University students conducted a field investigation, and later published their findings to emphasize the prevalent local fear of toxic threat. Prior to the Lukang movement, Taiwan’s environmentalism was mainly restricted to middle-class professionals whose effort was concentrated on educating the public and officials. Afterwards, journalists and professors were emboldened to work with the grassroots. The Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, organized at the end of 1987, was the product of this cross-class collaboration.

The Lukang movement also brought about political reverberations. At the end of 1986, political opposition organized the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the Legislative Yuan election. The Lukang dispute convinced the opposition leaders that they could challenge the Kuomintang effectively on environmental issues. The fact that a DPP candidate, who capitalized on the anti-DuPont sentiment, scored a landslide in Lukang seemed to confirm this strategy. The young opposition party adopted a pro-environment platform which included the famous anti-nuclear clause. Since then, the political alliance between environmentalists and the DPP has been formed (Ho 2003) and persisted until the latter came into power in 2000 (Ho 2005b). Alerted by the widespread support for Lukang and DuPont’s retreat, the Kuomintang government also stepped up the modernization of environmental administration. The cabinet-level Environmental Protection Agency was set up in August 1987, in a gesture to regain public confidence.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Environmental movements; Framing and social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Mandate of Heaven (China)

DINGXIN ZHAO

After conquering the Shang dynasty (circa 1600–1045 BCE), the rulers of the Western Zhou dynasty (circa 1045–771 BCE) claimed that they were able to come to power because Heaven had taken away the mandate of ruling China from the bad Shang king and passed it onto the virtuous Western Zhou rulers. The concept of “Mandate of Heaven” was created for a clear propaganda purpose, in part to suppress the resistance of the conquered population. Yet the lessons that the Western Zhou rulers learned from the demise of the mighty Shang state also compelled them to use the same message to educate their own people on the importance of being a good ruler. For instance, in an early Western Zhou document, it is stated that: “We should use the people instead of water as mirrors. Now that the Shang rulers have lost their mandate bestowed from Heaven, why should not we treat history as mirror and learn a hard lesson from the demise of the Shang state?” (Book of Documents 1980: ch. Jiugao). A similar message appeared in another document: “It is all contingent upon human conduct whether or not mistakes and evils will occur … Heaven cannot be trusted. Heaven will not take away the mandate that King Wen had received if only we carry on his virtuous conduct” (Book of Documents 1980: ch. Junshi). The Western Zhou rulers saw the heavenly mandate as precarious and believed that the only way to hold on to it was by governing well. In other words, while the Western Zhou rulers propagated the Mandate of Heaven concept, it was right conduct that they actually emphasized. This way of thinking later entered the teachings of Confucius and his followers during the Spring and Autumn (770–481 BCE) and Warring States (480–221 BCE) eras, and gradually became the single most important political concept in Chinese history.

The key to the Mandate of Heaven concept is the notion that rulers are able to influence Heaven’s will by good conduct, and when Heaven is unhappy about a particular ruler, it will send messages to the ruler in the form of natural disasters. Therefore, drought, flood, earthquakes, epidemics, and so on were all regarded in premodern China as messages from Heaven or even as signs that a state had lost its mandate. This encouraged rulers to work hard and also inspired countless peasant rebellions throughout Chinese history. While most rebellions were repressed, the idea of rising to rebel against an unfit ruler had a legitimate status in Chinese political culture. The Chinese were always ready to accept any one of the successful rebel leaders as the new ruler of China regardless of his original social status and ethnicity. In short, while premodern states in other civilizations tended to derive their legitimacy from traditional and divine sources, the legitimacy of the premodern Chinese state always had a strong performance dimension due to the centrality of the Mandate of Heaven concept.

In today’s China, while the mystic aspect of the Mandate of Heaven concept has gradually faded away, legitimation though good performance, the Mandate of Heaven concept’s most crucial legacy, still figures importantly in political life. After the 1980s, when most Chinese no longer believed in communism, the Chinese government had to increasingly rely on performance to boost its otherwise failing legitimacy. This has compelled Chinese leaders to work hard, which is a major reason behind China’s current economic success. Yet performance legitimacy is intrinsically unstable because it carries concrete promises from the governing to the governed, and is doomed to trigger political crises when they are not fulfilled. This problem is especially profound for the modern state because the modern state is development, rather than maintenance, oriented, and thus has a tendency to promise too much. Many of
the social protests, riots, and demonstrations in today’s China, from their styles of discourses, their repertoire of actions, to their patterns of interaction with the state, are shaped by the nature of the current Chinese regime, in particular its excessive reliance on performance as the basis of state legitimacy (Zhao 2009).

SEE ALSO: Peasant rebellions of imperial China; Religion and social movements; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Mandela, Nelson (1918–)
INEKE VAN KESSEL

As one of the leaders of the resistance against apartheid in South Africa, Nelson Mandela constructed and lived different images of himself over the years to suit his various audiences at home and abroad. His roles included those of youth activist, volunteer-in-chief in campaigns of civil disobedience, lawyer, defendant, and prisoner, leader of the African National Congress (ANC), commander-in-chief of the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the world’s most famous political prisoner, president of South Africa (1994–1999), elder statesman, as well as that of universal icon in the struggle for justice and reconciliation.

However, Mandela’s opponents portrayed him differently, with the South African government framing him as a terrorist and a communist. The label “terrorist” was also used by the US government, which placed Mandela and other leading ANC members on a list of “terrorists” who were barred from entering the country unless a waiver was granted by the US secretary of state. Mandela’s name was finally removed from this list in July 2008, just before his 90th birthday.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born on July 18, 1918 in Mvezo, a village in the Transkei, which was then part of Cape Province. His father, Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa, was chief of Mvezo as well as a privy councilor to the king of the Thembu, one of the Xhosa-speaking peoples in South Africa. After his father’s death, Mandela joined the household of the regent of the Thembu, Jongintaba Dalindyebo. As a ward of the royal house and a student at a Methodist boarding school, Mandela acquired qualities that would help him in his later life, notably discipline, self-control, a gentlemanly courteousness, as well as a certain aloofness. His aristocratic roots became an important building block in the construction of Mandela’s image as a born leader.

To escape from an arranged marriage, in 1941 Mandela traveled to Johannesburg where he met Walter Sisulu, a real estate agent and political activist who introduced him to a law firm where he started to work as an articled clerk. Sisulu also introduced Mandela to the ANC and to prominent members of the South African Communist Party (SACP) who provided him with Marxist literature. To encourage the ANC to adopt a greater militancy, Anton Lembede, A.P Mda, Oliver Tambo, Sisulu, and Mandela founded the ANC Youth League in 1944 and within five years it had acquired a majority on the ANC National Executive (NEC).

In 1950 Mandela was elected chairman of the ANC Youth League and joined the ANC NEC. At this time, he was a black nationalist firebrand who insisted that the ANC only participate in campaigns that were led and initiated by Africans. Fearing that the communists and activists in the South African Indian Congress would dominate resistance politics, he rejected alliances and disrupted communist meetings from time to time.

Mandela qualified as a lawyer in 1952 and in the same year was elected vice chairman of the ANC under the chairmanship of Chief Albert Luthuli. His first major involvement in mass protest was as volunteer-in-chief during the Defiance Campaign, a nonviolent campaign of civil disobedience against unjust laws, such as the segregation of public amenities.

After the proclamation of the Freedom Charter in 1955, Mandela was arrested and charged with high treason, along with 156 codefendants. All were acquitted in 1961, but by then the ANC had become a banned organization. As had been agreed beforehand, Mandela went underground while Tambo fled the country to establish the ANC in exile. Believing that nonviolent protest was no longer an option in view...
mandela, nelson (1918–)

of ruthless suppression by the state, Mandela and Sisulu persuaded the ANC leadership to set up an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), and launch a campaign of sabotage activities. Mandela was appointed as its commander-in-chief.

Mandela spent six months traveling round Africa in 1962 to gather support for the ANC but, shortly after returning to South Africa, he was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for leaving the country illegally and for leading an illegal strike. After serving only a few months of this sentence, he was taken back to Johannesburg to face charges of sabotage and planning an armed invasion. The police had raided a farmhouse in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia that was serving as the headquarters of the now underground ANC, and had confiscated numerous documents, including notes about guerrilla warfare in Mandela’s handwriting. These charges could carry the death penalty but the judge sentenced Mandela and the seven coaccused to life in prison. As in the past, Mandela used the courtroom as a platform to explain his convictions. His statement from the dock, where he expounded his ideals of a “free and democratic society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities” is regarded as one of his most effective speeches and it became a master frame for subsequently mobilizing antiapartheid activists.

Seeing their imprisonment on Robben Island as an extension of their antiapartheid struggle, Mandela and his colleagues established a hierarchical structure to organize the ANC prisoners on the island, and insisted that all political prisoners use their time there to further their education. Mandela’s stature grew while in jail, turning him into an international symbol of the antiapartheid struggle. After the ANC-in-exile decided to personalize the campaign for the liberation of political prisoners in 1980, the “Free Nelson Mandela” campaign became a resounding success. To celebrate his 70th birthday in 1988, Hollywood celebrities participated in a pop concert at London’s Wembley Stadium in front of a live audience of 72 000 who sang “Free Nelson Mandela” while an estimated 200 million people watched it broadcast around the world.

After being transferred from Robben Island to a prison near Cape Town, Mandela engaged in secret discussions with minister of justice Kobie Coetsee to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. Nelson Mandela was released from prison on February 11, 1990 after the newly elected president F.W. de Klerk removed the ban on the ANC, the Communist Party, and other antiapartheid organizations. However, before negotiations could start, Mandela had to reassure his following that he had not abandoned his principles and his commitment to the armed struggle. In 1991, Mandela was elected president of the ANC at an ANC conference and he and De Klerk were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

After the general election on April 27, 1994, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first black president of South Africa. The reconciliation of former enemies was one of the main themes of his presidency (1994–1999), efforts that were not inspired by religious convictions but, as his biographer Anthony Sampson pointed out, by the political conviction that winning over individual Afrikaners was the best way of neutralizing their collective potential to undermine the new dispensation (Sampson 1999). The politics of reconciliation lent a moral dimension to Mandela’s charismatic leadership and also added to his international stature as a beacon of moral integrity. As biographer Tom Lodge concluded: “Few Third World insurgencies managed to combine in their leaderships such an effective mixture of guerrilla glamour and reassuring metropolitan respectability” (Lodge 2006: 192).

SEE ALSO: Antiapartheid movement (South Africa); Charisma; Land movements in Africa; Leadership; Nationalist movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
MARC BLECHER

More than any other political figure in history, Mao Zedong led his state in many ways as if it were still a revolutionary social and political movement. And his leadership did indeed kindle such movements as significant social and political forces, promoting genuine “uninterrupted revolution” even after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

Mao was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. Impatient with the slow pace of development of the labor movement, early on he struck out in an unorthodox direction for a communist by focusing on the countryside – he helped develop an incipient peasant movement in 1925, and became a leader of the Peasant Movement Training Institute. After the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) betrayed its alliance with the CCP in April 1927 by crushing the Shanghai labor movement, Mao set off to rural Hunan to lead the Autumn Harvest Uprising that same year. With its defeat, he led his supporters to the remote Jinggang Mountains to regroup, soon establishing rural governments (“soviets”) that carried out agrarian reforms. Their strength alarmed the Guomindang, which, after four failed military campaigns, finally dislodged them in 1935, sending the CCP retreating on the “Long March.” In 1936, the decimated Party set about reestablishing itself in the remote town of Yan’an. Over the next 13 years it rebuilt the revolutionary movement, this time with considerable support from urban progressives who journeyed there to participate in literacy, production, and political campaigns that exponentially expanded the communist movement’s popular support. This party-led social and political movement was a major contributor to the surprisingly swift victory of the CPP over the Guomindang in 1949.

Several scholarly debates swirl around the question of the Chinese revolution as a social and political movement. Chalmers Johnson (1962) argued that rural support had more to do with anti-Japanese nationalism than class conflict, to which critics responded that he overstated his case and that the two were inextricable (Pepper 2004). Shambaugh (1997) argued that the revolution was mainly a military affair, a position which has not attracted much following, and in any event the party’s military exertions would still have required a great deal of active popular support given the their reliance on guerilla warfare. Finally, the early accounts of the Yan’an movement, based as they were on official documents available in the 1960s, were too positive, and with the emergence of new sources required reevaluation that toned down and balanced but did not fundamentally undermine the argument that a vibrant and important movement led by Mao was a crucial driver of the Chinese Revolution (Selden 1995).

Though 1949 saw Mao became the preeminent leader of the Chinese state, he often continued until his death in 1976 to discharge that role in ways that, extraordinarily, were redolent of the populist, mobilizational impulses he had developed over the previous three decades. Land reform was conducted as a bottom-up affair in which farmers confronted their landlords directly in struggle meetings. Mao encouraged rapid rural collectivization in the mid-1950s, and farmers joined in willingly and often enthusiastically. In 1956, Mao, worried that the Soviet model of command central planning was producing bureaucratic elitist sclerosis, issued a popular call for “a hundred schools of thought [to] contend” in a debate to produce a more dialogical politics of socialism. It worked too well: When popular criticism poured forth challenging socialism itself, Mao joined his colleagues in prosecuting the 1957 Anti-Rightist
Campaign. Yet the very next year Mao’s movement impulses burst forth again as he conceived and promoted the Great Leap Forward, a crash program of economic development grounded in grassroots reorganization (“people’s communes”) as an antidote to command central planning, and relying on popular initiatives (like “backyard steel furnaces”) and voluntaristic labor mobilization. When the Leap produced disastrous economic contraction and a gargantuan famine, Mao was forced to issue a self-criticism and accept a reduced political role, while the economy was restabilized under bureaucratic control in the early 1960s.

Yet those very retrenchments only reignited Mao’s populist impulses. As early as 1965, he issued proclamations evincing concern about a “capitalist road” within the Communist Party, laying the groundwork for nothing less than a renewed bout of popular “class struggle” – this time against party elites. The Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966 as an unprecedented social and political movement in which the supreme leader of a state socialist country called on the masses to attack the state he headed. Once again they responded actively. For the next two years the country was engulfed in turmoil, as ordinary Chinese seized the initiative, attacking their leaders at all levels, from President Liu Shaoqi to grassroots leaders, while also savaging each other. Mao himself was the only one who could restore order, which he did only by dispatching military occupations of institutions across the country.

Mao’s leadership of the People’s Republic of China has, naturally, generated impassioned debates, several of which are germane to the question of social and political movements. Some have questioned the genuineness of Mao’s commitment to movement politics, arguing that he used it mainly as a tool in power struggles at the top (Chang 1975). While elite power politics is undeniable, so is the fact that Mao could have fought in much less mobilizational ways; yet he kept returning to them. Others have questioned the genuineness of popular initiative and support for collectivization, the Hundred Flowers, the Leap, or the Cultural Revolution, pointing out that participants were responding to Mao’s charismatic authority or to patron–client networks (Teiwes 1984; Walder 1986). Yet critics note that participants rapidly took the initiative and that the center had difficulty reasserting control (Perry & Li 1997; Blecher 2010).

When all is said and done, Mao appears to have been serious about the importance of popular social and political movements in creating a more participatory, movement-based model of state socialism than that seen in the USSR or Eastern Europe. Yet he also reserved for himself the role of mobilizing those movements in the first place and restraining them when in his view they spun too far out of control.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Chinese communist revolution; Cultural Revolution (China); Leadership; Revolutions; Social movement organization (SMO).

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March First Movement of 1919 (Korea)

GI-WOOK SHIN

The March First Movement (Samil Undong) was the first nationwide nationalist movement in Korea. The Korean peninsula was “annexed” to imperial Japan in 1910 and, despite much armed resistance, Koreans experienced a decade of minimal rights under a brutal colonial regime. In the aftermath of World War I, and specifically indicated in the Versailles peace conference, the international climate began to change, giving Korean leaders a glimmer of hope for national independence from Japanese rule. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s idea for national self-determination for weak nations, Korean student and intellectual leaders in Tokyo published a statement in January of 1919 demanding national liberation from Japanese colonizers. Organizers hoped to spark resistance within the Korean community while simultaneously appealing for help at an international level. Even future president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, who resided in the US, took part in the movement by attempting to attend the Versailles conference in an effort to personally appeal to President Wilson for Korea’s independence.

Throughout 1918 domestic and international leaders clandestinely collaborated to create a sort of underground movement both in domestic Korea and among Korean students and intellectuals abroad. Combining with the Christian and Korea’s native religion, Tonghak, religious communities provided an organizational base for mobilization, as a 33-member group formed that would spearhead the movement. Leaders concurred that the actual demonstrations should be staged precisely two days before the public funeral for the former Korean emperor Kojong. Not only had Kojong’s death marked a tangible end to the former Korean state, but thousands of Koreans were expected to participate in the mourning events. However, had demonstrations commenced at the same time as the scheduled public ceremony (March 3), heightened colonial government security would have most likely outnumbered and quashed demonstrators.

On March 1, 1919, nationalist leaders met at Pagoda Park in downtown Seoul and read aloud a declaration for Korean independence. Concurrent with the gathering in Seoul, representatives of the movement read the same proclamations in other cities such as Pyongyang. People poured into the streets to show support, igniting an eventual nationwide protest. The movement quickly spread across the country, uniting Koreans from all regions, occupations, educational levels, and social backgrounds. Caught by surprise, Japanese forces had trouble containing the revolt that took place throughout March and April and included more than 10 percent of Korea’s roughly 20 million people. Overall there were estimated to be 1500 demonstrations in 211 of Korea’s 220 counties. While nationalist leaders embraced nonviolence in an effort to achieve legitimate recognition of Korean sovereignty internationally, violent clashes with the colonial government did erupt. In one case, colonial officers locked protesters inside a church and burned it to the ground. In the end Japanese official figures of the dead reported 553 killed with over 12 000 arrested. These numbers were in stark contrast to those calculated by Korean nationalists, who put the totals at 7500 killed and 45 000 arrested. Even with such violent episodes, in the end the movement by no means urged social revolution.

The March First Movement failed to achieve national independence from Japanese rule but left important legacies for Korea. First, the years following 1919 marked a transition in colonial policy to incorporate more cultural...
aspects while continuing to deny political rights. Japanese colonists, wanting to appear “modern” in their colonial rule, began to loosen their grip on freedom of speech and assembly, promoting the publication of Korean newspapers and other media. Additionally, Koreans created the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai as a result of the demonstrations. This entity would subsist to provide leadership for the initial regime in South Korea after 1945.

Second, the failure to attain independence through March First divided Korean intellectual leaders into two groups: nationalist moderates and socialists/communists. The former deemed immediate independence as immature, stressing reform, education, and economic development as a means for a gradual liberation; one which Korea would be ready for. The contending socialist radicals comprised Korean nationalists abroad in Japan, China, and Siberia who enjoyed more freedom in education, were critical of the reformist approach, and pursued more direct resistance to colonial rule. Many subscribed to Marxist/Leninist ideals and were especially attracted to a new vision of social and political development, one that offered insight into the causes of Korea’s colonial subjugation. Many scholars cite the failure of March First as the primary origin for the division between moderates and communists that would incite a civil war after the 1945 liberation.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, March First is celebrated as the first modern national social movement in Korean history. This is a particularly significant component to the contemporary story of South Korea. Reminiscent of March First in fervor and unity, the fight for democracy in South Korea during the 1980s came largely as a result of the successful mobilization of the Korean populace against the military dictatorship of Chun Do Hwan. Today, Koreans everywhere take pride in the ability to unite, despite differences, against a common cause and under the same nationalistic ideals.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Kwang-ju uprising (Korea); Nationalist movements; Pro-democracy of 1987 (Korea).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Mau Mau revolt (Africa)

INGE BRINKMAN

At the end of the 1940s central Kenya experienced the growth of a movement that came to be known as Mau Mau. People were initiated into the movement through pledging an oath, a fact interpreted as “traditional” by the British colonial authorities. Yet, people in central Kenya saw it as a novelty, since for the first time women and children were also allowed to take this oath. Initially Mau Mau received much support amongst Kikuyu squatters working on the farms of white settlers in the White Highlands. Later the movement expanded into the Kikuyu Reserve, an area designed by the colonial authorities as the homeland of the Kikuyu and into Nairobi, Kenya’s buzzing capital. Much of the support came from people with little hope of a better future: poor people with little to lose.

The colonial authorities regarded Mau Mau as a threat to law and order, and in 1952 decreed a state of emergency. Political leaders were arrested and, with the aid of British troops, a repression campaign was mounted. Perhaps precisely because of the hard-line state repression, Mau Mau engaged in guerrilla war, waged from the forests of central Kenya. Initially, it seemed hard to quell the guerrilla struggle, but after large-scale military campaigns (estimates of the death toll on the Kenyan side range from 11 000 to 150 000) the rebellion ended. Although some groups of Forest Fighters (Mau Mau guerrillas) continued, the 1956 death of Dedan Kimathi, the most important Mau Mau general, is widely regarded as the end of armed resistance. In 1961 the state of emergency was ended, and in 1964 Kenya became an independent country with Jomo Kenyatta as its president.

Mau Mau was a complex movement. In the colonial interpretation, Mau Mau was a barbaric movement which employed violence against innocent colonial families, missionaries, and local Christians. After Kenya’s independence, Mau Mau was hailed as a nationalist, anticolonial struggle. Obviously the roots of Mau Mau resistance lay in grievances related to colonial rule, and its demands – land and freedom – had a clear anticolonial character. In the 1980s, social history gathered momentum in African studies, often with a neo-Marxist interpretation. In this approach, Mau Mau was seen not only as an anticolonial nationalist movement, but also as a civil war between the haves and the have-nots, between landless poor and wealthy landowners. Mau Mau was also an internal struggle about political responsibility, leadership accountability, masculinity, and adulthood. British historian John Lonsdale (1990) described Mau Mau as “an imploded Kikuyu debate.” To understand this “imploded debate,” we need to go back to the nineteenth century, when colonial rule did not as yet play a role.

Back then there was no shortage of land in the region; the most important economic factor was the mobilization of labor. The societies in this region were based on explicit socioeconomic differences in status, wealth, and political power. Young people and women, for example, had only limited say in the political process, and rich men acted as patrons for poor men, in which the former offered land use and protection in return for labor and political support. A poor man could slowly move up the social ladder; through hard work he could acquire land and so build up his own group of dependents: women and children. Marriage formed the gateway to social and political status; a man with a well-organized household was assumed also to be a good political leader. In this homely conceptualization of politics, marriage and the family were obviously crucial. Given the abundance of land and the possibilities of social mobility through
hard work, it was also clear that work ethics were paramount: good, hardworking rich people were opposed to criminal, lazy poor.

Much changed during the colonial era. Political power was largely transferred from the village councils to colonial-installed chiefs. People in the region were all assumed to belong to “the Kikuyu tribe” and ordered to live in the Kikuyu Reserve, which soon became overcrowded. Patrons no longer offered their clients a chance to acquire land, and so men from poor families stood little chance to gather a bride price, to marry, and to build up a household. In short, it became difficult to become morally good, adult, and politically responsible men. The value of land possession increased sharply, rendering matters more difficult for groups who were not allowed to possess land and only had usufruct rights – such as women and clients. The chance to acquire land became ever more limited and more and poor people remained poor, despite their efforts and hard work. The desperation of people without access to land, of the landless without a proper household, and of sons without the means to marry grew over the years.

These same constraints also held for the White Highlands, where many people of poor descent sought to increase their wealth by working on white settler farms. Yet the latter saw patron–client relations very differently and squatters no longer had any possibilities for upward mobility. Other men, and fewer women, without means tried their luck in Nairobi. And indeed some managed to build up a household without their families’ help and buy land around Nairobi with their wages. Yet the majority did not succeed and remained living in the slums, jobless and poor.

These poor people could no longer look for another patron or clear a new piece of land; the principle of reciprocal patron–client relations had become a hollow phrase and nowhere was there any land to clear. It is these poor people that came to form the core of Mau Mau. They tried to claim their rights as clients, to acquire land, and set up independent households through this movement. The land and freedom demands can also be interpreted in this light. These people tried to call upon patrons and landlords to be heard, to be offered a chance to prove themselves, to become adult and politically responsible. The established and wealthy Kikuyu families opposed these claims and as anti-Mau Mau they were regarded as “loyalists” by the British.

Upon independence Kenya came to be ruled by a powerful Kikuyu clique, but these were all wealthy patrons; the claims of the Forest Fighters were paid no heed to in an independent Kenya.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Guerrilla movements; Nationalist movements; Repression and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


May Fourth Movement (China)
ANTOINE CADOT-WOOD

The May Fourth Movement, in a narrow sense, refers to a series of student demonstrations that occurred in Beijing on May 4, 1919. The demonstrations were in response to territorial concessions made by Chinese delegates at the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I. In a broad sense, however, “May Fourth Movement” also serves as an umbrella term for a series of political, social, and intellectual movements that began nearly ten years prior, known collectively as the New Culture Movement.

The demonstrations of 1919 were in direct response to events surrounding the end of World War II. A considerable number of Chinese intellectuals had seen the conflict as a just war against unchecked German imperialism. In the wake of the 1918 Armistice that ended hostilities in Europe, many of these same intellectuals rejoiced, hoping that the fall of Germany signaled the decline of imperialism in general. They were particularly interested in territories in the Chinese province of Shandong, which had been annexed by Germany in the late nineteenth century and that they now hoped to see returned to China.

The Chinese diplomats sent to the Paris Peace Conference, however, rapidly discovered that Japan in 1917 had signed a secret agreement with France, Italy, and Great Britain, which promised to support Japanese claims in Shandong. The Chinese head of state Duan Qirui had himself signed a similar secret agreement with Japan in 1918, promising military concessions in Shandong in exchange for Japanese loans. In the face of these facts, the Treaty of Versailles handed Germany's former territory in China over to Japan. News of the Chinese delegation's failure reached Beijing on May 1, prompting an outcry that led on to large student demonstrations on May 4 against both foreign imperialism and the current Chinese government.

These demonstrations did not materialize out of nowhere, however. The May Fourth Movement has in retrospect come to encompass a wide range of movements that began after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Chinese imperial system, and continued well into the 1920s, under the heading “New Culture Movement.” It was a movement largely composed of intellectuals, some of the most notable including Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), Hu Shi (1891–1962), Li Dazhao (1888–1927), Fu Sinian (1896–1950), Lu Xun (1881–1936), and Luo Jialun (1897–1969). The man of letters had traditionally occupied a special place in Chinese society, as both scholar and imperial official. Many May Fourth intellectuals were trained partly in the classical tradition, and were thus burdened with balancing intellectual inquiry with service to their country.

The root of this movement lay in a series of humiliating military defeats in the late nineteenth century, which forced China to make territorial, economic, and military concessions to European and Japanese imperial powers. In response to this situation, various viewpoints emerged among Chinese literati on how to prevent China’s decline. These ranged from a reform of the Chinese imperial system that incorporated Western military technology to the removal of the imperial system altogether, on account of its being composed of a “foreign” ethnic group, the Manchus.

Both of these extremes, ironically, were eclipsed by the abolition of the Manchu Qing government in 1911. Those advocating the reform of the imperial system had faced a reactionary imperial court that finally succumbed to its own intrinsigence. The anti-Manchus, by contrast, found the Qing replaced by a series...
of warlords who ruled in a way similar to their imperial predecessors. Within two years, many revolutionaries found themselves in exile, where they began a thorough questioning of all aspects of classical Chinese culture, informed by the large number of Western texts translated by the Japanese since their own modernization half a century before.

By the time these intellectuals were able to return to China, they had decided that the reason for China’s decline was not lack of military power or a flawed political system, but fundamental flaws in Chinese culture. The majority gathered at Peking University in Beijing, where Cai Yuanpei became the chancellor; Chen Duxiu the dean; Li Dazhao the head librarian; Hu Shi a professor of philosophy. Most famous of all, perhaps, was the novelist and professor of literature Lu Xun, whose stories were blistering indictments of traditional Chinese social norms. Under the influence of such people, Peking University acquired a culture of student activism that would remain for the rest of the century, its students leading both the May Fourth demonstrations and the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

Over the next few years, Peking University’s professors and others would spearhead an effort to teach the next generation, in Chen Duxiu’s (1915) words, to be “Independent, not servile; progressive, not conservative; aggressive, not retiring; cosmopolitan, not isolationist.” Their effort would become known by the 1920s as the New Culture Movement, and it would reach its zenith in 1919 with the May Fourth demonstrations. Chen Duxiu, editor of the movement’s principal publication, New Youth, would characterize the twin slogans of the New Culture Movement as “science and democracy,” although the actual ideas that made up the movement were considerably more varied. They included the vernacularization of written language, the creation of a modern literature, the liberation of women and families, the modernization of medicine, and the struggle against imperialism. May Fourth intellectuals also played with a number of political philosophies, from Marxism to French ideas on democracy, to anarchism.

How the May Fourth Movement is remembered in China today is a story as complex as the movement itself. The demonstrations of 1919 are remembered largely as a patriotic protest against foreign imperialism and a treasonous government. The New Culture Movement is officially remembered for its nationalism and its introduction of Marxist thought into China, while dissidents still point to the slogan of “science and democracy” as a goal for a country they see as still distinctly undemocratic. Following a renewed interest in classical Chinese culture in the 1990s, however, the May Fourth Movement has also come under attack for its perceived outright rejection of classical Chinese thought and wholehearted adoption of Western ideas.

SEE ALSO: Chinese communist revolution; Demonstrations; Nationalist movements; Student movements; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Media activism
ALICE MATTONI

Media activism can be understood in three different manners, going from broad to narrower interpretations: activism through the media, activism in the media, activism about the media.

Media activism is activism through media in the sense that activists use media technological devices in order to organize, promote, and account for social movement activities. For instance, activists can employ a mailing list to coordinate the organization of a strike, set up a website to sponsor a sit-in, and use hand-held digital camcorders to report a demonstration. In its broadest sense, therefore, media activism implies all those media practices by which activists mediate their own social movement activities (such as organization, promotion, and representation of protest events and campaigns), through the use of different media technological devices (today increasingly digital, like cameras) and resulting in a variety of artifacts diffused through alternative media channels.

In a narrower manner, media activism is also a form of activism in the media environment, assumed as the space in which to subvert symbols and icons representing those contentious topics activists engage with. An example of media activism in the media is the practice of culture jamming that aims at subverting dominant cultural codes. Culture jamming is rooted in past artistic vanguards and protest movements, like Situationist International, in which several groups of artists participated in the 1950s and the 1960s and whose subversive practices, like detournement, are also common amongst today’s culture jammer groups, such as AdBuster,™ark, and Negativeland, already active in the 1980s. Culture jamming may include broader disruptive practices directed toward the media, such as media hoaxes (Dery 1993). The creation of “media hoaxes” consists in organizing public events and constructing public characters which are then revealed to be false in front of media professionals and journalists. The aim is to expose the fragilities and contradictions of mainstream media and dominant cultures. Recent examples are media hoaxes organized by the Luther Blisset Project, the Yes Men, and the Chainworkers Crew.

With the growing importance of cyberspace, activism in the media environment also means performing protest events and campaigns in the online realm, developing various types of online actions like virtual sit-ins or the construction of fake websites (Costanza-Chock 2003). Some of these contentious electronic performances are also known as “hacktivism,” which is rooted in hacker culture and employs direct action in the virtual realm in order to disrupt cyberspace (Jordan 2002).

There is an even narrower conception of media activism, that is activism about the media and communication, seen as contentious issues and fields of struggle in themselves. This type of media activism could be seen as a social movement in itself, whose aim is to reform media policies at the national and transnational level. However, other authors prefer to consider activism about the media and communication as a connector between different movements (Hackett & Carroll 2006: 199), rather than a social movement in the strict sense. Activists engaged in contentious politics related to media and communication frequently change the media environment at the material level, especially in cyberspace: apart from engaging in protest performances, they also supply content, software, and infrastructures. The online encyclopedia Wikipedia, for instance, is a fairly good example of activism about the media producing public content online; over the past 20 years, the free software movement provided free and
open source software to perform a variety of tasks in the electronic environment; grassroots groups of activists engaged in the creation of information and communication infrastructures enabling other activists to perform a variety of media-related social movement activities.

Today, external boundaries of media activism are changing, especially with regard to activism through the media and, in particular, the production and diffusion of media contents. As for production, communication and information technologies are more accessible than in the past for a higher number of people. Although different forms of digital divide still exist, digital media devices are in general portable, easy to use, and low cost. This allows a faster mediated representation of protest events and campaigns and renders the practices at the basis of media activism feasible for those people who would not define themselves as activists, but rather as protest participants or sympathetic audiences. They document and circulate social movement activities without labeling what they are doing as “media activism.” In this case, media activism as a process of alternative communication production goes beyond the boundaries of activist groups. As for diffusion, the creation and pervasiveness of commercial social networking applications, like Facebook, has provided yet another place where content produced through media activist practices may be circulated. In this regard, media activism as a process of diffusion of alternative messages goes beyond the boundaries of alternative media, since it is circulated in commercial and profit-oriented contexts. The changing boundaries of media activism in contemporary societies require a redefinition of the very concept of media activism, a challenge for social movement practitioners and academic scholars in the field.

SEE ALSO: Culture jamming; Hackers; Internet and social movements; Media and social movements; Technology and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Mexican Revolution
ÁLVARO MATUTE

The Mexican Revolution started in the early years of the twentieth century and consisted of a set of events involving a number of social actors. Accordingly, the deeds and misdeeds that occurred as part of it served a variety of purposes. Some historians argue there were several rebellions, as opposed to only one revolution, and that all of them simultaneously converged in a major event referred to as the Mexican Revolution. The numerous geographical locations where actions unfolded highlight the diversity of the movement.

Early in the twentieth century, Mexico was facing hard times. In 1900 President Porfirio Díaz was reelected for a fifth term in office; however, that fact in itself was a sign of political instability. It also denoted a lack of political activity, as new generations of professionals were making attempts to gain access to high-ranking government positions. This situation was also occurring in most states – with the exception of Yucatán, where the governor was changed every four years. This state of affairs led to a feeling of dissension voiced by some groups. After the enactment of Lerdo’s Act, mandating the confiscation of church property (1856) – which also meant putting an end to collective property as a means to encourage the acquisition of private land by individuals – and the passing of subsequent laws concerning untended lands, many farming communities lost their commonly owned lands (ejidos), which became part of increasingly large rural estates (latifundios) that had emerged since the 1860s.

Emiliano Zapata was a revolutionary leader in the southern state of Morelos, where many farmers had seen their lands taken away to become part of the large sugarcane-producing haciendas. Factory workers were also discontented as they did not have access to basic rights such as freedom of assembly or the right to strike, and there were no regulations for establishing the minimum working age, the maximum number of working hours, or wage and social welfare policies. Although some mutualism and cooperativism trends were current at the time, they had not evolved into a consistently developed legislation, the exception being the state of Mexico, where laws were considered progressive to a certain extent. Associations having anarchist and anarchist-unionist leanings were formed, and the ideas stemming from Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum Encyclical (1891) spread and were referred to as Social Catholicism. The Catholic workers who affiliated with this movement held conferences and discussions and, like the anarchist groups, demanded solutions from those in power. In addition, the liberals – who followed the reformist tradition – had begun to complain about the rapprochement of some church and government leaders, and urged them to abide by the Reform Act, which dictated the separation of church and state. This set of political, agrarian, industrial, and religious factors eventually congealed into a revolutionary situation. Early in the twentieth century, the first signs of awareness of the situation surfaced among some citizens, who began to take steps aimed at implementing possible solutions.

Some actions led to others. In 1903, in the city of San Luis Potosí, liberal congressmen openly criticized the links of the state with the church. Three years later, the Liberal Party’s plan and agenda was drafted. Although such proposals did not overlook the church–state associations, it left the matter second to more pressing considerations such as political, economic, and social actions that had first to be put in place to accomplish reform. The plan and agenda covered issues concerning workers – such as maximum working hours and the minimum wage, and farmers – regarding new ways of preventing land from becoming idle. It also...
addressed the need for secular, public, and mandatory education. The ideas of this group were shared with massive clusters of workers through Regeneración, a newspaper published by Ricardo Flores Magón, the chief ideologist of the group, who, consequently, was persecuted, imprisoned, and finally sought exile in the US. On the other hand, Catholic workers developed the grassroots and organized meetings and conferences to discuss progressive labor reforms.

In cities, the professionals who were close to the political elite held heated debates about General Díaz’s succession. In articles, brochures, books, and general speculation they expressed their opinions on how the presidential succession ought to be tackled and their concerns as to whether or not Mexicans were ready for democracy. They also wondered whether or not it was possible to create new political parties. Speculation caught fire once they learned of President Díaz’s statement in an interview with reporter James Creelman, published in Pearson’s Magazine in March, 1908, that he would retire as soon as his term came to an end in 1910. Meanwhile, Francisco I. Madero, a grape grower living in San Pedro de las Colonias, in the northern state of Coahuila, shared his views on the dictator’s publicized retirement in his book La sucesión presidencial en 1910. In it, he expressed agreement with Díaz that, as the middle class had grown stronger, it was finally possible to bring democracy to the country. Other writers, however, were noticeably skeptical about the matter. One of them, Andrés Molina Enríquez – an evolutionist – came up with the most accurate analysis on the matter of democracy, warning it was still in the future. In his book Los grandes problemas nacionales (1909), he arrived at what today would seem a shocking conclusion: “considering the different ethnic and social groups had various forms of land ownership; and, given the vast diversity prevailing, it is impossible for the country to evolve. To make evolution viable, it would be necessary to move toward small land ownership and implement a miscegenation policy aimed at dissolving the gap breaking ethnic poles apart” (i.e., indigenous peoples, semi-nomadic peoples with no lands and those he referred to as Creole lords who owned huge rural estates). In his view, only a more homogeneous society would be able to have a democratic government. “Under the current circumstances personal dictatorship would just turn into party dictatorship.”

President Díaz changed his mind as 1910 arrived and decided to run for presidency again, this time with Ramón Corral running for vice president. The Partido Demócrata – formed in 1909 to endorse the candidacy of General Bernardo Reyes – was having problems; some of the party members had left and others were persecuted. The only contending party was the Partido Antirreeleccionista controlled by Francisco I. Madero, who organized the first electoral campaign ever in the history of Mexico. In his campaign trips, he noticed the uneasiness of citizens in a number of states concerning the reelection of governors. He managed to track down such worries to the source: Díaz’s never-ending reelectios. Madero was not harassed or persecuted and ran a successful campaign. However, as a result of fraud, the victory polls favored Díaz. Madero was imprisoned in San Luis Potosí and, while in jail, drafted the Plan de San Luis, urging his fellow countrymen to disown the deceitfully nominated authorities and calling for an uprising to start on November 20, 1910. Initially, just a few responded, but in the first three months of 1911 more insurgent groups joined the uprising, mainly in northern states. By May, with the map already showing a large number of revolutionary areas, the insurgent forces were concentrated in Ciudad Juárez, where the federal army and the insurgents engaged in a crucial battle. The victory of the Maderistas brought about immediate political consequences which turned out to be decisive: Porfirio Díaz stepped down as president and left for Europe, where he would spend the last five years of his life in exile.

Between May and November there was a period known as “Interinato” (temporary office), presided over by Francisco León
de la Barrera. Following a glorious journey from the border region to Mexico City, Madero was bound to face overwhelming difficulties once he reached the capital city. First, among the circles supporting him, there was a divide over who should run for vice president in the upcoming elections. The Partido Antirreeleccionista became fractured, which resulted in the creation of a new party: Partido Constitucional Progresista. Second, to honor Madero’s promise, the revolutionary forces had to be disbanded, but some of them – such as the Zapatistas – refused to comply until the new government fulfilled the commitments made to the agricultural sector. Furthermore, Madero’s advocacy of human rights – particularly concerning freedom of the press – took an ironic twist when journalists made him the target of blunt criticism. In spite of all this, Madero took office as president of Mexico in November 1911. Within a few days, the Zapatistas’ impatience surfaced with the Plan de Ayala, urging the government to take action so that communal property or ejidos could be returned to its original owners. It wasn’t long before further signs of anti-Maderism sprang up. General Bernardo Reyes crossed the border with the plan of overthrowing the new president, but failed in his attempt and was captured. In March of 1912 an old ally of Madero’s, Pascual Orozco, started a rebellion in the north. Meanwhile, the newly elected representatives of the Chamber of Deputies (XXVth) with a pro-government majority, started working on making laws intended to accommodate the nonconformists’ claims. In October, a new uprising started in Veracruz, led by General Félix Díaz, Porfirio Díaz’s nephew. He was soon defeated and sent to prison in Mexico City. The struggle against Orozco was the hardest of all and ended only when he lost a battle against General Victoriano Huerta, whose reputation increased after the victory.

President Madero now believed he had the country under control, but a new military uprising in Mexico City resulted in the liberation of generals Reyes and Díaz. Reyes was shot dead trying to assault the presidential palace. A scheme led by US ambassador Henry L. Wilson then succeeded: General Huerta was persuaded to betray the president and have him arrested in February 1913. The scheme involved several days of shootings known as “la Decena Trágica” (ten tragic days). Once he had had Madero killed, Huerta set up a dictatorial regime whereby the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and his opponents were sent to prison or, in some cases, executed. Huerta became president but Venustiano Carranza, who had been appointed governor of Coahuila, disowned him and prompted the people to overthrow him by means of the so-called Plan de Guadalupe, drafted in March 1913. By then, the reforms that had led to the revolutionary uprising had been only partially implemented and the ones already in place lacked cohesion. Congress started a debate on the returning of ejidos to the previous owners and reforms to the labor system. Independent groups of farmers continued to push their demands, whereas workers – both the anarchist-unionists and the Catholics – drafted different proposals time and again in pursuit of social justice. Yet, it was clear that up to that point, the movements were still disconnected. Technically, the lack of articulation in the movement would prevent authors from referring to just “one revolution.” In the period 1913 to 1915 the revolutionary process became most complicated as various trends spread out to the different regions and only in 1915 did they start to show some convergence.

An army was formed by Carranza to fight Huerta, which was joined by several groups from the north, such as the army led by Francisco Villa, known as the División del Norte, and one from Sonora, the Cuerpo de Ejército del Noroeste, whose commander-in-chief was General Álvaro Obregón. Zapata, on the other hand, had not ceased to fight. Carranza gave the movement a national character by sending troops to the south and southeast and controlling ports and custom posts, thus gathering funds for his venture. From March 1913 to August 1914, the different rebellious groups
fought the federal army, which was defeated after decisive clashes such as the assault on the city of Zacatecas by the División del Norte and the surrendering of Guadalajara under the siege of Obregón’s army.

Disagreements existed among the different revolutionary groups: some targeted social reforms (e.g., land distribution), whereas Carranza opted to defer such demands until after the attainment of his political-military goals. In view of the increasingly worsening relations among insurgents, it was necessary to keep them together through treaties such as the Pacto de Torreón. Once Huerta was overthrown the different groups decided it was necessary to organize a convention to set up a program of reforms. The convention, later known as the Soberana Convención Revolucionaria (Sovereign Revolutionary Convention), began in October 1914 in Aguascalientes, upon Villa’s request, arguing it was neutral territory. The Convention declared itself as self-governed and disregarded Carranza, who decided to leave Mexico City as the seat of power, moving the government’s seat to Veracruz. During the Convention there was overt antagonism between the conventionists and the constitutionalists – the latter were loyal to Carranza. All members of the Sovereign Revolutionary Convention traveled to Mexico City. In December 1914, under the Pacto de Xochimilco, the Villistas and Zapatistas were united and became loyal – at least momentarily – to Eulalio Gutiérrez, the president elected by the Convention. Álvaro Obregón, however, decided to support Carranza.

In 1915 there was war between the different revolutionary armies: in El Ébano, near Tampico, General Jacinto B. Treviño, from Carranza’s army, defeated Villa’s supporter Tomás Urbina, and, in Celaya, Trinidad, and Santa Ana del Conde, Obregón finally defeated Villa at the expense of losing his right arm. Apart from the warfare there was combat on a different field; that of ideologies, arising from the enactment of socially driven laws and decrees intended to benefit the farmers’ and workers’ groups. Workers held meetings at Casa del Obrero Mundial with the backing of the constitutional army. Both groups merged in the Batallones Rojos (Red Battalions) to fight Villa. Keeping armies at war involved using most of the already scarce crops and cattle to feed the troops, a policy that brought about starvation on an extended scale. Moreover, the country was in monetary chaos. Every army mint house was issuing its own currency. To make things worse, as a result of the unhealthy conditions prevailing in cities and in the countryside, the country was plagued with outbreaks of epidemics.

In 1916, some revolutionary reforms were turned into a legislation soon to be enacted. The armies had stopped fighting, although rioting went on. Both the defeated convention members and the triumphant constitutionalists set themselves to making plans and laws aimed at fulfilling the demands that had initially fueled the struggle. The convention – it had survived in the territory controlled by Zapata – announced its Programa de Reformas (reform plan) based on many of the ideas promoted by Ricardo Flores Magón’s supporters, the Magonistas, since 1906, and on other thinking that had emerged during the revolutionary movement. Carranza ordered the appointment of the members of Congreso Constituyente (Constitutional Congress) in December 1906 and the Congress started sessions in the city of Querétaro. Carranza instructed them to hold deliberations on a plan for a constitutional reform. In the meantime, a substantial number of counterrevolutionary groups, including the ones led by Manuel Peláez, Félix Díaz, Alberto Pineda, and Juan Andreu Almazán, declared war on the constitutionalist government in different regions of the country. This fighting did not involve the forces of Villistas and Zapatistas, but hunger still prevailed in the country. In addition, citizens were often attacked by bandits, such as those commanded by José Inés Chávez García in Michoacán and Pedro Zamora in Jalisco and Colima. The American government had ordered raids to pursue Villa, who had led the assault on the city of Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916.
The Congress closed sessions on February 5, 1917. Even though there were only representatives from the winning party at the Congress, its composition undeniably involved a social, professional, and generational variety of citizens. Carranza’s proposal was soon superseded by that of the left wing, whose proposals in the fields of education, religion, agriculture, and labor made the constitutionalist project look more modest, even though it was an attempt to follow the liberal tradition. The radicals known as the Jacobinos chose to take a step farther. Even though individual rights were set out, many of them were deferred until the state gained strength. According to the new ideas, a powerful government should rely on the figure of the president, who would face no restraints except the observance of the republican rules concerning the equilibrium of powers and the respect for individual rights. The nation would hold sovereignty over the entire territory, including minerals and hydrocarbons, and hold the power to transfer property to the citizens under a private system.

The new constitution mandates were: education shall be mandatory, free, and secular and must be regulated by the state; the nation owns all the land (including the subsoil) and the state has the power of ordering the fragmenting of very large estates; the provisions on the maximum working hours and the minimum wage shall be observed and social security benefits must be granted, while the hiring of children is banned. As far as the church was concerned, the names and nationalities of foreign priests would be thoroughly checked, and acts of worship in public spaces banned. The institutional figure of the president of the republic had also to be strengthened. Nevertheless, the successive administrations illustrate how implementing these concepts (i.e., turning constitution articles into laws and regulations), as well as ensuring law enforcement, was extraordinarily hard to achieve.

Venustiano Carranza was elected constitutional president in 1917. His administration showed some progress in the aspects listed above until he was faced with obstacles. The systematic enforcement of constitutional mandates had to be deferred, even to the point of moving them beyond the term of his administration. One of the most noticeable difficulties of his administration was the pressure from foreign countries and citizens to be allowed to own agricultural estates and subsoil resources. Carranza decided to take advantage of this situation by imposing heavy taxes on foreign-owned oil companies. This action rendered the treasury stronger. Apart from dealing with complaints by foreigners, Carranza had to tackle the church’s rejection of the constitution, and the municipalities’ lack of resources for implementing public education. The subsequent administration would have to work hard in the attainment of educational goals.

The Mexican Revolution did not reshape the nation radically, but it did serve to put into effect many reforms, namely the breaking up of large estates, the distribution of land among farmers, and the enforcement of advanced legislation for the labor sector. During the period 1920–1924, the constitution was amended to allow for the creation of the Secretaria de Educación Pública (Ministry of Public Education), a federal government agency meant to assist the municipalities in the handling of literacy programs and in bringing their cultural heritage closer to most people through the implementation of government programs. The strict enforcement of the laws regulating the relations between the state and the church led to the uprising known as Guerra Cristera (1926–1929) in the midwestern region of the country. Finally, subsequent to some administrations declaring the agrarian reform was over, Lázaro Cárdenas’ government (1934–1940) implemented a plan to systematically distribute the land and pass a decree that Mexico’s subsoil assets (i.e., oil deposits) were to be nationalized.

The chief outcome of the revolutionary movement consisted in the creation of a state headed by a central government, strong as it was founded on grassroots farmers and workers who endorse it in exchange for benefits. The state’s power lay in the creation of an army peopled mainly by common
citizens, and was enriched by the contributions of the middle class, who brought scientific, technological, and cultural progress. Since the 1920s—a time during which the ideology of the Mexican Revolution was renowned—it has been a widespread belief that national progress in every area was a direct consequence of the revolutionary movement. It is perhaps possible to affirm that the Mexican Revolution’s major goals were gradually attained—an idea to some extent consistent to Molina Enríquez’s thesis mentioned above—and that the landmark years of the revolutionary process were as follows: 1917, enactment of the constitution; 1920, retreat of forces that could star a rebellion against the government in office; 1929, creation of Partido Nacional Revolucionario, the political party that took on the role of interpreting the people’s aims and led the revolution; and 1940, when oil was declared to be the property of the nation and an equitable agricultural land distribution was finally accomplished. However, as Cárdenas’ term came to an end, it became evident that there would be no more policies inspired—strictly speaking—by revolutionary ideals. It may therefore be reasonable to assert that the events known as the Mexican Revolution occupied the years 1917 to 1920.

SEE ALSO: Ideology; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Apocalyptic and millenarian movements

JOHN R. HALL

Scholars invoke the terms “millenarian,” “millennialist,” and “apocalyptic” to refer to movements and sects that embrace ideologies positing the (typically traumatic) end of one era, promising relief from the sufferings of this world and its present age, and purporting to give rise to salvation in a new “golden age,” “heaven on earth,” or realized utopian social order. The strikingly broad range of movements that adopt such ideologies includes peaceful conversionist movements and militant religious social movements undertaking “holy war,” anticolonial movements, agrarian movements, and modern revolutionary political movements. Moreover, movements vary widely in their scale of organization and significance— from those that attract little notice beyond their participants to movements within early Christianity, the Protestant Reformation, and contemporary Islam that have been civilizational, even world-historical, in their consequences. Despite the ancient Middle Eastern origins of apocalypticism and millennialism, non-Western religions and ideologies— for example, Buddhism— have on occasion provided independent inspiration for such movements. Sometimes too, non-Western movements (for example, the nineteenth-century Tai Ping Rebellion in China) have synthesized local cultural materials with millenarian Christian ideas. In short, as rich veins of case study and comparative research document, millenarian and apocalyptic movements vary in ideology, organizational form, scale, and trajectory. The broad range of cases poses an important theoretical challenge— whether to focus on shared characteristics, or alternatively, to theorize alternative types of such movements.

The theoretical puzzle of millennialism and apocalypticism is signaled by the terms themselves. “Millennialism” in the narrowest sense refers to the thousand-year reign of Christ described in the Bible’s New Testament “Apocalypse of Saint John.” And the Greek word apokalyptein means “disclosure.” For Christian millennialists, disclosure signifies “revelation” about the end of history when God’s final judgment of— and victory over— the Antichrist and Satan is to take place. Millennialism, then, has to do with fixed temporal events, and since at least 1200 ce, when the Cistercian monk Joachim di Fiore unveiled his calculations about the three stages of world history, quintessential millenarian movements sometimes have focused on predicting the exact date of the anticipated second coming of Christ, the end of the world, or other decisive developments. However, even movements that evoke strong millenarian themes often display little interest in calendrical calculations, nor are they oriented toward the end of the world as such. Thus, millennialism has come to have a much broader— and looser— definition, centered on the anticipated arrival of an earthly utopia.

Overall, the apocalyptic offers a clearer basis for the conceptualization of the diversity of movements and sects centered on the end of one era and the beginning of another, because it is not inflected with meaning about a thousand-year period of time. The apocalyptic encompasses a broad array of ideologies and movements not necessarily focused on the actual physical destruction of the planet or its conditions of life (even if those are increasingly salient issues). Rather than the “end of the world,” the apocalyptic typically concerns “the end of the world as we know it,” an extreme cultural and social disjuncture in which dramatic events reshape the relations of many people at once to history” (Hall 2009: 3). Social researchers may affirm that the apocalypse is socially constructed in this way or
that, but nevertheless, study it with the same investigatory approaches toward (constructed) social realities employed in other research, for example, on bureaucratic organization.

In this light, it is possible to trace a rough genealogy of the apocalyptic in its ideological and organizational forms – from its ancient origins in Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thought and actions to modern-day secular and religious movements (Hall 2009). Already by the end of the first millennium of the modern era, apocalyptic movements took alternative forms – from groups expecting divine intervention, to efforts to convert others before the day of judgment, to pursuing the divine cause through violence against earthly oppressors, to “triumphalist” apocalypticism of a religion that spreads civilizationally to incorporate other parts of the world. In the European medieval era, both the Roman Church – through the Crusades – and heterodoxical and heretical movements elaborated on these possibilities. But it was the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, importantly shaped through retrenchment from the apocalyptically saturated “radical reformation,” that fundamentally altered apocalyptic conditions.

In the wake of the Reformation, European states took on the previously religious function of regulating the boundaries of legitimate religion, largely in efforts to “contain” apocalyptic movements. Equally important, on the basis of both Reformation and later Enlightenment developments, mystical strands that anticipated God’s imminent intervention (for example, Thomas Müntzer’s expectation during the sixteenth-century Peasants’ War in Germany that God would allow him to catch cannonballs in his sleeves) became displaced by modernizing rationalist discipline. Increasingly secularized on this new basis, the apocalyptic came to undergird the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, and from thence, influenced secular Marxist and anarchist theologies of revolution and, subsequently, anticolonial movements (cf. Eisentadt 1999). By the twentieth century, the diverse lines of diffusion had become highly complex. At the dawn of the third millennium, the modern disjuncture between the religious and the secular apocalyptic was to become blurred by both quasi-political militant Christian movements and the sacred – secular conflict between al-Qaida and the Western allies.

How to take theoretical stock? In part because the apocalyptic is so strongly centered in matters of belief (and ones that ordinary people during ordinary times tend to regard as fanciful or paranoid, or both), theorizations might seem tilted toward the analysis of ideologies and cultural formations, rather than toward investigation of patterns of action, organization, movements, and the processes and mechanisms driving their trajectories. However, such ideologies and beliefs are strongly oriented toward social temporalities, and because social action both occurs within and itself constructs social temporalities – in relation to organizations, movements, and institutions – theorization of millenarian and apocalyptic phenomena offers a potential basis on which to transcend conventional dichotomies of culture versus organization, structure versus agency.

The key classical source for theorizing would have to be the pathbreaking study written by Karl Mannheim as the Nazis consolidated power in Germany – *Ideology and Utopia* (1936). Although Mannheim was centrally concerned with thought formations, not action and organization, he advanced the important thesis that ideological and utopian thought formations are fundamentally temporal in their imaginaries of social existence. He also showed that the empirical varieties of such thought formations can be charted in relation to a small number of ideal types, including, importantly for our purposes, the existential “chiliasm” that directly experiences the millennial moment at hand, and the “socialist–communist” utopia to be advanced through strategic conflict.

The largest wave of scholarship on apocalyptic and millenarian groups came in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, developed countries trained the anthropological gaze on what
was then called the “third world” increasingly subject to decolonization movements, and the developed countries themselves experienced emergent countercultural and antiwar movements. In his classic study, Norman Cohn (1970) traced the ancient origins of millenarian movements and their flowering in medieval Europe in movements of “revolutionary millenarianism” and “mystical anarchism.” As Cohn’s inclusion of the latter category suggests, most seriously countercultural movements are “apocalyptic” in their initial break with an existing social order (and even “secular” groups invoke their causes as sacred). Such groups largely tend to emerge under conditions (often, as Barkun 1974 has noted, heralded by natural disasters) of felt or experienced crisis—of oppression by a more powerful group, of extreme economic hardship, of fundamental social changes that leave particular social strata feeling threatened (e.g., US whites in the Christian Identity movement), of divergent experiences by different social generations, or other developments that give rise to a broad countercultural milieu. However, the evidence is scant that actual calendrical eras, such as the end of the first millennium CE, are major drivers of apocalyptic movements (Hall 2009: 49). Indeed, especially in the United States, by the dawn of the third millennium, apocalyptic and millennial discourses have become so broadly diffused across rhetorical registers, and so deeply embedded in popular culture, that they operate as signifiers readily available on any occasion, across the political spectrum, and in diverse sectors of social life (Stewart & Harding 1999).

The problem of mapping the diversity has bedeviled inquiry. Apocalyptic and millenarian groups and movements have emerged among landless peasants, as movements of resistance, or sometimes, of honorable defeat, among native peoples facing colonial conquest. Sometimes movements have proposed physical escape to some promised land of redemption—to the New World for the English Pilgrims, back to Africa for Caribbean blacks in the Ras Tafari movement. Or, as in the case of Melanesian cargo cults, they have experienced re.sentiment to be resolved temporally, in an anticipated new era of abundant wealth. Some groups have sought to advance the date of promised redemption, either through the fulfillment of various prophetic requirements (e.g., conversion of certain numbers to the faith) or by performance of rituals (the cargo-cult construction of imitation airstrips to attract planes that would deliver the goods). At the extreme, movements like those Cohn described as “revolutionary millenarians” have sought to advance the arrival of the new order by taking matters into their own hands, no longer waiting for redemption but using violence to destroy the old order and make way for the new (Hall 2003). Vittorio Lanternari (1963) and Brian Wilson (1973) identified all these tendencies, and others besides, among what Lanternari called “religions of the oppressed.”

There are also affinities and connections between movements and other social phenomena. On the one hand, social bandits sometimes embrace millenarian ideology (and millenarian groups often engage in social banditry as a basis of want satisfaction), while, on a different front, millenarian movements may morph into, or become enmeshed within, broader revolutionary movements (Hobsbawm 1965: 58–59). Indeed, millennialism connects with major revolutionary movements such as the Puritan Revolution in England, Hindu nationalism, and liberation theology in Latin America (Lewy 1974). In any of various possible outcomes, a group may succeed to the point of transcending its tensed relationship with the rest of the world, become institutionalized, and increasingly accommodate to conditions of an established social order. Indeed, reflecting a possibility with ancient roots in Persian adoption of Zoroastrian ideas (Lincoln 2007), a movement that brings on a new established order may continue to embrace an apocalyptic rhetoric, transformed into triumphalism (Hall 2009: ch. 2 & 3).

Overall, movements that embrace apocalyptic and millenarian ideas are diverse, they
sometimes involve complex connections with
diverse other phenomena, and the scales of
action in which they occur are various—from
primary groups to transnational movements.
These complexities suggest three precepts:

- Differentiating apocalyptic and millenarian
  movements requires a battery of ideal types
  that clarifies alternative logics of ideology
  and organizational formation.
- Actual groups will vary in how closely
  they approximate a given ideal type, and
  sometimes hybrid groups will approximate
  various ideal types in different respects.
- Because such movements undergo often
  dramatic changes over the durations of their
  existences, they should be analyzed not as
  static structures but in relation to ideal types
  over historical time.

Given these precepts, by way of what concep-
tual frameworks might the array of movements
be understood?

Mannheim’s (1936) distinction between
chiliasm and socialist–communist utopia is
important, but insufficient to differentiate
empirical diversity, and it is centered on
ideology rather than social organization of
concrete movements (Hall 1978: 10–14, 18).
The (seemingly parallel) distinction of Norman
Cohn (1970) between mystical anarchism and
revolutionary millennialism also is too broad
to chart the diversity of movements, especially
given that mystical anarchism is not necessarily
millenarian. A different distinction, often made
in the study of Christianity, sets off “premil-
lennial” versus “postmillennial” groups on the
basis of whether the second coming of Christ is
anticipated to occur before or after a millennial
kingdom of God is established on earth. This
distinction is important, because premillen-

nialists are more likely to embrace the strong
apocalyptic expectations that can animate a
movement. However, the distinction is specific
to Christianity, and it is historically emergent
as well, gaining significance especially from the
eighteenth century, when postmillennialism
became linked with gradualist Enlightenment

Brian Wilson (1973) proposed a more devel-
oped typology. Beyond an “orthodox” baseline
of accepting the world more or less as it is, he
conceptualized seven alternative “responses to
the world”: (1) revolutionist, expecting God’s
imminent intervention to overthrow the world;
(2) introversionist, withdrawing into a sect of
true believers; (3) reformist, seeking gradually
but inexorably to align earthly social order on
the basis of divine guidance; (4) utopian, call-
ing for concerted human action to remake the
social world entirely; (5) conversionist, seeking
to bring widespread inner change to people,
whose sin and decadence are the sources of
evil in the world; (6) manipulationist, con-
cerned with effecting a new and more workable
relationship of individuals interacting with
the world; and (7) thamaturgist, employing
magical manipulations to achieve immediate
and local relief from travails (Wilson 1973:
21–30).

Both Mannheim’s and Wilson’s typologies
are keyed to alternative cultural formations—of
ideology or beliefs about salvation, respectively.
They thus offer rich bases for considering the
meanings associated with apocalyptic and mil-
ennial sects and movements. However, the
typologies are not based on any clear theoretical
axes of variation, and they are underdeveloped
in their capacities to flesh out how culture is
enacted, and with what tensions between beliefs
and organization.

A related, phenomenological approach (Hall
1978) constructs a two-dimensional typological
space based on (1) alternative social temporali-
ties (diachronic, synchronic, and apocalyptic),
and (2) alternative social enactments of reality
(natural, produced, and transcendental). Set
against synchronic and diachronic times are
two apocalyptic temporal orientations—pre-
apocalyptic, in which the end of an established
social order is anticipated as a real and immedi-
ate possibility, and post-apocalyptic, in which
escape from the old order purportedly has been
achieved, and the new circumstances are lived as
Apocalyptic and millenarian movements

evolve in everyday reality. The typology – based on alternative orientations to social temporality and social enactment – differentiates a variety of possible countercultural social forms that may emerge under broadly apocalyptic conditions, not all of them strongly apocalyptic or millennial. The commune is based on the anarchism of free-will association. Participants in the ecstatic association seek transcendence. And worldly-utopian groups – namely, the community and the intentional association – work to demonstrate the potential that alternative utopian bases of social organization have for ordering society at large (Hall 1978: 203–206, 208).

In relation to the apocalyptic, the key issues are when in time a movement posits its existence relative to the End Days, and how it positions its collective response to extraordinary times. The post-apocalyptic other-worldly sect claims to exist on the “other” side of the apocalypse, having “escaped” or otherwise established its life beyond the turmoil besetting the wider world. It thus enacts a “heaven on earth,” however construed. Pre-apocalyptic groups, on the other hand, remain on “this” side of the apocalypse and, accordingly, their trajectories depend on how quickly they anticipate the final trauma that will give way to the New Age, and what they construe as their role in the decisive events. A conversionist sect may simply seek to use the pre-apocalyptic moment as a basis in proselytizing to underscore the urgency of accepting salvation, or it may actually hold that sufficient conversions themselves will trigger the second coming of Christ, God’s final judgment, or some other event of the End Times. On the other hand, the apocalyptic warring sect seeks to advance the arrival of the new era through violence, including terror (Hall 1978: 206–207). Historically, such sects may operate under generally religious auspices, as al-Qaeda and militant/survivalist Christian groups in the United States claim to do, or they may be purely secular (for example, the Red Army Faction – or Baader-Meinhof gang – that operated in Germany during the 1970s). In either case, they invoke a value commitment to a sacred cause, following what Weber called an “ethic of ultimate ends” (Hall 1978: 206–207; cf. Wilson 1973: 23). Apocalyptic war, then, is the holy war described by Max Weber (1978: 473–474) – what Mark Juergensmeyer (2000: ch. 8) calls “cosmic war.”

No single typology will capture all empirical diversity, and trajectories need to be mapped over time. Internal dynamics (for example, the routinization of charisma classically described by Max Weber) will often shape movement groups. Also decisive is religious migration, which – as the histories of the ancient Jews, the American Pilgrims, the Mormons, and Peoples Temple (to name only a few) demonstrate – can both be spawned by apocalyptic efforts to escape evil forces, and give rise to apocalyptic conflicts in the Promised Land. More generally, apocalyptic trajectories will be shaped by concrete developments and a group’s own interpretations of them, often in interaction with other groups and a larger movement. Under such diverse circumstances, groups may seek to differentiate themselves from other movement groups by invoking fine-grained distinctions of theology, strategy, and tactics. Also, trajectories frequently are shaped in interaction with an established social order. Take two examples. First, the Weather Underground’s violent radicalization emerged in the wake of what its participants regarded as the failure of the wider anti-Vietnam War movement to affect US foreign policy. Second, the fiery 1993 denouement of David Koresh’s Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas, occurred during an ever-intensifying siege by governmental forces, themselves misled by cultural opponents (Hall, Schuyler, & Trinh 2000: ch. 2).

In yet another trajectory, a millennialist group that makes exact predictions about the world’s end faces a collective cognitive crisis when definitive evidence disproves its predictions. Yet this outcome does not necessarily spell the end of the movement, as was demonstrated after William Miller’s prediction about the world ending in 1844 failed to materialize, when some believers went on to found the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Similarly,
after flying saucers failed to rescue a sect from doomsday in 1954, believers revealed that God had decided to spare the world (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter 1964).

Millenarian and apocalyptic movements receive only episodic attention, largely contingent on the prevailing zeitgeist. The many open research questions concerning social movements in general are relevant to these groups as well, yet the special role of the sacred in such groups focuses attention on an issue of wider salience – the relation between culture, agency, action, institutions, and social formations. Some analysts would discount any substantial relationship between sacred ideology and movement developments, for example, suggesting that movement groups are basically rational in the collective choices they make, or that invoking the sacred may turbocharge a movement’s solidarity and sense of urgency, but has no significant independent effect net of other factors. Conversely, proponents of the Strong Program in cultural sociology initiated by Jeffrey Alexander will anticipate that cultural meanings have independent causal significance. The full range of such theories can offer useful clarification of alternative explanations, models, mechanisms, and processes. However, the empirical complexities and multiple explanatory issues concerning apocalyptic and millenarian movements suggest that explanations will be historically and situationally contingent. The central general task of research going forward is to map the conditions under which one or another process or mechanism takes hold, where one or another theory is salient. As we now recognize, apocalyptic movements can be both volatile in their trajectories and broadly significant in their consequences. Research on apocalyptic and millenarian movements thus merits pursuit with a new sense of urgency.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anticolonial movements; Christian Identity movement; Countercultures; Decolonization and social movements; Ideology; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Mau Mau revolt (Africa); Native American movements (United States); Peasant movements; Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany); Religion and social movements; Revolutions; Taiping Rebellion (China); Terrorist movements; Weatherman (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Molly Maguires (United States)
ANDREW MARTIN

The history of organized labor in most industrialized nations tends to be quite violent. This is especially true in the US, where employers often relied upon their own private security force, or the apparatus of the state, to quell labor unrest. Many labor unions during this period fell victim to a political and economic climate that granted business elites considerable discretion in ridding their workforce of union influence. Notorious instances included the lynching of Wobbly activists like Joe Hill, the Haymarket Riot of 1886 in Chicago, and a railway strike in 1877 that resulted in significant civilian casualties inflicted by state militia. These and other instances of violence, not surprisingly, led some unions, and many individual workers, to respond with violence of their own. The case of the Molly Maguires is an especially interesting historical example of the violence that sprang out of contentious industrial relations in America.

Labor organizations in the US have long relied on ethnic, religious, and racial boundaries to forge solidarity among members. The early years of the American Federation of Labor, with its emphasis on native-born, white skilled workers, is the most prominent example of this. Yet during the Industrial Revolution in America, when the labor process was becoming increasingly deskilled and repression of labor activism was common, other groups used pre-existing identities to create bonds among workers.

The Molly Maguires were not unique in this regard, as it was comprised largely of Irish-Catholic coal miners based primarily in northeastern Pennsylvania. The organization gained notoriety due to outbreaks of violence in the region in the mid to late nineteenth century. Its existence was subsequently used by the industrialists who controlled the mines as justification for repressing unionization efforts among the miners. Because of its illegal activity and informality of networks among members, the details of its membership, goals, and actions remain clouded in mystery. Indeed, the fact as to whether it was an “organization” or simply a loose collection of individuals who felt that violence was the only means of improving their lot is a matter of considerable debate among historians.

Despite this ambiguity, the Maguires did have their roots in the Irish countryside in the violence carried out by peasants seeking to protect their rights to land. With the growth of coalmining in the US, immigrants from Europe, including Ireland, came to work the coal fields, and they brought with them traditional means of confronting grievances, including the Molly Maguires.

Again, there is considerable speculation regarding the actual composition and activities of this group, and how influential it was in the coal mines of Pennsylvania. In particular, opponents of the Irish and the labor movement in the region at various times accused both the Irish-Catholic fraternal organization, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, as well as the main union of the mines, the Workingmen’s Benevolent Association (WBA), as serving as a front for the Maguires. Despite such claims, there is little actual evidence that this was indeed the case. Rather, it appears that such associations were made to incriminate both groups in the violence attributed to the Molly Maguires. In particular, the Maguires gained significant notoriety due to a series of assassinations and murders that were linked to the organization, 16 in all. These actions occurred during two separate periods.

The first wave took place during the American Civil War and was as much a struggle
against conscription as it was against the poor working conditions that marked the coal mines of the region. The Irish laborers identified primarily with the Democratic Party, and therefore opposed the war and efforts to raise an army through the draft. During the war there were six assassinations that were attributed to the Molly Maguires, and many of them were related to efforts by the government to draft Irish workers. With the conclusion of the war, violence waned, although it did not cease. Along with the end of the war, the rise of a unified labor organization, the WBA, contributed to the decline of violence in the coal fields. Unlike previous unions, this organization was quite successful in organizing mine workers across skill and ethnicity. Its roots were in the British model of industrial unionism and thus wholly opposed to the violence of the Molly Maguires. As such, it represented an important means by which the grievances for poor Irish mine laborers, including low wages and dangerous working conditions, could be expressed in a peaceful manner.

Yet this lull in labor violence in the coalfields proved to be short lived as major industrial changes led to renewed conflict between labor and management. Specifically, in the early 1870s the head of the Reading Railroad Corporation, Franklin Gowen, sought to consolidate the many small mine operators of the region and in the fall of 1874, under the leadership of Gowen, the large coal operators demanded serious wage concessions from the WBA, prompting a six-month long strike. This dispute weakened the union considerably, causing old ethnic tensions to flare up, and led to a new outbreak of violence, including eight murders and a number of acts of sabotage. The violence that arose during this period was more directly linked to the working conditions of the day, and often took the form of interethnic conflict, specifically between the Irish laborers and the more well-positioned Welsh immigrants, many of whom served as mine supervisors. Gowen knew that the union was the main obstacle to his control of the mines, and, using an antiunion press, sought first to attribute all of the violence during the strike as solely the responsibility of the Molly Maguires (a dubious claim at best) and second, to paint the WBA as merely a front for the Maguires (again, a dubious claim).

Using the considerable political power enjoyed by industrialists of the day, Gowen also hired Pinkertons detective agency to repress and infiltrate the Molly Maguires. Eventually, based upon rather weak evidence, most notably the testimony of a Pinkerton detective working undercover who had acted as an agent provocateur, 20 men were hung for the murders, including 10 on a single day. With this, the era of the Molly Maguires quickly faded. The legacy of the Molly Maguires remains sharply contested; earlier historical accounts tended to take at face value the claims made against them, but more recent, careful scholarship has both deflated such claims and put their activities within the context of the larger context of the contentious labor management relations that marked the day.

Although the Maguires portray a particularly notorious case of industrial violence, even for a period when such conflict was common, there are clear empirical benefits that can be gleaned from this struggle. First, the degree to which business and the state worked hand in glove is striking. For example, Franklin Gowen, who represented the interests of the mine owners and railroad, also served as the prosecutor in the main trial of the men suspected of murder. Clearly the interests of capital and the state were very closely aligned, and fundamentally opposed to the organization of workers into unions. The case also illustrates the extent to which business owners were willing to rely upon private forces, here Pinkertons, to ensure a union-free workplace. Violence by nonstate actors like mobs and vigilantes has long been a feature of working-class conflicts. It is evident also that unions during this period were often viewed suspiciously; in the case of the Molly Maguires there is virtually no evidence the WBA carried out or condoned any of the violence, yet the public was generally willing to believe accusations that this union was behind
it. Such belief allowed the state and mine owners to repress workers with little public opposition, thus effectively ridding the Pennsylvania coal mines of organized labor for many years.

SEE ALSO: Labor movement; Strikes in US history; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The term “moral panics” (MPs) first appeared as an academic term at the beginning of the 1970s, in the well-established field of sociology of deviance and labeling, along with the emerging sociology of mass media. It was the pioneering studies of Jock Young (1971), on the social meaning of drug use, and of Stanley Cohen (1972), on the media-inspired confrontations between youths, which developed and effectively launched the concept of MPs to its present status as a central tool of sociological and media analysis, as well as a common phrase in popular discourse. Since then, the conceptualization of moral panics has benefited from several theoretical innovations. The original model drew mainly on symbolic interaction and labeling theory in relation to deviant behavior, but also on other theories, such as those interrogating collective behavior, social problems, and social movements. Ironically, the success of the concept has also resulted in loose or outdated theoretical applications (McRobbie & Thornton 1995; Cornwell & Linders 2002; Garland 2008) and increased questions about its efficacy (Ungar 2001; Hier 2008). However, the concept and theory of MPs retain all their pertinence and still offer us a heuristic analytical tool by which to study social movements.

DEFINITION

MPs are classically defined as struggles for moral hegemony over interpretations of the legitimacy (or not) of prevailing social arrangements and material interests. They are moral disturbances centering on claims by moral entrepreneurs that direct interests have been violated, sometimes expressed in terms of demonization of “moral deviants” (Victor 1998), sometimes with humanitarian undertones (Becker 1963), that are “wildly exaggerated and wrongly directed” (Jenkins 1998: 7). Indeed, MPs have to create, focus on, and sustain powerfully persuasive images of “folk devils” (Cohen 1972) that can serve as the heart of moral fears. These fears are seen as grossly disproportionate to the event or the activities of the individuals concerned (Hall et al. 1978; Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994). As Cohen states it, a condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians, and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible (Cohen 1972: 1).

MORAL PANICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In his foundational book, Cohen studied official and public reaction to conflicts between rival youth subcultures – the “mods” (for modern styles), who drove scooters, against the “rockers,” who rode motorcycles and wore leather – which gave way to street fights and property destruction after their unanticipated arrival in an English beach town. In the same vein as Young, Cohen identifies five categories of groups as being part of the collective process of MPs: control agents, politicians, lawmakers, moral entrepreneurs, and the mass media. He builds a five-stage model of MPs: behavior by folk devils is defined as a threat to societal values and interests; the threat is depicted in a recognizable dramatic form by the media; a rapid build-up of public concern
arises; public authorities, politicians, and moral entrepreneurs call for a strong solution to the problem; the panic recedes or results in social and institutional changes.

Hall and colleagues (1978) expanded upon Cohen’s concept of MPs by explicating the role of ideology in the media’s contribution to the process of a MP, particularly during times of political or socioeconomic crisis. Using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the signification of “common sense,” Hall and his colleagues contend that “the media tend to reproduce the definitions of the powerful” (1978: 57) while maintaining relative autonomy. They state that MPs are intentionally created to draw the public attention away from social and economic troubles and toward the particular subject of the MP for increased forms of social control.

These early English theorists were precursors to the social constructionist perspective, which does not take reality as a given, but as something that is produced by the actions of individuals and groups and their interpretations of how the world works. Critcher (2003) contrasts this British “attributional” model (i.e., defining MPs by their attributes) with an American “processual” model (i.e., defining MPs by the processes through which they pass). Indeed, American studies are particularly insightful in their analyses of the role of moral entrepreneurs and claim makers, therefore of organized collective interests and social movements.

For example, Goode and Ben-Yehuda explicitly incorporate the concept into the field of social movements. Social movements are defined as organized efforts by a substantial number of people to change or resist change in some important aspect of society, and their principal aim is to establish the legitimacy of a specific claim about a social condition. (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994: 116). Social movements are distinguished from pressure groups or lobbies on the grounds that they are mainly composed of outsiders without direct access to policymakers and legislators, and that their statements do not receive automatic attention in the media. In order to further their claims they must gain the media’s attention and attempt to secure legitimation for their definition of the reality or the condition being addressed. They do this by opposing good versus evil, and using the language of moral indignation. Their focus is on the worst aspects of the condition they are denouncing as if these were typical and representative. The authors assess three competing explanations of MPs: first, a grassroots model, that sees the sources of panics in widespread anxieties about real or imagined threats; second, an elite engineered model, in which an elite group manipulates a panic over an issue they know to be exaggerated, in order to divert attention away from their own inability or unwillingness to solve social problems. The main concern of a dominant social group (state, institutions, police, social workers) is to have an objective and conscious interest in developing the MP: a middle level social movements model. Here, the important trait, in the vein of Gusfield’s seminal work on prohibition leagues (1963), is the role of moral entrepreneurs who launch crusades that may become panics.

Subsequent studies of MPs have multiplied exponentially, including AIDS (Watney 1988), drug scares (Armstrong 2007), minority youth violence (Welch, Jenkins, & Harris 1999), child abuse and pedophilia (Jenkins 1998; Whittier 2009), satanism (Victor 1998), school shootings (Burns & Crawford 1999), and obesity (Fraser, Maher, & Wright 2010), among others. Although both the original model of MPs and its successive reformulations are very useful for social sciences, one has to take stock of the criticisms that have been formulated by scholars in the field of social problems, public policy, media, and social movement studies.

REVISIONS AND CRITICISMS

Many grounds for the rejection or revision of the concept of MPs can be cited. Listed below are six main concerns that may help to consider further the strengths and weaknesses of this key concept to the study of social movements. The
first criticisms discussed are easily answered, while the later oppositions raise valid questions against the theory.

Since its inception, the concept of MP has been used as a form of social critique. As Cohen himself observes, panic research has tended to focus on “cases where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary forces...[where the aim of the research] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction...[but also as] tendentious (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction) and...as misplaced or displaced (that is, aimed – whether deliberately or thoughtlessly – at a target which was not the ‘real’ problem)” (Cohen 2002: xxxi). However, things have recently changed and scholars working on topics as diverse as pedophilia (Whittier 2009), health-related problems (Fraser, Maher, & Wright 2010), or flag burning (Welch 2000) have shown that moral campaigns are not intrinsically conservative.

Second, critics such as Whittier argue that MPs approach to social problems is far too close to largely discredited “studies in crowd behavior that falsely suggest that people in groups or crowds adopt irrational behaviors or beliefs in a kind of mass hysteria in which their usual behaviors and norms fall by the wayside under the influence of the group” (2009: 17). Indeed, it is true that some scholars tend to assume too quickly that people are easily swept up in a collective process of media hype and false information and subjected to “conformity pressures that enforce consensual beliefs” (Victor 1998: 560). However, it has also become very clear that the term “panic” is only a metaphor and has nothing to do with physical panics. As Ben-Yehuda states it, “moral panics are not characterized by fright, flight, freezing, stampede or other behaviours associated – most of the time wrongly – with ‘panics.’ MP’s are characterized by speeches, sermons, preaching, negotiations, arguments, debates, legislation, law enforcement priorities, agenda setting and the like, all focused on moral issues” (Ben-Yehuda 2009: 2).

It has also frequently been said that moral panics are volatile phenomena. By their nature, panics would be fleeting and subside as quickly as they erupt. For example, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) consider that the same issue may reoccur but individual panics cannot be sustained for long. Yet, however temporary they may seem, MPs may also pave the way to new institutional arrangements, as well as for long-lasting bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, even if a specific MP does not seem to immediately give way to routinization, its very occurrence may leave traces and have long-lasting cognitive effects. This has been illustrated by scholars working on police culture and the criminalization of social movements (Reiter & Fillieule 2006).

Other criticisms refers to the idea that the disproportional reaction to a particular deviance is a key attribute of any MP. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue, “the concept of moral panic rests on disproportionality” (1994: 38). It is evident where “public concern is in excess of what is appropriate if concern were directly proportional to objective harm” (1994: 36). A classic example is the 1980s missing children controversy in the US (Best 1990). A national campaign for missing children was boosted by the 1981 murder of a child in Florida whose parents consequently became prominent activists. The campaign claimed that 1.5 million children disappeared or were abducted each year in the US. Two federal laws set up a national system for recording missing persons (1982), and a National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (1984). However, from 1985 onward, attention to the issue declined as the media attacked the credibility of excessive claims. Even if Best’s work clearly illustrates the social construction of MPs, measuring the gap between the reality of a problem and its representation is in itself a difficult matter. Indeed, we simply remain “short of some reliable indication of what constitutes a realistic level of concern, anxiety or alarm” (Hier 2008: 178). In her study of child sexual abuse, Whittier (2009) strongly rejects sociological studies that take a social constructionist or social problem
approach to the issue and denies the fact that concern about child molestation run high only as a result of sensationalist media coverage and the claims of self-promoting “experts,” rather than as a result of real danger (Victor 1998; Jenkins 2001) She even shows that, in fact, the majority of criminal cases of child molestation are not even mentioned in the news coverage.

Criticisms of disproportionality are closely linked to the idea that the model of MPs is not well suited to fragmented and multicultural societies where experts, media, and the public do not speak with a unified voice. Here again, media coverage of child sexual abuse is a good example. In contrast to social constructionist arguments, rather than equating all sexual abuse with ritual abuse, media stories discuss other forms of child molestation, bringing more attention to other forms of abuse such as incest (Whittier 2009). A renewed MPs approach has to recognize that in multicultural societies, morality is constantly contested and negotiated. Moral consensus in such societies is not an issue taken for granted, and MPs may be launched by diverse competing moral entrepreneurs in various social arenas. Therefore, the entire issue of launching MPs within more general processes of moral entrepreneurship, legislation, policing, and regulation has to be reconceptualized. In the same vein, one must admit that the audience does not simply believe and act upon the messages it receives from the media. In this respect, the model allegedly fails to explain the role of the public as media audiences or a body of opinion (McRobbie & Thornton 1995; Cornwell & Linders 2002; de Young 2004).

Finally, and more damagingly for social movement research, classic MPs models tend to erroneously deny agency to “folk devils” themselves (Watney 1988; Cornwell & Linders 2002; de Young 2004). McRobbie and Thornton (1995: 571) convincingly stress the fact that in contemporary societies, stigmatized groups are less marginalized than they once were. “They not only find themselves vociferously and articulately supported in the same mass media that castigates them, but their interests are also defended by their own noches and micro media. So called folk devils now produce their own media as a counter to what they perceive as the biased media of the mainstream.”

Social movement research can help to enrich the MPs model by analysis of the interactions between deviantizers and stigmatizers on one hand, who try to create folk devils, and, on the other, folk devils who attempt the rejection or even reversal of stigmatization, though the latter attempts are not always successful (e.g., Snow & Anderson 1987). At the same time, social movement research could rely more on the theoretical foundations for the theory and concept of MPs, especially labeling theory, which offers powerful instruments to study interactions between stigmatizers and deviantizers and their targets. One of the more interesting questions to ask in this context would be when and why attempts to launch moral panics fail (Jenkins 2009).

SEE ALSO: Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Entrepreneurs, movement; Emotion and social movements; Framing and social movements; Identity work processes; Moral shocks/outrage; Temperance movements.

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Movement Toward Socialism (MAS–IPSP) (Bolivia)

ROBERT ALBRO

The Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, hereafter MAS) is the political instrument of Bolivia’s president Evo Morales. The story of Morales is well known. He grew up poor in a rural Aymara-speaking community of miners, and migrated to the lowland coca-growing Chapare region upon conclusion of his military service. In the early 1980s Morales became active in his local union of coca growers, and since 1988 he has been primary leader of the Six Federations of the Chapare, the region’s coca grower movement. He has continued as the titular head of the coca growers since 2006 while serving as Bolivia’s president.

The origin of the MAS cannot be understood except in the context of long-term coca grower resistance in the Chapare to the US-backed War on Drugs, initiated in the early 1980s in Bolivia. Efforts to eradicate coca – the active agent in cocaine – routinely pitted coca grower unions against US-trained Bolivian eradication agents, often with violent results. The politics of the coca growers combined sharp rejection of the US presence in Bolivia with defense of union autonomy, rejection of Bolivia’s traditional Bolivian class system, rejection of “Washington Consensus”-inspired neoliberal policies since 1985, and a discourse combining class with ethnicity. During the 1990s the coca growers increasingly framed their commitments in cultural and indigenous terms. Nevertheless, they remained marginal to national Bolivian politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s, despite coming to dominate the national agrarian union hierarchy.

The MAS was born from coca grower outreach beginning in the 1980s to cultivate ties with political parties from the Left. In 1995, on the heels of the 1994 “March for Life, Coca and Sovereignty,” the coca growers used their dominant position in the national union movement to adopt a “thesis of the political instrument,” aiming for the creation of a political party as a direct extension of their struggle. Concurrent with this the Bolivian government’s 1994 Popular Participation Law provided a means for the entrance of indigenous representatives into local political office. By the late 1990s the coca growers had become the dominant electoral force in the Chapare region.

This was the basis for Morales’ election to Bolivia’s congress in 1997, after borrowing the name of an obscure leftist party, the MAS, to run legally. In 2002 Morales was transformed into a national political figure when his MAS candidacy finished an unexpected second in the national presidential election. Morales won the presidential election in 2005 with a 54 percent majority of the vote, which was unheard of for Bolivia. Subsequently the MAS has continued to enjoy strong local support throughout the country – with the notable exceptions of the lowland departments led by Santa Cruz, which have opposed him – as well as a congressional majority. Morales was reelected to a second term in 2009. And despite some challenges the MAS has been the dominant local and national political force in Bolivia since 2005.

The MAS became a national political factor through its protagonism in the large-scale grassroots mobilizations in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, where it orchestrated highly visible marches and participated in road blockades, alongside other social movement and indigenous actors, in the process driving two presidents from office. During this period of sustained social ferment and direct-action protest, the cause of the coca growers also came to be elided with broader political currents bringing together concerns for national
sovereignty, the rejection of neoliberalism, the promotion of indigenous rights and autonomy, with calls for a constitutional referendum and more comprehensive agrarian reform.

In the process the MAS presided over the collapse of Bolivia’s traditional political class and established parties, which had held sway over the country’s politics since the revolution of 1952. The MAS forged an unprecedented coalition across previous social divisions, including coca growers, worker unionists, indigenous peoples, disenchanted members of the informal economy, students, and a significant proportion of the urban middle class. The MAS effectively channeled a shared rejection of the political status quo. The MAS consistently avoids calling itself a political party, preferring to behave as if an expression of the grassroots (referred to as the “bases”). Particularly early on, MAS representatives were careful not to present themselves as politicians but as “spokespeople” for a base-driven consensus emerging from face-to-face rank-and-file union and indigenous community meetings. A major challenge for the MAS has been to maintain its diverse electoral base. The inclusion of nonindigenous Marxist intellectual Álvaro García Linera as Morales’ vice president is one expression of this.

Morales and the MAS represent a historic political transformation for Bolivia. Carrying out an agenda given it by Bolivia’s social and indigenous movements to “refound” the country, the MAS has moved away from the policies of “savage capitalism” of prior administrations, in the process nationalizing both its oil and gas industries. It has promoted the country’s nascent lithium industry, while seeking new economic partners other than the US. It has decriminalized the coca leaf and undertaken an active program of land redistribution, especially for indigenous migrants. Most historic has been the successful passage of Bolivia’s 2009 constitution, defining the state as “plurinational” and “communitarian.” It has enshrined a wide set of new collective rights specifically for indigenous peoples, formally recognizing a total of 36 indigenous languages and groups alongside the right to self-governance. It has further included recognition of indigenous forms of leadership, decision-making, community justice, territorial rights, and the right to manage their own resources and development.

The symbolic politics of the MAS has effectively capitalized upon lessons learned from new populist parties which appeared in the late 1980s, and which had success among Bolivia’s lower and working classes by focusing on their economic duress and their indigenous heritage. This includes regular usage of Andean languages alongside symbols of indigenous culture and identity. The MAS official platform is framed in terms of the Andean cosmological concept of material and spiritual balance, called “suma qamaña” (or “living well”). And the “refounding” of the Bolivian state is known as a “Pachakuti” – a millennial term referring to world renewal. The MAS presents itself as a means for the “decolonization” of Bolivia’s native majority after “500 years” of struggle. The MAS has also used an indigenous agenda as a basis for its foreign policy goals, in conjunction with currents of transnational indigenous activism. This was evident when in 2010 Bolivia hosted the First World Conference of the People on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth.

If the MAS is often held up as an illustration of what happens when a social movement successfully aspires to governance, this process has not been free of conflict. In 2008 the MAS government grappled with a secessionist movement in Santa Cruz. And since 2005 it has faced strong criticism from different indigenous organizations that it is too top-down and not fully representative. In 2011 this occasioned a serious crisis of legitimacy for the MAS government when it quashed indigenous marchers seeking to halt the building of a new highway through their ancestral territory. Given the diversity of indigenous interests and claims upon the state, it has proven difficult for the MAS to represent them all. It is also unclear if the MAS can sustain its dominance if Evo Morales were to leave office in 2015.
SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Grassroots movements; Indigenous movements in Latin America.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Muslim activism in Europe
LASSE LINDEKILDE

For a long time Muslims in Europe, predominantly work migrants of the 1960s–1970s and their descendants, were ignored as political agents, both by authorities and academics. The sociology of religion has approached European Muslims in terms of religious identity, transformation of religious practices, and the institutionalization of Islam in different national contexts, but has largely ignored political manifestations (see Maréchal et al. 2003). Until recently, social movement studies considered religion an issue of the past (Kniss & Burns 2004) and rarely acknowledged it as a source of political activism.

However, over the past decade Muslim political activism has become a central political concern to Western European societies, and a fast growing field of research. This interest has been driven by a perceived challenge to secular democracies from Muslim activism in Europe, presumably demonstrated in high-profile cases such as the Rushdie affair, the affair des foulards in France, and the Danish Muhammad cartoons controversy.

TYPES OF MUSLIM ACTIVISM

Muslim activism in Europe is a diverse phenomenon in terms of mobilized identities, arenas of claims-making, types of demands, and so on. In practice the same religious doctrines give rise to different forms of activism and normative aspirations. From a majority society perspective much hope and effort has been invested in the mobilization of a “European Islam,” characterized by individualization and the belief that Islam should be practiced in private (Salvatore 2004). More prominent among Muslims has been the mobilization around neo-orthodox identities, stressing the right to be different, as in the fight for Islamic symbols in the public sphere, and the possibility of simultaneous strong affiliation with the Islamic community and societal integration (Schiffauer 2007). These types of Muslim mobilization and activism are often initiated and called for against the backdrop of ultra-orthodox Muslim communities, which reject the political struggle for recognition among Muslims in Europe, arguing the incompatibility of Islam and democratic participation.

The vast majority of European Muslims, who accept the terms of democracy, have raised a variety of political claims, some of a practical nature regarding religious practices, such as the building of mosques, Muslim burial grounds, veiling in public, and Muslim private schools. Such claims are often mobilized around arguments of equality of religion, referring to entitlements already given to other religions (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Other claims have been mobilized in reaction to public provocations of Muslims, such as the Scandinavian cartoon controversies, arguing for equal treatment, anti-discrimination, and freedom of religion (e.g., Lindekilde & Larsson 2009).

Muslim political claims in Europe have been cast using diverse repertoires of action. Considering institutionalized forms of political activism, European Muslims have (wherever possible) made use of their political right to vote and run for elections, in particular at the local level. Electoral participation by Muslims in Europe has generally been lower than among majority citizens, but has been shown to vary significantly across local and national contexts, depending on electoral systems and availability of Muslim candidates. Institutionalized channels of consultations with immigrant communities have also proven to be important to Muslim activism, serving as nurseries for Muslim political careers. The idea of official Muslim councils that provide authorities with a unified Muslim representation (as seen
in e.g., Belgium, Britain, and France) has been contested and has led to concerns about authority dependency, factionalism, and lack of representativity (Pfaff & Gill 2006). The legal system has also become an increasingly important forum for Muslim activism, as courtrooms become arenas of political claims-making (Amiraux 2005). Non-institutionalized forms of activism such as demonstrations, petitions, and “homeland claims-making,” have been shown to be more widespread in Muslim communities in countries with limited opportunities for procedural forms of political claims-making. Regarding Muslim participation in public debates, research points to national variance in the amount of claims raised by actors identifying as Muslims, issues raised, and justifications presented (Koopmans & Statham 2001).

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS

Recent research on Muslim activism in Europe has striven to integrate insights from the sociology of Islam with social movement theory, acknowledging the diversity and complexity of Muslim experiences in Europe, while taking Muslim political activism seriously (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2004). This development has caused a shift away from explaining Muslim activism in terms of Islamic exceptionalism (e.g., its proclaimed decentralized, political, and conflictual nature), toward seeing it as driven by dynamics of contention similar to other forms of activism. Instead of taking the incompatibility of Muslim activism and secular democracies as its starting point, more research is looking to empirically investigate if and how Muslim activists are adapting to the political culture of their country of residence. Likewise, the practical, rather than the theological, manifestations of the relationship between Islamic thought and political activism are increasingly coming into focus (Bayat 2007).

Empirically some trends in Muslim activism can be noticed. First, Muslims in Europe are increasingly organizing in multiethnic organizations focusing on a Muslim identity rather than in ethnocultural (immigrant) organizations. This tendency reflects a trend among second-generation immigrants of searching for a more acultural version of Islam (Roy 2002), but should also be seen as a response to the intense politicization of Islam in European societies. Second, Muslim activism in Europe is becoming more female, giving rise to female Muslim organizations and claims of gender equality. Finally, it has been argued that Muslim activism in Europe has radicalized in recent years, giving way to more ultra-orthodox interpretations of Islam, including views of democratic procedures as haram, and acceptance/support of violence, including terrorism, as a means of political activism (Abbas 2007). However, the claim that Muslim radicalization is on the rise has yet to be substantiated, and further investigation into the determinants of such radicalization is needed.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Claims-making; Ideology; Immigration, protest, and social movements; Islamic movements; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Barely a decade into the twentieth century, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded. Its principal charge, issued by the cadre of white reformers, in addition to W.E.B. Du Bois and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, was to secure for blacks the rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. More concretely, the organization was originally intended to help black Southerners overcome what Aldon Morris calls the “tripartite system of domination” in which whites subjected them to social, political, and economic oppression (Morris 1984). The NAACP did so in manifold ways, most of which rested upon appealing to federal authorities for legislative and legal redress.

From the outset, a principal organizational priority was the preservation of the lives of black Southerners whose welfare meant nothing to white supremacists. During what has come to be known as the “lynching era (1882–1930),” the lives of well over 4000 blacks were snatched by mobs of white Southerners (Tolnay & Beck 1995). In this context, one in which blacks were murdered with impunity, the NAACP lobbied Congress to make lynching a federal crime. James Weldon Johnson, the NAACP’s first black chief executive, managed to persuade enough members of the House of Representatives to pass the Dyer Bill in 1922. Yet, like much progressive legislation that would eventually follow, Southern senators used the filibuster to kill it, claiming that the Dyer Bill ran afoul of states’ rights (Sullivan 2009). However, in 1930, the NAACP successfully lobbied Congress to derail the appointment of Judge John Parker, a North Carolinian jurist who thought blacks unfit to vote.

Ironically, the NAACP’s victory in sweeping aside formal segregation unleashed forces that would all but cripple the organization in the South. With the rise of “massive
resistance,” a campaign to at least forestall desegregation if not end it (Bartley 1969), the South retaliated against the NAACP, forcing it to play defense as the 1950s played out. Among other measures, southern state legislatures dusted off old corporate tax and registration laws to force the NAACP out of business and force it to reveal the names of its members. While the NAACP refused to comply, its access to courts was suspended, and the organization was largely driven underground in the South, both of which caused membership to plummet (McMillen 1994; Jonas 2005; Sullivan 2009).

While its ability to press for litigation stalled, and its history of lobbying Congress long over, the NAACP managed to continue to contribute to the movement. It did so through its ability to help mobilize its membership for the direct action protests that took place throughout the South in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Along with the black church and black colleges, the NAACP was one of the institutional pillars on which insurgency would come to rest. Indeed, each possessed ready-made networks amenable to rapid mass mobilization (McAdam 1999). Moreover, in the absence of local branch leadership provided by Amzie Moore, Aaron Henry, and W.W. Law, to name but three, it is not clear that the movement would have been as successful (Carson 1981; Payne 1995; Brooks 2004).

Through the early 1960s, it is beyond dispute that the NAACP realized its founding charge: securing equality for black Southerners. They are far better off now than they would have been otherwise. Of course, blacks elsewhere benefited from the work of the NAACP through this period, including winning in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), in which the court held that attempts to enforce restrictive housing covenants would run afoul of the Constitution. Yet, as the 1960s wore on and bled into the 1970s, America’s oldest civil rights organization achieved fewer successes. The reasons for this are manifold.

Increasing resentment on the part of many whites, many of whom felt threatened by what they perceived as blacks’ improving status, and frustrated with the disturbances of the late 1960s, made it difficult for the NAACP to retain its support among progressive donors (Jonas 2005). In the face of this increasing hostility, the NAACP found it difficult to work with other civil rights groups. Part of this is due to the fact that the more progressive movement organizations, including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and, later, the Black Panther party, criticized the NAACP as too conservative when it rejected black power as necessarily antiwhite (Carson 1981). Further, it preferred to continue working within established institutional channels to ease the plight of blacks in the urban core, as other organizations continued to embrace protest as a means of redress. Moreover, the NAACP continued to aim for integration as a goal even as other social movement organizations began to move toward separatism as a tactical solution to the backlash (Lawson 2003). Further adding to its conservative image was the NAACP’s refusal to join with CORE and SNCC to take a hard line against the war in Vietnam (Hall 2003). Finally, the NAACP’s coziness with the Johnson administration further diluted its effectiveness by causing some to see it as successfully co-opted (Reed 1999). Ultimately, Nixon’s capture of the presidency summarily severed the NAACP’s access to the White House, spelling doom for the relatively conservative course it sought to chart, as the new administration worked to undermine all efforts for which the organization had fought; a pattern that continued in two of the next three administrations (Sitkoff 1981).

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Ethnic movements; Law and social movements; Social movement organization (SMO); Strategy; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


National Liberation Sandinist Front (Nicaragua)

SALVADOR MARTÍ I PUIG

ORIGINS

In July 1961 a group of young, radicalized Nicaraguans inspired by the experience of Cuba founded a guerrilla organization, the National Liberation Front (FLN), in order to take up arms against the Somoza regime. Later, after the first guerrilla campaigns, Carlos Fonseca, one of its founding leaders, added the epithet “Sandinista” to the organization’s name, making it the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), as of 1962. The main inspiration for the FSLN – as was the case with other Latin American guerrilla organizations – was the Cuban Revolution and the foco theory of guerrilla warfare (foquismo). Yet, in the case of the FSLN, the nationalist and anti-imperialist tradition started by Augusto César Sandino (1927–1933) also had an important influence.

Initially, the FSLN focused on carrying out guerrilla actions in the mountains in the north of the country. Although it enjoyed few victories over the 1960s, it did manage to create a type of “guerrilla legend.”

Over the following decade, the FSLN built a Marxist-Leninist ideological core and a solid organizational structure. However, during this period the FSLN also experienced internal conflicts that gave rise to three groups: the Guerra Popular Prolongada, which advocated carrying on with the guerrilla war; the Tendencia Proletaria, which wanted to organize the workers; and the Tendencia Insurreccional, which saw a need to establish alliances with sectors of the bourgeoisie and which called for insurrection.

It was in the second half of the 1970s that the FSLN began to gain real political influence. As of 1977 the Sandinistas carried out some spectacular actions (such as kidnapping the National Assembly), activated urban groups, gained the support of the middle class, and even co-opted members from high society.

It was in this way that the FSLN began to challenge (both on the streets and in the diplomatic arena) the regime of the Somoza family. Four elements were particularly important in this process: the position of the Carter administration in favor of human rights, the social impact of the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro (a prestigious journalist opposed to the regime), the intense repression unleashed by Somoza’s National Guard, and the FSLN’s capacity to create alliances. Thanks to this combination of factors, together with the social support they enjoyed, on July 19, 1979, the “muchachos” of the FSLN reached the streets of Managua to proclaim the second victorious revolution in Latin America.

LA SANDINISTA POPULAR REVOLUTION (1979–1990)

The revolutionary process led by the FSLN (via a collegiate body of nine commanders, called the Dirección Nacional) had many objectives, of which three are worth pointing out: (1) democratization and mobilization, (2) the recuperation of national sovereignty, and (3) productive development and equality.

At the institutional level the revolution created a state which, although led by the FSLN, maintained considerable spaces of plurality and guaranteed individual and collective liberties. At the international level, Nicaragua quickly became associated with similar cases (such as the Cuban revolution) but also maintained a solid policy of alliances with countries from Western Europe and Latin America. With regard to economic policy, the revolutionary government carried out a profound agrarian reform and intense education and health campaigns. Consequently, in the first years of the
Despite this, the revolution soon found a ferocious and powerful enemy: the US government. The US administration led by Ronald Reagan designed a financial, political, and physical aggression – the Contra war – to end the revolutionary experience that, as was claimed, could extend throughout the region. Consequently, the counterrevolutionary war limited and changed many of the projects that the FSLN had initially planned. The Contra war aroused great interest in the international arena. Many considered the process to be a fight between David and Goliath, giving rise to a great wave of international solidarity throughout the world.

In 1990, after almost a decade of war, the weak Nicaraguan economy was on the verge of collapse. In these circumstances, elections were held in 1990 in the framework of liberal-democratic institutions created as a result of a Constitution drawn up in 1987. Daniel Ortega (president of Nicaragua since 1984) represented the FSLN against a broad coalition led by Violeta Barrios (widow of the journalist assassinated in 1978).

The winner of the elections was the “anti-Sandinista” candidate and for the first time in history a formation that reached power by arms gave up its power after defeat at the ballot box.

SANDINISMO AFTER THE REVOLUTION

After losing the elections and governmental power, the FSLN became a political party and managed to survive, becoming the main force in opposition in the country for 16 years. Nevertheless, after losing three consecutive elections, in 2006 (and again in 2011) it won the presidency of the republic with the leader who had lost in 1990: Daniel Ortega. Yet the FSLN that reached power had undergone a considerable organizational and ideological change. On the one hand, over the 16 years in opposition many of the resources of organizational power became concentrated in the figure of its leader and, on the other hand, its discourse became more moderated, moving towards more populist positions, with a notable influence of religion.

The FSLN’s capacity to survive and adapt from its foundation as a guerrilla group up until the present day has been immense. Currently the FSLN is a party in power which has become a personal platform for Ortega, very similar to that of Chávez in Venezuela. Nevertheless, there is one important difference: the FSLN maintains the symbolic heritage of having been a victorious guerrilla group and a vanguard party that saw a revolutionary project through.

SEE ALSO: Cuban revolution; Guerrilla movements; Marxism and social movements; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

National Organization for Women (NOW) (United States)

STEPHANIE GILMORE

The National Organization for Women (NOW) was the largest explicitly feminist organization of the post-World War II women’s movement, and remains active into the twenty-first century. NOW was founded in June 1966, at the third annual meeting of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW); at this meeting in Washington DC, delegates refused to pass a resolution mandating the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to hear cases related to on-the-job sex discrimination cases. Commissioners Aileen Hernandez and Richard Graham had been pushing the EEOC to hear cases of sex discrimination, but were outnumbered by three other commissioners who denied sex discrimination as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Sonia Pressman Fuentes, an EEOC attorney, suggested that women needed an organization to speak on behalf of women as the NAACP and other organizations had done for African Americans; she also coined the name “National Organization for Women.”

Scholars often point to NOW as the example of liberal feminism, and position it in juxtaposition to radical feminism. NOW leaders have always pursued social and cultural change by working within the current political system (as opposed to a radical call for the overthrow of patriarchal structures), but never did so exclusively. In its 1966 statement of purpose, NOW identified itself as an organization for women and for men who sought equality between the sexes. It also acknowledged social conditions that perpetuate inequality for women, including motherhood and marriage, and sought political solutions to oppressive conditions. In 1968, NOW came out in support of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and women’s right to abortion. These stands proved controversial: union members were reluctant to support NOW because unions at the time opposed the ERA; religiously and politically conservative women rejected abortion rights.

In 1970, NOW announced a Women’s Strike for Equality for August 26, the 50th anniversary of the passage of the 19th amendment, which granted women the right to vote. Rather than coordinate a single strike, NOW encouraged people to “do your thing.” In New York City, thousands of feminists marched down Fifth Avenue at 5:00 p.m., while in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, feminist Gene Boyer marched alone in front of her husband’s furniture store to commemorate the strike. Although media outlets declared the strike a failure, many activists acknowledge the strike as a major success for getting the organization’s name out into the public.

Several issues threatened to divide NOW. NOW was in the political spotlight for Betty Friedan’s infamous grousing about lesbians, reportedly calling them a “lavender menace” that would distract activists from the organization’s political agenda. In response, a group of lesbians and heterosexual allies took over
the 1970 Congress to Unite Women in New York City, bearing shirts with Friedan’s words. By 1971, though, NOW passed a resolution in support of lesbians’ rights as women’s rights. Throughout the 1970s, NOW became a leading force for the ERA and abortion rights. When the ERA passed Congress in 1972, NOW mobilized women and men through local and state chapters around the country, and chapter members often organized in state houses and the streets to encourage support for the amendment. NOW was instrumental in the 1979 ERA extension campaign, which extended the time that states could ratify the amendment until 1982. NOW members and ERA supporters underestimated the rhetorical and political power of the STOP ERA campaign, spearheaded by religiously and politically conservative women and men who saw constitutional equal rights as a violation of states’ rights as well as a natural gender order of men and women. In spite of the amendment’s defeat, NOW proved itself as a major political, feminist force. NOW also became a powerful voice in support of abortion rights and in opposition to the Right to Life movement that emerged in 1973 after the Supreme Court case, *Roe v. Wade*.

After the defeat of the ERA in 1982, which happened in concert with the rise of political and social conservatism, NOW membership declined. In response, NOW focused attention on electing women politicians and has been a significant force in a number of local, state, and national campaigns. It also pushed for significant social change, becoming a leading force in lesbians’ rights and same-sex marriage. It also shifted its focus from abortion rights to reproductive justice, embracing birth control, abortion, child care, and same-sex parenting. It has also joined in coalition with other social movements and organizations to address a wide range of issues, from welfare and women’s image in the media, to women’s on-the-job rights and racism as a feminist issue.

SEE ALSO: Equal Rights Amendment (United States); Feminism and social movements; Friedan, Betty (1921–2006); Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Modernity of nationalism
MICHAEL HECHTER

Nationalism is widely perceived to be one of the leading threats to order in the contemporary world. Many lives have been ruined or lost in its name and, partly as a consequence, nationalism swirls in perpetual controversy. Part of the problem is that it seems to be an uncannily protean phenomenon. Nationalist political demands differ from place to place and time to time: sometimes they are linguistic, sometimes they are religious, sometimes they are cultural in a rather more diffuse sense. Strong nationalist movements often emerge in a given territory, subside, and then suddenly reemerge years later to nearly universal surprise. While the literature on nationalism is voluminous and growing at an increasing pace, there still remains a lack of conceptual agreement among scholars of the subject.

There is one fact, however, on which nearly everybody concurs: nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Before the nineteenth century, some people may have professed nationalist sentiments, but never the majority of people in any society. At the same time, there is no consensus about why nationalism is modern. Some writers explain its modernity by appeal to the emergence of new ideas (Kedourie 1960; Berlin 1992). Others view it as a by-product of industrial capitalism (Gellner 1984). This entry provides a somewhat different explanation.

NATIONALISM DEFINED

A vast array of cultural and political events – from the rise of folk festivals and the production of painting, poetry and music exalting the nation, to the development of paramilitary organizations – can be, and have been, labeled nationalist. Given this variety of phenomena the complaint that the concept is incoherent should come as no surprise (Alter 1989: 4; Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 4). Understanding of nationalism may not be quite so feeble as these assessments suggest, however. The literature’s incoherence is more apparent than real. There is a wide, if implicit, agreement that nationalism refers to collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation coterminous with those of its governance unit.

Although this definition appears to be simple, it is parasitic on the definitions of two separate entities, namely, the governance unit and the nation. One reason for the scale of the controversy surrounding nationalism is its sheer multiplicity. Another is that reliable comparative evidence about nationalism is scarce. The most comprehensive evidence has been assembled by Gurr (1993) and his associates. Using a worldwide sample of 227 “communal groups” (including 81 classified as ethnonationalist), Gurr analyses worldwide collective action that occurred in the 1980s. The principal determinants of collective action in his sample turn out to be, first, intergroup economic and political differentials, which enable political entrepreneurs to mobilize members of disadvantaged groups, and, second, political contexts which provide incentives and disincentives for protest and rebellion.

Are structural factors such as persisting group disadvantages and favorable opportunities (like those provided by democratic regimes) necessary causes of collective action? Evidently not. Since the fall of Franco, Catalan nationalists have managed to win substantial autonomy from the central government in Madrid. The Catalan government controls at least 110 000 jobs. These jobs are the fruit of past nationalist successes as well as the guarantor of future successes. But (pace Gurr) Catalonia has been anything but disadvantaged. Quite the reverse: It long has been one of the most privileged regions in Spain. No form of collective action is limited to the disadvantaged.
Nationalism arises from the relationship between governance units (including states) and nations, both being groups formed from more durable lower-level social units (Hechter 2000). It is the relationship of these units that serves to explain the mechanisms of nationalism.

Governance units and polities. The governance unit is that unit which is responsible for providing the bulk of day-to-day protection, legislation, rule enforcement, and dispute resolution to its members. In much theoretical writing this unit is called a polity, indicating its political sovereignty. Indeed, governance units often are also polities. But not all governance units are polities. The distinction between governance units and polities is crucial for explaining the modernity of nationalism.

The nation. Originally, the nation was a group of people born in the same place. In the European universities of the late Middle Ages, nations were groups of students who came from the same region or country. Following the French Revolution, a nation was the people of a given country, without distinction of rank and often in contrast to the ruling monarch. In its secondary usage, “nation” meant a strange people. Subsequently, a core definition of the nation has been enunciated by nearly every eminent scholarly and political authority (see the selections in Hutchinson & Smith 1994). Whatever else it may consist of, the term nation refers to a relatively large group of genetically unrelated people with high group solidarity.

Nations can be distinguished from other types of solidary groups by several criteria. In the first place, they are socially homogeneous. Nations are the largest of all solidary groups, save for religious ones. Unlike other kinds of groups, nations are endowed with a common sense of collective history, even if it is often of dubious accuracy. Nations generally have their own story – a history of the people – as revealed in oral and literary sources. This story provides a collective identity. Whether this identity is salient to individual members is always an empirical question. The preceding two factors serve to distinguish both nations and ethnic groups from other kinds of potentially solidary groups. Territoriality distinguishes nations from ethnic groups. Nations, then, are solidary, territorially concentrated, culturally homogeneous groups (like the Quebeccois), rather than ethnic groups (like American Jews, Algerians in France, and others often termed minorities). Although ethnic groups are also culturally homogeneous, they are not primarily concentrated in one specific territory of the state, and therefore cannot pose a realistic threat of seceding from it.

Group solidarity is jointly a function of members’ dependence and their control capacity (Hechter 1987). The greater the dependence and control, the greater the solidarity of the group. This mechanism lies at the heart of nationalism.

THE MODERNITY OF NATIONALISM

At this point, the necessary (but insufficient) conditions for the development of nationalism can be derived. If nationalism is collective action designed to make the boundaries of the nation and governance unit congruent, then it can only emerge when there is a disjuncture between the boundaries of the nation and those of the governance unit. For most of human history, however, there was no such disjuncture: the solidary groups within which individuals spent their lives were also governance units. Among hunter-gatherers, for example, families and local groups were governance units. Nationalism could not develop in such polities because political and cultural boundaries were congruent.

More surprising, nationalism is also unlikely to develop in larger polities such as premodern states. Due to the prohibitive costs of monitoring large groups (especially before the advent of modern communications), these larger polities could only be maintained on the basis of indirect rule. In a system of indirect rule, the central ruler exerts direct control only in his own domain. To simplify an admittedly complex picture, spatially distant territories must
be controlled by traditional authorities, who pay tribute to the central ruler in exchange for guarantees of their security and the right to rule within their local sphere (Bendix 1964: ch. 2). If the solidary group within which individuals spent their lives was also typically a governance unit, then nationalism could not develop in the premodern state. This governance unit was likely to be culturally homogeneous as well. Although many of the traditional authorities in rural areas of Europe and Eurasia initially were culturally distinct invaders (often the descendants of steppe nomads), they soon assimilated into the conquered peasantry, as did the Normans after their invasion of England. Culturally homogeneous governance units therefore often arose in equilibrium. This kind of social structure might lead to some forms of collective action, but it cannot lead to nationalism. Once again, cultural and political boundaries are congruent in this situation.

What about those localities in some parts of Europe east of the Elbe where traditional landed authorities remained culturally distinct from the peasantry? This kind of social structure – a hierarchical cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978) – indeed does have the potential to foster political conflict on cultural lines. Even then nationalism is unlikely, however, due to restricted political opportunities. After all, central rulers in the premodern state relied on traditional authorities precisely for their ability to exercise control in their own realms. Given an ample supply of labor, the prerogatives of the traditional authorities could be checked only by the force of custom (Weber 1968). The action of a lord who was both exploitative and culturally distinctive might spark rebellion in a given estate. But rebellion would be unlikely to spread to neighboring estates. In premodern city-states which were dependent on long-distance trade, the social structure was quite different. These relatively small polities tended to be culturally heterogeneous (for reasons analyzed by McNeill 1986), and therefore nationalism was unlikely to develop in them.

All told, therefore, indirect rule tends to inhibit nationalism. Since it preserves culturally distinct populations, however, its decay can easily lead to nationalist mobilization, as often occurs following the demise of empires. Nationalism could only arise after the advent of the modern state, which attempted to replace indirect by direct rule. In so doing, it created the conditions for the emergence of nations, those “imagined communities” that could demand sovereignty.

**WHY NATIONALISM FOLLOWS FROM DIRECT RULE AND THEREFORE REQUIRES THE MODERN STATE**

Direct rule made great strides on the European continent following the French Revolution (Tilly 1990). Direct rule fostered economic change by standardizing coinage, weights, and measures. It removed interregional barriers to trade and migration. It facilitated communications, thereby extending the reach of markets. Urbanization and industrialization were spurred in its wake. At the same time, direct rule brought about significant political changes by eroding the power of traditional authorities.

As direct rule progresses, one typical nationalist scenario takes place in the countryside. By usurping the power to tax and administer local justice, and by extending public education, direct rule weakens traditional authorities. The more literate a peasantry is, for example, the less dependent it is, for literacy lowers its cost of migration. Direct rule invariably decreases the power of all traditional authorities. In culturally distinctive regions, therefore, the traditional authorities are very likely to play the nationalist card in attempting to resist the incursions of the central state. The result is a top-down version of nationalism instigated by peripheral elites (Brass 1990). Even in culturally distinct regions whose traditional rulers assimilated to the culture of the center, direct rule spurs nationalism, for it permits the emergence of new leaders who could mobilize
the culturally distinct peasantry on nationalist grounds.

A bottom-up type of nationalism is more likely to emerge in cities, where massive shifts in social conditions produce new levels of uncertainty, particularly among the increasing number of displaced persons (Anderson 1986; Vail 1989). Once people migrate into urban areas, they face competition for scarce resources such as jobs, spouses, placement in educational institutions, residential space, and government services. The lion’s share of these resources is likely to go to individuals who organize effectively and act cooperatively. This gives people an incentive to join groups whose members act to favor one another in the battle for resources. These incentives hold across a wide variety of arenas. How do individuals decide what sort of group to join? They are likely to join that group which maximizes their expected benefits. The expected benefits of group membership, at least in part, are an increasing function of the size of the group, up to a point that is nearly half the size of the entire population (Chai 1996). In any large population center, the optimal size of a group therefore will be considerably larger than the number of migrants from any single community of origin (cf. Hannan 1979; Cederman 1995).

Yet groups cannot act effectively unless members share interests. In the absence of such shared interests, actions which help some members of a prospective group may hurt other members, and there will be little incentive for members who will be hurt to engage in the collective action. One way that a group of individuals can have shared interests in a particular outcome is if they have a common position in the division of labor (Hechter 1978). This gives them an interest either in raising the returns for the occupational roles commonly held, or in opening up opportunities for entry into other, more rewarding occupations.

The costs of organizing a group will be prohibitively high unless a simple set of criteria can be used to distinguish members from non-members. Large-scale groups must organize individuals who are unknown to each other. How then can members be distinguished from nonmembers? What must be found is a simple and clear-cut criterion so that individuals can estimate the prospective size and membership of such a group in order to decide rationally whether to join. The only criteria that meet these requirements are class criteria or ascriptive ones such as race, religion, language, customs, or region of origin.

The boundaries of such groups will be based on a simple set of markers embodying several conditions. The markers must generate a group of sufficient size to comprise a substantial portion of the population with the society. They must align with a common position in the population center’s division of labor. They must encompass communities of origin rather than crosscutting them. When no set of markers meets these conditions, no nations ought to form, even in the presence of structurally induced uncertainty. Where more than one boundary meets these conditions, then the boundaries of groups will be unstable as competing political entrepreneurs attempt to organize groups along alternative “crosscutting” cultural cleavages.

It is not the nature of the marker, therefore, but its salience that determines the potential political efficacy of social groups. The salience of markers is a social construction that waxes and wanes. Just as any individual marker can become salient under the appropriate conditions, so too it can become imbued with affect. The salience of a marker has both social and psychological components. The marker becomes socially salient when individual life chances are affected by possession of the marker. And a marker is psychically salient when those possessing the marker identify with one another.

The more that possession of a marker determines one’s life chances, the greater its psychological salience. A marker determines life chances to the degree there is a high probability that people born with it will have distinctive social networks and occupations. Salient markers contain a lot of information about their possessors’ life course; nonsalient ones contain
very little. The more salient the marker, the more it designates a collective fate, whether good or bad. Social psychologists have established time and again that when people are treated by others as members of a distinctive group, they come to identify with others so categorized (Tajfel 1981). The greater the salience of the marker, therefore, the more likely it is that the marked will identify with each other.

The more that cultural markers determine life chances, the greater the cultural – in this case, national – identification. When mobility between cultural groups is minimized, cultural identity will be strong. Ditto for classes. Markers tend to be most salient when they are ascriptive – that is, determined at birth – and difficult to shed. In societies where one’s membership in a category at birth determines the entire life course, escaping that categorical membership is well-nigh impossible. Hence the salience of cultural markers is greatest in societies having minimal intergroup mobility. When intergroup mobility increases, the salience of cultural markers declines.

Thus, by shifting dependence from local to central authorities, direct rule facilitates nationalism in two separate ways (Hechter 2000). It encourages local authorities to mobilize rural populations to protect their privileges. And it encourages newcomers to the cities to form national groups to compete for resources at the center.

CONCLUSION

The analysis explains why states were compelled to rely on indirect rule to control geographically extensive territories before the advent of industrial technology. Indirect rule tended to be based on culturally homogeneous governance units, in most of which culture had no political salience; therefore, nationalism was precluded as a form of collective action. The advent of direct rule has been historically uneven. Whereas the process began in the core of the world economy – in England and France in the late eighteenth century – it has occurred recently in more peripheral territories, as in Tibet. The historical unevenness of the advent of direct rule ought to explain variation in the timing of nationalism across the globe. Nationalism therefore should be correlated temporally with the onset of direct rule.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Nationalist movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Solidarity and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Prehistoric Native Americans developed complex societies that include confederations, nations, and empires whose only record lies in myth and folklore. Social movements in the historic period are noted as regional or ethnic movements responding to social changes brought by European and American societies that became pan-Indian movements as the US exercised uniform control over all Native Americans.

Revitalization movements used principles of accommodation to provide continuance for Native American societies and their cultures (Wallace 1956). Iroquois or Six Nation (Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk, Cayuga, Seneca, Tuscarora) societies and their neighbors in the northeast were disturbed by colonialism and trapping enterprises brought by the English and French and the territorial expansion of the US. After the British victory over the French and the beginning of American expansion, a revitalization social movement began in 1799 inspired by the religious doctrine of Seneca prophet Handsome Lake and his Longhouse Religion (Wallace 1972, 1978).

Handsome Lake was uncle to Red Jacket and half brother of Cornplanter. He declared a spiritual vision to call for a reorganization of Iroquois society that incorporated an accommodation of Christian values and native continuance. His visions included meeting George Washington who had gotten halfway to heaven and Jesus who complained he had no followers (Wallace 1978: 446). Handsome Lake preached against drunkenness, sexual promiscuity, quarreling, and gambling. This was combined with an apocalyptic vision and an emphasis on witch hunting. He supplanted the traditional high god Tharonhiawagon with the Creator. Handsome Lake successfully added new visions to traditional structures and his movement emphasized male social power in what had previously been matrilineal areas of social and political life.

The instituting of reservation systems brought further pressure on northeast Native American societies and made Handsome Lake’s religious movement relevant for affected groups to find new social structures and emphasis that accommodated the growing impact of the emerging American nation. He was in touch with Thomas Jefferson and his movement debated whether they should be involved with the War of 1812. Handsome Lake continued to declare visions until he died in 1815.

Territorial displacement continued to spread westward in the nineteenth century creating conditions for Native American social movements. The Shawnee had a complex social system of clans and societies with numerous allies and social relations that developed negative interactions with the Iroquois, who drove them out of the Ohio Valley (Callender 1978: 622). The Shawnee joined the Mingo tribe in attacks on American settlements in 1777 and brought major devastation to American communities in Kentucky after the murder of Chief Cornstalk by the Americans, who attacked and destroyed Shawnee villages (Callender 1978: 631).

After returning to the Wabash area in 1808, a new leader created an intertribal movement to resist US expansion. Tecumseh arose as both a political and religious leader, accompanied by his brother Tenskwatawa, who served as visionary (Callender 1978; Drinnon 1990: 90–98; Eckert 1992; Edmunds 1983). Tecumseh frustrated Thomas Jefferson by agreeing to Jefferson’s wish to see Native Americans stop warfare, adopt agriculture, and embrace religion but advocating the religion as a revitalization of traditional elements as
guided by Tenskwatawa. Tecumseh further angered the American president by not only advocating peace and agriculture, but also promoting the united boycott of land sales to agents or citizens of the US (Drinnon 1990: 90–98). Tecumseh’s movement motivated a pan-Indian alliance, a unity by race that, like Handsome Lake’s earlier effort, sought to accommodate European and American social pressure by using many of its principles, such as the valuing of land as real estate, but with a native intention and benefit as the guiding principle.

General and future president William Henry Harrison directed the Battle of Tippecanoe to stop the movement in 1811. Tecumseh continued to travel from Ohio to the American South preaching his social movement doctrine until he was killed at the Battle of the Thames in 1813 (Drinnon 1990: 96). Tenskwatawa fled across the Mississippi to Kansas, where George Catlin painted his portrait. He died in 1837.

The Creek Confederacy under the leadership of Alexander McGillivray was effective in dealing with the Spanish, French, and the US until the death of McGillivray in 1793 (Weatherford 1988: 155–156). The confederacy was split by internal struggles after contact with the Shawnee prophets Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (Martin 1991: 147). A religious reformation was organized, hallmarked by the use of red ceremonial clubs (batons rouges) that gave rise to the name of the movement: Red Sticks. The Red Sticks identified European culture as the enemy and admitted all racial and ethnic types into their ranks as long as they adopted the reforms and cultural emphasis (Weatherford 1988: 157). American white settlers were terrified of the uniting of blacks, Indians, and Spanish peoples into the Red Stick movement. The Red Sticks made a preemptive strike in 1813 at Fort Mims where Americans were marshaling for a campaign against the movement. Andrew Jackson led armies against the Muskogee-Creek and crushed their military force at the Massacre of Tohopeka or Horseshoe Bend on March 27, 1814 (Martin 1991: 162–163). Jackson sent the Creek to the Indian Territories with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 when he became president.

Native Americans in northern California began a Ghost Dance movement in 1870, also known as the Earth Lodge religion (Bean & Vane 1978: 670), that reacted to the increase in American influence after the 1846 Mexican War, the 1849 Gold Rush, the subsequent incorporation of California as a state in 1850, and the introduction of white settlers. Members represented the Nomlaki, Hill Patwin, Northern Pomo, other Pomoans, Wappo, Coast Yuki, Sinkyone, Lake Miwok, Coast Miwok, Calho, Wintu, Achumawi, and Sahsta tribes of northern California and tribes from Oregon. The movement worked to preserve the earth from destruction through the use of syncretist religious elements and philosophy that focused on dreamers or visionaries. This led to the Bole-Maru religion as an interethnic movement. A member of this Ghost Dance movement was Numu-tibo’o, a Paiute and the father of Wovoka.

The 1890 Ghost Dance movement was triggered by the visions of Wovoka who was struck down during a solar eclipse and arose to preach a pan-Indian doctrine that emphasized singing spiritual songs taught by Wovoka, dancing in circles, practicing abstinence from alcohol and a renewal of the world back in the control of Native Americans (Bean & Vane 1978: 671; Hittman 1990; Mooney 1991). The Ghost Dance movement was of major concern to the US authorities as it spread from California and Nevada across the country. Each ethnic group of Native Americans nativized the movement and its spiritual dimension to fit their own mythologies and regional concerns. The major common precepts held that by singing the songs, dancing, and holding to their vision, the white man would disappear, those who had been killed would be restored, and the land would once again flourish under the stewardship of Native Americans. The changed social environment of a continental US linked formerly separate ethnic indigenous groups and the Ghost Dance of 1890 became a national social movement.
Representatives of the Sioux and other Plains tribes traveled to meet Wovoka and learn his songs and dances, spreading them across the Plains (Brown 1970: 416–438; Mooney 1991). The Sioux organized their form of the Ghost Dance to include the return of the buffalo destroyed by the white men. The US army was used to crush the Ghost Dance, culminating in the Wounded Knee Massacre in South Dakota on December 29, 1890, when a small group of Sioux led by Big Foot were slaughtered in the snow by elements of the 7th Cavalry brought in to avenge the death of General Custer (Brown 1970: 439–445). The crushing of the Ghost Dance movement effectively ended the American Indian period in the US. The Ghost Dance, however, continued in disguised form among some tribes, with the Arapaho and Pawnee forming a hand game whose practice conveyed the same revitalization concepts as the dances, the social movement continuing as a folk tradition (Lesser 1978).

The twentieth century gave rise to Native American social movements based on pan-Indian identities and activities with increasing national focus, as ethnic distinctiveness faded in their relations with the US government and tribes were dealt with through a common Bureau of Indian Affairs, a division of the Department of the Interior. The Society of American Indians (SAI) was formed on October 12, 1911 by a diverse group of Native Americans who had achieved college educations, professional accomplishment, and were dedicated to creating a pan-Indian social movement that would use the courts and legislature to alter the social environment for Native Americans (Hertzberg 1971: 59). This movement marshaled those in the emerging Native American middle class to support initiatives and campaigns to change the social environment for native people on a national level and linked their cause with the Progressivists as well as the struggles of black Americans. The SAI promoted the cause of citizenship for all Native Americans and combated racism rather than dealing with individual ethnic cultural concerns. World War I stifled this movement, along with other social movements that had reacted to the industrial revolution (Hertzberg 1971: 155–178).

The 1930 Indian Organization Act was key to setting common social and governance structures among all indigenous tribes within the US and increased the possibility of pan-Indian social movements. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and Bureau of Land Management Policies, both within the Department of the Interior, caused pan-Indian social reactions and movements. Peyotism developed from 1938 onward as a form of social movement, as tribes from Oklahoma spread the use of vision-inducing mescaline imbibing as asserting a pan-Indian identity. Stock reduction policies on the Navajo reservation, the largest in the US, created relative deprivation sentiments that found relief by joining the peyotism movement (La Barre 1970: Stewart 1987). American reaction to the movement included outlawing the use of the sacramental peyote. This resulted in a furthering of the movement as it formalized into churches protected by the Constitution that included The Native American Church (La Barre 1970: 167–174).

Protests organized from the late 1960s onward by the American Indian Movement and other regional organizations included the occupation of Alcatraz Island from 1969 to 1971 (Fortunate Eagle 1992). Social change continued through advancing legislation with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA), the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, and the assertion of sovereignty by individual tribes resulting in increased social and economic mobility.

SEE ALSO: Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Religion and social movements.

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Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, pp. 662–672.
Nazi movement (Germany)
WILLIAM I. BRUSTEIN

THE ORIGINS

Out of the chaos surrounding Germany’s collapse at the end of World War I sprang the German Workers’ Party. This party, which would eventually become the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), was formed on January 5, 1919, in Munich under the leadership of Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer. One of the party’s early recruits was Adolf Hitler. In a short space of time, Hitler made his presence felt, becoming the party’s most popular orator. Between 1920 and 1921 Hitler established his complete authority over the party. He added the words “National Socialist” to the party’s name and adopted the swastika as the party’s symbol and flag, and in February 1920 the party issued its official 25-point program. It called, among other things, for the union of all Germans within a greater Germany, repeal of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, the establishment of colonies for Germany’s surplus population, the exclusion of Jews from citizenship, the appointment of only competent citizens to official posts (without regard to party affiliation), state promotion of the welfare and economic activities of its citizens, an end to non-German immigration, the improvement of national health and fitness levels through obligatory physical activities, and promotion of the common interest above self-interest. With regard to economic issues, the party demanded abolition of the “thralldom of interest,” confiscation of war profits, nationalization of syndicates and trusts, introduction of profit sharing in industry, improved old-age insurance, establishment and protection of a healthy middle class of artisans and merchants, implementation of land reform by means of “confiscation without compensation,” abolition of interest on mortgages, and prohibition of land speculation. The 25th and final point of the program called for the establishment of a powerful central government, along with diets and vocational chambers to implement the laws proclaimed by the Reich and the various German states.

Under Hitler’s leadership the Nazi Party before 1923 became a rapidly growing Bavarian regional movement, although Hitler’s initial attempt to seize power in Bavaria by means of a coup collapsed in November 1923. During Hitler’s brief 1924 imprisonment for his part in the failed coup, the Nazi Party fell into disarray. Hitler refounded the party in February 1925, two months after his release from prison. Later that year the Nazi Party replaced its “putschist” strategy with a strategy to gain power electorally, while establishing the foundations for a national organization. Between the reconstitution of the Nazi Party in 1925 and Hitler’s appointment as chancellor in January 1933, Hitler would remain its undisputed leader.

The NSDAP electoral strategy hit a major roadblock in the general elections of 1928. The Nazi Party polled a meager 2.5 percent. In contrast to the disappointing showing at the polls, the party’s recruitment of new members was extremely successful: membership grew from 27,000 members in 1925 to 108,000 in 1928. In 1929 the Nazi Party gained substantial visibility as a result of the national campaign against the acceptance of the Young Plan. The electoral fortunes of the party rose in 1929, as evidenced by strong showings in state and local elections in Schleswig Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Baden. The first major Nazi electoral breakthrough occurred in the general elections of September 1930. The NSDAP received 640,000 votes, or 18.3 percent of the total, and gained 107 seats in the Reichstag. As a
result, the party was second only to the SPD (German Social Democratic Party) in the size of its delegation. After the general elections of July 1932 the NSDAP replaced the SPD as the largest political faction in the Reichstag, with 230 seats. In the July 1932 election the NSDAP received 13,750,000 votes or nearly 38 percent of the total. In the election of November 1932 (the last free Weimar general election) the NSDAP experienced a loss of 2,000,000 votes and 34 seats. The NSDAP’s exclusion from government ended on January 30, 1933. In light of the tremendous popular backing for the NSDAP, President Hindenburg changed his thinking about a Hitler-led government and appointed the Nazi leader chancellor of Germany.

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS OF THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF NAZISM

The breakneck rise of the Nazi Party from its beginnings as one of 42 racist and ultranationalist fringe groups in 1923 to its position as the most popular German political party in 1932 has been the focus of attention for more than 75 years. Four of the most prevalent explanations of the social origins of Nazism emphasize respectively its irrationalist, lower-middle-class, political confessionalist, and cross-class appeal. Each of these major explanations contains theoretical and empirical shortcomings. In particular, these treatments of the social origins of Nazism have placed disproportionate emphasis on Nazi followers’ reactive response, while ignoring the degree to which individuals’ support for the Nazi Party stemmed from their desire to improve their material condition. Moreover, with few exceptions, these treatments have relied on aggregate-level analyses of Weimar electoral and census data rather than individual level analyses to assess the empirical validity of competing explanations of the social origins of Nazism. An alternative explanation of the social origins of Nazism, a theory of interest-based adherence, is the principal focus here.

THEORY OF INTEREST-BASED ADHERENCE

Examinations of the ideology of the Nazi Party before 1933 have focused largely on Hitler’s writings in *Mein Kampf*. Thus, it comes as no surprise that most treatments of Nazi ideology stress the primacy of nonmaterial themes such as racism, anti-Semitism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia. We must ask, however, whether millions of Germans would have supported a party that only offered vacuous promises and generalities. The party positions that were enumerated in the official Nazi Party programs have been too often ignored. Unlike the frequently vague and outlandish ramblings of *Mein Kampf* (which relatively few people read before 1933), the party programs taken together are characterized by a substantial degree of coherence and considerable emphasis on material themes. This is not to argue that racism, anti-Semitism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia played no role in Nazi ideology; nor to deny that many people found the Nazi Party attractive because of its stance on these themes, but rather that these nonmaterial leitmotifs have received disproportionate emphasis in explanations of the rise of Nazism. The Nazi Party leaders were savvy enough to realize that pure racial anti-Semitism would not set the party apart from the pack of racist, anti-Semitic, and ultranationalist movements that abounded in post-1918 Germany. Instead, Nazi success can be attributed largely to the economic proposals found in the party’s programs, which, in an uncanny fashion, integrated elements of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nationalist-etalist philosophy with twentieth-century Keynesian philosophy.
these were the 1930 agrarian program, the 1930 NSDAP employment program, the 1931 WPA document, the 1932 Immediate Economic Program, and the 1932 Economic Reconstruction Plan. NSDAP economics sought to create “a third path” between Marxist centralized state planning and laissez-faire capitalism. The Nazis were not the first in Germany to advocate or even to implement both nationalist-etatist and Keynesian economic principles, but they were the first to merge the principles of both schools in a seemingly coherent and innovative program. Among the ideas that the nationalist-etatist school contributed to Nazi economic planning were state socialism, autarkic development, and Lebensraum. The concept of state socialism was based on the principles that the economy should serve the interests of the state rather than the individual and that the state should oversee the direction of the economy. Proponents of nationalist-etatism argued that through a policy of autarky, Germany could become economically self-sufficient and pursue an independent foreign policy. The notion of autarky is based on the assumption that the needs of the national economy precede the needs of the international economy. Whereas the primary goal of German autarky with regard to monetary policy was to allow the state to create a state-controlled money and credit system, the geopolitical aims, stemming mainly from Germany’s precarious geopolitical position, were to negate the detrimental consequences of a naval blockade by Germany’s chief rivals (France, England, and Russia) of its world commerce. Nationalist-etatist thinking added that autarkic development could flourish only if Germany developed a continental economic zone (Grossraumwirtschaft, or Lebensraum). The nationalist-etatist thinkers saw eastern and southeastern Europe as the natural turf for Germany’s economic survival and growth. They envisioned a German-dominated economic union in which middle Europe would serve as a prime market for products of German heavy industry, while at the same time German agriculture would no longer need to rely primarily on protective tariffs for its survival but would be protected by trade agreements with the members of the economic union.

The Nazis were not breaking new ground when they advanced the ideas of state socialism, autarkic development, and Lebensraum in the party’s programs; the concepts had already become part of the German economic lexicon. The Nazi Party, however, was the first mass political party to make these nationalist-etatist concepts the core elements of its economic doctrine and to combine them with key notions from Keynesian economics. Nazi economists found much to their liking in Keynesian economics. Keynes’ *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, which was critical of the Versailles treaty and the financial obligations it placed on Germany, brought Keynes to the attention of many members of the NSDAP leadership as early as 1920. Most important, the Nazi Party agreed with Keynes that if governments and central banks hoped to maintain full employment and reduce the likelihood of economic recession, they should urge investment in new capital goods, ensure a cheap money policy, and initiate public investment. Nationalist-etatist principles and Keynesian economics made for a good match. Autarky was realizable, according to the thinking in the NSDAP, through government-initiated investment in the nation’s infrastructure, including public works, residential reconstruction, resettlement, and reagrarianization. In the end, the marriage of nationalist-etatist thinking and Keynesian economics allowed the Nazis to design some rather novel but nevertheless concrete economic policies.

Other themes certainly helped the party to attract support. One that pervades many of the party writings was the establishment of a Völksgemeinschaft, or “people’s community.” This was seen as a means to overcome the historical divisiveness of class conflict. In a people’s community, social class would be abolished. Like most organizations, it was to be hierarchically arranged, with the leader at the top. Leadership was a function of accomplishment and was integral to the survival of the
community. The people’s community was to be racially pure, for racial homogeneity binds people to the community, whereas racial heterogeneity fosters disunity and leads to the deterioration of the native stock. The people’s community would also expurgate cultural bolshevism, while strengthening the traditional family way of life, or the three Ks of Kinder (children), Küche (kitchen), and Kirche (church). Whether the community was Protestant or Catholic did not matter in Nazi ideology, although the Nazis viewed the Catholic church as a greater threat because of its institutional independence and supranational status. The Nazis tried to depict National Socialism as a movement embodying the youth rebellion and combating Weimar foreign policy blunders and the “red scare.” The party professed to represent the youth of Germany as opposed to the Weimar gerontocracy. To appeal to young people, the Nazi Party emphasized its newness, antisytem politics, aversion to bourgeois formality, and dynamism. Colorful demonstrations and martial symbols and clothing were also intended to induce young males to join the movement. Nazi speeches and writings were frequently peppered with references to the threat of communism. The “fear of bolshevism” theme was dramatized in conjunction with the growth of support in Germany for the Communist Party: 1.7 million votes in 1925, 4 million votes in September 1930, and 7 to 8 million votes in February and March 1932. Much like the Italian Fascist Party, the NSDAP presented itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism. A particularly dominant theme of NSDAP propaganda before 1933 was the failure of the Weimar system. Opposition to Weimar became the thread with which the Nazis linked communism, loss of national self-esteem, economic decline, foreign policy blunders, and Jewish influence. The NSDAP promised the total liquidation of the Weimar system, which, according to the party, was responsible for the host of evils that had befallen Germany.

Finally, there is the issue of anti-Semitism as a principal theme of the Nazi Party before 1933. Without question the Nazi party leadership was strongly anti-Semitic, but by 1924–1925 they had concluded that for building a national party attractive to all German classes, the issue of anti-Semitism held insufficient appeal. Increasingly, anti-Semitic rhetoric was merged with economic and political issues and was used to preach to the already faithful. Hitler was astute enough as a politician to realize that his rabid anti-Semitism lacked drawing power among the German masses. Indeed, it appears that increasingly the Nazi Party relegated anti-Semitism to a role as backdrop to other more materialist appeals. Though the NSDAP de-emphasized its anti-Semitism between 1929 and 1933, the party did opportunistically employ the theme where it was thought that anti-Semitic rhetoric would work to attract support.

Many examinations of Nazi Party principles fail to capture the party’s uncanny skill at disseminating its positions and casting itself in the role of a winner. Both abilities played a crucial role in attracting support, for if people had been unaware of the party’s programs or if they thought the Nazi Party had no chance of achieving power, they might not cast their votes for or join the NSDAP. The NSDAP was one of the earliest parties to implement modern propaganda techniques, including whirlwind campaigns by airplane, highly coordinated press campaigns, films, slide shows, massive leafleting and postering, continual door-to-door campaigning, and direct mailings. The Nazis even established a speakers’ school where party faithful who possessed knowledge of particularly useful subjects and good verbal skills were trained and then deployed throughout the country to speak at party gatherings. The NSDAP’s strong electoral performance in 1930 dispelled any remaining notion that it was a second-rate party. If before 1930 Germans had considered joining the NSDAP simply as a means of demonstrating their dissatisfaction with older parties, the results of the 1930 election convinced many people that the party was a potential winner and that a National Socialist Germany was now possible. Moreover, many
Germans who before 1930 had adhered to regional parties and movements such as the Bauerbund and Landvolk movements, many of whose positions were similar to those of the NSDAP, switched their allegiance to the more nationally oriented Nazi Party. The party more than doubled its membership, increasing it from 389,000 to 806,294, during 1931. The NSDAP was certainly aware of the importance of public perception of it as a major party.

SELECTIVE INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR JOINING THE NAZI PARTY

The Nazi Party was organized on the basis of Gaue, or regions. In 1928 the 35 Gaue corresponded to the 35 Reichstag electoral districts. Below the Gaue were the Kreise (counties or districts) and within each Kreis were the Ortgruppen, or local branches. Large local branches in big cities were frequently divided into sections. The organizational structure of the Nazi Party was completely centralized: each new member had to accept the organization and the leader unconditionally, and local branches needed approval from party headquarters. Local branches were required to submit monthly activity reports to headquarters, and by 1931 each branch leader was expected to maintain a record on the performance of local branches. Party finances were strictly monitored. Income and expenditures had to be logged, and each year audits were conducted on local and regional finances and the reports sent to party headquarters in Munich. The party treasurer in Munich had the power to examine the books of any branch without notification. Yet party headquarters afforded the branches a fair degree of independence with regard to recruitment and activities. The party favored granting independence to local organizations in the hope that greater latitude would allow them to fashion a strategy reflecting their local conditions. The party rewarded the most efficient locals, for instance, by sending them the most popular speakers who, by drawing a large attendance, could produce more money for the local party’s coffers.

It is often believed that members of extremist movements constitute a separate subset of partisans: their fanaticism may predispose them toward physical confrontation or a desire for martyrdom. We should not doubt that zealotry characterized many Nazi Party joiners; however, many NSDAP supporters who decided to join the party were motivated largely by their perception of the costs and benefits associated with membership. Given the costs in time and money and the physical risks, the logical strategy for the average Nazi Party sympathizer would have been to vote for the party without joining it. Had joining the NSDAP been cost-free, many more Germans would have joined the party before 1933. Nazi followers who joined the party before 1933 acted on their perception that the costs of membership had become acceptable because of an increase in the incentives and/or a reduction in disincentives to joining.

Incentives to join the NSDAP

Before the Nazi Party came to power, the party had few material rewards to parcel out. The NSDAP obtained the bulk of its operating revenues from membership dues, sales of its newspapers, and entry fees charged for public rallies and meetings. Still, the Nazi Party possessed some tangible incentives to offer joiners. It is likely that many Germans who joined the party after its initial electoral breakthrough in September 1930 saw Nazi Party membership as a ticket to employment or career advancement in a future National Socialist Germany. In late 1930, the party used membership as inducement to attract civil servants, by hinting that in a Nazi state civil service jobs would go only to registered Nazi Party members. But even before Hitler’s appointment as chancellor the NSDAP had jobs to offer. Between 1925 and 1933 the NSDAP had developed a government-in-waiting, comprising numerous specialized
branches and departments. At both the regional and national levels, the party created bureaus staffed with members who were knowledgeable about legal, financial, agricultural, labor, medical, and cultural issues. This party apparatus created thousands of jobs. Unemployed or underemployed individuals with the requisite skills found job opportunities in the party that were unavailable elsewhere. Moreover, the party tried to establish contacts with local employers to hire party members and published a list of employment opportunities in the Völkscher Beobachter, the NSDAP’s principal newspaper. The Nazi paramilitary Sturmabteilung (SA) housed its members in hostels and barracks, where they received food and shelter. SA hostels frequently served as soup kitchens for unemployed members and on holidays distributed provisions to members’ children. During 1932, in the depth of the Great Depression, the NSDAP established the Winterhilfe or Winter Relief program for party members. For the unemployed, largely young and working class, the offer of employment, shelter, and food made joining one of the NSDAP’s organizations all the more enticing. But people probably did not join the party merely to obtain these benefits; the Communist Party, the Center Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the German Nationalist People’s Party each had similar resources to offer the unemployed. What initially attracted them to the Nazi organizations was the similarity between their interests and the NSDAP program.

Disincentives to joining the NSDAP

What is often ignored is that Nazi Party membership before 1933 entailed numerous costs and risks with relatively few material rewards. Party membership demanded numerous sacrifices on the part of joiners; they were obliged to pay membership dues, distribute party literature, attend party meetings, and participate in public rallies which took up time and financial resources. Before 1933, party membership dues constituted one of the principal sources of NSDAP revenues. The financial burden of monthly dues probably deterred many financially hard-pressed farmers, artisans, blue-collar workers, and service workers from joining the NSDAP. Such party activities as attending meetings, planning events, distributing party literature, and selling subscriptions to party publications required considerable expenditure of time and effort. We can safely assume that many Nazi adherents decided against membership because they believed they could not meet the requirements for active participation. Furthermore, joining the Nazi Party led in some instances to loss of business or employment. Weimar society consisted of many individuals and groups who disliked the Nazi movement and many shops and stores owned by NSDAP members were the target of boycotts, and membership in the party frequently led to members’ dismissal by unsympathetic employers. One of the most frequently cited examples of the potential costs of joining the Nazi Party, as far as employment went, was the government’s pronouncement in 1932 that membership in the NSDAP was incompatible with employment in the German civil service. All teachers and government employees, like public transport workers, had to sign a declaration asserting that they were not members of the NSDAP and had not participated in NSDAP activities. Thus, before 1933 many civil servants who sympathized with the Nazis probably decided to vote for the party and forgo joining it.

Voting for the NSDAP between 1925 and 1933 was unlikely to result in imprisonment. Nonetheless, membership in the Nazi Party carried with it some risk of arrest, which served as a clear disincentive to joining. The local police generally kept extensive lists of NSDAP, SA, and Schutzstaffel (SS) members. Both state and central government gave the police the authority to disrupt political meetings and to arrest anyone who failed to abide by official bans on uniforms, demonstrations, and public meetings. If anxiety over being arrested did not deter many from joining the Nazi Party, the fear of physical injury or death did. When we think of the role of political violence in the rise of
Nazism we usually associate it with the party’s strategy to intimidate and destroy its enemies and to attract the elements in society to whom physical confrontation greatly appealed. We tend to forget that before 1933 the Nazi Party itself was frequently the target of political violence and that fear of physical punishment may have dampened the many sympathizers’ desire to join the party. The principal adversaries of the NSDAP were the host of Communist Party paramilitary groups. Between 1930 and 1932, several hundred National Socialists were stoned, shot, or knifed to death by members of the Communist paramilitary organizations.

For many pre-1933 Nazi sympathizers, compatibility of interests was insufficient motivation to join the party. What made joining the party more attractive to these individuals was the offer of real or potential incentives, such as employment, money, and friendship, and the removal of disincentives, such as job dismissal, arrest, physical injury, and group ostracism. Once the Nazi Party came to power in January 1933, the equation changed dramatically. Incentives for joining the party became plentiful, and most disincentives evaporated. It is not implausible that if the Nazi Party had permitted all Germans who wanted to join the party after 1933 to do so, the ratio of voters to joiners would have approached one to one. Though the compatibility of people’s interests with the programs of the Nazi Party before 1933 cannot in itself explain why people decided to join, that factor nevertheless stands out as critical in explaining who joined the party and why. The persuasive power of incentives and disincentives should further elucidate why some people join high-risk political parties. It is highly unlikely that any positive incentives the German Communist Party or the Social Democratic Party might have offered to Nazi sympathizers would have sufficed to lure them away from the NSDAP. What brought Nazi sympathizers to the point of deciding to join the party was their perception that, among all the Weimar political programs, the Nazi Party’s most closely corresponded to their material interests. The production of positive incentives and the reduction of disincentives became a salient element in the decision to join the NSDAP only after people had already identified with the Nazi Party’s political programs.

SEE ALSO: Fascist movements; Ideology; Neo-Nazi movements in Europe and the United States; Participation in social movements; Political alignments and cleavages; Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives; Social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Neo-Nazis in Europe and the United States

Pete Simi and Robert Futrell

Neo-Nazism refers to groups that emerged after World War II advocating for the fascist, nationalist, white supremacist, and anti-Semitic ideas of Nazi Germany. Neo-Nazi political activity is now an international phenomenon with groups located in Germany, Russia, France, England, the US, Canada, South Africa, and other countries around the world. Neo-Nazis embrace traditional Nazi symbolism, such as the swastika, describe themselves as national socialists, revere Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, and promote eugenics to ensure the existence of a pure Aryan race.

Neo-Nazi ideologists

Neo-Nazi groups are part of an overlapping web of racist movements that include the Ku Klux Klan, Christian Identity believers, neo-Pagans, and racist skinheads. While some ideological and stylistic differences exist across these movement networks, members also agree on some basic doctrines. First and foremost, neo-Nazis imagine they are part of an innately superior biogenetic race (i.e., “master race”) that is under attack by race-mixing and intercultural exchange. Neo-Nazis see themselves as victims of a world that not only fails to acknowledge their natural superiority but also suppresses and destroys all things Aryan (Berbrier 2000; Blee 2002).

Neo-Nazis unite around genocidal fantasies against Jews, blacks, Hispanics, gays, and anyone else opposed to white power. Neo-Nazis desire a racially exclusive world where nonwhites and other subhumans are vanquished, segregated, or at least subordinated to Aryan authority. They idealize conservative traditional male-dominant heterosexual families and loathe homosexuality and interracial sex, marriage, and procreation. Neo-Nazi women are celebrated for domesticity, particularly for rearing committed White Power children to be the foot soldiers in a racial revolution.

Neo-Nazi ideology is amplified by the emotions that accompany it. Hatred of nonwhite races is a powerful and important emotional dimension of neo-Nazism. But hatred is also accompanied by feelings of pride, loyalty, affection, and racial kinship directed toward other neo-Nazis. These vitalizing and reciprocal emotions strengthen in-group solidarity that links neo-Nazi members around the world to the common goal of White Power (Jasper 1998; Taylor 2000).

Neo-Nazis in the US

Neo-Nazis in the US persist in networks organized through the Internet and the White Power music scene. Protected by the First Amendment, US neo-Nazis play a crucial role in supporting international racism and anti-Semitism by publishing literature and hosting web sites with material considered illegal under various European antiracism laws. Accurate counts of neo-Nazis are exceedingly difficult to perform, but according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, activism among American neo-Nazis grew at an alarming rate during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Potok 2010).

American neo-Nazism began in the mid-twentieth century when George Lincoln Rockwell formed the American Nazi Party (ANP) in 1958. The ANP popularized Holocaust denial among the American racist right and encouraged followers to join forces with Christian Identity churches (Simonelli 1999).
Since the ANP, the National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance have been two of the most influential US neo-Nazi networks. The late William Pierce, a former physics professor and early ANP member, founded the National Alliance in 1974. In 1978, Pierce authored *The Turner Diaries*, a novel which depicts a racist guerrilla war and a Ryder truck bombing of a federal building. Timothy McVeigh reportedly used the book as an inspirational blueprint for the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City (McDonald 1989). National Alliance members use the group’s headquarters, a 346-acre farm in Mill Point, West Virginia, as an information clearinghouse for neo-Nazi propaganda. The headquarters hosts a publishing house for White Power books and magazines, the White Power music company Resistance Records, and neo-Nazi Internet activities. In 2001 the Alliance claimed 35 cells in 30 different states. Pierce’s death in 2002 dealt a severe blow to the group and the number of Alliance units dropped. However, Eric Gleiße and other new leaders have stepped in to continue Alliance activities.

Several groups splintered from the National Alliance following Pierce’s death. One of the most prominent of these splinter groups is Billy Roper’s White Revolution. Roper, a former high school history teacher with a master’s degree in anthropology, founded White Revolution in 2002. White Revolution draws upon Nazi-era ideals of *Volk* to celebrate Aryan racial kinship. Roper is noted for his efforts to pull together factions from across the movement for rallies, music shows, and other Aryan gatherings. White Revolution has an extensive web presence and chapters active in 16 states.

Tom Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance (WAR) emerged during the 1980s and 1990s as one of the most prominent multimedia clearinghouses for neo-Nazi ideology. Metzger founded WAR after traveling a circuitous route through several White Power activist networks. He began his career in right-wing extremism during the 1960s by joining the John Birch Society, but soon left the organization for groups more open to anti-Semitic advocacy. Metzger joined David Duke’s Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in 1975 where he became a Grand Dragon in California. After Metzger and Duke parted ways following Duke’s unsuccessful Congressional bid in 1980, Metzger founded the White American Political Association, which he eventually renamed the White Aryan Resistance. WAR has been in the forefront of the White Power Movement’s Internet presence, aggressively recruiting younger generations to the cause (Langer 2003).

Racist skinheads are the youngest neo-Nazi branch. The first US racist skinheads drew inspiration from disaffected English skins involved in the extreme right-wing National Front and the British National Party. In the late 1980s, US racist skinheads began to synthesize neo-Nazi ideals and symbolism and coalesced into networks of loosely organized gangs that congregate in skinhead crashpads and White Power music shows. The largest and most well-known groups, such as the Hammerskin Nation and Blood & Honour, have active cells around the world, an extensive web presence, and produce White Power concerts and festivals.

Skinhead culture began in Great Britain and developed in two waves through the 1960s and 1970s. The first skinheads emerged in Great Britain in the late 1960s as a response to deteriorating traditional working-class communities, a stagnating economy, and job competition with immigrants. While they did not initially associate with Nazism, they held ardently nationalist political ideals and fervently opposed foreign immigration (reflected in their affinity for violently attacking Pakistani immigrants, which they called “Paki-bashing”). The first skinheads “were aware that they attended the worst schools, lived in the poorest districts, and had the worst jobs with the smallest wages. They perceived hippies and students as idle layabouts living off the state” (Brake 1974: 181).

While the first wave of skinheads in Great Britain defined themselves along themes of nationalism, ultra-masculinity, and working-class concerns about lack of economic opportunity, they distanced themselves from
traditional, organized political parties and protest activities. British skinheads politicized in the late 1970s as established extreme right-wing groups such as the National Front and British National Party (BNP) attempted to draw disaffected white youth into their ranks. The second wave of skinheads spread beyond Britain and emerged in several other European countries as well as North America.

Many present-day Ku Klux Klan (KKK) groups now embrace neo-Nazi culture. The KKK reemerged in the late-1990s, following a long period of decline since its heyday as one of the most powerful political organizations in the US during the 1920s (McVeigh 2009). Klan groups drew in new recruits who rallied around immigration and economic concerns, combined with a “new racist discourse” of white victimization and white cultural heritage loss. The new wave of Klan activists are now tightly linked to neo-Nazi networks and have integrated neo-Nazi symbolism and rituals into long-standing KKK traditions. The “Nazification” of the KKK is evident in the Klan’s widespread use of the swastika and German Iron Cross emblazoned on traditional Klan robes, hoods, and flags, as well as wooden swastikas burned alongside wooden crosses at Klan rallies. The largest and most active Klan groups are the Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, with outposts in 18 states in the south, northeast, and western US, the Church of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, headquartered in Indiana with chapters in 20 states, and Brotherhood of Klans with 15 state chapters.

NEO-NAZIS IN EUROPE

Neo-Nazis are found around the world, but they are most prominent across Europe. Following World War II, neo-Nazi movements ebbed and flowed throughout Europe. Unlike their counterparts in the US, European neo-Nazis are much more involved in electoral politics and have organized various political parties across the continent. European neo-Nazis also participate in large rallies and festivals and coordinate ties with US groups through the White Power music scene and cyberspace (Bjorgo & Kaplan 1998).

Significant cross-national variation exists among European neo-Nazi movements. We focus on neo-Nazis in Britain, Germany, and Russia, countries which, for different reasons, are important sources of neo-Nazism. In Britain and Germany neo-Nazis emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II while the growth of Russian neo-Nazis is a more recent development.

Great Britain

After the defeat of Hitler and the Third Reich, British far-right advocates were factionalized and varied in the degree to which they openly expressed neo-Nazi ideas. Colin Jordan, who founded the National Socialist Movement in 1962, was England’s most vocal neo-Nazi advocate. The National Socialist Movement was reconstituted as the British Movement in 1968 and Jordan campaigned on an openly neo-Nazi agenda with members wearing swastikas and using pictures of Adolf Hitler in the group’s promotional literature. Other early British neo-Nazi groups included the National Labour Party (NLP) founded in 1957, and the White Defence League (WDL) founded in 1958. By 1960 the NLP and WDL merged to form the British National Party. In 1967, members of these groups combined to create the widely known National Front (NF). During the 1970s, the NF grew to some 20 000 members across England, experienced electoral success, and began cultivating ties with racist skinheads. The NF remains active in twenty-first century British politics.

As in most countries, neo-Nazis in Great Britain are tightly linked to racist skinheads. The international neo-Nazi network, Blood & Honour (B&H) was founded in 1987 by legendary skinhead and White Power musician, Ian Stuart Donaldson (now deceased). Blood & Honour is active in at least 24 countries and has a significant presence in the White Power music scene. In 1992 Combat 18 (C18 – the
number 18 is code for Adolf Hitler as “A” and “H” are the first and eighth letters of the alphabet) formed as a radical splinter from B&H and became notorious for their violent tactics. By 2000 British authorities had arrested and incarcerated many of C18’s leading figures, however, the group continues to remain active with an international presence. In addition, the lone wolf terrorist David Copeland, the London Nail Bomber, whose 1999 bomb attacks killed three and injured over a hundred was affiliated with C18 at one time. Copeland was arrested in 2000 and received six life sentences for his crimes. More recently, in 2010 British authorities disrupted a neo-Nazi father and son team dubbed the Aryan Strikeforce who were planning attacks using ricin, one of the world’s deadliest poisons, to target Muslims, Jews, and blacks. Yet, neo-Nazi activity in Great Britain is relatively minor compared to activism in Germany and Russia.

Germany

After World War II, Germany passed stringent laws prohibiting the direct and explicit promotion of Nazi ideas. Despite these regulations, former members of Hitler’s Nazi Party continued after the war to advocate for the genocide of Jews and other non-Aryans. The Socialist Reich Party (SRP) was one of the first groups to emerge from these networks to organize efforts such as distributing anti-Semitic election leaflets and forming the Reichsfront in the image of Hitler’s stormtroopers. The SRP gained 11 percent of the Lower Saxony vote in 1951, prompting the federal government to challenge the party’s legality before the constitutional court. The SPR was declared illegal as an attempt to reestablish the Nazi Party and soon disbanded.

The National Democratic Party (NPD) is Germany’s most prominent present-day neo-Nazi political party. Adolf von Thadden founded the NPD in 1965 to unite “nationalist opposition.” Since the late 1960s the NPD has experienced some limited electoral success. Careful not to breach anti-Nazi laws, the NPD appeals to national pride and xenophobia. Although Jews are not openly targeted, the NPD vehemently attacks the state of Israel. The NPD also denounces “domination by alien big powers” and has demanded an end to the exclusive blame of Germany for World War II. In addition to electoral politics, the NPD sponsors White Power music concerts, political rallies, and protest marches (Virchow 2007).

German reunification in 1990 stimulated a new wave of neo-Nazi activity across the country, but especially in the former East Germany. Violent attacks by neo-Nazis on refugees, foreign immigrants, and Jews also increased (Anderson 1995). Since reunification, authorities have banned 17 neo-Nazi organizations and, in 2000, Germany became the first country to outlaw the neo-Nazi skinhead group Blood & Honour. After several years of declining numbers, neo-Nazi related crimes in Germany in 2009 increased from an annual total of 17 176 to 19 894. In addition, neo-Nazism seems to have a significant impact on German youth. A recent study found that 1 in 20 West German and 1 in 8 former East German male 15-year-olds claimed membership in a neo-Nazi faction (Pfeiffer 2009).

Russia

The recent rise of neo-Nazi groups in Russia has been dramatic. While Russia had less than a hundred neo-Nazi skins in the early 1990s, by 2005, more than 50 000 roamed Russia’s streets. Neo-Nazis are especially prominent in Moscow and St Petersburg where they are known to attack African and other nonwhite immigrants. In a 2009 survey of African immigrants living and/or working in Moscow nearly 60 percent reported being physically attacked because of their race (Dade 2009). In 2004, there were 44 racially motivated murders in Russia, many of which are known to have been committed by neo-Nazi skinheads. A year later, Russian neo-Nazi skins were responsible for murdering at least 28 people and assaulting another 366 people (Jackson 2006). In 2008, neo-Nazi violence resulted in the murder of 109 people and the injury of 486 (SOVA 2009).
neo-Nazis were responsible for murdering at least 70 people (Liss 2010) and members of one neo-Nazi skinhead gang, the White Wolves, were recently convicted of murdering at least 11 individuals. The White Wolves primarily target Central Asian immigrants, using knives and screwdrivers to viciously murder their victims. In addition to targeting racial minorities, antistate violence is an emerging trend in Russian neo-Nazi violence. In 2009, Combat 18 Russia claimed responsibility for the bombing of an express train traveling between Moscow and St Petersburg that killed 26 and injured 100 people.

Some of the largest neo-Nazi groups in Russia include Blood & Honour, Moscow Hammerskins, United Brigades 88 (H is the eighth letter of the alphabet; HH stands for Heil Hitler), and Skin Legion. Similar to other European countries, Russian neo-Nazis are active in electoral politics and have established political parties such as the National People’s Party (NPP). The NPP’s leader, Alexander Sukharevsky, is widely admired by neo-Nazi skins with a party membership of approximately 15,000. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s neo-Nazis thrive in a larger context of normlessness most acutely illustrated by major economic breakdown. National survey data suggests that neo-Nazi political attitudes have mainstream appeal. For example, about one-third of Russians want to reestablish Jewish ghettos or settlements (Osborn 2005). The neo-Nazi problem in Russia has become so severe that authorities have recently banned the country’s largest neo-Nazi organization, Slavic Union (SS), and Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.

SEE ALSO: Christian Identity movement; Emotion and social movements; Genocide and social movements; Nazi movement (Germany); Racist social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


NIMBY movements
ADAM DRISCOLL

The acronym NIMBY stands for “not in my backyard.” It is a term that has been used to characterize local, grassroots movements that are endeavoring to resist the siting of some unwanted land use in a particular neighborhood, community, or region. NIMBY movements have formed to oppose a wide array of undesirable entities that include environmental hazards (landfills, waste incinerators, polluting industries), perceived social hazards (homeless shelters, prisons, mental health facilities), and aesthetic offences (wind turbines, airports, cell phone towers). When viewed collectively, the general tendency of local residents to resist the siting of unwanted entities within their community has been described as the “NIMBY phenomenon” or the “NIMBY syndrome.”

Critical perspectives emphasize that the term can be applied in a pejorative, dismissive sense, where the motivations behind the movement are viewed as selfish and exclusionary. While NIMBY movements themselves have a tendency to be narrowly focused, small in scale, and relatively short lived, some do evolve into more broadly focused NOPE (“not on planet earth”) movements that can achieve large size and complexity as well as prolonged longevity. This entry explores the history behind the use of the NIMBY label, the various movements that have been characterized by it, and some of the unintended consequences of those movements’ efforts.

ENVIRONMENTAL NIMBY MOVEMENTS

The use of the term NIMBY originated in reference to community opposition of the siting of environmentally hazardous facilities that emerged in the 1970s. While it has later been more broadly applied to movements resisting a number of other unwanted land uses, its most common usage still refers to grassroots groups that are fighting the locating of an environmental hazard in their neighborhood or region. The emergence of these antitoxics movements was partially a response to a growing public awareness of environmental issues, fueled by such works as Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962) and Barry Commoner’s *The Closing Circle* (1971). These building concerns particularly crystallized around the highly publicized Love Canal incident of the late 1970s, in which an elementary school was built over a chemical waste dump in Niagara Falls, NY. The various chemicals leached into both surface and groundwater and caused a series of health problems which led to widespread activism from community residents and eventual national media attention. The story of Love Canal sparked a widespread wave of public opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities (Szasz 1994).

Throughout the early 1980s, an increasing number of community groups across the nation organized around toxic waste issues, using an array of tactics to resist the intrusion of these unwanted land uses. This occurrence was not a coordinated, centralized movement, but rather a large number of groups independently organizing within a similar time frame around similar issues. Regardless of this lack of organizational cohesion, the NIMBY phenomenon did largely succeed in altering the political process behind hazardous facility siting decisions as individual movements in different communities continually succeeded in rejected proposed toxic land uses (Rabe 1994).

An unintended consequence of this explosive growth in grassroots resistance to the siting of hazardous facilities has been the concentration of unwanted land uses in poor and/or minority communities, as these are least able to mount a successful resistance (Bullard 1990). The sociological implication
of the NIMBY phenomenon is that if white, middle-, and working-class neighborhoods insulate themselves from environmental harm, those unwanted wastes and industries will be displaced elsewhere. Following the “path of least resistance,” they are far more likely to be sited in poor, powerless, minority communities than in affluent white suburbs. These regressive impacts of NIMBY movements have been empirically demonstrated by Saha and Mohai (2005), who use longitudinal analysis to demonstrate that racial, income, and housing disparities in the location of environmental hazards did not exist before the rise of environmental movements in the 1970s. It is only after environmental NIMBY movements started resisting the intrusion of unwanted land uses that disproportionate siting occurs. Thus, a cumulative effect of the NIMBY phenomenon has been the rise of environmental injustice (Bullard 1990).

While much of the research on both NIMBY movements and environmental justice has focused on community level resistance and outcomes in the US, the successes achieved by local groups can also manifest themselves at the transnational level as global environmental inequality (Pellow 2007). When environmental movements in developed nations succeed in resisting the siting of hazardous facilities and disposal sites and obtaining more strident environmental regulations at the state and federal levels, it becomes more difficult for business to locate polluting industries within the US and other developed nations. In response, these corporations are forced to look overseas for locations to house both polluting industries and hazardous wastes. In this way, the environmental policies of the US and other developed nations can be viewed as macro-level manifestations of the NIMBY phenomenon, where the “backyard” in question is the nation itself. Mirroring the unintended consequences of local level NIMBY movements, the increased environmental regulation in developed nations leads to hazardous wastes and facilities being sited in poorer nations that are starved of economic activity (Pellow 2007).

An example of this process can be found in the story of Philadelphia’s incinerator ash in 1986 (Pellow 2007). Since the late 1970s Philadelphia had been burning a substantial portion of its solid waste and burying it in a landfill in New Jersey. In 1984, New Jersey closed that landfill, partially in response to the protest activities of antitoxics and environmental justice movements. The city contracted a local firm to get rid of 15,000 tons of municipal incinerator ash. It was loaded onto a ship named the Khian Sea, which transported it to a series of less developed nations, seeking one that would allow it to dump its contents. A large portion of the ash was eventually unloaded onto a beach in Haiti under the false label of “soil fertilizer.” This series of events demonstrates how NIMBY movements and policies in developed nations can lead to environmental injustice on the global scale (Pellow 2007).

OTHER FORMS OF NIMBY MOVEMENTS

While the NIMBY acronym is most commonly used to describe movements organized to resist local environmental threats, the concept also applies to community groups that oppose a range of other socially undesirable entities, such as AIDS treatment centers, prisons, and substance abuse centers. Neighborhood movements fighting against this array of unwanted land uses have been studied by a number of scholars in a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, geography, economics, political science, and urban planning. Rather than focusing on identifying a universal model for all NIMBY movements, these works have shown that the NIMBY syndrome, as directed toward different unwanted land uses, likely has correspondingly different origins, mechanisms, and dynamics.

One area that has received a good deal of attention has been NIMBY movements directed toward human service facilities, which include homeless shelters and soup kitchens, free health clinics, and halfway houses. Unlike resistance to environmental hazards, where the perceived risks are attached
to inanimate substances and processes, movements opposing the intrusion of human service facilities into their neighborhood are required to engage in an element of frame management and stigmatization. In order to justify opposition to a humane service, the community residents must portray the patrons of these facilities as a risk to the safety and quality of life of the neighborhood (Takahashi 1998). For example, in the mid-1980s the city of Austin, Texas attempted to relocate and build a new Salvation Army facility to meet the demands of the growing homeless population. At every proposed new location, strident, organized community resistance emerged, characterizing the neighborhood residents as victims of the new facility. In each of these instances of resistance, the NIMBY movements focused on the character and nature of the homeless people who would be served by the Salvation Army. The homeless were repeatedly framed as dangerous criminals and rapists who would make the community not safe for women and children (Snow & Anderson 1993). In this way, community opposition to unwanted human service facilities involves an element of stigmatization, where those who use the unwanted facility are demonized and represented as threats to neighborhood residents (Takahashi 1998).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The original use of the NIMBY label indicated that the associated movement does not necessarily object to the existence of the unwanted land use (as is characteristic of “NOPE” movements), but merely desires to have that land use situated at some location that does not directly impact the members of the movement. Thus, NIMBY movements can be viewed as an expression of the free rider problem, where individuals desire the benefits of the facility they are protesting, but they want some other community to bear the associated costs. Recently however, NIMBY groups have grown in their sophistication and understanding of the issues they oppose and some have turned to more comprehensive solutions than mere displacement. These movements have shifted from resisting the siting of particular land uses to opposing the root cause of the need for such facilities. Additionally, there has been a growth of what Barry Rabe (1994) terms “positive-sum politics,” in which the siting of unwanted land uses is placed in a broader, more cooperative political context that involves early and extensive public participation, negotiation of compensation and safety packages, and protections against exploitation. Other scholars have pointed out economic solutions to the NIMBY phenomena, such as the reverse Dutch auction, which transform siting decisions of unwanted land uses into a voluntary process, rather than a forced one (Inhaber 1997). Combined, these recent developments indicate both a potential reduced need for NIMBY movements as well as an increased sophistication of those movements’ goals and objectives.

SEE ALSO: Environmental movements; Grassroots movements; Homeless protest movements (United States); Quotidian disruption; Resistance; Urban movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The nuclear freeze movement was an American campaign against nuclear weapons based around an ostensibly moderate demand with radical implications: a negotiated and bilateral end to the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Neither the freeze idea, nor opposition to the arms race more generally, was new in 1980 when the freeze emerged, amid resurgent allied antinuclear weapons movements across Western Europe. Astute activist opportunism, in conjunction with a series of more aggressive foreign policies from the US government, aligned to produce unusually heightened attention to national security policy in general, and nuclear weapons in particular. In this regard, the nuclear freeze movement loudly echoed previous periods of mobilization and concern, including antinuclear campaigns following the first use of weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945–1947), surrounding the long debate about a ban on testing (1954–1963), and in opposition to the deployment of antiballistic missile systems in the US (1968–1973). Although some activists are constantly trying to draw public attention to the costs and dangers of nuclear weapons, they only succeed episodically. The cyclic mobilization against nuclear weapons reflects more vigorous institutional debates about nuclear weapons strategy.

After the Vietnam War ended, peace activists had a difficult time generating any kind of national campaign. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all modernized US nuclear forces and also negotiated arms control measures with the Soviet Union. All claimed they were doing everything possible to limit nuclear armaments and the possibility of nuclear war, and spending on the military declined after a Vietnam era peak in 1968. Effective management of the national security issue worked well enough to prevent the emergence of an overarching campaign. Activists did, however, stage smaller campaigns against particular weapons systems, most notably the B-1 bomber and the MX missile. In such efforts, however, they often played a subordinate role to elite allies, particularly the president. In the case of the B-1, for example, antinuclear activists found themselves lobbying members of Congress to support development of a nuclear-armed air launched cruise missile (ALCM) as an alternative.

After two years, President Carter visibly retreated from his announced inaugural goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, initiating a military build-up and taking a more hawkish foreign policy stand. In doing so, he was responding both to world events, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Nicaraguan revolution, and Iranian militants taking American hostages in Teheran, and to increased domestic political pressure from conservative critics, who successfully organized to block Senate ratification of the second negotiated Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) agreement.

In response to Carter’s new stance, activist groups worked to find a new idea to organize around. The pacifist American Friends Services Committee (AFSC) commissioned Randall Forsberg, then a graduate student in political science at MIT, to draft a proposal. Borrowing from earlier arms control proposals, from inside and outside governments in both the US and USSR, Forsberg’s “Call to Halt the Arms Race” began with a demand for a verifiable, bilateral, negotiated freeze on the nuclear arms race. She saw the freeze proposal as the first step in a complicated and comprehensive program to remake world politics (Forsberg 1984). She took the proposal to the 1979 conference of Mobilization for Survival, a group that had been working against nuclear power, and won some support, but the freeze was one of many proposals for action circulating.
The freeze failed to gain political traction in the 1980 presidential election, rejected by both Jimmy Carter and his opponent, Senator Edward Kennedy, at the Democratic convention, and then virtually disappeared during the electoral campaign. The freeze remained a solution in search of an opportunity: broad public concern with a national security policy problem.

Ronald Reagan’s landslide election in 1980, and his explicit commitment to “rebuild” what he saw as America’s neglected armed forces, was a devastating defeat for advocates of arms control and disarmament. There was, however, one bright spot in the election for activists: Organizers in Western Massachusetts had placed a nuclear freeze proposal on the ballot in three state senate districts. Although Reagan carried all three districts handily, the freeze also passed with strong majorities, demonstrating its public appeal.

When Reagan came into office, the freeze became more attractive to the public as the new President’s policies provoked domestic opposition. The administration repeatedly and forcefully emphasized its commitment to policies peace activists saw as bellicose. Administration officials were also unusually candid in their judgments about the possibilities of limited nuclear wars, the necessity of strategic superiority, and the futility of arms control; their rhetoric was untempered by qualifiers or guarded language about “options.” Instead, they publicly discussed fighting and winning nuclear wars, and their military spending and procurement supported those objectives. The administration also purged from the State and Defense departments more moderate scientists and strategists unconvinced of the possibility or desirability of a war-winning strategic posture, virtually forcing those officials to go public to express their views. Mass media attention followed elite criticism of the Reagan program, subjecting the president’s policies and advisers to an unusual degree of scrutiny.

Activists in Western Europe also challenged the Reagan program, calling on their counterparts in the US to do more. Antinuclear weapons movements in Western Europe emerged strongly in 1981, focusing specifically on stopping the NATO plan to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in five European countries (Rochon 1988). This “dual track” decision, taken in the Carter administration, called for the deployment of new nuclear weapons while simultaneously pursuing negotiations to limit them. The Reagan administration jettisoned the arms control portion of the proposal, engendering a great deal of public opposition, particularly in the nations scheduled to host the so-called “Euromissiles.”

Activists with diverse goals and approaches engaged in a broad spectrum of activities: Pacifists began direct action campaigns at military contractors, submarine bases, missile sites, and even the Pentagon; arms control advocates held educational events, sponsored symposia, and teach-ins, pressed local governments to adopt resolutions, and organized referenda campaigns. Media coverage of these efforts grouped virtually all opponents of the Reagan administration’s security policies under the banner of the “nuclear freeze,” and politicians and activists to a lesser degree followed. As the freeze coalition grew broader and broader, commanding support from more than two-thirds of Americans in polls, its definition got fuzzier and fuzzier. As generally explained in mass media, the freeze was an unfocused cry for arms control. As the movement grew, staging a June 1982 rally in New York City attended by some one million people, activists were increasingly divided on the meaning of the proposal so many supported. Mainstream political allies endorsed and amplified criticism of the Reagan administration, but redefined the activists’ preferred policy solution.

Freeze activism, vaguely defined, continued and brought increased public and government attention to nuclear weapons issues. Early in 1982, flanked by campaign leaders, Senator Kennedy announced that he would introduce a freeze resolution in Congress. When the resolution failed by one vote in the House of Representatives in 1982, activists pressed the issue in
the midterm Congressional campaigns, claiming credit for large Democratic gains in the House. In response, the Reagan administration actively sought to limit its political vulnerability on national security, softening its rhetoric and floating a series of arms control proposals mostly designed to be rejected by the Soviet Union and defuse public opposition (Bundy 1988). The House overwhelmingly passed an amended freeze resolution in 1983, although the resolution failed in the Senate.

As the freeze campaign made inroads in institutional politics the movement coalition frayed (Meyer 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). Institutionally oriented arms control groups cultivated Washington connections and tried to influence a variety of budget issues, urging Congress to push the president on arms control, ostensibly a more direct route to political influence than public education or mass demonstrations, but the scope of the policy debate narrowed. At the same time, many pacifist and left-liberal groups shifted their efforts to other pressing issues, including working against apartheid in South Africa and preventing US military intervention in Nicaragua. And a broad stream of the movement focused on the upcoming presidential election. Six of seven Democratic presidential hopefuls endorsed some kind of nuclear freeze proposal, including the eventual nominee, Walter Mondale.

The Reagan administration worked to ensure the election was not a referendum on either the freeze or its own national security policies. In January of 1984, Reagan announced an invigorated approach to arms control negotiations, and to restoring summit meetings with the Soviet Union, offering conciliatory rhetoric to both freeze supporters and the Soviets. In conjunction with his Strategic Defense Initiative, announced in 1983, these positions allowed the president to shift the terms of debate, attacking freeze supporters for defending the status quo, and promising eventual deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and a benign end to mutual nuclear deterrence. A strengthened Congressional opposition prevented the most aggressive aspects of the Reagan build-up, limiting the growth of military spending and pressing arms control. Although these changes were the result of the freeze movement, no one in the administration acknowledged this.

The nuclear freeze movement did not end the arms race, as some of its supporters hoped, much less remake US foreign policy. It was critical, however, in resurrecting and institutionalizing the previous bipartisan policy consensus, constraining the Reagan administration’s initiatives. It returned legitimacy and institutional access to advocates of arms control and nuclear restraint. And President Reagan’s arms control proposals, offered more for domestic political reasons than international response, had unexpected effects. The new posture offered incoming Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev a lever with which to reopen detente. Gorbachev accepted the disproportionate nuclear force cuts that Reagan had proposed, trapping the administration: It couldn’t reject its own proposals. This forced flexibility on arms control proved to be critical in ending the cold war (Meyer & Marullo 1992). The movement won far less than it intended, yet it turned out to be far more significant than anyone involved would have guessed.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Antinuclear movement in Japan; Antinuclear power movements (in general); Antiwar and peace movements; Coalitions; Pacifism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


“Orange” and “colored” revolutions in former Soviet Union

SARA TESCIONE

The term Orange revolution refers to the massive protest campaign that characterized the Ukraine in the aftermath of its 2004 presidential elections as a reaction to the manifest falsification of the electoral results by the incumbent authoritarian regime of Leonid Kuchma. Protests began on November 22, prompted by the widespread perception that the results of the vote between the pro-regime candidate, Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko had been severely rigged in favor of the former. As the suspects of electoral fraud were confirmed by the numerous domestic and international election observers, an increasing number of protesters started to mobilize across the country, engaging in peaceful sit-ins, strikes, and rallies. Sustained pressure from hundreds of thousands of orange-clad protesters, who permanently camped at Maidan, Kiev’s Independence Square in below-zero temperatures for several days, led to negotiations between the government and the opposition and eventually to the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court to nullify the vote and call for a rerun of the elections. The final results of the internationally monitored second run-off on December 26 indicated the clear victory of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, who received 52 percent of the votes while 44 percent voted for Yanukovych. On January 23, 2005, following the certification of the results by the Supreme Court, Yushchenko was sworn in, thus becoming Ukraine’s third president since the country’s independence in 1991.

Ukraine’s Orange revolution was the most visible and internationally recognized episode of a series of similar electoral “revolutions” that in the early 2000s overthrew the authoritarian leaders of a number of former Soviet republics as a consequence of fraudulent and contested elections. These colored revolutions, as they have come to be known, represent some of the most controversial political developments in Central and Eastern Europe over the past decades. Largely unpredicted by scholars of postcommunist societies, their impressive displays of political popular participation and civic resistance seemed indeed to challenge long-held assumptions about the distinctive weakness and immaturity of postcommunist civil societies.

In the literature, two main explanations for the emergence of such mobilizations have been proposed. Most analysis focuses on the interplay of favorable domestic conditions, enlisting a number of endogenous “ingredients for success,” relating mostly to the hybrid, and consequentially weak nature, of the regimes in power (D’Anieri 2006). In pre-Orange Ukraine’s “competitive authoritarianism,” in particular, the mere persistence of meaningful formal democratic institutions despite the widespread use of authoritarian procedures – such as bribery, co-optation, and various forms of repression – created a number of windows of opportunity for the democratic opposition to challenge, weaken, and finally defeat the autocratic incumbents (Way 2005).

A second approach insists on the modular character of the colored revolutions, depicting them as the result of a somewhat broad process of international diffusion which channeled across diverse countries a specific “electoral model of democratization” (Bunce & Wolchick 2006; Beissinger 2007). According to this analysis, previous examples of electoral breakthroughs in the post-Soviet region, and in the Balkans, crucially impacted the unfolding of Ukraine’s very controversial presidential elections. In fact, Ukrainian democratic
activists capitalized on foreign experiences of civic resistance. One of the civic groups most active during the Orange revolution, PORA (It’s Time!), was clearly modeled after its Serbian and Georgian counterparts, Otpor (Resistance) and KMARA (Enough!) that had staged similar successful protests, respectively in 2000 and 2003.

The emergence of the Orange movement was favored by the thick layer of Western non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations and political foundations present and active in Ukraine since its independence. Some of these “external” actors, in addition to providing financial and material assistance to democracy promotion projects, played in some cases an active role in mediating the cross-national diffusion of the “revolutionary” know-how and nonviolent action repertoire. However, the effective role played by Western actors in the Orange revolution remains a subject of dispute and controversy among observers.

It is important to note that the label “revolution” immediately applied to the 2004 Orange mobilization (as well as to the other colored revolutions) seems more a catchy media slogan than the result of rigorous efforts of a scientific definition. Over time the concept of revolution has gradually evolved, departing from its classic definitions steeped in notions of class and violence, to include recent phenomena of democratic and nonviolent revolutions. Despite this, with regards to the Orange revolution, the revolutionary label seems problematic in a number of ways. In particular, Ukraine’s postrevolutionary trajectory, where the elements of continuity with the nondemocratic past seem to outnumber those of discontinuity, inevitably still raises important doubts on how to interpret the very nature of that “revolution.”

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Diffusion and scale shift; Elections and social movements; Nongovernmental organizations; Otpor; Postcommunism and social movements; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Otpor
OLENA NIKOLAYENKO

Otpor (“resistance” in Serbian) is a Serbian social movement that played a prominent role in removing Slobodan Milošević from power in October 2000. The movement articulated three major demands: (1) the depoliticization of universities, (2) freedom of the press, and (3) free and fair elections. More broadly, Otpor called for the turnover of power and the dismantling of Milosevic’s regime. Otpor grew from a group of a dozen university students in Belgrade to a nationwide movement with more than 70,000 members and more than 130 cells across Serbia. While young people formed the core of Otpor members, the movement enlisted support of various segments of Serbia’s population. In its efforts to undermine the repressive political regime, the social movement employed such methods of nonviolent resistance as graffiti, stickers, rock concerts, and street performances.

The social movement organized two major campaigns. The negative campaign titled Gotov Je (He is finished) targeted Milosevic as the culprit of all societal problems. Meanwhile, the positive campaign titled Vreme Je (It’s time!) was designed to boost youth voter turnout. One of the biggest accomplishments of the Vreme Je campaign was the fact that almost 86 percent of first-time voters cast a ballot in the 2000 election (Paunović et al. 2000: 39). The success of Otpor inspired civic activists in other countries to push for political change via nonviolent methods of resistance.

EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT

Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic had evolved into a nondemocratic political regime (Sell 2003). In 1998, the parliament passed a new law on universities that removed the protection of academic freedom and curtailed the autonomy of Serbian universities (see Human Rights Watch 1999). The law aimed to staff universities with government loyalists and stifle dissent in the academic setting. The same year, the government passed a law that further clamped down on the independent media.

In response to the crackdown on the universities and the mass media, the social movement Otpor was formed in October 1998. During the NATO bombing period, between March and June 1999, the movement suspended its activities. Since then, Otpor has dramatically expanded its membership base. In February 2000, Otpor held a national congress at which it formally announced its transformation from a youth movement into a people’s movement.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Otpor developed a horizontal organizational structure, with most power delegated to local cells. Each cell exercised autonomy in planning and executing its activities as long as Otpor members used nonviolent methods of resistance and articulated a message consistent with Otpor’s mission. Unlike the opposition political parties, the social movement had no visible leaders; they were hidden from the public eye. Instead, Otpor rotated its spokespeople each two weeks so that the government could not damage the reputation of the whole movement by discrediting or co-opting a few prominent members.

While Otpor was nonhierarchical, it was well organized. Otpor’s main office was divided into several departments charged with a specific set of tasks, for instance, human resources, networking, media relations. Furthermore, Otpor was split into two parts. Some Otpor activists worked upon the use-the-vote
campaign Vreme Je, while others focused their attention on the anti-incumbent campaign Gotov Je.

MOVEMENT RESOURCES

The international donor community made a major contribution to the financial resources of Otpor. In the aftermath of NATO bombing, the US government increased financial and technical assistance for civil society actors in Serbia. According to some reports (Cohen 2000), Otpor received more than $1 million in Western grants.

Another important resource that the social movement possessed was human capital. Otpor leaders built up a reservoir of organizational skills and protest experience through participation in student protests throughout the 1990s. Most Otpor leaders were veterans of the 1996–1997 student protest. The movement further strengthened its strategic capacities by applying Gene Sharp’s ideas about nonviolent action and the regime’s pillars of power (Sharp 1973, 2010). In particular, the movement participants were trained on how to break the hold of fear on the population and how to behave in case of arrest.

METHODS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

From its inception, Otpor adopted the principle of nonviolence. The social movement employed a wide array of tactics to operate in the repressive political environment. While the movement was denied access to national TV channels, Otpor reached citizens via local TV channels in several cities outside Belgrade. Using public space as a medium of mass communication, Otpor plastered streets with stickers and staged street performances infused with political humor. Otpor distributed more than one million stickers during the election year. Furthermore, within the framework of Vreme Je campaign, 33 rock concerts were held in cities and towns across Serbia.

INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT

Serbia’s Otpor set an example for civic activists in other countries on how to stage nonviolent resistance to a repressive political regime and to use elections as an opportunity for propelling political change. The cross-national diffusion of ideas has contributed to the rise of similar social movements in nondemocracies (Collin 2007; Nikolayenko 2007). Inspired by Otpor, youth movements were formed in Belarus (Zubr, 2001), Georgia (Kmara, 2003), and Ukraine (Pora, 2004). Moreover, former Otpor members set up the Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) and shared their expertise with civic activists in Myanmar (Burma), Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Resistance; Student movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Paris Commune

MICHEL OFFERLE

The Paris Commune of the spring of 1871 was essentially an emergent and makeshift government that ruled Paris from late March to May 28, 1871. It emerged largely as the result of a series of interconnected events: the Franco-Prussian War and France’s defeat; the fall of the Second Empire associated with an uprising among discontented French workers and other Parisian residents; the siege of Paris by Prussian forces and their defeat; the attempt to restore order within Paris, which failed on March 18; and the flight of the government to Versailles. Following the March 26 municipal election (with a low participation of 230,000 out of 485,000 registered voters), the Commune assumed control of the city. However, its reign was short lived, as it ended on the afternoon of May 28, with the surrender of the last barricade after one week of fires and street fighting. This week of fighting, known as “La semaine sanglante” (the bloody week), resulted in an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 insurgents killed or summarily executed. The few communes in the provinces lasted but a few days (Gaillard 1971; Aminzade 1993). The 72 days of the Commune’s existence have generated several thousands of books and articles (Lissagaray 1876; Le Quillec 2006), and it still generates scholarly inquiry and debate. The word “commune” is ambiguous: it harks back to the basic structure of the local French administration – a municipality (une commune); it evokes the insurrectional Commune of the 1792/1793 French Revolution; and it appears in ideologies of direct government from the 1850s onwards. The aim of the 1871 Commune was not merely governance; it was primarily military: to fight against the Versailles government (les “Versaillais”).

The Commune decreed various measures, some very specific but essential (upholding the impoverished National Guards’ pay, cancelling rent for the duration of the siege, free return of tools pawned by workmen); others more permanent (banning of night work in bakeries, separation of church and state, laicization of schools, 6000 francs cap on public workers’ salaries, abolition of draft and permanent military bodies, a ban on salary fines and withholdings by employers, and the proclamation of communal liberties, notably in the April 19, 1871 declaration). The declaration is a text to which scholars often turn in order to establish the respective weight of the Blanquist revolutionary socialists, neo-Jacobins, or Proudhonien internationalists who were part of the Council of the Commune. The declaration states that the Commune marks “the end of the old governmental and clerical world, of agiotage [financial speculation], monopolies, privileges, which are the cause of the proletariat serfdom, and of the misfortunes and disasters suffered by the nation.”

Did the Commune provoke municipal decentralization and consolidation of a patriotic republic ready to resume war against Prussia and opposed to the majority of monarchists who had signed the peace treaty, or did it portend a social revolution?

To understand the event, one can draw from nearly a hundred years of many Parisian insurrections and revolutions, from summer 1789 to spring 1871. Or might the Commune constitute a shorter conjuncture (Johnson 1997): popular mobilizations (unions and sections of the Internationale) caused by the liberalization of the Second Empire? During the siege of Paris by the Prussian troops, the frequency of “journées” (day of barricades) and mobilizations increased among an armed population organized by the Central Committee of the National Guard and the Central Committee of Paris’ 20 arrondissements.

But we might also be dealing with an a posteriori history, since the Commune, as early
as the publication of The Civil War in France (Marx 1871), becomes a laboratory of ideas for revolutionary entrepreneurs (Marx, Lenin):

“Its true secret was this: It was essentially a working class government, the product of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor” (Marx 1871: 171). This immediate interpretation, used by many Marxist scholars and maintained by the numerous marchers who commemorate the Commune, clashed with that of General Appert (1875), who published the numbers (36 309 taken in by police, representing 170 professions), which justified Versailles’ denunciation of the horrors and barbarity of the Parisian Convulsionaries, seen merely as a bunch of prisoners, prostitutes, lowlifes, rabble and drunks, often foreigners, often manipulated by agents of the Internationale and by illegitimate and bloodthirsty hostage-executing marginals. For a long time, these hasty generalizations constituted the template of the fear towards social movements, seen from the perspective of the maintenance of social order.

Against these two visions of the people, Rougerie (1971) attempted to demonstrate that those who had fought in the Commune, from top to bottom, were Parisian workers, of which they made up a good sociological and political sample (in the very broad sense of the term). The Communeux first and foremost hated their owners, their priests and, somewhat more marginally, their bosses.

Under the banner of the “new social history” and on the basis of “critical urban sociology,” Roger Gould (1995) sought to underline the peripheral neighborhoods’ strong mobilizing influence. He added the notion of “neighborhood community” to try to demonstrate that the mobilization of revolutionary neighborhood has to be understood in terms of overlapping ties and patterns among neighborhoods and the National Guard (citizen militia) insurgents, thus focusing attention on the multiplexity of locality- and organization-based, rather than just class-based, mobilization. As a result, solidarity is directed rather against the state than against a class (contrary to the June 1848 journées).

Tombs (1999) and Rougerie (in Latta 2004) have criticized this new version’s concepts, omissions, and methods: on the basis of the contemporary analysis of radicalization processes, the French historians explain that the Commune’s temporality is not one but plural: the September 1870 actors were not those of March or May 1871.

Once a politically “cold” event, the Commune has become a pregnant field for research on the sociology of mass mobilizations, as well as providing material for a more gendered cultural history (Gullickson 1996).

SEE ALSO: Barricades; French Revolution; Solidarity and movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Patriot/militia movement in the United States
NELLA VAN DYKE

The patriot/militia movement has waxed and waned since it first came to the attention of the public in 1995. At its peak, in 1996, there were over 800 documented patriot/militia organizations in the US (Southern Poverty Law Center 1996). The number of organizations declined dramatically after that, possibly in response to a crackdown from law enforcement (Southern Poverty Law Center 1999), and as militia and patriot groups adopted a mode of organization known as “leaderless resistance” whereby they function largely underground (Southern Poverty Law Center 1999, 2002; Berlet & Lyons 2000). In 2000, there were 194 documented militia/patriot organizations, and the movement hit a low of 131 groups in 2007. What is remarkable is the movement’s explosion in 2009. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (Potok 2010), the number of militia groups increased by 363 in 2009, a growth of 244 percent. Research on the emergence of the movement suggests that this explosive growth was likely fueled by both economic and political threats. After providing information on the movement’s history and ideology, the research on the movement’s emergence will be briefly reviewed, and in conclusion a speculation about the reasons for the increase in documented militia organizations in 2009.

MOVEMENT HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

While the patriot/militia movement is relatively young in US social movement history, its roots stretch back decades. Members of the US public first became aware of the movement in 1995, with the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building and the ensuing revelation that the perpetrator had ties to patriot/militia groups. However, the federal government was investigating these groups well before this time (Berlet & Lyons 2000). The movement’s most recent antecedents include the Minutemen of the 1960s, the Posse Comitatus, active from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, and the Order, active during the early 1980s. The modern movement stands in contrast to these earlier organizations, however, in that these were single organizations rather than an entire movement. Patriot and militia organizing follows a long history of conservative political thought and activism in the US, with its antigovernment, conspiracy-oriented philosophy sharing connections with the McCarthy-era communist witch hunts and the John Birch Society.

It is difficult to separate the patriot/militia movement from other right-wing movements, as they share many members (Berlet & Lyons 2000) and sometimes work together or attend conferences and rallies together (Stern 1996). However, there is no central organization to the movement, just loosely (if at all) connected organizations. The patriot/militia ideology reflects multiple themes from other conservative organizations and movements (e.g., confrontational antiabortion, pro-gun, white racist, far-right libertarian, and so on) (Berlet & Lyons 2000). The Southern Poverty Law Center (Potok 2010) reports that in 2009, the overlap between the militia movement and other extreme right-wing mobilizations became even more pronounced, as overtly racist commentary became more common on militia websites and militia antigovernment rhetoric was espoused frequently in a variety of conservative venues, including Tea Party movement events.

The ideological theme that unifies the patriot/militia movement is the belief that the US government has failed to represent its citizens and uphold the Constitution. Patriot/militia group members believe that the US government has become too involved in international politics, and that it is losing
its sovereignty to a socialist “New World Order,” managed by the United Nations. Government actions at Ruby Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993 are cited by movement members as evidence that the US government no longer supports the constitutional rights of its citizens, and that it intends to take all guns from citizens, in effect, making gun ownership illegal (Stern 1996; Berlet & Lyons 2000). Movement members believe that conventional political action is useless, and that citizens must arm themselves in order to fight back.

Antigovernment rhetoric is often combined with racism and sexism in the movement, although not all members are racist or sexist (Abanes 1996; Southern Poverty Law Center 1999). Some patriot/militia groups argue that the government is allowing women and minorities to gain too much political power at the expense of white citizens. In their analysis of patriot and militia rhetoric, Kimmel and Ferber (2000) argue that militia group members create an explanation for their economic woes by constructing an enemy that includes the federal government, women, and minorities. They show that movement members hold highly traditional views of gender, focusing on men as breadwinners and women as their passive helpers and suggesting that women’s empowerment means the oppression and emasculation of men. Some movement members are influenced by the Christian Identity religion, which holds that whites are the true chosen people, nonwhites are mud people, and Jews are the descendants of the devil. This religion provides a theological basis for their action, arguing that Anglo-Saxons have a birthright to establish God’s kingdom on earth. Thus, both racism and highly traditional views of gender roles are themes running throughout the movement.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT

While the movement has not been well studied by social scientists, research suggests that its mobilization was fueled by both economic and political threats. Although the US economy overall was doing fairly well until 2008, the country experienced profound economic changes in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors at the end of the twentieth century. Millions of manufacturing jobs were lost between 1990 and 2009, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country experienced what has been called the largest farming crisis since the Great Depression. Indeed in multivariate analyses, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) find that these economic changes fueled the growth of the movement; those parts of the country that lost a lot of manufacturing jobs and farms were more likely to host a patriot or militia organization in 1996. Freilich and Pridemore (2005) also find an association between loss of farms and patriot/militia organizing. Individuals with manufacturing and farming skills do not necessarily have the ability to secure positions with comparable pay in the new economy.

Although it is difficult to obtain valid information regarding the characteristics of organizations that are largely underground, consistent with the research described above, independent researchers suggest that the patriot/militia movement is populated by individuals who have been hurt by economic restructuring. Both Abanes (1996) and Snow (1999) suggest that patriot/militia group members are unskilled workers who face increasingly fewer employment opportunities, farmers, and middle-class individuals who have been hurt by economic restructuring. Thus, the research on the influence of economic change is echoed by that on movement membership.

In addition to mobilizing in response to economic threats, research finds that the movement has also been triggered by political threats and the perception that women and minorities are gaining political power to the detriment of white males. Van Dyke and Soule (2002) find that a higher level of women in state legislatures is associated with higher numbers of militia organizations. They also find that, at the county level, those counties which experienced an increase in their minority
population were more likely to host a militia or patriot organization. Other scholars show that states that have more of a paramilitary culture and more Gulf War veterans are more likely to host more patriot/militia groups (O’Brien & Haider-Markel 1998; Freilich 2003). They argue that a paramilitary culture emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in response to successes on the part of the women’s and civil rights movements as well as the American loss of the Vietnam War. Thus, there is some evidence that the movement is driven in part by threats to the perceived increasing power of women and minorities. The demographics of the movement are consistent with these findings: the movement is predominantly made up of white males (Snow 1999; Southern Poverty Law Center 1999; Kimmel & Ferber 2000), and others note a strong presence of military veterans (Kimmel & Ferber 2000).

CONTEMPORARY MOBILIZATION

The patriot/militia movement’s resurgence in 2009 is remarkable. As noted in the introductory paragraph, the number of groups increased by over 360 in 2009. The research described above suggests two possible triggering factors: economic downturn, and the election of Barack Obama to the presidency in 2008. 2008 saw the largest economic downturn in the US since the Great Depression, with unemployment rates reaching nearly 10 percent nationally, and local unemployment as high as 20 percent in some parts of the country. During times of economic stress, people look for someone to blame, and the federal government, as well as the increasing economic and political power of women and minorities, can make them feel that the government is to blame and that citizens need to mobilize and take up arms to protect their status.

The election of an African American Democrat to the White House is also undoubtedly one of the important triggers of the movement’s resurgence. Mark Potok (2010) of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) notes that patriot and militia web sites have been full of negative and racist comments regarding President Obama since his election. It is tempting to assume that this mobilization is driven entirely by racism, however, the SPLC (Potok 2010) did not find a significant increase in the number of white supremacist or hate groups in 2009. While racism is part of what motivates the militia movement, the movement’s central theme is a distrust of the federal government and a fear that the government will outlaw gun ownership. In the 1990s and 2000s this fear seems to have been especially heightened when Democrats were in power in the White House, probably because the Republican Party and others cast the Democrats as the party of big government, and as being opposed to gun ownership. The extent to which the recent mobilization has been driven more by economic downturn or political threats remains a task for empirical research to sort out.

SEE ALSO: Christian Identity movement; Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Quotidian disruption; Right-wing movements; Racist social movements; Threat.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

4  PATRIOT/MILITIA MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Peasant movements
DEBAL K. SINGHAROY

This entry summarizes the dynamics of peasant movements in both historical and contemporary terms. It highlights the nature of peasants’ political actions, the conditions that produce peasant movements, and the changing dimensions of peasants’ movements in the pre- and posteconomic liberalization world.

PEASANTS AND POLITICAL ACTIONS

Peasants have widely been described economically, as small producers, subsistence cultivators, landless agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, tenants, and part-time rural artisans who have been attached to land to eke out a living; culturally as unsystematic, unreflective, unsophisticated, and illiterate; socially as collectivities with predominantly primordial relations based on clan, caste, and ethnicity; and politically as underdogs deprived of knowledge for organized collective action who have historically borne the brunt of extreme forms of subordination and oppression in society. Interestingly, observers have attributed to peasants dichotomous social identities. On the one hand, they have been described as undifferentiated, conservative, and awkward social categories devoid of the potential for social movements of wider social concern and revolution; on the other hand, they are said to be progressive and autonomous social groups capable of concrete class actions. In the context of eighteenth-century peasantry in France, for example, Karl Marx described peasants as a social category in which members of the category are isolated from one another and “are formed by simple addition of homologous magnitude, such as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes” (Marx 1974: 231). To Lenin, however, the peasantry in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia was differentiated by the unequal patterns of landholding, income, and by their contact with the market with revolutionary potentials (Lenin 1972: 497–498). Notwithstanding the dichotomous perceptions, the peasantry has played crucial roles in several great revolutions and social movements and in daily grassroots struggles.

Shanin (1984) has described three major types of political action peasants have pursued: independent class action seen during the Green Movement in Eastern Europe, the Peasant Union in Russia in 1905 and in China (1900–1926), and the Zapatista movement in Mexico; guided political action spearheaded by external political forces and power elite, like the Russian Cossacks, French Bonapartism, and the Maoist People’s Armies; fully spontaneous, amorphous political action as in food riots and passive resistance reflected in the spontaneous restriction of production by the Russian peasantry in the 1920s. Passive protest is an important art of peasant resistance that was practiced by Gandhi during India’s freedom movement (Shanin 1984: 251–263).

Since the late nineteenth century, the peasantry has evolved into socially differentiated social categories affecting the nature, forms, and sequence of their participation in revolutionary movements. In the revolutions of Russia, the middle peasantry played the crucial leading role while the poor peasants came in only at a later stage when the success of the movement was almost guaranteed. By contrast, in the Chinese revolution the poor peasantry provided both the leadership and the main force of the peasant revolution. In India, as the nationalist movement emerged, the peasantry took up its cause against feudal lords under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, who mobilized peasant support for the Indian National Congress (Alavi 1965: 242–243). Peasants took part in the Champaran movements (1917),...
Kheda Satyagraha (1918), and Bardoli Satyagraha (1928) to protest against the oppressive antipeasant measures of the British and in the civil disobedience movement for India's independence through nonviolent means. It is, however, observed by many scholars that the structural features of Indian society, which are dominated by caste, religion, and ethnicity, ensured that the peasantry played a passive rather than a revolutionary role in the country (Moore 1966). Whether or not the peasants would participate in revolution appears to depend on the circumstances, what Marxists call the historical stages, of participation in the revolution (Alavi 1965: 243) and on the structure of power and class alignments in the society (Moore 1966).

Historical evidence shows that while peasants often constituted a “break in the middle-and working-class revolutions” in the West, they played a crucial role in anti-colonial movements in countries like Algeria where “they have nothing to lose and everything to gain.” The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays (Fanon 1971: 47).

Antonio Gramsci observed the peasantry in the context of Italy as a part of a larger sociopolitical order and not a discrete entity. They lacked unity and collective consciousness and participated in their own subordination by subscribing to hegemonic values and developing subaltern consciousness. To Gramsci, their subordination could be broken through an alliance of workers and peasants (Gramsci 1998). To Hobsbawm (1972), though “peasant-ness” of the peasantry can be defined by “subalternity, poverty, exploitation and oppression,” they are also capable of resisting attack and developing counterattack (1972: 13). Subaltern groups maintain an autonomous domain of politics in their own way to contest the structure of subordination through spontaneous mobilizations, as reflected in peasant uprisings and insurrections, unrest in the *hats* (local village markets), looting, and also in organized peasant movements (Guha 1982: 4–6).

Peasant resistance is also reflected in covert form through “hidden transcripts” as described by James Scott. In his view, subordinates in structures of domination have a fairly extensive social existence which is outside the immediate control of the dominant. Behind the scenes they are likely to create and defend a social space in which offstage dissent to the official transcript of power relations may be voiced. Every subordinate group creates, out of this ordeal, a “hidden transcript” that represents a critique of power as spoken behind the back of the dominant (Scott 1990: 4–15).

Besides these overt (protest, direct action) and covert (hidden transcripts) challenges, there is also a third form of contemporary resistance: *direct intervention to alter the labor and production processes*, especially to bring in indigenous forms of rural development.

Peasant societies have encountered varieties of challenges that can be clustered into pre-economic liberalization (until the 1970s) and postliberalization periods (since the 1980s). It is within these contexts that a number of peasant movements are summarized below.

**PEASANT MOVEMENTS 1930s–1970s**

**Anticollectivization movement, Russia**

Russia, under communist rule, took the initiative to collectivize private land owned by the peasantry in the late 1920s as a part of the Stalinist revolution from above, and proceeded to eradicate peasant institutions. The government recruited millions of party workers to frame the social base of the revolution that initiated all-out attacks on the peasants, their culture, and way of life. As the authorities tried to implement the collectivization initiative through coercion, the anticollectivization movement emerged, with thousands of peasant revolts. These revolts took the form of riots and disruption of meetings to organize collective farming, with the aim of frightening the party workers and reclaiming many of the properties taken for collective farming. In March 1930, Stalin stopped the process of collectivization.
However, it was initiated again in late 1930 and completed despite the peasants’ resistance (Viola 1996).

**Tebhaga movement, India (1946–1947)**

The British colonial land policy in India created a class of intermediary landowners with a dominant minority having social and economic command and a hapless majority suffering poverty, unemployment, and insecurity as agricultural laborers, sharecroppers, and tenants at the bottom of the agrarian hierarchy. In 1946, on the eve of independence, the undivided Bengal experienced a vehement outburst of peasant unrest known as Tebhaga Andolan, under the leadership of the left-dominated Bengal Kisan Sabha. Through this movement, poor peasants, who were mostly from a tribal and lower caste background, demanded “land to the tiller” and a two-thirds share of the produce for the sharecroppers instead of a half. The peasants asserted their rights by forcibly cutting and stacking the paddy in their own courtyards against the will of the landlords, resisted the police, and fought the united armed forces with traditional weapons. Though this movement spread rapidly across Bengal, it collapsed quickly in the face of repressive measures like killing, torture, and public flogging by the police and administration on the one hand, and lack of coordination among the peasantry and the collapse of their leadership on the other (Singh Roy 2004).

**Telangana movement, India (1946–1952)**

Through armed struggle in 1946–1952, the peasantry of the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh engaged in a prolonged movement against the feudal land tenure system and its exploitative practices, such as landgrabbing, illegal taxing, forced and bonded labor, extra-economic coercion, rack-renting, debt, and daily humiliation. Under the leadership of the communist-dominated Andhra Maha Sabha, the peasantry took part in a guerrilla struggle to overthrow the Nizam (the princely ruler) of Hyderabad. The national government of India initiated military action against the Nizam in 1947 for resisting the merger with the Indian Union and subsequently against the peasants in September 1948. Several hundred peasant rebels were killed while facing the armies of the Nizam and of India. However, once the Nizam was overthrown by the Indian army in 1951, the Politbureau of the Communist Party of India called off the struggle and opted for parliamentary democracy to espouse the cause of the peasantry (Dhanagare 1983; Singh Roy 2004).

**Naxalite movement, India (1967–1971)**

Immediately after independence, the Government of India introduced an elaborate land reform programme with a view to minimize agrarian inequality, putting it on the path of progress and accelerated development. However, all over India a gap surfaced between the land reform laws and their implementation that led to downward mobility of peasants. The left-wing political parties in West Bengal had been mobilizing peasantry for the implementation of land reforms, and in 1967 a left-supported United Front Government came into power in this province with the promise of land reform. However, once in power it showed reluctance to implement the promise. The peasants of Naxalbari, under the leadership of the Communist Party of India’s Darjeeling District Committee of West Bengal, began taking possession of surplus lands forcibly, arming themselves with conventional weapons like bows and arrows and spears, and set up a parallel administration to look after villages. They also declared some “liberated areas.” Although the state objected by initiating police action, the movement spread like wildfire across the state and in many other parts of India, and pushed for the seizure of state power through guerrilla warfare within a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideological framework. Peasants, especially from tribal areas, overwhelmingly participated in this struggle. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) was formed in 1969 to spearhead the movement across the country. However, the movement collapsed in the face of strong state action that
killed hundreds and arrested thousands. This movement continues to reappear in rural India, as more than a dozen of Naxalite groups are active in contemporary India under different names, covering more than one-third of the territory, mostly in deprived areas (SinghaRoy 2004).

Latin American peasant movements
Latin American history is replete with revolt and rebellion among the peasantry, initially against the Spanish and Portuguese and subsequently against the British, French, and the US. Some of the landmark movements associated with the peasantry include the Haitian revolution at the end of the eighteenth century against colonialism and slavery, the Mexican Revolution, starting in 1910, that culminated in the 1930s, ensuring agrarian reforms, the 1952 Bolivian revolt of peasants and miners for agrarian reform, the Cuban Revolution in 1959, leading to confiscation of US and Cuban-owned plantations, land distribution, and collectivization of smallholdings. The peasant movements in Peru in the 1960s and in Chile from 1966 to 1973 led to the redistribution of land among the peasants (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001). Other prominent movements connected to the peasantry and landless farm-workers that emerged between 1940 and 1980 include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in 1964, and the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra, MST), in 1978, which for many years was the best known social movement in Brazil.

African peasant revolts
Africa has also experienced a significant number of peasant movements, some of which scholars have described as peasant wars. The Mau Mau revolt in Kenya, the anticolonial uprising in Zimbabwe, and the Agbekoya uprising in western Nigeria are important examples. The many land movements in Africa can also be construed as peasant movements.  

CONTEMPORARY AGRARIAN SCENARIO (SINCE THE 1980s)
The agrarian scene in the contemporary world has been undergoing phenomenal change, widely characterized by continuing decline of the rural population, fewer people working in agriculture, and increasing stress on rural natural resources, namely land, water, and forest. These accelerating changes can be attributed to a confluence of factors: neoliberal economic policy, intervention of multinational corporations, phenomenal growth in agricultural production and trade, uneven food security both within and between countries, penetration of information and communication technologies with digital divides, and sharpened heterogeneity among peasants (Borras 2009: 9–16). This has been accompanied by the proliferation of multifaceted grievances and discontent in rural areas and internationalization of peasant movements linking them, via networks, regionally, nationally, and transnationally. Some examples follow.

National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE), Ecuador
The National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) was formed in 1986 against the backdrop of the introduction of neoliberal policy by the state which had adversely affected the identity and interests of the Ecuadorian indigenous peasants, leading to a series of popular uprisings. From the early 1990s, the Ecuadorian peasants started protesting against state neoliberal policies, culminating in a series of concerted actions including the storming in 2000 of Congress and a brief takeover of the presidency. Through this movement, the peasants resisted concessions to transnational corporation and new economic development projects, which are perceived to be detrimental to the interests of indigenous peoples, the environment, and the local economy. CONAIE has committed itself to a process of noncapitalist modernization, an alternative form of development rooted
both in the indigenous peasant economy and in equitable participation in the country’s resources and national development process. Accordingly, CONAIE sees itself as a means of converting the country’s indigenous peoples from a “passive subject of change” into “an active social and political subject” and, in the process, of bringing about a state of development, democracy, and justice.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Mexico (1983–1996)
The Zapatista movement emerged in the 1980s in the Canada Tojolabal area of Chiapas in response to the privatization and weakening of the ejido – a land-holding system granted to the village in which peasants were given usufruct rights over specific plots of land and, in the best of cases, the commons. Though this system had some collective aspects to it, neoliberal technocrats in the government came to consider it unproductive and sought to privatize ejidal parcels. Additionally, the government’s official peasant union, the CNC (Confederacion Nacional Campesina or National Peasant Confederation) also developed to be a corporatist organization, and became widely discredited and seen as illegitimate among the peasants, thus contributing further to the armed uprising in Chiapas. Thus, the EZLN engaged in a guerrilla war against the state, with the aim of bringing an end to oppression and exploitation and instituting some form of socialism. On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista movement, with more than 3000 insurgents, seized Chiapas, just as the North American Free Trade Agreement came into force in Mexico. The movement sought to capture local state power through armed struggle to solve the agrarian crisis and provide leadership, health care, and development for peasants and landless workers. The EZLN attracted a large number of people from the peasant community, many of whom engaged in guerrilla rebellion directly or indirectly by protecting and safeguarding guerrillas, contributing new recruits, supplying provisions in the guerrilla training camp, participating in protests, and helping with community works to enhance Zapatista identity and hegemony in Chiapas. This movement has also been marked by noteworthy participation of indigenous women (Olivera 2005; Saavedra 2005) and has received national and international support.

The food sovereignty movement, Honduras
Since the 1970s, the Aguan valley of Honduras has been a site of agrarian peasant cooperatives. However, many of them were compelled to sell or surrender land to the Honduran government and the US military in the 1980s when the military wanted to convert it into training grounds to contain revolutionary movement in this area. Again, in the wake of state neoliberal economic policy, agrarian reform programs were sidetracked. Even though the US military withdrew in the 1990s, land was not returned to the campesina – the subsistence peasants; instead, it was passed on to more influential persons in violation of the legal position and history of landownership. The Honduras National Coordinating Council of Peasant Unions (COCOCH) was formed to resist this policy. This movement grew in influence against the backdrop of increasing landlessness and semi-landlessness, and the increasing dependency of Honduras on imports of basic food items from liberalized markets. The Via Campesina (see below) took up the cause of these peasants at transnational forums (Boyer 2010).

Autonomous peasant committee, China
The fast rate of economic growth achieved in China in recent decades is linked to the disruption and privatization of rural communes, and the creation of village township and village enterprises (TVEs) that provided employment to over 123 million workers. However, after an initial period of success the TVEs failed in most provinces, contributing to a decline in economic growth and large-scale migration of poverty-stricken workers from rural to urban areas. The rural peasant realized that the benefits of economic boom accrued to the
holders of power rather than to themselves. This situation led to waves of protests, resistance, and insurgency in rural China from the 1980s, involving millions of protesters in 21 provinces. Though these protests are localized, they have similar concerns about corruption, embezzlement, and related issues. These peasant protests took the form of violence or revenge against the cadres and new rich, and village elites. In some places, the collective actions involved prolonged blockades of traffic, setting fire to government vehicles and residences, and marching through streets, mountains, and fields. In Anhui, an autonomous peasant committee was formed by the protesters, demanding tax reduction and power to the peasants. In 1993 more than 15,000 peasants in Renshou County in Western Sichuan resisted the arbitrary raising of tax by the local cadres. They blocked traffic for six months, attacked government offices, and set vehicles on fire, with the movement spreading to many other areas (Walker 2006).

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PEASANT MOVEMENTS

In the contemporary world international networking has emerged as a crucial dimension of peasant movements, as illustrated through the activities of the Landless Workers Movement and Via Campesina.

The Landless Workers Movement (MST), which began in Brazil, has acquired both national and international attention in the contemporary world, beginning most noticeably in 1999–2000, with the demand for greater credits and financing for small cultivators, smallholders, and impoverished landless rural workers. Although nationally focused, it also has a global focus, bringing together peasant communities from all over the world in solidarity to articulate their issues and struggles in the globalizing world. The slogan of the MST is “occupy, resist and produce.” It has occupied through the mobilization of poor peasants vast areas of unoccupied land, and secured credit to modernize agriculture, converting fallow estates into productive units. The MST has organized national marches into Brasilia of over 100,000 people, organized roadblocks, and has mobilized supporters throughout the country via the Internet. It has been a leading force in organizing urban alliances to counteract the neoliberal agenda of privatization and budget cuts, in the process mobilizing trade unions, political parties, university, and religious groups through a campaign called “Consulta Popular.” The MST pursues a “modernization from below with equity” strategy; in opposition to the elite modernization strategy favored by the Cardoso regime and its World Bank sponsors (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001).

The Via Campesina is a global movement of peasants, small and medium-scale farmers, rural women, farmworkers, and indigenous agrarian communities of Asia, the Americas, Western and Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa. It brings together rural organizations from all over the world in common forum to formulate policy alternatives to neoliberalism and to make their voices heard in GATT, and subsequently WTO deliberations and other discussions on agriculture and food that take place nationally and internationally. It has developed ties among 149 peasant organizations across 69 countries. The Via Campesina emerged in explicit rejection of neoliberal agricultural policies and as a direct response to the fact that the concerns, needs, and interests of people who actually work on the land and produce much of the world’s food are excluded in the GATT negotiations on agriculture. It also negotiates with the United Nations for international conventions on the rights of peasants along the lines of the Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Desmarais 2002; Torres & Rosset 2010).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEASANT MOVEMENTS

Radical peasant movements have been transformed into institutionalized peasant movements in many parts of the third world. For
example, the mainstream Left political parties in India, like the Communist Party of India and the Marxist Communist Party of India, and even a section of the Naxalite movements that sponsored radicalism and militancy, have opted for parliamentary politics and reoriented the tactics of peasant mobilization through tactical revisionism. Through routinized mobilization, peasant movements have sometimes been co-opted at the grassroots, and peasants’ subordination in society has been reinforced as they have been unable to bring livelihood security to peasants, instead fostering dependency relations between the political party and the peasantry. While in some arrangements of subordination the peasantry has developed hidden transcripts of criticality against political leaders, sustained mobilization has made them articulate alternative multiple identities. These have taken the form of caste (Rajbansi statehood movement, Madiga reservation movement), regional autonomy (Telangana statehood movement), and gender (anti- and prohibition of arrack) movements in India. Despite the transformation of some peasant movements, peasant marginality and subordination continues, prompting the articulation of multiple identities and use of available resources to challenge the structure of their marginalization and subordination in society.

CONCLUSION

In the globalizing world, despite the fast process of industrialization and emergence of a knowledge economy, peasantry continues to survive as the last tribe of humanity characterized predominantly by poverty, insecurity, deprivation, and marginalization, and domination of various forms. The peasant movements in the contemporary world are at a crossroads and have taken multiple forms, from local resistance to global coalitions. The peasants are in a process of constructing new identities and using the strategies of resistance, both against internal and external subordination, articulated through everyday experiences of survival in the wider world.

SEE ALSO: ANUC (Columbian peasant movement); Direct action; FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); Guerrilla movements; Land movements in Africa; Landless Workers Movement (MST) (Brazil); Moral economy theory and peasant movements in Latin America; Peasant rebellions of imperial China; Resistance; Russian Revolution; Transnational social movements; Transnational Zapatism; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Peasant rebellions of imperial China

HO-FUNG HUNG

China's imperial history was characterized by a dynastic cycle, in which the decay and collapse of a dynasty was often triggered by peasant rebellions. Many of these rebellions followed a similar pattern. A dynasty that prospered on the abundance of cultivable land and natural resources would inevitably encounter depletion of those resources when its population grew. Hardship inflicted by rising population–land ratio, in tandem with the concentration of landownership having developed over time, drove many to believe that the dynasty's mandate of heaven had gone and a new bearer of the mandate was about to emerge. When a new dynasty was established, the rulers usually expanded the available land by colonizing uncharted regions. They would also even out landownership. These measures, together with the relief of population pressure owing to turbulent dynastic transitions, created the foundation for the dynasty's heyday. Then resources would diminish again with rising population and the cycle would be repeated.

This cycle of peasant rebellion developed throughout China's imperial history. In late imperial times, after the fourteenth century, the rebels' ideology and organization underwent a significant change when the White Lotus religion and the respective sects gave most peasant rebellions a millenarian and utopian twist.

The origins of the White Lotus religion in China can be traced back to about 1100 CE. It represented a convergence of the religious traditions of Taoism, Buddhism, and Manichaeism. The core of the religion was the idea of cyclical kalpas (jie), a classical Sanskrit term meaning successive transformations of the world over immensely long periods of time. The religion's followers worshipped the Eternal Venerable Mother (wusheng naomu), the supreme deity controlling the recurrence of kalpas. Each kalpa was governed by a particular Buddha, and the present kalpa was governed by the historical Shakyamuni Buddha. When the current kalpa ended, the material world would be destroyed by horrific famines, diseases, and other catastrophes. The Venerable Mother would then send the Maitreya Buddha (lile fo) to earth and initiate a new kalpa. Followers of the religion were told to practice vegetarianism and to lead an ascetic way of life so that they would attain salvation and be brought back to the womb of the Venerable Mother during the calamitous kalpic transition (Overmyer 1976).

The White Lotus religion spread throughout China among the lower classes after the twelfth century. Independent and competing White Lotus sects proliferated (Gaustad 2000). At times, the White Lotus religion was appropriated as an ideology to call for rebellious action. In those instances, the content of the religion mutated with a utopian twist. It prophesied that, during the imminent kalpic transition, the Maitreya Buddha would be reincarnated, and his followers should aid his work of cleansing the world of corruption to earn their salvation. The new kalpa would be the dawn of an egalitarian world in which there would be no distinction between men and women, rich and poor, old and young.

The first major outbreak of a large-scale uprising with a White Lotus outlook was in the mid-fourteenth century, when White Lotus sects in the south declared in the midst of plagues and famines that the Maitreya Buddha had come and that people in search of salvation should take up their arms and overthrow the ruling Mongols. The Red Turban Army, to which Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty, belonged, was one of the militant sects.
inspired by the White Lotus religion. After the establishment of the Ming dynasty in 1368, the new emperor persecuted the White Lotus sects aggressively, for he was well aware of the religion’s rebellious potential. But toward the mid-seventeenth century, White Lotus activism revived and fueled a number of major rebellions, contributing to the final collapse of the Ming.

The White Lotus religion was suppressed once again after the consolidation of the Qing dynasty that replaced the Ming in 1644. But the Qing government was never able to root out heterodox sects altogether. During the eighteenth century, White Lotus sects proliferated alongside a growth in mobile, landless vagrants, who found social support and spiritual comfort in sectarian activities. White Lotus sects occasionally initiated open revolts throughout the eighteenth century. None of these rebellions were as threatening to the Qing rulers as the White Lotus Rebellions that spanned four provinces in the empire’s southwest in 1796–1805. The repression of this rebellion emptied the imperial treasury and weakened the Qing state to a point of no return. The Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century, which fused White Lotus sectarianism with newly imported Christian beliefs, aggravated the state crisis and triggered the disintegration of the empire, which eventually collapsed in 1911 (Hung 2011: chs 4, 6).

These millenarian rebellions never succeeded in creating the utopia the sectarian leaders initially promised, either because the leaders became emperor aspirants (as in the case of Zhu Yuanzhang and the Ming dynasty) or because the rebellion was crushed. But the tradition of such rebellions had successfully implanted an egalitarian and utopian consciousness among the peasants, who then became more receptive to the communist mobilization that strove to turn peasant rebels into modern revolutionaries in the early twentieth century (Perry 1980).

SEE ALSO: Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Mandate of Heaven (China); Peasant movements; Religion and social movements; Taiping Rebellion (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Peronism
FEDERICO M. ROSSI

Peronism is one of the main social and political movements of contemporary Argentina. Peronism owes its name to its founder Juan Domingo Perón – three times president of Argentina (1946–1952, 1952–1955, and 1973–1974). Peronism is a national-populist movement related to the first incorporation of laborers into Argentina’s political arena. The movement since then has evolved and diversified.

ORIGIN

The origin of Peronism is a highly contested issue. The core of the debate is related to the characterization of Peronism as a rupture or a continuity with the past development of the struggles of popular sectors (the poor and/or marginalized strata) for incorporation in and transformation of the political regime.

There are a number of factors that together explain the origin of Peronism. The massive internal migration of politically inexperienced poor people to the large urban areas during the 1930s produced a huge demographic change and the alienation of politically inexperienced new migrants (Germani 1973; Di Tella 1990). Simultaneously, there was an accumulation of Communist and Socialist union struggles that produced a disparity between the material expectations of redistribution and the few actual or perceived achievements obtained, which led old and new union leaders to support Perón for pragmatic and ideological purposes (Murnis & Portantiero 1971; Torre 1990). A group of politically unrepresented elites also found an opportunity to access power. Peronism included the emergent national industrialists as well as politically marginal civil and military right-wing and Social Christian intellectuals (Di Tella 1990; Brennan 1998). Last, the charismatic bond built between Perón and the popular sectors allowed for the replacement of much of the previous labor movement arrangements by ideologically transforming the popular sectors (James 1988; Plotkin 2003).

The combination of these elements built a populist multiclass coalition that worked until the 1955 coup against Perón (Di Tella 1990). However, from 1955 to 1973 the Peronist movement gradually added a youth left-wing sector and increased the role of unions while detaching the industrialists and right-wing elites. In this period the Peronist movement was proscribed and entered into a phase of state persecution that increased the movement’s radicalization, leading to the creation of Peronist guerrilla organizations.

IDEOLOGY

Justicialismo – a blending of the Spanish terms for social justice – is the ideology proclaimed by Peronism. The scholarship on the Peronist movement has produced a rich debate about its ideology, due to Perón’s changing discourse and scholars’ use of European analytic categories to explain a Latin American phenomenon. Justicialismo is founded on Social Christian values and has three basic principles: social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence. In pursuit of these three principles, Perón elaborated two key notions. The first is related to the location of Peronism as a movement in a third position “equidistant from both idealism and materialism and, in terms of socio-economic models, counterposed itself equally to capitalism and communism” (Gillespie 1982: 18). The second is related to the societal model to achieve social welfare. The organized community idea is one of direct state intervention to assure harmony between laborers and employers (Perón 1951). The Peronist economic model could be considered as an emulation of the Scandinavian welfare states.
in a mixed economy with a central role for unions in corporatist arrangements. In comparative terms, Peronism is the equivalent for Argentina to the US New Deal, and Getúlio Vargas’ Trabalhismo in Brazil.

PERONISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The great internal diversity of the Peronist movement has produced some confusion among scholars due to equating the electoral Partido Justicialista (PJ) with Peronism as such. As the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands is not the German labor movement, the PJ is not the Peronist movement, just the most important of a series of Peronist parties. Even Perón asserted that Peronism was not a party but a movement (Perón 1951), which was composed of four branches during the 1946–1976 period: (1) political, the electoral and patronage instrument based on the PJ; (2) female, created by Evita Perón after the enfranchisement of women and later underdeveloped; (3) labor, by far the most developed and structured sector, based on the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT); and (4) youth, incorporated in 1971–1974 through the creation of a Peronist student movement and left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Montoneros (Gillespie 1982; McGuire 1997). From 1955 the industrialists were gradually marginalized, through being represented in the weak Confederación General Económica.

Redemocratization in 1983 and neoliberal reforms from 1976 undermined the unions’ power as the PJ mutated into a patronage-machine party (Levitsky 2003). This new context produced a decline of the CGT influence inside the PJ during the 1990s. At the same time, the Peronist movement diversified, with the creation of the new union Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) in 1992, and the piqueteros movement that mobilizes unemployed laborers in 1996. The PJ has been quite dominant but has been weakened by disputes within its constituency by alternative Peronist parties since the 1990s, such as the right-wing Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia and the center-left Frente Grande.

In brief, Peronism can be studied as a movement because it is composed of a network of union, party, and social organizations that are interrelated through grassroots branches and informal gatherings, making use of contentious and routine strategies for electoral and other political purposes. The Peronist movement has transcended any specific protest with periods of latency and underground resistance networks during the 1955–1973 and 1976–1983 periods. Finally, as has happened with equivalent labor-based movements elsewhere, Peronism developed a popular political culture that unifies multiple actors and individuals, providing them with an identity that does not require membership.

POLITICAL POPULAR CULTURE

Historically Peronism was the movement that first incorporated workers into the nation’s politics. For this reason, the formation of the dominant laborers’ tradition in Argentina is intimately related to the Peronist movement. Peronism has an emblem, hymn, intellectuals, and is the hegemonic political popular culture of the poor people. Among the varied elements of the Peronist popular culture, Evita is the best-known figure, sometimes even worshiped as a saint comparable to the Virgin Mary (Karush & Chamosa 2010).

The Peronist popular culture is the most resilient element of the movement, resisting multiple persecutions and twists on elites’ discourses and practices. The neoliberal policies of Carlos Menem’s (PJ) presidency (1989–1995, 1995–1999) put into crisis some of the Peronist national-populist principles, while it showed the movement’s resilience. Martucelli and Svampa (1997) identified union, revolutionary, and party pragmatic types of Peronist militants during the 1990s. Auyero (2000) provided a detailed analysis of the clientelistic grassroots logics of the
PJ and the redefinition of the Peronist anti-establishment mythical origins.

In a new turn of Peronism, Néstor Kirchner’s (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s (from 2007) center-left Peronist presidencies have promoted a redevelopment of some of the first incorporation and left-wing Peronist symbols and rhetoric while including part of the piqueteros and unions in the government coalition.

SEE ALSO: Alienation and social movements; Charisma; Guerrilla movements; Ideology; Labor movement in Latin America; Leadership; Piqueteros (workers/unemployment movement in Argentina); Poor people’s movements; Populism/populist movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
The *piqueteros*, or unemployed workers movement, is the main contentious actor in the resistance to the social consequences of neoliberalism and the struggle for reincorporation of the popular sectors (i.e., the poor and/or marginalized strata) into Argentina’s political arena. The name *piqueteros* (picketers) is based on the type of protest that made this movement publicly known – the picket on the national roads. The origin and characteristics of the *piqueteros* movement are traceable to four main processes: (1) the social consequences of the collapse of industrialization by substitution of the imports model and the application of neoliberal reforms that produced a massive and fast deindustrialization from the 1980s; (2) the territorialization of politics since redemocratization as a result of the dissolution of the main corporatist arrangements for solving popular sectors’ claims; (3) the adaptation to a democratic setting of left-wing groups that had participated in armed struggle during the 1970s; and (4) the creation of territories for political organization without risks for unemployed people, by some unions, human rights organizations, and Catholic Church dioceses in the 1980s and 1990s.

ORIGIN AND GOALS

The *piqueteros* emerged in two petroleum enclaves, in the Patagonian province of Neuquén and in Salta on the border with Bolivia in 1996–1997 (Sánchez 1997; Auyero 2003). Later the movement diffused to the city of Buenos Aires and its suburbs through networks of militants of Christian-based communities, left-wing groups such as the Movimiento Guevarista (MG), parties such as the Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR) and Patria Libre (PL), the Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA), and the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Rossi 2011: ch. 5). In 1996, ‘The March against Hunger, Unemployment, and Repression’ was organized by militants of the PCR, the Trotskyist Movimiento al Socialismo, and the Partido Comunista de Argentina (PCA) (Flores 2007). In 1997, the first pickets in suburban Buenos Aires that succeeded in getting unemployment subsidies were coordinated (Svampa & Pereyra 2003). Since then the movement has spread throughout the whole country and is associated with a multiplicity of social movement organizations (SMOs).

The main immediate goal of the *piqueteros* is to recover full employment for the urban poor. This goal is related to the quest for reincorporating the popular sectors in the political arena. In a mid- and long-term perspective, each SMO has diverse goals based on their ideologies and repertoires of strategies. Some SMOs claim revolutionary aims, while others expect gradual reforms in coalition with governments.

THE MAIN SMOS

As with any movement, the *piqueteros* is composed of several SMOs (Table 1). This movement contains multiple ideologies but a common identity of “unemployed workers.” Although the number of SMOs that compose the movement has gradually expanded, it began with three main groups: the Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTDs), the Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), and the Federación de Trabajadores por la Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat (FTV). Despite the ideological diversity of the movement, the *piqueteros’* rank-and-file share a Peronist, nostalgic, national–populist social matrix (Svampa & Pereyra
Table 1 The piqueteros movement (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main SMOs</th>
<th>Related political organization</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barrios de Pie (BP)</td>
<td>PL – Libres del Sur</td>
<td>National–populist (N–P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>PCR</td>
<td>Maoist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinadora de Trabajadores</td>
<td>Movimiento Patriótico</td>
<td>N–P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desocupados “Aníbal Verón”</td>
<td>Revolucionario – Quebracho</td>
<td>National–populist (N–P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Popular “Dario Santillán”</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Autonomist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTV</td>
<td>CTA until 2006</td>
<td>N–P &amp; Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Theology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimiento “Evita” (ME)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N–P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimiento Sin Trabajo “Teresa Vive”</td>
<td>Movimiento Socialista de Trabajadores</td>
<td>Trotskyist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTD “Aníbal Verón”</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Guevarist</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTD of La Juanita</td>
<td>Alianza por una República de Iguales since 2007</td>
<td>Center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTD of Solano &amp; allies</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Autonomist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTD “Teresa Rodríguez” – Coordinadora de Unidad Barrial</td>
<td>MG &amp; Partido Revolucionario de la Liberación</td>
<td>Guevarist &amp; Trotskyist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimiento Territorial Liberación</td>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Marxism–Leninist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organización Barrial “Túpac Amaru”</td>
<td>CTA since 2003</td>
<td>N–P &amp; Indigenist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polo Obrero (PO)</td>
<td>Partido Obrero</td>
<td>Trotskyist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unión de Trabajadores</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Syndicalist</td>
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<td>Desocupados of Mosconi</td>
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2003: 195–196) that is part of Argentina’s popular sectors’ political culture.

THE PIQUETEROS’ INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT

The piqueteros’ relationship with the government had been mostly defined as a clientelistic one. However, recent studies showed that the picture is much more complex (Lodola 2005; Quirós 2006; Pereyra & Pérez 2008; Rossi 2011). The piqueteros use a wide collection of contentious and routine strategies.

The piqueteros’ contentious repertoire is related to the use of the picket as a tool for blocking the distribution of products. Their territorialized type of mobilization is a result of being linked to the urban land occupations of the 1980s (Merklen 2005). This strategy generally follows a sequence. First, mostly in association with the municipality or with a local political organization, a piqueteros SMO organizes a picket by burning truck tires and putting tents in a road crucial for nearby companies in order to claim for unemployment subsidies and/or jobs. Second, usually under the decision of a federal judge, the Gendarmería (military police) arrive in order to secure the free transport of goods. Third, in most cases state brokers arrive at the picket site and negotiate with the SMO leaders in order to achieve a concerted solution. Fourth, if an agreement is achieved, the leaders will generally explain it to the people in the picket who will then deliberate in an assembly and vote on whether to accept the accord. Fifth, if unemployment subsidies are allocated, this will be done by the ministry of labor, as it is the responsible agency. In almost all cases the state will refuse to give actual jobs. Sixth, if the government is less eager to support the piqueteros’ request, the Gendarmería will usually repress the picket and secure traffic.
If such repression occurs in Buenos Aires, this will generally lead to supportive CTA strikes and/or mobilizations in front of the seat of government by other *piqueteros* SMOs, human rights and left-wing groups. Seventh, if the allocation of unemployment subsidies is effective, this will tend to produce more protests by the same and other SMOs.

The *piqueteros*’ institutional politics repertoire is based on access to state positions. The FTV, BP, ME, PO, and the MTD of La Juanita have achieved legislative seats. The FTV and CCC have participated in the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003) presidency. The FTV, BP and ME have participated in the Peronists Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2011) presidencies. Due to strategic differences, the movement has been divided into two sectors since 2003. The social movement sector that has been participating in the governmental coalition is very much interested on accessing state positions. The other sector, which remained in opposition to the government, has been interested in establishing routine rapport with state agencies, but not in getting posts for their members. Overall, accessing the state has not meant participation in the employment public policy decision-making process. Rather, it has meant increased access to state resources and spaces for the noncontentious struggle to end or reduce the influence of neoliberalism in Argentina (Rossi 2011: ch. 7).

SEE ALSO: Labor movement; Labor movement in Latin America; Liberation theology/base communities (South America); Peronism (Argentina); Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Strikes within the European context; Strikes in US history.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Poor people’s movements
ANNIKA ZORN

Poor people’s movements describes contentious collective actors that are considered to be particularly powerless or weak in resources compared to other members of a community. Often, the term is used to describe spontaneous mass protest by members of social groups that are at the lower end of a socioeconomic scale or in a particularly marginalized position in a society, such as the homeless or the unemployed. Research into poor people’s movements has shown, however, that these movements share similar organizational efforts and coordinated social action to other movement activity. This entry examines the shared characteristics of these movements, how studies of poor people’s movements over the past decades have changed, and the insights we have gained from studies on social movement activity of the poor for social movement theory.

Poor people’s movements are episodic and rare phenomena compared to other movements. Research into poor people’s movements points to the crucial role of the local roots of these movements and the importance of disruptive actions to compensate for the lack of power of the participants (Piven & Cloward 1977). In fact, disruptive repertoires are stored within local and often informal organizational networks. Poor people’s movements are often characterized, as well, by a particular tension between social service activities and political (protest) action.

Historical examples of poor people’s movements include the protest by the unemployed and the working class during the New Deal in the US. In the second half of the twentieth century the protest of welfare recipients in the 1960 and 1970s (Piven & Cloward 1977) and the protest of the homeless during the 1980s in the US (Cress & Snow 1996) are well-known examples of poor people’s protest. In Europe, protest of the unemployed is both commonplace and pervasive across the region (Chabanet & Royall 2010).

More recent studies have stressed the marginal position of social groups within society that are not necessarily first and foremost economically disadvantaged. These empirical investigations broaden understanding of what is conceived as poor people’s movements. For example, in France in the mid-1990s a movement of the have-nots (mouvement de sans) gathered homeless people, migrants, and unemployed. While belonging to the group of migrants or the unemployed means a higher risk of being poor, it is not necessarily the case. These groups are instead mainly characterized by their marginal position in society. The term poor people’s movements can therefore point to two distinct aspects: either to the fact that the protest is carried by the economically poor, or to the fact that the carriers of a protest are particularly powerless or are weak in resources. The latter and broader understanding has gained in importance over the last two decades.

In fact, the term poor people’s movement is sometimes used as an analytical focus rather than just describing an empirical phenomenon or a specific movement. For example, the civil rights movement of black Americans was often described as a poor people’s movement, but it pertained more broadly to black Americans in general. Similarly, the civil rights movement played an important role in relation to the welfare rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the US (see Piven & Cloward 1977).

In the tradition of Marxian analysis, poor people’s movements were often explained by social and economic inequalities. The social tensions and experienced grievances would politicize members of the disadvantaged social groups and lead to the outburst of protest actions. The social and political meaning of these movements – that is, their
supposed critique of the social and political architecture – was therefore often highlighted.

History has often told us a different story, however. Movement research of the past decades has shown that protest by the poor is rather the exception than the rule. In fact, grievances do not simply translate into protest. Also, these movements rarely have a revolutionary impetus or question society as a whole, but often point, instead, to specific weaknesses of the political system. Further, other actors, such as the Global Justice Movement, sometimes take up the role of advocating for interests of the poor. While variants of strain theory may add to our understanding of how and when poor people’s movements emerge, there seems to be no automatic and direct link between socioeconomic grievances and protest on issues of social and economic inequality.

During the later part of the twentieth century poor people’s protest was comparatively infrequent. In postwar Europe and the US, protest action was much more often carried out by members of the middle class who had more privileged access to resources necessary to organize protest action. These protest movements, summarized in the European context as the “new social movements,” seemed to dominate the movement landscape. New social movements no longer formulated social claims in line with former movements – the expression of class-based actors expressing their socioeconomic position – but as actors seeking new collective identities beyond their class position (feminist movement, peace movement, environmental movement). Whereas in the US context movements of the poor were more common, especially in relation to welfare rights and homelessness, in postwar Europe poor people’s movements were relatively rare for many decades.

Social movement researchers have offered various explanations as to why poor people infrequently organized collectively or found it difficult to do so. On the individual level it is argued that poor people are often socially isolated and lack important networks to get politically involved. Further, poor people are assumed to have a difficult time accessing the resources necessary to organize collective protest action. Also the welfare state was assumed to defuse social protest topics. The difficulty of constructing and maintaining a positive collective identity, while belonging to an often ascribed and stigmatized identity, has also been considered as a major obstacle to building a movement of the poor. Unemployed people, for example, often refuse to describe themselves as belonging to the group of the unemployed, as do some of the homeless. The observations, considered together, underscore the difficulty of sustained mobilization among the poor.

These observations notwithstanding, over the past two decades protest by the poor has attracted increased interest. In the US, valuable empirical research had been done on the homeless movements, while in Europe the main focus of the past 15 years was on the mobilization of the unemployed. Research on poor people’s movements has furthered our understanding of social movement activism by refining the concept of resources, the role of networks for movement activity, and the importance of a shared, collective identity. The research has also shown the importance of benefactor organizations for poor people’s movements, without dismissing the fact that some poor organizations create resources from scratch or importantly rely on individual resources. Further, research into poor people’s movements has stressed the role of countercultural networks for disruptive action of the poor. Often oscillating between social services activities and political protest, poor people’s movements sometime blur the distinction between social and political action. Finally, research has shown that access to informal organizations seems to be especially crucial for poor people’s movements, as these movements produce fewer written accounts than their richer counterparts.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Homeless protest movements (United States); Marxism and social movements; Peasant
movements; Recyclable materials collectors movement in Brazil and South America; Resource mobilization theory; Squatters’ movements; Strain and breakdown theories; Unemployment movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Popular Assembly of the Towns of Oaxaca (Mexico)

SERGIO TAMAYO

Every May 15, Mexico commemorates teacher’s day. On June 14, 2006, in the southern state of Oaxaca, Section 22 of the National Education Workers Union (SNTE) sponsored, as they did every year, a routine mobilization for better wages. The teachers were assaulted by police helicopters and riot police on the orders of the state government, to stop the demonstration taking place in Oaxaca’s downtown. Due to police inefficiency and the resistance of the demonstrators, the police were not able to halt the demonstration, which generated considerable citizen reaction. As a result, the Popular Assembly of the Towns of Oaxaca (APPO) was created. It was formed by teachers participating in the general strike, neighborhood and district residents, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous towns, some municipal authorities, transportation officials, youth and students, communicators, peasants, members of religious orders, small businessmen and tradesmen, academics, artists, and intellectuals. The eclectic movement demanded the removal of the governor, because of his authoritarianism and corruption.

The teachers’ struggle in Oaxaca goes back to 1980, when unionists opposed their own leaders who were linked to the government and refused to lead union claims. Thus, the Democratic Teacher Movement and the National Education Teacher Coordinators (CNTE), a democratic trend inside the union, were formed. The 70,000 teachers of Section 22 were in contact with hundreds of rural and indigenous communities all around the diverse regions in the state: mountains, the coast, the isthmus, the tropical plain, and the central valleys. Oaxaca is one of the states in Mexico with the highest rural and urban poverty rates. It has 3.2 million inhabitants in 570 counties, the majority of whom are indigenous. Illiteracy and educational levels are alarming. Many do not even have electricity or drinkable water. Migration is constant toward both Mexico City and the US, as undocumented workers. Due to financial need, many enlist in the army – six out of ten Mexican soldiers are from Oaxaca. Social and ethnic polarization is severe. Eighty per cent of the population has an average income of two dollars daily per capita. The economic and political elite constitutes only 1 percent.

APPO represents many of these marginalized citizens in a context of an institutional legitimacy crisis. Nevertheless, Section 22 initially had social rather than political expectations, with the political aspect developing as the movement grew. To achieve better wages, teachers defined a traditional and habitual mobilization repertoire, including demonstrations and strikes, occurring each year from the formation of APPO. The government’s response was disproportionate repression, resulting in one social control error after another, and producing a dramatic political crisis.

The governor of Oaxaca was elected in 2004 for a six-year period, in fraudulent elections. Without political legitimacy, Ulises Ruiz substituted negotiation by authoritarian and despotic behavior, imposing public policies and repressing opponents. He obtained the support of legislators and mayors of the institutional party (PRI) and the conservative party (PAN); also of big businessmen, bankers, and media with huge investments in the state. During the presidential election campaign of 2006, the governor supported the PRI candidate and confronted the autocratic leader of the National Education Workers Union, who had promoted the PAN candidate. That year, there were several crises of governance all over the country; for instance: a huge national movement against the electoral
fraud headed by the political leader, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador; the peasant conflict in San Salvador Atenco, opposed to the project of the construction of an international airport; the miners’ strike in the north; and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas in the south. President Fox was eager to hand over power to the new president of his own party.

APPO is a pluralist movement, formed by a group of organizations based on union and family and community bonds. More than 50 social and political reform groups, as well as autonomists, anarchists, and communists, gathered around the teachers’ union in a general strike. The repertoire of mobilizations included traditional and innovative actions: highway blockage, seven megademonstrations, long political walks to Mexico City, fasts, and peaceful occupation of radio and television stations as well as public offices, such as the state university, the chamber of deputies, the court, and Government House.

Two contentious actions had outstanding impact. They were the barricades and the *radio popular*, controlled by the people. Three thousand barriers were built. They appeared immediately after the police and the paramilitary forces tried to eject the demonstrators. There were permanent watch guards who were changed regularly, recruited from union groups and community residents. The radio station had 24-hour programming, which allowed the population to keep informed of the development of the movement and to be called together for resistance actions.

The government commenced social control operations. They designed a media campaign, with counterframings that directed attention away from the harshness of the conflict. This counterframing also stigmatized the APPO and accused it of social violence. The authorities placed the city of Oaxaca in a state of siege. This was reinforced with a military presence and more than 5000 policemen, battleships, helicopters, land vehicles, and hired gunmen, such as “tonton macoutes” from the period of Duvalier in Haiti. Terrorist acts perpetrated, it is believed, by the government, were blamed on the APPO, and interpreted as provocation, justifying the intervention of the government forces.

On October 31 the police violently ejected the four-and-a-half-month occupation. There were eight dead, including an American reporter, teachers, a child, and a sick resident. Fourteen were injured; 61 were arrested in Oaxaca and 20 in Mexico City. Nineteen people disappeared.

Subsequently, APPO refocused on designing mobilization repertoires to free political prisoners, asking for punishment of the guilty police and military, reorganizing the assembly, integrating a state council, and creating autonomous territories. On October 2, 2009, Section 22 of the union was once more strong enough to organize a very large demonstration in memory of the 1968 student massacre at Tlatelolco, in spite of the repression it had suffered in 2006.

SEE ALSO: Barricades; Repertoires of contention; San Salvador Atenco farmers’ movement (Mexico); Social control errors; Transnational Zapatism; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Academic attention to populism has sharply increased in recent years. As Mudde (2004: 541) notes, thousand of books, articles, columns, and editorials have been written about it in the last two decades. Yet a commonly accepted definition is still lacking, with scholars disagreeing on categorization, labels, and boundaries between its different manifestations. Some also stress that there is an abuse of this term in public discourse. One of the difficulties regarding the definition of populism is that it has been applied (and adapted) to several very different historical phenomena (movements, parties, regimes, intellectuals), across various periods of time: from the American People’s Party of the late 1800s to postwar European movements such as the Italian Common Man’s Front (late 1940s), the poujadist (conservative reactionary movement to protect the business interests of small traders) French Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans (late 1950s), the Dutch Farmers Party (1960s), or the Danish Progress Party (1970s). Some scholars have argued that populism was a key feature of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s regimes (Mammone 2009).

Populism has been alternatively conceptualized as a political rhetoric that is marked by the “unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment” (Betz 1994: 4) and appeals to “the power of the common people in order to challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment” (Abts & Rummens 2007: 407). It has been considered a “thin” or “weak” ideology that holds “society to be ultimately separated in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure People’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543). A specific feature of this ideology is its “indeterminacy” that “responds to its need to be adaptable” (Ruzza & Fella 2009: 3). Finally, populism has been defined as a type of organization, characterized by the presence of a charismatic (new kind of) leadership (e.g., Taggart 2000; Eatwell 2003) and a special style of communication (Tarchi 2002), namely without intermediaries.

Definitions of the concept, however, generally converge in seeing as a core aspect of populism its focus on “the people.” Populist movements attempt to create a direct connection between the people and the political power, bypassing the electoral process. They often consider the people’s aspirations to be betrayed by corrupt political elites (Ruzza & Fella 2009) and suspect that a conspiracy against the people is taking place (Taggart 2000). The charismatic leader is the only one who embodies the will of the common people and is able to speak on their behalf. However, the very definition of the “people” remains ambiguous in the use of populists, and competing interpretations try to clarify who “the people” actually are, some seeing the people in terms of class or ethnicity (e.g., Di Tella 1997; Meny & Surel 2002), others referring to “the heartland,” namely a place in which “in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides” (Taggart 2000: 95; Mudde 2004). The centrality of the people notwithstanding, “elitism” is also seen as embodied in the logic of populism (e.g., Urbinati 1988).

THE EXPLANATIONS

In general, when analyzing the causes for the emergence of populism, one is confronted with three main types of explanations. First, there are those at the systemic/societal level which focus on socioeconomic conditions conducive to
populism, such as poverty, low levels of development, economic breakdowns, modernization crises, and situations of general change and instability. In more recent times, for example, the negative consequences of economic globalization have been pointed out (Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007). Second, there are those who underline the political factors favoring the development of populism, relating it to political discontent with liberal democracy and broken promises of the representative system (Taggart 2004). In this regard, populism is interpreted as a syndrome of democracy, a “pathological form, pseudo- and post democratic, produced by the corruption of democratic ideals” (Mudde 2004: 541), as well as a serious threat to it (Mény & Surel 2002; Abts & Rummens 2007; Pasquino 2008). Paradoxically, however, populists themselves participate in elections and argue that they are “true democrats” (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008). However, it has been noted that “populist parties are by nature neither durable nor sustainable parties of government. Their fate is to be integrated into the mainstream, to disappear, or to remain permanently in opposition” (Mény & Surel 2002: 18).

Finally, there are interpretations that insist on the crucial role played by populist leaders and the ability of populist movements to exploit social and political crises. In particular the presence of a charismatic leader – such as Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Silvio Berlusconi, Umberto Bossi, Pim Fortuyn, Carl Hagen, Pia Kjærsgaard, or Christoph Blocher – adopting a certain style and rhetoric (Deiwiks 2009: 3), is seen as a crucial characteristic of populism (Pasquino 2008). Populists are successful due to their role as “taboo breakers and fighters against political correctness” (Mudde 2004: 554). They usually appeal to emotions of fear and enthusiasm, adopt a demagogic style and refer to resentment, offering easy solutions for complex problems. With such an unconventional style of campaigning, they are often able to gain the support of younger and less politically aware people and traditionally apathetic voters (Heinisch 2003).

POPULISM IN CONTEXT: LEFT/RIGHT, HISTORY, AND REGIONS

Moving from theoretical definitions to empirical cases, one is impressed by the enormous variety of populist movements (Canovan 1981) that sometimes show very few similarities. Indeed, there have been several waves of populist movements in various geographical contexts – such as in North America in the 1870s–1900s, in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1870s–1920s, in Latin America in the 1930s–1950s and in Western Europe in the 1980s–2000s – assuming different characteristics, following different trajectories, and appealing to different strands of supporters.

When a typological criterion is adopted, we can distinguish between right-wing and left-wing populist movements. Whereas the latter identify the “people” in socioeconomic terms, such as the working class exploited by the bourgeois elite, the former refer to the ethnic nation (Abts & Rummens 2007). Today populism is above all found on the extreme or radical right (Betz 1994; Kopecky & Mudde 2002), as is, for example, manifested in Western Europe in the many radical right-wing populist parties which have successfully developed from the 1980s (e.g., the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn). These movements, beyond being characterized by nativism (nationalism/racism) and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007: 11–31), have an exclusive type of populism, since for them, “not only the [corrupt] elite but other groups as well (immigrants, ethnic minorities) are excluded from the pure people” (Rydgren 2007: 245). They tend to have a Manichean view of the world and an anti-establishment populist strategy, which distinguishes between “the corrupted” (politicians both from the government and the opposition) and “the saviors” (themselves).

Populism is also related to the radical left (Mudde 2004; Zaslove 2008), although, according to many scholars, this overstretches the concept. It is emphasized that left-wing movements also have populist anti-elite, antiglobalization, and/or anti-EU appeals.
Examples of such movements are the German left-wing party Die Linke, the Dutch Socialist Party, the Scottish Socialist Party, the Slovak Direction-Socialist Democracy, and the Lithuanian Labor Party. The new left-wing movements of the late 1960s–early 1980s in Western Europe (e.g., the new left and the Greens) have also been considered as raising “populist critiques” (Mudde 2004: 548).

However, there are important differences between left-wing and right-wing populism: while the populism of the new left refers to “an active, self-confident, well educated, progressive people”; populism on the right side appeals to a silent counter-revolution (Ignazi 2002), namely a “slightly conservative, law-abiding citizen, who, in silence but with growing anger, sees his world being perverted by progressives, criminals, and aliens” (Mudde 2004: 557). In sum, if left-wing populism stresses more participation and less leadership, right-wing populism wants the opposite. Beyond populism, on the fringes of the political spectrum, observers also accent the increasing importance in Western Europe of a type of “mainstream populism” (e.g., Tony Blair in the UK, see Mair 2002), as well as a “center-right populism,” considering Silvio Berlusconi one of the best examples in Europe of this category (e.g., Campus 2006).

Taking into account a geographical distinction in the manifestations of populism, we can observe that in the United States populism, which goes back to the agrarian movements of the nineteenth century and the US People’s Party, has today deep roots in mainstream politics, being associated with both Democratic and Republican politicians (Ware 2002). Here, populist appeals might rely on the traditional defense of individual liberties vis-à-vis the state (Michael 2003), also borrowing from several well-established American traditions, such as producerism (i.e., the idea that the true Americans are hard-working people, “fighting against parasites at the top and bottom of society”), anti-elitism/intellectualism, majoritarianism (i.e., “the will of the majority of people has absolute primacy in matters of governance”), moralism, and Americanism (Berlet, 2009: 26).

In Latin America, populism has a long history as well, dating back to the first half of the twentieth century. However, Latin American populism is of a more urban nature. Peronism, in the mid–1990s, has been its main manifestation, addressing the economic concerns of the emerging working class. Problems related to the democratic transition and the unstable economic situation of the 1980s–1990s, have been mentioned as important factors which favored the emergence of populist parties in this region (e.g., Carlos Menem in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Alan García in Peru and Abdala Bucaram in Ecuador), some of them remaining in power for a long time. Today, in general, populism is considered a common feature in Latin America and, although vested with different programs and styles with respect to the past, still a rewarding strategy.

Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, after the Russian experience of the populist intellectuals’ movement of the 1870s, which tried to mobilize a peasant rebellion against the Tsarist regime (Taggart 2000), more recently populism is seen as a specific post-transition (and post-accession, after 2004) phenomenon, determined by the economic, political, cultural, and social problems that arose after 1989. Indeed, populist movements mobilize the sizeable strata of Central and Eastern European societies who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy and have lost their trust in the political establishment, promising a politics closer to the needs of the people (Rupnik 2007). However, it is arguable that examples of populist politics were present before EU accession (e.g., in Bulgaria, with the ex-tsar Simeon II; in Slovakia with Meciar; in Hungary, with Orban; and in Poland, with the parties Self-Defence, League of Polish Families, and Law and Justice Palonen 2009).

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Charisma; Fascist movements; Ideology; Peronism (Argentina); Tea Party movement (United States).
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Pro-democracy of 1987 (Korea)
JAESOK SONN

On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung Hee, a military dictator who ruled South Korea for 18 years, was assassinated. Two months later, Chun Doo Hwan led a military coup that virtually secured his position as a commander-in-chief. In May 1980, he declared martial law and sent special forces to the city of Gwangju to crush protest, slaughtering at least 200 civilians. This massacre has become a very important collective memory for both the movement activists and the ruling elites.

Chun became president in August. Soon, he revised the constitution to limit the presidency to a single seven-year term while keeping the indirect election method to select the next president which advantaged the ruling party. Throughout the 1980s, there were continuous demonstrations against Chun’s dictatorship, especially by college students, demanding Chun’s abdication and a revision of the constitution that would allow more democracy. Chun responded to the opposition by severely repressing civil society and the public sphere.

1987 was the last year of Chun’s presidency, which heightened public concern about power transition. Chun suddenly suspended the discussion of constitutional revision on April 13 and decided to keep the existing constitution. In May, the people became infuriated when they found out that prosecutors had been covering up an incident in which they killed a student demonstrator by torture in January. On May 27, the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution was officially launched by forming a broad alliance of diverse groups which led a nationwide pro-democracy movement. The movement reached its peak in June, so it earned a name “the June Uprising.” On June 29, the ruling party made several concessions to democratization which included a constitutional revision to elect the president by popular vote. The government estimated over 3000 rallies and 1 million participants in June (Chung 1997), and 13,000 persons in police custody during two weeks in that month. Over the year, the riot police shot more than 670,000 canisters of tear gas (Chung 1997).

While the pro-democracy protests began to quiet down, a new wave of protests started. From July through October, there were more than 3000 labor disputes across the nation. Wage increase was the most important issue, but, influenced by the recent uprising, the workers also demanded “democratization” of workplaces.

Most political discussions and activities were suppressed under Chun’s dictatorship. The majority of participants in the democratization movement of June 1987 were mobilized not through formal organizations but spontaneously in the public space while involved in their daily activities. Urban centers and university campus neighborhoods throughout the nation were the most notable locations of mass rallies. These areas hosted government buildings, offices, restaurants, stores, and religious centers which drew huge crowds throughout the day. Downtown Seoul was at the nexus of busy boulevards (e.g., six lanes in each direction), on which major demonstrations often took place. College campuses and their neighborhoods were typical epicenters of protests whereas residential and factory areas were mostly quiet in June.

Protests intensified around lunchtime and peaked during the evening traffic hours when many people were on the streets. Protesters tried to hold big rallies at major places like churches or college campuses, but they almost always faced riot police who came to disperse them and they were forced out onto the street. Major confrontations usually occurred in the evening, lasting to late at night. This pattern of

protests was repeated daily throughout June on weekdays and eventually weekends as well.

The riot police’s indiscriminate use of tear gas and aggression against citizens made just about everybody on the street furious against a regime which already lacked legitimacy. Facing police brutality, some student activists adopted militant tactics such as throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails, but, overall, protesters tried to avoid violence and radical slogans. Demonstrators took over major boulevards so the impact of the protest could be felt throughout cities. Activists shouted slogans such as “Allow constitutional debate!” and sang popular songs, children’s songs, and even the national anthem together with the citizens. Countless citizens participated in the movement by applauding, honking, and sending donations and supportive messages to protesters while booing at police and hiding activists from them. Protesters often organized political discussion on the street with citizens when the situation permitted. Off the street, professional associations, one after another, issued statements criticizing the regime while expressing support for the movement.

The student activists were the vanguard of the pro-democracy movement during the 1980s. They were the ones who trained organizers and spread political consciousness to the rest of the society. Some of them continued their activities after leaving college. During the uprising, their self-sacrificing protests under police violence impressed other citizens, and eventually led to mass participation. The visible participation of white-collar office workers and professionals was a shock to the regime, because they symbolically represented the secure middle-class citizenry. Even the media deviated from the government guideline and reported the movement favorably. The support of religious leaders was a final blow to the dictatorship since they morally certified the movement. The Catholic cathedral in downtown Seoul was one of the most important protest places during the uprising, and the church officials actively protected student protesters by refusing police searches.

In December, a direct presidential election was held under the new constitution. While two opposition parties failed to field a single coalition candidate, the ruling party’s candidate, Roh Tae-woo, who had helped Chun’s military coup in 1979, won the election with 36 per cent of the vote. The election of a former coup leader as the new president was disturbing to many people and slowed down the democratization process. Nevertheless, the fact that the people stood up against the regime and successfully pressured it to make concessions marked a historical turning point that significantly changed the context of political development in the coming decades.

SEE ALSO: Democracy and social movements; Democratization and democratic transition; Ecological conditions/determinants.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Pro-life/pro-choice movements
DEANA A. ROHLINGER and MIRIAM SESSIONS

The contemporary pro-life and pro-choice movements disagree about the status of legal abortion in the US. The pro-life movement opposes elective abortion on ethical and moral grounds. Pro-life advocates argue that an “unborn child” has a right to life and they strive to get these rights legally recognized. The pro-choice movement contends that women have a constitutionally protected right to abortion and work to keep abortion safe and legal. While contention over abortion has a long history, it did not always center on issues of rights. Initially, abortion was a medical concern and physicians were the arbiters of its administration. This was the result of a campaign by physicians to professionalize medicine. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, there were no licensing laws regulating who could practice medicine. This, coupled with the lack of a traditional guild structure, meant that trained physicians had to compete directly with other medical sects (such as homeopaths) for patients. Physicians saw abortion as an issue through which they could distinguish themselves from other practitioners and push for industry regulation. They claimed that their scientific training gave them superior knowledge regarding if and when a woman should have an abortion. The campaign was a success; all but “therapeutic” abortions were outlawed and licensed professionals were charged with deciding whether an abortion was performed (Mohr 1978; Luker 1984).

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, physicians, social movement organizations and clergy pushed state legislators to repeal abortion laws and expand the circumstances in which physicians could administer abortions, including in cases of rape, incest, and fetal deformity. These efforts to change policy were quite successful and largely uncontroversial. Scholars attribute this lack of controversy to how the abortion issue was framed. Advocates argued that the state should expand physicians’ authority regarding the medical circumstances in which a therapeutic abortion could be administered, an approach that focused on medical practice rather than women’s rights (Staggenborg 1991; Burns 2005). However, the framework for understanding legal abortion changed in the 1960s as a result of two controversies that focused public attention on women’s roles in reproductive decisions. The first case involved Sherri Finkbine, who sought an abortion in 1962 after learning that she had ingested a drug known to cause fetal deformity early in her pregnancy. To raise public awareness, Finkbine notified the press of her situation. The publicity resulted in her hospital refusing to give her an abortion. Finkbine traveled to Sweden for the procedure, where her physician informed her that the fetus was severely deformed and would not have survived outside of the womb (Luker 1984). The rubella measles epidemic in the US also served as a lightning rod for abortion controversy. When contracted by a pregnant woman, the disease could cause fetal malformations. Thousands of pregnant women who contracted the disease sought abortions. Since hospitals limited the number of abortions they performed and physicians were unclear regarding their legality, many women were unable to obtain the procedure. In addition to providing a new framework for understanding the abortion issue – a woman’s right to choose whether she had an abortion – these controversies spurred the growth of the pro-choice movement. For example, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (now known as NARAL Pro-Choice America) formed in 1969 and began organizing repeal campaigns.
countrywide. Likewise, dozens of grassroots groups emerged and used direct action tactics and street theatre to raise awareness regarding the importance of safe and legal abortion to women’s health (Staggenborg 1988). The controversies also illustrated how great the differences of opinion regarding legalized abortion were in the US. The stage for the contemporary battle over legal abortion was set with two Supreme Court decisions handed down on January 22, 1973. In *Roe v. Wade* the Court ruled that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to an abortion and that the state could not prohibit abortion during the first trimester or before viability. Viability was defined as the potential for a fetus to live outside of the womb in *Doe v. Bolton*.

**THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLE OVER ABORTION**

Pro-choice supporters initially believed that the Supreme Court decisions resolved the abortion issue. In fact, the composition of the pro-choice movement changed dramatically in the following decade. Radical groups found sustainability difficult in this new political environment. With abortion legal, there was limited need for direct action tactics and many of the organizations became defunct (Staggenborg 1991). The pro-life movement changed as well. Before 1973, the movement was largely spearheaded by the Catholic church and pro-life groups that emerged locally in opposition to liberalizing abortion laws (Burns 2005). However, in the wake of the decisions, pro-life advocates quickly mobilized inside and outside of government and began to challenge the new status quo. As a result, the pro-choice movement has often found itself on the defensive and responding to the pro-life movement’s tactics and campaigns. Here, we focus on three targets of the movements – state legislatures, Congress, and abortion clinics – and briefly discuss the strategies, successes, and failures of the movements in each.

**Restricting abortion access: state legislatures and the Supreme Court**

After the Supreme Court decisions, the pro-life movement quickly introduced legislation that would restrict abortion access in states across the US. A driving force behind these challenges was the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC). Founded as an information clearinghouse in 1971, the NRLC coordinated the efforts of the largest pro-life groups in each state to restrict legal abortion. Specifically, NRLC constructed model legislation that could be introduced in state legislatures across the country (Rohlinger 2006). The pro-choice movement was not nearly as organized as their opponents at the state level and found it difficult to stave off pro-life legislation. Therefore, after a state passed legislation restricting abortion, pro-choice groups challenged the constitutionality of the law in the judicial system. We highlight three strategies employed by the pro-life movement to restrict abortion access and the decisions from subsequent Supreme Court decisions.

First, the pro-life movement pushed state legislatures to recognize the rights of spouses and minors’ parents in abortion decisions. Since *Roe v. Wade* made abortion a privacy issue, claims regarding fetal rights and morality were less resonant particularly in terms of connecting discourse to policy change. As such, pro-lifers framed abortion restrictions in ways that were consistent with dominant institutional discourse and advocated that the rights of other parties be protected as well. For instance, pro-lifers reasoned that parents had a right to be involved in a minor’s decision to have an abortion. The pro-life movement found that this line of argumentation had a great deal of public support and political legs. Several states passed parental involvement requirements, which have been affirmed by the Supreme Court. In *Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v. Ashcroft* (1983) the Court upheld a Missouri provision that required minors to obtain consent from a parent before obtaining an abortion. The Missouri law permitted
a judicial bypass in instances that a parent’s permission could not be obtained. The ability of the state to restrict access to abortion was situated in a broader set of legal principles in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). The Supreme Court ruled that regulating abortion was constitutional as long as the requirements did not place an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion. Currently, 34 states require parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision. Pro-lifers also argued that excluding a husband from the decision-making process discriminated against him on the basis of sex, impaired his right of procreation, and denied him equal protection under the law, and they introduced spousal notification and consent legislation to protect these rights. While pro-life advocates passed legislation in eight states, the Supreme Court overturned these laws in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976) arguing that spousal notification and consent requirements put an “undue burden” on women. Some pro-life advocates continue to push for fathers’ rights in reproductive decisions.

Second, and related, the pro-life movement introduced legal requirements that were designed to discourage women from getting abortions. While some of these procedures focused on making sure women seeking abortions understood the procedure and fetal development, others were designed to make access to abortion more difficult. These TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws include mandatory waiting periods, ultrasounds, and restrictions regarding where the abortion procedure may be performed (e.g., a hospital rather than a physician’s office) as well as who conducts it. Many of these provisions have withstood the scrutiny of the courts. Currently, 44 states and the District of Columbia have TRAP laws.

Finally, pro-life advocates shifted some of the legislative emphasis away from women’s rights to those of the fetus. Initially, pro-lifers focused on passing fetal viability testing requirements before a woman could obtain an abortion. The state of Missouri, for example, passed a law declaring that life began at conception and that unborn children have “protectable interests.” The statute, among other things, prohibited government-employed doctors from aborting a fetus that they believed viable and required fetal viability testing after the 20th week of pregnancy. The Supreme Court upheld the provision noting that the state had the right to protect “potential life.” This spurred other states to pass viability legislation as well and, to date, 24 states have laws that prohibit abortion if the fetus is viable, except in cases of life or health endangerment of the woman.

The battle on Capitol Hill

Since the abortion issue largely divides along party lines (with Democrats favoring legal abortion and Republicans opposing it), the makeup of Congress affects the number of allies a given bill has and, ultimately, whether it comes to fruition. Additionally, although activists and legislators often work together crafting policy proposals, the political arena has a limited carrying capacity, which means that a relatively small number of bills get congressional attention and an up-down vote. Here, we outline some of the most significant policy proposals advanced by pro-life and pro-choice advocates since Roe.

After the Roe and Doe decisions, the pro-life movement initiated two attacks on abortion. First, they questioned the use of tax dollars to pay for a procedure that many citizens vehemently opposed. Despite pro-choice arguments that such restrictions discriminated against poor women and women of color (Sillman et al. 2004), this line of attack proved successful. In 1976, the Hyde amendment, which prohibited the use of federal funds for the abortion procedure, passed. In 1979, funding restrictions were extended to military health care coverage and banned the use of federal funds for abortion services at overseas military hospitals. In 1995, pro-lifers passed a Department of Defense appropriations bill that prohibited women from obtaining privately funded abortion services at overseas
military facilities except in cases of rape or incest. Second, pro-lifers tried to overturn the Roe decision. However, there was not a consensus among groups regarding whether pro-life proposals should include an exception to save the life of the woman. NRLC argued that such an exception was necessary and supported the passage of the Human Life Amendment, which would reverse Roe, prevent states from making abortion legal at a later date and allow abortions that would protect the health and life of the woman. Other organizations, such as the American Life League, regarded the abortion exception an unacceptable compromise and supported the Paramount Life Amendment, which recognized the right to life of each human being from the moment of fertilization without exception. Other pro-lifers argued that the passage of a constitutional amendment was unlikely and advocated for the Human Life Bill, which declared that unborn humans were legal persons and restricted the power of lower federal courts to interfere with laws restricting abortion passed by the state. All of these efforts ultimately failed (Rohlinger 2006).

The watershed of the pro-life movement has been the debate over “partial-birth” abortion (PBA), which refers to a particular abortion procedure (medically known as the intact dilation and extraction procedure) performed late in a woman’s pregnancy. Although pro-lifers learned about the procedure in the early 1990s, it was commonly referred to as “brain suction abortion.” In 1995, the legislative director of NRLC coined the term, “partial-birth” abortion, which tested well in focus groups. NRLC launched a national media campaign and initiated state legislation in Ohio banning the procedure. Within months, debate over the “partial birth” abortion procedure dominated abortion discourse (Rohlinger 2006). Congress passed three bans on the procedure. The first two were vetoed by President Clinton, who refused to sign the bill since it did not include an exception to protect a woman’s health, in 1996 and 1997. President Bush, Jr, however, signed the ban (called the Federal Abortion Ban) into law in 2003. The Supreme Court upheld the law in Gonzales v. Carhart (2006), ruling that an exception to protect women’s health was not necessary since there were other medical procedures available.

The pro-choice movement has also introduced its share of legislation. Once it became clear that the Supreme Court would permit restrictions on abortion access, pro-choice advocates pushed for the passage of the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA), which gave every woman the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy before viability and after viability if it is necessary to protect her life or health. FOCA, in short, would codify Roe v. Wade and nullify existing state laws restricting abortion. The bill was introduced in 1989, 1993, and 2004, but languished in Congress. Pro-choice politicians, with the support of NARAL, Planned Parenthood, and the National Abortion Federation, introduced FOCA again in Congress the day after the Gonzales decision. To date there has been no progress on the bill. Pro-choicers, however, have been successful at passing legislation that protects reproductive health clinics and their clients. Most notably, they passed the Freedom to Access Clinic Entrances Bill (FACE), which makes it a federal crime to use force, the threat of force, or physical obstruction to prevent individuals from obtaining or providing reproductive health care services. FACE was a response to rising clinic blockades and violence in the 1980s and 1990s (discussed below).

While Congress is charged with creating public policy, the president plays an important role in abortion politics for four reasons. First, the president frames how abortion fits into a larger administrative agenda, if at all. For example, passing a universal health care bill was at the top of President Obama’s agenda when he took office in 2009. The abortion issue was part of that agenda insofar as his included abortion coverage in his plan. Second, the president helps decide who will hold important positions in government; and some of these offices can directly affect abortion policy. President Reagan gave well-known pro-lifers prominent positions in his administration, all of whom
supported his efforts to make legal abortion less available. For instance, he appointed pro-life activists to the Office of Population Affairs where appointees slashed funding to Title X clinics and instituted the “gag rule,” which prohibited personnel working in Title X funded clinics from discussing abortion with clients. Third, the president provides nominees for the Supreme Court. As indicated in the above discussion, the Supreme Court has played an important role in abortion policy. Finally, the president has the ability to veto legislation and overturn (or reinstate) existing executive orders. President Clinton rescinded several pro-life policies put in place by presidents Reagan and Bush Sr, including the ban on fetal tissue for medical research and the importation of emergency contraception. President Bush, Jr, however, put these bans back in place after he took office.

The clinic as a battlefield

In the 1980s, pro-life activists, who felt that President Reagan had done little more than give lip-service to movement goals, decided to stop abortion by counseling women regarding other options, disrupting clinic operations, and using violence to close clinics. These pro-life activists share a moral abhorrence to abortion and regard the clinic as a location where they can effectively end the practice. However, direct action pro-life groups differ in terms of whether they believe violence against clinic facilities and personnel is a justified and useful tactic. Those opposed to violence argue that sidewalk counseling outside of clinics is the best way to provide women the support and information necessary to prevent abortion. Those that use violence regard it as a legitimate way to defend the life of the unborn. In the last 30 years, dozens of clinics have been vandalized and destroyed, one abortion provider kidnapped, and four abortion providers murdered. Some pro-life activists tacitly encouraged violence against abortion providers. In 1995, the American Coalition of Life distributed “wanted”-style posters which listed the names, addresses and phone numbers of 12 abortion providers labeled the “Deadly Dozen” and offered a $5000 reward for “information leading to arrest, conviction and revocation of license to practice medicine.”

Likewise, in January 1997, Neal Horsley created the Nuremberg Files web site that compiled information on providers and noted which were active, which had been injured, and which had been killed by pro-lifers. The web site had to change this format after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision determined it constituted a true threat to those listed on the web site. Again, not all direct action groups advocate the use of violence. Two of the most visible direct action groups, Operation Rescue and Pro Life Action League, understand why pro-lifers resort to such desperate measures but argue that violence serves the interests of the pro-choice movement because it makes it easier for pro-choicers to pass legislation that restricts pro-life efforts to curtail abortion at clinics (Blanchard 1995; Risen & Thomas 1998).

The pro-choice movement responded to efforts to close clinics in three ways. First, pro-choicers engaged in clinic defense and mobilized volunteers to escort women into abortion clinics. In fact, new direct action pro-choice groups formed in an effort to ensure that women had access to clinic services. Second, pro-choice organizations publicly called on the president and Department of Justice to intervene in the battle on the street and to curb clinic violence. Pro-choicers contended that violence at clinics was not isolated incidents, but part of a larger campaign intended to reduce women’s access to the abortion procedure. This line of argumentation fell on deaf ears until Clinton took office and asked Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate clinic violence. Finally, the National Organization for Women (NOW) along with two clinics sued pro-life activists under federal antitrust laws and charged the defendants with a “nationwide criminal conspiracy to close women’s health clinics.” After more than a decade in court, NOW and clinics won the suit and a judge issued the first nationwide injunction, prohibiting the codefendants from interfering
with clinic services and women’s right to obtain them. The nationwide injunction and application of federal antitrust laws to pro-life threats was overturned by the Supreme Court (2003, 2006), which ruled that noneconomic violence was not covered by antitrust laws.

THE POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE?

One criticism of both movements is their seeming inability to compromise on the abortion issue. While compromise does seem unlikely in the political arena, some activists do look for “common ground” on the abortion issue. Founded in 1994, the Common Ground organization encourages dialogue among pro-life and pro-choice activists and looks for solutions that protect the health and well-being of women and children (Ginsburg 1998). For example, if a young woman is dropped off by a parent to obtain an abortion she clearly does not want, clinic personnel work with local pro-lifers to find other solutions. While common ground efforts have emerged in cities where the battle over abortion is the most divisive, it is not clear whether these efforts will influence political debate and policy processes. Given the entrenchment of the abortion issue and social movement organizations in American politics, it seems unlikely that political compromise is forthcoming.

SEE ALSO: Law and social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Religion and social movements; Science and social movements; Strategy; Tactics; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Quebec nationalist movement (Canada)
KENNETH MCROBERTS

Quebec nationalism is rooted in the French-speaking population of Quebec, Canada’s largest province by territory and second largest by population. Within Canada as a whole, French-speakers (or Francophones) have long been in the minority; they now constitute 21.4 percent of the Canadian population (based on language used at home). However, in Quebec Francophones have always been in the majority, currently constituting 81.8 percent of the province’s population.

Among Quebec’s Francophones there has been a strong sense of collective identity, going back to the establishment of the French colony of New France. Ultimately, the conquest of New France by Great Britain led to the emergence of a distinct sense of nationality. However, the very definition of this nationality, let alone the strategy for seeking autonomy, has taken different forms in different historical periods. These historical shifts in the definitions of national identity, and the associated nationalism, reflected both changes in Quebec’s political economy, as the French and then British colonial relationships were replaced by integration in North America, and changes in the configurations of social forces within Francophone society itself. As a result, there have been very distinct phases in the social and political movements that have mobilized nationalist support among Quebec’s Francophones.

NEW FRANCE: DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTINCT IDENTITY

Founded in 1608, New France remained a French colony until 1759 when, after the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, it passed into British hands. During that time, the colonial population grew to about 70,000 and, in the process, developed a certain sense of collective identity. Beyond enduring struggles with aboriginal populations and the British, as well as the challenges of a harsh climate, the colonists tended to resent the relative neglect of their French metropole. Indeed, there was periodic resentment of the monopoly that Frenchmen held over positions of authority in the colony. Thus, they began to call themselves Canadiens or habitants to distinguish themselves from the metropolitan French.

AFTER THE CONQUEST: THE EMERGENCE OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NATIONALISM

With the British conquest, leadership within Canadien society fell clearly into the hands of the Catholic clergy and a group of seigneurs. By and large, they were prepared to seek a modus vivendi with the new British authorities who, for their part, soon abandoned assimilationist ambitions. In 1774, this resulted in the Quebec Act, which accommodated the Canadien leadership by recognizing the church’s right to collect a tithe and restoring seigniorial rights, as well as reestablishing French civil law. Under such conditions, there was no space left for any Canadien challenge to British rule.

Nonetheless, by the early 1800s, two new social forces emerged within Quebec that would challenge this state of affairs. Through these struggles, the first coherent nationalist movement was formed. First, while remaining very much a minority, a growing number of Britishers settled in Quebec and spawned a commercial class with ambitious plans to develop the colony’s economy through trade with Great Britain. Having secured a legislative assembly in 1791, they enjoyed disproportionate power over the assembly and sought to use it to
promote their commercial projects as well as their hopes of assimilating the Canadien population. Second, Canadien society spawned a new class of liberal professionals and small merchants who used the colonial assembly to resist such pressures. At the same time, they began to challenge the role of the clergy within Canadien society.

This protracted conflict resulted in the emergence of a Canadien nationalist movement, the Patriotes, who championed an autonomous political status for Quebec. The Patriotes led an armed uprising in 1837 but were quickly defeated by the British authorities who, for good measure, had the active support of the Canadien clergy. Nonetheless, the Patriotes and their Parti canadien represented the first instance of a coherent nationalist movement among Francophones in Quebec.

1850–1960: NATIONALISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

With the defeat of the Patriote leadership, the Catholic church secured the upper hand within Canadien society. As such, it shifted Canadien nationalism away from the secular and autonomist ambitions of the Patriotes and articulated a vision of the nation in which the Catholic faith was pre-eminent and political institutions were decidedly suspect. Rather than political action, this religiously rooted nationalism contended that the advancement of the Canadien nation would come through cultural and social affirmation, largely through the institutions of the church.

In negotiations that led up to the creation of a new Canadian political structure, which joined Quebec with three other British colonies, Canadien leaders united in their demand that the new structure must be federal in nature. But the terms of the new federation, which was proclaimed in 1867, closely followed the concerns of the church in focusing provincial jurisdiction on areas that were central to the prerogatives of the church and its institutions (health, welfare, education, and the solemnization of marriage).

Over the decades, some nationalist movements did succeed in mobilizing electoral support. In the 1880s, le Parti national emerged in response to the federal government’s execution of Louis Riel, leader of a rebellion in western Canada. The economic crisis of the 1930s spawned Action libérale nationale. During World War II, opposition to conscription produced the Bloc populaire canadien. But these movements were short lived and ultimately absorbed within the mainstream political parties. During the post-World War II period, the Quebec government was held by the Union nationale which, while avowedly nationalist in its defense of the autonomy of Quebec within the Canadian federation, tended to defer to clerical elites and to avoid any major attempt to expand Quebec’s autonomy.

QUIET REVOLUTION: EMERGENCE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM

By the early 1900s, Quebec was well on the way to becoming an urban, industrial society. By the 1950s, there had emerged within French-Canadian society a substantial new middle class of intellectuals, administrators, engineers, and other professionals who began to challenge the clergy’s pre-eminence, cultural and social, as well as the clergy’s restricted vision of government. They contended that as an urban, industrial society, Quebec could no longer rely on the church to oversee its educational and social needs. Only public institutions, under government leadership, could do the job. By the same token, the new middle class began to challenge the historical dominance by English-speakers of the ownership and management of Quebec’s economy. Here too there was a need for government intervention to create opportunities for Francophones.

These arguments for state intervention necessarily focused on the government of Quebec. As a provincial government, it held the crucial jurisdictions of health, education, and social services. Moreover, it was the logical
instrument for opening the upper levels of the Quebec economy to Francophones, since it was responsible to an overwhelmingly Francophone electorate. The federal government, accountable to Canada’s English-speaking majority, could not be expected to take this on. Indeed, its public service was overwhelmingly dominated by Anglophones, and by the English language.

Out of these processes emerged a markedly new form of nationalism focused upon social and economic intervention by the Quebec government. Only in this way could Francophone society become fully modern and assume economic ownership and control. Only in this way could Francophones become *maître chez nous* or “masters in their own house.” In effect, the Quebec government had to become a “national” government and, within this nationalist vision, the nation could no longer be “French Canada”; it had to be “Quebec.”

The primary bearer of the new Quebec nationalism was the Quebec Liberal Party, which took power in 1960 and held it until 1966. This period has been dubbed Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution.” Under the Liberals, the functions and structures of the Quebec government were rapidly expanded, assuming direct responsibility for education and health and social services and displacing the church and its related institutions. The Liberals nationalized Quebec’s privately owned hydroelectric companies and established a network of state enterprises. Much of this was legitimized in terms of the new Quebec nationalism. In effect, rather than a political movement, Quebec nationalism had become the leitmotif of the provincial government.

Coupled with assertion of a new role for the Quebec government was a nationalist challenge to the place of Quebec within the Canadian federation. The jurisdictions of the provincial government would have to be expanded if it were to assume its responsibilities to the Quebec nation. Indeed, it would have to be afforded the status of a “national” state. These nationalist demands fed a constitutional struggle that dominated much of Canadian politics for the rest of the twentieth century.

**CANADA WITHIN QUEBEC: THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY**

During the 1960s, a variety of political movements sought to take the logic of Quebec nationalism one step further, calling outright for the political independence or sovereignty of Quebec. In 1968, they coalesced around a new political party, the Parti québécois, led by René Lévesque. It soon became the primary opposition party and, in 1976, was elected to power. As such, it was confronted with all the challenges that face a movement which assumes power within the very structures it is seeking to transform. Guided by a broadly social democratic agenda, it undertook a variety of social and economic reforms. In addition, it passed legislation enshrining the primacy of the French language within Quebec. But its 1980 referendum on Quebec sovereignty was defeated by a wide margin, at least in part because, as a government, it had addressed some of the nationalist grievances that initially had given rise to the movement.

Also contributing to the referendum defeat was the opposition to Quebec sovereignty led by federal prime minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, himself from Quebec. Trudeau contended that Quebec Francophones should embrace Canada as whole rather than being contained by a narrow Quebec-based nationalism. To that end, he strengthened the presence of Francophones, and the French language, within the federal government itself and sought to strengthen French-language rights across the country. In the wake of the referendum, Trudeau spearheaded a revision to the Canadian constitution which, among other things, entrenched across Canada the right to French-language schools. Nonetheless, the Quebec government and legislative assembly opposed the measure and refused to endorse it, since it diminished rather than enhanced the powers of the Quebec government.

In the late 1980s, a new federal prime minister, also from Quebec, Brian Mulroney, spearheaded an effort at constitutional reform geared to securing Quebec’s consent. This
effort failed to secure the constitutionally required unanimous agreement of the provincial governments. But behind this failure was a movement of public opinion outside Quebec, heavily influenced by Trudeau himself, against the constitutional package and against the accommodation of Quebec and Quebec nationalism that it represented. The failure of the initiative, in June 1990, led to a remarkable surge in nationalist sentiment among Quebec Francophones. But, in 1995, a second referendum on Quebec sovereignty, staged once again by a Parti québécois government, was defeated by a razor-thin margin.

CONCLUSION: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Fifteen years later, the forces in favor of Quebec sovereignty have yet to recover from their second referendum defeat. Indeed, the political parties favoring sovereignty are in considerable disarray. The Quebec sovereignty movement faces several challenges. To a considerable extent, issues that in the 1960s gave rise to the new Quebec nationalism have been addressed through government intervention. Key has been the entrenchment of the French language in Quebec. In addition, Quebec has undergone critical demographic changes: an aging population has heightened the need for Quebec to attract immigrants and this, in turn, has raised the challenge of integrating newcomers within Francophone society. Finally, given the failures of the past, there is deep reluctance within the Quebec Francophone population, and even more so in the rest of Canada, to address once again Quebec’s status as a nation and its place within Canada.

Yet, by all indications, Quebec’s Francophones continue to bear a strong sense of membership in a distinct collectivity that is largely, if not entirely, contained within Quebec. Moreover, many of them, if not most, continue to see Quebec as a nation, even if it is not clear what political and constitutional implications may stem from that status. Thus, the challenges to Quebec and to Canada that were first raised by Quebec nationalism in the 1960s remain unresolved.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Identity politics; Nationalist movements; Religion and social movements; Separatist movements.

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Red Brigades (Italy)
LORENZO BOSI

The origins of the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse in Italian; hereafter BR), which emerged in October 1970, are to be found in the Collettivo Politico Metropolitano (CPM), formed in Milan in September 1969 with the support of various local workers’ and students’ committees. Among other left-wing armed groups operating in Italy since the early 1970s the BR was the largest, the leading organization in terms of degree of political violence deployed, claiming 145 killings, and most long-lived, lasting, despite splitting up into various groups and wings, until the end of the 1980s. It was strictly organized into city columns: Milan and Turin were the first, which were subdivided into brigades with three- to five-member “cells.” Over time the city columns expanded into Rome, Genoa, Naples, and Venice. Over the 1970s and the 1980s it was estimated as being composed of over 400 full-time members, plus an unknown number of supporters.

Italian left-wing political violence originated out of the increasing fear that a possible coup d’état was just around the corner and from the conviction that the state was part of a conspiratory anticommunist “strategy of tension,” facilitated by the Italian secret service, parts of the army, and the American CIA. This influenced the collective decision of some extraparliamentary left-wing groups to resort to violence as a weapon of political competition (della Porta 1995). They saw an armed response as the only way to oppose the total domination of the Italian working class, which was seen to have been “abandoned” by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), unwilling to serve any longer in the vanguard of the struggle for the proletariat in its drive to become a credible democratic force. An opportunity existed for a champion of revolution to emerge on the left of the PCI, and the BR identified themselves completely with this role (Melucci 1981).

Marxist-Leninist in its ideology and organizational structure, the BR aimed to perpetuate and even radicalize the 1969 labor conflict, providing armed support to striking workers. Capitalist society, controlled nationally by the Christian Democrat (DC) establishment and globally by American imperialism, was, in its leaders’ view (among others, Renato Curcio, Alberto Franceschini, Mara Cagol, and Mario Moretti) a monster preparing to demolish the world, against which the use of force to undermine the status quo was legitimate in order to bring a communist upheaval led by a “revolutionary proletariat.” Acts of physical violence soon followed their bellicose rhetoric. Initially the group’s main activities were fairly low level. They did not go beyond damaging company properties, setting fire to numerous automobiles owned by business executives, security staff, and heads of sections, or the brief kidnapping of industrial managers and right-wing trade unionists. In those factories where they were present (Sit Siemens, Alfa Romeo, Magneti Marelli, Pirelli, and FIAT) members of the BR carried out what they termed counterinformation: the “exposure” of the hidden maneuvering of capitalist power.

The development of the BR towards the adoption of more specifically radical repertoires came about gradually. The “new” task of the organization, by the mid 1970s, was that of attacking and destroying capitalist power by “striking against the heart of the Italian state,” seen as the imperialist collection of multinational corporations (Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali, SIM). Violent action shifted from the factory to more directly political objectives, the DC. In 1976 the BR killing of General Public Prosecutor of Genoa, Francesco Coco, and two members of his bodyguard, marked an ominous change in its tactics. The declining social protest movement
in Italy during the 1960s and early 1970s; activists’ everyday conflicts with the police; the beginning of the historic compromise between the DC and PCI that caused widespread indignation in the extraparliamentary Left; and the competition within this same milieu with other left-wing armed groups, like the Front Line and the Fighting Communist Front (for recruits, financial support, and attention), were all important factors in the further radicalization of the BR repertoire (della Porta 1995). The most famous and emblematic crime of the BR was the kidnapping in 1978 and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro (with five bodyguards killed), who had twice served as prime minister and was one of the most important leaders of the DC.

The sociopolitical conditions of the late 1970s and the new repressive “emergency” measures, which constrained organizational resources and recruitment capacities, brought a further radicalization of the BR, leading to a sort of encapsulation from the outside world, in order to survive, keeping its organizational integrity, but at the cost of becoming more and more out of touch with political reality (della Porta 1995). The increasing brutality of its actions ended up disgusting not only the broader public, but also its own constituency. Public disapproval of the killing of Moro and other extreme crimes gave the state the opportunity to regain its legitimacy. The trade unions and the PCI engaging in proactive campaigns against left-wing underground groups; internal conflict over strategy; state antiterrorist measures of heavy military repression; and the onset of penitence or active collaboration (“repentance” law of 1980) by a number of captured militants from early 1980, were all factors which progressively drove the BR to its end: a process that took almost a decade to complete, from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. The organization never announced a complete cessation of its military activities, but essentially folded due to a lack of armed activists, given that most of them were either dead, in prison, or had decided to quit (Bosi & della Porta forthcoming).

A “new” group with few links with the BR performed the last violent attacks, in 1999 killing Massimo D’Antona, and in 2002 Marco Biagi, both labor advisors to the Italian government. This armed group, the BR-Partito Comunista Combattente, deserves a totally separate analysis, despite its claim to links with the old organization.

SEE ALSO: Direct action; Marxism and social movements; Radicalism; Terrorist movements; Violence and social movements.

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Red shirt anticorruption movement (Taiwan)
MAU-KUEI CHANG

The Red shirt anticorruption movement emerged in mid-2006 in Taiwan, with mass rallies and mobilizations in September and early October of that year. However, enthusiasm languished very quickly. It was originally called the “one-million people down Bian movement.” The word Bian stands for the then president of the country, Chen Shui-bian, the first pro-Taiwan independence president representing the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP). Chen was first elected in 2000, and reelected in 2004. Because of his consecutive victories, the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT), which had ruled Taiwan for over 50 years, was forced to yield administrative power to the DPP.

The movement was directly triggered by government mismanagement and a series of high-profile scandals, with members of the first family implicated. The primary goal was to force Chen to step down one-and-half years before his term ended. To frame the core issue of the movement, the organizers called their campaigns “anticorruption and down with Bian actions.” By focusing on “anticorruption,” the organizers tried to appeal to a broader spectrum of citizens, and to prevent the movement sliding into ugly dogfights between DPP and the KMT supporters. During their campaigns, citizens were urged to wear red in expressing their support and solidarity. Red shirts, caps, or scarves soon became identifiers for the participants. “Red-shirt Army” was the most used expression of the movement as the result.

The iconic leader of the movement was Shi Ming-teh (1941—). Shi had had a long career as the most stubborn political dissident during the authoritarian era. He had spent about 26 years in jail before being released, and was then elected as the party chairman of the young DPP (1994–1996). Shi inspired followers and bystanders to join the protests by openly criticizing Chen for behaving disgracefully toward the political opposition movement.

In retrospect, the Red-shirt Army’s campaign was one of the many battles springing from enduring and partisan conflicts over nationalistic and identity issues and politics. Ethnonationalistic conflicts in Taiwan have intensified since the early 1990s. Tensions have peaked corresponding to the openings of various significant posts through popular elections. This was especially so with the beginning, in 1996, of presidential elections every four years.

In an optimistic moment for Taiwan’s new democracy, the Chen-led DPP won the presidency in 2000 by a relatively large majority. And yet Chen and his minority government appear to have split the country more than united it in his first term precisely because of ethnonationalistic antagonism. His second victory in 2004 was highly disputed. Not only was his winning margin so minimal (only 0.22%, or 29,518 votes) that it required a total recount, but the fairness of the election was also clouded by the way the DPP and the government handled a shooting incident directed at Chen and his partner just hours before voters went to the polls. Seemingly never-ending conflicts, escalating resentments, the unsolvable shooting conspiracy, and the questionable winning of the presidency all deepened the divide in the general public prior to the outbreak of the movement. When Shi began to challenge the public to join him to “Down Bian” to preserve the core values of the young democracy, the widespread pre-existing discontents crystallized and energized the movement very quickly.

Postcampaign studies have confirmed the schism between the pro-KMT and the pro-DPP camps. For instance, the majority of “Down Bian” supporters were pro-KMT (Blue), while
the pro-DPP voters (Green) were much less likely to support the campaign even if they were sympathetic toward the anticorruption cause. Today some critics think that 2006–2008 was actually the most polarized period in Taiwan’s new democracy.

In the end, the vibrant rallies and sit-ins combined did not succeed in bringing Chen down. The “Reds” left the scene after their last and greatest rally on the Double Tenth Day (October 10), or the nation-state’s birthday, which commemorated the armed uprising of the early KMT in 1911 in mainland China. Today some movement participants fault their own leaders for being too “soft” in choosing their strategies, or being self-limiting in setting their political objectives and hence missing opportunities. But the real reason may lie in the fact that the pre-existing political divide was just too deep to be bridged by any civil campaigns. And for all stakeholders, especially political elites, the options were always clear, even if they felt sympathetic toward the campaign. That is, the only justifiable victory for them or for their parties must be won through the system of popular election. To them, and many citizens likewise, the bigger conflict can only be fought in election campaigns, regardless of the result of this particular battlefield.

Though Chen was able to finish his presidential term, the damage to the DPP caused by his low popularity was so serious that the party went on to lose the following two major elections, allowing the KMT to return to power by big wins in both the legislative and the administrative bodies of the government in 2008. Chen himself, with protest at his human rights being violated, was put on trial for embezzlement in 2008 after his term ended.

SEE ALSO: Chinese communist revolution; Leadership; Political alignments and cleavages; Taiwan Independent Movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Regionalist movements
LORENZO BOSI

Research on regionalist social movements lies at the intersection of two fields: studies of ethnic conflicts and studies of social movements. The term “regionalist movements” is used, in a broadly defined sense, to encompass a large spectrum of sociopolitical movements which share the claiming of sovereignty over a particular territory. They include activities that range from small-scale, sporadic events to well-developed campaigns that demand territorial rearrangements such as home rule, devolution, separatism, diaspora settlements, independence and/or secession. Cases in point, just to mention a few, are the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Northern Irish in Great Britain, the Corsicans and Bretons in France. One of the distinctive characteristics of the regionalist movement family is its internal diversity in relation not only to its goals, but also to its identity, ideology, organizational forms, and the repertoires used (Olzak 2004). Ethnic identity, for example, is not a requirement for regionalist mobilization. Nevertheless, it is usually instrumentally constructed and organized in the process of collective action as it helps to overcome the seemingly natural resistance of individuals to get involved in movement activities (Calhoun 1993; Johnston 1994). Thus many regionalist movements invoke ascribed characteristics such as culture and language, as well as histories of ethnic discrimination and systemic subordination from political and/or economic participation, which can be real or only perceived as such.

In seeking to challenge existing boundaries for economic, political, and social governance regionalist movements such as separatists or secessionists can provoke repressive reactions by state authorities that escalate into further mobilization and eventually justify even violent campaigns by the movements, so transforming their struggles into national liberation ones (Brubaker & Laitin 1998). In countries where there are dense social networks embedded in anti-systemic subcultures, repression functions as a catalyst for further protest. It raises the community’s political consciousness so as to mobilize further collective action by those individuals who were not previously involved. State violence against peaceful protesters has the power, in the view of anti-systemic groups, such as ethnonationalist minorities, to delegitimize the regime as non-democratic, and ultimately, to reveal its hidden malign nature so much so as to justify further protest and even violence. (Bosi 2007: 39)

Regionalist movements are not always anti-systemic and peripheral; they can also be institutionalized in political parties and become mainstream political players, pushing their agenda even from inside government. This depends very much on the openness of the regime.

Transnational forces (for example the EU) shape the emergence and trajectories of regionalist movements. But the literature so far has preferred to focus on domestic factors rather than on international ones. This despite the fact that the post-cold war era has seen regionalist movements growing in importance both in stable democracies and unstable political regimes. Most studies tend to magnify internal causes that seem most directly relevant to the emergence of regionalist mobilization. While these certainly play important roles, the existing literature does not fully explain why different types of regimes experience much the same increase in regionalist mobilization. The post-cold war era increase suggests that regionalist movements should be understood by integrating an international dimension to mobilization. In recent years there has also been a further and increasingly important resurgence of regionalist movements focusing on an opposition to
globalization by anchoring their communities to territories.

While in recent literature on social movements spatial aspects have become important explanatory dimensions in the understanding of the emergence, development, and demise of collective action, the specifically territorial aspects have been less well explored. The concept of territoriosity, understood as “a primary geographical expression of social power” (Sack 1986: 5), can provide a powerful analytical tool for understanding regionalist movements. It can become an essential concept for clarifying the way in which the dynamics of mobilization are related to external international boundaries, an issue of particular importance in societies with weakly naturalized and actively contested outer boundaries (O’Doghartaigh & Bosi, forthcoming).

SEE ALSO: Ethnic movements; Geography and social movements; Globalization and movements; Identity politics; Nationalist movements; Separatist movements; Transnational social movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Republican Revolution of 1911 (China)
GENG TIAN

The 1911 Republican Revolution ended over 2000 years of imperial rule in China. The revolution came to an end with the abdication of the Qing emperor and the rise of Yuan Shikai as the first president of the Republic of China. Traditional Chinese historiographies tended to highlight the leadership of the republicans in the revolution. However, the fall of the Qing Empire had its deeper roots not in the diffusion of republicanism but in changes upon three political actors: the Qing court, the provincial elites, and the New Armies modeled upon the modern German army after 1895. The 1911 revolution added a decisive blow to a falling empire.

Provincial governors and the gentry gained greater power by their active involvement in the repression of the Taiping Rebellion. Till the end of the Qing dynasty, the empowered provincial governorship remained a potential threat to the imperial rule. After the mid-nineteenth century, the gentry began to move into cities where they merged with urban reformists who were lobbying for provincial development, local self-governance, and constitutionalism. With the onset of the twentieth century, such local reforms turned into urgent demands for the constitutional rights of the provincial assemblies. The reformers believed that the provincial assemblies should enjoy greater autonomy from both central and local governments and that only the assemblymen knew what their people wanted and could bring real benefits to local communities. Overall, both provincial governors and gentries became increasingly difficult to subjugate by the Qing court after the mid-nineteenth century.

Continuous military pressures, from the Taiping Rebellion to the 1894 Sino-Japanese War led to the ascendency of both provincial governors and the gentry in imperial politics. In 1901, the Qing embraced reforms, in part to regain its control over the local powers. The court not only sought to squeeze more resources from the provinces, but also postponed the promised opening of the national assembly. Not surprisingly, these policies were resented and resisted by the provincial elites. The provincial elites had reasons to doubt that the court wanted to empower the royal rule in the name of installing constitutional monarchy.

After the Qing court appointed nine imperial nobles in a 13-seat cabinet in 1905, the lingering faith in the Qing court was shattered.

The triggering event of the 1911 revolution happened in Sichuan province. The Qing court attempted to nationalize railway construction, but was unable to repay the investment that the Sichuan gentry had made in the construction of local railways. They immediately organized a protest, which was later joined by local merchants, students, and members of secret societies. As the protest became more violent, the Governor-General of Sichuan pled for military support from other provinces. In late September, half of the 8th Division of the New Army stationed in Hubei was dispatched to Sichuan to aid the repression.

Many low-ranking New Army officers accessed reform or revolutionary ideals when they studied in Japan or in Chinese military schools. Many of them secretly joined the revolutionary cause. Before 1911, revolutionary soldiers in the New Armies had already unsuccessfully revolted twice in south China. Informed of the revolutionary activities in the 8th Division, the Qing court wanted to reduce the risk of mutiny by dividing the division.

Yet, the revolutionaries in the remaining troops in Wuhan, capital of Hubei, decided to stage a mutiny. However, on October 10, one revolutionary leader accidentally injured himself when he and some others were making
bombs in a house in the Russian Concession. Three of them were arrested and executed by the Russian police. To prevent further repression by the government, the revolutionaries mutinied immediately. On the same day, the 8th Battalion fired the first salvo of the revolution. Soon afterwards, the transportation units, supply units, and artillery units forced their way into Wuchang city and occupied the forts. Over the night of October 11, armies in Hanyang, another borough of Wuhan, revolted successfully, occupied the arsenal and the iron-works and secured large amounts of ammunition. After the initial success, the mutineers demanded Li Yuanhong, head of the 21st Mixed Brigade at Wuchang, as military governor. In the following weeks, more and more provinces, under the leadership of the provincial elites and local military men, declared independence from the Qing court. The revolution spread.

To repress the revolution, the Qing court installed Yuan Shikai as Governor-General of Hubei-Hunan, in the hope that he could command the armies to suppress the revolution. Yuan was the founder and high commander of the New Army in northern China but had been discharged from his position in 1908 by the court. Thereafter his loyalty to the Qing court wavered. When he resumed the commandship of the northern New Army in 1911, Yuan used his firm control over the New Armies of north China to facilitate his dealings with both the Qing and the revolutionaries. As a result, his personal authority increased after the outbreak of the Revolution. At the same time, Sun Yat-sen, founder of Chinese republicanism and a revolutionary pioneer, was elected as the provisional president of the Republic of China in Nanjing. Under Yuan’s military threat, however, the republican government compromised and agreed that Yuan would be the new president if he could end the monarchy. On February 15, three days after Emperor Puyi abdicated, Yuan became the Republic of China’s first president, thus ending the violent phase of the 1911 revolution.

The 1911 revolution terminated China’s millennium-long imperial tradition but did not bring the more powerful China the revolutionaries had hoped for. China was as weak as before, plagued internally by the warlords and externally by Japanese imperialism. To save the new nation, those Chinese inspired by the 1911 revolution spirit staged more radical social movements and revolutions such as the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the 1926 Northern Expedition, and finally the communist revolution. The 1911 revolution thus ushered in a century of revolution in China with repercussions lasting till today.

SEE ALSO: Chinese communist revolution; May Fourth Movement (China); Revolutions; Taiping Rebellion (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Right-wing movements
SIVAN HIRSCH-HOEFLER and CAS MUDDE

While social movements are defined as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally based or culturally based in the group, society, culture, or world order of which it is a part” (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi 2004: 11), many authors exclusively focus on movements that “promote” change, or even more narrowly, change toward a more egalitarian society. Indeed, some scholars explicitly define social movements as those challenging the status quo (Tarrow 2011: 9), which is their implicit justification for focusing only on left-wing or “progressive” movements.

Others, like Rory McVeigh (2009: 32), define right-wing movements in political (i.e., power) terms, as acting “on behalf of relatively advantaged groups with the goal of preserving and expanding the rights and privileges of its members” (our emphasis). This definition, according to him, distinguishes right-wing movements from progressive movements, which mobilize on behalf of relatively disadvantaged groups. As most social movement scholars are primarily interested in change-oriented movements, rather than the maintenance of stability, right-wing movements have remained at the margins of their interest.

We prefer a more neutral conception over a more political functionalist definition; hence defining “right-wing” in the terms of Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio (1994), as antiegalitarian, and thus focus in particular on extreme and radical right movements. Extreme right movements are both antiegalitarian and antidemocratic; they reject popular sovereignty and majority rule. Radical right movements are antiegalitarian and antiliberal democratic; they accept democracy, but oppose pluralism and minority rights (Mudde 2007).

Even when we exclude the mainstream right, and focus exclusively on extreme and radical right movements, we are dealing with a very broad and highly diverse group. Rather than developing a strict typology of mutually exclusive and not overlapping categories, we will discuss some of the most important types of right-wing movements that exist today. While most of our examples are drawn from established democracies, we cover not just Western Europe and North America, but also Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

NATIVIST RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS

Nativist right-wing movements are the quintessential “radical right” movement today, particularly in Europe. The radical right is mostly organized through political parties and there is some scholarly debate about whether we can actually speak of a radical right social movement (e.g., Hellmann 1996). At the ideological heart of these movements is nativism, the idea that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-states (Mudde 2007: 19). The main targets of these parties’ actions and propaganda are immigrants and indigenous ethnic minorities, but also natives who enable or support multiculturalism, most notably cultural and political “elites.”

In most Western democracies the nativist right-wing is mostly organized in so-called populist radical right parties, such as the Australian One Nation Party of Pauline Hanson, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) of Heinz-Christian Strache (and earlier the late Jörg Haider), and the French National Front (FN) of Jean-Marie and now Marine Le Pen. Populist radical right parties have gained electoral successes since...
the mid-1980s and combine a core ideology of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007). They are currently represented in the parliaments of roughly one-quarter of all European countries, but are part of only a couple of national governments. While the successful parties are often part of broader nativist subcultures, notably in Austria or Slovakia, there are few nativist right-wing movements. Among the most visible street movements are the English Defense League (EDL) and the Russian Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).

The DPNI was founded in 2002, by a former member of the notorious nativist right-wing organization Pamyat (Memory). While distinctly Russian in origins and targets, the movement differs from traditional Russian radical right movements in its virtual lack of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, as well as its amorphous organizational structure (Zuev 2010). Its manifesto, “How Many Russians Are There Left in Moscow,” reads like a copy of the anti-immigration points of West European populist radical right parties. According to the manifesto “migrants from the Caucasus states and from Central and South-Eastern Asia are the first part of the foreign expansion.” While its membership is estimated at around 5000, spread over some 30 branches, the DPNI gained notoriety for organizing mass demonstrations throughout Russia, which at times turned into violent attacks on migrants and clashes with the police. The movement was officially banned by Moscow City Court in April 2011, under the new draconian “antiextremism law,” but it has not been enforced yet as the DPNI has appealed the ban.

The EDL is probably the most active and visible nativist right-wing movement in Europe today. According to its website, the English Defense League is a “human rights organization that was founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group of Muslim extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure.” The organization continues the well-established English radical right tradition of violent street protests, attracting mostly white working-class men, including many from the football hooligan subculture. However, ideologically the group provides a more modern and moderate program than more traditional nativist parties like the British National Party (BNP), breaking with overt anti-Semitism, homophobia, and racism, and predominantly targeting Muslim immigrants and fighting the alleged “Islamization” of Britain and Europe. This has enabled it to attract a much more diverse support base among the “native” English population (e.g., Bartlett and Littler 2011), and even to make modest inroads into groups traditionally targeted by English nativists, such as Jews and Sikhs. The EDL has an official “Jewish Division,” as well as “Gay” and “LGBT” divisions, while one of its (three) official leaders is Guramit Singh, a Sikh. It has received vocal support from right-wing activists and organizations abroad, including the Jewish Defense League in Canada and American “counter-jihadists” like blogger Pamela Geller and talk show host Michael Savage (see below). In late 2011 the EDL announced that it would run candidates for elections on lists of the tiny British Freedom Party, an offshoot of the struggling BNP, but also vowed to remain predominantly a street movement.

RELIGIOUS RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS

Religion has played a role in social movements of both the left and right throughout history. For example, many US populists have been deeply religious, while many of the leaders of the civil rights movement were part of the clergy. Today, some of the strongest right-wing movements have a significant religious identity. We will briefly describe three of the most influential right-wing religious movements: the Christian Right in the US, the settler movement in Israel, and the Hindutva movement in India.

The American Christian Right is perhaps the best known and most widely studied right-wing social movement in the world. Also known
as the Religious Right, it emerged as a significant political force in the US in the late 1970s, and has since influenced the Republican Party’s platforms and nominations, especially in the South and the West, in part because of its ability to provide potent activist resources and access to a significant voting bloc (Green, Rozell, & Wilcox 2003). From a social movement perspective, the Christian Right may be defined as a set of activists dedicated to mobilizing an aggrieved but previously inactive group of citizens into mainstream politics by tapping slack resources and deploying them to its best advantage (Green, Rozell, & Wilcox 2003). The contemporary Christian Right is an informal coalition of numerous groups, with a majority of Evangelicals and Catholics. Over the past five decades the CRM has become increasingly politically organized (Rozell 2011) and engaged in various battles to restore (pro-life and pro-family) Christian values to American life by promoting conservative legislation, national campaign efforts, partisan and electoral activity, and using national organizations. Through such organizations as the Christian Voice, Moral Majority, Focus on the Family, and the Christian Coalition, the CRM has promoted a conservative right-wing domestic political agenda in the media and schools, and a hawkish foreign policy, most notably in its unconditional support for the state of Israel (Spector 2009).

The roots of the contemporary Israeli settlement movement are found in Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful), which evolved in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars from a group of activists from the youth faction of the National-Religious Party (NRP), and has developed into a major political force on the Israeli scene. Even though the Jewish settlers constitute a small minority of the Israeli population, less than 1 percent, they have significantly influenced central processes of decision-making by all Israeli governments. The movement has, over the years, taken a broad range of actions, including unconventional illegal activities. The uniqueness of the Israeli settlement movement is in its prime activity: the act of settlement or creating “facts on the ground” (Sprinzak 1991). Its activists do not just protest for their cause, but actually serve as a fulfillment of their ideology or religious commandment (mitzvah), “to settle the country and make it flourish.” Yet the contemporary Israeli settlement movement is complex and diverse. It represents various types of settlers in terms of religiosity (e.g., secular, religious, national-orthodox, and ultra-orthodox), motives for settlement (ideology versus pragmatism), socioeconomic status (upper middle class versus lower class), and types of settlement (towns, cities, outposts). What characterizes the settlement movement, aside from the consensual features shared by all social movements (see the definition above), is a combination of two more traits: the active achievement of national-territorial goals (through the act of settlement) and an ideological core of nativism and exclusionism (Yiftachel 1998). The settlement movement may be characterized as a form of ethnic-religious nationalism wherein the nation is defined in terms of both ethnicity and religion. The movement struggle highlights the tensions between commitment to the state, its institutions, and the Jewish people of Israel (also known as Mamlakhtiyut), and the commitment to the Jewish law (Halakha) (Alimi 2010: 13), often expressed in valuing religious principles over the state’s legal system (Sprinzak 1991). Through the years, members of the movement became representatives of a variety of right-wing political parties, from the Likud and NRP to the extreme right-wing National Unity Party. After some setbacks, the settler movement reorganized around a more institutionalized group, the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (Moetzet Yeshut), which became the new official roof organization for the settlement movement. Alongside the Council are a variety of organized (as well as informal) groups of settlers, sharing a similar goal, maintaining and expanding the settlement enterprise. However, there is a significant difference in their methods of action and in their activist members (Hirsch-Hoefer 2008).
The Indian Hindutva movement can also best be described as ethnoreligious nationalism, in which the Indian nation is homogenized in both cultural and religious terms. Dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, during the colonial period, its most powerful voice today is in the Indian People’s Party (BJP), which was in government between 1998 and 2004. However, the movement is much broader and includes nonparty organizations like the World Hindu Council (VHP) and the more radical National Patriotic Movement (RSS); collectively called Sangh Parivaar (Chowdhry 2000). The BJP program (1996) stresses a broad nationalist agenda based upon four key values: good governance (surajya), economic nationalism (swadeshi), defense of the territorial integrity of India (suraksha), and empowerment (samrasata). The religious nature of Hindutva is fiercely contested. The movement itself argues that Hindutva is a “unifying force” to create a national identity and ensure national cohesion, downplaying the Hindu character of that nation. This interpretation is upheld by rulings of the Indian Supreme Court in 1992 and 1996, which ruled that “‘Hindutva’ by itself does not invariably mean Hindu” (quoted in Chowdhry 2000: 104). This notwithstanding, the (then) president of the BJP, Lal Krishan Advani, left little doubt when he stated: “Call it Hindu or call it Bhartiya (Indian). If nationalism is stripped from its Hinduness, it will lose dynamism” (quoted in Malik & Singh 1994: 41). This Hindutva movement has often targeted non-Hindu Indians in demonstrations and propaganda, most notably the sizable Muslim minority, and has been at the heart of various violent clashes in the country. Among the most deadly have been the demolition of the Babri Masjid Mosque in 1992, which led to months of rioting in which over 2000 people died, and the anti-Christian riots in Orissa of 2008, killing hundreds and displacing tens of thousands. Today the Hindutva movement remains a diverse and powerful political force in India, despite the unexpected electoral defeat of the BJP in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Right-wing movements are often associated with strong, even authoritarian leaders, but this is not always the case. Within the European extreme right, for example, there are some national-anarchist groupuscules (particularly in France and Italy), while the US has a long tradition of leaderless movement, dating back to at least the US populist movement of the late nineteenth century. We highlight two leaderless movements, which represent the two boundaries of the radical right in terms of their relationship to the mainstream: the recent Tea Party movement in the US, on the one hand, and the (almost) global neo-Nazi movement, on the other.

The Tea Party movement emerged almost directly after the 2008 presidential election, which not only gave the Democratic Party control of all three branches of government (i.e., House of Representatives, Senate, and Presidency), but also delivered the first black president of the US, Barack Hussein Obama. The specific name, referring to the famous Boston Tea Party of 1773, came from a rant by conservative CNBC reporter Rick Santelli, who invited American “capitalists” to a “Chicago Tea Party” to fight a mortgage plan proposed by the Obama administration (e.g., Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin 2011). Within weeks Tea Party groups sprang up all over the country, often gathering small groups of local conservative activists worried about “big government,” “socialism,” and the alleged attack on the US Constitution. They gathered at local “town meetings” at which well-orchestrated challenges were organized against members of Congress who supported health care reform and other despised examples of “government take-over” (Tarrow 2011). The movement gained national momentum through extensive favorable coverage by the conservative media, most notably Fox News and talk radio hosts like Rush Limbaugh. Obama’s proposed health care bill provided the ultimate opportunity to mobilize nationally; heavily supported by then Fox News presenter Glenn Beck (Tarrow
more than 300,000 Tea Party supporters demonstrated against the Obama administration outside the Capitol in Washington in September 2009. While the Tea Party originated as a true grassroots movement, counting over 650 groups nationwide in October 2010, it has increasingly been overtaken by so-called Astroturf organizations like FreedomWorks, run by former House Majority Leader Dick Armey. Today the Tea Party movement has lost much of its independent thunder, having largely exchanged its public demonstrations for internal pressure within the Republican Party. Tea Party activists and candidates played a major role within the 2010 Congressional elections and have been highly influential in the Republican primaries for the 2012 presidential elections as well.

The neo-Nazi movement is a diverse collection of mostly small and violent groups, often partly overlapping with similarly amorphous subcultures like white supremacists and (racist) skinheads (e.g., Kaplan 2000). Ideologically neo-Nazis subscribe to different varieties of German National Socialism, centered on anti-Semitism, the leadership principle (Führerprinzip) and racism, often mixed with specific national fascist issues and traditions. The heartland of the neo-Nazi movement is, of course, Germany, which according to its intelligence service (BVS) counted some 5600 neo-Nazis in 2010. However, because of the particularly repressive legal and political system in Germany, much of their activities take place abroad. For example, neo-Nazi concerts and demonstrations often take place in neighboring countries such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland. Similarly, much neo-Nazi propaganda is traditionally hosted in websites or printed by publishers in Russia and the US. Despite the leadership principle, the neo-Nazi movement is bitterly divided, both nationally and internationally, and violence among neo-Nazis is not uncommon. The largest groups of neo-Nazis can be found in Germany, Russia, and the United States, but neo-Nazi groupuscules can be found from Mongolia to Israel. Few organizations have the capacity to organize demonstrations of more than a few hundred people, most are in the mere tens, particularly now that some of the leading organizations have been banned or succumbed to internal division after their leaders died (such as the German Action Front of National Socialists of the late Michael Kühnen, or the US American National Alliance of the late William Pierce). This notwithstanding, the neo-Nazi movement is one of the most deadly right-wing movements in the Western world. Moreover, several neo-Nazi organizations, like Blood & Honour or Resistance Records, make a lot of money selling “white power music” (or white noise music) and organizing concerts with bands like Bound for Glory and Macht und Ehre (power and honor), which reach thousands of mostly young people around the globe.

INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS

While many right-wing movements are quite anti-intellectual, and action-oriented, there are also some right-wing movements that believe in the power of ideas over actions. These so-called “Gramscians of the Right” fight their battle in magazines and on the Internet, some with significant political success.

The French Nouvelle Droite (New Right, ND) is probably the most influential intellectual radical right movement of postwar Europe. Founded in 1968, by French philosopher Alain de Benoist and others, it calls for the preservation of organic, homogeneous pan-European or Western identities. It insists on the necessity of inequalities between people and is opposed to formal, juridical equality in the context of a liberal, multicultural society. Specifically, the movement’s notion of a strong, unified, homogeneous, pan-European empire regenerated in defense against the dominant “materialist” ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, socialism, capitalism, and communism (Bar-On 2008: 327). The ND organized itself through groups like the Research
right-wing movements and Study Group for European Civilization (GRECE) and the Club de l’Horloge in France, with offshoots like the Belgian Texts, Commentaries and Studies (TEKOS) or the German Thule-Seminar in other parts of Europe. It was instrumental in ideologically separating the radical right from European fascism, despite some similarities, replacing the belief in hereditary and hierarchical racial differences of traditional racism with the ideology of “different but equal” cultures of “ethnopluralism.” While this central idea was popularized among European radical right parties through the French FN, the new right movement has mostly had a strained relationship with radical right parties. Today the new right has split into several subsects and no longer plays a prominent role within the European or North American radical right.

One of the exceptions is the Russian Eurasianists, who have many different sources of inspiration, dating back at least to the 1920s, but the contemporary (neo-) Eurasianists can to a certain extent be seen as the Russian new right. The original Eurasians rejected European tradition and culture, particularly European-style nationalism, and saw the Russian Revolution as an opportunity for Russia-Eurasia (Rossiia-Evraziia) to break away from Europe. Their contemporaries have created a complex and often contradictory worldview, heavily influenced by some ideas of the European new right, yet at the same time often anti-Western and pro-Asian. Eurasianism can be best seen as a specific trend within the Russian nationalist or patriotic movement: it sees in the Eurasianist “empire” a solution for contemporary Russia, differing from more nativist right-wing movements like the DPNI, which would prefer a Russian great power without imperial colonies (Laruelle 2008). It is mostly a movement made up of tiny groupuscules, with at the heart the International Eurasian Movement of Alexandr Dugin, the unofficial leader of the contemporary Eurasianists. While Dugin emerged within the extreme right circles of the infamous National Bolshevik Party of Eduard Limonov, he has since become an influential thinker in democratic Russia with close ties to important political leaders, including President Putin’s circle (e.g., Shlapentokh 2007).

More recently a growing group of Islamophic authors and bloggers have come together to fight the alleged global threat of Islam(ism). While these so-called “counterjihadists” also have some organizations, like Stop the Islamization of America (SIOA), also known as the American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI), it is mainly active and influential through books and blogs. Websites like Pamela Geller’s Atlas Shrugs and Robert Spencer’s Jihad Watch, both associated with SIOA, are only the most prominent tips of the counterjihadist Internet iceberg. Like the books by authors such as Bruce Bawer, Christopher Caldwell, and Bat Ye’or, with ominous titles like While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within, the influence of these websites reaches deeply into the American conservative movement and Republican Party (Ali et al. 2011). While counterjihadists are also active within Europe, among others through Stop the Islamization of Europe (SIOE), they are more closely linked to traditional radical right parties, most notably the Belgian Flemish Interest (VB), the Danish People’s Party (DFP), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders.

CONCLUSION

Right-wing movements come in many shapes and sizes, differing in types of actions, ideology, organization, and strategies. This diversity makes right-wing movements a potential goldmine for theoretical advances in social movement studies, particularly as scholars in the field have so far largely ignored these movements (for exceptions, see Diamond 1995; McVeigh 2009). We hereby provide some first insights on the basis of a cursory study of right-wing movements.

First, and perhaps most crucial, is that this kind of study brings back the (need for a) concept of a “social movement family,” defined as
“a set of coexisting movements that, regardless of their specific goals, have similar basic values and organizational overlaps, and sometimes even join for common campaigns” (della Porta & Rucht 1995: 232). The focus on such specific types of movements as nationalist, racial, ethnic, or religious, and the fact that the right-wing scene is at least as splintered as the left-wing movement scene, calls for fuller collaboration between researchers, which emphasizes ideological proximity without necessarily stressing the organizational dimension (Rucht 2004).

Contemporary nationalist, ethnic, and religious movements have invoked similar themes and should be viewed as (instrumental) creatures of right-wing movements.

Second, while internally divided, most contemporary (far) right-wing movements combine a core ideology of nativism and exclusionism. This type of ideology can adhere to the formalistic requirements of democracy, but its defining exclusionary and anti-egalitarian features are opposed to the essence of liberal democracy, most notably pluralism and (constitutional protection of) minority rights. These ideas and movements can be found in developing democracies as well as in advanced democracies. However, they might interact differently with their political contexts, in part depending on how (il)liberal the national democracy is.

Third, and related, right-wing movements deserve much more attention from social movement scholars, as in many countries they are much more relevant than the new social movements that dominate the field. For example, the Tea Party has provided a social movement challenge not seen in decades in the US. Moreover, while right-wing movements might not be “progressive,” they are not always merely “defending extant authority” either. In fact, in many advanced liberal democracies the new social movements often defend extant authority, while right-wing movements challenge them. But even in less liberal democracies right-wing movements can constitute the main challenge to authority. For example, in Israel the right-wing settler movement is not only much more powerful than the crippled peace movement, it also constitutes the most powerful and serious challenge to state authority.

Fourth, and last, the study of right-wing movements could provide new insights into the complex relationships between social movements and political parties. Our cursory overview seems to indicate that these relationships are closer on the right than on the left, and that political parties are more dominant within the right than left social movements. In fact, in several prominent cases the right-wing movement is largely co-opted by the party – such as in the case of the Nouvelle Droite and the National Front and the Christian Right and the Republican Party; an exception is the right-wing settler movement in Israel, which profits from the fact that various right-wing parties are vying for its support, which gives it the power of choice.

In conclusion, the right-wing social movement family offers an extremely diverse and fertile, yet so far largely untapped, area of research for social movement scholars. At the same time, social movement theory provides an important additional theoretical framework to better understand the recent rise of right-wing politics throughout the democratic world.

SEE ALSO: Antiracist movements in Europe; Coalitions; Contemporary social and political movements in Russia; Fascist movements; Israeli social movements; Nationalist movements; Nazi movement (Germany); Neo-Nazi movements in Europe and the United States; Populism/populist movements; Racist social movements; Religion and social movements; Tea Party movement (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Russian Revolution
YEVGENYI MOSCHELKOV and OLEG GUBIN

In search of new approaches, this entry analyzes the Russian Revolution in terms of grassroots mass mobilization, which – in one year – smashed samoderzhavia (the Russian czarist regime), then attempted to create a representative liberal democracy, but culminated in the Bolshevik power seizure. In 1917, the revolutionary social movement took a quite different turn than during the barricade militant uprising and civic unrests of 1905, which advanced Russia towards constitutional monarchy and were followed by economic expansion. World War I disrupted both processes and became a catalyst for the Russian Revolution. The hard core of the Russian Revolution constituted the causal chain of collective actions and events in the year of 1917, from the fall of samoderzhavia to the emergence and then Bolshevization of the soviets, to the power duality, and further on to the construction and failure of the liberal democracy, destroyed in the Bolshevik armed rebellion. Our approach differs from conceptualizations of the Russian Revolution as a prolonged process from 1917 to the end of civil war in 1924 (the official Soviet version) and even further on to the mid-1930s (Fitzpatrick 2008). Also, we break with the idea, perpetuated in Soviet and Western scholarship, of three Russian revolutions: the 1905 Revolution, the February Bourgeoisie-Democrat Revolution, and the October Socialist Revolution. The Russian Revolution began in February 1917, with the overthrow of samoderzhavia, and ended in January 1918, with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

RISE OF THE SOVIETS, EMERGENCE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND END OF SAMODERZHAVIA

In early 1917, the deteriorating political, military, and economic crisis, largely caused by the Russian Army losses in World War I on the one hand, and by hyperinflation combined with increasing food shortages, on the other, led to worker unrest in the capital of the Russian Empire, Petrograd, and other industrial centers. At the end of February 1917, the unrest turned into a general strike in Petrograd, which brought together hundreds of thousands of industrial workers, clerks, students, and soldiers from military units located in the city. The anguished demonstrators demanded “Bread, give us bread.” The number of factories and plants where workers went on strike grew exponentially from 49 on February 23, to 224 on February 24, to 433 on February 25, with worker-striker numbers reaching 300,000, constituting 80 percent of Petrograd workers (ktq, thjd 1979: 189). On 27 February, the strike escalated into armed rebellion. Thousands of soldiers, over 10,000 in the morning, around 26,000 in the afternoon, and almost 67,000 in the evening, united with the revolutionary workers (Nbnfhtyrj 1986: 185). On February 28, the number of soldiers rebelling reached 128,000, and grew to 170,000 by March 1. The rebels released political prisoners, who then joined the protest movement and further radicalized its activities.

During the unrest, workers began spontaneously assembling self-governing bodies at the factories and plants: the soviets. As Lenin put it, “In February the masses created the soviets even before any party had managed to proclaim this slogan. It was the great creative spirit of the people, which had passed through the bitter experience of 1905 and had been
made wise by it, that gave rise to this form of proletariat power” (Lenin 1975). Workers, soldiers, and peasants began assembling their soviets too. In February–March 1917, over 600 soviets emerged, 12 times more than during the year of 1905. By October 1917, the number of soviets exceeded 1400. By June 1917, the workers had also formed the Central Factory-Plants Committee aimed at establishing worker control over the means of production. By October 1917, factory-plants committees had emerged in 50 industrial centers. The soviets and workers’ committees directed worker protests and framed their collective political demands (1986: 290–291). The avalanche of events composed a broader revolutionary situation in Russia, with increased deprivation and rapidly deteriorating living conditions for the lower classes as well as the inability of the ruling monarchical institutions to manage the overarching crisis.

The revolutionary situation created multiple opportunities for contending political forces. The right-liberal and center-right political parties of Octyabrists, Progressives, and Kadets (Party of Constitutional Democrats), united into the Progressive Block in the 4th State Duma (the highest representative body, operating in Russia since 1906), strove to pursue a liberal democratization of Russia, with greater control by the representative assemblies over policymaking processes. The pro-peasant Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (also known as Essers) and the Mensheviks, the moderate Russian social democrats, came close to achieving their strategic goals of the abolition of samoderzhavia, gradual transformation of Russia into a social democracy, and economic, especially agrarian, reforms. The Bolsheviks, the left wing of the Russian social democracy, whose leader Lenin considered Russia to be the weakest link in the global capitalist system (Lenin 1977), vowed a radical transformation of the post-monarchical regime into a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On February 27, in the wake of the revolutionary situation, the policymakers of the Progressive Block created the Interim Committee of the State Duma, which then formed the center-right Provisional Government. However, in the rapidly changing political landscape, leftist deputies of the State Duma crafted an alternate power structure, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (Petrosoviet). The Petrosoviet was reminiscent of the Paris Commune and workers’ soviets of the 1905 militant social unrest. Hundreds of thousands of workers and soldiers participated in the election of deputies to the Petrosoviet and its analogy in Moscow, the Mossoviet (Титаренко 1986: 216). The Petrosoviet and Mossoviet, as well as other soviets in major industrial centers, in the Russian Army, and in peasant communities, marked the institutionalization of the workers-soldiers-peasants democracy – the democracy of the exploited and have-nots. The latter excluded the rich – the “haves” – and exploiters, that is, the monarchists, capitalists, landowners, top military commanders, entrepreneurs, and top managers. Unlike the inclusionary democracy of the Progressive Block, the leftists gave birth to exclusionary democracy, which Lenin mentioned in State and Revolution (Lenin 1975). The exclusionary democracy, as the revolution would soon unveil, led to the exclusion not only of the rich but also of Mensheviks and Essers.

However, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Mensheviks and Essers dominated in the Petrosoviet and its leadership. It was under their influence that the Petrosoviet gave general consent to the formation of the first Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks, although active in the Petrosoviet and persistent in their demand for the abolition of samoderzhavia, stayed – at this stage of the Revolution – in the shadow of the power shifts. The Bolsheviks did not support or participate in the Essers-Mensheviks’ political maneuvers with the Progressive Block and the Provisional Government. They focused, instead, on the methodical construction of their strongholds in the grassroots working-class communities and soldiers’ committees of the Baltic Fleet and army. Thus, the Bolsheviks formed, just within
the army, about 160 groups of supporters during the period 1916–1917 (Фои́н 1967: 73). Moreover they formed the military commission, Voenka, that played a crucial role in the Revolution. It was through the lower level soviets and soldiers’ committees that the Bolsheviks gradually expanded their influence, participation, and presence in the soviet movement, including the Petrosovet and Mossoviet, and then began to challenge the Mensheviks-Essers leadership in them and the broader working-class and soldiers’ movement.

Unlike the 4th State Duma, which was elected in 1912 and had already lost its legitimacy due to its support of Russia’s unpopular participation in World War I and its association with the ancien régime, the formation of the Petrosovet and other soviets was a fresh political innovation of the grassroots workers, soldiers, and peasant mobilization into an organized sociopolitical movement of the have-nots. Given the fact that the majority of soldiers were of peasant origin, one could argue that the Petrosovet had become a representative assembly of a workers-soldiers-peasants democracy. It is noteworthy that the Interim Committee and the Provisional Government, on the one side, and the Petrosovet, on the other, confronting and power-balancing each other from the start, declared themselves to be the highest state authority in the country, even though the monarchy still formally existed.

With the emergence of the Provisional Government and the Petrosovet, the pressure on the monarchy to step down reached its apogee. The abolition of the monarchy had become the collective demand not only of the have-nots but also of the bourgeoisie and, most importantly, the army officers’ corps (Лысако́в 1967). Finally, on March 2, the embattled Czar Nicholas II, who de facto lost power and was pressured by the functionaries of the Progressive Block to step down de jure, signed his renunciation of the throne in favor of his brother Michael, who also abdicated in less than 24 hours.

**POWER DUALITY AND COMPETING STRATEGIES OF REBUILDING POSTMONARCHICAL RUSSIA**

Russia – during the four days of February 27 to March 2, 1917 – eliminated the three-hundred-year old monarchical system of government. And March 3, 1917 marks the beginning of the postmonarchical history of Russia. At the start of the new history, the Provisional Government was immediately confronted with a disintegrating state, Russia’s unpopular participation in World War I, and accelerating economic crisis. It was also confronted with rising opposition from the Petrosovet and a growing number of workers’ and soldiers’ committees that were falling under Bolshevik influence. No wonder that the new period of Russian history began with an acute struggle between different political and ideological forces: one based on supporting the Provisional Government, and another on supporting the Petrosovet, thus creating a situation which went down in history under the name “duality of power.” Despite this power duality, there had been an overarching objective for the majority of the revolutionary political forces: that is, holding the Constituent Assembly, which should have determined the constitutional form of government in Russia, its national statehood, system of land ownership, and other important social and political issues. However, it was these very issues that led to uncompromising political struggle and became stumbling barriers in the way of the Constituent Assembly.

In order to avoid a power vacuum and further fall into anarchy, the Provisional Government, during its first weeks of existence, reorganized the state institutional structure under the proclaimed principles of “governance continuity” and “continuity of law.” Accordingly, virtually all articles of the 1906 Basic Laws of Empire remained in place, with the exception of the formal abolition of a few articles on the institutionalization of the czar’s authority. The State Duma and the State Council, although having formally lost their
power, stayed afloat. The Senate and Synod (highest church administrative body in Russia) were formally resubordinated to the Provisional Government but maintained much of their former state functions.

While the Provisional Government was involved in legalistic-bureaucratic reorganizations of the old power structure, the protest movement of the have-nots grew daily, with the active participation of the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks began assembling the party’s military units, the Red Guard, composed of small and medium-sized mobile units of armed workers and soldiers subordinated to the district party committees. From June 16–23, the Bolsheviks held the All-Russian Conference of the Party’s Military Organizations, in which 167 delegates represented 25,000 party members, serving in the Russian Army (Корольев 1986).

The growing grassroots social movement of the have-nots closely monitored the Provisional Government and was prepared to respond to any of its policies that were contrary to the soviets’ demands. The movement escalated in April. The unpopular Provisional Government’s statements on Russia’s commitments to the Entente’s strategic objectives in World War I, which basically justified Russia’s suicidal commitment to the war until victory, led to new waves of civic unrest and the April Crisis. The unrest prompted the establishment of the first coalitional Provisional Government, in which Essers and Mensheviks received six government posts. The Crisis was also marked by Lenin’s arrival in Petrograd and by his The April Theses. The April Theses openly called for socialist radicalization by the grassroots worker and soldier communities towards full state authority transfer to the soviets and launched public critique of the Essers-Mensheviks leadership in the Petrosoviet and their politics of agreement, negotiations with, and participation in, the Provisional Government (Lenin 1972). The Bolsheviks charged that the Mensheviks and Essers continued, through participation in the Provisional Government, to mingle with the czarist heritage instead of breaking away from that heritage and launching reforms in the interest of the have-nots. In the new propaganda turn, directed to mobilize peasant support and consolidate support among soldiers, most of whom were of peasant origin, the Bolsheviks articulated the slogan “Land to the peasants.”

The left trend in the revolutionary movement underwent substantial enhancement and institutionalization at the Congress of Peasants’ Deputies and the Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies held in May-June in Petrograd. At the latter, Lenin vocalized the Bolshevik claim for power. He interrupted the Menshevik leader, who made an assertion that there was no political party that would say, “Give us power; leave, and we will take your place,” with the call: “There is such a party!” Of course, “he meant the Bolshevik Party, which had a total of 105 delegates out of more than a thousand at the Congress of Soviets” (Medvedev 1979: 28). The congresses ignored Lenin’s gesture and elected executive committees dominated by Essers and Mensheviks. The important political outcome of the congresses was the integration of the three most numerous strata – peasants, workers, and soldiers – into the political process and the creation of their governing bodies at all levels of Russian society.

While mass mobilization and social movements of the have-nots continued to gain strength and institutional structures, the coalitional Provisional Government was losing legitimacy, as it failed to calm the revolutionary situation in the country. Overall, the “ministerial changes helped the regime little” (Riasanovsky 1993: 459). The economic problems that worsened in the summer of 1917, especially with the lack of a stable food supply, were further aggravated by the Russian army’s failures and separatist processes on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire (Hickey 2011: 266–270). These problems further undermined trust in the Provisional Government and, most importantly, negatively affected the positions of the Mensheviks and Essers in the workers’ and soldiers’ movement – positions which had already been shaken by their denials of Bolshevik
demands for immediate withdrawal from the war and power transfer to the soviets. With the diminishing influence of the moderate socialists, the Bolsheviks were rapidly gaining popularity in the working-class soviets in major industrial centers and in soldiers’ committees of the Western and Northern Armies and the Baltic Fleet.

The rising popularity of the Bolsheviks had become evident in the formidable armed demonstrations of July 3–4, led and organized by the Military Organization of Bolsheviks. The demonstration included such slogans as “All power to the Soviets,” “Down with ministers-capitalists,” and “Bread, peace, and freedom.” All political forces, including moderate socialists, interpreted the July uprising as a clear attempt by the Bolsheviks to seize power. The attempt failed. However, the methodical grassroots mobilization that the Bolsheviks had been nurturing in local workers’ and soldiers’ communities and committees came to fruition. A few days in July transformed the Bolsheviks from contenders to the front runners of the revolutionary movement. Moreover, the July demonstration delineated two opposing tendencies in resolving the revolutionary situation. The Provisional Government, with the participation of right-liberal and moderate socialists sought to get out of the crisis by synchronous replacement of the ancien régime with a democratic republic. For that purpose they pushed for gradual transformation of monarchical institutions into a liberal-democratic social structure, with consequent representation and reconciliation within it for the interests of all classes of the Russian society. The Bolshevik strategy was not “power and law continuity” – claimed by the Progressive Block and supported by moderate socialists – but rather revolutionary power discontinuity and creation of entirely new, notably socialist, social organization of the have-nots on the basis of the soviets. More specifically, the Bolsheviks demanded, in the vital interests of the have-nots, Russia’s immediate withdrawal from the war; the establishment of worker control of factories and plants, with eight-hour working days; and provision of land for the peasants, especially the poorest. While the Mensheviks and Essers primarily saw in the soviets an expressive-educational representative body of the have-nots and the vehicle of participation in, and control of, the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks were determined to turn the soviets into a new system of socialist government of the have-nots that would eventually replace not only the Provisional Government but refurbish the entire Russian power structure.

In response to the July military uprising, the Provisional Government outlawed the Bolsheviks, ordered the arrest of their leaders, and dissolved the military units that participated in the demonstrations. However, it “never carried out any serious punitive actions against the Bolsheviks for the July putsch,” as it “deprived the Military Staff of the authority to arrest Bolsheviks,” “forbade it to confiscate weapons found in their possession,” and “looked the other way as the Bolsheviks held their Sixth Party Congress in Petrograd” (Pipes 1990: 465). Instead, the Provisional Government focused on reshaping itself. The second coalition Provisional Government included seven moderate socialists and was now headed by one of their own representatives, Kerensky. These political changes ultimately put right-liberals and moderate socialist parties into one camp and the Bolsheviks in the other.

The second coalitional Provisional Government vigorously attempted to remedy the situation both at home and on the military front. On August 12–15, 1917, it held a state conference in Moscow attended by representatives of all political forces, industry, military, and clergy. While the Bolsheviks boycotted the conference (Hickey 2011: 325–327), the Mensheviks pushed for the creation of a unified democratic front. The conference generally supported their “United Democracy Platform” but, besides that, “produced no tangible results” (Riasanovsky 1993: 459), especially for the Provisional Government. Moreover, in a blow to Kerensky, the charismatic new commander-in-chief of the Russian Army,
General Kornilov, used the conference to outline a political platform of the military that was quite contrary to the Provisional Government. His speech grabbed the headlines and overshadowed the Mensheviks’ maneuvers on transferring the unified democratic front from paper to reality. And the reality demonstrated that the Provisional Government policies did not produce improvements in the country, in which workers demanded bread, peasants land, and soldiers peace – exactly what the Bolsheviks promised them.

KORNILOV MUTINY, RISE OF THE BOLSHEVIKS, AND BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE SOVIETS

In these circumstances, the Provisional Government faced another challenge, now on the right. On August 23, General Kornilov – whose popularity was on the rise after his flamboyant speech at the Moscow conference – demanded that the Provisional Government give more state authority to the military. The latent, if not primary, objective was to overcome the Provisional Government’s indecisiveness towards the soviets and Bolsheviks and rout them from the political process (Членов 1959: 431; Pipes 1990: 463–464; Алексеев 1991: iv). The threat of military dictatorship forced Kerensky to seek the support of the worker’s and soldiers’ soviets and form a “quasi-alliance” (Медведев 1979: 29) with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks mobilized the Red Guard and their military organization and, with Kerensky’s support, armed workers and withstood military mutiny (Pipes 1990: 466–467). Also, the Bolshevik agitators and soviet’s representatives worked hard among military units adjacent to Kornilov (Алексеев 1991: ix). The standoff came to an end without even a shot (Катков 1980). However, “The ‘Kornilov affair’ remains something of a mystery . . . Only the Bolsheviks really gained from this episode . . . Their leaders were let out of jail, and their followers were armed to defend Petrograd. After the Kornilov threat collapsed, they retained the preponderance of military strength in the capital, winning ever more adherents among the increasingly radical masses” (Ряшинов 1993: 460).

After that victory, Alexander Kerensky became not only the commander-in-chief, but the head of the Directory (“Council of Five”), a compact government, which included Prime Minister Kerensky and the four most powerful ministers. On September 1, the Directory, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, declared Russia a republic. Kerensky’s act was twofold: on the one hand, he associated himself with left and left-centrist definition of Russia’s future in terms of republican ideas; on the other, Kerensky’s government became the government of the Russian Republic rather than an amorphous remnant of the overthrown monarchical assemblage. However, the triumphant Kerensky underscored the new turn in the revolutionary movement, the rise in number and political influence of the Bolsheviks and their Red Guard and military organization. Kornilov’s mutiny had become a “training ground” for the strengthening Bolsheviks’ military squad, which would soon play a decisive role in the 1917 Bolshevik rebellion.

In order to stop the Bolsheviks, the All-Russian Executive Committees of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ soviets, dominated by Mensheviks and Essers, summoned the All-Russian Democratic Meeting. Over 1500 delegates – representing a broad spectrum of social forces including workers’ and peasant soviets, soldiers’ committees, leftist parties, trade unions, local representative assemblies and self-governing bodies, and ethnic organizations – gathered in Petrograd at that meeting, held on September 14–22. No parties from the Progressive Block were invited, as they were largely seen as pro-capitalist and corrupted by either support of, or sympathy for, the Kornilov mutiny. The meeting sought, but without success, to form a government on a broad socialist and democratic basis. Perhaps it was the missed last chance for a peaceful exit of the revolutionary situation. The meeting managed to agree only on one issue: it formed, in place of the State Duma,
russian revo lu tion
a new representative body – the Temporary
Council of the Russian Republic, which aimed
to control the Provisional Government and
draft basic documents for the upcoming Constituent Assembly. The Temporary Council
was comprised of representatives of the left
parties, with the exception of the Bolsheviks,
who boycotted the Council.
The Bolsheviks saw in the Democratic Meeting and the Temporary Council a substitute
for the soviets, in which they, after the defeat
of the Kornilov mutiny, were rapidly gaining
the upper hand – the process known as the
bolshevization of the Soviets. On September
17, Bolshevik Nogin was elected chairman of
the Mossoviet, and on September 24 Bolshevik
Trotsky became chairman of the Petrosoviet. By
September-October, the Bolsheviks occupied
90 percent of the seats in the Petrosoviet and 60
percent of the seats in the Mossoviet. Soldiers
of the Baltic Fleet and the Petrograd garrison
declared their support of the Bolsheviks. The
methodical Bolshevik grassroots antiwar propaganda and promises to soldiers of peasant
origin to bring not only peace but give them
land paid off with their support. It was no wonder, then, that the Bolsheviks also boycotted
the so-called Pre-Parliament that was called for
by the Temporary Council. After September
25, the Pre-Parliament expanded from 313 to
555 members, as it opened its doors – in order
to become a representative body of all walks of
the Russian society – to the Kadets Party representing middle-class professionals, chambers
of commerce for entrepreneurs and business
people, and various public associations and
unions. Upon reorganization, the Mensheviks, Essers, and other moderate socialists held
255 seats (about 46%) in the Pre-Parliament.
Whereas the Pre-Parliament became a representative body of all walks of the Russian society
(Helytdf 2006), the soviets represented only the
lower layers and have-nots. However, the latter
constituted the vast majority of the Russian
population.
The major problem, however, was that neither the Pre-Parliament nor numerous reorganizations of the Provisional Government

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were able to overcome the widening socioeconomic crisis and its further aggravation
of the revolutionary situation in the fall of
1917. Compared with 1916, gross industrial
production decreased by almost 40 percent,
hundreds of industrial enterprises were closed,
the train service, which at the time was the most
important transportation and communication
system, virtually shut down. The steadily rising
food and consumer products prices, accompanied by the reduction of real wages by 40–50
percent, caused further massive strikes and
social unrest, now with the demand of regime
change. In September–October 1917, about
2.5 million workers went on strike in Petrograd
and other industrial centers (Nbnfhtyrj 1986:
289). The scope of peasant unrest significantly
expanded: the peasants began appropriation
and redistribution of the landlords’ parcels of
land. The military losses on the German front
continued and the army became heavily demoralized, with many soldiers abandoning their
duties and returning home. And finally, the
police and other law enforcement agencies were
paralyzed in the wake of the workers’ and peasants’ unrest and protest. In this situation, the
impoverished lower classes and the exhausted
and demoralized soldiers and sailors lent their
support to the Bolsheviks and their policies of a
regime change. The Bolsheviks, a highly organized and determined force, grew rapidly: during the period February–October 1917, they
augmented their membership almost 15 times,
to 350 000 members, including 60 000 in Petrograd and the surrounding provinces and 70 000
in Moscow and the adjacent Central Industrial
Region (Rigby 1968; Fitzpatrick 2008: 52). In
sum, the Bolsheviks – both numerically and
organizationally – were prepared to take over
the failed Russian state.
THE BOLSHEVIKS’ POWER SEIZURE,
REFORMS IN FAVOR OF THE
HAVE-NOTS, AND DISSOLUTION OF THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The Bolsheviks’ resolute and charismatic leader
Lenin was able to overcome uncertainties


among party leaders about the power takeover, and to direct the party members toward forceful power acquisition. In August 1917, the 6th Party Congress passed a resolution on the armed uprising, set up special committees and staff, and outlined specific targets for the various aspects of the rebellion. On October 12, the Petrosoviet, which since September had been led by another charismatic Bolshevik, Trotsky, established the Military Revolutionary Committee for that purpose (Rabinowitch 2004: 233–241). The government of Kerensky had attempted to resist the efforts of the Bolsheviks, but the events were already irreversible, as the masses leaned towards the Bolsheviks. Aware of this situation, the Bolsheviks pursued an armed seizure of power. On the night of October 24, 1917, the Red Guard took control of the post office, telegraph, railroads, bridges, and other strategic infrastructures in Petrograd. In the morning of October 25, the city was covered with flyers and leaflets proclaiming removal of the Provisional Government and authority transfer to the Petrosoviets Military Revolutionary Committee. The Red Guard, people’s militia, and soldiers also dissolved the Pre-Parliament. In the late evening, the Bolsheviks, with the active participation of workers and soldiers, opened the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. During the Congress, which was cut off at night, the Bolshevik Red Guard took over, almost without resistance, the Winter Palace, the symbol of Russian statehood.

The legitimacy of the Provisional Government was so low and its inability to govern was so obvious, that no social or political force rose to defend it. It happened exactly as Kerensky’s former minister of war had predicted on October 20: “In Petrograd itself not one hand will be raised to protect the Provisional Government.” It could be argued that the Bolsheviks virtually grabbed state authority and, in the absence of other able political forces, saved the country from chaos and anarchy (Berdyaev 1960).

On the morning of October 26, Lenin announced at the Congress of Soviets that the socialist revolution had concluded victoriously and the Provisional Government was abolished. In response, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries accused the Bolsheviks of usurpation, denounced the Bolshevik takeover, and most of them left the Congress in protest (Wade & Cummins 1991: 1–2). The Congress continued working under the full control of the Bolsheviks and declared itself the only legal authority in Russia. On October 26–27, it adopted two fundamental documents: the Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land (Wade & Cummins 1991: 6–11). In the Decree on Peace, Congress appealed to all warring countries for an immediate truce and peace negotiation without annexations and contributions. The Decree on Land proclaimed the nationalization of the landlords’ land, with transfer of that land to local peasant committees and boards for further distribution to peasants. Both decrees were enthusiastically received by the masses exhausted by the protracted “destructive war” (Berdyaev 1960) and the misery of peasant life. The next critical decision of the Congress was on the formation of a new government, with the establishment of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) and the appointment of Lenin as its chairman (Wade & Cummins 1991: 11). The new revolutionary government at first included only Bolsheviks. The Congress also elected the Executive Committee (VTSIK), dominated by the Bolsheviks.

During the few months after the Congress, the Bolsheviks managed to consolidate their power. First, the Sovnarkom announced a ban on right-wing and center-right parties and organizations, closed their media, and established censorship (Wade & Cummins 1991: 12, 53–58). On the other side, the left-wing Essers joined the Sovnarkom, making it a multiparty. Also, the Bolsheviks created VChK – the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Wade & Cummins 1991: 62–64). Second, the “victorious march of the Soviets” began all over the former Russian Empire. The soviets assumed
power in Petrograd, Moscow, major industrial centers, and in Ukraine, the Don region, and the Transcaucasus. In 69 out of the 84 largest cities, power transfer to the Soviets happened peacefully. Third, the Bolsheviks adopted new legislation, culminating in the 1918 Constitution that laid the foundations of the new socialist order. In the name of social justice, the Bolsheviks abolished estates, ranks, and noble titles (Wade & Cummins 1991: 47). In November 1917, they unveiled the “Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” that established equality among all people and gave people, including national minorities, rights of self-determination (Wade & Cummins 1991: 24–26). Private property was abolished too; only public and individual properties were allowed. The Bolsheviks established workers’ control in industry with the eight-hour workday (Wade & Cummins 1991: 19–21, 47–48). Fourth, in December 1917, the Bolsheviks signed a truce with Germany and its allies. Again, Lenin was able to overcome uncertainty among the Bolsheviks and push for the peace treaty. The left-wing Essers rebelled. However, their mutiny lacked “street support” and led to their expulsion from the government. According to the peace treaty, Soviet Russia suffered huge territorial losses to Germany, later regained by the Red Army. Overall, Lenin and the Bolsheviks emerged victorious from World War I and further consolidated their power.

The only challenge to the Bolshevik dictatorship could have come from the Constituent Assembly, elections to which occurred on November 12. The socialist parties received a strong majority of the votes, the Essers receiving about 59 percent, the Bolsheviks about 25 percent, and the Mensheviks about 3 percent. The Bolsheviks prevailed in Petrograd, Moscow, industrial centers, the Baltic Fleet, and the Western and Northern Armies (Fitzpatrick 2008: 66). The high vote for the Essers was predetermined by the fact that Russia was predominantly a peasant country and the Bolsheviks had introduced the Essers’ program of land reform. The Constituent Assembly opened on January 5, 1918 with 410 deputies out of 715 elected attending, and the Essers’ leader was elected its chairman. The Bolsheviks, emboldened by decisive victories among the strategic constituents, demanded, in an ultimatum form, unconditional recognition of their government and issued decrees by the Congress of Soviets and Sovnarkom (Wade & Cummins 1991: 64–67). After the dismissal of their requests, the Bolsheviks left the Assembly. In the small hours of the morning, “the sailor leader A.G. Zheleznyakov announced ‘the guard is getting tired’ and put an end to its proceedings forever” (Smith 2006: 138). Like the fall of the Provisional Government, no social or political force protested the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which, according to many scholars, should have been convened much earlier in order to prevent the Bolshevik victory. On January 6, 1918, the Bolsheviks’ VTsIK adopted a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly (Wade & Cummins 1991: 82–83). This act symbolized the completion of the Russian Revolution (Hickley 2011: 458). Further developments can be seen as a process of construction of the new Soviet regime under the aegis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

AFTERWORD

The Bolshevik movement emerged victorious in the Russian Revolution. It was – at that moment of Russian history – a successful revolutionary social movement. Its success can be attributed to the following seven factors. First, the Bolsheviks developed an efficient social movement organization led by professional cadres-revolutionaries. Second, their strategy of grassroots mobilization of workers and soldiers through alternative authority structures, the soviets, emerged superior to the bureaucratic reorganizations of the old government by their opponents. Third, the Bolsheviks seized the moment, that is, the economic, political, and military crisis and revolutionary situation of 1917. Fourth, the Red Guard and military organizations of the Bolsheviks were strategically designed and organized. Fifth, their
...propaganda slogans, collective action frames, lexicon, and keynoting were sharp and targeted at the right opponents and reflected the deep interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Sixth, they acted strategically and masterfully emphasized the unpopular deeds of their opponents. And, finally, their opponents, from samoderzhavia to the Provisional Government, were too lenient with them, allowing them to thrive, grow, and finally seize victory.

However, from the long-term historical perspective—as perestroika, glasnost, and the rapid collapse of Bolshevism worldwide in 1980–1990s unveiled—the success of Bolshevism appears dubious. The soviets, the cornerstone of the Russian Revolution, are gone. The name of the highest representative body of the new post-Bolshevik Russia is the State Duma, in which communists represent the minority fraction comparable in size and influence to that of the 1st Congress of Workers’ and Soldier’s Deputies, at which Lenin shouted: “There is such a party!”

A NOTE ON DATES

All dates are given in the “old style” (Julian Calendar), which operated in Russia until February 1918. To convert to “new style” (Gregorian Calendar) add 13 days.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Grassroots movements; Lenin (V.I. Ylianov) (1870–1924); Marxism and social movements; Paris Commune; Political alignments and cleavages; Revolutions.

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San Salvador Atenco farmers’ movement (Mexico)

CARLA BEATRIZ ZAMORA LOMELÍ

Atenco represents one of the most important contemporary social movements in Mexico, not only because of its historical importance in defense of the collective ownership of the land, but because of the actions that followed this territorial defense. These included conflict with the state, including state repression, growing alliances at regional, national, and international levels, and variation in the structure of political opportunities. The Atenco farmers are defined as collective actors, because of the social and historical particularity of their community, with high social density and communitarian relations in which collective identity is built up, with the land as the axis of the farmers’ identity.

San Salvador Atenco is a community located at the eastern boundary of the metropolitan zone of Mexico City. Historically, it has remained outside the great urban expansion, with the farmers of Atenco allocating nearly 40 per cent of the land to agricultural production in the saline soil on Lake Texcoco that the producers work year after year, working to reduce the salinity and producing maize, beans, and vegetables for local consumption. At the same time, Atenco’s location intersects with a diversified economy where agriculture combines with salaried work and with regional commerce. These means provide the subsistence of the community’s population of 42,739.

However, the Atenco residents were presented with a challenge to their way of life when, on October 22, 2001, the federal government published expropriation decrees of 5,000,393 hectares of cooperative and communal lands of the municipalities of the Texcoco, Chimalhuacán, and Atenco areas for the construction of a new international airport for Mexico City, one of the most ambitious projects of the federal administration of Vicente Fox. The decrees, coupled with the unacceptable offer of only a half dollar for each square meter of land, not only aggrieved the residents but prompted them to mobilize and act collectively in defense of their land.

The mobilization for the defense of the land and against construction of the airport manifested itself most strongly from October 2001 to July 2002. During this period the People’s Front in Defense of the Land (FPDT) was born as an organization that integrated social mobilization activities, drawing repeatedly on the learned repertoire of collective action in other contexts, such as road blockades and barricades. At the same time, the structure of political opportunities, coupled with social mobilization and associated legal strategies, facilitated the derogation of the decrees and the cancellation of the airport project.

Although there were several moments of violence between the collective actors of the FPDT and the government’s social control agents, the conflicts were solved essentially through political dialogue, as shown by the negotiation meetings between the FPDT and representatives of the federal and state governments installed in August 2003. In the subsequent stage to the airport conflict, the FPDT was recognized as a political interlocutor taking regional demands to the negotiation meetings with governmental representatives. However, the structure of political opportunities stopped favoring the FPDT with changes in the state government, that resulted in a decreasing interest in negotiating with the collective actors.

The definitive rupture of the negotiations occurred in April 2006, and with this rupture another stage in the history of the Atenco movement began. In May of the same year, the alliance of various groups with diversified regional interests and demands prompted the FPDT to support the demands of a group of...
flower vendors in the municipality of Texcoco. Given the absence of dialogue between government and demonstrators, collective protest actions escalated and met with violent confrontation when the federal and state governments unleashed its social control agents, resulting in various human rights violations: illegal searches, unlawful entry, arbitrary detention of over 200 people, sexual abuse of detained women, and the killing of two young boys by the police.

In summary, the Atenco farmers’ movement has experienced two different periods of contestation, each of which associated with different outcomes: during the first conflict (2001–2002) there was political negotiation which resulted in a successful outcome for the social movement. However, in the second conflict (2006–2010), due in large part to the closing of political opportunities and the criminalization of social protest as a governmental strategy, the movement failed to achieve any substantial gains, including the failure to achieve the release of imprisoned movement participants. After four years, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation released the detainees; the ministers determined that, in this case, the government used illegal evidence to accuse them of a crime they did not commit.

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Collective identity; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Quotidian disruption; Repression and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Satyagraha
SEAN CHABOT

Satyagraha literally means tenacity in the pursuit of truth, with the purpose of activating our capacity for moral compassion and love of humanity in struggles for personal and social liberation. Mohandas Gandhi, India’s famous leader, coined the concept as an alternative to passive submission and violent extremism in the face of oppression. It implies a nonviolent yet forceful approach to resolving conflict that addresses structural causes of suffering, benefits oppressed people, and creates favorable conditions for peace and social justice. This entry reviews satyagraha’s principles and methods, compares it to other forms of nonviolent action, illustrates its application during the Indian independence movement, and considers its historical and global relevance.

Satyagraha is unique in stressing unity between truth as end and nonviolence as means. Gandhi’s end (“truth”) was a just and peaceful society—a society where people did not face the exploitation, alienation, lack of autonomy, and violence associated with oppressive structures like British imperialism and Hindu untouchability. But since human beings do not have access to absolute truth, practitioners of satyagraha (“satyagrahis”) focus on experimenting with nonviolent methods in private and public life, inspired and guided by relative glimpses of truth.

The methods of satyagraha at first sight appear similar to other methods of nonviolent action. They include preparatory strategies like pledges, prayers, and fasts, which publicly demonstrate the worthiness and commitment of participants. They include familiar forms of direct action like boycotts, strikes, and rallies that increase pressure on political authorities and power elites. They include examples of civil disobedience such as picketing, mass marches, tax evasion, and legal defiance aimed at opposing oppressive structures and liberating individuals and society. And they include grassroots efforts (like Gandhi’s constructive program), which seek to develop the “people power” that fuels social and political movements.

But there are significant differences between satyagraha and other methods of nonviolent action. Unlike passive resistance, satyagraha is not a weapon of the weak. It relies on the strength and courage of participants, who abstain from violence out of choice rather than necessity. It calls on participants to suffer the violence of others and avoid retaliating with their own violence. Such self-suffering minimizes total loss of life, dramatizes unjust conditions, shows commitment to the common good, and ensures that mistakes do not cause suffering by others. While passive resisters internalize their hatred for opponents and express it nonviolently, satyagrahis are motivated by love of all human beings—especially opponents—in word and deed. Whereas passive resistance can set the stage for armed resistance, satyagraha attempts to avoid violent force under all circumstances. In short, satyagraha is more principled and revolutionary than most unarmed protest. It is not purely pragmatic about achieving its goals and seeks enduring transformation of oppressive structures, not just legal victories or political reforms.

Satyagraha’s principles and methods shaped all of the Indian independence movement’s major campaigns, with mixed results. But the Salt March campaign of 1930–1931 was the pinnacle of satyagraha in action. Gandhi decided to focus on the Salt Acts, because they involved taxation of a basic human need for the most oppressed people in India and obstructed national autonomy. On March 12, 1930, Gandhi and 80 satyagrahis started the 200-mile march to the coast of Dandi. Soon thousands of Indians joined the marchers, while millions more engaged in civil
disobedience or constructive work throughout the country, all dressed in white homespun cotton. Following satyagraha’s strategic steps, they had first investigated the situation, negotiated with rulers, taken the satyagraha pledge, participated in training, publicized demands, and issued an ultimatum before applying more confrontational methods. On April 5, the marchers reached the sea and Gandhi broke the law by picking up salt. When government authorities later imprisoned Gandhi and other leaders, the satyagraha campaign continued despite severe police repression, especially during raids on the Dharasana Salt Depot. In the end, Gandhi signed a settlement with British rulers that met most movement demands and signified that Indian independence was merely a matter of time.

The Salt March campaign came closer to fulfilling satyagraha’s requirements than any other campaign before or since. It demonstrated to the world that masses of ordinary people, and not just exceptional individuals, were capable of self-suffering without loss of discipline and violent retaliation. By voluntarily complying with reasonable laws and policies, satyagrahis earned the right to disobey the immoral Salt Act. And by focusing on national autonomy and reconciliation with rulers, they showed that the Indian independence movement promoted the common good, not just self-interest.

The Salt March campaign became a global media event, as journalists wrote vivid descriptions of courageous marchers and brutal police officers, and Gandhi appeared on radio programs throughout the world. It dramatically shifted domestic power relations in favor of Indian nationalists, leading to Indian independence in 1947, and has inspired activists outside of India ever since. African-Americans, for example, started paying attention to the Indian independence movement around 1920, but did not seriously consider satyagraha’s practical relevance until the Salt March campaign. Afterward, numerous African-American leaders traveled to India, talked with Gandhi and other Indian nationalists, and promoted reinvention of satyagraha to fight racial segregation at home. The African-American version of satyagraha guided the US civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and brought fame to Martin Luther King, Jr, the “American Gandhi.”

Satyagraha has continued to influence social movements and activists ever since. In the United States, it guided the farm workers, peace, and feminist movements, for example. Elsewhere in the world, it empowered participants in South Africa’s antiapartheid and Poland’s Solidarity movement, among others. Today, radical intellectuals like Vandana Shiva and George Lakey urge members of global justice movements in the South and North to recognize the contemporary relevance of Gandhi’s concept. Clearly, satyagraha is still an important subject for scholars and activists in the field of social and political movements. What feminist-pacifist Barbara Deming observed in 1960 remains true today: “Experiment with revolutionary nonviolence has barely begun.”

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Indian Independence Movement; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Strategy.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Science and social movements
KELLY MOORE and MATTHEW HOFFMANN

Scientific knowledge has been a growing subject for organized political movements primarily since World War II. Science developed as a distinctive form of social activity in the seventeenth century, and refers to the collectivities of knowledge, tools, practices, and people who create verifiable, reliable knowledge about the natural world. Scientific knowledge may be in the form of words or formulas, or it may be represented in material things, such as a weapon or a drug. The growth of movements that challenge aspects of science parallel the immense government investments in science research post-World War II, particularly in the areas of weapons development, agriculture, health and medicine, and industrial processes. As governments have used measurable standards to characterize more aspects of their citizens’ lives – race, population, crime rates – social movements have come to challenge what Jürgen Habermas in his influential work *Theory and Practice* (1973) called interference in the “life world” of citizens. Today, many active social movements in the US, including Creationism, the pro-life movement, health social movements, and environmental movements and their critics, use science to frame their claims. Ironically, although scientific claims are ubiquitous in political debates, they are often highly contested and therefore have less power than they once did.

The increased role of science in many parts of social life poses distinct political hurdles for social movements. Theoretically, in liberal democratic governance all public governance forums are open to citizens, and rules and laws govern the conditions under which citizens can influence these systems. Despite the ubiquity of science in everyday life, it is often difficult for citizens to affect its production and use. Science is produced in places that are not easily accessed by outsiders, such as government or private laboratories. Scientific knowledge is complex, and uses highly specialized language. When activists suspect that scientific products or processes have caused harm, such effects are not always visible or immediate. It is often costly and difficult to generate counterevidence, particularly when opponents have more access to the tools to make knowledge. This problem can be characterized as the problem of “undone science” (Frickel et al. 2010). Finally, science carries a cultural authority based on specialized training and legal rules that makes bystanders, publics, scientists, and legal adjudicators skeptical of nonscientists’ claims.

Social movements that target science have addressed these issues in six major ways: building alliances with scientists; generating new rules and laws for adjudicating science-related issues; learning the science behind a problem or simply deploying it in claim making, thereby gaining credibility; engaging in “popular science” by measuring effects using rules and practices set by ordinary people rather than scientists; and by drawing attention to the political nature of some knowledge claims.

Social movements that engage science are not always critical of it. Technophilic movements appropriate scientific knowledge in the service of other goals, such as personal liberation or democratization through technological “connectedness.” These movement actors often use science in novel ways, mixing it with mysticism and other forms of personal experience that are usually thought to be antithetical to science. They are often led by gurus of various kinds who have some training in science.
HOW SCIENCE CAME TO BE A TARGET OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements have rarely targeted science until the early twentieth century, and not in a widespread fashion until after World War II when its role in human life increased dramatically. Since the 1920s, chemicals, weapons, consumer goods, and medical technologies have developed more quickly than ever before, affecting the natural environment, the human body, and the border between them. Proponents of these developments assumed that science automatically led to progress for all, and that scientific practices were a model of democracy. Other proponents have been enthusiastic about the possibilities for individuals to use science to transform themselves. Yet many social movement groups argue that scientific developments have unanticipated material and psychological consequences, and that science is an elite, antidemocratic practice.

The earliest sustained movement challenge resulted from the development of a standing army and concomitant buildup of nuclear and chemical weapons stocks shortly after World War II. Such weapons were created in secret, and required risky secret tests to understand their effects. Peace and antimilitarist groups opposed their testing, deployment, and development, which activists suspected of causing long-term illnesses (though they could not prove this), in addition causing blast destruction (Wittner 1997).

Since the 1950s, it has been more common for social movement groups to work with scientists in some way, even as they challenge some aspect of science. The next section explains some of the main ways that movements use science to make political claims.

HOW MOVEMENTS USE SCIENCE TO MAKE POLITICAL CLAIMS

Scientist–movement alliances

One strategy to overcome knowledge deficits and a lack of credibility is for activists to ally with scientists. Beginning in the 1950s groups began to raise new questions that made deeper inroads into challenging the uses of science, challenging the very content of scientific claims. Consumer groups, often with a small group of scientists or even a single scientist as an ally, contested government and industry’s claims that new kinds of chemicals developed for health, agriculture, or consumer products were safe. Because the harms caused by new chemicals were not obvious, scientists who understood what was known and unknown about them served as important allies and interlocutors for nonscientists. Controversies such as the safety of pesticide use, air and water pollution, and the fluoridation of public drinking water, published in works such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), Murray Bookchin’s Our Synthetic Environment (1962), and Barry Commoner’s Science of Survival (1966) instigated the deployment of counterclaims, pitting expert versus expert (Egan 2009). It was during this period that scientists themselves came to be important critics of the idea that science was always a force for progress and to offer their knowledge to other challengers. Ironically, by doing so, they undermined one of the key bases of their political authority, which is the idea that science is untainted by values. By participating in these movements, scientists helped to show that the choices to study, develop, and deploy knowledge are deeply political.

These early challenges relied on ad hoc assistance from scientists, but they had important longer-term effects as they helped inspire legal changes that resulted in the institutionalization of scientific expertise in public policy. In 1969 Congress passed the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), requiring federal agencies to collect scientific data documenting the environmental effects of proposed federal law. It called for experts, both for and against proposed federal laws, to submit claims based on scientific data. As a result, social movement organizations and civil society organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (1970) and the Center for Science in the Public Interest (1971) employed scientists to conduct
research and carry out politics. These were among the first science-based public interest groups, and were followed by the formation of thousands of others over the next decades. They continue to be important sources of evidence and expertise for groups who wish to use science to contest political issues. These professionally staffed organizations provide scientific ideas and legitimacy to social movements.

In the 1970s, a new kind of alliance between scientists and activists took hold. *Stable alliances* between professionals and nonprofessionals developed, with groups working together to develop new knowledge, rather than having scientists develop knowledge and deliver it to movement groups. In Love Canal, New York, lay people and journalists documented widespread illness in the community, eventually finding that the community had been built on a toxic waste dump. Projects such as the National Women’s Health Network collectively documented hazards and abuses women had faced in health care as patients and as research subjects. Feminist scientists and other government bureaucrats were able to institutionalize solutions to some of the problems that women had identified (Kline 2010).

Collaborative relations between activists and industries have been influenced by the convergence of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) and the for-profit sector which began in the 1980s. One result is that contemporary social movement targets have expanded to include markets and industry. Industrial opposition movements, such as the movements against genetically modified foods and mountaintop removal mining, seek to alter corporate practices. This opposition tends to spur “alternative industrial movements” such as those surrounding organic foods and renewable energy/clean technology. These movements are characterized by the collaboration between the state, industry, and citizens groups and have been referred to as “alternative pathways” (Hess 2007) and “interpenetrated social movements” in the case of the breast cancer movement (Klawiter 2008).

**Gaining credibility**

AIDS activists used a slightly different strategy, gaining *credibility* by learning the science of AIDS transmission through working with a handful of scientists. Drawing on their authority as people at risk of or with AIDS, activists helped generate their own science. Recent scholarship has examined embodied health movements that conceptualize the body as a site of contestation and deemphasize the state as a primary target. AIDS-related movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s challenged the paternalism of standard practices of diagnosis and treatment, eventually influencing the creation of participatory models of disease research. This provided patients and advocates with the opportunity to influence the research agendas of pharmaceutical companies, most notably the design of medical trials (Epstein 1998).

**Generating new rules and laws that legitimate activist claims about science**

In the 1950s, there were no laws or bureaucratic rules that legitimated activists’ participation in legal or political deliberations about science. As suggested earlier, one major change since that time is that new laws and rules have been institutionalized to give citizens the right to participate in decisions about environmental issues. Changes in how research on human subjects is carried out have also provided activists with more leverage. Slowly building through the 1950s, major changes in the treatment of research subjects lessened scientific researchers’ power, and gave research subjects new formal rights of informed consent. Activists have used these new rules to call for even greater participation in how research is carried out. Some legal rulings, however, have had the effect of giving scientists and activists less power. The *Kuhmo Tire vs. Carmichael* decision (1999) elaborated the rights of judges to decide what constituted “junk” or “good” science in the courtroom. This lessens the benefit of allying with scientists.
Popular science/popular epidemiology

Alliances, changing rules, and learning to use scientists’ tools and language are not always possible or effective for activists. As a result, some movement groups collect their own scientific evidence, engaging in what Brown (2007) calls “popular epidemiology.” They may or may not work closely with scientists, but, in every case, they define problems differently than scientists usually do, developing their own techniques, standards, and solutions. Phadke (2005) documents this phenomenon in the successful resistance to the Indian government’s proposed Uchangi dam, as affected village residents used participatory resource mapping to record local ecological characteristics and land-use patterns and developed alternative irrigation plans with the assistance of nongovernmental engineers. Other groups collect data in response to scientific uncertainty or indeterminacy and may advocate taking precautionary measures, as in the case of office workers’ efforts to legitimize sick building syndrome (Murphy 2006). As Brown has demonstrated, this type of movement engagement is among the most powerful, for it often challenges traditional understandings of the relationship between scientists and nonscientists and leads to novel solutions to problems.

The ability of social movements to collect and analyze data is in part shaped by broader trends such as higher levels of education, the accessibility of computer software systems, and the electronic availability of scientific studies. It is also the result of the availability of inexpensive and easy to use testing technologies such as those used by “bucket brigades” or citizen groups that collect and analyze data on environmental pollutants (Ottinger 2010).

Drawing attention to the political nature of knowledge claims

Science derives some of its political power from the belief that scientific knowledge is adjudicated only by nature, not by the political interests and beliefs of sponsors and practitioners. Social movement groups have disrupted the presumption of value-neutrality and thereby minimized a distinct source of science’s political power.

Political theorists have been critical of the idea of the neutrality of science since the 1950s. Some writers in the 1960s, such as Herbert Marcuse in One Dimensional Man, asserted that the uncritical acceptance of instrumental rationality as a basis for organizing contemporary life had created “one-dimensional” people, in which the sublime and creative aspects of humans were pushed aside (Marcuse 1964). Religious groups have made similar kinds of challenges to science. Creationists, for example, have asserted that scientists, far from being value-neutral, have failed to look at evidence for evolution fairly. Whether these claimants are correct is less relevant than their ability to dispute the idea that science is separate from other forms of social life.

More recently, activists around the world have challenged the supposedly neutral scientific safety standards for foods, chemicals, and for what counts as “healthy.” States and suprastate groups, such as the European Union and the World Bank, embed these standards into national and local policies. Citizens have a difficult time challenging the originating agencies, since citizens have minimal or no legal standing with them. Instead, many social movement groups use courts to draw attention to the ways that moral and political values of governments and industry are masked by supposedly neutral standards.

TECHNOPHILIC MOVEMENTS

Social movements sometimes enthusiastically embrace science as a form of liberation from the body, the planet, from place, or from the mind. In the 1970s new movements advocated using science and technology to escape from the cultural strictures, including religion, that were supposed to have twisted and damaged emotional, sexual, and physical life. These technophilic countercultures advocated a form of what Binkley (2007) calls a “loosening,”
that was promulgated through magazines such as CoEvolution Quarterly and how-to manuals such as The Joy of Sex. Each provided, often via the authority of a guru, technical instructions and goods, ironically, to be used to become more “natural” and relaxed. The apotheosis of this cultural movement was what came to be known as the Human Potential Movement (HPM), a secular answer to spiritual quests inspired by psychologists Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Rollo May. The HPM saw endless potential in human beings for creativity and self-expression, after their basic needs were met, and encouraged people to use quasi-scientific principles to improve their lives.

Other groups and leaders expressed technocratic ideals by calling for the simultaneous reorganization of large-scale social and technological systems in order to promote self-actualization, democracy, and sustainability. In the 1970s, Stewart Brand, one of the founders of The Whole Earth Catalog, helped to turn the Internet, then a tool of the military, into a civilian communication system that he and others hoped would allow citizens to express their political interests and creative selves free from government control (Turner 2008). Anti-nuclear activists similarly sought to decentralize power relations by changing how technology was organized (Epstein 1991). These impulses can be seen today in open-source technology movements.

CONTEMPORARY MARKETS AND ECONOMY

As a relatively autonomous field, science has always been contested. The study of science and social movements reveals the changing nature of that contestation from disputes over the use of science, to the questioning of the content of science, to the eventual institutionalization of these challenges in contemporary deliberative knowledge-producing practices. Because of the established connections between scientists and ordinary people, some writers have asked whether we are seeing a widespread shift in the general form of social movements, or whether scientist–nonscientist alliances are a form of co-optation.

SEE ALSO: AIDS activism; Coalitions; Environmental movements; Framing and social movements; Health movements (United States); Movements within institutions/organizations; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Self-help movements
ROBERTA G. LESSOR

Self-help groups are a distinctive feature of social life in the US and elsewhere that emerged on the scale of a social movement during the last four decades of the twentieth century. The term “self-help” applies to a wide variety of groups in which members mutually aid one another, seek personal changes, and in some cases, seek to challenge existing institutions that are not meeting their needs. Self-help groups can generally be characterized as “lay” versus “professional,” as formed in respect to members’ discontent with institutionalized means of dealing with a variety of human physical and mental problems, and as proposing new practices to address these problems. The proposed strategies include the promotion of personal, individual growth and, in some cases, the betterment or improvement of the health or well-being of an entire affected group. The rapid expansion of self-help in the 1960s and 1970s coincides with larger human rights movements of the time (the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the women’s health movement). “Self-help” continues to evolve in the twenty-first century, albeit in new forms and with different emphases.

WHY SELF-HELP?

Social scientists in the mid-1970s began studying the expansiveness of self-help, which was estimated at the time to constitute half a million small support groups. They emphasized the groups functioning as a shelter from the alienation and dehumanization of a technologized society (Katz & Bender 1976). Such groups, it was asserted, provided face-to-face connections among people who felt powerless to confront their problems alone in mass society. The individual member could draw on the power of the group itself to sustain him or herself through a variety of life challenges. In the 1960s and 1970s, self-help groups emerged and/or grew markedly in every imaginable arena, helping members negotiate every point of both anticipated or unexpected change in the life cycle (new nursing mothers in La Leche League; single mothers or fathers in Parents Without Partners); to cope with all manner of human pain or stress (grief recovery groups, family members of suicide victims); to cope with stigmatization (Little People of America); with health issues (International Association of Laryngectomees, United Ostomy Association); to aid in recovery from addictions (Recovery, Inc., Alcoholics Anonymous, Overeaters Anonymous); and to offer acceptance and advocate for change (Committee for the Rights of the Disabled, the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, and dozens of feminist women’s health collectives throughout the country) to name only a few out of thousands emerging or growing in this period.

EVOLUTION OF SELF-HELP GROUPS AND THE STUDY OF SELF-HELP

The minimal number of self-help groups prior to the 1960s is evidenced by the paucity of studies of self-help and self-help groups. Bales’ 1944 sociological study of the therapeutic function of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) stands out as an early investigation of self-help groups, the AA of that time having grown from a group of less than 100 members beginning in 1936 to the establishment of groups in most sizable US cities. The growth of AA is a marker of self-help group growth in that the organization currently reports over 63,000 groups and 1.4 million members in the US and Canada (data provided by Alcoholics Anonymous General Services Office, NY).
The rapid growth of self-help groups soon made even categorization a challenge (Killilea 1976). Early research on self-help appeared mainly in the disciplines of social service, clinical psychology, and education, rather than sociology. However, social scientists recognized the key importance of self-help organizations as a form of social institution and as a “natural laboratory for investigating social structure, social relationships, and issues of policy” (Katz 1981: 135). Studies appeared on groups themselves and on a range of social processes that could be understood through field research and participant observation in such groups, for example, socialization (Lofland & Lejeune 1960), consciousness raising (Lessor 1985), and community building (Wuthnow 1996). Not all sociologists in the early years of the self-help movement recognized self-help groups as particularly significant, however, Goffman (1963) referring to them as “huddle-together” groups.

If AA represented the epitome of the lay group with no professional leaders, the other extreme was the incorporation of self-help into professional practice. Recognizing the popularity and apparent power of group members to help one another in solving human problems, mental health professionals soon launched groups as a useful accompaniment to individual therapy or as a therapeutic modality in itself. The difference in the newly emerging encounter groups, T-groups, and sensitivity training in psychotherapy (Back 1972) was their mediation by a trained leader. The rise in such groups is further evidence of the recognition of the profound impact of the self-help movement. Therapists attested to the therapeutic value of the input of a small group helping its members and literally changed the way that much of therapy was conducted (see for example, Back’s 1972 recounting of the evolution of the work of the psychotherapist Kurt Lewin).

SELF-HELP GROUPS AIMED AT CHANGE AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

The women’s health movement (WHM) offers an excellent example of the rise of a self-help movement that changes both individual practice and social policy. It further illustrates the process of mainstreaming that occurs when a movement is successful. The early days of the WHM were marked by the formation of small groups of women who were determined to overcome what they identified as women’s exclusion from medicine as both patients and providers. They pointed out the lack of information available to women about their own bodies, health, and sexuality and the way in which such knowledge was seen as the sole province of a then male-dominated medical establishment. Working together in small groups, women took matters into their own hands, learned from their own bodies and each other, and disseminated their newly acquired knowledge and skills such as self-examination and menstrual extraction. They communicated about normal processes in menstruation, menopause, and women’s sexuality and about recognition of diseases affecting women. From such self-help group work, participants wrote and distributed self-help materials. What originated as a sheaf of shared mimeographed materials generated in groups known as The Boston Women’s Health Book Collective became the astoundingly successful book, Our Bodies Ourselves. The book has now been issued in multiple updated editions in its 35-year history and been widely adopted, translated, and read by millions.

Women’s health groups were also deeply concerned over the nearly complete lack of research on women’s health and the exclusion of women from large federally funded panel studies. The WHM provides a prime example of a self-help movement that viewed political change as an important element of support. Similarly, self-help groups formed by gays, lesbians, people of color, and people with disabled were established because participants saw their voices as not being sufficiently heard in legislative, medical, educational, or workplace institutions.

If the purpose of a politically active self-help group movement is to change existing
institutions that were formerly unresponsive to members’ concerns, the WHM’s successful efforts once again offer a case in point. Among other gains, research on women’s health markedly increased (e.g., the establishment of the Nurses’ Health Study in 1976, the Women’s Health Initiative in 1991), women’s reproductive freedom increased (the 1973 Supreme Court Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion), and the number of women in medicine dramatically increased (from 3% prior to the WHM to the nearly 50% of women now entering medical school classes and the 70% who occupy obstetrical/gynecological residencies). That is, many of the concerns made their way into the mainstream of women’s health care. Being “mainstreamed” marks recognition of the movement’s concerns yet at the same time signals transformation as the rallying cries of the lay self-help group are incorporated into formal institutions. For example, almost every hospital medical complex now has a designated “women’s health center,” but one that in its professionalization necessarily looks quite different from the early women’s centers that challenged existing institutions through asserting women’s control over their bodies and reproductive lives. Further, many of the health issues that the WHM groups sought to highlight and educate themselves about are now the focus of disease-specific advocacy groups. Initiatives concerning breast cancer, uterine cancer, autoimmune diseases, and heart disease compete for attention and funding. And perhaps the ultimate consequence of the movement’s “success” is that some hard-fought WHM issues now have corporate sponsors, as in cosmetic companies such as Avon sponsoring run/walks for breast cancer (Ruzak & Becker 2004).

THE WIDESPREAD DISSEMINATION AND DIFFUSION OF SELF-HELP

The women’s health movement exemplifies the rise of a self-help movement, its activism, success, and eventual demise as it is incorporated into professional help. The recovery movement, however, demonstrates professionalization as well as a further step (no pun intended) of the self-help recovery movement into marketing and entertainment. Self-help group members of the 1960s could have had little or no awareness of how huge a societal phenomenon self-help would become, or the ways in which it would be institutionalized, an ironic twist to the very term “self-help.” Similarly, few observers could have foreseen the enormity of the recovery movement, although much has been written on it more recently. What began as the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 12 Step Recovery program with alcoholics sharing “experience, strength and hope” with other alcoholics “for fun and for free” as they sought sobriety together, led ultimately to a multibillion dollar recovery industry. The AA self-help program remained essentially the same, a no-cost, leaderless, lay self-help group, yet its success led ironically to the development of an entire recovery industry. And the recovery industry netted enormous profits using as its main therapeutic offering the transport of its clients to free AA self-help groups.

The recovery industry grew around AA and the multitude of other anonymous self-help groups spawned by its 12-step model: Narcotics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous, Overeaters Anonymous, Sex Addicts Anonymous, and Adult Children of Alcoholics. These and numerous other groups employed the concept of “addiction” or its corresponding identifier, “codependency,” both terms that were widely introduced into everyday jargon as the movement grew. By the 1990s, 4 in 10 Americans had joined a self-help group, most oriented toward recovery or self-improvement (Wuthnow 1996).

The self-help movement and self-help industry has not been without its analysts and critics. The book A Disease of One’s Own (Rice 1996), illustrates the popularity of self-help seeking in recovery groups by examining the impulse felt by many who don’t have an addictive disease to examine whether they may well be affected by someone else’s as a “codependent,” thereby qualifying for their own self-help group.
and recovery identity. In The Culture of Recovery (Rapping 1996), women’s current self-help participation and reading of self-help books aimed at “fixing” the person is contrasted to the earlier efforts of participants in the women’s health movement. The earlier self-helpers sought to feel better by also changing society, the later by changing the self, an analysis casting the self-help “recovery” movement as conservative or even counterrevolutionary. While it could be argued that reading self-help books may not contribute to making social change, a more positive assessment is offered in Women and Self-Help Culture: Reading Between the Lines, where it is asserted that such advice books validate “caring” (Simons 1992). On the other hand, one biting critique of self-help books warns of the “totalitarian” nature of a movement that sees pathology everywhere and personal change as mandatory (Kaminar 1992).

The incorporation of self-help/recovery into daily life is nowhere more evident than in the self-help book industry, a category of books taking up substantial space in the chain bookstores. And while advice books have undoubtedly been around since the printing press was invented, their growth in recent years has been so explosive that they now occupy their own category in the New York Review of Books, outsell most other types of books, and, with their authors, occupy center stage for discussion on the most popular television talk shows. Through televised discussion, the subject of a self-help book can be known without the need to read it. In addition to talk shows dealing with self-help efforts, an ever more personal scrutiny of self-help efforts is offered in currently popular televised reality shows. Such prime-time fare chronicles recovery groups and personal improvements of all types, as exemplified by the weight loss show, “The Biggest Loser,” where self-help becomes not just entertainment but competition. In reviewing the self-help efforts that now blanket the social landscape, a sociological analysis places self-help in an even larger social and historical framework, showing that Americans have always cheered recovery and reform and the creation of a new and better self (McGee 2005). This does not explain the late twentieth-century explosion in self-help, however. Such a qualitative increase, it is argued, is accounted for by the inclusion of women alongside men in the workforce and the development in the US of an increasingly “beleaguered self” in search of relief (McGee 2005).

CONCLUSION

The self-help movement in the past 50 years can be characterized as growing in size yet weakening in social impact, as the self-helper read the book or watch the television show, or visit an online web site to learn how to cope or to post comments that focus on themselves. The bulk of such efforts appear less oriented to social change and more oriented to personal change (cf. Rapping 1996; McGee 2005). The increasing embeddedness of self-help groups in churches further assures their increasingly conservative nature. A recent study of the “mega churches” that are now in the foreground of American religious life observed that perhaps the churches most distinguishing feature is the great number and varied range of self-help groups that they offer (Snow et al. 2010). Wuthnow’s extensive study of small support groups in the US found that two-thirds of such groups are linked to religious faith in some way. He points out that such groups reflect the fluidity of American lives and also the latest “realignment” in adapting American religion to the main currents of secular culture. That is, group members are seeking both community and spiritual growth as they pursue an improved “self,” yet the creation of either in such groups is unlikely. In a “come if you feel like it” and “learn if you want to” environment that has come to characterize self-help groups, participants are neither held to account for their participation as a community nor is doctrinal knowledge pursued (Wuthnow 1996: 6–8). The churches, in giving people a comforting setting in which to focus on personal troubles or to develop an improved self, have chosen an popular emphasis but one that is oddly unlikely
to build a doctrinally inspired organization. Despite their pervasiveness, self-help groups don’t focus on social and political change as many did in the 1960s and 1970s. Further, it could be argued that their exclusively inward focus and voluntary norms may also preclude building the institutions in which they are housed.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Health movements (United States); Religion and social movements; Victim movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Separatist movements

DEVASHREE GUPTA

Separatist movements advocate for greater sovereignty for their members, who are often part of a common ethnic, religious, or territorial group, and who resist further incorporation into the larger polity, believing instead that they should exercise more control over their political, economic, or cultural affairs than the national states in which they live. While some separatist movements may attempt to achieve their goals within the confines of existing state boundaries, seeking to increase group autonomy or gain more power in local governance structures, such movements can also challenge existing state boundaries and call for the formation of entirely new or reconstituted territorial units. Since World War II, separatist movements in Europe, Asia, and Africa have nearly quadrupled the number of independent countries in the international system and increased the number of United Nations members from 51 at its founding to 192 members today. By some counts, there are over 70 current separatist movements around the world, mostly concentrated in Europe and Asia. Not all of these involve ongoing, active mobilization, and fewer still feature violent resistance, though the violence that such movements engender can be particularly intense and intractable.

At the heart of almost all separatist movements is the principle of self-determination – the idea that individuals are entitled to determine, freely and without compulsion, how and by whom they will be governed. Self-determination was a guiding principle of the Treaty of Versailles, which sought to create new states, largely along ethnonational lines after World War I. Though this initial use of the self-determination principle was limited to Europe, the rise of anticolonial movements in the wake of World War II broadened the scope of application to other parts of the world while enshrining the principle as a legal right in a host of international treaties and accords. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, both maintain that “all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

The right of self-determination, however, does not entitle groups to demand their own, independent states, as it does not come with a concomitant right of unilateral secession – a limitation that reflects the right of states to maintain their own territorial integrity. Indeed, these two principles, both of which are protected in international norms and legal instruments, exist in fundamental tension, and complicate the choices of other states that may wish to assist separatist movements because of perceived human rights abuses or co-ethnic ties, but that also do not wish to see the principle of state sovereignty weakened or the creation of new, unstable state actors (Horowitz 2003). Instead of independence, separatist movements that claim a right of self-determination may pursue a variety of other goals, including some form of accommodation within existing political boundaries, such as regional autonomy, consociationalism, or explicit protections for minority rights. However, such limited outcomes may not suffice for some separatist groups, particularly in cases where historic grievances are deeply felt, or where the state is unwilling to lessen its control over certain populations or territories. In such cases, separatist movements are both unlikely to reach some kind of accord that respects state sovereignty and to want anything short of full independence. It is in these difficult cases – like the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Moros in the Philippines, or the Tibetans in
China—that violence, both by the separatists and the state, is most likely to occur.

Because separatist movements can vary considerably in their characteristics, including where they occur, the intensity and scale of their mobilization, and their use of violence, considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to better understanding why such movements occur when and where they do. Early explanations maintained, for example, that separatist movements are more likely to emerge in places where states themselves are multiethnic and where central political authorities are unable to hold centrifugal forces at bay. Such states, common particularly in Africa and Asia where the artificial boundaries drawn during the decolonization process rarely reflected ethnolinguistic settlement patterns on the ground, can lack a unifying national identity that can hold a country’s heterogeneous communities together (Furnivall 1948). When such states are helmed by strong central authorities, these polities can appear stable and united. However, if that political center weakens, as happened in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after the collapse of communism, or in Somalia in the early 1990s, different regions and identity groups are more likely to seize the opportunity presented to demand greater autonomy and local control. Thus, multiethnic states need not be inherently more likely to dissolve into separatist fractiousness, but that demographic quality, combined with weak control by the political center, creates a climate in which separatist movements can thrive.

A rival state-centric explanation argues that state strength, not weakness, is a precipitating factor in separatist pressures. In this line of reasoning, as the modern state has developed, it has extended its reach, both in terms of exerting territorial authority to more areas as well as in regulating and controlling an increasing number of activities in the lives of its citizens. When the state penetrates areas that previously have not been subject to regulation and control, especially if this extension of its power is perceived as excessive, unnecessary, or arbitrary, it risks sparking a separatist backlash by those actors unwilling to submit to this new authority (Gellner 1983). When that backlash is concentrated among territorially contiguous populations or particular ethnonationalist groups, it can form as a separatist movement. Many of the regional nationalist movements in Western Europe, such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, or the Bretons in France, are the products of central state authority being extended to regions that have strong substate identities and prior experience of autonomy, or even independence, and that accordingly reject the central state’s authority in favor of more localized control over their affairs.

In contrast to the above state-centric explanations, a third body of work emphasizes unequal relations between economic centers and peripheries as an important factor in separatist movement formation. Michael Hechter (1975), for example, argues that uneven economic development can reduce certain areas within a state to the status of an internal colony, systematically exploited for its resources without receiving commensurate political or economic benefits, thus placing it in a perpetual relationship of dependency and subservience to the political and economic center. Moreover, such internal colonies are frequently distinct, ethnically and culturally, from the rest of society, such that economic differentiation between the center and periphery is also reproduced as a cultural differentiation of labor. If such regions are able to organize themselves and create movement structures, as the Scottish have been able to do, these economic grievances, coupled with ethnic differences, can become a potent source of inspiration for separatist claims.

Center–periphery cleavages, and grievances more generally are usually not sufficient, in themselves, to spark separatist mobilization. There are numerous examples of underdeveloped and deprived regions around the world that have little or no separatist ambition, and many ethnic groups that can claim grievances against the state but that fail to organize themselves around demands for greater
separatist movements. Rather, such conditions merely provide tinder for movements; what is needed is the spark. Here, a number of scholars who focus on the microfoundations of mobilization examine the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in generating sustained separatist pressures. Such entrepreneurs are typically members of regional or local elites who use their position and influence within minority ethnic groups to increase their power vis-à-vis central political authorities. Ethnic entrepreneurs play a crucial role in framing grievances and crystallizing potential separatist tendencies in a way that is understandable to the public and that serves as a focal point for organizing. Just as movements do not “just happen,” and are instead the result of individuals working to organize, sustain, recruit, and deploy supporters in strategic ways, explanations that look at ethnic entrepreneurs attempt to expand on prior arguments about where and when separatist movements take place by looking at the agency of the actors that are involved (Smith 1981).

Finally, a vigorous debate has unfolded in recent years about the impact that globalization and regional integration have had on separatist tendencies. One group of scholars has argued that globalization and integration have increased separatist pressures because they have reduced the salience of state borders and thus weakened the once inviolable principle of territorial integrity – previously held to be an obstacle to many separatist demands. Further, for separatist groups that lack sufficient critical mass to be viable autonomous or independent political entities in their own right, participation in a regional integration project, such as the European Union, can offset the disadvantages of small size, as such groups can more easily conceive of engaging in a variety of economic and political relations that bypass the traditional state (Jones & Keating 1995). On the other hand, globalization and regional integration may also defuse more extreme separatist pressures because many of the traditional advantages of being an independent, sovereign state are no longer linked to having state status. In the European Union, for instance, regions can interact economically with other regions, and local actors can access development funds with minimal interference from national political authorities (Lynch 1996).

Once separatist movements emerge, states can respond in a variety of ways to their demands, including ignoring movements, negotiating with them, or repressing them. What states choose to do, and the outcomes of this interaction, are other rich areas for research that in a number of crucial features and hypotheses intersects the broader literature on state responses to social movements, policing, and violence. For example, a number of the variables that scholars highlight to explain how and why states grant some separatist demands and not others include whether they are democratic (and therefore more likely in principle to respond to self-determination claims) and their governance structures. Nancy Bermeo (2002) argues, for example, that federal systems are better equipped to accommodate regional autonomy demands than centralized systems. Barbara Walter (2006), moreover, posits that one of the most salient factors determining whether a state will negotiate with separatist forces is future reputational effects – whether concessions will adversely affect other potential separatist demands from other groups. Thus, states facing multiple separatist movements, like China, will be far less likely than states with limited movements to concede ground for fear of setting a precedent that other groups can invoke in the future. Of the concessions that states may grant, formal secession is quite an uncommon event, occurring in only a handful of cases. Since 1990, for example, just over two dozen new countries have emerged from separatist movements, most from the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; elsewhere, the number of successful secessionist claims is sharply limited and includes rarities like East Timor and Eritrea. Instead, and as with social movements more broadly, separatist movements can achieve more limited success such as local autonomy, or recognition of
minority rights – outcomes that may fall short of a movement’s stated goals but that satisfy all but the most zealous activists.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal peoples’ movements (Australia); Anticolonial movements; Globalization and movements; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Nationalist movements; Native American movements (United States); Political economy and social movements; Regionalist movements; State building and social movements; System exiting and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Slow Food movement
SOPHIE BOSSY

“Slow Food is a global, grassroots organization with supporters in 150 countries around the world who are linking the pleasure of good food with a commitment to their community and the environment. A non-profit member-supported association, Slow Food was founded in 1989 to counter the rise of fast food and fast life, the disappearance of local food traditions and people’s dwindling interest in the food they eat, where it comes from, how it tastes and how our food choices affect the rest of the world” (Slow Food 2012).

Slow Food was born from a protest issued against the building of a McDonald’s at the Spanish Steps in Rome in 1986 and was formally created in 1989 during a meeting in Paris where the founders of the organization adopted a manifesto stating as their mission the defence of “sensual pleasure and slow, long-lasting enjoyment” that food can represent against the “Fast Life” of our societies.

Today, there are around 85,000 members located all around the world in over 1000 “convivia.” The headquarters is in Bra, Italy. The missions of the organization include the defence of biodiversity, taste education, and encouragement of the linkage between producers and consumers (or, as they sometimes call them, “co-producers”). These missions are concretely translated into actions with the Slow Food Foundation for Biodiversity, the Ark of Taste, and Terra Madre for the defence of biodiversity; the organization of taste workshops, school initiatives, and the creation of the University of Gastronomic Science with a multidisciplinary academic program for taste education; and the organization of fairs and markets such as the Salone del Gusto, Aux Origines du Goût, A Taste of Slow, or Eurogusto. The organization is composed of local chapters called convivia, grouping, at least partly, local producers, people working in the food-processing sector, and foodies or amateurs of good cuisine. These convivia are variously oriented because they usually stem from local initiatives. Italy has the biggest contingent of convivia but the growth of Slow Food is important in many other countries.

Its president until the date of writing, Carlo Petrini, has been its main charismatic leader and contributor to the theorization of the philosophical and political background of the organization (Petrini 2003, 2007). The core philosophy of Slow Food is summed up in the concept of “eco-gastronomy” that attempts to link the ideas of pleasure and of responsibility with concern for the environment in order to enjoy food that is “good, clean and fair.” For Slow Food members, an eco-gastronome is thus someone who seeks an “educated pleasure,” that is, an enjoyment coming from the knowledge of how and by whom the food was produced and by supporting those who do it well from an environmental, social, and ethical point of view (Andrews 2008: 72). This eco-gastronomy is also a promotion of a “moderate hedonism” (Humphery 2010: 69) that can be expressed with the phrase “mangiare meno e mangiare meglio” (eat less and eat better) that distances itself from the traditional views of gastronomy associated with fancy food and a form of elitism: Slow Food promotes simple food and family run restaurant more than “haute cuisine.” Through the Ark of Taste, the Slow Food Foundation for Biodiversity, and the network of Presidia, it also attempts to save endangered crops, traditional recipes, or dishes from disappearing under the assault of globalization.

If Slow Food has emerged from a struggle against McDonald’s, its main target is not fast food but, more generally, “Fast Life,” which is seen as a more systematic world order that imposes its pace of time, ideologies, and values on every aspect of life. In that sense, Slow
Food is a member – and certainly one of the main promoters – of the Slow Movement in that the organization attempts to contribute to the spread of different way of life: “slow living” (Honoré 2004; Parkins & Craig 2006). With the snail as their symbol, these “time rebels” attempt to promote an art of slowing down against the cult of speed that is so present in our societies: by respecting the timing of seasonality, by taking the time to cook, and taking the time to sit down and enjoy the food that has been prepared, people can rediscover lost pleasures and give meaning to their actions. Slow Food does not give miracle recipes to slow down and many of its members admit they struggle to slow down in their – often very busy – daily lives but this philosophy is nonetheless at the core of the principles of Slow Food and its little brother Città Slow: an organization whose members, small cities, implement reforms in urban planning that are designed to improve the quality of life: reduction of traffic, improvement of public transportation, banning of neon signs, restoration of old buildings, and so on.

With its attempt to increase consumer awareness, Slow Food is strongly involved in the political consumerism movement, the network of actors who criticize traditional consumerism by politicizing the act of buying in order to search and promote other types of consumption. However, what sets Slow Food apart from other organizations in this movement is its emphasis on pleasure and conviviality and its support of small producers around the world. Nonetheless, as many political consumerists, Slow Food is not only an organization that fights against a certain system but a network of people who dream of how things could be different and attempt to create alternative ways of living with the belief that it can start with a good meal.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Consumer movements; Culture and social movements; Environmental movements; Networks and social movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The first World Social Forum (WSF) was organized by a group of Brazilian and French activists in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, coinciding with the meeting of the World Economic Forum, and challenged neoliberal globalization under the slogan “Another World is Possible.” Organized under a set of principles outlined in its charter, the WSF was intended to be an “open meeting place” for civil society actors to commit to “reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals and free exchange of experiences” (World Social Forum 2002). While explicitly critiquing neoliberal globalization the gatherings were also meant to be a “permanent process of seeking and building alternatives” and “open to pluralism and diversity.” Politically, social forum activism is characterized by more radical versus mainstream approaches to social change and is focused mainly on social justice and human rights concerns regarding models of development; gender, indigenous, labor, and environmental issues; and the forces of globalization writ large.

On the surface, social forums are large gatherings where organizations facilitate working sessions, testimonials, cultural events, large panels and speeches, but organizations, movements, and activists engage each other on many different levels before, during, and after the event itself. The notion of WSFs as a “process” signals the idea that the meetings themselves are not the main purpose. Instead, the goal of most organizers is to facilitate the exchange of ideas, to expand and deepen activist networks, and to provide new spaces in which people can reflect on and help realize alternatives to neoliberal globalization. They create ongoing opportunities for activists to come together to strengthen their alliances, foster shared identities and goals, build trust, develop plans for cooperation, and disseminate ideas about strategies for advancing more sustainable and just social and economic policies. They generate reflection and learning through multiple and diverse forms of interaction (Byrd 2005; Juris 2008).

Since its inception, the WSF has expanded to hundreds of regional, domestic, and community forums facilitated by decentralized organizing coalitions and organizations throughout the world (Smythe & Smith 2010). In addition, WSF gatherings grow in size and change in terms of organizing processes and priorities. Each WSF proves to be very much a political reflection of the time and place in which it occurs. The first three WSFs, from 2001 to 2003, were held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, with over 80,000 activists attending the 2003 WSF, which served as a planning space for the largest global protests ever held, against the Iraq War on February 15, 2003. In 2004 the WSF moved to Mumbai, India, to focus on issues related to Asia, and in 2006 WSFs were held simultaneously in Mali, Pakistan, and Venezuela. More recently the WSF has taken place in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2007 and in Belém, Brazil, in 2009. In 2011 it returned to Africa as Dakar, Senegal, was host. While the US has held two domestic social forums: the first in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2007 and the second in Detroit, Michigan, in 2010, Italy has seen literally hundreds of domestic, local, thematic, and community forums throughout the last decade. In each instance the location choice is deliberate and intended to highlight key concerns or issues as well as stimulate and develop regional and local networks. In Latin America the forums have played a role in helping elect more progressive leaders, especially in Brazil and Bolivia, and have, in general, lent political support to the “pink tide,” which has signaled a more progressive political shift overall in the region.

THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUMS’ ANTECEDENTS

Although the World Social Forum may at first appear as an anomaly in the global arena, the gathering represents the convergence of several transnational protest traditions and a continuity of transformative events contending the global economic and political order. Smith et al. (2007) trace the origins through a web of transnational associations and movement networks that developed out of activist streams of the 1980s and 1990s. This web facilitated cooperation and exchange across national boundaries. These networks included transnational movements targeting human rights, labor, trade liberalization, antiwar, and environmental issues. The earliest resistance to the global economic order began in the global South around the issues of International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed structural adjustment policies. Organizations in Canada, Mexico, and the US. started focusing on trade liberalization during negotiations around the North American Free Trade Agreement. As a result of these struggles, the annual World Bank/IMF meetings became sites of protest rallies in the late 1980s, continuing throughout the 1990s.

Other authors point to the genesis of the WSF in the depths of the Chiapas jungles where many observers cite the First Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity Against Neo-liberalism, held in Chiapas, Mexico, in the summer of 1996 at the initiative of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, as the first step in building the international movement against neoliberal globalization (Seoane & Taddei 2002). A few months after the first Zapatista encounter in early 1997, the first drafts of the Multilateral Investment Agreement began to circulate, especially at the initiative of the Global Trade Watch organization in the US. The trade agreement served to mobilize not only organizations from the south but also groups from the US and Europe. These mobilizations lead up to the event that transformed the antiglobalization movement: the “Battle for Seattle.” This event, in November 1999, mobilized approximately 30,000 activists on the streets of Seattle to protest the meeting of the World Trade Organization (Smith 2008). These campaigns marked a turning point in economic globalization by demonstrating a capacity for mass challenges to international trade agreements and high levels of concern for global human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. The Seattle protests challenged our understanding of state–social movement relations because they demonstrated how global-level politics affect a wide range of local and national actors.

In response to the impact of those protests, the idea of a World Social Forum to be held at the same time as the World Economic Forum, which meets in Davos, Switzerland, began to take shape early in the spring of 2000. The city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, was chosen for its 12-year experience of democratic initiatives expressed in the unprecedented participatory budget applied by the left-wing municipal government led by the Brazilian Workers’ Party. The first World Social Forum, held in January 2001, brought together all the different currents of thought that have come to comprise this rich and heterogeneous movement now taking shape at the international level, and which has become highly visible since the mass protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle.

The period from 1999 is a new epoch in which worker’s struggles, the “new social movements” of the north, and a new group of young activists (anarchists, antisweatshop, antibiotech, peace, and human rights movements) came together via an interrelated set of efforts. The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994, the protests in Seattle against the WTO in 1999, the subsequent demonstrations against the perceived agents of corporate globalization in Washington DC, Melbourne, Prague, Gothenburg, Quebec City, and Genoa, and the creation of the World Social Forum, coalesced to create a new diaspora of contention against the global neoliberal model (Fisher & Ponniah 2003).
FORUM ORGANIZING DYNAMICS AND DEBATE

The WSF organizational environment focuses on exchange and diffusion of ideas and tactics as a primary driving force connecting the various participants within the spaces created. Forums achieve this objective by promoting an antihierarchical organizing logic, variously termed "horizontalism," "autonomous space," or "self-organization" by Forum organizers and founders (Juris 2008; Wood 2010). The discursive fields and mobilizing structures created by the WSF organizers work to allow participant organizations and movements to find commonality in their grievances, as well as to discover differences in their strategies and tactics in order to ultimately build larger networks of contention, which are culturally and conceptually diverse (della Porta et al. 2006). Consequently, innovative methods for diverse inclusion and democratic collaboration across borders have paved the way for movements to integrate their struggles and reflect on collaborative projects in an openly deliberative space. But at the same time, such lofty objectives have brought about adversity and tensions among participants and Forum organizers concerning representation and the move away from more radical "Seattle"-styled encounters.

From the beginning the WSF emerged as not only a countermeeting to the World Economic Forum, but was also meant to be a countersymbol to globalized capitalism. In building this process the organizers were keenly aware of the failed attempts in the past, such as the socialist internationals, to organize movements transnationally around a diverse set of issues. One specific concern was to create a space for exchange that had little hierarchical intervention and was simply a reflection of the diversity of movements in the Global Justice Movement. Thus, to democratize the space, participants sought to eliminate hierarchical organizing tendencies within WSF process (Smith et al. 2007). A common diagnosis of the Global Justice Movement promoted by Forum participants highlighted the danger in organizing transnationally in a fashion that could reproduce the hierarchical structure endemic to global neoliberal capitalism.

Globalizing processes aimed at expanding global capitalism and consolidating and protecting capitalist elites have a long history, and these processes have been met with fierce opposition from popular groups, including indigenous peoples, peasants, and workers. The current expansion is no different. The WSFs have clearly provided a focal point, a center of gravity, for diverse streams of activism to come together across national and other boundaries in order to counter the power of global capitalist elites and their supporters in governments. It reflects the need to link local action with global politics as well as activists’ desire to shift their energies from mass street protests toward the articulation of alternatives to the current global political economy. But the expansion of the WSFs has been uneven and reflects variation in organizing capacities across locales and a variety of network dynamics that affect the diffusion of the WSF process (Smythe & Smith 2010). In other words, there have been many more local and domestic social forums held in Europe and North America with rich activist traditions and well-funded organizations than in developing countries; the exception being Brazil.

Writers and researchers have provided assessments that are both positive (social forums as a space where oppressed groups, such as laborers, women, and indigenous populations, can gain visibility and support for their liberation struggles) and negative (as when groups from developing countries are co-opted within the forum process itself by larger well-funded organizations from Europe and North America) (Smith et al. 2011). In fact, the WSF itself has become, at times, a bitterly contested space where organizations and activists disagree and find common ground on both issues and tactics. Thus, debates rage at the social forums concerning promoting radical vs. reformist tactics; saving the environment vs. the economy; endorsing human rights vs. protectionism; embracing
a universality of values vs. indigenous and local knowledge; and locating geographies of dissent – whether focus and resources should be placed on the local, domestic, or global arenas. Forum organizers argue that these debates and the discussions they incubate are part of the beauty of the WSFs as a learning space, enriching the experience of forum participants, and providing a platform for activists to refine their arguments and alternative visions for a more just, sustainable, and equitable world.

SEE ALSO: Antiglobalization movements; Anti-World Bank and IMF riots; Civil society; Discursive fields; Global Justice Movement; Participatory democracy in social movements; Transnational social movements; Transnational Zapatism; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Social movements in India
DEBAL K. SINGHAROY

Indian society has long been a breeding ground for a range of tribal, caste, peasant, worker’s, women’s, ethnic, regional, environmental, human rights, gay rights, and animal rights movements, and many other social movements under the auspices of varied ideologies and organizations. This entry outlines the emergence and dynamics of some of these movements in the context of societal transitions in contemporary India.

BACKGROUND

Ideationally, India is epitomized as a country with a heritage of ancient civilizations with a spirit of accommodation, peace, and non-violence. In reality, however, India is laden with a host of contradictions between tradition and modernity, prosperity and poverty, enlightenment and ignorance, vice and virtue, globalization and localization. Though India has achieved the status of a fast-growing economy, with its average annual economic growth rate above 7.5 percent per annum in the last decade, her socioeconomic realities have remained embedded in a declining land–person ratio; sustained poverty with more than two-fifths of the population living below the poverty line, more than four-fifths earning less than $2 per day (World Bank 2010); one-fifth of the population remaining undernourished (Schöniger 2007); protracted ignorance with one-fourth remaining illiterate; environmental degradation with fast declining forest coverage and phenomenal increases in carbon emission; corruption in high places; increasing social divides and inequalities, and a lack of political commitment for social justice. In recent years these contradictions have been accentuated and the people who have been the victims of historical neglect and injustice have suffered the brunt of these various deprivations, all of which have paved the way for the emergence of varieties of social movements both within and outside the democratic framework of the society. Major facets of these movements are delineated below.

SELECTED MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

Tribal movements

The tribes of India (744 communities are recognized as scheduled tribes (ST) in the constitution to get the benefits of protective discrimination), with over 90 million people, constitute 8.5 percent of the population of the country. Around 98 percent of them live in rural areas, including in forest, mountain, islands, and geographically isolated areas, and traditionally enjoy a good deal of autonomy and practice a distinctive cultural way of life. However, their contacts with the outside world have seldom done much to improve their social and economic life. Rather, these contacts often victimized them economically by taking away their land and traditional livelihood, subordinated them politically by encroaching on their autonomy and connection with the environment, and marginalized them culturally by imputing constructed stigmatized identities, such as being backward and uncivilized. The early resistance and revolts of tribes began during the colonial period when the British extended their hegemony into the tribal areas. This caused an array of radical revolts of the Oraon, Bhumij, and Kol in 1830–1832, Santal in 1855–1857, Munda in 1874–1901, and the Kherwar in 1877–1880 in eastern India against oppression and infringement on their lives and culture by government officials, moneylenders, Christian missionaries, and businessmen. The tribes’ love for autonomy was also reflected in the movements of the Kuki in Manipur in 1917–1919,
the Santal, Oraon, Munda Bhumi, and other tribes of Jharkhand in 1940–1995, the Naga in the 1920s, Mizo in 1960 (Singh 1983), the Bodo since 1987 in northeast India, and the Gorkha in West Bengal, since 1980 struggling for separate statehood.

The forest is an inseparable part of the lives and livelihood of the tribes in India. Through collective mobilization of the Kharwar of Bihar in the 1930s and 1970s, the Saora of Andhra Pradesh, and the Adivasis of Deng in Gujarat in 1980–1990, there were attempts to resist the oppressive actions of forest officials and demands that their rights over land and forest be acknowledged (Shah 2005). The tribes also participated in the nationalist movement, in radical peasant movements like Tebhaga (1946–1947), Telangana (1948–1952), and Naxalite (1967–1971), and in environmental movements to protect their autonomy and identity. Tribal movements in India have mostly remained localized and violent and their mediating ideology is grounded in these movements’ connection to the land, the forest, and nature, except for their participation in peasant, environmental, and regional autonomy movements to protect their autonomy and identity. Tribal movements in India have mostly remained localized and violent and their mediating ideology is grounded in these movements’ connection to the land, the forest, and nature, except for their participation in peasant, environmental, and regional autonomy movements linked to broader ideological and organizational frameworks. Contemporary India has been experiencing extremist Maoist movements in 13 states, covering one-third of the country. Guided principally by radical Marxists, these movements mostly thrive in areas with significant concentrations of tribal people and high incidences of poverty and unemployment. The recent trends show that though there has been a proliferation of tribal movements based on localized issues, with increasing interconnectivity and emergence of an educated middle class, an increasing number of the tribes are becoming more connected to the wider society through rejuvenation of their primordial ethnic identity, demanding redress of their neglect through democratic political means.

Dalit movement

Historically the Dalits (meaning broken or crushed) are the Antaja – the outcastes and untouchables who have been rendered such by their birth in the Hindu social order. They have been the victims of social oppression and exclusion, being prohibited from fetching water from community wells or tanks, entering temples, sending children to school, speaking in public gatherings, touching the upper caste, wearing new cloth, using umbrellas, and riding bicycles in front of higher caste people. Furthermore, any act of disobedience has led to violent reactions by the higher castes, including beating, death, and house burnings. Additionally, the outcastes have been economically exploited, as bonded labor, getting low or no wage for their work, and being politically subjugated, as reflected by their absence from political decision-making bodies.

The early voices against such practices were raised in the ninth-century Alvar and twelfth-century Veerashaiva movements in South India, and in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Bhakti and Sufi movements in North India, which preached egalitarianism and humanity through devotion to God, and questioned the practice of untouchability and caste inequality. The nineteenth-century social reform movements of Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj, and the Ram Krishna Mission strongly opposed caste prejudice and conservatism among the Hindus. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anti-Brahmin movements of the Dalits arose in several parts of the country under the auspices of the Satyashodhak Samaj and the Self-Respect movements in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, the Adi-Dharma in Bengal and Adi-Hindu movements of untouchables in Uttar Pradesh that propounded dignified existence of the untouchables (Shah 2005).

The anti-untouchability movements received significant attention during the independence struggle. Mahatma Gandhi called them the Harijans (children of God) and regarded untouchability as a curse on humanity. He worked to improve heir status by undertaking constructive societal reform. Ambedkar, the celebrated Dalit leader who spearheaded the anti-untouchability movement, pleaded for their mass conversion to Buddhism, and social
and political empowerment through separate elections and a state policy of protective discrimination. The government of India has recognized 1108 groups of Dalits as scheduled castes, who make up 16 percent of the country's population today, and provides them with economic, educational, and political benefits through protective discrimination. However, despite such provisions, the overwhelming majority of Dalits live in poverty, are unemployed, or work in demeaning low-paid occupations. Dalit movements have created the space to voice their grievances against the injustice and exploitation they suffer both at the grassroots and at the regional and the national levels by forming organization and political parties like Republican Party in 1956, the Dalit Panther Party in 1972 in Maharashtra, the Bahujan Samaj Party in 1984 in Uttar Pradesh, the Kamptapuri Political Party in 1990 in Rajbansis, West Bengal, and many others. Significantly, the Bahujan Samaj Party, under the leadership of Ms. Mayawati, the present chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, has wielded considerable influence in both regional and national politics.

India is now experiencing the resurgence of numerous Dalit movements at the grassroots to claim some measure of dignity, a greater share of economic and political power, and to redress the historical injustice inflicted on them for centuries. These grassroots movements have also become better connected locally, regionally, and nationally to various organizations, in order to help influence decision-making processes of the state and civil society to activate institutional mechanisms for their empowerment.

Backward class movement
The other backward class (OBC), which forms 52 percent of the country's population, belongs to the Shudra caste, the lowest rung in the Varna hierarchy of Hindu social order, and historically has been the victim of educational and economic backwardness, deprived of opportunities for upward mobility even though they are not untouchables by birth. Significantly, there have been contradictory processes: On the one hand, castes like the Mahars of Maharashtra state and the Lingayats of Karnataka state have claimed the status of upper castes through Sanskritization (a process of acquiring the lifestyle of an upper caste); while, on the other hand, many castes like the Reddis, Vokkaligas, and Kammas of South Indian states contested the domination of the upper castes, especially of the Brahmins, through organized movements. Tamil Nadu experienced an anti-Brahmin movement in the 1920s. Political organizations like the Justice Party (1916) and Dravida Kazhagham (1944) were formed to provide separate states for the non-Brahmins (Rao 1979). These caste groups have also participated in peasant movements manifested during the 1940s to 1970s in the agriculturally backward regions, and also in the farmers' movements in the agriculturally developed regions during 1970 and the 1990s. The OBC movements gained momentum in 1980s with the submission of the Mandal Commission Report to parliament and acceptance of its recommendation for a 27 percent reservation for them in government jobs and admission to educational institutions. Significantly the OBC has used the strategy of strong protest and sustained agitation to make their presence felt in regional and national politics. Caste associations of OBC like the Jat Mahasbha, Jadav Mahasabha, Kasyastha Mahabha, and Gujjar Mahabha play important roles to consolidate their interests. The OBC like the Yadavs and Jats has emerged as a viable social and political force in contemporary India by projecting their collective interests and identities and developing alliances with Dalits and religious minority groups through political parties like Rashtriya Janta Dal, Janta Dal in Bihar, and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, which are ideologically affiliated to socialism.

Women's movement
Women in India remain victims of traditional practices and institutional arrangements. Though tribal and peasant women participated in tribal and peasant movements and many in
the independent movements, a self-conscious women’s movement took shape only in the 1960s and thereafter. (See entry on Women’s movement in India for further discussion.)

**Peasant movements**

India has historically been a land of villages and agriculture and has witnessed a series of violent and nonviolent peasant movements. (See entry on Peasant movements for further discussion.)

**Working-class movement**

In India, the working class consists of workers both from the industrial and the service sectors. The emergence of India’s modern industrial working class began in the mid-nineteenth century concurrently with the growth of urban industrialization, with the working-class movement following in the early twentieth century when, with the support of Mahatma Gandhi, the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association formed in 1917. It was followed by the formation of the Madras Labour Union in the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills in Madras in 1918, the All India Trade Union Congress in 1920, the Bombay Textile Labour Union in 1926, and many other unions. However, the trade union movement experienced a temporary setback in the late 1920s and 1930s when trade union leaders were implicated in conspiracy cases by the colonial rulers (Bhowmik 2010). These movements regained momentum in the 1940s and thereafter, with the nullification of these cases and subsequent engagement of left-wing organizations and the Indian National Congress with trade unionism. In postindependence India, trade unions have been part of larger political processes and remained integrated with political parties, for instance the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) is affiliated with the Indian National Congress, the Centre of India Trade Unions (CITU) with the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) with the Communist Party of India, and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) with the Bharatiya Janata Party. Until the late 1970s the working-class movement sustained its significance in the social movement sector arena of society with both the left and the nationalists remaining firm on the issues of safety, security, good pay and working conditions for the working class. The workers’ strength and unity was depicted in the historic 20-day Indian Railway Workers Strike in 1974 under the aegis of the United Council of the Trade Unions (ICTU), with the participation of workers from across ideological and organizational strands coming together to make the government accept their demands. However, the increasing dependence of Indian governments on international financial institutions for funding since the 1980s, and introduction of the structural adjustment program for economic liberalization since the 1990s, imposed restrictions on trade union activism. But the promulgation of the National Security Act and the Essential Services Maintenance Act has helped to make the working-class movement resilient in the post-economic reform period.

In contemporary India, 455.7 million workers, constituting 49.8 percent of the total workforce of the country, are employed in industrial and service sectors, and 92.3 percent of them belong to the informal sectors that suffer from the problems of employment security, low wages, and a lack of legal and social security protection. Established trade unions seldom step in to help. Even the big multinational companies employ workers on hire and fire basis, positing them awkwardly in relation to their bargaining strength vis-à-vis the management. The Maruti Suzuki Motors workers’ movement against poor wages, authoritarian management, and victimization of workers was ruthlessly crushed in Gurgaon in 2000 and in Manesar Haryana in 2011, as workers were killed by brutal police action and many workers suffered suspensions. Significantly, the Congress-led government of Haryana took a pro-management view and persuaded the workers, by signing a “good conduct agreement,” to return to their jobs, but the national trade unions have remained noncommittal to
the cause of the striking workers. Indeed, the political economy of economic liberalization in India seldom privileges workers’ mobilization for their rights over the investment-friendly environment for the multinational corporation.

Environmental movements

Against the backdrop of the declining land/person ratio to 0.29 hectare per household, declining forest coverage to 23 percent of the land mass, phenomenal air pollution with 93 percent increase in carbon emission (597 metric tons in 1990 to 1149 in 2005; World Bank 2010), involuntary displacement and loss of sustainable livelihoods, threat of climate change, chaotic industrialization and urbanization, overexploitation of natural resources, and continued, rabid population growth, India has been experiencing the proliferation of a multifaceted environmental movement in various parts of the country, dating back to at least the early 1970s. This general movement can be broken down into a number of more specific movements that vary in part in terms of focus.

One set of more specific environmental movements are those that focus on the forest and water. Examples include the Chipko (hugging the tree) movement which emerged in Uttrakhand (1973) to protect the forest from destruction by government officials and forest contractors; the Appico movement in Karnataka (1983) that sought to protect and conserve the forest for the forest dwellers; and the Chilka Bachao Andolan in Orissa (1990), which protested against the joint project of the Orissa government and the Tata Iron and Steel Company for commercial shrimp cultivation, posing an ecological threat and loss of the livelihood of the traditional fishermen of the Chilka lake area.

A second set of environmental movements protest against hydro and thermal projects and dams. Examples include the Silent Valley movement in Kerala (1974), which mobilized against the massive hydroelectric project and the likely destruction of the valley’s unique ecological foundation as a result of the submersion of a vast area of the valley under water; the anti-Tehri dam movement (1978) in Uttarakhand state, against the construction of a big dam for a hydroelectric project in an ecologically fragile area that threatened the displacement of approximately 50,000 people; the Narmada Bachao Andolan movement (1980 onward) against the construction of large, multipurpose dams in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh on the Narmada River, threatening displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from around 230 villages; the Enron Virodhi Andolan movement in Maharashtra (1999–2002) against the US-based Dabhol Power Company and the Maharashtra government for forcible occupation of land, resulting in the displacement of the villagers and endangering an environmentally sensitive area.

Another set of environmental movements includes those against nuclear and defense projects. Among these movements was the anti-missiles base movement in Baliapal (1985–1986) in Orissa which was opposed to the forceful eviction of villagers and the loss of their traditional livelihood; the antinuclear power project in Haripur, West Bengal, against the Russian-supported nuclear power plant, which was exposing the vast area and its people to nuclear hazards; and the movements against the French-sponsored Jaitapur nuclear power project (2010) in the Ratnagiri district of the Konkan region Maharashtra, for its forcible land acquisition displacing thousands of farmers and bringing nuclear and environmental hazards.

Antimining and industry movements constitute the final set of environmental movements. Examples include the anti-POSCO-India agitation (2011) in Jagatsinghpur, Orissa, against forceful acquisition of land for a Korean steel company by the government of Orissa to set up a mega-steel project in this area; and the antibauxite mining movement in the Deomali Hill of Koraput district of Orissa (2008–2009).

Environmental movements in India have acquired added support from international NGOs like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife
Fund, and national NGOs like the Centre for Science and Environment and Centre for Environment and Education. These NGOs have been particularly vocal about articulating environmental concerns, and pressuring the state to take pro-environment measures concerning water, forest, wild, and marine life, climate change and sustainable development, through institutionalized means. Though the environmentalists have predominantly followed the Gandhian principle of nonviolence, in recent years there has been a good deal of engagement of left-wing politicians and some extremist groups. Environmental movements have also contributed to the formation of predominantly tribal states like Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, and the Chhattisgarh, and have emerged as part of democratic politics at the grassroots. Their ideological and strategic differences notwithstanding, these movements have received support from wider civil society activists, students, women, tribal and human rights activists, peasants, farmers, and intellectual activist groups. They have been successful in drawing public attention to a range of issues of concerning the environment.

New farmers’ movement

The introduction of advanced technology in agriculture has led to impressive agricultural development and the emergence of commercial farmers, mostly in Punjab, Haryana, Western Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. These farmers are concerned about a range of issues, including subsidies for agriculture, free and uninterrupted supply of electricity, higher prices for agricultural produce, deferment of loan recovery, crop and cattle insurance, and abolition of agricultural income tax. Since the early 1970s protests have been organized by localized farmers’ organizations like Shetkari Sanghatana in Maharashtra, Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab Khetibari Zamindara Union (KZU) in Punjab, which was later merged with the BKU, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh in Gujarat; the Tamil Nadu Agriculturalists’ Association (TNVS) in Tamil Nadu, and the Karnataka State Farmers in Karnataka (Brass 1994). These movements wielded influence in local, regional, and national politics in India in the 1970s and 1980s by increasing their representation both in the state legislatures and Union Parliament, and created and reinforced the significance of primordial institutions and the identity of peasant castes, like the Jats of northern India who demanded the creation of a new Harit Pradesh (Green Province) in the Western part of Uttar Pradesh.

Movements against corruption

Over the decades India has been widely known for its corruption. In 2010, for example, India acquired the dubious distinction of occupying the 87th position among the 178 countries of the world in the corruption index of Transparency International. Twenty-eight percent of the members of parliament (MPs) had criminal cases pending against them; several ministers, MPs, and bureaucrats were behind bars; and judges of upper courts and chief officials of investigative agencies were facing corruption charges. More than 30 million cases were pending for disposal in the judiciary (Developed Nation 2012). The ordinary person has been the major victim of this corruption, as social justice and welfare was and is elusive. Against this backdrop, India has witnessed the proliferation of right to information movements that began in the rural areas in early 1990 under the leadership of civil society activists to compel central and state governments to enact a Right to Information Act, empowering citizens to ask for information on the functioning, planning, and expenditure on any issues of governance, to be provided within 30 days of submission of the application. Again, a nationwide movement against rising corruption, and the government’s apathy and inaction to stop corruption by MPs, ministers, and bureaucrats, moved through the whole country in 2011 under the leadership of Anna Hazare, a Gandhian civil society activist. This movement reached most parts of the country, compelling the government to include civil society representatives to draft the Lokpal Bill and to call for a special parliamentary
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<tr>
<th>Name of movement</th>
<th>Type of demands/interests</th>
<th>Nature of organization, ideology, e-mobilization</th>
<th>Nature of states response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculturalists' movements</td>
<td>Higher land price and competition</td>
<td>Institutionalized, at times violent mobilization</td>
<td>Negotiation and cooption</td>
<td>Agriculturalists/rural, against industry</td>
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<td>against land acquisition in Lucknow and NOIDA in Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<td>Agriculturalists' movements</td>
<td>Resisting land acquisition and returning land to the agriculturists</td>
<td>Institutionalized but took violent turn. Sustained mobilization</td>
<td>Strong opposition</td>
<td>Agriculturalists/rural, against industry</td>
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<td>against Tata Motors and state government in Singur and Nandigram, West Bengal</td>
<td>Implementation of land reforms policy, stop atrocities against tribes, Dalits, OBC, withdrawal of police/paramilitary forces</td>
<td>Radical, Sustained underground mobilization</td>
<td>Violent opposition</td>
<td>Class based/mostly from SC, ST, OBC, and women/antidevelopers, against industry</td>
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<td>Extreme movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peoples War/Maoist in Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh since 1980, etc.</td>
<td>Initiate yoga, spiritualism, meditation, social work</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Accommodative</td>
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<td>Neoreligious cult</td>
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<td>Art of Living Foundation, Sathya Sai Baba, Baba Ram Dev, etc.</td>
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<td>Class based/mostly from SC, ST, OBC, and women/antidevelopers, against multinational corporations, big landowners</td>
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<td>Regional/ethnic movements</td>
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<td>Gorkhaland and Kamtapur in West Bengal, Telangana in Andhra Pradesh, Bodoland in Assam, Bundelkhand in Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>Formation of separate state within Indian Union based on linguistic, cultural, and geographical specifics, implicitly political and economic consumerism</td>
<td>Mostly institutional, at times becomes violent. Sustained mobilization</td>
<td>Opposition and negotiation, cooption</td>
<td>Middle class, intellectual, against state apparatus</td>
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<td>Civil liberty and human rights movement</td>
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<td>Integration and negotiation</td>
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<td>Middle class, intellectual, against state apparatus</td>
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<th>Name of movement</th>
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<th>Nature of states response</th>
<th>Identity(ies)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women's movements</strong></td>
<td>Movement for women's reservation bill, movement against declining female sex ratio, Movement against sexual harassment in workplace</td>
<td>Providing 33% reservation for women in parliament and in state legislature, Establishing gender parity by enacting laws, creating enabling mechanisms for womens empowerment</td>
<td>Institutional and sustained</td>
<td>Encouragement, negotiation, and integration</td>
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<td><strong>Gujjar movement to change caste status</strong></td>
<td>Change in status from OBC to ST</td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Caste based, identify against state</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dalit movements for reservation within reservation Maadigaa reservation movement in Andhra Pradesh</strong></td>
<td>Recategorization of the SCs based on levels of economic educational development</td>
<td>Institutional, sustained, and continuous</td>
<td>Integration, cooption</td>
<td>Caste based against Malla, another SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De-notified tribal movements</strong></td>
<td>Denouncing the stigma of ex-criminal tribes and getting back the status of ST</td>
<td>Institutional and sporadic</td>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>Ethnicity based, against state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National and global networking</strong></td>
<td>Forming federation among social movements on issues of development, human rights</td>
<td>Mostly institutional</td>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Social activists, intellectuals against multinational corporations, state</td>
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discussion of the bill and its expeditious enactment in hopes that would be an effective deterrent to corruption among the public servants. This movement has renewed people’s faith in the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and people’s capacity to question the functioning of their elected representatives.

Other contemporary movements

In addition to the movements discussed above, contemporary India has been a hot spot for agriculturalist, religious, human rights, gay rights, and animal rights, ethnic, caste, regional autonomy, and extremist movements. An outline is provided in the table.

CONCLUSION

As the contradictions between economic prosperity and livelihood insecurity, legal enactment and political commitment, culture of inclusion and politics of subordination, worldly vice and spiritual virtue, continue to reign in India, making the marginalized insecure and vulnerable, social movements have remained an inseparable part of social progression to create space for contestation against these contradictions in one form or the other. Many of these social movements are not only mobilizations to address these contradictions, but form cross-cutting alliances or coalitions, for example, participants in regional autonomy movements are also participants in environmental, ethnic, human rights, and women’s movements and vice versa. As the state’s legitimacy has suffered as a provider of social and economic security, and of opportunities for upward mobility, eco-sustainability, and climate justice, a culture of social movements has been inculcated by civil society actors to develop struggles of various forms against the functioning of the state, integrating varieties of interests and identities for collective actions. Through sustained mobilization Indian society has taken the form of a social movement society – an interconnected collectivity regularly mobilized with the interplay of multiple social movements on the principle of fragmentation at one end and unification on the other, and in a process of continuous renewal and rejuvenation. Thus, social movements have achieved the state of “recurrently organized and sustained mobilizations of interactive civil actors to have access to and control over the cultural, social, and economic and the political resources to enable them for upward social mobility, to demolish the structure of domination and reorient their collective identities for self expression and fulfilment” (SinghaRoy 2010: 179). While the state has provided the liberal democratic framework to articulate issues, interests, and identities for collective mobilizations and cooption of these movements on the one hand, people’s protest at the grassroots has also created space for their self-assertion and social recognition on the other.

In India there have been rich intellectual efforts of applying various sociological theories and social movement theories to a variety of collective contestations and mobilizations. There have also been efforts to use comparative and analytical perspectives to examine social movements cross-culturally. However, there is an added methodological need to investigate the intersectionality among social movements in contemporary India by formulating a dynamic holistic perspective that accommodates social movement mobilizations as an integral part of society, taking shape due to unequal access to resources and conditions for capacity building and social mobility, and to create new space for inculcation of critical thought, ideas, and actions for the progression and sustenance of social structure.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Environmental movements; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); Grassroots movements; Indian Independence Movement; Movement society; Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Peasant movements; Women’s movements; Women’s movements in India.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Solidarity (Poland)
GRZEGORZ PIOTROWSKI

Solidarity (Solidarność in Polish) is a social movement, based on a trade union, that emerged in Poland in 1980. It was not only the biggest social mobilization in history (it is estimated that approximately 9–10 million people became members of Solidarity in a country of 38 million), but many commentators stress its leading role in overthrowing the communist regime in Poland and also in the rest of Eastern Europe.

The genealogy of the Polish pro-democratic opposition and anticommunist resistance starts with the “thaw” in 1956, when the Communist Party, after an uprising in Poznań in June 1956, decided to liberalize its politics and reduced censorship. The next wave of contention was the events of 1968, which began with student strikes in March in Warsaw that were directed against cancellation of a theater play and later spread countrywide. It was also the beginning of an anti-Semitic campaign launched by hard-core activists within the Communist Party. The hard line the Communist Party took after these events triggered further social discontent, which resulted in strikes in 1970, brutally pacified by the militia and the army in December 1970.

The direct predecessor of Solidarity was the Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), established in 1976 after the violent suppression of strikes in Ursus and Radom to defend the leaders of these protests. Most of the founders of KOR were later at the core of the Solidarity movement. KOR introduced two trends that were at the foundation of the opposition of the 1980s: they tried to link the intellectuals with the workers, and they opposed the regime openly, without disguising their names. KOR was established as a group providing legal aid for oppressed workers using the tools that were given by the communist legal framework, especially by the constitution.

The movement developed from independent strike committees (gathered in an umbrella organization, Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy), which mushroomed in the summer of 1980 after the government’s decision to increase food prices. Massive strikes, especially those in August of 1980, brought the communist state’s economy to a halt, resulting in its signing the August Agreements (Porozumienia Sierpniowe) between August 10 and September 11, 1980. One of the claims of the workers was an independent trade union confederation, which was formed on September 17, 1980, and confirmed on November 10, 1980, when the Solidarity trade union was registered in a court in Warsaw. The workers also demanded wage rises, better working conditions, amnesty for their colleagues, and less censorship.

On September 19, 1980, an independent student’s union (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, NZS) was formed; it was registered by the authorities on February 17, 1981. On May 12, 1981, the farmers’ section of the union was registered in a court as the Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy Rolników Indywidualnych Solidarność. These organizations broadened the reach and impact of the Solidarity movement into other parts of society.

Solidarity, formally a trade union, had a hierarchical structure, with its charismatic leader and chairperson Lech Wałęsa (later president), at the top. Its structure included regional divisions as well as chapters referring to particular industry branches, which allowed greater flexibility. The movement’s leaders were both intellectuals and the workers themselves, the most prominent among them including: Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bogdan Lis, Władysław Frasyniuk, Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń, Andrzej Gwiazda, Anna Walentynowicz, and Zbigniew Bujak.
The months between the first strikes, legalization of the Solidarity trade union, and the establishment of martial law in Poland, are called “Carnival of Solidarity,” and were characterized by massive participation in the union (reaching 10 million members, quarter of Poland’s population according to some estimates) and a historical compromise with the authorities. The Communist Party was initially reluctant to use force against the workers and activists, and agreed to some of the claims of the movement, mostly because of its fear of its potential (almost all working people in Poland took part in a four-hour warning strike on March 27, 1980). The demands of the strikes in summer 1980 and the August Agreements became the basis for establishing a legal opposition in the form of Solidarity.

The introduction of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, ended the Carnival of Solidarity. The military regained control of the streets, a curfew was introduced, and strikes were broken, sometimes with the use of firearms, as in the Wujek coal mine where nine miners were shot by the police. It is estimated that some 56 people lost their lives during the coup. The martial law, described by Davis (1998: 1181) as “the most perfect coup d’etat in the history of modern Europe,” resulted in the delegalization of Solidarity and the incarceration of around 10,000 activists. With increasing repression against the dissidents (increased censorship, expulsions from workplaces, curfews, infiltration by the secret police, random arrests, house searches, occasional beatings, and a few killings), Solidarity activists moved underground, formed the Temporary Coordination Committee (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna), and began operating surreptitiously. Some of their clandestine actions included graffiti, underground stamp production, underground radio broadcasting, and, most significant of all, an illegal “second cycle of publishing” to avoid censorship, similar to the samizdat in the USSR. During this phase of the movement’s career, several splinter groups emerged, such as Solidarność Walcząca, established in June 1982 in Wrocław by Kornel Morawiecki, which differed in its attitude toward compromise with the authorities and was focused on underground publishing and intelligence and counterintelligence actions aimed at the secret police.

Solidarity leaders played the key role in negotiations with the communist government at the round table negotiations and the first (partially) free elections of June 4, 1989, when citizens’ electoral committees (Obywatelskie Komitety Wyborcze) won all 160 seats in the first round of the elections. The electoral committees were established in December 1988 and were transformed into a series of political parties soon after the elections. The elections were part of the agreements of the round table negotiations that took place from February to April 1989, between the communist leaders, the pro-democratic dissidents, and Catholic church officials. After the electoral victory, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was nominated as the first noncommunist prime minister on August 24, 1989, and his government initiated a series of changes that dismantled the communist regime. Partisan pluralism was introduced and the capitalist economy replaced the centrally steered socialist one. These reforms became known as the “Balcerowicz plan” (named after minister for finance Leszek Balcerowicz) or “shock therapy.”

Following the 1989 victory, Solidarity changed its purpose and became a legal trade union again. All of this presumably contributed to the context that fostered a series of right-wing parties, which formed an electoral committee Electoral Action Solidarność (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS) that spearheaded 1997 parliamentary election victories, including the nomination of Jerzy Buzek as prime minister. At the same time, the importance of the trade union was declining, with approximately 500,000 members as of 2010.

Over the years many controversies swirled around the Solidarity movement. They include accusations from the Right of the political spectrum over the nature of the compromise reached at the negotiations (and occasionally of betrayal of Solidarność ideals or of its leaders’
cooperation with the secret police), to the agreement on introduction and support of neoliberal economic reforms (Ost 2005). Some of these issues were raised in the late 1980s, but most surfaced after 1989 at the behest of mostly right-wing-oriented politicians and commentators. Other controversies were linked to the turn within the Solidarity movement that took place after martial law in Poland, when the Catholic church began playing a more important role and was grouping the different currents within the opposition. The shift toward more conservative positions (especially after the killing of Solidarity’s chaplain, Jerzy Popiełuszko, in 1984), together with the support of Pope John Paul II, resulted in the emergence of many small youth-based groups that were critical of the communist authorities and the pro-democratic dissidents. One of the best-known groups of this kind was the Orange Alternative (Pomarańczowa Alternatywa) that was established in Wrocław (Kenney 2002). Also, for many young activists, the actions of Solidarity were too moderate and some issues were ignored (especially compulsory military service and environmental issues, particularly visible after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, and the prospect of building a nuclear power plant in Poland).

Solidarity became a symbol of pro-democratic movements behind the Iron Curtain and for a peaceful systemic transformation, which was confirmed by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Wałęsa in 1983. For many observers, the “Carnival of Solidarity” and the massive participation of Poles in the union spelled the beginning of the end for communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The Solidarity movement is often presented as an example of a successful social movement operating through nonviolent means and taking power in a peaceful and successful process of democratization. The actions of Solidarity were also a blueprint for other dissident movements in Eastern Europe, offering not only ideological inspiration, but also a model for direct cooperation before and after 1989.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Labor movement; Leadership; “Orange” and “colored” revolutions in former Soviet Union; Postcommunism and social movements; Strikes within the European context.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) grew out of the Montgomery bus boycott to become one of the leading organizations of the civil rights movement in the US. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested in Montgomery, Alabama, for refusing to relinquish her seat on a public bus to a white person. Local black clergy, activists, and the women’s political council called a bus boycott. The boycott organization elected Reverend Dr Martin Luther King, Jr as its president. Tens of thousands participated in the nonviolent campaign, drawing violent reprisals from white supremacists and crippling Montgomery’s bus system until they succeeded in integrating it in December 1956. Bayard Rustin wrote a series of working papers proposing a permanent organization to carry the movement to other cities. In January 1957, King, Rustin, Ella Baker, and 60 young black ministers met at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta to form the SCLC. Coupling Christian ethics with activism, their goal was to “redeem the soul of America” through nonviolent resistance to Jim Crow. SCLC intentionally cultivated a principled but pragmatic image of King as a leader, capable of appealing to a wide range of interests. An association of organizations, with no individual members, the SCLC emphasized networking between black churches, supporting local action, and spreading civil rights struggle.

Through the late 1950s, the civil rights movement developed slowly. But then, on February 1, 1960, four black students sat-in at the “whites only” Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, prompting the manager to close the store for the day. Within two months the sit-in tactic spread to 125 cities in nine states. White supremacists spat on, beat, and arrested the young nonviolent activists for violating Jim Crow, eliciting broad public outrage and drawing national support to the movement. Followed by the Freedom Rides and other campaigns to integrate public spaces, the civil rights movement spread like wildfire through the South. Ella Baker and SCLC played an important supportive role.

In December 1961, SCLC committed to the wholesale desegregation of Albany, Georgia. Laurie Pritchett, the shrewd chief of police, trained his officers to conduct themselves cordially and arrest masses of protesters without violence. After a year of protests, police had arrested more than 1000 activists – Dr King three times. But the campaign encountered little violence, failed to capture national attention, won few gains, and soon petered out. Theorizing the failure of the campaign, Rustin surmised that “protest becomes an effective tactic to the degree that it elicits brutality and oppression from the power structure.”

With these lessons in mind, SCLC initiated a campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, intent on holding highly visible public demonstrations, eliciting police brutality, and projecting the movement onto a national stage. As one activist remarked, SCLC “calculated for the stupidity of Bull Connor,” the sheriff of Birmingham with a disreputable history of enforcing segregation through violent means. In April, after breaking a court injunction barring further protest, King, in jail, composed his famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” “Instead of submitting to surreptitious cruelty in thousands of dark jail cells on countless shadowed street corners,” wrote King, the Southern black “would force his oppressor to commit his brutality openly – in the light of day – with the rest of the world looking on.” In May, in response to the “Children’s Crusade” organized by SCLC’s James Bevel, Connor’s police repeatedly assaulted nonviolent young
schoolchildren with dogs, clubs, and high pressure hoses, provoking a national outcry. President Kennedy sent Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall to intervene, and introduced legislation to Congress, culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. President Kennedy told Martin Luther King, Jr: “Our judgment of Bull Connor should not be too harsh. After all, in his way, he has done a good deal for civil-rights legislation this year.”

As SCLC and the civil rights movement made substantial progress toward ending legal segregation in the South, it shifted its focus toward eliminating the de facto disenfranchisement of vast swaths of the black population. SCLC targeted Selma, Alabama, since whites represented 99 percent of the electorate but constituted less than 50 percent of the population, and because of the notorious brutality of Sheriff Clark. On “Bloody Sunday,” March 7, Clark’s police dispersed nonviolent marchers with clubs and teargas, garnering national coverage. During February and March, white supremacists murdered three nonviolent protestors – Jimmy Lee Jackson, James Reeb, and Viola Liuzzo. Responding to the broad public outcry, President Johnson dispatched 2000 soldiers and 1900 national guardsmen to protect the insurgents. On March 15, Johnson told the nation “Their cause must be our cause too.” Two days later, he introduced the Voting Rights Act to Congress.

By 1966, the civil rights movement had effectively dismantled many legal barriers to civil and political integration. SCLC expanded its efforts to address persistent economic inequality and de facto segregation through the Chicago Campaign and the national “Poor People’s Campaign.” But these efforts made little headway in challenging poverty or informal segregation. Civil rights practices were particularly suited to challenging local authorities who sought to preserve Jim Crow; as Jim Crow waned, the civil rights movement ran out of targets. Determined to win economic and political equality, a new generation of young black activists rejected civil rights politics and called for “Black Power!”

Even while the civil rights movement flagged, King’s stature kept the SCLC alive. His mere presence at rallies attracted supporters, and captured a national audience. After King was assassinated on April 4, 1968 in Memphis, where he supported striking sanitation workers, the SCLC all but collapsed.

SCLC played a unique ambassadorial role for the civil rights movement, helping pioneer and proliferate civil rights practices, and linking local black churches with young activists and Federal officials. SCLC will always be remembered for its contribution to overcoming legal segregation and the de facto disenfranchisement of black people in the US.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (United States); Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Squatters’ movements
LYNN OWENS

To squat is to occupy a space otherwise not in use, without the owner’s permission. Squatting takes many forms, from building shantytowns on the outskirts of the megalopolises of the developing world, to claiming unused rural land for food production, to occupying vacant buildings in the city center. Squatting addresses unmet spatial needs, either indirectly, as a protest to draw attention to the vacancy and viability of alternative spaces and force authorities to intervene, or, more directly, by procuring space for the squatters themselves. Boundaries between squatting and squatters’ movements are messy. They overlap, but are not the same. While all squatting is at least somewhat political – challenging property regimes and the elites benefiting from them – to squat is not necessarily to participate in a squatters’ movement. The vast majority of the world’s squatters do not actively take part in squatters’ movements; conversely, these movements do not limit themselves simply to housing concerns, and their participants are not necessarily always squatters. When researchers study squatters’ movements, these are both narrower and broader than merely squatting. Such movements are almost invariably urban, and usually in Europe. The history of these movements dates from the 1960s, peaking into the 1980s, and continuing in a smaller form to this day. The Netherlands, once numbering over 20,000 active squatters, had the largest and most influential of these movements, but other countries also experienced noteworthy squatting activity, including the UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, and Spain. Squatters’ movements promote a do-it-yourself (DIY) ethic in defending space and lifestyles against the influence of capital and state. Housing issues establish only the stating point for these movements.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

Typology
Pruijt (2004) suggests six different types of squatting. The first, deprivation-based squatting, consists of poor people who lack other housing options. Although probably the most widespread form of squatting, it is least likely to figure in most contemporary squatters’ movements, despite remaining a central movement framing trope. The second type is squatting as an alternative housing strategy. This includes a broader group of actors, not only the very poor, and a wider set of goals, such as creating alternative living arrangements. Next, entrepreneurial squatting exploits the opportunity to start projects with few resources and free of bureaucratic demands, leading to a proliferation of squatted social centers, restaurants, theaters, bars, infoshops, and more. Conservationist squatting seeks to protect buildings from destruction, often occupying spaces made vacant during processes of development. Fifth is tourist squatting, where travelers temporarily reside in vacant buildings. Finally, political squatting takes squatting, with its rejection of dominant laws and mores regarding property, as the baseline for a broader form of antisystemic politics and extraparliamentary activism. While this list provides a useful structure for distinguishing ideal types of squatting, studies of actual squatters’ movements reveal that they frequently contain all of these forms. In practice it can be hard to differentiate clearly the intentions and usage of squatted buildings. Squatters’ movements can be understood through how they bring these differences together and seek to manage and exploit their tensions.

Local and transnational
Squatting is ostensibly a highly localized phenomenon, but this localism often provides a springboard for transversing national borders.
Squatting opportunities vary widely depending on national and municipal laws, as well as the specific conditions of cities, neighborhoods, and buildings. Therefore, even when squatters’ movements share cultural and legal frameworks of a shared nationality, one often finds wide variation between squatters’ movements across cities. Primarily urban, their tactical and narrative focus is on the immediate conditions of urban social space; they privilege defending and defining the local. Concurrently, many squatters also seek to expand the boundaries of their neighborhood and city, rejecting the parochialism of some forms of localism by building larger networks of squatters and squats across borders (Owens 2008). For example, squatting in New York City has a long history, but the city’s squatters’ movement was sparked by an influx of European activists (Pruijt 2003). Facilitated by shared information and the mobility of squatters between locations, these intensely local movements simultaneously construct a shared movement culture and identity across national and local contexts. Squatters’ movements underscore the complex interaction generated when local politics connects across geographic boundaries, and how spatial relationships are remade through activism.

Radical and conservative

By challenging the integrity of private property, squatting appears inherently radical. This radicalism, however, is often tempered by conservative impulses, such as preserving old buildings, threatened neighborhoods, and lost community. Many squatters practice radical politics, marked by frequent ideological and organizational overlaps with autonomists and anarchists (Katsiaficas 2006). Even outwardly apolitical squatting takes a radical edge, its DIY ethic encouraging people to solve their own housing problems outside of market and state influence. Moreover, squatting can radicalize its practitioners, either through the self-empowerment experienced by the act itself or, frequently, through the intense repression that such threats to property tend to provoke (Owens 2009). Nevertheless, squatting often draws on a conservationist, and even conservative, streak. Sometimes this is explicit, such as when squatters occupy buildings in order to keep them from being demolished. More often, though, squatters’ movements frame their actions beyond questions of housing deprivation, producing narratives of lost community and alienated individuals, calling for the protection of vacant buildings and abandoned neighborhoods with historical or community significance. The squatters’ movement in Berlin, for example, began as a conservationist action (Pruijt 2004). Squatters push forward their radical actions grounded in preserving a certain ideal of the past. Squatters’ movements thus resist simple ideological categorizations. Even at their most radical, they depend on protecting not only old buildings, but also traditional values of community and communality.

Independent and connected

Squatting provides the essential resources of space and shelter, increasing squatters’ self-sufficiency, but all activists value space, which ensures that connections will be forged across other movements. Squatted spaces create new opportunities and resources. Most movements are comprised of loose networks of squatted buildings spread across cities and regions, but more developed movements display the capacity to create their own self-contained environments. At their peaks, neighborhoods in Amsterdam and Berlin had the population and density of squatters to allow many activists to live inside the movement, literally and figuratively. Squatting provided not only dwellings, but also workshops, daycare centers, stores, restaurants, movie theaters, and more; homes, work, and leisure all in one place. These examples are relatively rare, yet the aim of using squatting to provide as many services as possible is exemplified in the successes of squatted social centers. Social centers are most highly developed in Italy (Mudu 2004), but can be found in many locations with active squatters’ movements. They concentrate services, providing space not just for squatters, but also other activists. Further, they operate
as an access point for nonactivists and local residents to connect with movement activities, as well as important social services (Membretti 2007). Users need not be explicitly political, as the performance, practice, and atelier spaces of social centers also attract artists and cultural activists. This fluid border, both open and closed, facilitates cross-fertilization between movements and activists, offering them stable and safe free spaces. For example, Spanish and Italian social centers act as central nodes of networks of alternative globalization activists (Mudu 2004; Martinez 2007). Squatting builds allies through offering space for their work and needs; allies build squatting through offering their own skills and legitimacy.

**Action and identity**

Squatting is both a means and an end; not simply an action, it is also a mode of being. Squatters’ movements must mediate the relationships between squatting as an action and squatter as an identity. Squatting can be used as a form of direct action or a protest tactic, providing an effective means for disenfranchised groups, who may lack other options. This is seen most clearly in the case of deprivation squatting: people squat because they have to. Their goal is to secure stable housing and end their time as squatters as quickly as possible. Alternately, housing organizations occupy buildings to draw attention to homelessness, like Home Not Jails in the US (Corr 1999), seeking to compel authorities to increase their assistance. In both cases, squatting is simply a means; if a better one becomes available, it can be replaced. This facilitates legalization of housing and co-optation of movements (Pruijt 2003). However, squatting can also be an end goal; shelter is less important than squatted shelter. This distinction is significant in understanding squatters’ movements. Many movements may employ squatting as a tactic, but only squatters’ movements privilege it as an end in itself. This commitment to squatting protects movements from forces of co-optation, but also makes success less likely in the long term. In the end, a squatted building is nearly always either legalized or evicted. A possible exception can be found in Amsterdam. Through a process of flexible institutionalization, as described in Pruijt (2003), squatters negotiated concessions from authorities, maintaining some autonomy over buildings without completely compromising their squatter identities. Conflicts between action and identity frequently emerge as differences over whether squatting is primarily a political movement or a cultural one. As with the other tensions, squatters’ movements are often most robust when refusing to privilege one exclusively over the other. Yet, this is not always possible, especially during hard times. For example, as their movement declined, Amsterdam squatters fought over the essence of the squatting and its politics (Owens 2009).

**UNANSWERED QUESTIONS**

Squatters’ movements have a unique and coherent character. This is partially a result of the similar contexts and information flows between and within these movements. But it is also due to the nature of how the movement is defined, which limits it to a very specific form of squatting and politics. Yet squatting is a vast phenomenon, used by many political actors across the world. More work needs to be done researching squatting politics in the developing world, such as Brazil’s rural Landless Workers Movement (Wright & Wolford 2003). While Corr (1999) tries to integrate squatters’ movements across rural and urban, developed and developing countries, this project remains underdeveloped.

There is still much work to do comparing movements across national contexts, particularly as they change over time. Pruijt (2003), comparing New York City and Amsterdam, explains weaker US squatters’ movements by stricter US property laws, which limited New York City squatters to government-owned, buildings, thus those in the poorest condition, restricting the movement’s growth. Such constraints were even stronger in other US cities, further limiting political squatting. However, opportunities change with time. With the
housing crisis beginning in 2008, vacancies and homelessness have greatly increased, bringing with them a marked increase in squatting. Conversely, the Dutch government made squatting illegal in 2010. Although squatting and squatters’ movements continue, they do so under very different circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Free spaces; Global Justice Movement in Europe; Homeless protest movements (United States); Landless Workers Movement (MST) (Brazil); Urban movements.

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*European Urban and Regional Studies* 14(3), 255–266.


State-sponsored social movements

YANG SU

A state-sponsored social movement refers to a popular movement initiated and endorsed by the central leadership of the state and organized by the government’s apparatuses. Collective action events are peopled by citizens in their capacity as nonstate actors, but the main source of claims, leadership, and organizational resources is from within the state itself, and state actors, in their official capacities, serve as the main organizers. Examples range from a daily ritual that the government calls for its citizens to perform (such as a pledge of allegiance) to a campaign of persecutions against its minorities (such as genocide). Oft-cited historical events such as the Nazi persecution of Jews in Hitler’s Germany and the Cultural Revolution in Mao’s China, are considered to be state-sponsored movements. Other less extreme examples also belong to the category, as will become clear when the concept is further clarified.

As a concept to describe the state’s role in social movements, state sponsorship shares similarities with the commonly known concept of political opportunity structure, but it is also qualitatively different from that concept. They both belong to the group of conditions that facilitate the emergence and operation of a social movement. A movement is thought to be more likely to emerge, develop, and succeed if the system is open, the state’s repression capacity is low, the elites are in conflict, and/or some elite members are supportive. For political opportunity structure scholars, a movement is seen as outside the realm of the state, and favorable conditions as constituting a facilitative environment.

The boundaries between the state and movement, however, all but disappear in the situation of a state-sponsored movement. There are three distinct features in the interaction between the state and movement. First, the top leadership, or at least the prevailing faction of the leadership, is calling for the movement. This is in contrast to a movement that is initiated by forces within society. Second, the government provides the organizational resources – funds, personnel, office, for the movement. In comparison, in other movements state leaders and bureaucrats may be restricted by law from openly participating in their official capacities, and government resources from being used in partisan mobilizations. Third, leadership and activism are often rewarded with career opportunities by the government, while they may be met with the government’s indifference, harassment, or even imprisonment if involved in other movements.

As such, given their close relationship with the state, should we just treat state-sponsored rituals and campaigns as part of institutional politics? To do so would be to miss what social movement scholarship has to offer. Like other social movements, not only do the campaigns of state-sponsored movements take the form of collective events, but they also draw their participants from among the ordinary masses. Once started, the movement may involve initiatives that quickly deviate from the state’s blueprint. In other words, the state’s initiation opens up the floodgates of other mass actions, albeit under the cover of the original goal. More often than not the state cannot police the movement into the shape originally designed. The result more resembles a social movement – with unexpected twists and turns in its course and newly constituted identities among the participants – than the prescribed routines associated with institutional politics.

While state sponsorship of social movements is common wherever there is a state, the character and volume of such movements
state-sponsored social movements vary through history and across different types of political systems. Before the separation of church and state, the religion of a country sponsored by the government might be understood as a state-sponsored social movement. But large waves of change in the past several centuries generated political regimes built on the claims of the “people,” as opposed to the traditional sovereignty claims based on the “king.” These newer regimes possess institutional affinity with the populace, and are therefore prone to mobilizing popular movements in their state-building projects and the maintenance of legitimacy. Among the popular-based governments, there is a marked difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes, however. In the former, election resolves a large part of the legitimacy issue; hence fewer state-sponsored movements. In the latter, the occurrence and volume of such movements are higher. Among the democratic regimes, transitional democracies witness more state-sponsored movements than more stable and mature democracies.

Given all the powers enjoyed through its bureaucratic and legal channels, why would a government mobilize popular movements? First, state-building is always a work in progress; this is particularly the case for a nascent government established through a popular movement such as revolution. In the course of transitioning from a revolutionary movement to a bureaucratic and legalistic state, mass campaigns become a routine and permanent feature of political life. Second, in authoritarian as well as democratic countries, the state monopoly of authority is by no means complete. Many authorities—church, scientific, commercial, educational, and medical, for example—reside outside the control of the state, in varying degrees. When the state attempts to compel them to serve the regime or to give up authority, citizen groups may be prompted to challenge such authorities. Third, the state may find its organizational resources to be in short supply, which is almost always the case, and voluntarism among the citizenry to be a volcanic source of power to tap.

Conceptually state-sponsored social movements can be classified into two types: promotional and persecutory. Promotional state-sponsored social movements center on ceremony and collective action that proclaim and rehearse certain values such as racial purity, patriotism, class conflict, and egalitarianism. These include public rituals in public squares in communist countries such as Cuba, China, Soviet Union Russia, and North Korea. These rituals are seemingly joyous and victim-free. In democratic countries, state-sponsored rituals also exist, as illustrated by Robert Bellah’s (1991) concept of “civic religion in America.”

Persecutory state-sponsored social movements are mobilized to remove undesired elements of the population, and too often take the form of state-organized purges of “class enemies,” ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The state promotes hatred and discrimination among the citizens, pitting one group against the other. In extreme cases, the state also promotes elimination of certain segments of the population as a solution of the “problem.” Examples include the Holocaust, recurrent political campaigns in communist societies, and the contemporary genocidal events in Bosnia and Rwanda.

Most often, a state-sponsored social movement is a combination of these two types, with one feature being more pronounced than the other. On the one hand, a state’s promotion of a value is rarely victimless, even in the most seemingly innocuous cases. For example, certain versions of patriotism are bound to differentiate a hierarchy of ethnic order, and to enhance hostility toward immigrants and foreigners. On the other hand, persecution is conducted in the name of a value, an ideology, and hence rehearsed repeatedly, as occurred with both Nazism and communism.

The tradition of studying state-sponsored movements dates back to World War II, when the world witnessed the rise of totalitarianism. The research peaked in the postwar decades, and the field of collective behavior studies, the predecessor of the social movement studies, was heavily built on the analysis of this type of movement. On the nature of regimes
and character of societies, scholars proposed concepts such as totalitarianism and mass society. On the micro level of participation, psychologists engaged in psychiatric analysis and proposed concepts such as alienation and authoritarian personalities.

Since the 1970s, for a considerable period research has shifted away from these movements to only study “good” or “popular” social movements such as civil rights movements, women’s movements, and environmental movements. The new paradigms in the social movement field rightly reject some notions drawn from earlier studies of state-sponsored movements, such as irrationality of participants and the totalitarianism imagery of the society. But in the meantime, movement studies suffered a problem of a different kind: theories were too narrowly drawn from only those episodes in contemporary America and other Western democracies.

Two recent developments may herald a new boom of studying state-sponsored movements. On the theoretical front, some proponents of the current paradigms have made a forceful call to study “contentious politics,” a concept that encompasses a wide variety of episodes. Empirically, many historic-comparative scholars now dismantle the boundaries between social movement scholarship and cases of contention which in the past may not have been counted as social movements. For example, the Red Guard movements in Beijing in 1966–1967 may be seen as prototypical state-sponsored movements. In them researchers have uncovered features commonly observed in “good” movements such as grassroots initiation, rebellion, factionalism, and tactical innovation. For another example, genocide has been seen as a campaign driven by genocidal state policies. In some instances, the nonstate actors in those killings can be seen as participating in state-sponsored movements. But recent scholarship has challenged the state-policy model and contends that perpetrators act sometimes more on their self-constituted identities than on their prescribed institutional roles. To the extent they are community actors, killing events can be seen as collective action events, and social movement theories may thus have a lot to offer in understanding such events, even though they have not been traditionally considered as social movements.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Cultural Revolution (China); Genocide and social movements; Nationalist movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Revolutions.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Stonewall riots (United States)

ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG and SUZANNA M. CRAGE

Around 1:20 a.m., early on Saturday, June 28, 1969, police raided the Stonewall Inn, a homosexual bar on Christopher Street in Greenwich Village in New York City. Customers included homeless teens, drag queens, and others unwelcome elsewhere. Patrons initiated a riot that lasted into the night and resumed the next day. The Stonewall riots are often viewed as the spark of the gay liberation movement (Duberman 1993; Teal 1995; Carter 2004). This is not historically accurate: gay liberation was already well underway. The riots were not the first time gays fought back against police, nor were they the first raid to generate political organizing (D’Emilio 1983; Stryker & Van Buskirk 1996; Epstein 1999; Armstrong 2002; Bernstein 2002; Silverman & Stryker 2005; Stryker 2005).

The Stonewall riots are of interest because of their symbolic importance to gay movements in the US and around the globe. The processes through which the riots acquired this salience provide insight into the creation of collective memory within social movements.

GAY LIBERATION AND THE STONEWALL RIOTS

The gay liberation movement was active by fall 1968, and likely before (Stryker & Van Buskirk 1996; Armstrong 2002; Carter 2004). Gay periodicals used the language of “gay power,” and small radical organizations existed. Gay liberation was particularly vibrant in New York. In 1969, Greenwich Village was home to some of the most skilled and visionary gay activists in the country. When the police raided the Stonewall Inn, a crowd gathered (Carter 2004; Duberman 2004). People started throwing things, and after further escalation riot police arrived to disperse them. Rioters blocked the street and taunted police. Activists happened upon the riot in process and immediately began constructing it as significant. One helped escalate it (Carter 2004); another called contacts at New York newspapers. The event received unprecedented coverage on Saturday morning, including reports of nearly a thousand rioters and several hundred police. That day, people gathered to see the bar. That evening, riot police returned and another riot followed (Duberman 2004).

On Sunday, activists distributed flyers calling the riots “the first time that thousands of Homosexual men and women went out into the streets to protest” in New York City (Teal 1995). Another account labeled the riots “The Hairpin Drop Heard around the World.” These assertions became self-fulfilling prophecies. (See Armstrong and Crage 2006, particularly the online supplement, for a list of primary documents on the event and its aftermath.)

THE MAKING OF THE MYTH

The Stonewall riots acquired lasting significance not simply because of what happened, but because of how activists used them – starting when they were still in progress – to advance social movement goals. Stonewall was not the first time homosexuals stood up to the police – they did so earlier in both San Francisco and Los Angeles (Silverman & Stryker 2005; Stryker 2005; Armstrong & Crage 2006) – but it was the first time they did so in front of activists with the capacity to commemorate this defiance. That fall, New York activists drew on an existing annual protest and began planning a Christopher Street Liberation Day parade to commemorate the riots’ first anniversary. They encouraged other cities to participate, and in 1970 New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago held successful events. New York activists immediately began planning the second parade, and in 1971 seven cities hosted events. Approximately 200,000–250,000 people attended San Francisco’s tenth-anniversary parade. The parade was an ideal commemorative form: It fit the Stonewall story, affirmed gay collective identity, produced feelings of pride (Taylor & Whittier 1995), and forced cities to accommodate public gay existence.

REPRODUCING THE MYTH

The Stonewall story is better understood as an achievement of gay liberation rather than an account of its origins. Historians of sexuality have tried to debunk the Stonewall myth, but it retains its hold among activists and scholars (Kissack 1995; Silverman & Stryker 2005). The political utility of the myth is obvious – it continues to serve the movement well. It is not only rehearsed annually in freedom day parades around the globe, but is employed by activists in countless ways. For example, Rupp and Taylor (2003) observed vivid retellings of the Stonewall story by drag queens in their stage performances. Scholars reproduce the story for at least three reasons. First, people politically invested in the elaboration of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer (GLBTQ) political and cultural project – particularly journalists and public historians – share movement interests in preserving and extending this powerful story. Second, referring to events as occurring “before Stonewall” or “after Stonewall” is easier than referring to events as occurring before or after the complex set of historical and cultural processes that transformed gay life during the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, sociologists studying contemporary GLBTQ movement politics sometimes reproduce the myth in overly simplified movement histories. Historically inaccurate accounts threaten the credibility of sociological work on GLBTQ movements, as well as our understanding of the role of events in the development of movements. Naturalizing the Stonewall story also makes it difficult to see its globalization as a political accomplishment in need of explanation.

SEE ALSO: Collective memory and social movements; Culture and social movements; Event history analysis; Framing and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Riots.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Strategies of the Chinese communist revolution
SHIZHENG FENG

The victory of a revolutionary struggle depends on the effectiveness of the strategies. Mao Zedong argued that the success of the Chinese communist revolution relied on the three grand strategies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had adopted—party building, armed struggle, and the united front. Mao praised them as the CCP’s three magic weapons. Yet, between 1921 and 1935, the CCP was most of the time under the strong influence of the Communist International (Comintern), and its strategy was rather incoherent, to say the least. It was only after 1935, and especially after the 1940s when Mao ascended to become the CCP’s paramount leader, that these grand strategies became the guiding principles of the revolution.

PARTY BUILDING

Of the three grand strategies, party building was primary. According to Mao, whether or not the CCP could successfully carry out the other two grand strategies depended on the CCP leadership’s capacity to maintain an effective organization. The CCP’s organizational building strategy had three major components: (1) the maintenance of CCP’s solid leadership in the revolution, (2) a stress on “thought construction” in party building, and (3) an emphasis of “mass line” as CCP’s basic organizational principle. Each is discussed in turn.

During the revolution, the CCP leadership strove to have absolute control over all affairs, especially military matters. Before 1927, when the CCP did not have its own army, it was only able to establish party branches at the regiment level within some Kuomintang armies over which it had a strong influence. Soon after 1927, the CCP began establishing party organs at all levels of its own army: party groups at the level of squad and platoon, party branches at the company level, and party committees above the company level. A military unit above the level of the company also installed a CCP representative, assumed by the secretary of the CCP organization at the same level. Moreover, the entire army was under the control of the CCP “Front Committee.” The party decided major issues ranging from army deployment to officer promotion. This absolute CCP leadership over the military has lasted till today.

Second, within the party, decision-making power was held at the center, largely in the hands of a few top CCP leaders. To maintain the authority of the party and the central leadership, the CCP constitution had the following regulation: “the individual party members are subordinate to the party organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, all the constituent organizations and members to the center.” In fact, the leadership question had posed a serious problem for the CCP ever since its establishment. In the early years, the CCP leadership was most of the time dominated by those who had Soviet Union background and were trusted by the Comintern. After the CCP’s Zunyi Conference in 1935, however, Mao’s influence in the CCP rose quickly. After the early 1940s and the Yan’an Rectification Campaign, Mao rose to become the CCP’s paramount leader and the Comintern faction lost its influence in the party. Mao remained the CCP’s ultimate arbiter on all aspects of decision making till his death in 1976.

To strengthen internal cohesion, the CCP had made great efforts to educate its members. This strategy, known as “thought construction,” is another basic example of party building. The CCP demanded its members be well versed in Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong thought. To achieve and

maintain party cohesion, the CCP often launched thought struggles or line struggles, during which members who held views deviating from the party center were criticized or even purged. The Yan’an Rectification Campaign, from 1941 to 1945, was the most well-known line struggle. Through the campaign Mao gained absolute domination within the party.

The third feature of party building was the adoption of “mass line” as the party’s fundamental organizational principle. The CCP claimed that the party was the vanguard of the proletariat and should serve the people’s heart and soul. It urged CCP members to mobilize the people by raising their class consciousness without considering themselves as saviors of the people. The party maintained that the revolution could achieve major success only when the poor became enlightened to fight for their own liberation. Therefore, the CCP leadership demanded their members understand the masses and learn from them, to understand people’s interests and knowledge and theorize them, and to construct general policies and strategies to guide the revolutionary struggle. The principle of “from the mass, to the mass” refers to forming policies on the basis of opinions collected from the people, and using the policies to guide the people. It must be noted that the actual workings of communist mobilization never precisely followed this standard model. On the other hand, the mass line ideal did lead the CCP to organize many large-scale mass movements before and after the success of the revolution. This is an important feature that distinguishes the Chinese communist revolution from most other revolutions.

ARMED STRUGGLE

The second grand strategy of the Chinese communist revolution was armed struggle. Because the CCP at first did not have its own armed forces, it was easy for the Kuomintang to purge CCP members in 1927. Learning from this lesson, armed struggle was promoted as one of the CCP’s central strategies. Thus we have Mao’s famous quote: “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” In response to the Kuomintang purges and killings, the CCP instigated numerous armed uprisings during and after the summer of 1927. Although all the uprisings failed, the survivors of the rebellion forces were able to retreat to mountainous regions in various parts of China and stage guerrilla warfare.

The CCP’s military strategy was initially incoherent. After Mao reached domination within the party, his military thinking became the guidelines for the communist revolution. Mao’s military strategy had three main components, namely, establishing communist-controlled local governments, encircling the cities from the countryside, and sustaining guerrilla warfare.

The CCP used its military power to seize a territory and establish a government on that territory. It then implemented land reform and other policies to win the support of poor peasants and recruited them to the armies that defended the territory. Since most of the Kuomintang armies were located in and near big cities and the Kuomintang forces were much more powerful, Mao promoted the strategy of encirclement of the cities from the countryside, that is, establishing military bases in poor and backwoods areas or border regions, and expanding the bases to close in on the cities. Mao insisted that the CCP army should start capturing big cities, even the entire country, only after it gained enough power. Many rural communist bases were established, the most famous one being the Central Soviet Area in the Jinggang Mountains in Jiangxi, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. During the time that it faced more powerful enemies, the CCP adopted guerrilla warfare as the main form of armed struggle. It was not until 1947, when the military strength of the CCP army in many ways surpassed the Kuomintang army, that the CCP started to stage large-scale military campaigns. Within two years, it had defeated the seemingly mighty Kuomintang forces.
UNITED FRONT

The third grand strategy of the Chinese communist revolution was the united front. The essence of the united front ideal is that the party needs to exhibit great flexibility in order to unite with possible allies and defeat its archenemy. The idea of the united front was originally introduced to China by the Comintern, but was greatly enriched through the practice of the CCP and eventually promoted by Mao as the party’s pivotal strategy.

During the course of the Chinese communist revolution, the united front policy went through four main shifts, the first being the establishment of the National Revolutionary United Front, 1924–1927, which was the premier alliance between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The chief purpose of this united front was to oppose the northern warlords or, in the CCP’s language, those who represented the power of imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism.

In 1927, after Chiang Kai-shek’s purge of the CCP, the surviving members of the CCP reached the conclusion that the landlords and bureaucratic capitalists as well as their representatives were their archenemies. Accordingly, they promoted the idea of the second united front, or the Democratic United Front of Workers and Peasants. The CCP implemented radical land reform policies and killed many landlords in its controlled territories. In some places, the radical policies went so far that even many well-to-do peasants were slain.

During the Long March, grasping the opportunity of the increasingly pressing Japanese aggression, the CCP propagated the idea of another united front with the Kuomintang, that is, to unite with all the patriotic forces in China in order to resist the Japanese invasion. The CCP’s new call gained some sympathy among the Kuomintang elite and generals. The ensuing historical dynamics ended with the Xi’an Incident on December 12, 1936, during which Chiang Kai-shek was placed under house arrest by two of his generals and forced to agree to form a united front with the CCP to fight against the Japanese. With the full-scale Japanese invasion of China in 1937, this new united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP became a reality. In this period, to obtain the support of all Chinese (rich and poor) in the Japanese-occupied rural areas, the CCP no longer implemented its radical land reform policies. Instead, it promoted a policy of “reducing rent, reducing interest.” It even tried to incorporate local landlords in the government apparatus in areas under its control.

The new CCP policies widened the mass support for their causes and greatly helped the CCP army to resist the increasingly ferocious Japanese attacks between 1940 and 1943.

The CCP identified the Kuomintang as its archenemy after the defeat of Japan in 1945. Accordingly, it improvised a new united front that included all the Chinese – workers, peasants, intellectuals, and businessmen – except the landlords and the Kuomintang as their allies. This is the so-called People’s Democratic United Front. This united front had its theoretical and practical aspects, both of which had a huge impact on modern Chinese history. The way the CCP regarded Chinese businessmen and intellectuals as one-time friends shaped many CCP policies after it took power. Yet, at the practical level, it was the support of the peasants in rural areas (as a result of the CCP’s new land reform policy) and the intellectuals and students in urban areas (as a result of the successful communist propaganda and mobilization strategies as well as the effect of the Kuomintang-controlled areas) that was most crucial for the CCP’s success during the civil war.

The essence of the united front strategy was “alliance for the purpose of struggle,” that is, to shift CCP’s alliance strategies in time to get more people on its side and to more easily defeat its identified archenemy. According to the CCP theory, in order to bring success to the revolution, the CCP could not forfeit its leadership in the united front. This required the CCP to have a strong party apparatus and strong coercive forces under its control. In other words,
in CCP’s theory and practice, the three great magic weapons were an integrated whole.

SEE ALSO: Chinese communist revolution; Guer-rilla movements; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Revolutions; State-sponsored social movements; Strategy.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Strikes in US history

JUDITH STEPAN-NORRIS and BEN LIND

Strikes occur when activists temporarily and collectively withhold their participation from some crucial activity in order to convey a grievance or to enforce demands. These include food strikes, rent strikes, hunger strikes, culture strikes, prison strikes, student strikes, and labor strikes. By far the most prevalent of these, the focus here, are the latter, also known as walkouts or work stoppages, which occur when workers withhold their labor. The strike is potentially the most injurious action to firms, since production and therefore profits are reduced or stopped altogether (Rubin 1986).

Strikes are a vital component of labor union activities that qualify unions as social movements, even while they have other features that reinforce their institutional characteristics. Strikes require worker solidarity, mobilization, and collective action that put workers at risk for serious consequences (reduced income and job loss). Strike leaders oftentimes solicit community support, form alliances, and engage in relations with the public and the media. While labor unions are important actors in the initiation of strikes – they often call strikes in attempts to obtain union recognition and to enforce collective bargaining demands – their orientations to strikes differ greatly. In addition, strikes may be initiated by union actors who are working outside of their unions (as in wildcat strikes).

THE DETERMINANTS OF STRIKES IN THE US

The US has the most violent and militant labor history (Taft & Ross 1969), yet its labor movement is less progressive than most others. This is known as “American exceptionalism.” Further, US strike patterns are distinct in that although their frequency and participation rates are moderately high compared to other industrial nations, their most distinguishing characteristic is their long duration. To better understand strike activity, scholars have investigated bargaining logic and strategies, macroeconomic forces (including business cycles, unemployment, and wages), the role of organizational influence (union density and leader ideology), as well as legal and political contexts. They have also investigated interindustry differences (Kerr & Siegel 1964) and workers’ positional power (Wallace, Griffen, & Rubin 1989).

ECONOMIC BARGAINING APPROACHES

Early works examining strikes attributed their outbreak to imperfect market knowledge. This argument emphasizes misunderstandings in negotiation over worker remuneration, including pay and benefits, such that a strike occurs when either management or (especially) labor is unaware of the other’s concession range (Hicks 1932). If both parties have perfect knowledge of what remuneration terms the other party would accept, negotiations would quickly reach an apparent optimal compromise. Strikes therefore occur when either party overestimates the concessions the other will find acceptable.

Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) improve this model by introducing a third negotiating party – union leadership. Their model assumes the union’s leadership, like management, is better informed than the workers they represent. Despite sufficient bargaining knowledge, the union leadership is accountable to the interests of the rank and file, interests which are often difficult to satisfy given the range of concessions management is willing to make. When the best attainable concessions from management falls short of expressed worker interests, the union...
leadership may either sign a contract that risks rank and file disappointment and objection or they may call a strike. Accordingly, calling a strike ensures union leadership support and is often done despite union leadership’s knowledge of its inevitable failure.

Both the amount and the characteristic of information available to the parties involved vary as do their particular strike histories and contexts (Cousineau & Lacroix 1986). Sources of quality information include a reduction in economic uncertainty, such as noninflationary settings (Kaufman 1981), prior negotiations and contracts (Reder & Neumann 1980), and a firm’s past experiences with strikes (Tracy 1987). Viewed relationally, asymmetric knowledge disparities between bargaining parties also increase the duration of bargaining and the likelihood of strikes (Tracy 1987).

MACROECONOMIC CAUSES

In contrast to the attention scholars give to firm-level bargaining processes, others cite macroeconomic conditions, such as the business cycle, as a motivator for strike outbreak. The macroeconomic hypothesis states that economic prosperity has a positive relationship with strike frequency, such that strikes will occur more frequently during times of economic expansion and less frequently during economic recession.

An assumed worker risk assessment motivates the macroeconomic hypothesis. Striking poses a risk of unemployment to participating workers and this risk becomes more salient if alternative venues of employment are unattainable. Should the strike fail and the workplace either refuses to rehire the strikers or closes its doors completely, workers must find employment elsewhere and draw upon savings during the strike. Knowing that high unemployment rates suggest greater market competition for available jobs, workers are less likely to strike in these conditions given the relatively heightened cost of unemployment. Furthermore, during periods of high unemployment, employers draw upon a relatively larger pool of replacement workers (Rees 1952).

Empirical tests of this hypothesis offer some support. Analyzing US quarterly data from 1952 through 1968, one study finds a strong negative relationship between unemployment and strike frequency and a strong positive relationship between gross national product and all strike measurements (Skeels 1971). However, one must be wary of the direction of causality here. Strike activity may consequently lead to an economic slowdown (Flaherty 1987) or decline in industry stock value (Dinardo & Hallock 2002).

However, the strength and role of these macroeconomic effects may be particular to certain national and historical circumstances (Snyder 1975, 1977; Edwards 1981). Skeptical of using these economic indicators without scrutiny, one study shows that economic prosperity led to an increase in strikes in the US prior to 1910 and again after 1947, yet the effect did not hold up between 1910 and 1947 (Edwards 1981). Beyond the period effects, the study finds that, during the most prosperous times, strikes tended to occur within economically disadvantaged sectors. While both improvements in real wages and low unemployment increase the number of strikes in the US and Canada (Snyder 1977), earlier work (Snyder 1975) finds that for Italy and France economic factors affect neither the number of strikes, nor the number of strikers. These findings have not gone uncontested; one study argues that high unemployment rates led to a decrease in strike frequency in Italy following World War II (Franzosi 1995) and another describes economic effects as “surprisingly vigorous” in US strikes (Skeels 1982) as compared to the analysis of Italy and France.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

As the organized unit negotiating on the behalf of workers, labor unions play an immense role in strike activity. The advent of resource
mobilization theory directed greater academic attention to this role. When rank and file workers pay union dues and elect union leaders, they maintain an organized vehicle to pursue their interests at minimal personal cost. Should a strike occur at a workplace, unions are better equipped to engage rank and file participation than a nonorganized workforce.

The US labor federations since the late 1800s have approached the strike differently. The Knights of Labor (1869–1900, substantively) emphasized education, cooperation, and arbitration. Although it rose to prominence by means of a series of successful strikes, in general, its leadership did not support them. Ironically, it was a series of unsuccessful strikes that brought the Knights to ruin. The American Federation of Labor (AFL, 1886–1955), formed to protect and improve craft workers’ positions, was more reliant on strikes to accomplish its ends, as was the merged American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO, 1955–present), which incorporated less skilled industrial workers.

Marx argued that strikes were training grounds for workers, and necessary as a precursor to revolution. US revolutionary unions have seen the strike in a similar way, but there were vast differences in their use of the strike and their adherence to this principle. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, in substantive existence from 1905 to about 1924), organized around anarcho-syndicalist principles, invoked its ideological precepts in its highly visible and spectacular use of the strike. It aided grassroots worker struggles by providing organizers and personnel to help organize strikes, while it scorned collective bargaining (it refused to sign collective bargaining agreements), paid officers, high union dues, and strike funds. The IWW sought to organize the unorganized mainly by supplying leadership where spontaneous strikes occurred. It was very successful in its leadership, but less successful in leaving lasting organization: concessions workers won in these strikes oftentimes weathered away. The Trade Union Unity League (TUUL, 1929–1934) was a communist trade union federation organized out of the Trade Union Educational League (TUEL), which “bored-from-within” the AFL. Both organizations attempted to move the AFL’s apolitical stance and mild militancy in a more political and confrontational direction.

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The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO, 1938–1955) was a progressive (but not revolutionary) union that organized workers by industry. Its strength was in its ability to organize all workers, regardless of skill, gender, race, or national origin, and it is known for its widespread and successful implementation of the sit-down strike.

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While some contend that it engaged in strikes for political reasons (attempts to help the Soviet Union accomplish some end), TUUL strikes were mainly conducted for economic reasons and to further trade union demands (Devinatz 2005).

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Communists were involved in the CIO’s organization and leadership. Unions aligned with the communists were also accused of engaging in political strikes. Communist-led unions also vigorously pursued workers’ control on the shop floor as well as their ordinary grievances (Stepan-Norris & Zeitlin 2003).

Studies generally use union density to gauge labor’s organizational capacity. “Union density” refers to the percent of a population’s workforce belonging to a labor union. A great deal of evidence supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between union density and strike activity, as measured by both the frequency of strikes and the quantity of strikers (Snyder 1975, 1977; Skeels 1982).

While these studies failed to show a relationship between union density and strike activity after World War II, one study attributes this nonresult to the allowable conditions and characteristics of strikes that were elaborated in postwar collective bargaining agreements (Morris 2003). Unions either completely cede their right to strike during the term of the agreement, they agree to specified conditions under which strikes may occur, or they maintain their right to strike. Collective bargaining agreements, which became widespread beginning
in the late 1930s, initially had considerable diversity on strike clauses. But after the communist unions were expelled from the CIO, and the CIO merged with the AFL in 1955, more unions negotiated contracts that gave away their right to strike during the contract’s term. This tendency made the timing of strikes predictable and eliminated unexpected and costly conflicts. While this development didn’t eliminate strikes, it did render the union an enforcer of class harmony in that unions are required to ensure their members adhere to the terms of the contracts they sign. After accounting for contract lifespan of approximately two years and lagging union density accordingly, the study indeed finds a positive relationship between union density and strike activity in the postwar era (Morris 2003).

Though there is little doubt the involvement of established unions result in more predictable strike activity, scholars should proceed with some historical caution. Before 1900, strikes frequently emerged without the assistance of formal organizations. Though in many instances at the time, workers formed organizations during a strike, these organizations often disbanded afterwards. Beyond the limited role of unions in these early strikes, the matter of union recognition as a reason to strike should raise some alarm and suggest the possibility of reverse causality (Franzosi 1989: 356).

Additionally, some scholars question how militant labor unions actually are with regard to strikes (Fantasia 1988; Brecher 1997). In line with Michels’ 1915 “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1949) these scholars see organizations formalizing relations, making deals, and assuring peace. They suggest that when organizations are involved, employers withhold concessions or withdraw concessions they have already granted. In this view, it is only workers’ continual disruption of production that accomplishes working class progress. One such scholar, for instance, states that due to the professional and bureaucratic nature of unions, union leadership often tries to prevent strikes and mass upheaval (Brecher 1997). Likewise, the formation of unions and collective bargaining agreements lead to fewer strikes due to their recognition of management as a legitimate form of authority (Brecher 1997). The nature of unions as an adequate embodiment of worker solidarity has served as another line of inquiry. One seminal work addressing this topic claims that all bureaucratic institutions – not excluding labor unions – inevitably individualize workers and reduce their sense of solidarity, and consequently diminish their potential for collective action (Fantasia 1988).

POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

Once legal restrictions encumber the strike’s initiation and manifestation or when business unions lead them, strikes tend to be more rational, strategic, and disciplined. The US political and legal environment has changed, and has thereby had a tremendous effect on the use of the strike and its prevalence. Following is a list of the US major labor laws affecting the use of the strike (Roberts 1971).

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 prohibited actions in restraint of free trade and competition. Even though corporate abuse was its original intended target, it was often used by employers against labor unions. Injunctions, which are prohibitory writs issued by courts to restrain individuals or groups from committing inequitable acts, were many times granted to employers to end picketing and/or boycotts. The Clayton Act of 1914 unsuccessfully attempted to make unions exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act and from injunctions. The 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act succeeded in restricting the use of injunctions. The Railway Labor Act (1926, extended to airlines in 1934) required mediation and voluntary arbitration in railroad (and airline) disputes. A very important part of the New Deal legislation was the National Industrial Recovery Act (Section 7a) of 1933, which gave workers the right to organize, to be free from interference or coercion of employers in their attempts to organize, and prevented
the requirement that workers join company unions. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935 was passed one month after the Supreme Court ruled NIRA Section 7a unconstitutional. It established workers’ right to organize and set up machinery (National Labor Relations Board) for holding elections. This act established unfair labor practices prohibiting discrimination against workers due to union membership, prohibited company unions, and required employers to bargain with unions that are the lawful representative of its employees.

During World War II, the tripartite National War Labor Board (1942) settled disputes. This followed the AFL’s and CIO’s commitment to a no strike pledge during the duration of the war in exchange for employers’ promise to freeze prices. However prices were not kept constant, and though the no strike pledge was (largely) honored for the first two years, strikes then became more prevalent than before the war.

The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 represents a major retreat from labor protections. Taft-Hartley was passed in the aftermath of the post-war strike wave and attempted to equalize bargaining power by providing a series of union unfair labor practices. It limited union security provisions (outlawing the closed shop and automatic check-off of union dues), established procedures for handling national emergency disputes (including the use of an 80-day injunction during fact finding), made collective agreements enforceable by the courts, set up conciliation and mediation services, required union leaders to sign non-communist affidavits as a leadership requirement, mandated unions file financial statements, and outlawed certain types of strikes (e.g., secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes). The Taft-Hartley Act also made the unions more susceptible to injunctions. The Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law) of 1967 is one of over 30 state laws that cover public employment relations. It prohibits public employees from striking and assesses penalties for violations against the union and employees involved.

As a form of collective action, strikes also develop with respect to broad, encompassing political structures according to political opportunity theory. Beyond the legislation discussed above which directly enabled (or impeded) the ability of workers and unions to call strikes, when analyzing strikes in the US, scholars often use the number of Democratic Party office holders to gauge labor’s access to the political system, as the Democratic Party is more pro-labor than the Republican Party. During the first half of the twentieth century, this relationship did indeed hold, as times with more democrats in Congress also featured more frequent strike occurrence (Snyder 1975, 1977). Likewise, other studies conclude that a Democratic president in the White House yields an increase in strike activity (Skeels 1971, 1982; Snyder 1977).

TYPES OF STRIKES

Sit-down strikes are actions that involve workers sitting down at their workstations and refusing to leave their places of work. This prevents the need for and the dangers around picketing, because replacement workers are not easily utilized. For employers to defeat sit-down strikes, they would have to employ replacement workers who were willing to engage in face-to-face confrontations at every workstation.

Wildcat strikes are work stoppages called by union employees that do not have union authorization or approval. Normally, it is assumed that these are evidence of a lack of authority of the union (i.e., the union is not able to control its members), but they may also have the informal support of local and/or shop level union representatives.

General strikes are large-scale and coordinated actions by unions that stop all production and commercial activity (with exceptions of necessary supplies) within a given industrial, geographical, or political boundary. They span
multiple unions and firms, and sometimes have revolutionary aims.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor movement; Marxism and social movements; Molly Maguires (United States); Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Resource mobilization theory; Strikes within the European context.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (United States)
RICHARD FLACKS

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was the leading national organization in the white student movement of the 1960s. SDS originated as the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), whose roots were in the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, founded in 1905. The latter group, founded by such notables as Jack London, Upton Sinclair, and Walter Lippmann, became the League for Industrial Democracy in 1921. SLID was its youth wing, and was part of the burgeoning student Left of the 1930s; it declined in membership and visibility through the 1950s. The mobilization of black students beginning in 1960, and the stirrings then of political interest on the part of some grouplets of white students, provided opportunity for a revitalized organized student Left. Al Haber, seeing that the SLID was an organizational shell with some resources, led an effort to change its name to Students for a Democratic Society, and actively recruited a number of student activist leaders to construct an ideological center for the emerging student movement. One of those he recruited, Tom Hayden, editor of the University of Michigan Daily agreed to draft a manifesto for SDS and the wider movement. This draft was debated and adopted, along with a new constitution, at the founding convention of the newly constituted SDS in June 1962, at a United Auto Workers conference center in Port Huron, Michigan. The conference was attended by several dozen students from campuses in the northeast and Midwest. Many of these, like Hayden, were student government leaders and campus activists; a number of leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came to the Port Huron meeting (Miller 1994; Hayden & Flacks 2002; Hayden 2005).

Although SDS’ founding was inspired by the courage and social impact of the Southern student movement, its founders identified with emerging ideological currents in the European and American left – currents which in Great Britain were identifying as the “New Left.” “New Left” refers to a deliberate break with both the communist and social democratic traditions of the “old left” – a stated desire to transcend the terms of the cold war, and the languages of orthodox Marxism. Clues to a new language were found in the writings of such radical intellectuals as C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, and Albert Camus. The Port Huron Statement defined the New Left vision in terms of “participatory democracy” (rather than “socialism”). As a social vision, “participatory democracy” privileged action through social movement and decentralized communities; as an organizational model, it suggested rotating leadership, local autonomy, consensus decision making (Miller 1994).

Although SDS was born out of the strongly anticommunist wing of the social democratic left, it deliberately transgressed the latter’s rules of engagement with those labeled “Stalinist” and “Stalinoid.” The Port Huron Statement criticized the politics of anticommunism as well as communism, and at the convention a “noncommunist” membership requirement was eliminated (Sales 1974; Gitlin 1993).

SDS’ perspectives on the cold war, anticommunism, and the need for a new left proved influential and prophetic even though strongly criticized by LID leaders, who tried to strangle the organization in its cradle. Several revered elders, particularly Norman Thomas and A.J. Muste, stopped the infanticide; eventually SDS split from its “adult” sponsor (Sales 1974).

For a couple of years after its 1962 convention, SDS appeared destined to be a think tank for a new generation of left-wing activists,
providing a bridge between campus and community social action. In 1964, a grant from the United Auto Workers initially was intended to help SDS organize campus support for labor movement and progressive economic issues. After much debate, however, the Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) instead focused on establishing collectives in a variety of northern cities, aimed at organizing on economic issues in primarily white working-class neighborhoods. This effort was, again, inspired by SNCC, who had urged that their white supporters work with poor whites in parallel with SNCC’s southern black organizing work (rather than seeking to “come South” where their presence was increasingly tense). ERAP projects in such cities as Newark, Cleveland, and Chicago became nuclei of ongoing “community unions” that presaged community organizing projects encouraged by federal war on poverty programs. SDS was increasingly identifying itself as a center for youthful activism (mostly off campus), rather than serving as an intellectual center.

SDS’ early founders took it for granted that a majority of college students would be apathetic and largely conservative and didn’t at first envision catalyzing a mass student movement. In the fall of 1964, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement’s character as a mass uprising began to suggest that there might be some potential for an American student movement. At the same time, American participation in the Vietnam War was rapidly escalating. SDS’ most organizationally fateful decision, made in December 1964, was to call for a national student march on Washington demanding US withdrawal from Vietnam scheduled for April 1965.

This call was rather prophetic. President Johnson initiated attacks on North Vietnam in early 1965, and draftees were sent as ground troops that spring. In March, in Ann Arbor, a number of faculty (many close to SDS) initiated a “teach-in” on the war. The teach-in was a kind of reverse strike in which concerned faculty and students met after classes and through the night for a marathon set of discussions, debates, forums, and lectures concerning the war. Thousands participated in the March 25 Ann Arbor teach-in; the form rapidly diffused across campuses, and eventually national teach-ins using a telephone hookup took place.

Antiwar feeling quickly grew among students and faculty; the SDS March in April drew at least 25,000 participants. These events were widely covered in weekly magazines; SDS suddenly was highly visible as the main national organization mobilizing protest against the war. By 1966, as the threat of the draft increased, SDS chapters were leading on-campus protests against military encroachments on campus life: use of class standing for deciding student deferments, use of campus facilities by recruiters for weapons manufacturers, on-campus military research centers and the like. These protests typically involved acts of civil disobedience, followed by police quelling of resistant protesters, mass arrests, and roughing up of protesters, culminating often in large-scale student strikes and rallies to protest treatment of the protests. Hundreds of such episodes, often led by SDS chapters, occurred on campuses across the country. During the same period, SDS initiated or endorsed some national marches and rallies against the war (though increasingly it emphasized local on-campus action and criticized national mobilizations), and encouraged draft resistance and direct action against selective service. A feature of SDS’ organizational life in the second half of the 1960s was that the national organization was often unable to achieve agreement on specific strategies of protest, but local chapters were free to mobilize on their own (Sales 1974; Gitlin 1980, 1993).

SDS’ practice of rotating leadership, combined with the inevitable fluidity of a student membership base, resulted in considerable turnover in national leadership. At the same time the organization’s membership growth far outstripped the capacity of the national office to service local chapters. To a considerable extent, SDS became a symbol of radical identity, rather than a strategically or ideologically coherent national organization. As a result, it was invaded by the Maoist
Progressive Labor Party, which defined SDS as a mass organization (rather than an ideological rival) ripe for takeover. To overcome the challenge, SDS leaders began employing a “more revolutionary than thou” rhetoric; national meetings were characterized by bitter conflict among competing factions. And all the while, SDS was increasingly a target of deliberate efforts to disrupt it by the FBI’s COINTELPRO (Cunningham 2005).

In 1969, the organization split asunder. The “weather” faction, including many national leaders, declared themselves a revolutionary underground and abandoned belief in the revolutionary potential of its bourgeois student base; other factions vied for primacy as true representatives of Maoism (Varon 2004). The demise of SDS as a national organization ironically preceded the largest mass mobilization in American history as 4–5 million students struck and rallied in the aftermath of the Kent State and Jackson State massacres (Gitlin 1993).

SDS, like other movement organizations founded in the 1960s, had a brief existence. Some have interpreted its history as a story of failure or frustration – and many SDS veterans have written memoirs trying to understand its trajectory (e.g., Flacks 1988; Gitlin 1993; Pardun 2001; Oglesby 2008; Rudd 2009; there are many others).

SDS was, however, a crucible for much of the political and cultural change associated with the 1960s. It fostered the vision of “participatory democracy” as a cognitive practice for the Left; catalyzed a mass student movement unprecedented in size and militancy in US history; helped invent the role of “community organizer”; sparked feminist consciousness among activist women rebelling against their marginalization in SDS leadership (Echols 1989); deeply challenged US imperial policy and the legitimacy of conscription. Like student movements through history and around the world, SDS was a training ground for a large number of political actors and intellectuals who continued as change agents in many social arenas. The literature about SDS is vast; many puzzles concerning its dynamics and social impact remain.

SEE ALSO: Activism; Community organizing (United States); Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; New Left and social movements; Participatory democracy in social movements; Student movements; Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States); Weatherman (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States)
FRANCESCA POLLETTA

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was formed in the spring of 1960 to support the student sit-ins against segregation that were sweeping the south. By 1962, the group had metamorphosed into a cadre of activists who combined direct action with political organizing in the most repressive areas of Mississippi and southwest Georgia. Never a membership organization, SNCC (pronounced “Snick”) had 160 staffers at its largest. It lasted only eight years and it could take credit for no landmark civil rights legislation or policy. Yet, then and now, SNCC’s influence far outstripped its size, longevity, or easily measurable accomplishments.

Young, smart, radical, and seemingly fearless, SNCC workers were famous for their willingness to confront Southern apartheid at its starkest, often singing as they were carted off to jail. But their influence came also from their innovative strategies, and these were a result of SNCC’s position at the intersection of two very different activist traditions. SNCC’s founders were tutored in nonviolent direct action by the Gandhian pacifist James Lawson. In campaigns such as the 1961 Freedom Rides, they drew on techniques of passive resistance that had long been used by pacifists, but they stripped direct action of its sober religiosity and made it radical, spontaneous, urgently moral, and effective.

A different tradition came to bear as SNCC moved from direct action to community organizing in 1961–1962. Ella Baker, a former Southern Christian Leadership Conference official, with roots in labor organizing and the cooperative movement, encouraged SNCC activists to work closely with local black activists. SNCC staffer Bob Moses collaborated with longtime Mississippi activist Amzie Moore to launch voter registration projects in the most repressive areas in the state. The plan was to force the Justice Department to intervene to protect black voting. But just as important, SNCC workers saw their task as helping to build enduring black political organizations.

In 1964, frustrated with the government’s unwillingness to act, a coalition of civil rights groups including SNCC brought upward of 800 mainly white students to the state for the summer to help with voter registration efforts and staff alternative schools. After a white volunteer and two other civil rights workers were abducted and killed, the summer project operated within a glare of national publicity. That publicity continued as the SNCC-created Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) challenged the National Democratic Party to seat its delegates, rather than the segregationist regular state party, at the national convention.

The Party refused, granting the MFDP only two symbolic seats. Still, the challenge solidified SNCC’s place among the Big Five of the civil rights organizations. Funding and support were now pouring in, yet the organization found itself in turmoil. Disillusionment with self-professed liberal allies and burnout from the rigors of the summer combined with a sense that the influx of white workers was transforming what had been a predominately black organization into something else. Diverse cleavages crystallized in a battle over organizational structure. At a time when northern New Leftists were celebrating SNCC’s consensus-based decision making, many SNCC activists were castigating participatory democracy as ineffectual and self-indulgent.

By the time the battles over organizational form ended, many SNCC workers had left the south altogether and others had shifted their focus from Mississippi to Alabama. There
SNCC workers helped to form an all-black independent county-level party, the Loundes County Freedom Organization (nicknamed the Black Panther Party). It was in Loundes County that SNCC’s new chair Stokely Carmichael called for “Black Power” on the Meredith March in June 1966. Carmichael’s call came after long and contentious discussions within SNCC about the need to focus on black consciousness, organize separately from whites, and renounce nonviolence. However, few within SNCC had a clear sense of what Black Power should involve programmatically. While some staffers championed the publicity that SNCC spokespeople were increasingly garnering on an international stage, others bemoaned the fact that the organization had all but abandoned grassroots organizing for speechmaking. At the same time, increased government surveillance and the loss of funding led many to drift away from the organization. By 1969, when chair H. Rap Brown changed the group’s name to the Student National Coordinating Committee, it had little national presence and by 1971 it had stopped operating.

For a small organization with a short lifespan, SNCC’s political influence was outsize. It made popular tactics of direct action and community organizing; created, in the MFDP, an organization that would remain central in efforts to gain black electoral representation; inspired a generation’s enthusiasm for consensus-based decision making; produced an early salvo in the rise of second wave feminism; and developed influential black cultural projects such as the Free Southern Theater and the Freedom Singers.

SNCC has figured in numerous theories of movement dynamics: in McAdam’s theory of recruitment to high risk activism and in his analysis of the biographical consequences of movement participation; in Morris’s theory of the organizational basis of mobilization; in Robnett’s account of “bridge leadership” in which women perform essential, if often unrecognized, leadership tasks; in Polletta’s analysis of participatory democracy’s strengths and weaknesses; and in Evans and Boyte’s theory of the role of “free spaces” in spurring protest.

SEE ALSO: Black Power movement (United States); Civil rights movement (United States); Direct action; Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Freedom Summer (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Suffrage movement, international
REBECCA J. MEAD

Voting is considered an inherent right of citizenship in modern democracies, an idea originating in Enlightenment ideology but not automatically achieved in practice. In the past, proposals to expand the franchise to include nonproperty-holding white men were quite controversial, so the concept of suffrage for women and people of color was an even more radical suggestion given their putative lack of rational capacities. Dominant gender roles confined women to the domestic sphere while husbands or other male kinfolk represented their political interests, and challenging these ideas was difficult. Even when women gained voting rights, these were frequently partial (allowing participation in some elections but not others), restricted by marital status, education, property qualifications, and race, and did not automatically grant other civil rights. Winning full suffrage required hard work by determined women – it was never a "gift" – and success was the result of multiple factors. These include: (1) educational advances; (2) the growing presence of women in the workforce and trade unions; (3) the increasing political sophistication and mobilization of women in clubs and reform organizations; (4) affiliations between suffragists and progressive reform movements; (5) fluid political environments in territories, provinces, and colonies; (6) the adoption of direct action techniques; and (7) transnational activism, although these relationships could be problematic.

Traditionally, suffrage studies have focused on the achievement of national suffrage by privileged women in the industrializing countries of North America and Europe, but more recent scholarship examines exclusionary as well as inclusionary factors, cross-class, race, and gender coalitions, transnational connections, areas that lacked established national boundaries and independent democratic political systems, and the partial and sequential nature of the process as it moved from the peripheries to the centers of power. In particular, the international nature of suffrage activism is a flourishing area of current research that transcends the boundaries of nationalistic histories and addresses the dynamics of imperialism. Women’s rights activism has always been a transnational phenomenon, providing invaluable encouragement to isolated women through letters, visits, publications, conferences, and formal organizations. In the 1830s, utopian socialism and abolitionism linked women in America and Europe and catalyzed their efforts to achieve equal rights. Between 1848 and 1852 the revolutionary movements that swept Europe stimulated an explosion of feminist enthusiasm and organization which inspired the first American women’s rights convention at Seneca Falls. When reactionary forces crushed the democratic insurgencies and ruthlessly suppressed political organizing for decades, European women took heart from the vivacity of the American movement.

In 1888, American leaders established the International Council of Women (ICW) hoping to promote international suffrage activism, but they were disappointed because the organization avoided controversial issues (like suffrage) and most of its constituents were preoccupied with moral reform campaigns, especially temperance and prostitution. This emphasis did not prevent the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) from playing a vital role in early transnational suffrage organizing, however. In the early twentieth century a resurgence of feminism transformed suffrage activism into a mass movement in many countries and created new organizations at all levels. Between 1890 and
1915 a powerful international feminist socialist movement developed, often in open hostility to and in competition with “bourgeois” women, but with a shared concern for female economic independence and the rights of the growing numbers of wage-earning women. In 1904, the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) was established by suffragists frustrated by the broad program and conservatism of the ICW. The organization continued to expand into the 1920s, incorporating chapters from regions outside the Anglo-European core and providing suffragists in those areas with support in their struggles for enfranchisement. Nationalism and imperialism could and did affect many suffrage struggles and limit transnational cooperation. For example, many US suffragists who resented their own lack of political autonomy nevertheless advocated the imposition of woman suffrage on colonial peoples in violation of their rights to self-determination. Nevertheless, the constant efforts of woman suffragists to overcome national, class, racial, religious, and logistical barriers in order to create and sustain international ties clearly indicates the importance of these networks of friendship, collegiality, and organizational authority.

Prior to the radical political shifts catalyzed by the Enlightenment, male suffrage was heavily restricted by property ownership, but some women in medieval Europe and colonial America could vote if they were taxpayers, property owners, or independent heads of households. Revolutionary democratic movements did not automatically guarantee equal citizenship rights, although they did provide powerful philosophical arguments useful in future struggles. In 1776, New Jersey women could vote if they met the property qualifications (which few did, since married women could not own property independently), but they were disfranchised in 1807. During the French Revolution, philosopher Antoine Condorcet and feminist Olympe de Gouges argued for women’s rights, but in 1793 the Jacobin-controlled Assembly rejected their arguments, passed measures prohibiting female political activity, and sent de Gouges to the guillotine and Condorcet to prison, where he died mysteriously. The political exclusion of many working-class or racial-ethnic men necessitated long struggles for universal male suffrage. Although woman suffragists often developed crucial alliances with labor, socialist, or civil rights activists, these men generally considered universal male suffrage a prerequisite for female enfranchisement and rejected partial measures that would disproportionately benefit elite women. Indeed, woman suffragists sometimes argued that their votes could undermine the political influence of radical groups, used racist or nativist arguments, and supported exclusionary measures.

In the US, gender discrimination within the abolitionist movement eventually led to the foundational 1848 Seneca Falls women’s rights convention, but the suffrage movement split after the American Civil War. When the Fifteenth Amendment proposed to prohibit voting discrimination because of race, but said nothing about sex, some prominent suffragists accepted this compromise as the best deal possible under the circumstances, but Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony disagreed and demanded immediate universal suffrage. This controversy resulted in the establishment of two separate suffrage organizations in 1869: Stanton and Anthony organized the National Woman Suffrage Association while Lucy Stone, Henry Blackwell, and others created the American Woman Suffrage Association. Until they merged to become the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1890, these two groups pursued different strategies. The AWSA tried to win suffrage at the state and territorial level, while the NWSA pushed for a federal amendment and tried to gain the vote through creative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This “New Departure” strategy argued that voting was a right of citizenship and since women were citizens they should be able to vote. Women who went to the polls to test this theory (including Anthony) were usually unsuccessful. In 1875, the US Supreme Court rejected this argument when it
ruled that voting was a privilege, not a right of citizenship (Minor v. Happersett).

By necessity, US suffragists turned to territorial and state campaigns which generally failed. Early suffragists were politically inexperienced and handicapped by criticisms that they violated prescriptive gender norms. Over time they developed an array of organizational skills, arguments, and tactics and learned to maneuver through the political system, but they experienced many defeats and disappointments in the process. They had some success in convincing small territorial legislatures to grant woman suffrage – in Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870), and Washington (1884; disfranchised in 1887) – but usually state legislatures would not accept responsibility for directly enfranchising women. At best, they would authorize a referendum which required suffragists to conduct statewide public campaigns. Reviewing the record in 1916, NAWSA president Carrie Chapman Catt counted 480 state legislative campaigns and 41 state referenda resulting in only nine state or territorial victories, all in the western US. These successes were significant in establishing important precedents and creating a body of four million western women voters by 1915, as well as many veteran activists. These western connections have received inadequate historical attention, as studies of the US movement generally focus on the East Coast, the militancy of Alice Paul and the National Woman’s Party (NWP), and the final push for the federal amendment.

In the early twentieth century, the US suffrage struggle became a mass movement reinvigorated by a new generation of activists who renewed the effort to win a federal amendment. Like Paul, some learned confrontational methods from their experiences with British suffragettes. The NWP activists picketed the White House, suffered arrests and forced feeding, and infuriated President Wilson and the mainstream NAWSA leadership, but they made it clear that they would persevere until successful. Eventually the Nineteenth Amendment squeaked through Congress, but the ratification process almost failed due to implacable opposition in the South. Since the 1890s, some suffragists had been willing to compromise with racism and segregation in order to gain southern support, but this “Southern strategy” had no success. Finally, in 1920 the Tennessee state legislature ratified the amendment – by one vote – when a young representative changed his position at his mother’s request. Enfranchisement within a segregated polity did not guarantee other civil rights, however, especially for African-American women.

Like the US, Canada and Australia were settled rapidly by Anglo-Europeans and a decentralized political system allowed provinces to determine their suffrage requirements. By 1900, municipal female suffrage was widespread, and beginning in 1916 several western Canadian provinces granted provincial suffrage. In 1917 Canadian women gained limited federal suffrage, with full enfranchisement in 1918. Nevertheless, several provinces subsequently lagged in granting provincial suffrage – the last was Québec in 1940. In New Zealand, efforts to enfranchise women narrowly failed in 1878, 1879, and 1887. After full male suffrage was established in 1889, an innovative Liberal-Labor government passed woman suffrage in 1893. South Australia enfranchised women in 1894, Western Australia in 1899, and New South Wales in 1902. These victories were due to cross-class coalitions of woman suffragists and Labor-Liberal politicians supported by the WCTU. In 1902, the constitution of the new Australian Commonwealth enfranchised white women to maintain consistency with the areas that had already granted female suffrage. To settle the “race question,” the constitution disfranchised all Aboriginal peoples, a provision which was not rescinded until 1966.

In northern Europe, the earliest successes were in Scandinavia. In 1906, relative political autonomy from Russia, universal male suffrage, and a strong socialist movement allowed Finnish women to become the first in the world who could both vote and stand for office. As a result, 19 women became members of parliament in 1907, inaugurating a long tradition
of female participation in national politics. Norwegian women who met certain property requirements could vote in 1907, additional reforms allowed most women to vote in local elections in 1910, and the Norwegian parliament passed full female suffrage in 1913. In Sweden, some women taxpayers were allowed to vote in the mid-1700s, but these rights were abolished in 1771. In 1862, tax-paying women who were unmarried or widowed regained the local franchise. Parliament rejected full suffrage for women in 1906, but allowed married women to vote in municipal elections, and in 1909 women won the right to stand for local election. Despite the election of many women to municipal councils and female involvement in trade unions and social democratic politics, Swedish women did not gain national suffrage until 1919. In Denmark women were allowed to participate in municipal elections in 1909, but could not vote for the national legislature until 1915.

In Great Britain, the publication of Mary Wollstonecraft’s book, *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792), is considered the beginning of the women’s rights movement, but it became a political movement in association with efforts to expand the franchise for British men. In 1867, John Stuart Mill introduced a woman suffrage amendment to the proposed Reform Bill, followed by his famous article, “The Subjection of Women,” in 1869, the same year women taxpayers won the municipal vote. In 1897, 17 suffrage organizations consolidated as National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) under the leadership of Millicent Garrett Fawcett, the wife of a member of parliament. Without universal suffrage, however, even the most progressive male politicians resisted the enfranchisement of women.

In 1903, the most famous British suffrage organization, the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU), was founded in Manchester by members of the Pankhurst family and others who were dissatisfied with the lack of progress. Manchester had a vigorous early suffrage movement which involved many working-class women who borrowed militant tactics from the labor movement. Initially the WSPU worked with the Labour Party to support a variety of social reforms, but after 1905, the Pankhurs dropped this commitment, focused solely on woman suffrage, shifted their attention to middle-class women, and moved to London. They began to attack whichever political party was in power and to oppose to all legislation that did not address their demands. Through public meetings, confrontations, and disruptive tactics that led to arrests and imprisonment, the suffragettes gained much publicity and some sympathy. Their efforts seemed to produce results when Parliament considered a measure that would enfranchise female “householders,” but when the bill stalled, a WPSU delegation stormed the House of Commons on “Black Friday” (November 18, 1910). They were assaulted by the police and over a hundred women were arrested, creating a public relations disaster for the government. Subsequently WPSU violence escalated to include arson, bombings, and other attacks on persons and property. In 1913, Emily Davison became a suffrage martyr when she died after throwing herself in front of the king’s horse at the Epsom Derby. Imprisoned WPSU militants began hunger strikes and publicized the brutality of force-feeding, which won them public sympathy and seriously embarrassed the government.

These actions made it clear that the suffragettes were willing to die for their cause, but World War I interrupted further progress. Under the strict control of the Pankhursts, the WPSU adopted a patriotic pro-war stance and stopped campaigning, alienating antiwar members and causing organizational splits. The issue of home rule in Ireland also complicated the British movement. Irish Unionist women suffragists had been active since the 1860s, and in 1900 Republican women began forming their own groups. The program of the failed 1916 Easter Uprising promised universal suffrage and equal rights to all citizens, reflecting the participation of many women in Irish nationalist politics. In 1918, Parliament granted the vote to women in Great Britain who were over
the age of 30, householders, the wives of householders, or graduates of British universities, but full suffrage was not achieved until 1928.

The argument that women’s contributions to national war efforts earned the gratitude of politicians and resulted in female enfranchisement has enjoyed broad popularity because it is a nationalist narrative that emphasizes the generosity of men rather than the continuing struggles of women. Suffragists always insisted that the vote was a basic right of citizenship, not something that could be earned. In fact, the impact of World War I on the movement was frequently problematic. Organizations split over support or opposition to the war, energies were diverted into war-related activities, and many victories were partial. In the Netherlands, women won the right to run for national office in 1917, but full suffrage was delayed until 1919. Belgian women could vote locally after 1921, but they had to wait until 1948 for full enfranchisement.

Postwar geopolitical reorganization and revolutionary instability profoundly affected the suffrage movement. After the overthrow of the czar in February 1917, Russia granted universal suffrage which was reconfirmed by the Bolsheviks when they seized power. Under Soviet influence, Latvia and Estonia granted women the right to vote in 1918, followed by Belarus and Ukraine in 1919. Free of foreign domination for the first time in over a century, Poland granted full woman suffrage in 1918. In Austria, universal male suffrage was not fully established until 1907, but female enfranchisement was not achieved until after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the formulation of a new constitution in 1918. In the 1920s, other new nations emerging from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires granted women suffrage: Czechoslovakia (1918); Albania (1920); Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania (1921); Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan (1924); Turkmenistan (1927); Romania (1929); and Turkey (1930).

In Germany, the replacement of monarchy by democracy also resulted in female enfranchisement. In the late 1800s, universal male suffrage and female political participation was limited by the regime of Chancellor Bismarck. Middle-class women established various feminist organizations by the 1900s, but the main force in the German suffrage movement was socialist women. Despite government repression, German socialists built the most powerful movement in Europe by the early 1900s, and Clara Zetkin became the principal German socialist suffrage leader. Zetkin advocated suffrage to strengthen working-class power but reinforced the essentialism of women as as wives and mothers, perhaps to allay concerns that socialists would radically disrupt traditional family and gender roles. Zetkin actively participated in international socialist women’s activities but scorned collaboration with middle-class suffragists because she considered reformism and feminism as distractions from the revolutionary class struggle. There was also a significant German movement advocating expanded mother’s rights, including greater sexual and reproductive freedom and broader government maternal support policies. By November 1918, Germany was in crisis. The Social Democrats took control, signed the armistice, and announced many reforms, including universal suffrage. Although the radical revolutionaries were forcefully defeated in their efforts to implement a communist government, the 1919 constitution of the Weimar Republic confirmed full suffrage.

In France, woman suffrage was consistently linked to revolutionary activism. Given the chronic instability of the French state, equality for women was perceived by some as a threat to social stability, public order, and the family, while radical anticlerical politicians argued that women would be conservative, pro-family and pro-church voters. In 1848, the provisional French Republic proclaimed universal suffrage as a basic right – except for women, who were legally forbidden to attend political meetings on the grounds that their proper place was in the home. When two persistent French suffragists, Jeanne Deroin and Pauline Roland, formed a women’s rights association they were arrested and given six-month
prison terms. After the collapse of the Second Republic, the Commune, and the founding of the Third Republic in 1871, the tension between anticlerical republicans and Catholic monarchists polarized French political life, but both resisted equal rights for women. For many years, the suffrage movement was led most notably by Hubertine Auclert (who coined the term féminisme), but it was internally fragmented and centered in Paris. Despite a vigorous public debate on women’s rights issues and some legislative support for granting municipal suffrage, the measure failed in the early 1900s.

French suffragists resumed their efforts after World War I, but the country’s terrible wartime losses led to pro-natalist policies which emphasized female domestic and reproductive functions at the expense of their individual rights. Female enfranchisement by communists also reinforced fears that gender equality would undermine traditional French society. In the interwar years, suffragists remained active and the debate continued, but progress was limited. Although the Chamber of Deputies passed enfranchisement measures in 1919, 1925, 1932, and 1935, the Senate consistently rejected them. Finally, in June 1942, while the country was under Nazi occupation, Charles de Gaulle promised that “all our women” could vote in the next National Assembly election. In 1944, the provisional government confirmed this right and French women participated in the assembly elections in 1945. While technically French citizens, Muslim women in Algeria were not enfranchised until 1958.

Suffragists experienced similar difficulties in other countries with unstable democratic institutions and strong Catholic traditions. In early twentieth-century Spain, suffragists organized a Supreme Feminist Council and petitioned Parliament. In 1931, the constitution and legislation of the new Spanish Republic granted women the vote, full legal status, and many other rights. In the 1933 elections, however, a conservative victory seemed to confirm fears that women influenced by the Catholic church would vote for reactionary candidates and thus endanger the Republic. After the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco rescinded earlier women’s rights legislation. Although female heads of households were allowed to vote in referenda, political participation meant little under his dictatorship. After Franco’s death, the 1978 constitution restored democratic principles and established equal rights for women.

Portuguese women gained expanded rights when a republic was established in 1910, excluding the right to vote. After a fascist coup in 1926, Portuguese women were allowed to vote in 1931, but only if they met certain educational requirements which did not apply to men. In 1933, the constitution stated they everyone was equal under the law “except for women, the differences resulting from their nature and for the good of the family.” After another coup in 1974, women were granted full political rights. Greece passed limited female suffrage in the 1930s, but only in municipal elections to women who were both literate and 30 years or older. Full suffrage was achieved in 1952.

As in many other countries, feminism emerged as a social force in Latin America late in the nineteenth century as a consequence of modernization. Progressives argued that improvements in the status of women were necessary for social, political, and economic development, while urban elite and middle-class professional women protested their limited educational and vocational opportunities. Throughout the hemisphere, they expanded their professional associations through a series of women’s congresses encouraged and supported by the ICW, and they established several pan-American women’s associations. Latin American women relied upon these international connections because of the weak condition of democratic politics in their home countries. Universal male suffrage for Latin American men was rare until the 1910s and 1920s, and political circumstances frequently interfered with the exercise of this right.

As in Europe, debates about female suffrage often centered on the conservative influence of the Catholic church, and even many women’s
rights activists worried that enfranchising women would endanger other progressive reforms. Although Ecuador was the first Latin American country to grant women the vote in 1929, it was passed by conservative politicians who were confident of female support and limited to literate women. Thus many Latin American women’s rights activists initially prioritized education and other reforms and developed strongly maternalist arguments for suffrage that emphasized female difference, economic vulnerability, and contributions to social reforms. The Brazilian Federation for the Emancipation of Women (FBPF), formed in 1920 under the leadership of Bertha Lutz, articulated a broad program demanding civil rights and protective labor legislation for women. In addition to suffrage organization and publicity, female enfranchise in the small state of Rio Grande do Norte in 1927 established an important precedent, and a new electoral code enfranchising women under the same conditions as men was implemented in 1932.

The growing involvement of working-class women and socialists in populist political movements broadened public support for suffrage but did not guarantee women the vote. The 1917 Mexican Constitution granted major improvements in the rights of women and extended voting rights to all citizens, but women were excluded from that category. A counterrevolutionary coup in 1924 terminated a socialist experiment with woman suffrage in the state of Mérida. Encouraged by the election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934, Mexican suffragists renewed their efforts. With his support, an amendment passed both houses of the Mexican Congress in 1938, but stalled during the ratification process. Mexican women were not enfranchised until 1953. In Peru in the 1920s, women’s rights activists associated with the revolutionary Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) coalition repressed their demands in favor of political solidarity with their male comrades. Expressing concern about Peruvian women’s dependence upon men, their general lack of education, and the influence of the Catholic church, they expressed only qualified support for limited female suffrage. The measure finally passed in 1955.

In contrast, influential Argentinian suffragists denounced the exclusion of women from political life and rejected the idea of restricted suffrage. The differences reflected conditions in the respective countries. The nations of the Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) had vigorous progressive movements and democratic traditions that supported women’s rights activism, but Peru and Colombia generally lacked these foundations. Although the small Colombian state of Vélez enfranchised women in 1927, the national supreme court annulled this action and subsequent constitutional reforms explicitly excluded women from voting. After 1948 a violent civil war delayed further progress until the Colombiant dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, granted female citizenship in 1954. Argentine men gained universal suffrage in 1912, and the state of San Juan enfranchised women in 1927 but the national government ended that experiment in 1930 and the senate continued to block woman suffrage bills. In 1947, the populist president, Juan Péron, and his wife, Eva, mobilized female support for the peronista cause, leading to the enfranchisement of Argentine women. Uruguay adopted universal male suffrage and other constitutional reforms in 1916. Uruguayan feminists stressed female difference, not gender equality, and the obligation of the state to protect vulnerable women. Their nonthreatening position gained the support of conservatives and the Catholic church, and in 1932 the senate approved woman suffrage without discussion. In 1920, Chilean men received universal suffrage and a supportive populist president was elected, stimulating the growth of middle-class women’s feminist and suffrage organizations. Literate Chilean women received municipal suffrage in 1934, but continuing political instability and conservative resistance delayed full suffrage until 1948.
In Asia, woman suffrage was also associated with progressive political movements. During the Japanese Meiji Restoration, the government’s rapid push for modernization led to greater opportunities for female education and vigorous public debate about democratic reforms, including woman suffrage. Women began to participate in political meetings and in a few towns they exercised the right to vote. Alarmed by this enthusiasm, the government granted limited suffrage to men and prohibited political activities by various groups, including women. Additional laws codified women’s proper role as a wife and mother with no legal rights independent of husbands. Efforts to contest these laws were encouraged by the Japanese WCTU (established in Tokyo in 1886), but the organization’s moral reform program challenged traditional values and generated controversy.

In 1921, the Japanese Women’s Suffrage Association was organized within the WCTU, but religious and political differences hampered coalitional efforts until 1924, when the Women’s Suffrage League was formed. In 1925, Japan authorized universal male suffrage, eliciting protests from Japanese women who were excluded. In 1930, a bill to grant women local suffrage passed the House of Representatives but was blocked by the conservative House of Peers. Larger political developments soon engulfed the movement: by 1931, Japan was at war with China and male support for suffrage was designed to win women’s patriotic cooperation in imperial expansionism. Many suffragists did not comply, adopting convention resolutions against fascism (1932) and reduced military spending (1933). After 1937, they stopped holding annual conventions, and the League disbanded in 1940. After the war, suffragists regrouped and successfully requested that the government support woman suffrage. Their demand was confirmed by General Douglas MacArthur and additional constitutional revisions in 1946 eliminated other gender inequities. Thus it would be misleading to conclude that Japanese women were “given” the vote by the American occupational regime without acknowledging their long struggle and quick action to gain their rights in the new political order.

As in Japan, a small number of educated, progressive Chinese women were intensely involved in the revolution that established the Republic of China in 1911. When the 1912 constitution excluded women from political participation, they immediately began lobbying, parading, and protesting, including attacks on parliament buildings in direct emulation of the British suffragettes. Their efforts ended when repressive new laws banned many democratic political activities and groups, including the Women’s Suffrage Alliance. As China descended into political chaos in the 1920s, suffragists focused on provinces that declared independence from the central government and implemented democratic reforms resulting in four provincial constitutions that guaranteed women equal political rights. In 1936, the draft constitution of the national government proposed “universal, equal, and direct suffrage,” but war intervened and the document did not become official until 1947. After the communists took over in 1949, they co-opted the narrative of women’s liberation, celebrating the achievements of communist women and eliminating the contributions of noncommunist suffragists from official histories.

After World War II, many nations passed voting rights for women, especially after the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Oddly, Switzerland instituted universal male suffrage in 1848, but did not enfranchise women nationally until 1971 due to the decentralized nature of the Swiss canton system and deep conservatism in isolated areas. Suffrage activism began in the late nineteenth century, but sustained pressure by women’s groups, the Social Democratic party, and the trade unions was fruitless. After World War II, referenda failed repeatedly in most cantons. The 1971 referendum passed nationally with 66 percent of the vote, but several cantons still rejected it. Finally, in 1990 the federal supreme court ordered the last
hold-out (the canton of Appenzell) to comply with the federal constitution which guarantees equal rights to men and women.

In other areas, equal enfranchisement sometimes resulted from colonial rule but it was usually part of the decolonization process. Indian women gained suffrage under the Government of India Act of 1935, and this right was reaffirmed following independence by the 1949 Indian constitution. Universal suffrage generally accompanied decolonization in Africa. Technically, many Middle Eastern countries granted suffrage after World War II, but electoral participation is often limited. For example, in 2004 Saudi Arabia banned women from voting in the first national elections and their future inclusion remains uncertain. Factors that have worked in the past to disfranchise many people – including political instability, lack of commitment to or rejection of democratic principles, and racial and gender prejudices – are still powerful. Indigenous peoples, in particular, continue to struggle for inclusion in their national political systems despite policies and practices intended to marginalize them. Much current research on suffrage examines these exclusions, often within analyses of larger conceptions about the meaning of citizenship, because these remain highly significant and contested issues in the contemporary world.

SEE ALSO: Democracy and social movements; Democratization and democratic transition; Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Organizations and movements; Rights and rights movements; Transnational social movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Sendero Luminoso/Shining Path (Peru)
CYNTHIA MCCLINTOCK

Sendero Luminoso or “Shining Path” was an unforgiving Maoist rebellion that emerged in Peru’s remote, impoverished southern highlands and began violent attacks in 1980. Led by Abimael Guzmán, a former philosophy professor in the southern highlands town of Ayacucho, the Shining Path expanded across vast swathes of Peru and by the late 1980s and early 1990s was active in the capital, Lima. The conflict between the Shining Path and Peru’s security forces was the most violent in the country’s twentieth-century history; it was estimated that, by 2000, 69,200 people had been killed; 75 percent of the victims spoke the indigenous language, Quechua (CVR 2004).

The Shining Path was very different from other Latin American insurgencies. First, it was brutal; it was the perpetrator of the majority of the killings, 54 percent, versus the military’s 30 percent (CVR 2004). Sendero’s targets included not only soldiers and police but agronomists, journalists, teachers, nuns, priests, and even militants of left-wing and grassroots groups. Second, whereas most Latin American insurgencies were political movements with diverse factions, the Shining Path resembled a religious cult, whose deity was Guzmán. Also, most Latin American insurgencies were formed out of rage at repressive dictatorial regimes; but in 1980 Peru had just returned to elected civilian government. Further, support for the Shining Path from foreign countries was insignificant; its funds were derived from the drug trade.

For scholars, the puzzling question was: How could such a sectarian, savage movement have posed a threat to the Peruvian state? How did it gain 25,000 militants and the support of roughly 15 percent of Peruvians (McClintock 1998)? All analysts agreed that Peru’s society was deeply divided and that Peru’s indigenous peoples had long been excluded and impoverished; Peru’s truth and reconciliation commission emphasized these points. But why did Sendero emerge in the 1980s?

Challenging in particular the work of Theda Skocpol, Peru’s foremost analysts advanced a voluntarist explanation; they highlighted the importance of Guzmán’s leadership and the character of the revolutionary organization itself (Degregori 1994; Gorriti 1999). Gorriti emphasized Guzmán’s image as a brilliant intellectual; dubbing himself the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” (the first three being Marx, Lenin, and Mao), Guzmán appeared to be a “philosopher-king” and, in a country whose indigenous peoples traditionally revered the sun, the “Puka Inti” (“Red Sun”) (Gorriti 1999). Degregori emphasized that the teachers and students in Peru’s southern highlands were at this time painfully distancing themselves from their traditional peasant communities and were yet excluded from “modern” Peru; in the Shining Path’s rigid ideology and strictly hierarchical organization they found solace (Degregori 1994).

As Sendero expanded into more prosperous regions of Peru, scholars began to emphasize the interplay between economic and political factors (McClintock 1998; Taylor 2006). With respect to the scholarly debate between Theda Skocpol and James Scott about the significance of economic factors to peasant rebellion, McClintock and Taylor sided with Scott: a real threat to peasants’ subsistence and a dramatic erosion of Peruvian living standards were catalysts to Peru’s rebellion (McClintock 1998; Taylor 2006). In turn, the economic devastation eroded state legitimacy and created opportunities for a shrewd revolutionary organization; Sendero’s actions provoked human rights abuses, which further delegitimated the state (Taylor 1996; McClintock 1998).
In 1992, Guzmán was captured at his Lima hideout by a specially-formed elite police-intelligence squad. Although Alberto Fujimori was president at the time and took credit for the capture, the successful police intelligence squad had been formed by his predecessor, Alan García. Scholars concur that his capture was pivotal to turning the tide of the war. Immediately, Guzmán’s charismatic image was punctured; behind bars, he was revealed not as a deity but a paunchy middle-aged man with a ragged beard and thick glasses. Scholars also agree that, by this time, Sendero was losing support in the highlands; its brutality was alienating peasants at the same time that the security forces’ human rights violations were reduced. In part as a result, many peasants were inclined to join government-sponsored armed self-defense patrols, called rondas campesinas, and these were also important to Sendero’s defeat. Much more controversial was the draconian antiterrorist legislation and repression, especially in universities, under the Fujimori government (1990–2000).

By the mid-1990s, Sendero was decimated. In the new millennium, remnants of Sendero continued to operate, but virtually exclusively in Peru’s coca-producing areas. The raison d’être for these Senderista groups was not ideology but cash from the drug trade.

For highland Peruvians and for scholars, the most important questions in the new millennium were whether or not the community members on different sides in the war could reconcile and whether or not victims’ families could be compensated in a meaningful way. At the same time that these questions loomed, the vast majority of Peruvians were tremendously relieved that “the time of fear” had ended.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Cults; Guerrilla movements; Peasant movements; Repression and social movements; Revolutions; Terrorist movements; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Symbolic crusades
SHAUNA A. MORIMOTO and STEVEN WORDEN

Looking back from today’s diverse and fluid society, American theorists in the first half of the twentieth century appear to have been unduly narrow in their collective action theorizing. Early studies addressed primarily instrumentally oriented forms of collective action. Specifically, research focused on those that sought mainly to advance or defend the tangible economic or political interests of their adherents. Analysts dismissed noneconomic or nonclass-related struggles as trivial, epiphenomenal, or expressions of personal pathologies. Thus, theorists offered few frameworks equipped to analyze struggles to reform or ban noneconomic practices and preferences, especially those that did not appear to directly affect the activists themselves.

Yet the question remained unasked: Why would people form movements aimed at abolishing or drastically altering certain practices, especially when participants personally seemed to have little or nothing to lose by the persistence of the targeted practices? Such neglect was peculiar especially in light of America’s rich history of general reform movements: the abolitionist movement, the temperance movement, antipornography movements, various public education reform movements, sundry health fads, and the long tradition of anti-animal cruelty movements.

In the mid-1950s, Joseph Gusfield began redress this neglect with his initial theorizing of the “symbolic crusade.” According to Gusfield (1963) symbolic crusades are movements that do not seek utilitarian or instrumental outcomes, but instead focus on reforming or restricting behavior for the symbolic purposes of enhancing activists’ status or prestige. Although Gusfield’s formulation has been critiqued, theorizing the symbolic aspects of collective action represented an important shift in understanding social movements.

ROOTS OF THE THEORY

In his early research on the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, Gusfield documented the organizational effects of a slide in the prestige formerly enjoyed by advocates of abstinence, as they went from being admired as bold humanitarian reformers to being regarded as figures of ridicule. Gusfield further elaborated this theme of loss of status group prestige in the context of social change in his seminal work, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement. In this work, he most fully formulated a theory of disinterested, noneconomically instrumental movements.

BASICS OF THE THEORY

Drawing upon Max Weber’s concept of social status, Gusfield argued that just as social class exists in a stratified system, social status is similarly stratified and allocated. Status groups exist as they set themselves apart from other status groups on the basis of common values, moral standards, and consumption patterns such as housing, transportation, and leisure activities. But, as Gusfield pointed out, whereas class is manifested in control and power, prestige is communicated through the giving and receiving of acts of deference on the basis of a way of life. Thus, status groups establish themselves in a hierarchy as deference is accorded to the distinctive values, customs, and habits associated with status groups. Such customs, habits, and styles of life, in turn, also serve to identify membership within a status group. But as society changes, members of a status group may find themselves not sufficiently respected for their way of life.
When one group’s “status discontents,” as Gusfield termed them, perceive that another group is withholding the respect, admiration, and approval that they believe is their group’s due, they may attempt to assert their position in the hierarchy through ceremonies of symbolic defense. Status discontents may contend with other status groups in the political arena, competing over the allocation of prestige through the legislative or judicial process. In such instances, one status group may struggle to formally institutionalize their own values over others, through the passage of legislation. Gusfield terms such activities “status politics.” Understandably, the political arena is an especially valuable resource for status discontents’ negotiating of social status. Indeed, laws help us determine what is culturally acceptable and shape values.

Symbolic crusade theorists would cite instances of status politics as actions by status discontents to increase the allocation of approval and admiration that they feel their status groups’ values deserve. Thus, Gusfield would consider these results as status movements’ successes undertaken on behalf of status communities or status collectivities.

Gusfield’s contribution to social movement theorizing was to see these efforts in their full dramatictistic significance as they were performed in the highly visible theater of state politics. On that stage, symbolic acts take place that confer legitimacy and prestige on selected status communities and correspondingly lower the prestige of others. Situating his perspective in the dramatistic perspective of Kenneth Burke, Susanne Langer, Clifford Geertz, Erving Goffman, Murray Edelman, and Hugh D. Duncan, Gusfield identified the state as the crucial venue in which status communities carry out the performance of dominance and recognition. As he noted: “Issues which seem foolish or impractical items are often important for what they symbolize about the style or culture which is being recognized or derogated. Being acts of deference or degradation, the individual finds in governmental action that his own perceptions of his status in the society are confirmed or rejected” (Gusfield 1963: 11).

Prior to Gusfield’s work, theorists simplistically dismissed the entry of status movements into the political sphere as anomalous expressions of irrational or paranoid fringe groups or of neurotic individuals caught up in overly emotional expressive movements. Such was especially the case when the groups were religiously affiliated, or culturally and politically conservative (Hofstader 1964).

APPLICATIONS OF SYMBOLIC CRUSADE THEORY

In the case of the temperance movement, Gusfield traced its origins to the decline in prestige and influence of the lifestyle of rural American Protestants vis-à-vis other emerging groups, namely the urban Catholic “indulgent” working class. In response, many adherents of the threatened status group fought to reassert the dominance of their lifestyle by pressing for adherence to its values regarding alcohol consumption. But the movement’s antialcohol orientation was not simply a statement of preferences regarding beverages; more importantly, it provided the symbolic means for proclaiming one’s membership in a status group that valued self-control and industriousness. Furthermore, the fact that Prohibition was essentially unenforceable was of small consequence to the crusaders. What was important was that other rival status groups had to modify their drinking habits according to “our” law. Gusfield thus saw the goal of the temperance movement as being more symbolic than instrumental or utilitarian.

Other social movements, such as anti-pornography crusades in the US and nuclear disarmament campaigns in the UK, have been studied as symbolic crusades (Parkin 1968; Zurcher & Kirkpatrick 1976). Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976), for example, argue that working-class antipornography activists had achieved high status by generating high incomes. Because their occupational status
was inconsistent with their pay rates, they turned their attention to antipornography as a symbolic crusade to maintain their high economic rewards despite their lower status work. Importantly, this crusade propelled antipornography activists to a moral high ground, and demonstrated the righteousness of their social status.

CRITIQUES OF SYMBOLIC CRUSADES

There have been significant critiques of Gusfield’s work on symbolic crusades, and the framing of social movements based on the idea of maintaining status and prestige (Wal- lis 1977). One concern is with the ideological underpinnings of the theory. Because the theory is applied to moral crusades that reinforce the status quo, symbolic crusaders are thought to have “ulterior” motives which the theory seeks to expose. Conversely, the instrumental goals of progressive movements are accepted and understood. However, because reform is central to symbolic crusades, the theory may well be applicable only to more conservative movements.

Other critiques focus more squarely on the formulation of status, on the one hand, and symbolic goals on the other. With regard to status concerns, critics point out that such movements may be more focused on maintaining culture, lifestyle, or values rather than status (Wood & Hughes 1984). For example, the temperance movement has also been interpreted as a way for business and religious leaders to deal with the social problem of drunkenness in the developing Americas (Rorabaugh 1979; Tyrell 1979). Wood and Hughes (1984) argue that culture, ideology, and beliefs drive moral movements directly, rather than these being secondary to the overarching concern of the loss of group status.

In a related critique, some have suggested that symbolic goals cannot be easily disaggregated from instrumental objectives. Beisel (1990), for example, points out that Gusfield, and others working within the framework of symbolic crusades, separate class from status. This, however, overlooks the important ways that class and culture are linked, and not just to material gains. Indeed, Beisel (1990) argues that the strength of urban antivice movements in the late 1800s varied by levels of class cohesion. She finds that crusades over moral reform were a way that elite social classes struggled to uphold their lifestyle and transmit culture to younger generations, hence connecting symbolic, status, and economic concerns.

SYMBOLIC CRUSADES IN CURRENT CONTEXTS

These critiques notwithstanding, or even perhaps because of them, Gusfield’s work continues to have an enduring influence. First, by theorizing symbolic meanings, Gusfield offered an alternative way to view fervor behind collective action. Instead of being merely concerned with economic or political gains, status and symbolic meanings are important to social movement actors. This has influenced how sociologists understand phenomena such as moral panics against groups that pose threats to society (Cohen 1972). Examination of moral panics has been particularly significant in examinations of youth culture, including analysis of comic books, music, and video games (Binder 1993; McRobbie & Thornton 1995; Lopes 2006). Further, lifestyle and cultural concerns have advanced understanding of social movements that combine political, economic, and cultural concerns. Luker (1984), for example, argues that the ongoing conflict between pro-life and pro-choice activists is driven by concerns over gender, class, and lifestyle. While middle-class women see motherhood and career as choices and support legalized abortion, working-class women view motherhood as a master status and hence wish to repeal abortion rights. From the perspective of social movement research, Luker’s analysis shows how both instrumental and symbolic concerns are central to moral reform movements.
Second, being attentive to the symbolic meanings of collective action offers greater insight into the contingent and contested nature of social movements. Thus social movements are not just viewed linearly, but as an emergent and changing process that varies with social actors and depends on the changing social environment. This is particularly useful when examining the success of social movements, and whether or not countermovements arise in response to organized social action (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996).

Third, stressing the importance of collective action for symbolic gains led researchers to consider issues such as social movement framing and dramatization. By recognizing the emotionally charged nature of reform movements, scholars are now especially attentive to the ways discursive practices influence culture, social norms, and values. How social movements are framed, dramatized, and represent collective social values has implications for the ultimate success in garnering support for social movements. Thus, in the US, rural interests oppose urbanites and government in concerns over logging, while Canadians celebrate “timber culture” to oppose environmentalists (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Beyond simply theorizing framing, scholars are also now attentive to the media and discursive strategies of social movement organizations.

Tepper (2009) argues that symbolic crusades remain central to understanding both regulation and the movements of oppositional culture. Rather than being dramatic, emotional, and highly visible “crusades,” however, reform of “immoral” lifestyle choices has morphed into “quiet regulation.” In studying raves in Chicago, he argues that regulation in the contemporary era relies on the discourse of danger (particularly to youth) through bureaucratic channels. While no less concerned about upholding the status quo against moral threats, reform has shifted to administering laws and ordinances instead of garnering broad-based concern or moral outrage. Importantly, being out of the limelight allows this type of symbolic crusade to undermine the potential for groups to organize in opposition to the reform. Tepper (2009) suggests that it is important to remain attentive to symbolic crusades, especially in their quiet and regulatory form.

CONCLUSION

Today we see a plethora of political acts taken that result in days or streets being formally designated to honor status groups’ heroes, months honoring particular groups’ histories, and festivals commemorating specific groups’ contributions to the national heritage. Activists get laws passed to save old growth timber, prevent drilling in Alaska, censor art and music, and outlaw cockfighting, flag-burning, and the hunting of baby seals. In effect, laws come to define the culturally acceptable.

The concept of symbolic crusades thus remains important in understanding the dynamics of social movements and collective action. Indeed, being attentive to symbolic meanings, dramatization, and status pointed scholars to new ways to look at social regulation, reform, and social change. Such considerations offered insight into social movements as much more complex and nuanced than analyses that focused exclusively on the political and material gains of adherents. Whether one finds Gusfield’s theory fully applicable to contemporary analysis, there is little question but that examination of the symbolic and cultural meaning of social movements remains a fruitful and even necessary area of sociological investigation.

SEE ALSO: Animal rights movement; Culture and social movements; Dramaturgy and social movements; Framing and social movements; Moral panics; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Tea Party movement (United States); Temperance movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Taiping Rebellion (China)
YANG ZHANG

Lasting from 1850 to 1864, the Taiping Rebellion was the biggest social rebellion of China’s imperial era and probably the most violent rebellion in world history, measured by the number of casualties. Led by Christian convert Hong Xiuquan, the rebels uprose in Guangxi province, next to Canton, established the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (“Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace”), and controlled large parts of southern China. The rebellion swept across most parts of the Qing Empire’s 18 inner provinces, involved around 5 million troops, and killed more than 20 million people (Cao 2001: 553). The Taiping Rebellion is also well known for its charismatic leadership, Christian ideology, anti-Manchu nationalism, and radical social reform. Despite its final failure, the rebellion directly influenced the Qing Empire’s military, administrative, and fiscal structure and central–regional relationship.

The Taiping Rebellion was rooted in the social disruption and rebellious turbulence which had developed since the late 1840s, which was triggered by several social-structural factors including both long-term changes and abrupt social dislocations. Above all, population grew steadily from 160 million in 1680 to 430 million in 1850 (Cao 2001: 703–704, 706–707), and thus overstretched the Qing Empire’s agrarian economy and caused serious land annexation and elite competition. Second, the Qing Empire’s annual revenue had not increased since 1750 and its silver stock accumulated in its golden age during the eighteenth century had been exhausted by the Lotus Rebellion between 1796 and 1804. This fiscal distress could not sustain the empire’s operation. Third, due to the increasing opium trade, especially from the late 1820s, Chinese society incurred serious silver shortages each year until 1852 and witnessed economic recession from the late 1830s to 1850. Almost 200 million silver dollars flew out of China and drove silver inflation alongside deep copper devaluation and price deflation. This worsened the livelihood of peasants, small landlords, and artisans since they earned in copper, yet paid taxes and bought production means in silver. Millions of peasants and artisans were bankrupted. Several natural disasters during the 1840s further drove the poor to become a floating population, and some became bandits. Last, Chinese secret societies combined folk religion and anti-Manchu nationalism, developed translocal networks and organizations, spread over south China, and drove the Qing Empire to scatter its troops and fiscal resources.

In this specific Chinese social disruption, the Taiping uprising was further facilitated by its social-spatial environment. In both Guangdong and Guangxi, there were continuing conflicts between the “natives” and the “guest settlers” who migrated from north China. In the nineteenth century, tensions were sharpened since the guest settlers took up Christianity and attacked the natives for their superstition, while Confucian bureaucrats and natives despised guest settlers’ foreign faith. Hong Xiuquan, a guest-settler yeoman’s son, after repeatedly failing civil service examinations between 1827 and 1843, accepted Christianity, claimed himself as the younger brother of Jesus, and recruited several Taiping leaders, such as Feng Yunshan. They preached to other guest settlers in mountainous areas of Guangxi and attracted thousands of believers until 1847.

Triggered by several conflicts between the Christians and local Confucian gentries, especially during Feng’s detention between December 1847 and June 1848, Taiping leaders began to plan armed rebellion. At that time, Guangxi’s standard army paid most of their attention to other rebellions inspired by folk religions, and so did not notice the mobilization of Taiping
organizations. Between November 1850 and January 1851, about 20,000 followers from different parts of Guangxi and Guangdong region arrived at Jintian, Guangxi to join the uprising and the founding of the Heavenly Kingdom on January 11, 1851.

The Taiping rebels began to fight with the Qing troops and local militias organized by Confucian gentries in Guangxi, and then marched into Hunan and Hubei provinces along the Yangtze River between June 1852 and January 1853. In January 1853, they captured Wuchang, the capital of Hubei province, and developed a troop of 500,000 soldiers by affiliating with other traditional rebels and enlisting poor peasants and artisans. They marched quickly east along the Yangtze and occupied Nanjing, a very important city of populous, prosperous southern China, in March 1853. They then made Nanjing the Heavenly capital, territorialized its regime, and controlled several areas in the Yangtze Delta.

From March 1853 to the fall of Nanjing in 1864, there were numerous, large-scale, and fierce military conflicts. After defeating Taiping’s northern and western expeditions in 1853–1856, the Qing Empire reorganized its army, largely by creating local gentry-led self-defense militias in all warring provinces to replace the failed standing army (Kuhn 1967). While the Qing had to rely on them to fight the Taiping rebels and thus decentralize its military, fiscal, and administrative structure, the Chinese gentries also had very strong incentives to annihilate Taiping for its anti-Confucian ideology. On the other side, Taiping was weakened by its brutal internal factional conflicts in Nanjing in 1856. After several wars between Taiping and provincial militias as well as foreign mercenaries between 1857 and 1864, Nanjing finally fell and Taiping was suppressed in July 1864.

Taiping was important for its revolutionary yet ambiguous ideologies and institutions. It combined Christian religion, anti-Manchu nationalism, and radical socioeconomic thoughts, and claimed to build an equitable society (Jen 1973), yet also made use of Chou-li, an ancient Confucian moral creed (Shih 1966). Taiping Heavenly Kingdom announced social reforms, including land reform, prohibition of private trade, a ban on opium smoking, the abolition of foot binding, and strict separation of the sexes, but few of them were effectively carried out even in its urban bases. Claiming equality in the beginning, Taiping nevertheless established a theocratic, and highly bureaucratic, militarized rule over land in its control (Michael 1970).

Its political ideal was further damaged by extensive corruption, brutal factional conflicts among its leaders, and clientelism within its military and administration.

Despite its final collapse, Taiping facilitated several other great rebellions (especially the Nien and Moslem Rebellions) between the 1850s and 1870s, since the Qing Empire paid most attention to Taiping. Those rebellions cost the Qing almost 1 billion tael silver (20 times its annual revenue), resulted in the disintegration of its governmental structure and the rise of Han bureaucrats’ political power, and finally led to the rise of provincial warlords in 1890s and contributed to the downfall of the Qing Empire in 1911. Owing to its anti-Manchu nationalism and radical socioeconomic claims, the Taiping Rebellion has also been broadly seen as the forerunner of the later Nationalist Revolution of 1911 and the Communist Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Charisma; Demography and social movements and revolutions; Ideology; Leadership; Mandate of Heaven (China); Peasant rebellions of imperial China; Religion and social movements.

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Taiwan Independent Movement
FU-CHANG WANG

The Taiwan Independent Movement (TIM) refers to collective, organized efforts to establish a sovereign Taiwan independent of China. Since the seventeenth century, Taiwan has been closely related to China. The western part of Taiwan became part of Chinese territory in 1684 after Qing troops defeated Koxinga, a Ming dynasty loyalist who drove away the Dutch colonialists in 1662 and used Taiwan as a base for his military campaign against Qing dynasty rulers. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 by the Qing dynasty in the Treaty of Shimonoseki that followed the 1894 Sino-Japanese War and was returned to Chinese rule again in 1945 after World War II. Since the seventeenth century, many Chinese Han migrants have settled in Taiwan, constituting more than 95 percent of the island’s population by 1905, according to the Japanese census. Advocates of TIM, however, claimed that after 51 years of Japanese rule the Taiwanese had evolved into a nation different from China. The TIM claim was contested by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime and the Kuomintang (KMT, literally “Nationalist Party”) regime, which relocated to Taiwan after the former took over the Chinese mainland in 1949. Both the CCP and the KMT claimed that Taiwan had been a part of China since ancient times.

Although the idea of a unique Taiwan nation was first conceived in the 1920s, a political movement to advocate for an independent Taiwan did not emerge until 1947, when the new Chinese rulers’ actions resulted in an island-wide protest in the so-called “February 28th Incident” (Kerr 1965; Lai, Myers, & Wei 1991). Before 1990, however, TIM was strictly prohibited in Taiwan and advocated openly only abroad, especially in Japan and the US. The first notable TIM organization emerged when Thomas Liao (Liao Wen-yi 廖文毅) announced the establishment of the Provisional Government of Republic of Formosa on the ninth anniversary of the February 28 Incident in Tokyo in 1956 (Chang, Hu, & Tseng 2000). Liao served as president of the exile government and openly promoted the TIM within the international community, but met with little success. After the KMT regime coerced Liao to return to Taiwan on May 1965 and forced him to publicly denounce the movement, TIM’s major base moved to the US. In June 1966, the United Formosans in America for Independence (UFAI) was formed in Philadelphia. In January 1970, the most important umbrella TIM organization overseas, the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), was established in New York by collaborating among the TIM organizations in Japan, the US, Europe, and Canada. The WUFI began to use conventional measures, including lobbying and demonstrations, and radical measures, including attempted assassination and bombing, to promote its cause (Chen 2006: 204–212). The WUFI moved back to Taiwan in 1991 after legal restrictions on TIM’s public campaign were abolished.

Given the KMT regime’s strict regulations and repression, no organization openly promoted the TIM inside Taiwan until the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan made a public announcement in 1977 to demand that a new and independent nation be formed, though some underground TIM activities did take place in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, Ming-min Peng and his students prepared a manifesto titled “A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation,” but were arrested before they could distribute it (Peng 1972: 121–131). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a champion for Taiwan’s democratic movement, was the first political party to offer public support for TIM, in 1987, in the name of freedom of
speech. The DPP later included the demands of Taiwan Independence in its party outline in 1991. Given the public controversy surrounding TIM, however, the DPP did not rank the TIM agenda as a high priority in its platform. In 1996, some radical members left the DPP and established the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP 建國黨) out of their disappointment over the DPP’s pragmatic turn on the TIM issue. Even after the DPP won the presidential election in 2000, it still did not actively pursue the TIM agenda; instead, it claimed that Taiwan was already in a de facto state of independence, and hence there was no need to declare de jure independence, for both internal and external reasons.

The domestic dispute over TIM has several causes. First, because most Han Taiwanese have Chinese ancestors, TIM advocates had difficulty convincing people that the Taiwanese had become a different nation. What’s more, early TIM activists’ concept of the Taiwan nation did not include the Chinese mainlanders who migrated to Taiwan after 1945. Rather, TIM supporters regarded the 1.2 million mainlanders (14–15% of Taiwan’s population during the 1950s) as members of the Chinese nation and Taiwan’s oppressors. After the 1970s, such an exclusionary concept of the Taiwanese nation became problematic as more second-generation mainlanders began to identify with Taiwan, especially after they were treated like strangers in their supposed fatherland when they were allowed to visit China after 1987. A multiethnic nationalism claiming that all ethnic groups in Taiwan, including mainlanders, are part of the Taiwanese nation emerged to replace the previous ethnic nationalism after 1990 (Schubert 1999; Chang 2000; Wong 2001). Most mainlanders, and some Taiwanese of different ethnic backgrounds, however, still could not accept TIM.

The external factor played an even more significant role. After 1990, TIM supporters began to regard the CCP regime as the Taiwanese nation’s new oppressor, as China has threatened to use military means to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. The threat is quite real, as China still deploys over 1000 missiles targeting Taiwan along the coast. The TIM thus receives mixed support from the Taiwanese people, as they were, and still are, quite divided over interpretations of Taiwan’s historical connection with China, their familial relations with China, perceptions of Taiwan’s de facto status, and their preferred pattern of future relations with China.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Anti-Japanese colonization resistance (Taiwan); Lukang anti-Dupont movement (Taiwan); Nationalist movements; Red shirt anticorruption movement (Taiwan).

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Temperance movements
SHARON S. OSELIN

The temperance movement in the US encompassed a long and tumultuous historical period spanning from the 1820s to the passing of National Prohibition in 1919, and, some argue, has reemerged more recently. In studying this movement, scholars are able to examine how a confluence of political and social goals fuels and sustains mobilization. The temperance movement was a morality-based movement, focused on issues of vice among the American population, which activists felt were indicative of the demise of a collective moral fiber. Wagner (1997) proposed that this perspective underscored a national ideology that was embedded within a specific cultural and political context. Those who comprised this movement were largely upper and middle class Protestants, with a strong base in the Midwest and New England (Gusfield 1986). Through the social construction of actions that constitute vice activities, seen as a “social problem,” powerful groups also designated a target population for the many social ills assumed to be connected to these behaviors. The growing numbers of immigrants – Irish, Germans, and Italians – were held particularly responsible for the pervasiveness of vice practices. They were also groups who were slow to support temperance movement agendas, which further demonized them.

The temperance and vice movement, however, not only focused on the consumption of alcohol, as many people assume, but cast a wider net to target additional forms of vice – such as prostitution, smoking, venereal disease – that in turn spawned multiple overlapping social movements. These movements include the vice and vigilance movement, the antipornography movement, the hygiene movement, and antismoking movement. All of these movements shared the similar objectives of changing individual behaviors with the intention to bring about societal transformation.

While the central goal of the temperance movement was to change individual behaviors through the enactment and passing of laws that enforced these restrictions, its goals also served to carry out other social and cultural functions, such as reinforcing differences between categories of people along ethnic, class, and immigrant lines and securing status among particular groups. It was this intense scrutiny of behavior which helped differentiate status among citizens; thus abstinence from a myriad of social practices served as status markers that were particularly heralded and enforced by the middle-class communities. Indeed, those who complied were thought to embody esteemed auxiliary traits, such as self-control and industriousness (Gusfield 1986). Conversely, individuals who were unable or refused to conform to these behavioral performances and corresponding ideology were “lowlifes” who constituted an undesirable low status group. Prohibitions against “vice” activities became socially constructed and maintained among powerful groups in society, and the most significant accomplishment of this movement was evident in the passing of National Prohibition in 1921.

The propelling force behind this movement was a well-defined sense of morality among American Protestants. Thus, it is not surprising that the practice of denouncing moral “inferiors” and heralding those who complied with moral virtues produced widespread moral crusades against drinking alcohol as well as other vice activities (Morone 2003). Stemming from ideas about salvation and repentance based in Puritanical beliefs, the adherents of the temperance movement viewed individual actions as a reflection on the wider community. Accordingly, supporters of this cause proposed that personal practices of vice in turn diminished

their community. A “good” society provides instructions and discipline regulating behaviors of vice. The demarcation of the populations assumed to be responsible for vice was especially effected by the law and demonized by its supporters. Not only were these groups considered less refined but they were also largely situated within the lower class strata of society.

Middle-class white women, thought to be paragons of virtue and morality, performed a central role in mobilization and the use of tactics in the latter part of the nineteenth century for the temperance and vice movement. Indeed, it was these women who comprised the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and engaged in a myriad of public tactics and strategies in order to elicit awareness and garner public support for their cause. For example, some of their acts included street demonstrations and visits to local saloons armed with bibles as they sang hymns. When they were turned out of these businesses, this small group of women in Ohio in 1873 dramatically knelt in the snow and prayed for the sinners inside (Morone 2003). More importantly, the WCTU helped launch the massive women’s movement that took up a variety of causes beyond prohibition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that directly influenced women, including women’s suffrage, good hygiene, daycare for children, and sexual purity.

The issue of sexual purity was of paramount concern for the women’s movement in the early twentieth century. As a result, sexual chastity was emphasized while prostitution and pornography were identified as temptations that threatened the moral fiber of upstanding citizens and many middle-class marriages. These Victorian-based notions sustained perceptions about the dangers of rampant lust and women’s virtue within American society. In fact, it was expected that women’s roles revolve around motherhood and domesticity as these private spheres were thought to keep women pure. The women who did not embrace this role were stigmatized and held responsible for promoting social ills.

At the height of the temperance movement, prostitutes were especially demonized for their direct assault against feminine virtues. Indeed, many of these same notions still linger today surrounding women’s sexual practices, and therefore their behaviors are continually scrutinized according to these codes of conduct. Weitzer (2007) argues that moral crusades against prostitution are still ongoing in the twenty-first century, which not only promote expectations of virtue surrounding women’s sexual behaviors but also actively mobilize groups of citizens to shape and influence relevant laws. These laws (and social opinion) therefore inform police interactions with sex workers, which ultimately uphold containment strategies where street prostitutes are punished for their noncompliance with prevalent gender codes of conduct.

In one scholarly endeavor, Reckless (1933) analyzed the transformations of vice in Chicago during the early part of the twentieth century. As a result of the temperance and vice movements during this time, he found that many of the “redlight” district activities and establishments were closed. Yet, interestingly, he notes an upsurge in the number of clandestine businesses throughout the city, such as cabarets, roadhouses, and taxi-dance halls. His findings suggest laws did not greatly dampen acts of prostitution in terms of numbers but rather simply encouraged different forms of prostitution (indoor sex work) to blossom.

In a related vein, pornography was also tapped as a threat to sexual purity. Like the purity movement, the antipornography movement comprised its own movement but was also subsumed within the broader vice and temperance movement. The movement adherents deem the viewing of pornography as a social problem largely due to the challenges these acts present to the status quo (Zurcher & Kirkpatrick 1976). In fact, supporters perceived such “illicit” practices posed threats to the middle-class status and way of life, beliefs which led to the mobilization of the antivice movement generally.
The hygiene movement stemmed from the purity movement in that the two eventually became synonymous due to having very similar agendas – to create social and legal change in order to uphold a particular set of morals and to stop the spread of venereal diseases. The movement also had a secondary agenda to protect girls and women from sexual exploitation, which was exacerbated by rampant fears of sex slavery (Pivar 2002).

Although these campaigns were often at least temporarily successful in the increased prosecution of prostitutes and pornography (although there was variation by state), the degree to which the practices decreased remains unknown as they often occurred clandestinely. In contrast, the temperance and vice movement can be considered a success in that it accomplished one tangible goal – to enact laws that made drinking alcohol a crime and consequently altered social practices. And even while Prohibition ended in 1933, some argue it had long-term effects on American culture. For example, Americans did not return to their pre-Prohibition drinking levels until 1971 (Burnham 1968).

Some scholars make the case that there is a new temperance movement which emerged in response to the 1960s, a time period laden with “behavioral crises,” filled with sex, drugs, and challenges to authority (Wagner 1997). Indeed, it was during the 1960s and 1970s that many in the American middle class perceived this breakdown in norms and morality as indicative of a serious cultural and societal problem. Yet, it is also arguable that it was the middle-class fear of slipping into downward mobility that bolstered their commitment to this particular ideology, which upheld class differentiation. The practices of drinking, drug use, and sexual promiscuity posed a threat to their way of life, and the reassertion of abstinence and outward rejection of these “licentious” behaviors underscored middle-class status cues. For example, Zurcher and Kirkpatrick (1976) note that the revival of the antipornography movement in the late 1960s, which surfaced across the US, was fueled by these very principles and beliefs.

From this vantage point, it can be argued that there is a new temperance movement among the middle class, which functions as before to protect and preserve their cultural, social, and economic position. Overall, the reiteration of this ideology not only demarcates appropriate behaviors surrounding issues of “vice” but also underscores the power, resiliency, and commitment of the American Protestant middle class to extant norms which uphold their status.

SEE ALSO: Moral panics; Social class and social movements; Social problems and social movements; Symbolic crusades; Women’s movements.

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Terrorism has been a hotly contested phenomenon for centuries. The term first came to be used to describe the Terror of the French Revolutionary government of the late eighteenth century, although the principle of spreading terror through violence for political ends is much older. Since then, the term has come to focus on nonstate actors, from the anarchist militants of the late nineteenth century, through the nationalist anticolonial movements of the mid-twentieth, to the leftist, rightist, religio-nationalist, and religious groups of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in New York and Washington DC, the term has become particularly ubiquitous. From media coverage to literary and film subgenres and academe, terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist movements fascinate as much as they appall. Why do individuals, movements, or states turn to terrorism? Under what circumstances do they move away from it? Are they driven by ideology? By political or economic exclusion?

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Before discussing “terrorist movements,” it is important to unpack the term “terrorism.” In traditional terrorism studies, terrorism is considered a brute fact, an objective phenomenon, independent from the person describing it. While there has been a heated (and as yet unresolved) debate over how exactly to define terrorism, and while it is recognized in these circles that who or what is labeled “terrorist” is influenced by political agendas, traditional terrorism scholars take for granted that there are certain actions and actors which are inherently “terrorist,” and can be unproblematically labeled thus. Amongst critical scholars, by contrast, “terrorism” is considered a social construct, a phenomenon that derives its meaning in large part from its description as “terrorist.” This is not to deny the brutality and suffering that such violence causes; far from it. Rather, it is to underline the intensely political nature of the term “terrorism” and the way it is used to legitimize the violence carried out by (usually) states and their allies, and delegitimize the violence (and much else) carried out by their opponents (Jackson et al. 2011; for a critique see Horgan & Boyle 2007).

To illustrate the subjectivity of the term, one has only to look at the heated debates over who is labeled a terrorist in the Middle East, with Israel and the West labeling groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah “terrorist,” while Hamas, Hezbollah, and many ordinary Arabs return the compliment by tar-ring what Israel and the US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan do with the same brush. One can, of course, counter that this is mere political point-scoring, and that the task of academics is to apply an agreed-upon definition objectively and systematically across the board (cf. Ganor n.d.).

There are, however, a number of problems with the term “terrorism” (Jackson et al. 2011). First, it has become profoundly pejorative and normatively laden. “Terrorism,” as Richardson (2006: 19) observed, “is something the bad guys do.” This inhibits neutral analysis, and led Schmid and Jongman (1988: 182) to lament in the 1980s that terrorism studies are “counterinsurgency masquerading as political science” – although the field has since improved. Second, precisely because of its pejorative effect, the term has been so overstretched to condemn such a variety of actors that it has become almost meaningless. What, after all, do Greenpeace (“ecoterrorists”) and al-Qaeda have in common? Third, and more fundamentally, the term is “ontologically unstable,” as
it is not only subjective but also contextually contingent, in other words “subject to historical and political trends . . . and the perceptions, beliefs and values of the person defining it” (Jackson et al. 2011: 103–104). Terrorism, as we have seen, has evolved with the times from describing acts of state violence during the French Revolution to describing violence carried out primarily by nonstate actors. It draws heavily on particular, historically bound conceptions of the state and its relationship with society, and would lose much of its force without the (modern) concept of noncombatant immunity. The decision of which groups to include in (academic) “terrorist” databases is profoundly affected by the political and legal climate of the day. Once a group is labeled “terrorist,” all its (violent) actions are included in the database, regardless of whether they are strictly “terroristic” – think of a Hamas attack on an Israeli tank in combat inside the Gaza Strip, or an IRA skirmish with British soldiers in Northern Ireland, both of which can be described as guerrilla tactics in an asymmetric war. Liberal states and their allies are usually excluded from such databases, even if they have been involved in, or sponsored, acts that could be described as terrorist. Sowing terror in a wider audience beyond the immediate victims for political goals – one of the key ingredients in most terrorism definitions – is not confined to what is conventionally called “terrorism,” but is widely practiced in warfare and politically minded criminal circles, for instance, yet convention usually stops us from labeling it thus.

Even if the term is more precisely defined and used as neutrally as humanly possible, the way “terrorism” is used is problematic for two further reasons. By grouping together movements or individuals simply on the ground that they share a set of tactics at a particular point in time, one creates an illusion of homogeneity where none exists (Toros & Gunning 2009). What, after all, do the Allied Forces bombing Dresden (a coalition of state armed forces), the Tamil Tigers (a nationalist, mass-based guerrilla group), al-Qaeda (a loose transnational network of small cells) and the Unabomber (a lone individual) have in common, beyond using broadly similar tactics? Would it not make more sense to compare the Tamil Tigers to other mass-based insurgent groups, regardless of whether they used tactics that can be described as “terrorist”? The exclusive focus on a tactic thus has the effect of downplaying historical and social context, and conflating phenomena that may otherwise have little in common. Second, because “terrorism” is used not simply to describe acts but to label individuals, groups, or movements, once an entity has committed an act described as “terrorist,” all its actions are tainted by the label, regardless of whether they actually fit the definition. Yet the actions of groups like Hamas or the IRA range far more widely, from violence that is not strictly speaking terrorist, through provision of welfare and security, to engagement in the political process (Toros & Gunning 2009).

With these caveats in mind, I will use the term “terrorist” to describe acts of (threatened) violence against targets that are considered illegitimate by the target audience, with the purpose of affecting the attitudes and behavior of a wider audience than the immediate victims of the violence through the spread of fear. I will not use it to describe individuals, groups, or movements to avoid essentializing what they do and reducing their complexity to one single set of tactics (for a critical theory-inspired discussion of this position, see Toros & Gunning 2009).

**TERRORISM, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY**

For most of the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism studies dominated the study of political violence by movements such as the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the German Baader-Meinhof Group. Although a few scholars of that period used social movement theory to study political violence, the majority of social
movement scholars focused on largely nonviolent social movements such as the US civil rights movement or the antinuclear movement, despite the fact that the violence carried out by, say, the Italian Red Brigades or the Algerian NLF could be seen as part of wider social movements (cf. Crenshaw 1995). It was only in the 1990s and 2000s that social movement theory began to be more frequently used to study “terrorist” violence (e.g., della Porta 1992, 1995; Hafez 2003; Bergesen et al. 2007; Gunning 2007). However, within terrorism studies, social movement theory is still a minority concern; for instance, by 2008, still only 7 out of over 1500 articles in what were then considered to be the two core “terrorism studies” journals explicitly employed a social movement theory framework (Gunning 2009).

A social movement perspective is particularly useful for studying terrorist violence because it squarely places the violence in its political and social context – something which has often been downplayed in traditional terrorism studies. Social movement theory does so by focusing not just on the (often small) organizations carrying out the attacks but the wider social movements and societies out of which they typically grow. It helps to locate “terrorists” socially, as embedded social actors, with multiple identities and social roles, whose relationship with “terrorism” is often far more ambiguous than traditional “terrorism studies” allows (see for example Toros’ discussion of Philippino farmers drifting in and out of militias, depending on who dominates the area; Toros 2008). It also helps to locate “terrorism” temporally, seeing it not as a static phenomenon but as a fluid, constantly changing form of protest, which usually grew out of – and often evolves back into – largely nonviolent protests, and, as such, part of a larger “protest cycle” (Toros & Gunning 2009).

Through its tripartite focus on opportunity structure, mobilizing, structures and frames, social movement theory helps to bring into focus the relationship between the organizations carrying out terrorism, wider society (including its belief systems), and political structures. Through this dynamic model, social movement theory helps to bridge both the structuralist-interpretivist and the structure-agency divides in the social sciences by focusing attention on the interplay between structures, agents, and interpretations.

Where traditional terrorism studies tend to focus either on broad structural explanations or on narrow ideological or organizational explanations, social movement theory encourages us to look at the interaction between structure, organization, and ideas (della Porta 1995; Gunning 2009). How, for instance, do political exclusion or state repression affect oppositional organizations and the way they, and the societies they claim to represent, frame their grievances? How do broader belief systems feed into the frames militant groups use, and how are they impacted by organizational and broader political dynamics? An example of this is the effect of state repression on oppositional organizations, which, depending on the precise circumstances, can either serve to drive them underground, creating a “spiral of encapsulation” which isolates them from wider society and facilitates the development of increasingly radical frames (della Porta 1995; Hafez 2003), or can encourage the creation of an “insurgent society” which comes to accept radical tactics as the norm (Araj 2008).

Where traditional terrorism studies focus overly on ideological justifications and grievances, social movement theory encourages scholars to look beyond ideology and grievance to the availability of resources and opportunities. Grievances and, to a lesser extent, justifications for violence, are ubiquitous; terrorism is not. To explain why only some groups resort to terrorism at certain times (and forewear terrorist tactics at others), one needs to include an analysis of the relative availability of networks, highly motivated and skilled volunteers, weapons, weapon expertise, popular support, safe places, and third-party support (e.g., a neighbouring state elite), among other things.
EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING “TERRORISM”

Although much of the literature on terrorism focuses on structural conditions, structural explanations in themselves are insufficient to explain the occurrence of (nonstate) terrorism. Democracy, for instance, has been found by some to feed terrorism by providing both the motivation for those who feel marginalized by majority rule and the opportunities to mobilize and organize. Others, however, have found the opposite, namely that greater levels of democracy decrease the chance of terrorism occurring by providing political avenues for redressing grievances (Lia 2005). Repression has similarly been found both to cause terrorism and to prevent it. Structural conditions alone cannot explain these divergent trajectories.

An exclusive focus on ideology or organizational characteristics is equally unsatisfactory (della Porta 1995: 6; Gunning forthcoming). Most ideologies contain justifications for violence. Yet many adherents do not actually turn to violence. Groups often act against their own ideological pronouncements, and most groups are ideologically more diverse than their opponents present them as. Individuals often join for wholly nonideological reasons, whether in search of safety against rival groups or the police, or in search of identity or status or simply to follow their friends.

A more persuasive explanation lies in an analysis of the interaction between broader political and socioeconomic conditions, organizational and resource dynamics, and the framing of grievances, identities, and action repertoires. State repression, for instance, has been found to be particularly conducive to political violence if it is seen as indiscriminate and excessive by those the opposition movements claim to represent, and if it is reactionary—in other words, when oppositional organizations are already well developed, with the skills, loyalties, and motivation to maintain what they have (Hafez & Wiktorowicz 2004: 67–71). Whether the response becomes specifically “terrorist” (as opposed to more broadly violent), depends on a number of factors, including the relative strength of the organization carrying out the violence, the (perceived) responsiveness of the political system to opposition, the place in the protest cycle where the violence occurs, and the way the grievances, the state, the immediate victims of the attack, and the responses are framed by both the activist and the broader society they claim to represent. This in turn is influenced by organizational dynamics (for instance, whether it concerns a broad-based insurgency movement or a vanguardist, underground organization).

A good example is the case of the Italian Red Brigades, which began as a small self-help defence force for the Italian Left’s protest movement of the early 1970s, against the attacks of right-wing groups and police forces (della Porta 1995). The Brigades grew out of the mass protests of students and workers that engulfed Europe in the late 1960s, and many of its members had become socialized into politics by the organizations of the New Left. Violence intensified in response to policing becoming more indiscriminate and repressive, driving hitherto nonviolent activists into the arms of the Red Brigades. When mass protests began to wane, the Brigades also began to use violence (and the counterviolence it provoked) to reignite the masses. Violence initially peaked when most of the Brigades’ members were imprisoned. However, the violence of the early 1970s, and in particular the violent response by the police and its endorsement by the establishment, had socialized a new generation into violent politics, and when the official organs of the Left, the Communist Party and the Trade Unions, struck a “historic compromise” with the Centre Right, this second generation embarked on a more destructive wave of violence, reinvigorating the Red Brigades in a spiral of competition and one-upmanship.

This second wave of violence was facilitated by the structural conditions of Italy’s political system (and in particular the perception that there were no effective political avenues left for addressing youth grievances), by the passing on of organizational underground expertise and a
by now established ideological framework for glorifying violence as part of a global struggle against capitalism, and by personal loyalty to fallen or imprisoned comrades (many of those who joined these groups had already been close friends before they joined). Ideology played a role, as did structural conditions of social and political exclusion and repression. But it is in the interplay between structural conditions, ideology, and organizational dynamics that the explanation lies for the evolution of this particular cycle of violence. Justifications for violence, for instance, had been prominent in both left- and right-wing ideologies in 1960s Italy. Yet it took the particular dynamics of protests, police violence, economic uncertainty, and political marginalization to bring these justifications to the fore and translate them into actual violence – and then only those socialized in the (isolated) hothouse of the New Left’s underground organizations heeded the call to violence. The vast majority of supporters of Italy’s Left did not resort to violence.

Another example is that of Palestinian Hamas’ turn to suicide bombing against civilians in the mid-1990s. Hamas was founded at the start of the Intifada in 1987–1988, as an offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, a large social organization focused on the re-Islamization of Palestinian society. The Brotherhood’s main emphasis had been on providing social welfare and education and it had eschewed the resistance efforts of its main rival, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). When the uprising broke out against Israeli occupation in 1987, its younger members decided that, faced with a resurgent PLO, they did not want to be marginalized by events and founded the Islamic Resistance Movement (acronym: “HAMAS”). Suicide bombing had been spectacularly used in both the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s and in Hezbollah’s fight against Israel’s occupation of Lebanon. Yet Hamas did not turn to suicide bombing until 1993, and only embarked on sustained campaigns against civilians from 1994 onwards.

One explanation for this is that, until 1993, Hamas lacked both the ideological and organizational tools to carry out suicide bombing and the context to give it the motivation to do so (Gunning 2007). To compete successfully for popular support in the Palestinian uprising, Hamas initially just had to copy the tactics developed by the PLO. When the PLO’s exiled leadership agreed, controversially, to participate in the ill-fated Madrid Peace Process, Hamas reaped the benefits locally, by portraying itself as the true champion of Palestinian rights. Hamas was further strengthened by the PLO’s siding with Saddam Hussein against Kuwait, resulting in the withholding of funding from the rich Gulf countries. By early 1993, Hamas was beating Fatah, the PLO’s main faction, in most student union elections, one of the chief barometers of grassroots support in the Palestinian Territories at the time.

This situation changed dramatically over the course of 1993. In September, the Oslo Peace Accords were announced, catapulting Fatah back to center-stage and seriously weakening Hamas’ position. The Intifada had already all but ground to a halt and popular support for the uprising had been on the wane for some time – much as support for the 1960s protests had waned in Italy by the early 1970s. The main political player, Fatah, had made a compromise with the status quo – not unlike the Communist Party in Italy – and those opposed to the compromise were fearful of marginalization, particularly as the Peace Accords included an agreement to cooperate with Israel on the suppression of opposition groups. Israeli troops were scheduled to withdraw from Palestinian city centers in 1994, calling for a tactical revision of how to carry on the resistance. By early 1994, therefore, Hamas had the motivation to find a new way of attacking the enemy, to reclaim its position as a key player in Palestinian politics and to reignite the uprising through spectacular acts of resistance.

The ideological and organizational tools were provided courtesy of Israel’s decision to send over four hundred Hamas and Islamic
Jihad leaders into exile to Lebanon in December 1992. In the no-man’s-land between Israel and Lebanon, where the exiles languished for months, the organization which helped to look after the Palestinians was Hezbollah, the pioneer of suicide bombing in the Levant. It is thus no coincidence that the first suicide bombing claimed by Hamas was carried out in April 1993 (against soldiers, in the West Bank). When Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler living on the West Bank, killed some 30 worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron in February 1994, Hamas was ready to respond with a bloody suicide bombing campaign against civilians inside Israel. Ideological justifications, organizational know-how and a changed opportunity structure came together to create the conditions for a radical change in tactics.

That suicide bombing targeting civilians was chosen over other tactics was a function of both the close links developed with Hezbollah and the fact that occupation by a well-armed democracy appears to be particularly conducive to the adoption of suicide tactics when resistance groups lack the means to win a direct battle with their better-armed opponents (Pape 2005; for a critique of Pape’s methodology, see Ashworth et al. 2008). In a democracy, so the argument goes, the general population has a direct influence on the government, as well as a claim on the government’s protection. Suicide attacks against civilians are thus a cost-effective tactic with the potential to both sway public opinion and undermine the government’s legitimacy. However, contrary to Pape’s study, which links suicide bombing with occupations by democracies in an almost mechanistic manner, a social movement perspective is able to explain why suicide bombing was only embarked on in 1993–1994, more than 25 years after Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza began. As with the Red Brigades, ideology played a role by providing religious and nationalist justifications for suicide bombing. Yet it took the particular dynamics of uprising, controversial counterinsurgency tactics, political marginalization, and exile to bring these justifications to the fore and translate them into actual violence.

SEE ALSO: Al-Qaeda; Framing and social movements; French Revolution; Guerrilla movements; Hamas (Palestine); Ideology; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany); Red Brigades (Italy); Repression and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Violence against oneself; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The Tiananmen student movement was triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989. Hu was the former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but was pressured to resign from the position in 1987 in part because of his lenient attitude toward the student protests in 1986. Hu became a widely respected figure among students and intellectuals after his resignation. Hu’s death, however, was just a triggering event. By the late 1980s, most Chinese no longer believed in the communist ideology upheld by the Chinese government. A limited number of people even started to criticize the government for the tragedies it had brought to the Chinese during the Mao era (1949–1976) and advocated political reform and democratization. A general crisis of faith occurred among the Chinese, especially the educated population. Moreover, in the late 1980s, China’s higher education had overproduced students who were unable to get jobs with respectable earnings after graduation. Finally, rumors about official corruption spread and inflation soared in 1988 as the Chinese economy underwent a downturn. Ever since 1986, student protests of different scales had never really stopped on college campuses.

The 1989 student movement in Beijing lasted for seven weeks between April 15 and June 4. It ended in a military crackdown during which hundreds of civilians, students, and soldiers were killed. The movement’s dynamics can be captured by the following chain of events. First, the death of Hu Yaobang allowed students to frame the protests as mourning activities. Since Hu was then still a CCP politburo member, and mourning a top CCP leader was a legitimate action, the nature of the protest delayed the government response and gave the movement an early boost. By April 23, that is, the day after Hu’s state funeral, the students had staged a city-wide class boycott and established university- and city-level movement organizations. A few major claims of the movement centering on free press, free association, and pro-democratic reforms also emerged in this period. While Beijing students and residents were involved in the movement for numerous different reasons, the above claims did become the movement’s master frame. Second, alarmed by the scale of protests, the Chinese government published a *People’s Daily* editorial entitled “It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand against Turmoil,” which labeled the movement as antigovernment and called on the people to stand up and oppose it. The outmoded Maoist language of the editorial, however, upset most Beijing students and triggered the April 27 demonstration staged by some 100,000 students.

Third, the government started to make concessions after the April 27 demonstration. Several dialogues were held between government officials and students and a student dialogue delegation was established. The concessive mode of the Chinese government reached a peak when the government-controlled media published the May 4 speech that Zhao Ziyang (then the CCP’s general secretary) made in his meeting with the delegates of the 22nd Asian Development Bank Meeting. In that speech, Zhao stated that the majority of students were “by no means opposing our basic system” because their basic slogans were “Support the Communist Party!,” “Uphold the reforms!,” “Push forward democracy!,” and “Oppose corruption!,” all also on the government’s agenda, and that “China will not have large-scale turmoil.” The government concession satisfied the majority of the students and the movement declined in early May as a result. Fourth, compelled by...
the movement’s decline, around 300 students, most of them from Beijing University, staged a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square on May 13. Negotiations and dialogue immediately took place between the government officials and student movement leaders with the hope of ending the hunger strike and Tiananmen Square occupation before May 15, the first day of Mikhail Gorbachev’s state visit to China. The negotiations brought no result and the hunger strike and occupation continued. On May 15, the hunger-striker population swelled to over 3000 students and more and more supporters arrived in the square. When the ambulances for collapsed hunger-strikers shuttled across the Beijing streets, the sirens became a mobilization call. After May 16, huge numbers of sympathizers and supporters came to the square daily, and more and more people from all over China arrived in Beijing. The hunger strike was a great success in terms of movement mobilization. Nevertheless, it disrupted several major events of Gorbachev’s China visit and disheartened those top state officials who had once supported Zhao Ziyang’s concessive approach to the movement. Most top state officials except for Zhao Ziyang started to support a more hardline approach. Fifth, the government declared martial law and about 100,000 soldiers were brought to Beijing on May 20. The troops, however, were blocked by the students and Beijing residents and the Tiananmen Square occupation continued. Finally, on the evening of June 3, a new wave of martial law troops forced their way into Beijing. Hundreds of civilians, students, and soldiers died in street battles that night, making it one of the greatest tragedies of twentieth-century China.

During the movement, some student leaders, intellectuals, and top government officials tried very hard to find ways to bring the movement to a better ending. The tragic outcome was not entirely inevitable. Yet, three related structural forces did make other possible endings of the movement less likely. First, the government habitually used outdated Maoist rhetoric to criticize the movement and those who participated in the movement. Such action only heightened resentment because most Chinese of the 1980s had bitter memories of the Maoist Cultural Revolution, and thus no longer believed in the communist ideology. Second, the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime had given little space to the development of organizational forces beyond state control. Thus, the organizations that led the movement were all newly established, the leaders of different student organizations did not know how to work together, and the students had little respect for those who led the movement. This made it very hard for the government to negotiate with the movement organizers and almost impossible for the movement organizers and activists to steer the direction of the movement in a strategic manner. Third, the government’s lack of ideological legitimacy and the poorly organized nature of the movement greatly raised the importance of rumors. The first major success of student mobilization in Beijing on the morning of April 20 was facilitated by a rumor about police brutality and arrest at Xinhua Gate, where the CCP Central Committee and State Council are located. The first city-wide class boycott was made possible largely because the students believed in a rumor that premier Li Peng had agreed to meet with the students after Hu’s state funeral but then broke his promise. After martial law was enacted, numerous rumors of the factionalism in the government and the army gave people the courage and hope to resist the martial law troops. While almost all of the rumors were later proved to be unfounded, people believed them because they did not trust, even hated, the government. This kind of state–society relationship made the Tiananmen student movement more like a prolonged riot, which greatly reduced the chances of reaching a compromise between state and students and contributed to the tragic ending of the movement.

The 1989 movement has shaped Chinese politics in many ways. On the positive side, top Chinese officials became more clearly aware that dogmatic communist ideology was not going to work. They thus resolutely
ventured into market-oriented reform and have increasingly relied on good performance as the basis of state legitimacy. This performance-based state legitimacy has made Chinese officials more susceptible to public pressure and led them to work harder, which has been a major reason behind China’s economic success. Nevertheless, after the military crackdown, Zhao Ziyang stepped down from the CCP general secretary post and many of China’s pro-democracy intellectuals fled to the West. Although the new CCP leaderships after Zhao were by no means conservative, they all became overcautious in dealing with the issue of political reform for fear of creating opportunities for another large-scale antigovernment movement like that of 1989. Political stability thus became the main goal of the new generations of Chinese leaders. Yet, overly relying on good performance as the basis of state legitimation led to new problems. Most importantly, no government has the ability to lead a country to economic success without setbacks. Even though the current Chinese state has performed very well in terms of its ability to maintain a successful economy, this success has raised the Chinese people’s expectations and encouraged populism. In short, the current Chinese government’s craving for political stability has a tendency to cover up rather than solve social problems, and to demoralize society. Moreover, every year during the June 4 anniversary, dissidents in China and abroad have found different ways to commemorate the movement and to push for political reform in China, which makes the regime very nervous. The spirit of the 1989 movement is still widely alive, and its historical meaning has not yet crystallized.

SEE ALSO: Cultural Revolution (China); Democratization and democratic transition; Mandate of Heaven (China); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Repression and social movements; Rumor in collective behavior and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Transnational Zapatism
THOMAS OLESEN

The Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994, in the Mexican state of Chiapas, immediately posed a challenge to observers of Mexican politics. The impact of the uprising, however, quickly spread beyond Mexico’s borders. The transnational interest generated by the Zapatistas is matched by no other comparable movement in the post-cold war period. Despite the obvious physical, social, and cultural obstacles, an extraordinarily large number of civil society actors, mainly in Europe and the US, have initiated solidarity efforts in support of the Zapatistas, leading to the formation of a transnational Zapatista solidarity network. The network was at its most active in the latter half of the 1990s when dramatic events in Chiapas—such as the Mexican army’s invasion of Zapatista territory in 1995 and the paramilitary massacre in the village of Acteal in 1997—garnered massive attention abroad. Yet the Zapatistas continue to be a source of inspiration for activists outside of Mexico to this day—as testified by an ongoing scholarly interest in the transnational dimension of the movement (e.g., Bob 2005; Olesen 2005; McDonald 2006; Reitan 2007; Juris 2008; Khasnabish 2010).

The Zapatistas emerged on the scene in the post-cold war historical setting. This was a period of redefinition and identity crisis on the Left. The movement contributed to this process in several ways. In 1996 they staged a so-called Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and against Neoliberalism, which drew thousands of non-Mexican activists to settings deep in the Lacandon Forest of Chiapas. The Zapatistas were quick to embrace the concept of neoliberalism, which had become a descriptor of the political processes initiated by Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s—favoring welfare state retrenchment and capitalist development strategies. The Zapatistas focused on neoliberalism in Mexico, but at the same time linked this to a global process of capitalist domination over society, culture, and nature. By illuminating a common source of social and political injustice the Zapatistas successfully located their own local and national struggles in a wider context that made it easier for outside persons and organizations to mirror their own struggles and concerns in those of the Zapatistas (Olesen 2005).

The 1996 meeting was not conceived as a political rally with the Zapatistas in the leading role. The Zapatistas viewed it as an extended and open workshop and went to great lengths to emphasize how social and political change must occur through dialogue and from the grassroots. While clearly locating themselves on the political Left, the Zapatistas thus dissociated themselves from the traditional vanguardist conceptions of revolutionary change that had dominated the radical political scene in Latin America during the 1950s–1980s. In taking this approach the Zapatistas apparently drew considerable inspiration from the indigenous roots of the movement. Indigenous communities have a long tradition of deliberation as the basis of political decision making. The Chiapas encounter in 1996 became a major source of inspiration for the development of the so-called social forums that have been a key feature of transnational activism since the 1990s. Meetings modeled on the Chiapas encounter were held in Spain in 1997 and Brazil in 1999 and were important catalysts for the protests at the WTO meeting in 1999, widely seen as the birth of the so-called Global Justice and Solidarity Movement (Olesen 2005).

The transnational Zapatista solidarity network is notable for the broad array of activists engaged in it. Three broad and sometimes interrelated trends may be discerned: first, organizations with a focus on human rights,
and especially indigenous rights, are centrally involved in the network; second, a number of organizations relate to the Zapatistas via different projects (e.g., schools) intended to improve social development in Chiapas; third, the Zapatistas attract different types of organizations on the Left, especially those with a radical, anarchist, and autonomous outlook. This variety can be partly explained by the Zapatistas’ communication or framing activities. The Zapatistas, and in particular their primary spokesperson and communicator, Subcommandante Marcos, have located their struggle in a democratic framework.

This focus makes the movement and its political projects appealing to a broader sector of organizations than would have been the case with a more narrowly defined radical/revolutionary project. Further, the Zapatistas have constantly invited activists around the world to use them as a mirror. Subcommandante Marcos, aided by an intellectual and literary style of writing that goes down well with the well-educated middle classes of Europe and the US, has successfully portrayed the Zapatistas as a symbol of struggles against injustice everywhere. This interpretation has been widely adopted and is reflected in slogans such as “we are all Marcos” popularized during protests against the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and G8 in the early 2000s (Olesen 2005).

SEE ALSO: Earth’s Color March (Mexico); Social Forum, World; Transnational social movements; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Unemployment movements
MATTHIAS REISS

From the nineteenth century onward, movements of the unemployed have played a significant role in constituting the workless as a distinct social group in modern societies and have helped shape the emerging welfare state. Unemployed protest – or the prospect of it – has fostered the introduction of measures to help the workless and served as a corrective to the tendency of decision-makers to stigmatize and marginalize them.

Conflicting interpretations of whether unemployment was “a problem of industry” (as in the title of an influential book by British economist and social reformer William H. Beveridge in 1910) or the result of individual shortcomings have always marked it as a site of contentious actions. Unemployment movements have gone to great lengths to stress the respectability of their constituents and frame their demands as entitlements earned through previous (or, in the case of youth unemployed, future) services rendered in industry, the armed forces, or society (especially the family). Membership in specific national or ethnic communities has also been used as a basis for claim making. Unemployment movements have also offered the workless a chance to overcome the negative psychological effects of involuntary idleness and provided them with a sense of agency. Any discussion of the outcome of unemployment movements therefore has to take into account not only the tangible benefits won by them but also the impact they had on their participants and supporters, their deterring effect on decision-makers, and the way they shaped the discussion about unemployment and the unemployed in the public arena.

Unemployment movements are a relatively new field of research which emerged with the return of mass unemployment in Western societies during the 1970s. Previous works, such as the famous study of the unemployed in the Austrian village of Marienthal (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, & Zeisel 1933), had denied the ability of the workless to organize and act collectively, or dismissed their movements as insignificant, ineffective, or dominated by outsider groups or agitators. Recent research has overturned the thesis of the politically apathetic and socially isolated unemployed and broadened the framework of analysis to unemployment movements in developing countries, such as Argentina, and the transnational protest against the causes of unemployment.

One of the remarkable features of unemployment movements is their wide repertoire of action. With few resources and limited or no access to the media or political institutions, the unemployed have adapted and further developed established forms of protest action as well as invented a number of new ones, such as national protest marches, church parades, occupations of buildings, sit-down strikes, mock funerals, visits to restaurants without paying, roadblocks, or “boss-napping.”

Unemployment movements have frequently tried to overcome their lack of resources through cooperation with other groups. These movements are usually short lived unless they are supported by external partners, although the latter often experience the unemployed as hard to control and unpredictable. Cooperation with extreme groups can also lead to stigmatization and loss of legitimacy.

Socialist and communist parties have provided not only funds, organizational skills, dedicated cadres and leadership, but also a master frame which offered a nonindividual explanation for unemployment (capitalism), a remedy (socialism/communism) and a way to achieve it (social or political revolution). Conservatives and groups of the extreme right offered similar explanations but different remedies (paternalism/protectionism/cooperative state).
Trade union movements and the political parties affiliated with them command great legitimacy and substantial resources and for that reason have been important allies of unemployment movements over the years. However, trade unions are organizations of the employed and often had – and still have – an ambivalent relationship with those who were out of work. The interests of the unemployed differ from those who are still employed, and mass unemployment weakens the positions of trade unions vis-à-vis employers. Unemployment organizations were also perceived as rivals for the representation of the working class, front organizations of radical groups, or associations of potential strike breakers. Nevertheless, some trade unions supported unemployment movements and provided forums for the workless to bind them to the labor movement.

Mobilization of the unemployed has proven to be difficult even at the best of times. Being out of work does not create a stable and positive social identity around which people can be easily mobilized but is a status which most try to shed as soon as possible. On the other hand, involuntary idleness has freed individuals to build movements of the unemployed, especially if they already had organizing experience, while anger and feelings of victimization have provided powerful incentives for collective actions – often in cooperation with those who were still in paid employment but concerned about the effects of unemployment on a community, region, or the nation at large.

As long as unemployment affected mainly blue-collar workers, working-class communities offered a variety of networks for mobilization. The initial practices of controlling the unemployed and administering benefits also facilitated the building of networks at labor exchanges or relief work projects and offered a clearly identifiable target for protest activities in the form of local or regional authorities. These favorable preconditions for mass mobilization have now largely disappeared, although e-mail and Internet forums offer new ways for exchanging information and building networks.

SEE ALSO: Contentious politics; Labor movement; Marxism and social movements; Master frame; Networks and social movements; Piqueteros (workers/unemployment movement in Argentina); Poor people’s movements; Social class and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Urban movements
ELEONORA PASOTTI

WHAT ARE URBAN MOVEMENTS?

The definition of urban movement is contested and has changed over time. Urban movements were and continue to be often referred to as urban social movements. The reasons are not explicitly articulated, but can be attributed to the emphasis on noninstitutional politics and protest rather than associations, which was privileged by early path-setting work in this field.

In one such contribution, Castells (1977: 360–375) defined urban movements by their outcomes. He distinguished between participation, protest, and urban social movements, attributing only to the latter category the ability to bring about social change. Subsequently, he and others abandoned this strategy, and focused on potential rather than actual outcomes and on the specifically territorial focus of urban movements. Castells defined urban social movements as movements that consider themselves related to a specific spatial community, are territorially defined, and usually mobilize around three goals: collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management (Castells 1983: 328).

Other definitions put more weight on the political context within which urban movements operate. Here, urban movements are a type of social movement rooted in “collectivities with a communal base and/or with the local state as their target of action” (Fainstein & Fainstein 1985: 189). As in Castells, participants can share a communal base because they relate to the same housing complex, neighborhood, or city. However, this approach underscores that economic and sociodemographic changes condition but do not determine the trajectories of urban social movements and emphasizes the target of protest. Most often action is directed towards local authorities as they “act to service, police, and redevelop urban communities” (Fainstein & Fainstein 1985: 189). Yet, the local state is not necessarily the target of action, which can also be directed to private agents or towards self-help initiatives.

A further unresolved issue is the form of urban movements. A focus on protest and resistance and skepticism about nonconfrontational forms of civil society engagement (Mayer 2003) led some scholars to privilege informal groups over associations and nongovernmental organizations. Yet, other scholars see urban movements as taking a variety of forms, “from counter-cultural squatters to middle-class-neighborhood associations and shanty town defense groups” (Castells 1983: 328), with strategies that vary tremendously, including lobbying, protesting, rent strikes, squatting, reappropriation, and other forms of subversive reclaiming.

COMMUNITY AND CLASS

A recurrent theme in the study of urban movements is the challenge of combining community identity (primarily around place and ethnicity) with class identity. The lack of this integration is often taken as a reason for movement failure. For instance, Castells (1983) argued that only urban movements that combined all three goals of collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management could succeed in bringing about social change and avoid disempowerment through co-optation and integration into existing institutions. However, he argued that even that change was limited in scope, precisely because, due to their emphasis on locality and their inability to integrate class, urban social movements are only the expression of
the inability to find systemic solutions to the problems afflicting the oppressed: “the source of urban movements in our societies is the absence of effective channels for social change” (Castells 1983: 326). Thus ultimately urban social movements can only aspire to have local effects, not systemic effects.

The inability of urban movements in the US to combine class and community has been isolated as a core reason for their weakness and ultimate inefficacy in political science as well. In *City Trenches*, Ira Katznelson argues that US workers in major industrial cities act on the basis of class solidarity at work but on ethnic and territorial identities at home (Katznelson 1981). This sharply divided consciousness between the politics of work and the politics of community protected the core arrangements of capitalism from political challenge. The effect in the US has been a predominance of community politics in the critical period of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, in some cases, claims went beyond self-government and collective consumption and extended to employment. However, coalitions were fragile and movements were co-opted by municipal governments through moderate and piecemeal reforms and decentralization.

Much analysis on urban movements sets them in the context of macroeconomic shifts. In the latter part of the twentieth century, capital reacted to deindustrialization by investing its surplus in cities with a strategy of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2008), in which poor residents in high-value areas were displaced to make place for profitable urban redevelopment. The state acted as a facilitator of business in the 1960s and 1970s. With the spread of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, city governments took the leading role in initiating extensive urban redevelopment, which is combined with retrenchment in social spending and privatization of service provision in the effort to compete with other cities (Smith 1996).

Yet, urban movements also reflect the political system in which they are “channeled and contained” (Katznelson 1981; Fainstein & Fainstein 1985). The openness or vulnerability of the political system and the fragmentation of the elites are key factors in the emergence of urban movements and shape targets and strategies. Hence, current work conceptualizes urban movements as part of the urban system and even of global networks.

**CURRENT AND FUTURE EMPHASES**

There continues to be a significant isolation of writings about urban movements from scholarship on other types of social movements (Pickvance 2003: 104). Yet, the spatial dimension of the urban context and its effect on mobilization is ripe for analysis – thanks also to new geomapping data which allows for a better link between space and protest strategy. A promising area in which social movements and urban movements come together is the study of the urban dimension of democratization protests. Despite having national (and even global) audiences, the main actors in these protests are urban movements, based in the capital and sometimes a few other cities. Vivid examples have been offered by the toppling of the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia, by the Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet zone, and by uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011.

Beyond cases of regime transformation, the challenge to integrate workplace and community identities remains key to urban movements. The translation of *Right to the City* (Lefebvre 1996) launched a new wave of scholarly interest and activism aiming to combine community and workplace consciousness into forms of resistance against capitalism and in particular against neoliberalism. Since the original version of the book, on the eve of the 1968 Paris revolts, the main tools for organization at the disposal of the working class have lost significant sway. Political parties suffered steep declines in voters’ loyalty and electoral turnouts. Unions witnessed dramatic falls in membership, in both the private and public sectors, and lost their claim to representativeness following the rise of flexible work in advanced
economies, and of informal work in developing economies. The weakening of organized forms of popular resistance lessened the ability of the disadvantaged to mobilize. Research on political participation, protest, and associationalism shows that socioeconomic status continues to be the most significant predictor of political activity, and that the waning of unions further undermines involvement by popular sectors (Collier & Handlin 2009).

Yet, a new wave of resistance is taking place in cities worldwide, in industrial and developing economies, as well as in democracies and authoritarian regimes. Urban movements continue to mobilize around a great variety of issues—such as their struggle against urban redevelopment and gentrification; for environmental justice, including public transportation, waste management, pollution, and urban agriculture; for improved social services, community empowerment, and employment opportunities. Over the last decade, these goals manifest themselves not in isolation, but rather as components of a wider agenda of social justice, as urban movements mobilize people and “new urban meanings” (Castells 1983). The approach evokes the campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s. However, movements today are much better able to scale horizontally and vertically, thanks to the use of digital technologies.

The Right to the City Alliance, founded in 2007, is an important illustration of such urban movements. With chapters in eight regions/cities across the US, the movement presents a coalition of several dozen organizations building grassroots resistance in “low-income, working class communities of color to strategically challenge neoliberal economic policies.” Formal and informal linkages under the header of Right to the City are growing across the world, deploying digital communication to achieve coherence in ideology, to share tactical and strategic tools, and to support one another (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer forthcoming).

In parallel, new approaches to negotiation are emerging between community coalitions, local governments, and capital investors. Two prominent examples in the US are community benefit agreements and living wage campaigns. Both efforts rely on urban movements in which community groups and organized labor come together. Organized labor contributes by emphasizing the class dimension of the conflict, and bringing resources and organizational skills. Community groups deliver transversal mobilization and the legitimacy that derives from broad representation. The actor that is still missing is formal politics. Political parties do not take on a leading role in the protests, and serve a moderating and co-opting function now as they did 40 years ago. Scholarship suggests that the strength and resilience of class–community coalitions is key to these movements’ results, yet the conditions under which these coalitions succeed are not yet explored. Thus, issues in the field of urban studies for future research are (1) the conditions under which labor and community organizations can collaborate successfully and sustainably, with a focus on issues of democratic governance and scaling mechanisms; (2) how digital activism changes the scope and effect of urban movements, as well as their mobilization, organization, and framing; and (3) the interaction between urban movements and the processes of formal politics.

SEE ALSO: Community organizing (United States); Homeless protest movements (United States); Labor movement; NIMBY movements; Paris Commune; Squatters’ movements; Urban riots in Europe, post-2000.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Since the start of the new millennium there have been four major instances of urban "rioting" in Europe, each of which has given rise to prolonged academic and/or public theoretical speculation regarding the underlying political origins and motives of such action. The term “rioting” is often rejected as inappropriate by academic and political commentators, on the grounds that it often used to suggest “wanton criminality” or, oppositely, to imply a degree of political awareness and ambition that is actually lacking among participants. Here we shall be employing the more neutral descriptor of “disorders” in referring to such events.

The first of these disorders occurred in the spring and early summer of 2001 in a handful of northern British towns and cities (Burnley and Oldham in Lancashire, and Bradford in West Yorkshire), all once famous for textile manufacturing. Each event involved violent clashes between Muslim youths of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage and police officers, following initial altercations between the former and white neofascists on the outskirts of major Asian residential areas.

The next major example, the French disorders of October/November 2005, were sparked off by an ostensibly innocuous encounter in the Parisian suburb (or banlieue) of Clichy-sous-Bois in which three male teenagers of North African descent were approached by a handful of police officers seeking proof of their identities. This quickly developed into a chase, during which the youths tried to avoid capture by entering an electricity generating station. There, however, two of them were fatally electrocuted while the third incurred severe burns. Rumors that the police had pursued the teenagers without good reason became the pretext for five successive nights of confrontation. Disorder then extended into numerous other Paris banlieues before proliferating outward across the entire nation.

The Greek disorders of December 2008 were precipitated by the death of a 15-year-old male high school pupil, Alexis Grigoropoulos, who was shot down by a police officer in the Exarcheia area of central Athens while out socializing with friends. The tightly policed location in which the incident occurred is synonymous with the “koukouloforoi” anarchist group, who are notorious for covering their heads and faces with hoods in an apparent attempt to avoid identification and incrimination. Soon afterwards, hundreds of youths gathered outside the nearby polytechnic school, a symbolic location of resistance since 1973 when it was the scene of rebellious activity against the military dictatorship of the day. The youths began shouting antipolice slogans and threw stones and petrol bombs at officers before protesting throughout the city center, where they vandalized scores of banks and multinational commercial and retail premises.

The last of the four examples – the nationwide disorders in the UK in August 2011 – initially broke out on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, north London, the scene of similar violence in 1985. Here the fatal police shooting of a male black resident, reputedly belonging to a local gang, became the focus of unchecked rumor asserting that he had been fired upon while unarmed or even wearing handcuffs at the time. Forty-eight hours after the shooting had occurred a crowd of 200 gathered outside the local police station, demanding to know precisely what had happened and why. The protest was initially good-natured. However, as the crowd grew increasingly impatient in the face of police unresponsiveness, confrontation was sparked off when a 16-year-old
woman demanding answers from the officers present was allegedly bundled to the ground.

Details of this incident and the associated violence were quickly circulated on YouTube and various forms of social media. Within an hour, there were running battles between police and residents on nearby streets while hundreds of local shops were looted. In the next three days, the looting and disorder spread, first to other parts of London, and thereafter to pockets of other major cities like Birmingham and Manchester. Those involved in the disorders were primarily young and male, but not confined to any particular ethnic category.

In all three countries, violence was condemned by the national media and political authorities in ways which reflected long-standing academic “theories” of “riot” causality. Thus, the British and French disorders were each denounced as evidence of the inherent criminality of those involved (the so-called riff-raff hypothesis), of the rabble-rousing influence of “political or religious fundamentalist trouble-makers” (the agitator theory), or of the “copycat” effect of mass media – or, in the case of the more recent UK riots, social media – coverage (the contagion effect). The Greek disorders were similarly attributed to the sinister influence of the koukouloforoi and the equally criminally minded or poorly socialized immigrant groups supposedly overrepresented in these events. However, closer academic inspection of all four cases makes it possible to identify clear underlying political motives for such behavior.

Relevant research into the French and 2001 British disorders, for example, has highlighted several common antecedent causal conditions, most notably: relatively high levels of social segregation and stigmatization; severe industrial decline and correspondingly high unemployment (impacting on ethnic minority youth in particular); complaints of poor schooling and educational and employment discrimination; and lack of political representation. These factors have evidently encouraged forms of cultural adaptation involving assertively antisocial attitudes predicated on toughness and territorialism, petty criminality, and drug use.

Research further reveals how, in Britain, feelings of disaffection among working-class youths of Asian heritage had been intensified by the renascence of neofascism, as reflected in vastly increased shares of local electoral voting. Here, the growing tendency for ethnic youth to organize responsively in defence of community was misconstrued by right-wing parties, the police, and local media as “antiwhite racism,” characterized by the creation of “no-go areas” supposedly heaving with lawlessness and under the sinister influence of “Muslim fundamentalism.” Far Right opposition rose correspondingly, and it was in response to perceptions of enhanced right-wing provocation and allegations of police indifference to the plight of local Asian populations that youth resistance was ultimately expressed through violence.

Similar forms of cultural adaptation exhibited by French ethnic minority youth were likewise condemned by political and media commentators apt to perceive the banlieues as hotbeds of Islamic militancy and delinquency. The resulting abandonment of “community policing” programmes in favor of a general crackdown on “quality of life crimes” (like hanging around entrances to public housing and defrauding public transport), the tightening up of immigration laws and a greater emphasis on identity checks, helped produce the drastic deterioration of police–community relations in which the disorders eventually occurred.

Academic theorists have emphasized how the Greek disorders differed from their British and French counterparts to the extent that they involved a far broader coalition of working- and middle-class youth, all variously affected by an economically ailing and politically corrupt society in which the unemployment rate for people aged 15 to 24 was approaching 25 percent, employment rights were being nullified, and completion of a highly expensive university degree offered no guarantee of a secure job. It was against such conditions of
hopelessness and demoralization, and amidst perceptions that the police were responding repressively to mounting popular dissent, that the reaction to the killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos occurred—and was, perhaps, all the more incendiary due to the political significance of the location where the fatal shot was fired and the neighboring polytechnic school.

The pivotal Tottenham disorder of 2011 occurred in a context of high unemployment and educational underachievement, compounded by recent cuts in the funding of youth club provision. Widespread police application of “stop-and-search” and other specially targeted operations instigated in response to rising street theft, burglaries, and gang-related activity were said to have blurred the distinction between innocent and guilty. If collective indignation surrounding the police shooting and the more precipitous treatment of the teenage girl was symptomatic of endemic community alienation and resentment, it is also possible that disorders occurring elsewhere in London, and thereafter nationwide, were driven by sympathetic undercurrents in areas also experiencing problematic police-community relations. Even the widespread looting of retail outlets (which was more characteristic of these disorders than the above precedents) may have contained an underlying political motive. While lacking the political ambition of (say) the hunger or bread “riots” of earlier centuries, the UK disturbances represented, in the words of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (Duarte 2011), “a mutiny of defective and disqualified consumers, people offended and humiliated by the display of riches to which they had been denied access.”

There is therefore little doubt that the most prominent examples of “European rioting” occurring in the past two decades have been relatively unfocused and inchoate, lacking either obvious goals or explicit demands for political empowerment. Though unquestionably driven by profound political grievance, they did not constitute the type of “insurrection,” “uprising,” or “upheaval” that is generally more synonymous with enduring, bona fide social movements.

SEE ALSO: Contagion theory; Convergence/dispositional theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Precipitating events and flashpoints; Riots; Urban movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Velvet Revolution of 1989
DON KALB

It was the massive and peaceful civic eruption in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 which first generated the name “Velvet Revolution”: an accelerating wave of demonstrations and strikes, initially led by a handful of young students in the performing arts, which led within three weeks to the fall of the supposedly “hard-line” socialist regime in Prague. Subsequently, the name “Velvet Revolution” was extended to include the whole sequence of peaceful (except for Romania) revolutions in 1989 that initiated the fall of state socialism in Europe.

The protest sequence was driven by developments in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Its first phase culminated with the Gorbachev approved Polish Round Table of February–April 1989, which produced the partially free parliamentary elections in June and then a Solidarity-led government in August. The Polish negotiations were a response to a new cycle of ferocious labor protest in Poland that started in the late spring of 1988. In Hungary it was the gradual fragmentation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party since 1985 and the emergence of open political competition, first within and then outside the party, leading to the opening of the Iron Curtain in July 1989 and subsequent free elections. In the Soviet Union it was the arrival of Gorbachev in 1985 that allowed discussion of the stagnation of “really existing socialism,” an endorsement of “reform,” and a sober calculation of the costs and benefits of its Central European empire.

By the summer of 1989, opposition forces, underground youth, peace, and environmentalist groups in Central and Eastern Europe, empowered by a diffusion of news and civil society networks connecting East and West Europe, were emboldened to come out and press claims for free elections and the end of socialist party rule. Even where such dissent had not openly existed before, such as in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or Romania, this swiftly led to mass movements. These movements were of a different nature from country to country, and were represented by different sorts of leadership, focusing on partly different concrete issues, and employing partly distinct framings. But they reinforced each other, shared in the claim for democracy and civil society, and produced nothing less than the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the end of state socialism. The heavily militarized division of Europe, with stockpiles of nuclear weapons that could have destroyed the world ten times over, was swiftly unmade by peaceful protests in less than a year.

The subsequent full victory of liberal capitalism over state socialism in the cold war led Western commentators, from Francois Furet to Francis Fukuyama, to announce varieties of the famous “end of history” thesis, extolling the end of the ideological antagonisms that had riveted modern Europe and the world since the French Revolution. It has continued to frame the character of dominant political narratives to this day. We are still in the post-1989 period.

As in the classical revolutions (England, the US, France, Russia, China), intellectuals of diverse sorts (dissidents, pastors, actors, writers) were substantially involved in 1989. But instead of claiming the victory of an arising class and capturing the command centers of the state to impose it, they walked peacefully under the banners of “civil society,” “decency,” “normalcy,” basic civic freedoms, and a “return to Europe.” Their ideas were framed in universal notions of human rights as revitalized by the “Helsinki process” (1975). These were merged with recent and older local traditions of antipolitics and what the writer Milan Kundera had called “the republic of the mind,” traditions
that rejected centralized power over people's lives.

Except in Poland and Hungary, however, such intellectuals had been thoroughly marginalized by the party states and their security apparatuses in the 1980s. In countries with strong police states like Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania, even a few weeks before the actual revolutions dissident groups had been tiny and ostensibly irrelevant. They found themselves lifted at once into positions of responsibility as representatives of “the people” – with the exception of the dissidents of the GDR, who were swiftly marginalized by “reunification” with the Federal Republic of Germany, and Romania, where “the revolution” was manipulated by sections within the security apparatus itself. “This was not an explosion,” the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski later wrote about the revolutions, “it was like the breaking of an egg from inside the shell” (1999).

The Velvet Revolution of 1989 is one of those enigmatic recent world-shaping events that the experts did not foresee, like the financial crisis of 2008 or the Middle Eastern and north African rebellions of early 2011. Nineteen eighty-nine, in fact, called for new perspectives in the social sciences. There is a recent consensus that this unexpected cycle of region-wide peaceful revolutions can only be explained in a complex multiscalar narrative that proceeds on several temporal planes simultaneously, going beyond the usual modernist focus on separate nation states and intrastate social movements. The protest wave was the crystallization of a set of diffuse structural processes within the socialist bloc that were only weakly perceived in their full dimensions by contemporary participants and commentators. We need to (1) analyze the whole empirical sequence of public contentious events in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; (2) link processes in CEE with developments within the Kremlin; (3) understand these events against the background of the basic contradictions within “really existing socialism” as they were unfolding over time; and (4) place these dynamics in the socialist world within the transformations of encompassing world capitalism since 1945 as a whole.

Stalinism was designed to turn backward agricultural societies into urban industrial societies within a uniquely compressed period of time enabled by forceful methods. East Central Europe in 1948 was overwhelmingly rural, with anywhere between 50 and 80 percent of the population living off the land (except in the GDR and the Czech lands). By 1980 these agricultural populations had been largely transformed into modern literate urban working classes and white-collar workers. After the initial high-speed social transformation a seemingly stable “socialist mode of production and consumption” had developed. Against its self-image, however, that mode of production was not well planned and had its own irrationalities, among others a heavy bias toward capital and military goods controlled by the party-state, and a massively underperforming agricultural sector. After 1970 it also became ever more dependent on Western loans. While it did produce the basics for a modern way of life, it did not live up to Khrushchev’s famous promise of 1961; it never surpassed the West. Growth began stagnating around 1970 and remained in a low-level equilibrium ever since. Overtaking the West, however, had always been part of its proclaimed raison d’être. By the 1980s the “capitalist” other, that had been stuck in deep crisis in the 1930s and was associated with Nazism and war, had been thoroughly transformed into a wealthy space of social democracy and individual freedom. Life in socialism seemed bleak in comparison. Socialism produced a modern public with modern desires, but characteristically left the desires suspended and therefore politicized, feeding a civic disavowal that deepened over time as Western lifestyles were increasingly showcased over the socialist region. This was one aspect of what was growing inside Kolakowski’s “shell of an egg.”

Just as important and more politically momentous, the socialist mode of production left a large measure of control over production
to its lower level managers and workers. It penetrated much less forcefully into the sphere of production than capitalism did. This lack of control by the center amounted to a partial denial of the Western idea of socialist authoritarianism and totalitarianism; it controlled the sphere of political discussion but not quite the sphere of work. Workers’ control had been a recurrent idea in the antisoviet revolts in Poznan 1953, Budapest 1956, Prague 1968, and of course in Poland under Solidarity, and was one aspect of the claim for “socialism with a human face.” But in fact quite a bit of control from below on the workshop floor existed. This was part of the bargain to get sodalities of workers, who could not be fired nor incentivized by high wages, to commit themselves to the plan under the conditions of shortage and obsolete technology. The more complex the socialist economy became, the less the party-state seemed capable of securing the central appropriation of surplus from workers and firms.

Workers were also aware that they were ruled in their own name and they had learned to use this to their own advantage. Although independent labor unions were outlawed, workers did not go easy on the party state if it raised food prices. Worker unrest and local rebellions would recurrently break out in protest against imposed raises, in the price of meat in particular. In Poland in 1971, 1976, 1979, 1980, and 1988, massive worker unrest, increasingly coordinated, emerged precisely around this issue, with cumulative political consequences. Paradoxically, socialism unraveled among others as a consequence of workers demanding workers’ rights. Poland was the prime example.

One response to stagnation, pioneered in Hungary since 1968, was “reform.” It was an effort to decentralize control and responsibility to lower levels of execution in firms and the bureaucracy. It empowered the technocrats vis-à-vis the central planners and the party leadership. Such experts would then subsequently claim further “reform.” In the daily running of socialist societies after 1970 therefore, technocrats, increasingly with university credentials, pushed back party ideologists and became a force both within and outside the parties, further hollowing out party rule. Hungary was the classic case.

This shift in leadership downward and outward from the party center was accelerated as socialist countries, from the mid-1970s, were given access to Western loans as part of the “Helsinki” deal with the West (“human rights for loans”). In the 1980s, indebted socialist countries desperately tried to export their way out of their newly acquired servitude. Their products, however, were hardly competitive in the West. The energy bill to be paid to the Kremlin kept rising too. International loans were also used to buy off rebellious workers, in particular in Poland after 1973. By 1989 Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, the GDR, and Russia had run up some 90 billion of dollar debt to the West. Instead of defaulting, as Mexico did, the state socialist economies desperately tried to integrate further into the Western markets. Hungary became the first Comecon nation to become a member of the International Monetary Fund in 1982. The Soviet Union rejected an invasion into Poland in 1981 because the politburo feared a Western economic blockade. In the process, “reform” was accelerated while the party was losing its ability to buy off the workers in whose name it ruled. Socialist parties in the 1980s became increasingly bent on exacting higher productivity and a larger surplus from them. In the process, Ceaucescu’s Romania imposed a new homebred Stalinism and in fact paid off its debts by 1989.

Poland, for various reasons, one of them being its strong Catholic church, had always enjoyed a more open political scene than other Warsaw pact countries. From the mid-1970s, young critical intellectuals, in particular Jacek Kuron, began seeking alliances with an increasingly restless working class, resulting in the creation of the Workers Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976, to support workers in their legal fights against punishment. The KOR was
of signal importance in turning a new bout of isolated worker protests in the shipyards of the Baltic Coast in 1980 into the making and then the legalization of an independent nationwide labor union, Solidarity, with the electrician Lech Walesa at its head. The collective spirit that percolated after the new Polish pope, Karol Wojtyla, had brought the nation together in massive public rituals in 1979, was now increasingly turned into defiance against the party state. The alliance between intellectuals, workers, and the Catholic church fractured and delegitimized the party. With a membership of 8 million by late 1980, and openly demanding worker self-management and a pluralist civic sphere, this was the end of state-socialism as we knew it. Solidarity was not just a blue-collar union; the new middle classes of technocrats were substantially part of it, including a good million party members. On December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski’s martial law destroyed the public side of the union in a few weeks, and incarcerated thousands of its activists. But it did not defeat for good the spirit of defiance in the factories, nor could militarization be a durable solution for the accumulating problems of socialism. In 1985 an amnesty was announced. In April 1988, in response to price hikes of meat, several mines in the south and various factories along the Baltic coast were once again occupied by workers, now led by a new generation of young and even more radical worker leaders. Dada-like street performances by students, mocking the regime, were also spreading again in the cities, such as, famously, the “Orange Alternative.”

The coming of Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 signaled the start of a rejuvenation of the aging Kremlin leadership. Glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were the symbols under which the new politburo set about tackling social and economic stagnation. In talks with the Polish generals following the renewed strikes and occupations in Poland in the spring of 1988, the Kremlin accepted that the Polish generals would negotiate with opposition individuals. The idea of the Round Table was born. The intention of the party was to acquire acceptance of “economic reform” (including price rises) in exchange for political pluralism and the strengthening of its own legitimacy. Gorbachev and even the Polish party leadership did not fully sense that the legitimacy of the party in Poland was beyond repair, and elsewhere soon too. Poland started its Round Table in January 1989, ushering in partly free elections in June that the regime was confident to win. They would not, and against everyone’s expectations Solidarity would form a government in September.

In Hungary, oppositional youth groups had been forming since the late 1970s around colleges and in independent democratic networks. Within the Socialist Party the “reform socialist” faction had become hegemonic in the early 1980s. In 1985 independent representatives were allowed to register for elections and became a strong oppositional nucleus in the party and the parliament. Increasing competition among leaders within the party gradually led to the formation of political movements, including Fidesz, the youth league of the Socialist Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which united a faction of reformists around Imre Pozsgay with “populist” intellectuals in the provinces. Political competition was spilling over into the street from the summer of 1988 onwards. The Hungarian Democratic Forum was allowed to organize a huge demonstration against the treatment of Hungarian minorities in Transylvania under Ceaucescu’s “systematization policy.” Large-scale environmental protests emerged against plans to dam the Danube. Janos Kadar, who had led the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party since 1956, was forced out in the summer of 1988. The party was now pressed to acknowledge that 1956 had in fact been a “popular rebellion” rather than a “counterrevolution.” The party was forced to face the legality of its actions in the aftermath of the Budapest uprising, including the killing of Imre Nagy and others. This process of legal and historical questioning
finally resulted in the public reburial of Imre Nagy in Budapest in June 1989, where Victor Orban of Fidesz openly demanded the departure of the Russian army and sovereignty and democracy for Hungarians. Youth groups were now campaigning in the form of “pan-European picnics” for the opening of the Iron Curtain. GDR tourists, holidaying in Hungary, were not returning home, hoping to get to Austria through the weakening Curtain and then on to West Germany. This was made possible officially in August 1989, after Gorbachev told the Hungarian government that it was a bilateral issue between Budapest and the East German government. Tellingly, Hungary received an extra incentive to lift the Curtain from the West German Christian Democrats in the form of a one billion Deutschmark loan. Hungary, like Poland, was becoming a parliamentary republic and the Iron Curtain was falling.

This in its turn had repercussions for the GDR as the number of refugees through the Hungarian route exploded. The GDR first refused travel to Hungary. But GDR citizens fled in large numbers to the German and US embassies in Prague. When a trainload of refugees was finally allowed to travel from Prague to the Federal Republic through GDR territory, protests within the GDR itself began mounting. A small church-based group in Leipzig had been doing quasi-oppositional religious processions on Mondays, but from September on attendance began to grow exponentially, turning the processions into the famous Monday demonstrations, with tens of thousands of participants claiming democracy, and later demanding reunification. Gorbachev, visiting Berlin in October for commemorations, rejected violence and urged the replacement of Erich Honecker. With huge demonstrations now spreading to East Berlin, the new leadership was shaken. On November 9, in the confusion, a government speaker giving improvised answers on television to journalists uttered, mistakenly, that the new free travel regime to West Berlin could start immediately that same night. Large crowds began gathering at once before the checkpoints in the Wall. Local officers, who could not get through to the central committee, which was meeting behind closed doors, finally opened a checkpoint. Shortly, excited and incredulous people were flowing into the streets of West Berlin and crowds soon started tearing down the Wall. The overwhelmed GDR leadership felt incapable of stopping the crowds and meekly began discussing reunification on Western terms, to which Gorbachev, seeking further economic ties with the West, had no objections.

With the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall crumbling, all the other socialist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe were on the line. Thodor Zhivkov, the Socialist Party leader in Bulgaria, declared, as soon as November 10, that Bulgaria would have free elections. The hard line socialist regimes in Czechoslovakia and Romania did not choose that route. The Czechoslovak regime cracked down on a big demonstration in Prague on November 17, but was soon overwhelmed by a new wave of even more massive demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of people in Prague and elsewhere, which were set in motion by networks of young actors in the country who used their schools and theaters as organizational nodes. Oppositional thinkers such as Vaclav Havel were catapulted into positions as “representatives of the people” and into national leadership. Before the end of November the regime was negotiating a date for elections.

The Romanian revolution was even more convulsive and indeed violent. Here it was not the democratic voice of a sudden opposition but the violent fractures within its own repressive apparatus that ultimately produced the end of the Ceaucescu regime and one-party rule. A Hungarian-speaking protestant pastor, Laszlo Tokes, in the border city of Timisoara, had been criticizing the discrimination of (Hungarian) Protestants. The Ceaucescu regime had already decided it would crack down on any open dissent, following the example of the Chinese
Communist Party at Tiananmen Square on June 4, and it proceeded to remove him from his church. A few dozen parishioners were protecting him. In the local escalation that followed, the army commander who was sent in to besiege Timisoara refused, after an initial assault, to shoot common people who were clearly not the bloodthirsty counterrevolutionaries denounced by official rhetoric. Put under pressure by Ceaucescu to use the army, the minister of defense committed suicide in Bucharest on December 22. Top networks within the Romanian security apparatus, unwilling to fight the nation, decided that it was time for the “conducator” to go. They used the unrest that emerged at a public address by Ceaucescu in Bucharest later that day to highjack the dictator and his wife, shoot them without legal process, and impose control over Bucharest and the armed groups. And, following the regional examples, they swiftly announced elections.

By December 31, 1989, Kolakowski’s “eggshell” had been broken, ostensibly by an assortment of mutually reinforcing civic movements of highly variable persuasions, composition, and power. They had done so in different ways, along different crack-lines, reflecting different histories of different states. The deeper unity and direction of the process was driven by the unfolding inner contradictions of “really existing socialism” within a world increasingly dominated by Western capitalism.

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Eastern European social movements; Marxism and social movements; “Orange” and “colored” revolutions in former Soviet Union; Postcommunism and social movements; Revolutions; Solidarity (Poland); Strikes within the European context; Tiananmen student movement (China).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Victim movements

STÉPHANE LATTE

Over the last three decades, “victims” have become in most Western democracies one of the central figures in the field of social movements. While, in order to make their voices heard, increasing numbers of activist groups claim to be “victims,” the number of books and articles which either celebrate or denounce the advent of a “nation of victims” has been growing. Yet few sociological studies have taken the political uses of this category seriously. After briefly tracing the genealogy of victim movements, I will then identify the originality of this new contentious repertoire. Then, I will show how the study of this emerging form of protest has shed light on three blind spots of the sociology of collective action: the emotions of protest, the role of the traumatic event in the activist recruitment, and the gendered dimensions of social movements.

THE GENESIS OF THE “VICTIM MOVEMENT”

Since the mid-1970s, the identification of “victims” as a population with specific characteristics and problems has developed in Europe and the US along with an administrative, social, and academic mobilization. Launched by various governments, the “victim” category has been adopted by social movements and integrated into scientific knowledge.

Interest in “victims” first arose from a bureaucratic concern for the crime issue. While in the late 1970s the problem of crime control competed with social-economic issues at the top of the political agenda, governments sought to promote victim assistance and compensation programs. The influences behind these policies are quite varied. In the US, these initiatives were inspired by the law-and-order campaign as they primarily aimed at encouraging victims and witnesses of crimes to cooperate with law enforcement authorities so as to reduce crime. In France and Canada, victim assistance was rather a symbolic counterpart to a penal policy aimed at the rehabilitation of offenders. Victim relief should help defuse the “fear of crime” and promote social acceptance of measures for offender reintegration. In both cases, these policies led to the institutionalization of the administrative category of “victims.” Symbolic measures focused public attention on victim-related issues such as the proclamation of the National Crime Victims Rights Week by Ronald Reagan (1981) or the convening of committees in charge of stimulating victim reforms (the Task Force on Victims of Crime in the US and the Milliez Commission in France). National organizations were also created to coordinate the implementation of grassroots victim assistance programs run by volunteers: the National Organization for Victim Assistance in the US (1979), Victim Support in Britain (1979), the Institut National d’Aide aux Victimes in France (1986). Finally, the “victims” category has received institutional consecration with the founding of the Office for Victims of Crimes in the US Department of Justice (1984) and, more recently, with the launching in France of the first department entirely devoted to victims’ rights (2004).

This unprecedented public concern subsequently encountered the nascent victim activism. The first victims’ groups were created in the late 1970s in the US (Parents of Murdered Children in 1978, Protect the Innocent in 1979, Mothers Against Drunk Driving in 1980) and Canada (Citizens United for Safety and Justice in 1981, Victims of Violence in 1984). However, the relationship between the mobilization of victims and the state varies depending on national configurations. Thus, in the US, there is a strong convergence...
between public assistance programs looking for legitimization and protest entrepreneurs looking for institutional support (Elias 1993; Weed 1995). Victim activists work closely together with officials in charge of public policies: each identify themselves with the same category of “victim movement” and they conduct joint campaigns for constitutional amendments for victim rights. In Canada, officials of the ministry in charge of victim issues have faced difficulties in co-opting activist networks that do not describe themselves with this label and they have failed to generate a belief in the existence of a “social demand of victims” (Rock 1986). Finally, in France and the UK, victim assistance leaders, who have mostly come from the movements for prisoner rehabilitation, refuse to play the role of spokesperson for the “victims” and explicitly reject the characterization of “victim movement.” They derogatorily call self-help groups “angry victims” and suspect them of being driven by irrational reactions, vengeful aims, and punitive spirit. In both countries, it was not until the late 1990s that victims’ organizations were recognized by government officials as legitimate representatives (Rock 1998).

An academic field – victimology – has played a role in the reification and institutionalization of the “victims” category. Following the First International Symposium on Victimology, held in 1973, scholars, policymakers, and victim advocate group leaders founded the World Society of Victimology (1979). This scientific society functions as a transnational pressure group, coordinating a lobbying campaign at the United Nations that led to the vote for the “Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power” in 1985. But above all, this academic movement for victims has helped forge and circulate encompassing concepts defining the “victims” category as a homogeneous entity. Thus, the “discovery” of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 1980 led to the identification of a psychiatric syndrome supposedly shared by victims of crime, natural disaster, or road crash. Now all victims, regardless of their origin, receive the same treatment and care.

WHAT IS A “VICTIM”? THE LABELING PROCESS AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE “VICTIM” ROLE

In some countries, like the US, the expression “victim movement” is now commonly used and refers to a coalition of well-defined self-help groups, lawyers, and victim assistance professionals who campaign for the recognition of victims’ rights. In other countries, the term is not a stable reference, so it may be risky to give a sociological definition to a victims’ mobilization. Indeed, an overly broad view of this term leads to including eclectic social movements which do not necessarily have common characteristics. Today, almost all collective action requires the identification of a group defined as a victim (of injustice or inequality) and the public display of suffering persons is one of the strategies commonly used by many protest movements, such as feminist mobilizations and those of the unemployed, AIDS activists, or undocumented immigrants. Therefore, what sociological characteristics specifically distinguish victim mobilizations from more conventional social movements?

Victim movements might first be defined in a tautological sense in that they consist primarily of “victims” and that these “victims” lead the movement. The direct commitment of individuals facing a dramatic event is the first criterion of differentiation that allows us to distinguish victims’ organizations from other forms of assembly such as trade unions, humanitarian agencies, or charities. For example, the main French group of victims of terrorism chose a slogan – “created by victims for victims” – which clearly differentiates it from victim assistance networks involving legal experts and psychologists.

But having been the victim of a tragic event is not in itself an objective property. It is rather the result of a social process of labeling. In some cases such as aviation or road accidents,
the relatives of deceased persons rather than the survivors are socially designated as victims. In contrast, in France, associations of terrorism victims are usually run by the survivors of terrorist attacks while the bereaved families occupy a secondary role in the mobilization. The designation as “victim” is the result of a hierarchy within the victims’ organizations.

Moreover, the term “victim” is not always claimed by individuals who have had a personal tragedy. The word still has a negative connotation among social movements because it is associated with passivity or helplessness. Thus, feminist movements against domestic violence or child abuse prefer the label of “survivor” which implies agency (Dunn 2005). The leaders of the first French association of struggle against HIV refuse the characterization of “AIDS victims” and call their members “sick social reformers” or “citizen experts.” In South America, the associations of parents of disappeared persons replace “victim” with the term of “fighter” or “hero” or “resistant” which more correctly corresponds to the political nature of their struggle. To understand the endorsement or rejection of victim status, it is thus necessary to analyze the construction of collective identity by activist groups.

Finally, not all dramatic events necessarily give rise to the public designation of victims. For example, work accidents have historically been seen as victimless crimes, a fatality, or a socially acceptable risk. Therefore, without the resources needed to engage in lawsuits, workers who have had work accidents struggle to perceive themselves, to mobilize, and to be recognized as victims.

A NEW CONTENTIOUS REPERTOIRE?

Rather than trying to define who is and who is not a “victim,” it is in fact more important to observe what constitutes the specificity of the protest activities subsumed under the label of “victim movements.” To this end, we will define as a victim repertoire a new register of collective action characterized by four properties:

1. This repertoire presupposes the use of a limited range of self-designation, all of which refer to a position in a tragedy: “victims,” “bereaved families,” “survivors,” etc.
2. This register is then characterized by a particular emotional tone. Victimization entrepreneurs often portray a range of public emotions—pain, grief and suffering—which, unlike anger or pride, are usually considered outside the realm of political struggle.
3. This repertoire is also defined by a special form of organization—the victims’ association—led by actors whose public legitimacy is based on their direct victimization experience.
4. Victim groups rely primarily but not exclusively, on four modes of protest. First they employ individual public testimony (press releases, participation in talk shows, autobiographical publications) as a way of publicizing their grievances. They then use lawsuits to obtain compensation and the conviction of those responsible for their suffering or to transform their trials into a court of public opinion. In addition, these organizations frequently mobilize therapeutic practices and medical language, either to strengthen ties within the group (support group) or to authenticate their damages and legitimize the merits of their complaints (public use of diagnosis categories such as PTSD) (Latté & Rechtman 2006). Finally, they regularly organize commemorative events (silent marches, public funerals, memorial services, and vigils) to get a hearing for their case and get media attention. Thus, victims’ organizations have specific strategies that are usually associated with the treatment of individual misfortune rather than with collective action.

This victim repertoire is currently spreading far beyond the limited framework of the victim movement. It tends to become a master frame invested by eclectic fractions of social
movements. For example, antipsychiatry movements in Britain, which previously were based on class struggle rhetoric and trade union models, have, since the 1980s, adopted the style of victimhood protests by creating associations of survivors (Survivors Speak Out), organizing support groups and public commemorations (Crossley 2006). Similarly, since the 1980s, part of the American feminist movement has left the field of political action to engage in self-help groups of survivors of patriarchal violence (Whittier 2009). More recently, labor unions have also converted to the victim repertoire by attempting, for example, to mobilize the victims of harassment at work or asbestos victims. The success of this contentious repertoire should probably be related to broader trends: the growing importance of media constraints on social movements, the judicialization of collective action and the depoliticization of protest activity. However, more detailed studies could help identify which contexts and actors promote or prevent the introduction of this register into the various sectors of protest activity.

VICTIM ACTIVISM: A “NEW EMOTIONAL MOVEMENT”?  

The development of victim activism provided an opportunity to reopen several fields of research on social movements, the first of which is the study of the role of emotions in collective action. Walgrave and Verlhust thus propose to add a new case in the typology of social movements to designate certain mobilizations of victims: the Movement against Senseless Violence in The Netherlands or the Belgian White Movement against pedophilia, for instance (Walgrave & Verlhust 2006). These authors characterize these demonstrations as “new emotional movements” (NEM) for which they consider the affective variables predominant in participation. These NEM indeed contradict some of the results of resource mobilization theory. First, no traditional protest organizations (trade unions or political parties) take part in the mobilization process. Moreover, usual social networks (friendship, church, or professional circles) remain largely inactive in activist recruitment. Finally, protest actions are organized only by small, loosely structured groups often led by inexperienced activists. Similarly, contrary to the principles of framing analysis, these victim mobilizations do not rely on the classical frames of collective action. They do not refer to major transformative ideologies and their claims are usually imprecise and weakly formalized. Finally, none of the socio-demographic variables – age, educational level, and income – seems to predict the recruitment of these movements. The authors conclude that the logic of adherence to these movements is mainly emotional: the grief, compassion, fear, or identification with the figure of the victim outweigh the absence of organizational support and social predisposition to a political commitment.

However, identifying victim movements with NEM presents a number of difficulties. First, the lack of socioeconomic data concerning the mobilization of victims makes it difficult to test the generalized hypothesis that the weight of the social determinants of activist participation fades as an emotional logic becomes dominant. Some empirical studies even tend to invalidate this. Thus, during the mobilization of the victims of industrial disasters (Latt 2009) or road fatalities, cultural capital, economic resources, and activist know-how appear essential to explain why some victims join support groups and why others remain apathetic. These organizations “tend to be run by activists who have been victimized rather than victims who have become activists” (Weed 1990: 469).

Moreover, even in the most dramatic circumstances, material benefits and economic incentives are not necessarily absent. Indeed, victim organizations form loose collectives that cannot rely on community pressure to encourage their members to participate. Creating financial incentives for mobilization (around issues of pecuniary
compensation, in particular) therefore contributes to strengthening an emotional tie which otherwise remains vague.

Finally, the “emotionality” attributed to victim activism should not be viewed as an inherent property of this type of movement, but as a “folk construct” (Groves 2001). Thus, the attribution of emotions is a common form of disqualification, in both the public as well as the judicial arena. Victim groups are thus stigmatized as “irrational” movements based on a sense of mourning, a desire for revenge, or a traumatic shock rather than reasoned claims. This is why many victim spokespersons try to repress the public expression of their emotions (Whittier 2001) while others explicitly reject the emotional dimension of their protest. As a recent press release issued by a French association of disaster victims put it: “We are not part of an emotional demonstration; we refuse to be confined to that role” (Latté 2008: 692, 2009).

A fruitful direction is to leave aside the study of mobilizing emotions and to emphasize the analysis of mobilized emotions. The victim movements are perhaps distinctive less because of their (“emotional”) motives than because of the affective role they play in public and the emotional work to which they are obligated by the cultural expectations attached to the social victim’s role (Stanbridge & Kenney 2009).

ARE VICTIMS MOBILIZED “ACCIDENTALLY”?  

In line with this reflection on emotions in protest activities, victim activism also offers the opportunity to clarify the role played by sudden events in collective action. For 30 years, social movement scholars have made efforts to identify the effects of dramatic events on mobilization processes. The concepts of “suddenly imposed grievances” (Walsh 1981), “moral shock” (Jasper 1997), and “quotidian disruption” (Snow et al. 1998) aim at highlighting the catalytic effect of certain events on the onset of collective action. These tools have been forged in part from case studies of victim movements (the protest of residents from the area of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, in particular). In fact, these collective actions arise chronologically subsequent to a brutal event that disrupts the routines of ordinary life. Moreover, the self-presentation of these movements is built on the dramatization of an accident solidarity that binds individuals who did not know each other prior to the accident and who only share the traumatic experience. Thus, Lemieux and Vilain characterize victim organizations as “circumstantial groups,” that is, as organizations which, unlike ordinary social movements, are not based on “a priori solidarity” (friendship networks, family ties, political affinities, social proximity), but on “a posteriori solidarity” (the fact of having been together at the “wrong place at the wrong time”) (Vilain & Lemieux 1998).

The role of the event in the process of mobilization cannot, however, be overestimated. The event effectively functions as a screen that sometimes obscures the fact that many victim groups are in fact based on deeply rooted social identities and preexisting organizational networks. For example, in France, the associations of cult victims are based on the religious affinities of their members while the movement of Polynesian nuclear test victims finds its support in the networks of the Protestant church and the Independence Party. The groups of asbestos victims are based on the labor unions, and the mobilization of “Gulf War syndrome” victims on the solidarity of veterans. From this point of view, the victims are not only captives of the event, but they take hold of the event as an opportunity for collective action. The event reorients activist commitments, but it does not create them.

DO VICTIMS HAVE A GENDER?  

The analysis of the gendered dimensions of victim activism is a final field which deserves to be opened. Compared to most social movements, victim organizations have atypical patterns of gender composition. These are
most often mixed movements not directly focused on gender-related issues. However, the visibility of women in victim activism contrasts with the often-noted invisibility of women activists in the area of social movements. The cause of victims has historically been championed by spokeswomen: Candy Lightner, the founder of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, or Françoise Rudetzki, the leader of SOS-Terrorism in France. Quantitative studies also reveal an overrepresentation of women in the membership of such organizations (Weed 1990). Moreover, the names of some of these movements are explicitly related to collective identities linked to motherhood or wifehood: Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the “crazy women of Algiers” (a movement against forced disappearances) or the “asbestos widows” in France. Finally, victim groups frequently face disqualification full of gendered meanings. For example, media representations of the “victim” are based on the stereotype of the “weeping woman”: “the quintessential disaster victim is emotional, beleaguered, overwhelmed, passive – in a word, female” (Enarson & Meyreles 2004). Similarly, critics of the development of victim movements denounce this activism as a “personal” (rather than “political”) commitment, as a claim for a “passive” status (rather than an “active” citizenship), as a “private” (rather than a public) problem, as an “emotional” reaction (rather than as a “rational” position). In short, victims’ characteristics are routinely related to properties culturally associated with femininity. Therefore victim activism is a particularly promising field to explore how these gendered meanings are used by activists and their opponents to classify and prioritize social movements.

SEE ALSO: AIDS activism; Collective memory and social movements; Emotion and social movements; Emotion work; Gender and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Master frame; Moral shocks/outrage; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Participation in social movements; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Quotidian disruption; Repertoires of contention; Resource mobilization theory; Self-help movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


War crime movements in Japan
JENNIFER CHAN

Various nongovernmental advocacy efforts concerning Japanese war crimes have arisen in the past six decades since the conclusion of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter referred to as the Tokyo Tribunal) and the trials at other sites throughout the Pacific. One can group these movements broadly into three periods: (1) the parole for war criminals movement (1952–1958); (2) the post-Tokyo Tribunal war crime movements (1958–1998); and (3) the nongovernmental coalition for the International Criminal Court movement (1998–present). In this essay, the scope of war crime movements encompasses those concerning war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity, as defined in the relevant international conventions such as the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952 at the end of the Allied Occupation of Japan, the parole for war criminals movement emerged out of popular Japanese sentiments that the Tokyo trials represented victors’ justice. The conviction of Japanese war criminals (28 top military and government leaders for Class A crimes against peace and 5700 individuals for Class B and C war crimes and crimes against humanity) was considered unfair (Totani 2008). The war victim narrative put forward by this right-wing nationalist movement, demanding the release of all Class B and C criminals, quickly garnered widespread support. In particular, movement leaders rallied around the dissenting opinion of Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal that the Hague Convention of 1907 was not legally binding on Japan and that crimes against peace were not punishable under international law up until World War II (Totani 2008). By 1958, all war criminals were released from prison, marking a temporary and artificial closure to war crimes issues in Japan.

In the second period, spanning the four decades between 1958 and 1998, several factors facilitated the emergence of a range of war crime movements in Japan and Asia. First, an intellectual movement led by Japanese historians, philosophers, and political theorists, such as Oda Makoto, pushed beyond the predominant victim consciousness to look at the complicity of the Japanese nation as war aggressors (Avenell 2010). Second, new evidence unveiled by historical and feminist researchers, notably in South Korea and Japan, since the 1970s, reopened issues of Japanese war crime responsibility that were omitted by the Tokyo Tribunal, such as military sexual slavery. Third, the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989 removed one of the last obstacles for various national and regional social movements (Dudden 2006). Fourth, the emergence of international human rights discourses and movements since the 1990s has lent considerable normative as well as organizational weight to various war crime social movements in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region (Tsutsui 2009). This period is characterized by domestic, regional, and international activism on a range of differentiated issues from forced slave labor to military sexual slavery in an increasingly institutionalized human rights frame.

Two prime examples of war crime movements of this period are the history textbook movement and the “comfort women” redress movement. Support groups against Japanese history textbook censorship, centered on the famous lawsuits of historian and Professor Saburo Ienaga, have developed since the 1960s (see, for example, Children and Textbooks Japan Net 21 1998 (consisting of 110 groups)). These in turn are countered by a nationalist
historical revisionist movement made up of groups such as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (founded in 1996). The redress movement for “comfort women” (the majority of whom were Korean) best illustrates the gender and racial biases of international law, the UN human rights system, and social movements. Though rape was clearly defined as a war crime in international conventions, the “comfort women” issue was largely dropped in the Tokyo Tribunal with the exception of the prosecution of a few cases (Totani 2008). It took concerted mobilization efforts by regional and transnational social movements (led by the nongovernmental Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, the Violence Against Women—Network Japan, and the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility) to obtain a public apology by the Japanese prime minister in 1992 and UN recognition of military sexual slavery (Chan-Tiberghien 2004). In July 1995, a private Asian Women’s Fund to provide support and atonement money for the “comfort women” was established with donations from the Japanese public. The Fund was controversial, as it was not financed by the Japanese government. It divided the “comfort women” as well as the advocacy groups into pro- and anti-Asian Women’s Fund camps. In 2000, a coalition of national, regional, and international nongovernmental networks including the Violence Against Women—Network Japan, Korean Council for the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, Asian Center for Women’s Human Rights, Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice (US) organized a people’s tribunal, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, which for the first time found the emperor guilty of war crimes (Hayashi 2000; Violence Against Women in War—Network Japan 2000).

The last period of Japanese war crime movements coincided with an international movement for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1995, several nongovernmental groups met in New York and formed the Coalition for the ICC, which played an instrumental role in the lead-up to the signing of the Rome Statute in 1998. In Japan, two networks – the Japan Network for the ICC and the International Human Rights NGO Network – started to educate the public as well as legal professionals about the ICC. Advocacy for Japan’s signature of the Rome Statute was tricky, as some legal scholars believed that talking about war crimes in the context of the ICC might slip into supporting Japanese emergency measures in dispatching Japanese Special Defense Forces overseas and, worst of all, the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. The ICC movement in Japan, however, used the opportunity to connect contemporary war crimes to Japanese war crime responsibility during World War II (Chan 2008). Japan acceded to the Rome Statute in 2007.

As many issues were left out of the scope of the Tokyo Tribunal – the emperor’s criminal responsibility, issues of the treatment of colonial subjects as well as nationals (notably the atrocities committed against Okinawans in the last months of the war), and military sexual slavery – Japanese war crime movements have lasted for over six decades and seem unlikely to subside in the near future.

SEE ALSO: Advocacy networks; Law and social movements; Transnational social movements; War and social movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Weatherman (United States)

PEPPER G. GLASS

Weatherman (also known as Weathermen, The Weather Underground, and The Weather Underground Organization) was a revolutionary organization that staged violent and dramatic events, especially bombings, across the US. The group formed in the late 1960s, continuing into the 1980s when it disbanded as members became increasingly isolated and smaller in number.

Weatherman originally emerged from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a central force in “New Left” protests in the US during the 1960s. As the SDS faced internal schism in the spring and summer of 1969, a militant faction – the Revolutionary Youth Movement – wrote and distributed a document. The statement, “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows” (a quote from a Bob Dylan song), called for the student movement to become revolutionaries by organizing a base of white, lower-class youth. “In every case, our aim is to raise anti-imperialist and anti-racist consciousness and tie the struggles of working-class youth (and all working people) to the struggles of Third World people, rather than merely joining fights to improve material conditions, even though these fights are certainly justified” (Ashley et al. 1970: 75). The paper also expanded SDS practices by advocating violence as well as moving the settings of protest beyond college campuses.

Following the lead of foreign guerrilla movements, Weatherman established small groups in major cities, including a central “Weather Bureau” in Chicago. There they organized demonstrations from October 8 through 11 1969 – the “Days of Rage.” This was a protest “not only to bring ‘peace to Vietnam,’ but beginning to establish another front against imperialism right here in America – to ‘bring the war home’” (Students for a Democratic Society 1970: 168). Hundreds attended the Days of Rage, many armed with football helmets, gas masks, sticks, and pipes. On both October 8 and 11, they broke through police lines to damage property in wealthy downtown neighborhoods. These events ended in injuries to protesters and police, as well as mass arrests – including most of the organizers of the event.

Within months of the Days of Rage, the members of Weatherman decided to operate clandestinely, becoming the Weather Underground Organization. This move “underground” greatly shrank their numbers. Over the next several years, the group set off bombs in various settings, including Chicago police cars, the home of a judge in New York City, the National Guard Association in Washington, DC, the Presidio Army base in San Francisco, the US Capitol building, the Pentagon, and Gulf Oil’s headquarters in Pittsburgh. Statements explaining their reasons, as well as warnings beforehand in order to avoid harming people, accompanied the bombings. Still, there were several injuries and deaths, including for Weatherman itself. On March 6, 1970, three members died when a bomb that they were building exploded. These deaths led the organization to reconsider its view on human victims, deciding to only target property. The group also participated in a prison escape of counterculture icon Timothy Leary on September 15, 1970.

Weatherman were highly critical of “imperialist” interventions by the US, especially the war in Vietnam, and they were influenced by international communist and guerilla campaigns. Some visited Cuba, and they met with North Vietnamese representatives. In protests, members cheered “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh” and “Mao, Mao, Mao Tse-tung.” Named after a
quote from Mao’s *Little Red Book*, their book *Prairie Fire* (Weather Underground Organization 1974) was “the first manual devoted specifically to urban guerrilla warfare in the United States” (Short 1975: 25). As a group wishing to organize white, working-class youth, as well as early challengers of “white privilege” (Berger 2006), Weatherman also saw themselves as corollaries to the Black Panthers. Yet the Panthers did not necessarily approve of their practices, as Fred Hampton said of the Days of Rage, “We oppose the anarchistic, adventuristic, chauvinistic, individualistic, masochistic, and Custeristic Weathermen” (Rudd 2009: 173).

The activities of Weatherman also found the scorn of law enforcement. The FBI placed multiple members on its Ten Most Wanted list during the 1970s. Yet by the mid- to late-1970s, most members had surrendered themselves, especially after 1973, when the government dropped criminal charges because of its use of illegal wiretap surveillance. Still, the FBI hunted Weatherman well into the 1980s. One of the final activities of members was an attempted Brinks truck heist in 1981, when fugitives killed two police officers and a Brinks guard, as well as injuring numerous others. “By 1986, with most suspects captured, the ‘armed struggle’ movement originating in the 1960s had come to a virtual end” (Varon 2004: 299).

SEE ALSO: Black Power movement (United States); Guerrilla movements; New Left and social movements; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (United States); Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

ANDREW MARTIN

The way in which social movement groups organize themselves has considerable, and often unforeseen, ramifications. Among movement scholars, much of the debate regarding the degree of formalization centers on issues of tactics, with bureaucratic movement organizations charged by critics as too conservative. Yet there the implications for adopting a less formalized structure may play out in other ways as well. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, opposition by business elites and their allies in the state to unionization efforts, particularly among unskilled workers, often took the form of extreme repression, and bloodshed was not uncommon during this period. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of the Industrial Workers of the World, whose radical goals and loose organizational structure provided considerable opportunities for repression.

Of course, it is important to recognize that the “Wobblies,” as they are fondly recalled, demonstrated, for the briefest period of American history, that a radical labor movement could indeed prosper in the United States. Although only viable for 20 years, the movement produced some of the most notable figures in American labor history: “Big” Bill Haywood, Joe Hill, Eugene Debs, “Mother” Jones, and the “Rebel Girl,” Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.

Like many progressive labor organizations in America, the Wobblies began in opposition to the more conservative American Federation of Labor, a rivalry that would define much of the IWW’s life-course. This was not the first time the AFL, primarily comprised of highly skilled native workers, was challenged from the left. In the late 1800s the Knights of Labor, advocating a broad agenda of labor reform, sought to include all types of workers. It was, however, not until the IWW that a labor organization consciously strove to organize all laborers, regardless of occupation, national origin, or race, into “One Big Union.”

The union was formed in 1905 in Chicago by a collection of labor activists, as well as leaders of the Western Miners Foundation, a militant union that had already experienced substantial repression in its efforts to organize miners in the Western United States. Maintaining that the American political system was structured to ignore the needs of the working class, the Industrial Workers of the World adopted an anarcho-syndicalist philosophy. As such, all of the efforts of the union were focused on creating disruption at the point of production, rather than seeking to win new gains at the ballot box. Bill Haywood, one of the most famous leaders of the IWW, famously pronounced that all workers needed only to fold their arms (stop working) and they would be successful. Within the context of the economic strategy, the union advocated a number of militant tactics, including strikes, boycotts, and even sabotage. Reflecting its anarchist bent, the union’s organizational structure was comprised less of formal positions than a network of loosely connected allies and organizers. In fact, the organization resisted in signing formal binding contracts with employers, preferring instead to use the threat of a work stoppage to enforce its demands.

One of the reasons why the IWW, despite its short life, is still so well known today is the fact that it was involved in a number of notable labor disputes. True to its eclectic organizational roots, these strikes occurred across a diverse range of industries. One of its most notable triumphs was the textile workers strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912. Like many other disputes it was involved in, the
conflict actually began prior to the arrival the IWW. Nevertheless, it was able to snatch victory from the jaws of failure; IWW organizers were successfully able to unite an ethnically diverse group of workers. In a tactical stroke of genius, the union used children of striking workers to solicit support from elites in New York City. The union also had some successes elsewhere, including among loggers in the Pacific Northwest and the South, as well as in the mines throughout the country. It was also one of the first unions to take seriously the plight of farmworkers through its Agricultural Workers Association.

Not surprisingly, given the radical goals and tactics espoused by the union, it was almost inevitable that it would elicit strong repression, not only by the state and businesses elites, but also by the AFL. This union often got involved in Wobblies disputes, promising the employer a “safe” alternative to the IWW. Obviously the ability of such unions to ensure more stable labor relations than the IWW was also critical. And while violence by police and businesses was common in many of the strikes organized by the IWW (Joe Hill, for example, was lynched, as were other supporters), it was the Wobblies’ opposition to what they deemed to be a capitalist conflict, World War I, that finally afforded the state the opportunity to crush the union once and for all. The government raided a number of IWW offices across the country and successfully convicted a number of leaders for their opposition to the war, including Bill Haywood, who fled to the Soviet Union, where he lived for the rest of his life.

The fact that the union lacked a clear structure and bureaucratic resources only made it more vulnerable to attacks by the state. Indeed, the union was often beset by internal squabbles. Moreover, individual actors within the union pursued their own organizing agenda, which spread the limited resources of the union thinner and made it even more vulnerable to external opposition. Not surprisingly, the severe repression eroded the strength of the organization considerably, and while it does exist in the United States and other countries today, it is a shadow of the organization that led successful labor disputes in the mills and mines of early twentieth-century America.

While the tangible gains made by the IWW were fleeting, its impact on the labor movement and beyond is considerable. Along with the Knights of Labor, it played an important role in organizing the growing masses of factory workers and the eventual success of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in forging industrial unions like the United Autoworker. Many members of the IWW, such as Joe Hill, also recognized the importance of music in organizing workers, and, as such, the IWW has generated a number of famous labor songs, including “Solidarity Forever,” many of which can be found in its “Little Red Songbook.” Perhaps less well known, but as important, was the IWW’s impact on freedom of speech laws. In various cities throughout the country efforts by the police and business interests were made to silence IWW agitators, but the union won a number of free speech cases. The IWW demonstrated that the melding of working-class concerns with issues of social justice was a powerful formula for change. Of course, its radical claims and rather weak organizational structure made it particularly susceptible to state repression, and it is no surprise that the more formalized Congress of Industrial Organizations would eventually become the primary union to mobilize the unskilled workers of American factories.

SEE ALSO: Boycotts; Labor movement; Strikes in US history; Syndicalism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Women’s movements
ALISON DAHL CROSSLEY and HEATHER MCKEE HURWITZ

Women have organized throughout the course of modern history and in all parts of the world. Women’s movements are broadly defined as “all organizing of women explicitly as women to make any sort of social change” (Ferree & Mueller 2007: 577). Mobilizations of women arise out of gendered structures of oppression and opportunity, and women’s movements have been among the most enduring and consequential movements in modern history. Participants in women’s movements frequently use gender to form a collective identity on the basis of their social position as women. While many women’s movements embrace a feminist identity and seek to advance the social position of women, it is not always the case. Women also mobilize around claims that are unrelated to or in opposition to feminism.

CONTEXT FOR WOMEN’S MOBILIZATION

Women have always had sufficient grievances to mobilize, and women’s collective action abounds throughout history. However, collective activity on the part of women directed toward improving their own status has flourished primarily in periods of generalized social upheaval, when sensitivity to injustice, discrimination, and social inequalities has been widespread in the society as a whole.

Modern women’s movements have been widely conceptualized in waves of mobilization. While the wave framework correctly identifies time periods of heightened collective action, scholars of women’s movements challenge the idea that there are distinct waves of the women’s movement because it obscures the persistence of feminism in different political, social, and cultural climates. Instead of disappearing between waves, the women’s movement is best understood as going into a holding pattern, which Verta Taylor (1989) termed abeyance in order to survive in hostile political climates; such was the case in the US in the 1950s (Rupp & Taylor 1987). In abeyance, movement activists from an earlier phase of mobilization struggle to maintain the ideology and structural base of the movement in the absence of mass support. A movement in abeyance is primarily oriented toward maintaining itself rather than confronting the established order directly. Focusing on building an alternative culture, for example, is a means of survival when the political structure is not receptive to challenge. The concept of abeyance has since been used to analyze contemporary women’s movements in numerous countries and national contexts, including Britain, Australia, South Korea, and Japan (Grey & Sawer 2008).

Despite temporal and geographical differences in women’s movements, scholars identify certain basic structural conditions that have contributed to the emergence of women’s protest in most parts of the Western world. Broad societal changes in the patterns of women’s participation in the paid labor force, increases in women’s formal educational attainment, shifts in marriage, women’s fertility rates, and reproductive roles disrupt traditional social arrangements, setting the stage for women’s movements. As industrialization and urbanization bring greater education for women, expanding public roles create role and status conflicts for middle-class women, who then develop the discontent and gender consciousness necessary for political action. For example, declines in women’s childbearing can improve women’s educational attainment and participation in the paid labor force which, in turn, may raise their gender consciousness.
Women’s movements in the global South also arise out of structural conditions related to globalization and structural adjustment policies. Although these movements may not be labeled feminist movements, women around the global South have mobilized against the ramifications of globalization such as poverty, militarism, and environmental degradation. For example, women maquiladora workers in Mexico are fighting for better work conditions and higher wages, domestic workers in Uruguay gained legal standing comparable to the country’s formal workforce, women in India built an environmentally sound dam and continue to organize for land and water rights, and women in Okinawa are leading antimilitarism mobilization (Naples & Desai 2002).

The structural preconditions underlying the emergence and endurance of women’s collective mobilization are perpetually evolving. Demographic, economic, and cultural processes that spur women’s movements vary by national and regional context. Even within a specific country, political and cultural variations in women’s movements are reflected in differences in the ways women define their collective interests, whether by regional, cultural, racial and ethnic, religious, age, caste, or community identities, or a combination of these intersecting identities.

RANGE AND TYPES OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Women mobilize in all parts of the world and in response to a broad variety of grievances and social inequalities. Participants in women’s movements use their identities as women to address social problems that face women in particular or that affect women disproportionately to men. They also use their bonds as women to further their networks and communities as a base for mobilization. The range of women’s movements includes feminist movements, hybrid movements, transnational movements, and antifeminist movements.

Feminist movements seek to advance the status of women and are informed by feminist ideologies. However, the term feminist is contested not only because it has been historically associated with Western women’s movements, but also because the meanings ascribed to feminism have changed over time. One approach to categorize feminist movements by historian Karen Offen has been to distinguish between individualist and relational feminism. In this comparative historical model, individualist feminism emphasizes women’s rights as human rights based on ideologies of personal autonomy, while relational feminism bases women’s equality on their traditional contributions to family and childrearing. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminist movements were often classified as liberal, radical, or socialist. Liberal feminist ideology argues that women lack power because they are not, as women, allowed equal opportunity to compete and succeed in the male-dominated economic and political arenas but, instead, are relegated to the subordinate world of home, domestic labor, motherhood, and family. The major strategy for change is to gain legal and economic equalities and to obtain access to elite positions in the workplace and politics. Examples of liberal feminist movements include campaigns to increase the number of women in political office or to invest in education programs that teach girls to be leaders in underrepresented fields. In contrast, radical feminist ideology dates to Simone de Beauvoir’s early 1950s theory of “sex class,” which was developed further in the late 1960s among small groups of radical women within the New Left. The radical approach recognizes women’s identity and subordination as a “sex class,” emphasizes women’s fundamental difference from men, and recasts relations between women and men in political terms. To unravel the complex structure on which gender inequality rests, requires, from a radical feminist perspective, a fundamental transformation of all institutions in society. To meet this challenge, radical feminists formulated influential critiques of the family, marriage, love, motherhood, heterosexuality, capitalism, and more. Socialist feminism, which has been the dominant form
of feminism in some countries, shares with radical feminism the intent to transform society in fundamental ways but focuses on a class analysis of the ways that capitalism oppresses women. Since the 1970s, varieties of feminism have expanded to include lesbian feminism, Islamic feminism, environmental feminism, to name just a few.

Hybrid women’s movements use elements of feminist movements as a frame for other causes or claims. Women’s movements have shaped the ideologies and tactics of a wide variety of social movements, and were instrumental in the formations of gay and lesbian and peace movements, among others. The effects women’s movements have on other movements are classified by Nancy Whittier as generative or spillover. Generative effects are those that change the fields of protest or influence future stages of protest. An example of the generative effect of women’s movements is the mobilization against childhood sexual abuse, which was originally framed in feminist terms but has since created numerous networks and communities of activists that do not necessarily adhere to feminist ideologies. Spillover effects of women’s movements include the spread of tactics, structures, and cultures to other movements. For example, the feminist framing of health care has influenced other women’s health movements such as breast cancer activism. Some women’s self-help movements emerged from combining a feminist frame of postpartum depression with a medical frame, illustrating the hybridity of women’s movements (Taylor 1996).

Transnational women’s movements have long been in existence, despite the heightened attention devoted to them as a result of globalization. From the late nineteenth century through World War II, women created alliances and coalitions to improve the position of women. Transnational organizations such as the International Council of Women, the International Alliance of Women, and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom mobilized around suffrage, citizenship, and world politics. In the aftermath of World War II, the Women’s International Democratic Federation, founded by left-wing women, challenged the existing transnational women’s organizations and met great success organizing throughout the third world. These organizations provided the foundation for a transnational feminist community that would successfully incorporate women’s concerns in global politics (Rupp 1997). Since the 1970s, transnational women’s movements have continued to create and sustain networks of women, although the grievances have evolved to address issues such as the feminization of poverty, environmental justice, and the agency of women in development. Transnational women’s movements also situate local interests within a global stage set by governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international funders.

Antifeminist movements that mobilize against women’s equality have existed since the earliest feminist movements. Elite white women mobilized against woman suffrage, concerned that women’s political participation would undermine the family structure and women’s caretaker role. Contemporary antifeminist movements include participants who hold a variety of perspectives, including in the US those of the religious Right who assert that traditional gender roles and the heteronormative nuclear family should be the foundation of society. On the other end of the antifeminist spectrum are those who are not necessarily religious, but whose antifeminist beliefs are informed by their view of the rational self-interested individual as the foundation of society. Other antifeminists seek to curtail women’s reproductive freedom, and they continue to escalate their tactics, including harassing women at abortion clinics and killing physicians who are abortion providers. The prevalence of antifeminist resistance throughout history highlights the significance of the family, sexuality, reproduction, and traditional gendered arrangements for the maintenance of the dominant social order.
DYNAMICS OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Historical, cultural, and structural contexts influence the dynamics of women’s movements. Social movements also develop in response to political and cultural opportunities and the availability or scarcity of resources. Women’s movements mobilize not only to make claims against the state and the government, but they also target other institutional and cultural arenas (Staggenborg & Taylor 2005). An examination of movement dynamics reveals the varieties of mobilizing structures and tactical repertoires significant to women’s movements across the globe.

Mobilizing structures

Women’s movement organizations may be independent or form networks and coalitions with other women’s movement organizations. They address a variety of grievances, from raising women’s unequal status with men in the home, labor, or political spheres, to organizing against the war in Iraq, toxic plants, or mega-dams. Whether they are local, national, and/or international in scope, they adapt their mobilizing structures to their social and political contexts and their targets. For example, women’s movements in Calcutta and Bombay have divergent ideologies and organizational structures as a result of the differing political cultures and distributions of power within each city (Ray 1999).

Women’s movements have complex relationships with the state, which inevitably influences the development of movement organizations and strategies. In India, women’s movement organizations rely on the state for legal protection while simultaneously acknowledging its role as oppressor. In contrast, contemporary Korean and Australian women’s movement organizations focus on developing strong connections with the state, which both advance gender equality and hinder development of feminist political cultures (Grey & Sawer 2008). In addition to negotiating relationships with the state, international women’s movement organizations must also reconcile differing perspectives about the relationship between nationalism and internationalism.

Women’s movement organizations develop a range of mobilizing structures to achieve their goals. Bureaucratically structured women’s organizations have hierarchical leadership and primarily target mainstream arenas. They may work for women’s rights in the public sphere, such as improving women’s political representation and legal protection. In contrast, collective organizations use nonhierarchical leadership and decision-making processes, and often place importance on women’s culture and personal experiences. Collective organizations grew from radical feminists’ attempts to structure relations among members, processes of decision making, and group leadership in a way that prefigured the values and goals of the movement.

Women’s grassroots organizing responds to traditional male-dominated political avenues of change, or top-down bureaucratic structures. Grassroots organizations value local knowledge and experiences, as well as the inclusion of women from a variety of social backgrounds. Grassroots organizations may preserve women’s political participation in states undergoing postsocialist transition when neoliberal or capitalist policies may undermine the roles that women once held. In other political settings, grassroots women’s movement organizations may organize workers in the informal sector to protect their communities from environmental degradation or provide microloans to poor working women.

Strategies and tactics

Participants in women’s movements use a wide variety of strategies and tactics to challenge gender inequality in multiple arenas, including at the institutional, cultural, and interactional levels of society. A social movement’s tactical repertoire is not only influenced by internal movement dynamics, but by external macro historical processes. At the cultural and interactional levels, women frequently form self-help groups that challenge gender inequality and seek to change power
imbalances between men and women. Some women’s movements emerge out of separatist women’s and lesbian communities that seek to challenge dominant systems of power. Young women activists form study circles and reading groups to educate themselves about global issues and social problems, using informal social gatherings to develop a critical consciousness that informs their activism. The cultures of solidarity that arise out of women’s movements not only promote individual participants’ politicization of everyday life, but also simultaneously collectively challenge traditional gender expectations of women and girls.

At the structural level, women’s organizations may employ legal reform strategies, legislative campaigns, and policy advocacy related to gender inequality. Women’s movements create networks of elected officials, lawyers, and women’s political parties. Legislative campaigns for equal pay or maternity leave policies disrupt the essentialist practices of institutions that value the contributions of men over those of women. Women’s movements have contributed to other types of institutional change through participation in union organizing and religious and military institutions.

Tactical repertoires of women’s movements also include protests, rallies, marches, pickets, and petitions. One of the most successful uses of petitions in recent women’s movement mobilization was the One Million Signature Campaign, the first mass feminist mobilization to protest gender inequality in mudawwana, or Moroccan family law. The campaign also mobilized women outside of North Africa, sparking women’s movement organizing throughout the Islamic world (Salime 2011). Women in the same movement also employed cultural strategies such as sharing their experiences in the family by publishing their stories in newspapers and magazines. In fact, women’s movements in many parts of the world combine tactics to address both cultural and institutional change, such as participating in consciousness-raising groups as well as in acts of civil disobedience.

The Internet

In order to fully recognize the numerous forms of contemporary women’s movements, we must also expand our understandings to include online activities. Since the mid-1990s, feminists across the world, of all ages and backgrounds, have used the Internet to circulate news and information related to women and feminism, to connect feminists across the world, to create and sustain feminist communities, to empower women through sharing gendered experiences, to promote particular goals and agendas, and to broaden the scope of organizations that operate primarily offline. Scholars point to the vibrant feminist communities on the Internet as evidence that feminism is flourishing and not in abeyance (Grey & Sawer 2008).

Much of the power of feminism online lies in its global dissemination of feminist information and resources, which would have been virtually impossible before the widespread use of the Internet. The Internet has shifted both the potential and trajectory of contemporary feminism through the creation and sustenance of transnational feminist networks (Moghadam 2005). The success of transnational women’s movements projects and campaigns, such as a web-based feminist analysis of the global crisis and their offline international forums, relies on the connections and speed that Internet technology affords.

While feminism on the Internet may seem starkly different from offline feminism, it does reconfigure elements of traditional feminist modes such as self-help and consciousness raising. For example, feminist websites and blogs develop communities of readers who get to know each other by posting comments on a regular basis or by participating in a discussion board. While consciousness-raising groups required face-to-face connections between feminists in the same geographical area, online communities may be established across a variety of boundaries. Although differences between offline and online relationships may be vast, similar issues are discussed in both
contexts, including sharing experiences of and reactions to sexism in everyday life.

GLOBAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Throughout modern history, women in all regions of the world have organized collectively against the injustice and oppression in their lives and communities. International women’s organizations date back to the closing decades of the nineteenth century, but since the 1970s there has been a phenomenal growth in regional, subregional, interregional, international, and transnational networking among women’s organizations. The global stage of feminism has changed dramatically in recent history, exhibited by greater numbers of transnational networks and international conferences. Each of these changes has led to a significant shift in the context of women’s movements in the global sphere and has also brought women’s lives and experiences to discussions about globalization and transnational politics.

The United Nations has spearheaded numerous campaigns for women and has created and dramatically shifted global women’s networks and organizing. UN efforts include International Women’s Year (1975), the Decade for Women (1975–1985), and the fourth world conference on women (1995). Each has fostered global feminist dialogues and stimulated local and transnational feminist activities. Although these conferences have been sites of considerable debate and conflict over the meaning of “women’s issues,” the definition of feminism, the use of terminology such as “first world” and “third world,” and inequalities between feminists of the global and economic North and South, their forums facilitated the development of networks and strategies that positioned the language of gender equality and human rights at the forefront of the UN.

The institutional landscape of global feminism was forever altered by the policies and actions of the UN, but these changes happened alongside other feminist efforts, including NGOs, transnational networks, and grassroots organizing (Moghadam 2005). Grassroots feminist organizing effectively incorporated voices and experiences of women from a variety of communities, educational backgrounds, and socioeconomic statuses. The Huairou Commission, a network of grassroots partnerships, was formed in 1995 in response to the absence of grassroots women organizers at the UN conferences.

Women from governmental organizations, NGOs, and those not associated with formal organizations are actively working to eradicate sexism and other interrelated forms of inequality on local, regional, and global scales. Although these networks are not without struggles over difference and power inequalities, they also highlight the commonalities between women from different parts of the world.

THE IMPACT OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Women’s movements have been influential in democratization throughout the world, and they have also shaped other social movements in significant ways through their discourse, collective identities, organizational structures, and decision-making processes, and their embrace of culture and everyday activism as tactical repertoires. The study of women’s movements has also led to new lines of theorizing in social movements by calling attention to a wider range of claims-making that targets institutions beyond the state, focusing on tactics that emphasize culture and community, discovering processes of movement “spillover,” and informing larger questions related to movement trajectories, continuity, and change.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Antifeminist movements (United States); Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Equal Rights Amendment (United States); Feminism and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Islamic women’s movements; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Repertoires of contention; Self-help movements; Suffrage movement, international; Transgender
movement; Transnational social movements; Women’s movement in Australia; Women’s movement in Japan; Women’s movement in Spain; Women’s movements in Africa; Women’s movements in Europe; Women’s movements in India.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Women’s movements in Africa
AILI MARI TRIPP

African women’s movements became especially visible after the 1990s. Women’s organizations were increasingly characterized by their associational autonomy from the government and from the dominant political party. In contrast to the first three decades after independence, they began to acquire their own resources, select their own leadership, and forge their own women’s rights agendas in ways that were no longer dictated by the ruling party or government. Although the movements had new agendas, leaders, and funding sources, they sometimes drew on precolonial ideologies (e.g., of political motherhood) and older protest tactics (e.g., shaming authorities and grieving). They also drew on experiences of women during the independence movements and armed liberation movements and built on the experiences of women’s mobilization during the earlier single-party era.

During the first three decades after independence, women’s organizations were generally tied to the patronage politics of the single-party state. Their activities were monitored and directed to ensure that they would support various party/government initiatives. This meant that women’s organizations tended to be focused around religious associations, welfare, and domestic concerns and espoused a discourse of “developmentalism.” At the grassroots level producing handicrafts, promoting literacy, farming, income-generating projects, assisting AIDS orphans and fighting AIDS, and cultural expression dominated women’s associational life.

This changed in the 1990s, with growing feminist international influences and the diffusion of norms and strategies across Africa regarding women’s rights. Women’s movements were influenced by women’s rights agendas that were being promoted by international women’s organizations as well as the United Nations, African Union, Southern African Development Community, and other subregional organizations. New women’s networks and conferences organized around female education, violence against women, peace, the environment, reproductive rights, and women’s rights more generally were the main vectors in spreading these norms.

The 1985 UN Conference on Women held in Nairobi and later the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, in particular, served as catalysts for many organizations and activists. International donors, weary of state corruption and waste, began to shift resources towards nongovernmental organizations, including women’s associations, which now had new resources at their disposal, independent of the state and party patronage. Women activists had fought for greater democracy and in turn, the new democratizing trends opened up political space for women’s mobilization along with activism of environmentalists, human rights, indigenous peoples, party activists, and many other groups. In the 1990s, single-party regimes transformed themselves into multiple-party systems; military dictatorships dissolved into civilian rule; while freedom of press, association, and assembly expanded. The decline of conflict in Africa, especially after 2000, speeded up the push for women’s rights, especially in postconflict countries. The end of a significant number of conflicts after the mid-1980s created important political opportunities for women’s movements, especially where women’s peace movements overlapped with women’s movements. All of these changes—the diffusion of international norms regarding gender equality, new donor strategies, democratization and political liberalization, and the decline of conflict—created conditions which allowed new women’s
movements to emerge and have the impact they did.

A wide variety of new women’s organizations emerged in most African countries, even countries that still exhibited semi-authoritarian and authoritarian tendencies. However, in countries where the ruling party loosened its grip, the new organizations began promoting a women’s rights agenda to push for constitutional and legislative changes regarding gender equality. They began to introduce new agendas ranging from issues of reproductive rights, to violence against women, expansion of credit facilities for businesswomen and women farmers, access to land, women’s inheritance rights, media representation of women, women’s political representation, and many other concerns.

Reforms that had at one time met with active resistance from more conservative and religious forces, including clan leaders and traditional authorities, were encountering less resistance from them, and in some instances they even became advocates for changes in women’s status. These included issues such as domestic violence, land inheritance by women, female genital cutting, child marriage, and forced marriage. Issues that pertained to family and clan, or family law and customary law, generally met the most resistance, compared with legislative changes that affected gender equality in markets or in state institutions like the civil service or schools. Thus legislative quotas for women, maternity leave, employment practices, and other such concerns have been much less controversial than reforms in family law.

Although the older welfare-oriented and developmental agendas persisted after the 1990s, a new emphasis on political participation and advocacy emerged. New women’s organizations formed to improve leadership skills, encourage women’s political involvement, promote women’s political leadership, press for legislative changes, and conduct civic education.

The 1990s thus were marked not only with greater political liberalization in much of Africa but also by the rise of new women’s activism, which continued into the following decade. The movements saw gains in legislative and constitutional reforms regarding women’s rights. There were significant increases in female representation, with some of the highest rates of representation globally found in Africa (e.g., Rwandan women hold 56% of their national legislative seats). Norms and attitudes also began to change rapidly regarding girls, education, women’s right to political leadership, women’s need for access to resources, and even cultural practices such as female genital cutting. While activists within women’s movements generally believe there is a long way to go before gender equality becomes a reality, if one contrasts the beliefs and practices of the 2010s with those of two decades ago, significant gains have in fact been made in the areas of education, health, and, increasingly, in the area of political representation.

SEE ALSO: AIDS activism; Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


In many ways, the women’s movement in Australia might be understood as a diffusion of women’s movements elsewhere in the West. Both the so-called “first wave” of the movement, with its focus on the struggle for the franchise, and the “second wave” of mobilization in the 1970s, bore close resemblance to similar waves of mobilization in the UK and the US. Even the more recent phenomenon of a “generation war” among feminists centered on the contested notion of an emerging “third wave” of feminist activists seemed to have its genesis in struggles far away (Maddison 2008). Such a comparison, however, misses the unique contribution that the Australian women’s movement has made to both feminist repertoire generally, and, more specifically, to research and reflection on the relationship between women, feminist movements, and the state.

The handful of published histories of the Australian women’s movement (see, e.g., Kaplan 1996; Lake 1999) recall the arrival of women’s liberation in Australia in 1969 and its rapid development through the spread of collectives and consciousness-raising groups. In 1972, women with a more instrumental focus, and who specifically wanted to influence the 1972 federal election, created the reformist organization the Women’s Electoral Lobby. With the election of a reforming social democrat Labor government, feminists successfully rapidly entered the state, an innovative – indeed world-leading – model of women’s policy machinery was developed, and a period of rapid policy advancement ensued. The Australian women’s movement forged a unique and highly interconnected relationship with the state that relied upon an informal alliance between the women’s movement outside the state and feminist activists within the bureaucracy. Since this time there has been much justified praise for the innovative “wheel” model of women’s policy machinery that developed through this relationship and which gave the rest of the world the “femocrat,” the name for feminists appointed to positions in the bureaucracy with a specific directive to improve policy outcomes for women (see Sawer 2003).

In the years since the 1970s a great deal has been written about the Australian women’s movement’s relationship with the state in Australia and the consequences of that relationship (see, e.g, Dowse 1982; Franzway, Court, & Connell 1989; Sawer 1990; Maddison & Partridge 2007; Maddison & Jung 2008). This state focus certainly produced some extraordinary outcomes, not the least of which was an acceptance (that lasted several decades) that feminist-informed gender analysis had a legitimate place at the heart of government policymaking. While this issue remains highly contested there is little doubt that the establishment of a women’s machinery of government in Australia and the accompanying gains in policy, legislation, and funding for essential women’s services such as refuges, child care, and health centers are very tangible, if insecure, feminist achievements.

With hindsight, however, there is also the view that perhaps the construction of a model that relied, at least in part, on a sympathetic and reformist government and on external pressure from the women’s movement, was somewhat short-sighted (Maddison & Jung 2008). The pressure required under this model needed to come from a visible, united, and highly mobilized movement; the sort of movement that history shows is only ever in episodic existence over longer cycles of movement continuity (Rupp & Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989).

Since the mid-1990s Australia has seen the almost total demise of a feminist presence...
within government. Dramatic changes in the Australian political context during this period, including the growing hegemony of neoliberalism and a long period of conservative, antifeminist government, certainly contributed to this decline. However, it is also probable that the dominant state focus added to the wider invisibility of the movement, particularly as movement organizations became partially co-opted by their funding relationship with government. The paradox for feminists was that the price of policy success inside government was an increasing lack of influence and access for activists outside the bureaucracy (Eisenstein 1996).

The entry into government also profoundly challenged the feminist commitment to nonhierarchical organizational forms and the type of interpersonal connections that were possible in these contexts. The loss of these personal connections may partially account for the subsequent loss of visibility for the movement as personal commitments to organizing and attending public protests waned. Feminist cultural events that promoted movement visibility and were essential to defining an ongoing collectivity have also declined in both frequency and number of participants. The net effect is a feminist movement that appears to have entered a period of abeyance with no obvious end in sight. It is likely that the strong state focus of the movement – although innovative and undoubtedly successful at the time – has contributed to this decline.

SEE ALSO: Abeyance; Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Protest cycles and waves; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Women’s movements in Europe
LAURE BERENI

Women’s movements in Europe appeared during the second half of the nineteenth century, a time of nation-state building and slow progress towards the realization of democratic principles. Women were excluded from the political realm, but they could increasingly organize on behalf of their (constrained) identities as women. Among the various emerging women’s organizations, mostly dedicated to philanthropic and social reform work, some sought to challenge women’s subordination to men. By the first decades of the twentieth century, a number of these organizations began to identify as “feminist,” after the term coined by French suffragist Hubertine Auclert. While not all women’s movements overtly struggled against gender hierarchy and saw themselves as feminist, all addressed women as a constituency and devoted a large part of their energies to work for women.

Facing comparable legal situations throughout Europe, women’s movements converged on the same issues, such as the disadvantaged status of married women, unequal pay in the workplace, the situation of poor single mothers, organized prostitution, barriers to education and professions, and suffrage, which would become the principal concern of the “first wave” of feminism. Organized women acted mostly by legal and respectable means, publishing papers, launching manifestos, organizing public conferences, or lobbying political actors. From the outset, efforts were made to link women’s activities across national boundaries. A series of women’s rights congresses were held in European cities from the late 1870s on, and a variety of international organizations appeared in the wake of the International Council of Women, founded in 1888 in Washington.

Alongside national differences, European women’s movements were divided along cross-national lines of debate. Historian Karen Offen (2000) distinguishes between an “individualistic” tradition of feminism, which emphasized abstract individual rights and women’s personal independence, and a “relational” tradition, which rooted women’s emancipation in the revaluation of their gendered identities, crucially defined by motherhood. Another important source of division among women’s movements appeared with the rapid development of Marxist-Socialist parties in most European countries from the 1880s on. Feminist socialists, such as Clara Zetkin in Germany and Alexandra Kollontai in Russia, insisted that the situation of women workers was specific, called for the proletarian revolution as the prerequisite of women’s emancipation, and distanced themselves from what they called “bourgeois feminism.”

During the interwar period, women’s movements experienced a variety of difficulties: first, they lacked a major common goal after suffrage had been granted to women in several European countries; second, their transnational efforts were increasingly weakened by international divisions, with a communist regime being established in Russia and antagonist chauvinisms emerging throughout the continent; third, by the mid-1930s, the fascist or authoritarian regimes established in Germany, Italy, and other European countries brutally dismantled autonomous women’s movements.

In the aftermath of World War II, European women’s movements suffered the direct consequences of the cold war; in the West, they stood in the shadow of dominant political forces, and feminist mobilization entered a phase of quiescence, despite the publication of such writings as Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second
Sex in 1949; in the East, women’s organizations were gradually absorbed by the socialist states.

In most West European countries, the second wave of women’s movements emerged in the late 1960s, following the birth of the “women’s liberation movement” in the US. Arising in the wake of radical student protests, the new women’s movements saw themselves as departing from past feminism. Rallying to the new motto “the personal is political,” they advocated free contraception and abortion, railed against the dominant definition of women’s roles as mothers and spouses, and denounced all forms of male violence against women, including in intimate relationships. Organizationally, sexual separatism became a central norm, and small, loosely interconnected groups were favored over conventional hierarchical organizations. Innovative militant practices were developed, such as consciousness raising and self-help. Throughout Western Europe, second-wave women’s movements were divided into three dominant currents: liberal (or reformist) feminists called for a gradual improvement of women’s rights, mostly through institutional lobbying; radical feminists sought to combat patriarchy through a profound challenge of existing social structures; socialist feminists, finally, called for an inseparable fight against patriarchy and capitalism. In the 1970s, radical thinking gained an unprecedented influence among European women’s movements.

By the end of the 1970s most women’s movements had entered a period of diminishing activism and declining political visibility. A new era began, marked by three main evolutions. First, women’s movements underwent a process of institutionalization. By the turn of the 1980s, women’s policy agencies, often referred to as “state feminism,” were established to improve gender equality in many European countries, as well as at the European Union level. Women’s organizations, therefore, became less confrontational and more professionalized. Second, new forms of international cooperation were developed: after the collapse of the socialist regimes in the early 1990s, women’s movements reflourished in Eastern Europe, and new solidarities were built between organized women across the continent. The European Women’s Lobby, founded in the late 1980s, gathered hundreds of women’s organizations around a common gender equality agenda that included equality in the workplace, dismantling trafficking in women, and combating violence against women. Finally, feminist protest gained new momentum during the 1990s. On the one hand, new groups formed with younger generations of activists, who emphasized the intersectionality of power relations (gender, race, class, sexuality), and often called themselves the “third wave.” On the other hand, many European women’s organizations engaged in campaigns for equal political representation in government, through electoral gender quotas or “parity.” As they have gained new political visibility, women’s movements in Europe have remained divided along political and generational lines, as evidenced by the fierce controversies over the Muslim headscarf and prostitution.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Gender and social movements; Feminism and social movements; Institutionalization of social movements; Self-help movements; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements.

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Women’s movements in India
MANISHA DESAI

India has a long history of dynamic and varied women’s movements beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholar activists (e.g., Gandhi & Shah 1992; Kumar 2002) normally identify two major waves: the first wave from around 1920 to 1945, which coincided with India’s independence struggle and whose major aim was suffrage and education for women and later addressing legal inequities in family laws; and the second wave, also called the “autonomous” women’s movement, from the early 1970s to the 1990s and whose main focus was violence against women. I identify a third wave, namely the transnational women’s movement which, beginning in the mid to late 1990s, has organized across national and regional borders around issues of neoliberal globalization and religious fundamentalism, among others. Each wave consisted of many strands that were often in conversation with each other. And while each period had a main focus, there were many issues and strategies in each wave.

The first wave, or the nationalist women’s movement, emerged during India’s independence struggle against British colonial rule. The roots of this movement were laid by elite social reformers in the mid- and late nineteenth century such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, who sought improvement in upper-caste women’s status, namely abolishing sati (the murder of women on the funeral pyres of their dead husbands), allowing widow remarriage, raising the age of marriage, and opening educational opportunities for women. Dalit (meaning “oppressed” – the identity chosen by the ex-untouchable castes) reformers such as Jyoti Phule, by contrast, focused more specifically on the unequal patriarchal relationships among upper-caste Hindus and linked it to the unjust colonial relationship with Britain. As a result of these reform movements, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a class of educated, upper-caste, Hindu, Muslim, and Parsi women had become active in the nationalist movement. It was through their activism in the nationalist movement that many women began to create women’s organizations to work on “uplifting” women and demand suffrage. During the late nineteenth century most of the women’s organizations were local, mostly urban, and regional, focusing on social reform within Hinduism, women’s education, and as forums for discussion among educated women. National level organizations began to emerge between 1910 and 1920. The first of its kind was the Mahila Parishad (Ladies’ Congress) and in 1917 the Women’s India Association was formed, in 1930 joining with others to form the All India Women’s Conference, which continues to exist. These organizations combined the issues of national freedom and women’s suffrage with issues including education, health, and later wages and benefits for women workers.

As a result of their struggles, at independence in 1947 women were granted suffrage and the constitution guaranteed equal social, political, and economic rights for women. Among the rights that the constitution did not address and which continue to be an issue today is that of personal laws or laws relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Given the religious diversity of India and the violent partition that led to the formation of India and Pakistan, the nationalist leaders did not support a uniform civil code. Instead, women are governed by the laws of their respective religions, most of which are not gender just. The expectation was that each religion would seek reform of its own practices.
Following independence, some women’s activists focused on reforming personal laws in their respective religions, while others organized poor urban and rural women workers through the various Left parties. By the late 1960s the promises of independence had failed to address issues of poverty, landlessness, and violence against the poor. And it was around these issues that a new generation of activists became involved in landless peasants’ movements, antiprice rise movements, and worker and student movements, in all of which poor women participated in large numbers. Left parties or radical “nonparty political formations” organized most of these movements. It was through their activism in these movements that many urban, middle-class women experienced the subordination of gender issues to caste and class issues and began to discuss this in “autonomous” women’s groups. These groups were galvanized into a highly visible protest movement throughout the country around the rape of a 14-year-old girl while in police custody. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the autonomous movements focused on violence against women, ranging from “dowry-deaths” (murder of women by in-laws for not bringing an adequate dowry) to wife-battering and female foeticide or sex-selective abortions.

The movements sought and succeeded in getting numerous legal changes to combat the various forms of violence against women. In addition to legal reform, activists also undertook consciousness raising or conscientization and provided support services to women. This period was marked with a focus on oppression common to all women across class, caste, and religion. Many research and documentation centers also emerged and women’s studies programs were established in universities across the country.

This period of active mobilization coincided with the UN-sponsored International Women’s Decade, 1975–1985, which provided both resources and opportunities for activists in India to travel and interact with activists in the region as well as at the global level. This led to the current period of what I have called the transnational women’s movements. This period is marked by an increasing diversity of movement groups, issues, and strategies, such as dalit women’s movement, gay and lesbian groups, hijras or transgender groups, and women’s antinuclear and peace groups. Many see this plurality as a fragmentation of the movement, some see it as the institutionalization and depoliticization of the movements. The movements, however, are active on a lot of fronts, chief among them neoliberal globalization and religious fundamentalism as well as taking advantage of the 33 percent reservation for women in local government. Given the commonality of these issues across borders, Indian feminists have also been at the forefront of transnational organizing, as evident by their involvement in organizing the 2004 World Social Forum in Mumbai. The diversity of Indian women’s movements points to their vitality and they have become key players in forging south–south and north–south collaborations and shaping transnational feminist movements.

The extent to which this vitality will make a difference in the lives of ordinary men and women in India will be determined by its ability to form meaningful coalitions with other movements to challenge the domination of the market-driven reforms that have widened social, economic, and political inequalities since their inception in 1991.

SEE ALSO: Decolonization and social movements; Feminism and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Suffrage movement, international; Transgender movement; Transnational social movements; Women’s movements.

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Women’s movement in Japan
KOSUKE NIKAIDO

The telltale signs of the remarkable level of success that the discourse of feminism and the accompanying politico-social movement of women’s liberation have had on the society and culture in Japan are quite visible, in spite of the country’s reputation as a rather patriarchal and traditional society. For instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, first instituted in 1985 and considered largely symbolic and toothless then, has nevertheless been strengthened repeatedly through a number of reforms. In the twenty-first century, the principles of egalitarianism and gender neutrality with respect to hiring, promotion and so on, are widely accepted and deeply entrenched, at least at the level of the ideal, if not always at the level of practice. The relatively small but dedicated and tireless group of attorneys, feminist activists, academics, and lawmakers who have done the lion’s share of the work of prodding and pressuring the government can also in large part take credit for some other notable accomplishments, like the Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 2001 and 2004 (see, for instance, Gelb 2003, for details on the specific strategies adopted by Japanese activists to press for these policy changes).

Also, in the sphere of public opinion as measured by survey polls, we may observe that there are some conspicuous changes with regard to attitudes toward gender roles. In general, it seems the case that a sizeable majority of women in Japan feel that the social and political conditions for women have improved significantly over the last several decades or so. However, the difficult question – from the standpoint of a study of the feminist movement – has to do with whether these generally progressive changes can be attributed mainly, or even partly, to the work and influence of the movement activists themselves. The feminist movement in Japan has always been quite small compared with its counterparts in most other advanced industrial countries, and many, if certainly not all, activists have traditionally evinced some aversion toward direct involvement in politics. In turn, the generally conservative and corporatist Japanese state has often been insulated from pressure by lay activists and citizens’ groups. It is quite understandable, then, that many observers of Japanese society have been dismissive or downright unaware of the contribution, or even existence, of the surprisingly vibrant feminist movement there. For instance, in the preface to the book Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism – a highly useful anthology that introduces the arguments and ideas of some of the most paramount activists in Japan to the English-speaking world – Sandra Buckley (1997) laments that so many Western academics assume there is no feminist movement in Japan. However, any concrete historical change in social order must be instigated, in a broad sense, by an empirically existing individual or group, and upon a closer look the contributions made by the feminist movement are considerable.

Within that scope, it is generally agreed that the most vigorous periods of activity for the movement came during two stages in the twentieth century. The first “wave” occurred mainly in the teens and early 1920s following World War I; it was initially spearheaded by literary critics and writers – most notably Raicho Hiratsuka, famed founder of the progressive-minded journal Seito (Bluestocking) – who retrospectively ended up being precursors to the more identity-oriented activists of the “second wave.” It was not long before the budding movement began to broaden into an ideologically and politically wide-ranging entity that grew more audacious in making concrete political demands. For instance, following the
international trend, suffrage was among the paramount issues, and the remarkably adept and resilient Fusae Ichikawa – whose tenure as an active leader in the movement for women’s rights was to last into the 1970s – began her activist career as a founder of the suffragist organization the Women’s Suffrage League in 1925. Socialist feminism also developed considerable intellectual vigor around this time, led by luminaries like Kikue Yamakawa. Yet, as is well known in modern Japanese history, many of these progressive efforts were totally scuttled by Japan’s turn toward wartime mobilization, and suffrage was not achieved until the Allied Occupation Forces introduced it following the military regime’s defeat.

Meanwhile, “second wave feminism” in Japan corresponds more or less with the worldwide mobilization of the similarly labeled movement following the highly activist and energetic decade of the 1960s. So, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s a number of grassroots groups dedicated to the cause of women’s liberation sprouted up in urban areas, at times in concert with, but often independently of, the New Left or student movements. A few of these groups were able to conduct activities that led to considerable exposure and visibility in spite of their ragtag start and relative organizational inexperience. In particular, groups of young women in Tokyo that coalesced around the Lib Shinjuku Center vigorously published leaflets and journals, staged demonstrations, and continuously organized study sessions on issues as diverse as reproductive rights, women’s education, immigration policy, and Japanese corporations’ exploitation of women in the developing world. In the meantime, a group of somewhat older and more established women began to contest more specific policy issues focused on gender equality – their often long monikers, such as the Group to Promote Coeducational Home Economics and the United Nations International Year of Women Action Group, seem to directly embody the goal and substance of their arguments and concerns.

Thereafter, it is not uncommon to hear the argument that the feminist movement quickly expended its energy and dissipated, thus reinforcing the notion that such a movement would have little or no cultural viability in Japan. However, while it is true that most of the grassroots “women’s liberation-inspired” groups did demobilize sometime after the late 1970s, at the same time the impact they left behind on the nature of the discourse on gender politics in Japan must be properly remembered. The more holistic and identity-focused discourse of the women’s liberation movement left a deep imprint on the consciousness of a number of more organized and professional activists working as academics, writers, attorneys, and so on. Such cultural influence, in turn, enabled the latter group of women to take up issues such as equal employment opportunity and domestic violence prevention in a more comprehensive and reflective manner after the 1980s, when organized feminism in Japan gradually became more professionalized and compartmentalized.

In the twenty-first century, as is the case in many advanced Western countries, there has been considerable talk of the so-called “postfeminism generation” in both the popular and academic media in Japan. Such a newly developing trend has yet to receive any systemic consideration and analysis in the English-language scholarship, however. Probably this is because most concerned intellectuals – both Japanese and foreign – are still very much playing “catch-up” in the sense of introducing the very existence and accomplishments of the movement to begin with.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Feminism and social movements; Gender and social movements; Rights and rights movements; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Zapatista movement
(Mexico)
MARCO ESTRADA-SAAVEDRA

The National Liberation Zapatista Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) was formed in 1983 from the National Liberation Forces (Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional, FLN), a subversive organization formed in the late 1960s in northern Mexico, inspired by the Cuban revolution. FLN set up a guerrilla movement whose aim was the spread of socialism in Mexico. However, FLN was virtually wiped out by the federal Government in the early 1970s. Former members of the FLN managed to regroup and settle in the southeastern state of Chiapas in 1983, mainly along the hilly region of Los Altos, in the northern area of the state in the Lacandon jungle, where they pursued similar goals to those of the late FLN and created EZLN, a grassroots-based organization. With this organizational base, EZLN was able to expand its ranks and lead the 1994 armed rebellion.

The FLN was formed by a politburo, whereas the EZLN originated in rural areas, with insurgent cells made up of “fighting students and workers” in cities. The EZLN’s command is structured as follows: General Command, Subcommand, General Staff – a council of military commanders – and the Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena, CCRI). The military command positions of EZLN are: general commander, subcommander (subcomandante), commanders, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, sublieutenants, and insurgent troops. The EZLN’s insurgent troops have subdivisions: sections, platoons, companies, battalions, and regiments. In addition, there are Zapatista militias formed by civilians trained by the EZLN; they are not part of the insurgent army but are on call to support the guerrillas in regular warfare actions.

The CCRI is formed by indigenous commanders and plays merely a political role within communities. Most commanders have no military training; they are mostly influential political leaders in their communities and regions and they receive instructions from the EZLN’s General Command and General Staff communicated by Subcomandante Marcos. They share such commands with those responsible in each community. They also inform the military chiefs about the state of affairs in their communities and about the activities of outsiders inside the jungle.

The Zapatista grassroots include communities and indigenous groups who decide to take part in the revolutionary project. The guerrilla insurgents may be assisted in five major ways: (1) by maintaining the anonymity of insurgents, (2) by recruiting new combatants, (3) by ensuring food and supplies to sustain the guerrillas, (4) by taking part in demonstrations and public protests, and (5) by involvement in collective efforts of infrastructure development and setting up (inter)community services. These activities help strengthen (inter)community bonds of solidarity, increase social integration, and foster and sustain Zapatista collective identity.

In a Zapatista community health and education sponsors play a special role in collective life in terms of the preservation of the Zapatista identity and the continuance of resistance. In each community the number of health and education sponsors may vary from four to six men and women – appointed by the community – who take part in health and education sponsoring activities. In view of the deficiencies in local medical services, the health sponsor is chiefly responsible for disease prevention and health care. The education sponsors teach Zapatista children how to read.
and write and basic math. Sponsors also educate children on history, life, and environment, and community integration. The shaping of children’s minds into a Zapatista identity is a form of political propaganda that builds commitment to the movement.

**Colectivos** – cooperatives providing products and services intended for the exclusive benefit and enjoyment of insurgent farmers – run the Zapatista community services. Colectivos are formed by working groups, which are also called colectivos. The larger colectivo is led by a representative, whereas the internal working groups are headed by a coordinator. The duties at the Zapatista colectivos are assigned by the community responsible, which organizes tasks based on the regional commanders’ instructions. The community responsible oversees the colectivo’s work and provides the materials and resources required for any voluntary work conducted in the community. Such resources are, in turn, provided by the political-military organization of the Zapatistas.

The EZLN’s subsystems and grassroots are linked to one another via the community and region responsible people who are the top civil and military authorities at local and regional level. The community responsible person organizes local meetings, collects the resources to be sent to insurgent camps, runs the colectivos and monitors and manages the community to ensure its cohesion. All community responsible persons report to the Regional Military Command.

The Regional Military Command and all community responsible persons in a region make up a Clandestine Regional Committee. The Committee’s duties are chiefly political: organizing the resistance, recruiting militia, and conducting ideological and propaganda activities. The community responsible persons meet once a month at the Clandestine Regional
Committee’s headquarters to discuss issues and requests from communities and try to find ways for the EZLN’s military commanders to address them.

To ensure grassroots cohesion, control, and coordination and fulfill core demands included in the EZLN’s political strategy since the 1994 uprising, new regional political organization structures were required to set up a de facto autonomy in the territories controlled by the insurgents. To this end, the Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities (Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas, MAREZ) were created, followed by the Good Government Boards (Juntas de Buen Goberno, JBG).

The first MAREZ were formally established in December 1994; they would take on the duties of a formal government. The MAREZ’s authorities are appointed civilians supervised jointly by the CCRI-EZLN and the Council of Communitarian Representatives. The top authority at each municipality under the MAREZ government is the superintendent (presidente), followed by a secretary and treasurer. Just below these three offices there is the Social Participation Council, in charge of four aspects: justice, agrarian affairs, public services, and the civil registrars. By the end of 1999 regional education and health plans were developed at the Zapatista civic-political centers or aguascalientes (literally “hot waters”), later given the name of caracoles (literally “snails”). The work of insurgent municipal authorities is unpaid as is customary in indigenous communities. Projects are conducted through collective or communitarian work with resources donated by domestic and international pro-Zapatista groups.

Just after the efforts to reestablish dialogue between the federal government and the rebels failed and the 2001 Indigenous Rights and Culture Act was passed in 2003, the Zapatistas announced the creation of resistance caracoles and five JBGs in insurgent territories. The goal behind such actions was to demilitarize Zapatista areas with civil authorities and make progress in establishing autonomy as well as to obtain recognition for indigenous rights and culture.

The presiding members of the boards are the highest authorities in their respective regions. The number of authorities at each JBG varies according to the number of autonomous municipalities represented. In every case, each MAREZ has two town councilors, who are members of the autonomous municipal council, as part of the authorities. Their term of office is three years. During each term, the authorities of the JBG are turned over every 15 days. Candidates for the posts are selected by means of collective deliberation under the tutelage of the EZLN’s military authorities. There is a parallel body to that of the JBG that has no official recognition, the Surveillance Committee, formed by members of the regional CCRI who actually make the most important political decisions. In this sense, the process of forming the JBGs entails a partial demilitarization of Zapatism.

The creation of the JBGs places regional Zapatism under a supracommunitarian civil authority and is a redefinition of the relation of Zapatism and communities, farmers, political organizations, and the state government. By means of the JBGs, neo-Zapatism hopes to mitigate the attritional effects of resistance, such as shortage of resources, and diminish the development gap among insurgent communities. This process of administrative control seeks to lessen the discretionary and conflicting nature of governmental roles by providing the grassroots with access to a higher instance to deal with prevarication and abuse by local authorities and the Autonomous Council. However, this leads to a centralization of power in the JBGs.

The redefinition of Zapatista relations through the JBGs involves certain steps for a state-creation strategy: (1) geographical demarcation of Zapatista territories; (2) sovereignty over law-making, regulations, and authorizations; (3) tax collection and resource distribution among Zapatista communities; (4) authority to rule, prosecute, and punish in disputes among Zapatistas and between...
Zapatistas and other jungle inhabitants; and (5) authority to perform the executive and administrative duties of a civil government for the Zapatista population. However, the operational powers of the JBGs are limited by the access to symbolic, material, and human resources supplied by pro-Zapatista groups.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Earth’s Color March (Mexico); Grassroots movements; Guerilla movements; Religion and social movements; Transnational Zapatism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Culture and social movements
RHYO H. WILLIAMS

Culture encompasses the symbolic and expressive dimensions of social life. Culture includes sets of symbols such as language, intangible, abstract “mental products” such as ideas, beliefs, values, and identity, and the meanings given to material objects such as clothing, decorations, art objects, buildings, and the like. A long tradition in sociological theory conveys culture as a distinct dimension of social life, and embodied primarily in social institutions such as religion or the family. More recent theorizing, however, understands culture as analytically embedded in all aspects of human society. When institutionalized in organizational routines and social networks culture is tightly enmeshed in social structures, even as it can be kept analytically distinct.

Social movements are sustained, more-or-less organized attempts at change. They may try to change individuals, group behaviors, government policies, or society’s cultural understandings. Social movements are generally thought to last longer and be more organized than a mob or a crowd, but are not as established or institutionalized as a political party or lobbying group. Further, unlike parties or lobbying groups they may have goals and targets well beyond the state or realms of institutional policies (Snow 2004).

Sociologists have studied culture and socialmovements with three basic sets of questions. First, many accounts of social movement emergence posit their basic causes as cultural. Second, when studying the processes and dynamics that allow social movements to function and maintain themselves, analysts have focused on cultural factors such as collective identity, ideological claims, emotions, and internal group norms, rituals, and practices. Third, scholars who study the impact that movements have on society have often focused on the cultural changes that are their goals for action.

MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

Most of the sociological study of social movements since the end of World War II has sought to ascertain “why do social movements emerge?” One way to categorize the answers is whether they put the basic cause of movement emergence in the social structural dimensions of society, or in societal and group culture. Social structural causes include changing economic fortunes of particular classes, the formal political systems of society, or the resources (such as money, members, and organizations) that a group can mobilize in order to mount collective action. Cultural answers to the question of movement emergence have generally fallen within one of two categories: changes in the national or societal culture; or changes in group subculture among those people involved in a social movement.

For example, traditional strain theorists argued that movements develop because large-scale social and cultural changes result in a collective social-psychological anomie or alienation among people experiencing these changes. Various types of cultural “strain,” such as the development of “mass society,” or widespread changes in normative values, lead to breakdowns in normal routines and result in disruptive and innovative collective actions. More recently, European-based “new social movements” of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Greens, were theorized by Melucci (1989) as the cultural response to late capitalism’s elevation of “life-style” concerns over re-distributive economic politics. Middle-class cultural movements have replaced labor as central collective actors of the period in the post-industrial West. A more specific analysis of the role of
group culture was Gusfield's (1986) thesis that the US prohibition movement was led by people concerned about their declining social status. Their movement was a “symbolic crusade” to restore their cultural prestige.

At a more micro-level perspective, scholars have focused on the language and “framing” work done by movement leaders. Analysts argue that many groups have the potential for collective action, but it takes the articulation of an ideology or a set of grievances, and a sense of collective identity, for this potential to turn into an actual movement. Movements are thus “constructed” by the frames of movement leaders, who convince people to engage in collective action. Collective action frames interpret people’s life situations, including such emotions as the anger and fear they may feel, by articulating them as grievances against an unjust system or enemy. Frames also tell people how they might change such situations, and try to convince them their own involvement will make a difference (see Benford & Snow 2000).

In all of these examples, it is something in culture – changes in the culture of a particular group, changes in the larger culture, or the use of cultural objects such as rhetoric, ideology, and identity – that contribute significantly to a social movement’s emergence.

MOVEMENT DYNAMICS

Once a social movement has emerged, it needs to sustain collective action through mobilizing people repeatedly to action, whether street protests, letter-writing campaigns, financial contributions, or the like. The capacity to sustain action involves both cultural objects and processes that work cognitively, emotionally, and morally. Movement ideology is composed of ideas, language, and nontextual symbols directed at both movement members and publics in the society that the movement is trying to persuade. Other dimensions of culture, such as collective identity, group practices, and shared emotions and narratives, help people who are mobilized stay committed to their movement and their cause.

Social movements use ideological claims and symbolic messages to make their case for social change (Platt & Williams 2002). Sometimes ideology is a straightforward articulation of the ideas that motivate the movement and include the visions of how society might be different. For example, the Students for the Democratic Society drafted the “Port Huron Statement” that articulated their rationale for action; similarly, Marx and Engel’s *The Communist Manifesto* was the ideological base for the international communist movement’s calls for social change, including a diagnosis of the injustices of capitalist society and a vision of a more equitable socialist social order.

Movements create or adapt ideologies for change, but they also experience some limitations in the ideological claims they can make (Williams 1995). While activists are free to formulate any argument they choose, many claims will not be effective in particular contexts. There is a “cultural repertoire” that puts boundaries on what a given society or historical period will consider legitimate ideas. These repertoires develop through the interaction of challenger claims and the reigning hegemonic ideology within a society (Steinberg 1995).

Some movements use the memories of historical figures to legitimate their movement goals (Jansen 2007). But these associations require “memory work” and are bounded by the “reputational trajectories” of the historical figures. Thus, movements face the challenge of articulating innovative calls for change, while using ideological claims and symbolic messages that are largely within the boundaries of the existing legitimate culture.

Movements’ ideological messages are often reduced to easily remembered slogans, such as “Make Love, Not War,” “God is Pro-Life,” or “No Blood for Oil.” These slogans are a shorthand that is only effective when the movement’s fuller ideology is well enough known that audiences can fill in the potential ambiguity in content (e.g., a San Francisco bumper sticker, “I own a dog and I vote” only makes sense if one
understands current land-use issues regarding beaches in the Bay Area).

Another method of communicating the content of movement claims is to reduce them further to pictures or nontextual figures. The pro-choice movement consistently uses a drawing of a coat hanger with a line through it to symbolize the dangers of illegal abortions. Christian Right organizations distribute bumper stickers with the word “vote” in which the ‘t’ is elongated into a cross. Communist movements have used red stars historically, while white supremacist groups in the United States and Europe resurrect the Nazi swastika. Nontextual symbols provide even less information about specific issues, and yet make even broader political and social claims. They are often ambiguous enough that multiple groups use them, as in the Vietnam War era in the United States when counterculture protesters stitched American flags on to the backs of their blue-jean jackets at the same time that pro-war blue-collar workers were putting American flag decals on their hard hats. In such cases, the ideological message was not readable directly from the symbol used, but could only be understood within the context of the wearer’s general presentation of self. And the political battle was in part over which movement would control the potent cultural symbol itself, with its attendant legitimacy and positive associations.

Movements must create and sustain a collective identity as part of maintaining collective action (e.g., Polletta & Jasper 2001). That is, people must feel that they share important characteristics with others in the movement, and that this identity is important enough to promote or protect through movement involvement. So, while slogans and nontextual symbols articulate a social movement’s ideas, the individuals and groups who display them are also making a statement about their personal and social identity. Symbolic displays mark those using them as part of a particular movement, and encapsulate their basic attitudes and values.

The creation and nurturance of a shared collective identity produces a sense of “we-ness,” in such a way that it can become the basis for action. People may identify themselves as the victims of an injustice based on their identity or social location, experience anger or determination as a result of this, and organize to combat the injustice. Other times, the “we” becomes people who hold a certain set of values or interests (such as preserving wilderness areas) and feel both motivated and obligated to act. Sometimes the “we” seems obvious, as when it is built on a longstanding ethnic or religious identity.

Collective identity helps mobilize and sustain a movement (Nepstad 2004). People must be willing to continue to contribute time, energy, and perhaps withstand risk, through both victories and setbacks. Spirits must be kept up, shared identities must be reaffirmed, and group solidarity must be cultivated. Slogans, a particularized vocabulary, items of clothing or grooming, flags or pennants, all can contribute to this process – letting fellow movement members know who one is, and distinguishing movement “members” from others. Particular songs, or a style of music, can be a powerful force in galvanizing emotions, providing opportunities for shared action in collective performance or singing, and cementing a collective identity through shared knowledge or words or the like (see Roscigno & Danaher 2004). Narratives and stories allow group members to frame a shared history and align their experiences, motives, emotions, and identities (Davis 2002).

Another dimension of movement culture is the discourse and practices used among movement members in the processes of internal debate, decision-making, and interpersonal interaction. “Backstage” arguments among movement members are connected to the public ideology movements articulate, but they are often not identical (Kubal 1998). They may be dress rehearsals for later public positions, they may be quarrels among factions vying for control of the group’s message (Benford 1993), and they may be jokes, rationales, or beliefs purposely kept from public view. Movement members develop norms of etiquette (Polletta 2002) or styles of discourse (Hart 2001) that
govern what types of arguments are allowed within group meetings, what types of relationships are considered the model for action, and what types of people movement members should want to try to be. These are cultural rules of action that help shape movement ideological claims, group strategic decisions, and public collective identity. Alternatively, one can think of movement culture as a “group style” that entails both standards for intra-group behavior and relationships, as well as modes of communicating and establishing shared meanings (Eliasoph & Lichterman 2003).

Group style and other dimensions of movement culture are contexts within which collective action must be imagined and manifested. They facilitate as well as constrain some types of action and not others – affecting the strategies and tactics that groups use in their efforts at collective action. While rational and instrumental calculation often helps a group make strategic and tactical choices, they are not the entire picture. For example, Moore (2008) demonstrated that three different groups of scientists, in three different eras, had different rationales, collective identities, and integrative principles for their protests against defense and military spending in science. These different styles, or modes, of protest, rested on different assumptions about science and society, and different assumptions about what constituted appropriate action. Klawiter (2008) calls similar formulations “cultures of action” and shows how they constitute the meaning of breast cancer for different groups of people and activists. Conceptually, these considerations bridge between the “internal” dynamics of movement maintenance, to help shape the “external” impact the groups had on the wider social environment.

MOVEMENT IMPACT

Almost all social movements have a variety of goals. Many want to change laws, or enact policy changes within institutions such as schools, churches, or hospitals. Some movements seem primarily intent on blocking the goals and efforts of other movements (Fetner 2008). But many movements also seek changes in their wider societal culture (d’Anjou 1996). For example, the gay and lesbian liberation movement wants policy changes that will end discrimination against gays and lesbians, but it also wants to change the cultural values associated with homosexual orientations and identity. Similarly, the women’s movement in the United States and globally has worked at combating stereotypes about women, while the vegetarian movement has tried to change people’s ideas (as well as habits) about food and nonhuman animals (Maurer 2002). In all cases, movements are arrayed against a sense of “authority,” whether that authority is institutionalized in the state and organizations or more generally within the culture (Snow 2004).

Most movements shift fairly easily between attempts at institutional change and cultural, although one type of target or strategy often comes to dominate the movement’s public identity. For example, Christian Right groups have sometimes been interested almost exclusively in symbolic change, as when they advocate putting the Ten Commandments in government buildings. Other movement groups are often particularly interested in creating “activists”; that is, the change in which they are most interested is in the set of personal and collective identities found within groups of people (Lichterman 1996). Helping to transform individuals and groups into people who continue to agitate for sociocultural change is itself a form of cultural impact.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Commitment; Countercultures; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Narratives; Science and social movements; Strain and breakdown theories; Subcultures and social movements; Symbolic crusades.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Diffusion and scale shift
SARAH A. SOULE

DIFFUSION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social scientists use the term diffusion to refer to the spread or flow of an innovation across actors in a social system (Rogers 1995). When we speak of diffusion of social movements, we mean that some element of a social movement (e.g., tactic, frame, ideology, protest, repertoire, campaign) is spreading across some set of actors (e.g., organizations, networks, groups, people, communities, states) in a social system either through direct or indirect networks of communication (Soule 2004; Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010).

There are four different types of actors in the diffusion process and it is worth offering some discussion of how each relates to the diffusion of social movements. First, there are innovators, who are the very first to adopt some movement innovation and are usually adventurous and willing to take risks. These may be thought of as “early risers” or “initiators” when thinking about the way in which some movements seem to spawn others in a cycle of protest (Tarrow 1998), but we might also consider the generators of a particular frame or the developers of a new protest tactic to be innovators. Second, there are the early adopters of an innovation who are important because, by adopting the innovation, they help to legitimate it by demonstrating its effectiveness to others. Early adopters do not usually invent new tactics or frames, but they are quick to jump on the bandwagon once these become available. Third, there are the later adopters of an innovation who choose to adopt it once it has become somewhat legitimate and/or it has been proven to be useful. A given protest tactic may be costly and risky, thus many observers may wish to wait and see if the tactic is efficacious before they adopt. Finally, there are the non-adopters who have not (and presumably will not) adopt the innovation. In the case of social movements, non-adopters may be groups or organizations that do not have the resources to adopt a given tactical innovation or they may be groups or organizations for which an innovative frame simply does not resonate.

Early treatments of diffusion by social movement scholars were framed by an interest in psychology and micro-level processes and they viewed diffusion as an outgrowth of contagion between individuals in groups or crowds (Soule 2004). In this body of work, collective gatherings were something to be feared because impulses toward aggression were thought to spread between people. Observers of race riots, lynching, Nazism, fascism, McCarthyism, and Stalinism viewed individuals as susceptible to such aggressive impulses.

With the development of the resource mobilization and political process traditions, scholars focused instead on the connections between different movement organizations, movement actors, and their wider, political environment. Thus, more recent treatments of diffusion recognize that the boundaries between movements and movement organizations often overlap, leading to a web of connections (both real and imagined) between actors and social movement organizations. This web of connections helps us to account for the wave-like character of protest cycles and other types of social mobilization (Tarrow 1998). It also helps us to account for the spillover of ideas and personnel between different movements and movement organizations (Meyer & Whittier 1996).

MECHANISMS OF DIFFUSION

Observers and scholars of social movements have long been intrigued by how social movements seem to spread or diffuse from one site to another. Recent work has tried to specify
the *mechanisms* by which this happens. This work focuses on the importance of two different mechanisms: *direct network ties* and *indirect network ties*.

Direct ties are those that facilitate diffusion via point-to-point contact between people via communication. Some scholars are able to measure such ties directly, such as when interpersonal communication is linked to the spread of riots (Singer 1970), protest tactics (Morris 1981), frames (Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010) and tactical repertoires (Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010). Other recent work focuses on technological innovations and the use of the Internet, which facilitate direct communication between activists and between activists and potential activists and thus impact the diffusion of protest (Ayres 1999; Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010). However, other scholars infer that communication between people has happened. For example, some argue that transportation, trade, and travel routes facilitate diffusion of information about rebellions and other forms of mobilization, presumably because these bring people together (e.g., Hedstrom, Sandell, & Stern 2000). Related, scholars argue that physical proximity leads to the diffusion of mobilization (e.g., Gould 1991). And, others infer that interpersonal communication occurs via shared organizational memberships (Morris 1981).

Indirect ties are those ties that are not forged via direct person-to-person contact. Some of the scholarship on indirect ties focuses on how shared cultural understandings and identification of similarity to others can lead activists to imitate the actions of others to whom they are not directly connected, but to whom they feel connected for some reason (McAdam & Rucht 1993; Soule 1997). For example, Soule (1997) argues that innovative protest tactics spread between activist groups who define themselves as similar to others. Other work on indirect networks focuses on how the mass media can also serve as an indirect channel of diffusion via broadcasting information about a movement or some element thereof (e.g., Walgrave & Manssens 2000; Andrews & Biggs 2006; Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010). Finally, other work focuses on structural equivalence (Soule 1997), or the way in which actors who are not connected, but who are both mutually connected to a third actor, come to resemble one another (Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010).

**SCALE SHIFT**

Scale shift is the “change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened claims” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001: 331). Like diffusion, scale shift implies the transfer of some element of a social movement from an origin to other destinations. In short, scale shift is the process by which issues that are important to certain localities resonate with, and are adopted by, others in places situated either above or below the origin. Scale shift, as such, can be thought of as vertical diffusion, such as when an issue or tactic or frame emerges at a local level, but is adopted by actors at the supra-local (for example, the federal or transnational) level. While the examples of scale shift provided by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) and Tarrow and McAdam (2005) tend to focus on “upward” scale shift (that is, on examples of contentious politics that expand outward and upward from the local level to the state, federal, or transnational level), Tarrow (2005: 121) elaborates also on the idea of “downward” scale shift, or when a practice is adopted at a lower level.

Scale shift is thus a specific kind of diffusion; it is vertical rather than horizontal. As such, it implies a radical difference in the targets of social movements as activists move from one level to another. For example, when movements shift scales from targeting a community or a city council to targeting the European Union or a transnational agreement, such as NAFTA, that which is the object or target of the activism is quite different. This difference might produce radically different outcomes, different probabilities of repression,
and may suggest radically different strategies and tactics, as what works at one level may fail miserably at another (Soule 2009). For example, activists associated with the Free Burma Coalition began by targeting corporations, such as Pepsi, which had investments in Burma. Eventually, these activists began to target cities, and eventually states, to encourage the passage of selective purchasing agreements. This shift in the object or target of the movement led to different opportunities for the movement and necessitated different strategies (Soule 2009).

MECHANISMS OF SCALE SHIFT

Like the literature on the diffusion of social movements, scholarship on scale shift describes the way in which established lines of communication and interaction facilitate the spread of ideas and information necessary for a movement or campaign to spread from the local level to some other level (i.e., direct ties). But, scholars who describe scale shift also emphasize the importance of brokerage or when information is transferred between two or more previously unconnected sites, as was the case when Southern student groups such as SNCC and CORE visited Northern campuses during the civil rights movement in an effort to connect (or broker) relations amongst campuses (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).

Also important to the process of scale shift are attribution of similarity and emulation. The core idea of scale shift is that local collective action inspires broader collective action when information reaches a distant (either culturally or geographically) group and when this information resonates with the distant group. The distant group defines itself as similar to the initial, local group via the mechanism of attribution of similarity. This is similar to what diffusion scholars mean when they talk about the importance of culturally constructed similarity to diffusion via indirect ties (Strang & Meyer 1993). The attribution of similarity leads the distant group to imitate the original group, or to the process of emulation (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001).

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

There are several issues worthy of further consideration and deliberation in this area of scholarship. First, scholarship on both diffusion and scale shift should specify in a more precise manner what exactly is being diffused or is shifting scales. All too often scholars speak vaguely of the diffusion of social movements without specifying exactly what element of the movement is spreading. And, when scholars speak of scale shift, they speak vaguely about “contention” moving upward and outward. But, is this a behavior (e.g., tactics and tactical repertoires) or an idea (e.g., frames and ideology) or a campaign? Are the mechanisms and processes of diffusion and scale shift the same with both ideational and behavioral innovations? Are these innovations being transplanted whole cloth or are they borrowed with some degree of adaptation?

Second, much of the empirical work on diffusion and scale shift has not adequately conceptualized which actors are truly at risk for adopting an innovation. Scholars should specify precisely which units are at risk for adopting a given innovation; for example, while all organizations or groups may technically be at risk of adopting a new protest tactic, in actuality many of these would not really be at risk because they may not have the resources to deploy the new tactic or their own particular identity may preclude using some kinds of tactics. The attention to attribution of similarity by those discussing scale shift moves us in the right direction, at least with respect to the need for adopters to define themselves as similar to transmitters as a basic requirement for being at risk. This is even more complicated when talking about cross-national diffusion (Snow & Benford 1999) because cultural differences may inhibit the attribution of similarity.
Third, scholarship should pay careful attention to the impact of diffusion, especially by exploring the ways in which the varying levels of contention described by work on scale shift also represent both the targets of contention and the opportunity structures within which contention happens (Soule 2009). Activism may start at one level by targeting this level (e.g., protest in a community to prevent the building of a “Big Box Store”), but as it begins to shift scale, so too does its target shift (e.g., rather than targeting a local city zoning board, the target may shift to a multinational corporation). As the contention shifts scales, it encounters different opportunity structures (e.g., the city-level opportunity structure likely differs from the corporate opportunity structure of the multinational corporation). And, finally, scholars should begin to unpack how the opportunity structure at one level may drive scale shift (e.g., if activists are thwarted at one level, they may strategically move to another level). Soule (2009) begins to explore these issues, but there is room for further unpacking the dynamic relationship between scale shift, targets of social movements, and the levels of opportunity, all of which affect the impact of diffusion.

Fourth, scholarship on diffusion and scale shift should move away from the imagery of mechanical transference of some innovation across different social actors and, instead, consider the way in which diffusion is a creative, agentic, and strategic process (Snow & Benford 1999; Chabot 2000). Diffusion and scale shift follow an uneven process whereby groups experiment with innovations, which are then adopted in a piecemeal and variegated fashion. Scholarship should recognize the processual and contested nature of the diffusion process and move beyond more mechanistic accounts (Schneiberg & Soule 2005; Givan, Roberts, & Soule 2010).

Finally, thus far scholarship on the diffusion of protest has not compared the relative effectiveness of indirect and direct models of diffusion for spreading elements of social movements. There is an often overlooked distinction between communication and influence (Soule 2004), both of which transfer information and both of which have potential to alter the actions of other people. But, communication may be less likely than influence to change opinions. To what extent is communication analogous to indirect ties and influence analogous to direct ties? If these are analogous, we might expect direct ties to be more effective diffusion channels than are indirect ties. Scholars of social movements might begin to explore the differences in effectiveness between these mechanisms of diffusion and scale shift.

SEE ALSO: Brokerage; Contagion theory; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Mechanisms; Networks and social movements; Political process theory; Resource mobilization theory; Tactics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Direct action
KELLY MOORE and BENJAMIN SHEPARD

Direct action is strategic political activity in which users seek redress by targeting the people, institutions, and practices that they wish to change. In contrast, indirect political action uses intermediaries, such as elected representatives, to effect change. Direct action is not only an instrument to force others to change. Participants in direct action often see themselves as enacting the values that are important to them, such as fellowship and nonhierarchical relations. It is used by revolutionaries, religious groups, and many others. Groups on the left, right, and center of the political spectrum have used direct action. Direct action is most common among groups that are prohibited from or have limited access to legal participation in institutionalized politics. These include, for example, prisoners, members of ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities, women in some places and times, and students and other young people.

Examples of direct action include blockades, encampments, occupations, vigils, and street theater, refusal to pay taxes or salute officials and royalty, and violence against people and property. A distinguishing quality of direct action is that it is often reinvented rather than being routinized for long periods of time. It is distinct from retreatism and from immediate, unplanned actions such as spontaneous riots. Direct action can have immediate effects on power relations, force a rethinking of those relations, and symbolize and express new kinds of relationships.

TYPES OF DIRECT ACTION

One of the hallmarks of direct action is that it is often specific to a time, place, and problem. While some forms of direct action are modular, spreading from place to place and across different contexts and users, many forms of direct action are quickly defeated by opponents. Activists engage in what McAdam (1983) calls tactical innovation, or efforts to develop new techniques that opponents cannot quickly counter. Yet direct action can be categorized in some general but overlapping categories, including occupations and blockades, sabotage and slow-downs, play and mockery, witnessing, and violence against people and material things.

Occupations and blockades encompass the use of spaces for purposes other than for what they were intended in order to disrupt routine practices and draw attention to their immorality. Examples include sailing into nuclear testing zones, sit-ins, human chains, marches, flashmobs, parades, land occupations, and attaching people to objects using locks and other tools. Sabotage and slow-downs include actions that make routine action more difficult by making it costly and time-consuming to continue in a routine manner. Tree spiking, changing images on advertisements such as billboards, pouring blood on draft card files, hacking or disrupting computer systems, destroying or hobbling machinery, and working at a very slow pace are some important examples of sabotage and slow downs. Not all forms of direct action are confrontational or angry. Play and mockery are often filled with humor that can encourage participants and audiences to rethink what kinds of social and political relations are possible, and give participants a feeling of power. Effigies, clowning, guerrilla theater, street parties, and humor used in sight of targets are examples of this type of direct action. Witnessing is the sharing of one’s moral convictions. While often associated with religious groups, especially Christians, witnessing is the act of publicly identifying one’s moral commitments, particularly in the face of arrest or repression, as a means of convincing others of one’s seriousness and intentions. Vigils, hunger strikes, refusal to
pay taxes, self-immolation, and accepting arrest or beatings are examples of witnessing. Finally, violence against people and things can destroy what participants see as the causes or visible representations of the power relationships they wish to end. Violence can take the form of assassinations, bombings, kidnapping, arson, hijacking, torture, and prison breaks that are organized by individuals or by groups such as militias.

IMPORTANT HISTORICAL SOURCES OF DIRECT ACTION

Direct action is perhaps one of the oldest and most universal forms of political action. It is not specific to any form of government, appearing in totalitarian systems, liberal democracies, feudal systems, and nearly every other form of governance. One early example is described in Aristophanes’ play Lysistrata (c. 411 BCE) in which Greek women, who were not by law Greek citizens and could not vote, withheld sex to force their husbands to end the Peloponnesian War. Other early forms of direct action include medieval peasants’ refusal to plow fields or tender what they owed to their rulers unless their demands were met; soldiers in nearly every country and time period who collectively refuse to fight; and public mockery of officials. Some forms of direct action are modular, that is, they move from place to place and time period to time period. Other forms, such as the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English tradition of “rough music,” or the practice of publicly humiliating community wrongdoers through boisterous, noisy, theatrical processions using musical instruments, bones, effigies, and other props in front of the target’s home or business, are shorter-lived.

Although ubiquitous, direct action was not self-consciously theorized and codified as a form of political action until the late nineteenth century. Labor activists and revolutionaries, especially anarchists in Western Europe, Russia, and the United States, called for the use of “direct action” rather than the ballot box to challenge the state. Anarchists rejected the moral legitimacy and utility of the state, and advocated the organization of individuals into self-governing groups and federations. Important theorists of direct action include the Russian Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), and the Americans Emma Goldman (1869–1940) and Voltairine De Cleyre (1866–1912). All three advocated that workers refuse to participate in exploitative labor. De Cleyre and Goldman called for strikes, for work slowdowns, and violence against property, as well as advocating for an end to marriage, which they saw as a form of economic oppression.

Another important source of direct action is religion. Many religious traditions have strict injunctions against certain forms of action and require others. These injunctions have served as the basis for resistance to political, social, and economic rules. In the West, Christian Anabaptist traditions have served as a basis for resistance to slavery and warfare; Hinduism, Catholicism, Islam, and Buddhism have also served as theological bases for direct action. Indian political leader Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) joined religious practices with anarchist calls for refusal to participate in unjust systems. His method, called Satyagraha, or “the way of truth,” greatly influenced other uses of direct action in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Satyagraha was inspired by the writings of Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and John Ruskin (1819–1900) and by Gandhi’s Hindu religious beliefs. The core principle of Satyagraha was the appeal to the moral goodness of opponents, accepting the consequences – including violence and incarceration – of refusing to participate in unjust systems (Diwakar 1948). Users of Satyagraha were required to make sacrifices, such as fasting, and to morally prepare themselves for disobeying unjust systems. Between 1904 and 1913, Gandhi worked for equal rights for Indians in South Africa. Thousands of people went to jail for refusing to pay an annual tax levied on former indentured servants, and for refusing to carry identification papers that the government required of Indians. He later used
this same method to help Indians in India to
win freedom from British rule in 1947.

Gandhi’s methods inspired religiously based
peace and civil rights activists in the United
States in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Men
who refused to fight during World War II
were given “conscientious objector” status, and
assigned to work camps. At the end of the
war, some conscientious objectors helped to
generate direct actions against the cold war
weapons buildup occurring in Europe, the
United States, and in the Soviet Union. These
actions included peace marches, boats sailed
into nuclear test zones, and refusal to partici-
pate in civil defense drills. Civil rights activists
in the United States, including the Reverend
Martin Luther King Jr, Rosa Parks, James Bevel,
Septima Clark, and Myles Horton, learned and
taught about Satyagraha-based civil disobedi-
ence techniques. These were used in a series
of campaigns to end segregation in the Southern
United States between 1954 and 1965 that
included sit-ins, freedom rides, and mass arrest.

Direct action took a more carnival-like and
celebratory form when it was used by antiwar
and counterculture activists. The French Situa-
tionists International, inspired by Dadaism and
surrealism were a major influence on this kind
of direct action. The Situationists advocated
the overthrow of capitalism by undermining its
key means of reproduction, including adver-
tising. The Situationists and other anarchistic
art community groups in the United States,
such as the Diggers, the Yippies, and the San
Francisco Mime Troupe, used carnivalesque
forms of action, including distributing free
food, putting on street theater, and mocking
traditional culture through new styles of dress.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, violent
direct action reemerged as the mass-based
political movements of the previous decade
dissolved. In the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, Italy, and other countries, small, armed,
underground clandestine groups such as the
Weather Underground, the Republic of New
Africa, and the Red Army Faction used rob-
bery, kidnapping, and murder to try to start a
revolution. In the southwestern United States
and in Great Britain, “monkey wrenching,” or
the destruction of machinery and other equip-
ment, was used by ecological activists.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, antinu-
clear activists followed their Christian faith
to oppose the creation of nuclear weapons.
Renowned campaigns targeted the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore,
California, and Pacific Gas and Electric’s Dia-
blo Canyon energy plant near San Luis Obispo,
California. Here, a diverse group of activists
used a wide range of tactics to block the con-
struction of the plants, creating carnivals as
well as experiments in direct democracy, to
both prefigure a better world and to persuade
others to abandon nuclear technologies (Epton

Among the more important recent devel-
opments are the combination of celebratory
and confrontational action used across places
and times in quasi-modular forms. Global jus-
tice groups such as the People’s Global Action,
for example, use festivity as well as more seri-
ous demonstrations to draw attention to their
claims and to build solidarity among them-

WHY USE DIRECT ACTION?

A major reason for the use of direct action
is that groups believe that targets hold power
illegitimately, so routine means of influence,
such as voting to influence governments, will
not address their grievances. Anarchists, for
example, believe that states are illegitimate, and
therefore use political tools outside the state’s
control to achieve their goal of small-group,
relatively autonomous governance. Similarly,
groups use direct action to change the practices
or existence of universities, police forces, reli-
gious hierarchies, or prisons. They may view
the existence of these institutions, not just their
policies, as detrimental.

Direct action is also used by groups who
dem a problem in need of immediate remedy.
Like a firefighter who must destroy property
in order to save a life, some activists see direct
action not as a choice, but a moral necessity to prevent greater and significant harm from being done. AIDS activists have looked to this logic in passing out syringes to drug users to prevent disease transmission, and urban gardening activists have built gardens in roads while existing community gardens were being destroyed. In these cases, groups use direct action to prevent imminent harm.

Yet, some groups, such as Operation Rescue, turned away from a commitment to nonviolence. Here, American anti-abortion activists sought to prevent what they saw as imminent harm in blockading abortion clinics or shooting abortion providers (Lovell 2009). In 1991, Operation Rescue started the Summer of Mercy, a wave of direct actions to block access to an abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas. They rejected Gandhi’s principles of nonviolence and, 18 years later, Dr. George Tiller, a doctor who was the target of this direct action, was shot and killed by a man in contact with Operation Rescue.

Some groups use direct action because the other political and cultural tools available to them, such as violence, petitioning, or voting, are themselves morally objectionable or are seen as futile. Direct action is, for many users, an expression of who they are and what kind of relationships they have with co-participants and targets and want to have with them in the future. Actions such as street parties, vigils, and humor are expressions of emotional, moral, and social ties as much as means to an end.

Particularly in highly repressive systems where there are limited or no formal ways of affecting groups who are in power, challengers have little choice but to use direct action to acquire new benefits. People who are imprisoned or enslaved, for example, may use work slow downs or “strategic incompetence” to force opponents to concede in some way. The less power groups have, the more likely they are to face serious repression for using subterfuge to gain power.

Finally, direct action exemplifies new ways of living. Playful actions, such as clowning and wearing costumes, dancing and playing music, for example, exemplify a celebratory and joyful life. Refusing to participate in an activity, such as conscription or degrading or dangerous work and accepting the consequences can exemplify a moral commitment to living a just and humane life.

In practice, many motivations are often blended together, and not all motivations are equally salient for all users of direct action.

STUDYING DIRECT ACTION

Direct action is studied using a variety of methods. There are many studies of individual groups and techniques, which are also widely available in electronic form on blogs and websites. Systematic studies of direct action typically use field observation and interviews, surveys of actions, users, and consequences of actions, and historical comparisons. Evidence often comes from newspapers and other mass media, personal and organizational correspondence and records, images, police reports, and interviews. The goals of most research studies are to understand the meanings of direct action for participants and observers, to understand its effectiveness in changing relations of power among users and targets, to understand its moral and political sources, and to understand how repression shapes the development and effectiveness of direct action. Exemplary studies include Gamson’s (1975) study of the relationship between tactics, organizational character, and outcomes. In a study of direct action in the United States between World War II and 1968, Tracy (1996) showed that users considered direct action to be politically important not only because of its instrumental value, but because it revealed the power of users’ beliefs. Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005) studied armed underground, clandestine groups in the United States and Japan and showed that such groups were likely to develop at the end of cycles of mass-based protest and attendant increases in repression. Earl (2006) and McAdam (1983) also document the effects of repression. Shepard (2011) documents the origins and meanings of ludic, or playful direct action.
SEE ALSO: Everyday activism; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); King, Martin Luther, Jr (1929–1968); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Religion and social movements; Tactical interaction and innovation; Tactics; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Emergent norm theory
MIKAILA MARIEL LEMONIK ARTHUR

Emergent norm theory hypothesizes that non-traditional behavior (such as that associated with collective action) develops in crowds as a result of the emergence of new behavioral norms in response to a precipitating crisis. For proponents of emergent norm theory, collective action includes all types of social behavior in which the conventional norms stop functioning as guides to social action and instead people collectively overturn or go beyond the normal institutional practices and frameworks of society (Turner & Killian 1987), and therefore new conventions must form as part of the collective action. The basic suppositions of emergent norm theory are that collective action is rational, that collective action is a response to an ambiguous precipitating event, and that new norms of behavior appropriate to the collective action situation emerge through group processes without prior coordination and planning. Originally proposed by Turner and Killian (1972), emergent norm theory has grown out of two main traditions. First, the Le Bonian tradition of thinking of crowds as normless entities and collective action as irrational behavior led Turner and Killian to think about how norms are instituted in crowds. Second, symbolic interactionist perspectives and small-group analysis contributed a model of norms as developing through interaction.

Emergent norm theory suggests that crowds come together because a crisis occurs that forces people to abandon prior conceptions of appropriate behavior and find new ways of acting. When a crowd forms, there is no particular norm governing crowd behavior and no leader exists. But the crowd focuses in on those who act in a distinctive manner, and this distinction is taken on as the new norm for crowd behavior. As this new norm begins to be institutionalized within the crowd, pressures for conformity and against deviance within the crowd develop, and discontent is silenced. This silencing of alternative views contributes to the illusion of unanimity within the crowd.

The norms that develop within crowds are not strict rules for behavior. Rather, they are more like overarching frameworks for behavior that set limits on what is appropriate (Turner & Killian 1987: 9–11). These norms develop through either emergent or pre-existing social relationships. Turner and Killian suggest that anything which facilitates communication among crowd participants facilitates the emergence of norms, and they call this process “milling.” In addition, though the emergent norm theory perspective does contest the notion that crowd behavior is particularly irrational, it suggests that many crowd participants are suggestible and that this suggestibility contributes to the spread of emergent norms.

There are two main avenues of criticism that have faced emergent norm theory. The first, proposed by Reicher (1987) suggests that when crowds come together, they bring norms with them. Therefore, new norms do not have to emerge. These norms are different depending on the group making up the crowd – for instance, an angry crowd gathering after the arrest of a community member will exhibit different norms than a group of suburban teenagers at a rock concert. These differences reflect the different ways that crowds behave, but are norms nonetheless.

The second line of criticism suggests, first, that all social behavior results in the renegotiation of social norms, and second, that the creativity in norm creation and behavior that has come to be seen as “norm emergence” are usually not created through interaction but rather through long-term rational planning processes or through reliance on small
changes to established repertoires (Tilly 1993). Couch (1968), while writing before the development of emergent norm theory, is often cited to support this criticism. An additional area of criticism suggested by some researchers is that there are significant methodological difficulties in tracing the emergence of a norm in a crowd setting.

While emergent norm theory was originally applied to a variety of forms of collective behavior, it is most commonly relied on to help understand the behavior of large groups, or crowds. In particular, emergent norm theory has gained a strong foothold in disaster research, as it is used to understand the behavior of groups who experience a precipitating crisis (a disaster) and then are forced to find new ways to respond that will help to ensure the safety and survival of as many people as possible. Dynes and Tierney (1994), for instance, have used emergent norm theory to help understand the civilian-initiated evacuation of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Other researchers, such as Johnson (1987) have suggested that emergent norm theory can explain not just orderly civilian-initiated evacuation but also the aggressive and selfish behavior sometimes seen in mass panics. Johnson believes that in certain situations the breakdown of social order leads to these types of behavior as rational responses to the new social circumstances.

SEE ALSO: Contagion theory; Convergence/dispositional theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Participation in social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Emotion and social movements
DEBORAH B. GOULD

Etymologically, emotion and movements (in the sense of protest) are related. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, emotion, meaning “a physical moving, stirring, agitation,” comes from the Old French emouvoir, meaning “stir up,” and from the Latin emovere, meaning “move out, remove, agitate,” from ex-meaning “out” and movere meaning “to move.” Movement comes from the post-classical Latin movementum, meaning “motion,” and earlier, movimentum, meaning “emotion,” “rebellion,” or “uprising.” The verb “to move” – which means “to affect with emotion” and “to prompt or impel toward some action” – links emotion and movements and suggests a frequent accompaniment. We might expect, then, that studies of social movements and other forms of protest politics would foreground the role of emotion in mobilization. History shows, however, that scholars of protest have been and continue to be ambivalent about emotion.

THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN PROTEST AND IN STUDIES OF PROTEST

Early scholars of protest in the “collective behavior” tradition were strongly influenced by nineteenth-century French social psychologist and sociologist, Gustave Le Bon. In his famous book The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895), Le Bon revealed deep concern about the growing power of “the masses” who, he argued, were determined “to destroy utterly society as it now exists” (1960: 16). Although he noted that crowds could be virtuous and heroic (19), his overriding concern was their negative qualities, especially with regard to one variant of the “crowd,” mass movements. Like many thinkers of his age, Le Bon pitted emotion against reason, and crowds, in his view, were dangerously under the sway of emotion. The feelings exhibited by a crowd, he asserted, were “very simple and very exaggerated” (50). Even more, in a crowd feelings were transmissible from one individual to another: indeed, sentiments in crowds possessed “a contagious power as intense as that of microbes” (126). Driven by instincts and unconscious motives, and infected by the unruly passions of those around him, the individual in a crowd was likely to become irrational, “induced to commit acts contrary to his most obvious interests” (32). Crowds, Le Bon asserted, displayed “extreme mental inferiority” as well as an “incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit,” and an “exaggeration of the sentiments” (4, 35–36).

Through the middle of the twentieth century, scholars of collective behavior echoed Le Bon’s psychological theory of mass political action, reducing contentious politics to the instinct-driven, unconscious, irrational, and destructive behavior of unruly mobs. Scholars in this tradition placed emotion, typically understood as natural impulses that interfered with reason—emotion as irrationality, in other words—at the heart of their explanations. Protest emerged when a structural strain—for example, massive unemployment or an economic depression—disrupted the normative order and ostensibly excited “feelings of anxiety, fantasy, hostility” among individuals (Smelser 1995: 11; as cited in McAdam 1960: 9); emotionally and psychologically distraught, individuals turned toward rash, impetuous, frenzied, disruptive group behavior. Individuals engaged in protest, then, not because they had political grievances but because social changes made them psychologically unstable and emotionally overwrought, leading them toward irrational behavior. Scholars in this
literature bought into and upheld a normative split between the psychological and the political, relegating all things psychological to the private realm; they thus understood protest as a dangerous seepage of the psychic into the political realm where rational deliberation should reign. In contrast to legitimate actors in the polity, protesters violated the public/private split and were, in different versions of this literature, self-evidently alienated from society and unfulfilled in their personal lives; narcissistic and arrested in their development; perhaps even latently homosexual (see, for example, Lasswell 1959: 125; and Kornhauser 1998: 163, as cited in McAdam 1960: 17–18).

Scholars in this early collective behavior literature, in short, tended to pathologize those who engage in contentious politics, viewing collective protest not as struggles over power but rather as the emotionally driven working out of participants’ psychic distress. Regardless of its political content, protest was simply a form of acting out, an expression of unbalanced individuals’ unconscious psychic agonies and needs, the actions of a frustrated, overwrought, wild, and dangerous mob. The psychic, in this rendering, is always pathological and passion always seems to interfere with and preclude reason. Protest is an aberration, engaged in by aberrant people.

These scholars’ disparaging portrayals of protest and protesters, and the prominence of affect and emotion in their depictions, were precisely what energized critics of the collective behavior literature and sparked the emergence of a new sociological field – social movement studies – in the 1970s. Social movement scholars responded to the collective behavior literature by adopting paradigms that assumed, even if implicitly, the rationality of protesters. (The intellectual climate influenced these scholars as well: in that moment, rational actor models were migrating from economics departments into other social science disciplines like sociology and political science.) For example, resource mobilization and political process models posit that participants in collective action are ordinary actors in the polity who, blocked from engaging in routine interest group politics, unite and prudently turn to extra-institutional politics to press their demands. Protest, here, is understood as normal political behavior, and protesters are construed as rational actors in the sense that they engage in reasonable, thoughtful, strategic behavior designed to achieve their sensible political goals.

Still dominant today, these rational-actor models usefully countered the classical paradigms’ depictions of protesters as impulsive, irrational deviants motivated by psychological problems and unruly passions rather than reason. But, as Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta (2001) have noted, they simultaneously entailed an evacuation of emotion from research into contentious politics. In light of prevailing understandings that oppose emotion to reason, acknowledging that protesters might be motivated by feelings risked painting activists as irrational, so scholars in this new field expelled emotion, replacing the unthinking and irrational psychological misfit with the dispassionate and calculating rational actor. Whereas in the classical models we had protesters who felt their grievances deeply but never cognitively assessed them, in the now-dominant models we have rational actors who coolly calculate their grievances and pursue a strategic course of action, all the while apparently devoid of anger, fear, joy, pride, shame, hope, or any other emotion.

**THE EMOTIONAL TURN AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS**

This is the terrain on which an emotional turn in the study of social movements has occurred. Over the last 15 years, in an effort to offer a corrective to the assumption of rational actors in the reigning political process model but without resurrecting the problems presented by the classical collective behavior models, a number of social movement scholars have begun to explore the emotional dimensions
of mobilization and demobilization (Groves 2009; Morgen 1982; Taylor 1962, 1996; Taylor & Whittier 1996; Goodwin 2005; Jasper 1995, 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta 2001, 2001; Aminzade & McAdam 2001). Where the earlier collective behavior literature coded institutional politics as the realm of reason and maligned protest as driven by emotion and thus unreason, and where, in response, the next generation of scholars assumed movement actors’ rationality and wrote emotion out of their accounts, scholars in the emotional turn offer a multifaceted picture of human beingness that, without denying the reasoning capabilities of movement actors, posits emotion as a ubiquitous and vital feature of social life. Drawing from a wealth of research across the arts and sciences which challenges the pitting of emotion against reason, scholars in the emotional turn posit emotion as a motivational force and an important means by which human beings come to know and understand ourselves and our contexts, our interests and commitments, our needs and our options in securing those needs. Accordingly, we cannot ignore emotion or relegate it to one arena (e.g., protest) which can then be disparaged and dismissed.

This turn toward emotion in the study of protest not only challenges the rationalist ontology which prevails in much of the literature, but it also enhances our understanding of the workings of key concepts in the field. The factors that movement scholars deem important for mobilization have force precisely because of the feelings that they elicit, stir up, amplify, dampen (Goodwin & Pfaff 1997: 283): opening political opportunities, for example, might be an important factor in the emergence of a social movement but only to the extent that an emotional charge attaches to those openings; a collective action frame successfully mobilizes only when emotionally resonant. Even more than improving existing models, in foregrounding emotion this research points us toward a largely unexplored arena for analyzing crucial sources of activism, and blockages as well. Political opportunities might be tightly closed, but indignation and desperation might combine to encourage mobilization, or the sheer pleasure of engaging in contentious politics might generate a willingness to protest despite the small odds of success. Conversely, political opportunities might be opening, but fear, a paralyzing sense of hopelessness, or an overriding numbness might impede mobilization.

A focus on emotion also provides insight into why participants continue their involvement in activist formations when they could easily take the proverbial “free ride” and rely on others to do the work. As sites where world-making occurs, activist contexts generate strong feelings among participants – for example, marvel at being part of a collectivity, euphoria and camaraderie from being in an action together, feelings of fulfillment that derive from taking part in something larger than oneself, a sense of freedom to become the self you want to be. Once experienced, the desire to feel those feelings again may be strong, helping to sustain participation. As well, activist contexts are crucial sites of meaning-production in the realm of emotion: they not only offer a language for people’s often amorphous, inchoate, nontransparent affective states, they also provide an emotional pedagogy of sorts, a guide for what and how to feel and for what to do in light of those feelings. Analyses of women’s consciousness-raising groups show that feminists challenged individualized understandings of what many women were experiencing as depression and, pointing to the social origins of that feeling state, renamed it anger. In similar fashion, direct-action AIDS activists in ACT UP linked the pervasive grief in lesbian and gay communities to anger, and both feelings to militant and confrontational political activism (Gould 2001). Both examples illustrate that social movements’ interpretive emotion work encourages people to understand themselves and their situations in new ways and indeed to feel differently, all of which can have significant political consequences.
Attention to emotion may also illuminate aspects of movement decline. To understand why internal conflicts sometimes fracture movements, for example, we may need to explore their emotional undercurrents. The often unstated and unacknowledged, but nevertheless forceful, feeling states that often shape the texture, tonality, intensity, velocity—the very content and character—of such conflicts. Internal conflicts do not always destroy movements but they can become extremely difficult to navigate when feelings such as betrayal, nonrecognition, resentment, and mistrust are in play. Feelings like the allure of normativity and social acceptance, discouragement and a sense of political inefficacy, or boredom might also play a role in the decline of social movements.

In short, then, foregrounding emotion enhances our understanding of the emergence, sustainability, and decline of activist formations.

OPEN QUESTIONS

Renewed interest in emotion spans the disciplines and, as a result, definitions have proliferated. An open question for scholars in the field of social movements is thus how to characterize emotion. Rather than decide definitively whether to view emotion as hardwired physiological event, social norm, or some combination, we might better serve by developing a working concept that speaks to what emotion does. Such a working definition might begin by noting that emotion references bodily sensations or feelings, of greater or lesser intensity, in response to a situation. Arising as we come into contact with the world, emotion helps us to make sense of that world, and prepares us to act.

A key unresolved question for those studying social movements and other forms of protest politics is the relationship between emotion and reason. Haunted by the earlier collective behavior literature which often equated emotionality with irrationality, scholars in the emotional turn sometimes have tamed emotion conceptually, strongly linking it to cognition and rationality. Assertions that tether political feelings and action to people’s cognitive processing of the facts of a situation undoubtedly fend off the specter of irrationality that often accompanies discussions of political emotion. And it certainly is true that political feelings and action sometimes flow unambiguously and predictably from one’s cognitive processing; we can easily imagine how plans to construct a toxic waste dump near a school, for example, might generate outrage and consequent mobilization. But assertions of thought-emotion continuity mask the ways that feelings—political and otherwise—frequently diverge from our reasoning selves and do not always result in understandable and thus “reasonable” political behavior. Consider the following example. We might know that our government has authorized torture of prisoners, and that knowledge might give rise to an understandable, even “rational,” outrage, but other feelings, perhaps more indistinct and inchoate and less tied to one’s cognitive reasoning, might be what most shape our responses, or nonresponses, to this knowledge: overwhelmedness in the face of this information, anxiety about engaging in activism, or a desire to block out the world’s problems.

As cultural theorist Lauren Berlant notes, nonrationality is at the heart of the political (2005b). Nonrationality differs from irrationality: the nonrational is not within conscious, cognitive sense-making but rather to the side of such processes; the term irrational, in contrast, usually means that which is contrary to such processes, connoting that which goes against one’s interests as well as that which is (therefore) illogical, crazy, senseless, unfounded, and unreasonable. In the hurry to refute the problematic equation of emotion with irrationality, some scholars in the emotional turn have elided the difference between the irrational and the nonrational and have disavowed the nonrational aspects of emotion. But political feelings are often less
emotion and social movements

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SEE ALSO: Contagion theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Emotion work; Political process theory; Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND Сuggested Readings


Emotion and Social Movements


Framing and social movements
DAVID A. SNOW

Framing, within the context of social movements, refers to the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by movement adherents (e.g., leaders, activists, and rank-and-file participants) and other actors (e.g., adversaries, institutional elites, media, social control agents, countermovements) relevant to the interests of movements and the challenges they mount in pursuit of those interests. The concept of framing is borrowed from Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1974) and is rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle that meanings do not naturally or automatically attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences we encounter, but arise, instead, through interpretive processes mediated by culture. Frames contribute to this interpretive work by performing three core functions. First, like picture frames, they focus attention by punctuating or bracketing what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is “in-frame” and what is “out-of-frame,” in relation to the object of orientation. Second, they function as articulation mechanisms in the sense of tying together the various punctuated elements of the scene so that one set of meanings rather than another is conveyed, or, in the language of narrativity, one story rather than another is told. And third, frames often perform a transformative function by reconstituting the way in which some objects of attention are seen or understood as relating to each other or to the actor. Examples of this transformative function in the context of social movements are illustrated by the transformation of routine grievances or misfortunes into injustices or mobilizing grievances, and by the reconfiguration of aspects of one’s biography as commonly occurs in both political and religious conversion. Given the focusing, articulation, and transformative functions of frames, it is arguable that how we see, what we make of, and how we act toward the various objects of orientation that populate our daily lives depends, in no small part, on how they are framed. Applied to social movements, the idea of framing problematizes the meanings associated with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings are typically contestable and negotiable and thus open to debate and differential interpretation. From this vantage point, mobilizing grievances are seen neither as naturally occurring sentiments nor as arising automatically from specifiable material conditions, but as the result of interactively based interpretation or signifying work. The verb framing conceptualizes this signifying work, which is one of the activities that social movement leaders and participants, as well as their adversaries, do on a regular basis.

DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMING PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The link between framing and social movements was first noted in a 1982 experimental study of the conditions under which authority is defined as unjust and challenged (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina 1982) and then developed more fully in a 1986 conceptualization and elaboration of “frame alignment processes” (Snow et al. 1986). Since then there has been an almost meteoric rise in research on framing and social movements, with much of the work congealing into what is now called the framing perspective on social movements (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow 2004). The analytic appeal and utility of this perspective is based largely on the conjunction of three factors. The first is the neglect of the relationship between meaning and mobilization, and the role of interpretative processes in mediating that relationship, by the
dominant perspectives on social movements that emerged in the 1970s; the second is the rediscovery of culture and the so-called discursive turn that occurred during the 1980s; and the third is the development of a framing conceptual architecture or scaffolding which has facilitated more systematic theorization and empirical assessment of framing processes and effects.

CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE

Among the interconnected concepts and processes that have surfaced as the framing literature has expanded, there are at least nine that can be thought of as cornerstone concepts and processes in that they provide a conceptual architecture that has stimulated much of the research exploring the relevance of framing to mobilization both empirically and theoretically. These key concepts or processes include: collective action frames, master frames, core framing tasks, frame alignment processes, frame resonance, framing hazards, discursive processes, and discursive opportunity structures and discursive fields.

Collective action frames are the resultant products of framing activity within the social movement arena. They are relatively coherent sets of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that legitimate and inspire social movement campaigns and activities. Like everyday interpretive frames, collective action frames focus attention by specifying what is “in” and “out of frame”; articulate and elaborate the punctuated elements within the frame so that a particular meaning or set of meanings is conveyed; and, as a result, often transform the meanings associated with the objects of attention, such that some situation, activity, or category of individuals is seen in a strikingly different way than before, as when everyday misfortunes are reframed as injustices or status groups like the homeless and cigarette smokers are framed as legitimate targets for social movement protest. But collective action frames differ from everyday interactional frames in terms of their primary mobilization functions: to mobilize or activate movement adherents so that they move, metaphorically, from the balcony to the barricades (action mobilization); to convert bystanders into adherents, thus broadening the movement’s base (consensus mobilization); and to neutralize or demobilize adversaries (counter-mobilization). Much of the research on framing and social movements has focused on the empirical identification of collective action frames and specification of their functions with respect to the movements in question. In the case of the environmental movement, for example, numerous frames have been identified, such as “an environmental justice frame,” a “runaway technology frame,” a “conservation frame,” and a “landscape frame.”

Although most collective action frames are movement-specific, sometimes those that emerge early in a cycle of protest come to function like master algorithms in the sense that they color and constrain the orientations and activities of other movements within the cycle, such that subsequent collective action frames within the cycle are derivative (Snow & Benford 1992). When the ideational and interpretive scope and influence of a collective action frame expands in this way, it can be thought of as a master frame. Examples of master frames in recent history include the civil rights frame in relation to the resurgence of the women’s movement and the flowering of movements accenting the rights of the aged, the disabled, the American Indians and other ethnic groups; the nuclear freeze frame in relation to the peace movement of the 1980s; and the environment justice frame in relation to various environmental movements (Snow & Benford 1992; Benford & Snow 2000).

The relative success of collective action frames in performing their mobilization functions is partly contingent on the extent to which they attend to the three core framing tasks or challenges of “diagnostic framing,” “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing” (Snow & Benford 1988). Diagnostic framing entails two aspects: a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life or system
of government as problematic and in need of repair or change; and the attribution of blame or responsibility for the problematized state of affairs. Diagnostic framing provides answers to the questions of “What is or went wrong?” and “Who or what is to blame?” Much research examining the substance of collective action frames suggests that diagnostic framing typically defines or redefines an event or situation as an “injustice” (Gamson 1992; Benford & Snow 2000: 615), but it is not clear that all collective action frames include an injustice component. Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, including a plan of attack and the frame-consistent tactics for carrying it out, and often a refutation of opponent’s current or proposed solutions. Such framing, simply put, addresses the Leninesque question of “what needs to be done.” Research has shown that both diagnostic and prognostic framing can generate considerable debate resulting in “frame disputes” within movements (Benford 1993a). The final core framing task, motivational framing, involves elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis. Motivational framing entails the construction of “vocabularies of motive” that provide prods to action by, among other things, overcoming the fear of risks often associated with collective action and the so-called “free-rider” problem (e.g., why contribute to the attainment of some large goal when that goal constitutes a “public good” in the sense of being an indivisible and nonexcludable benefit?). Motivational framing attends to these impediments to action by accenting and highlighting the severity of the problem, the urgency of taking action now rather than later, the probable efficacy of joining others in the cause, the moral priority of doing so, and enhancement or elevation of one’s status (Benford 1993b), as when some suicide bombers are promised various divine favors for their “righteous” deeds (Snow & Byrd 2007). Understandably, motivational framing has been referred to as the “agency” component of collective action frames (Gamson 1992).

Frame alignment processes encompass the strategic efforts of social movement actors and organizations to link their interests and goals with those of prospective adherents and resource providers so that they will contribute in some fashion to movement campaigns and activities. Four basic alignment processes have been identified (Snow et al. 1986). They include “frame bridging,” which involves the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally disconnected frames regarding a particular issue; “frame amplification,” which entails the embellishment, crystallization, and invigoration of existing values and beliefs; “frame extension,” which depicts movement interests and framings as extending beyond the movement’s initial constituency to include issues thought to be of relevance to bystander groups or potential adherents; and “frame transformation,” which involves changing prior understandings and perspectives, among individuals or collectivities, so that things are seen differently than before, as is commonplace with conversions and so graphically illustrated by the opening and closing refrain of “Amazing Grace”: “Amazing Grace, how sweet the sound, That saved a wretch like me. I once was lost but now am found, Was blind, but now I see.” Research on these alignment processes has been quite extensive and has firmly established their importance in relation to mobilization (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow 2004).

The ultimate measure of the effectiveness of proffered collective action frames and the corresponding alignment strategies is whether they resonate with targeted audiences. Those for which frame resonance is established facilitate mobilization; those that are nonresonant fall on deaf ears, thus failing to inspire or influence the direction of social movement activity. Two sets of interacting factors have been postulated to account for variation in frame resonance. One is the “credibility” of the proffered frame, which is affected by the consistency between claims and actions, the relative empirical credibility of claims and events, and the credibility of the frame articulators, as determined by status and knowledge considerations. The second
set of factors affecting frame resonance is the “salience” of the framing to the targets of mobilization, as determined by the centrality of the beliefs and claims to the lives of the targets of mobilization, the extent to which the framing is experientially commensurable with the past or present lives of the targets, and the extent to which the framings have narrative fidelity, such that they are resonant with cultural narrations and myths (Snow & Benford 1988; Benford & Snow 2000: 619–622).

Affecting both sets of factors are various framing hazards or vulnerabilities that undermine the prospect of resonance and/or frame alignment. There are at least three sets of such framing hazards: ambiguous events or ailments, as when there is uncertainty about the correct application of two alternative framings (Goffman 1974); framing errors or misframings, as when a diagnostic frame is inappropriately applied or just wrong, or a frame is overextended (Snow & Corrigall-Brown 2005); and frame disputes, as when movement actors disagree and debate about appropriate diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings (Benford 1993a). Inasmuch as concerted problem-solving is contingent, in part, on interpretive alignment regarding the diagnosis and prognosis of some problem, then framing hazards constitute impediments to concerted collective action.

The generation and modification of collective action frames occur primarily through the discursive processes of frame articulation and elaboration. Frame articulation involves the discursive connection and coordination of events, experiences, and strands of one or more ideologies so that they hang together in a relatively integrated and meaningful fashion. Frame elaboration involves accenting and highlighting some events, issues, and beliefs or ideas more than others, such that they become more salient in an array of movement-relevant issues (Snow 2004). Historically renowned movement leaders, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King, were masters at frame articulation and elaboration. Gandhi’s principles of “satyagraha” and “ahimsa” were based, in part, on his articulation of beliefs derived from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and Martin Luther King’s potent civil rights frame derived, in part, from his articulation and elaboration of strands of Christianity, democratic theory, and Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence.

The processes of frame articulation and elaboration occur during the course of conversations, meetings, and written communications among movement leaders and members within broader enveloping cultural and structural contexts variously called discursive fields (Steinberg 1999) or discursive opportunity structures, which have been found to facilitate and constrain framing efforts (Ferree et al. 2002; Ferree 2003; McCammon et al. 2007). Discursive fields evolve during the course of debate about contested issues and events, and encompass cultural materials (e.g., beliefs, values, ideologies, myths) of potential relevance and various sets of actors (e.g., targeted authorities, social control agents, countermovements, media) whose interests are aligned, albeit differently, with the contested issues or events, and who thus have a stake in what is done or not done about those events and issues. The discursive processes of frame articulation and elaboration draw selectively upon these cultural materials and are conducted in relation to the various sets of actors that constitute the discursive field. This suggests that the development of collective action frames is facilitated and/or constrained by the cultural and structural elements of the discursive field and discursive opportunity structure in which the evolving frame is embedded. This further suggests that collective action frames constitute innovative articulations and elaborations of existing ideologies or sets of beliefs and ideas, and thus function as extensions or antidotes of them. From this vantage point, social movements are viewed not as carriers of pre-configured, tightly coupled beliefs and meanings, traditionally conceptualized as ideologies, but as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meanings that are intended to mobilize adherents and constituents, garner bystander support, and demobilize antagonists.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Although the connection between framing and social movements has generated considerable theorization and empirical research, there are a number of issues that have not been adequately addressed. One cluster concerns issues specific to framing processes and their consequences. Much research has identified movement-specific collective action frames, but comparatively little research has examined systematically the discursive processes through which frames evolve, develop, and change. The conceptual cluster of frame articulation and elaboration and the theorized discussion of the discursive fields in which these processes are embedded provide the conceptual edifice for research on frame discursive processes, but to date the actual occurrence of systematic research on framing processes (see Gamson 1992; Ferree et al. 2002; Snow et al. 2007) has not kept pace with the calls for such research (Steinberg 1999; Johnston 2002; Snow 2004).

A second cluster of issues that have not been sufficiently explored concerns the relationship between collective action frames and framing processes and relevant cultural and social psychological factors such as narrative, ideology, collective identity, and emotion. Clearly these are overlapping concepts that interact in ways not yet fully understood.

And last, our understanding of social movements will be advanced if more attention is devoted, both theoretically and empirically, to how framing intersects with the issues and processes examined via the theoretical lens of resource mobilization, political opportunity, and cultural perspectives. These perspectives should be seen not so much as competing but as shedding light on different aspects of the character and dynamics of social movements. The framing perspective emerged not as an alternative to other perspectives on social movements, but to investigate and illuminate what these other perspectives glossed over, namely the matter of the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing meanings and ideas.

SEE ALSO: Consciousness, conscience, and social movements; Consensus and action mobilization; Culture and social movements; Discursive fields; Discursive opportunity structure; Frame disputes; Ideology; Injustice frames; Master frame; Narratives; Participation in social movements; Resonance, frame.

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Gender and social movements
NANCY WHITTIER

Social movements are shaped by gender systems and they also are a source of social change in gender. Some social movements directly attempt to change gender relations; these movements, particularly women’s movements, have been the focus of considerable scholarship. Increasingly, scholars also recognize the gendered nature of other social movements and the impact of systemic inequalities of gender on the opportunities, constraints, and forms of social movements in general.

RESEARCH ON GENDER AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Research on gender and social movements has proceeded through several stages. Initial works focused on documenting women’s movements, including feminist and non-feminist movements, and explaining their emergence and development. A second phase of work began to analyze gender in social movements more broadly, including masculinity, and to analyze the intersections between gender, race, class, and nationality in social movements. Most recently, numerous scholars have begun to examine the ways that movements are gendered in their origins, collective identities, frames and discourses, organizational structures, tactics, and political and cultural opportunities. In doing so, they contribute to a rethinking of the basic concepts of the field of social movements. These phases are similar to those for scholarship on gender more broadly, which initially focused on documenting women’s experiences and remedying male bias, next on gender as an institution and the intersections between gender and other major forms of social inequality, and lastly on reformulating basic sociological knowledge and theory based on a perspective that makes gender central. Sociological work on gender and social movements thus reflects the influence of the feminist movement on the academy.

OVERVIEW OF GENDERED MOVEMENTS

Many social movements have targeted the social structures, culture, and interactional norms around gender. These include feminist movements, which in many countries focused first on gaining basic political rights such as the vote and the right to own property, and then progressed in later waves to addressing other forms of inequality between women and men ranging from responsibility for child-raising and household labor, discrimination in paid employment, sexuality, reproductive rights, and healthcare, to stereotyping in the arts and popular culture, election to public office, violence against women and children, and so on. Parallel to these movements are antifeminist movements, which tend to emerge in response to feminist movements, and also target gender directly in an attempt to forestall or roll back changes.

Other movements have been organized around gender, without taking gender as a central or explicit target. For example, women’s temperance and social reform movements in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s organized women based on their social responsibilities for morality, child-rearing, and the promulgation of religious values. Women have organized in “mother’s movements” to challenge governmental killings and disappearances of their children (such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina), or to fight against environmental degradation or for better public education. Such “maternalist
politics” can uphold traditional definitions of women’s place while simultaneously expanding those definitions, bringing women into the public sphere and often changing activists’ own family relations and identities. Men’s movements also organize men around some traditional definitions of masculinity while simultaneously stretching those definitions by, for example, encouraging men to express emotions more freely (Newton 2004).

Further, movements do not have to be oriented around gender to be shaped by it. Because gender is a central feature of social structure, culture, and daily life, all movements are gendered. The major elements of social movements are their emergence and recruitment, collective identities, frames or discourses, organizations, tactics or actions, external contexts or political opportunities, and outcomes. Each of these elements is gendered. Because gender intersects with race, class, sexuality, nationality, and other forms of inequality, social movements are gendered in multiple ways.

EMERGENCE

First, movements’ emergence and processes of recruitment are gendered because the status of women and men shapes their differential ability and willingness to organize on their own behalf. Gendered factors such as family structures and responsibilities, access to higher education, paid employment, and fertility rate, all affect recruitment and participation in activism. These factors all vary according to race, class, and nationality as well as gender, and also change over time; such variations account for some of the differences in the level and form of women’s mobilization cross-culturally and historically. Further, social movements emerge along gendered lines because they emerge from gendered pre-existing organizations and networks (Taylor 1999). For example, feminist organizing during the late 1960s in the United States emerged partially from the civil rights movement, in which women gained organizing experience and an ideology opposing inequality, but also faced gender barriers to full participation. However, grievances and networks based on race and class cross-cut those based on gender. For African-American and Latina women during the same era, their connections to mixed-sex movements around race mitigated their interest in a mixed-race movement around gender. Instead, many advocated for women’s interests within mixed-sex movements (Roth 2004; Springer 2005). Similarly, international women’s conferences sponsored by the United Nations have illustrated how women in third world countries define their interests quite differently from those in the highly industrialized global North.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

Second, movements’ collective identities, or group definitions, are gendered. Some social movements directly try to change the definition associated with their group, as feminist movements, for example, try to change what it means to be a woman. Beyond this, movement participants bring with them a gender consciousness that affects the collective identities they construct, and they draw on ideas about gender from both dominant and oppositional cultures. For example, environmental or peace activists may define themselves as mothers concerned about the well-being of children and future generations, and participants in antiglobalization protests may draw on masculinity to define themselves as warriors standing up to the police, or they may draw on feminist and queer politics to define themselves as rejecting the dominant gender order along with capitalism.

FRAMES

Third, social movements construct interpretive frames to explain their grievances and issues, addressing their causes and calling for action. In doing so, they draw on mainstream discourses and also challenge and extend those
discourses. Mainstream frames and discourses are built around particular definitions of the nature, roles, and responsibilities of women and men, and social movements include elements of these mainstream frames and discourses even as they construct alternatives. For example, movements for women’s suffrage, like other maternalist movements, drew on women’s special place as mothers to argue for a greater influence by women on national affairs.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Fourth, social movements’ organizational structures are gendered. For example, the American civil rights movement assigned formal leadership to men while assigning women to more informal leadership roles (Robnett 1997). Recognizing these differences entails not only recognizing discrimination within the movement and bringing to light the previously unacknowledged role of women, but also redefining theories of leadership to include the ways that women exercised influence outside of official leadership positions. Beyond leadership, women and men may take on different tasks within movement organizations, with women taking more responsibility for activities such as providing food for events or monitoring the emotional climate at meetings, and men undertaking more public speaking, drafting of position papers, or providing “peacekeeping” at public demonstrations. Gendered divisions of labor within movements vary considerably across time, space, and among movements, of course. In movements that explicitly challenge the gendered status quo, such differences may be much less marked or even at times inverted; while in movements that seek to restore traditional gender roles, they may be exaggerated.

TACTICS AND STRATEGIES

Fifth, tactics and strategies are affected by gender. Women and men may draw on established social activities in order to work for change, as in men’s use of violent intimidation compared with women’s reliance on boycotts and vicious gossip in the US racist movement of the 1920s (Blee 1991). Here, too, incorporating tactics grounded in traditionally feminine activities into social movement theory suggests a broader definition of tactics and strategies that includes actions previously not seen as part of social movements.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Sixth, gendered external social structures and mainstream culture delimit the opportunities and constraints for social movements. Because gender varies by race and class, these opportunities and constraints differ substantially as well. Political opportunities are affected by gender because women and men have differential access to the state both as elected officials and as outside activists. On a more subtle level, the state and other major social institutions operate through gendered structures, procedures, and discourses (sometimes termed gender regimes). When activists target or enter institutions, therefore, they face particular opportunities or barriers depending both on their actual gender and on the way their movement engages with or challenges existing notions of gender. For example, in working to change discourses about gender in the Catholic Church, women were able to draw on the institutional base of female religious orders but were limited by their structural subordination. As a result, they focused on discursive rather than structural change (Katzenstein 1998). Mainstream culture affects how movements’ claims are received, as well, with activists who challenge accepted notions of gender being more likely to be marginalized. Men who openly display affection toward each other and lobby for an expansion in the definition of masculinity, for example, are the subject of considerable ridicule (Schwalbe 1996), while women who lobbied for restrictions on hunting were viewed as hysterical females treading into waters where they did not belong (Einwohner 1999).
OUTCOMES

Finally, in addition to being shaped by gender, social movements are an important force in changing gender systems. Feminist movements in the United States and Western Europe have produced considerable change in cultural beliefs, the structure of paid employment, women’s access to higher education, and basic rights such as the vote, credit, and property ownership. In many countries, women’s activism has produced constitutional guarantees for women’s minimum representation in elected office. Further, social movements have contributed to changes in the cultural codes and interactional norms that define gender. At the same time, these changes have been contested by antifeminist movements. Social movements also produce unintended outcomes for gender. For example, women’s involvement in environmental activism can change their positions at home and in their communities. Social movements also have gendered consequences for subsequent social movements, through the changes they produce in political opportunities, mainstream culture, and other institutions.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Several lines of research are promising. First, more analyses of the gendered dimensions of men’s and mixed-sex movements will augment the extensive work on women’s movements. Second, work on cases outside the United States and Western Europe is examining the gender dimensions of a variety of movements (Davis 2007; Fallon 2008). Because gender systems vary comparatively, this work promises to expand theorizing on the topic. Third, efforts to reconceptualize social movement theory based on this work have begun, and promise to produce a richer and more inclusive theoretical model.

SEE ALSO: Antifeminist movements (United States); Collective identity; Culture and social movements; Emotion and social movements; Feminism and social movements; Framing and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Multiculturalism and social movements; National Organization for Women (NOW) (United States); Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Moral shocks/outrage
MIKAILA MARIEL LEMONIK ARTHUR

Many analysts of social movements are interested in how it is that people come to participate in social movement activity. The decision to participate is not a simple one – social movement participants may face significant risks and personal costs, such as arrest or violence, if they become involved. In addition, individuals often perceive social movements as being able to obtain desired goals without their own personal action, a dilemma that has come to be known as the “free-rider” problem (Chong 1991). Some popular explanations for individuals’ decisions to join social movements have included biographical availability and mobilization through preexisting social networks (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson 1980). However, there are individuals who participate in social movements without being connected to any existing networks or being in any significant way biographically available. The moral shocks perspective shows how these individuals, often ignored in research about participation in social movements, can recruit themselves into social movement activity due to their experience of a moral shock.

The term “moral shock” refers to the experience of a sudden and deeply emotional stimulus that causes an individual to come to terms with a reality that is quite opposed to the values and morals already held by that individual. Moral shocks can take a variety of forms. They often emerge as suddenly imposed grievances (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001), but can also arise as a result of rhetorical appeals on the part of movement leaders or through shocking personal experiences (Jasper & Poulsen 1995). Some research on moral shocks and self-recruitment looks at the framing strategies that movement leaders use to create a sense of shock in potential recruits, in particular the use of extreme graphics in public or through direct mail campaigns. Those moral shocks which are related to powerful and well-known symbols are most influential in generating self-recruitment on the part of potential social movement participants. Research using the moral shocks perspective has focused on social movements around environmental or nuclear hazards, abortion, animal rights, religious values, healthcare, and other matters where individuals have strong personal and moral reactions to the issues at hand while not necessarily being part of networks which have a preexisting commitment to these issues.

Once potential recruits have experienced a moral shock, they are galvanized to participate in social movement activity. The “self-recruitment” portion of the moral shocks and self-recruitment model then suggests that rather than waiting for an appropriate social movement organization to seek them out, potential recruits who have experienced a moral shock are likely to seek out social movement participation on their own. These individuals will search for a social movement organization that shares their personal, moral, and value-based commitments to the issue that they believe in, and they will then join without much prompting from the social movement organization. As noted above, social movement organizations can take advantage of the self-recruitment process by designing recruitment campaigns relying on moral shocks which cause individuals to believe that they are joining the social movement organization on their own out of a sense of moral duty.

Criticisms of the moral shock and self-recruitment model of mobilization have tended to be rooted in the hypothesis that the majority of social movement participants are recruited through preexisting social networks like friendship groups or church memberships, and that therefore even if moral shock sometimes drives potential social movement participants to seek out and join...
social movement organizations, moral shocks are not very significant overall in explaining why people participate in social movements. In particular, those who study recruitment to high-risk activism highlight the necessity of networks to fulfill the function of convincing people to participate (McAdam 1986), since merely coming to care deeply about an issue will not make an individual willing to take significant risks of arrest or physical harm in pursuit of social movement goals.

One of the most well-known works that uses the moral shocks and self-recruitment perspective to explain why people join social movements is Kristen Luker’s *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (1984). Luker explains how women who had never previously been active in social movements or in any kind of politics became mobilized as part of the anti-abortion movement because of a variety of moral shocks. In particular, Luker outlines two main varieties of moral shocks that these potential recruits experienced: those surrounding their own reproductive decisions or options, and those concerning the ways in which they first heard about the *Roe v. Wade* court decision.

SEE ALSO: Biographical consequences of activism; Emotion and social movements; Framing and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Moral panics; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Recruitment.

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Music and social movements
ASHLEY R. GROMIS and WILLIAM G. ROY

Recent scholarship has increasingly addressed the ways that social movements creatively use cultural products and themselves act as sources of cultural creativity. Because of its temporal synchronicity and its expression in lyrics, music has been an especially powerful form of cultural expression. It is music’s dual nature as a set of cultural objects and an activity fostering solidarity that explains its effectiveness for social movements. Music not only serves as an important resource for social movements, but is also something they actively “do.”

A RICH HISTORY

Music has been widely used for many purposes by many movements (Eyerman & Jamison 1998; Mattern 1998; Turino 2008; Rosenthal & Flacks 2010). The civil rights movement has been well studied as the archetypical musical movement. It not only utilized folk music as part of its collective action, but also made a significant impact on the national consciousness as reflected in contemporary popular music (Garofalo 1992; Eyerman & Jamison 1998; Roy 2010). Elements of the Black Nationalist movement continue to be present in both rap and hip hop music and their broader culture (Zook 1992). In Hawaii, music is a vital part of the movement by native Hawaiians to reclaim their traditional heritage (Lewis 1992). The punk-inspired English “Rock Against Racism” campaign formed in 1976 in hopes of organizing youth to fight racism both in music and British society (Frith & Street 1992). Marginalized youth have widely found their voice in and advocated for social change through popular music in such disparate places as socialist Hungary, post-Cultural Revolution China, Hong Kong, Cuba, Chile, and Argentina. Students protesting the Milošević regime in Serbia made extensive use of popular music in the creation of collective identity, framing of the opposition, and mobilizing youth for elections. Playing rock music, particularly popular Western songs, became a staple at protest events (Steinberg 2004). African traditional and popular music throughout the continent has fortified the fight against cultural imperialism. Popular musicians have effectively indigenized their music, many drawing from existing models of “black music” from across the world (Collins 1992).

As the frequent presence of music in social movements might suggest, there is no systematic relationship between music and the content of social movement goals. Music can be used equally effectively to empower reactionary and progressive movements. Through the exaltation of German classical musicians over their foreign or Jewish counterparts and the creation of participatory music programs for both children and adults, leaders in Nazi Germany were successful in securing support and loyalty from the larger German population (Turino 2008). During approximately the same period, the Italian fascist regime effectively used theater performance and its music as a vehicle to convey fascist ideology to the broader society (Berezin 1994). And the American White Power movement has developed a highly sophisticated infrastructure for the production and distribution of hate music (Futrell, Simi, & Gottschalk 2006).

The association between music and social movements extends far into the past as well. Songs used for protest and propaganda, or “songs of persuasion,” can be traced as far back as political and religious movements following the Protestant Reformation in Europe (Denisoff 1983). By the end of the nineteenth century, topical songs were already present in the American labor and abolitionist
movements, and, as early as 1900, the Socialist Party began publishing workers’ songbooks (Cohen & Samuelson 1996). Beginning in the 1920s, folk music formed a deep and lasting connection with the political left in the US. Music was an important aspect of the early mass mobilization of textile workers in the American South between 1929 and 1934, where the use and transmission of oppositional, mill-specific songs was facilitated by the advent of new technology, such as radio, records, and broadcasts of live performances (Roscigno & Danaher 2004).

CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE

Scholarship on music and social movements reflects the general theoretical cleavage between “cultural sociology” and the “sociology of culture.” “Cultural sociology” examines all social life through the lens of culture, which is defined in the anthropological sense of how people make sense of social life. “Sociology of culture” focuses instead on the institutions that specialize in artistic expression including art, music, literature, architecture, etcetera, emphasizing the intersection of organizational, economic, aesthetic, and cultural variables.

The cultural sociology perspective unpacks the meaning of music for participants and in relation to the larger culture. Three kinds of meanings are emphasized: what social movements believe, who they are, and what they want. What social movements believe is analyzed in terms of social values and ideologies. Music is seen as doing the work of persuasion—either of or by social movement activists. Like stories, songs have identifiable structures and are often open to interpretation, which allows them to be appropriated by movements to garner attention and empathy from individuals and help them relate to the message articulated by the movement (Polletta 2006). What participants are is a matter of identity. Popular music and musicians who embody their musical messages can be instrumental in launching identity movements and creating a medium through which protesters can construct collective identity and discourses of opposition (Eyerman & Jamison 1998; Steinberg 2004). Music has a remarkable ability to reinforce and undermine social boundaries such as race, gender, class, and nationality (Roy 2010). For participants of marginalized movements especially, music can be an important medium through which commitment to the movement is articulated and reaffirmed while the contrast with the mainstream culture is reinforced (Turino 2008). What social movements want is matter of goals. Music can express political and transcendent aspirations, captured most vividly in the universal hymn of social movements “We Shall Overcome.”

Some scholars explain how movements express meaning to the broader culture, rather than their internal dynamics. As cultural actors, social movements reflect and reinterpret established and shared frameworks of meaning from common cultures. They are also open spaces in which movement-specific cultures, such as rituals, traditions, and forms of artistic expression, can be injected into the dominant culture (Rosenthal & Flacks 2010). Sometimes people in or associated with the movement are analyzed; at other times, nonparticipants are treated as the voice of the movement. For the latter, analysis is sometimes little different from cultural analysis of the mass media. For example, in the 1960s, American singers of soul music were sometimes treated as the voice of the civil rights movement. In some instances, including African-American and American folk music or Swedish progressive music, social movements can help develop distinct musical genres and influence the dominant popular culture (Eyerman & Jamison 1998). The most common form of analyzing expression to the broader culture is political analysis of lyrics. Protest songs put emphasis on the verbal or intellectual aspect by framing something as “wrong” and in need of alteration (Denisoff 1983).

Turning now to the sociology of culture, four perspectives within this paradigm will be
discussed to examine the relationship between music and social movements – why and when social movements use music, art worlds and the production of culture, the effect on collectivity itself, and the emphasis placed on activities and relationships.

In examining why and when social movements use music, the movement use of music is treated as a variable that needs to be explained. Explanations are given in terms of characteristics of the movements, characteristics of the social bases on which those movements draw, and characteristics of the broader social context in which movements arise. Music can serve many different purposes within a movement, including providing those already active in a movement with an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment, educating those who are not familiar with movement issues, recruiting of new participants, and mobilizing those who identify with the movement to action (Rosenthal & Flacks 2010).

Drawing on the literatures about art worlds and the production of culture, movements can also be analyzed in terms of the organizational and institutional characteristics of the movement and their contexts. The hierarchical structure of the American Communist Party was reflected in the social form of its use of music as propaganda. Their strong organizational experience was used to create an impressive musical infrastructure. In contrast, the embeddedness of the civil rights movement in the black community facilitated a more participatory form of music by which music became part of collective action itself (Roy 2010).

Music may serve a movement as a whole by expressing and reinforcing ideology and agreements that help to bind a group together (Rosenthal & Flacks 2010). The act of sharing music on the community level may be meaningful to a movement in and of itself, and can foster interpersonal connection and community acknowledgement and celebration.

Finally, the use of music in movements can be examined through an emphasis on activities and relationships. In this approach, movements are treated as more than the sum of individual motivations. Some analysts focus on activities such as collective actions, or rituals. In the case of the American Southern labor movement and the textile strikes, the use of music that was already familiar to the workers utilized musical expression as a resource that was already rooted in rituals and collective activity that could easily be integrated into the movement (Roscigno & Danaher 2004). Music is set within dyadic and higher order relationships with attention to such features as hierarchy, division of labor, and solidarity. The division of labor in a movement can inform how music is experienced within the movement. The adoption of the conventional performer/audience model in the Old Left hindered the development of a participatory, “singing” movement, whereas the disintegration of this distinction in the civil rights movement allowed for music to become an activity that everyone participated in together in the movement (Roy 2010).

Music and social movements is currently a lively field of study. We can anticipate new themes to include the effect of new technologies on musical activities in social movements, a broader global focus, including both global movements and comparisons of nationally based movements, more comparisons or contrasts with other forms of creative arts in social movements, and greater attention to musical activities.

SEE ALSO: Artistic currents and milieus and social movements; Countercultures; Culture and social movements; Dramaturgy and social movements; Identity work processes; Movies and movements; Solidarity and movements.

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Networks and social movements
MARIO DIANI

Since the interest in social movements started to develop in the 1960s, the relation between networks and movements has been analyzed from two perspectives. By far the most popular one has treated networks as important facilitators of individuals’ decisions to become – and remain – involved in collective action (e.g., McAdam 1988; Kitts 2000). This reflected, on the one hand, the need to stress the social embeddedness of movement participants, in contrast to their earlier characterizations as marginal and disorderly personalities (McAdam 2003: 281–284), on the other, the interest in identifying the mechanisms behind people’s commitment to collective causes, contributing to the debate inspired by Mancur Olson’s seminal work on *The Logic of Collective Action*. At the same time, analysts have looked at social movement networks as the structure of the links between the multiplicity of organizations and individual activists, committed to a certain cause. From this perspective, movement networks have been treated as the consequence, rather than the precondition, of collective action, a specific instance of the broader processes through which actors modify social structures through agency. More specifically, looking at the configuration of movement networks has provided observers with a clue to grasp the logics by which movement actors choose their partners, thus generating broader and complex organizational fields (e.g., Diani 1995).

In their most basic sense, social networks consist of sets of nodes, linked by some form of relationship, and delimited by some specific criteria. Analysts of social movement networks have mostly used as nodes either the individuals mobilizing or sympathizing with a certain cause, or subscribing to certain alternative lifestyles, or the organizations, promoting collective action on such issues and/or encouraging alternative cultural practices. They have looked at both direct and indirect ties. Direct ties are present when two nodes are directly linked in explicit interaction and interdependence, for example, two activists who know each other personally, or two organizations that jointly promote a rally. Indirect ties are assumed to exist between two nodes when they share some relevant trait or orientation – for example, interest in certain issues or in the same campaigns – yet without any face-to-face interaction.

Defining the boundaries of a social movement – classifying certain actors or events as part of a social movement dynamic or not – has proved most problematic. Many social movement analysts associate with a given movement all organizations sharing an interest in certain issues (for example, the environment, or women’s rights) or all organizations willing to adopt disruptive tactics, regardless of whether they are actually linked to each other or not (e.g., Andrews & Edwards 2005). Others include in a movement only those nodes actually connected by some kind of relation. In particular, social movements have been conceived as the processes through which informal networks between a multiplicity of actors, sharing a collective identity, and engaged in social and/or political conflict, are built and reproduced (Diani 1992). Identity plays a crucial role here as it connects actors to longer-term collective projects, thus making their relation different from that between actors engaged in purely instrumental coalitions. While some movement identities may be very exclusive, thus leading to the consolidation of very self-referential and tightly bounded networks, most movement identities are fairly inclusive, and allow for activists’ multiple involvements.
in different types of collective experiences (Carroll & Ratner 1996).

In the beginning, social movement analysts mostly focused on the role of social networks as predictors of individual participation in collective action. Even in the early 1970s, many still regarded movement participants as individuals lacking a proper social integration, following the disruption of routine social arrangements brought about by radical processes of change and modernization (McAdam 2003). Interest in the link between social networks and movement participation developed precisely to challenge that assumption. By the 1980s, the notion that social movement participants are usually well integrated in dense systems of social relationships, that prior social ties operate as a basis for movement recruitment, and that established social settings are the locus of movement emergence, had become one of the most established findings in social movement research (Kitts 2000; McAdam 2003).

Social movement activists and sympathizers are usually linked through both “private” and “public” ties well before collective action develops. Personal friends, relatives, colleagues, neighbors, may all affect individual decisions to become involved in a movement; so may people who share with prospective participants some kind of collective engagement, such as previous or current participation in other movement activities, political or social organizations, or public bodies. Individuals may also be linked through indirect ties, generated by their joint involvement in specific activities and/or events, yet without any face-to-face interaction. These may range from participation in the same political or social activities and/or organizations, to involvement in the same subcultures or countercultures (Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996).

The impact of individual networks on individual participation has been tested in reference to different dependent variables. These have included presence or absence of participation; participation in specific types of activities, for example, in conservation or political ecology groups; the continuation of participation over time; the levels of risk associated with participation. Networks may provide opportunities for action through the circulation of information about ongoing activities, existing organizations, people to contact, and a reduction of the practical costs attached to participation. They may be the source of social pressure on prospective participants (“if you go, I will go too”), although cross-pressures are also possible, and so are people participating precisely because they expect others not to do anything. Networks may facilitate the development of cognitive skills and competences, and/or provide the context for the socialization of individuals to specific sets of values. They may also represent the locus for the development of strong emotional feelings (Gould 2003; Passy 2003).

It is disputed whether direct or indirect ties should operate differently, although in general social pressure is more likely to be exerted through direct links, while socialization to values or cognitive skills may also originate from involvement in similar organizational settings, regardless of strong involvement with specific individuals. Whether strong or weak ties should matter most is also a matter of debate: one would expect strong ties to matter more in the case of high-risk activities but weak ties may facilitate the contacts between a movement organization and a constituency with more moderate or at least diversified orientations, and/or the diffusion or the spread of a movement campaign.

While many analyses treat network location mainly as an individual attribute, a structural account of participation requires analysts to look at how individual ties combine into more complex network patterns. These questions have been addressed through both formal modeling and empirical case studies. For example, Marwell and Oliver (1993) have challenged Olson’s conclusions by emphasizing the crucial role of a critical mass of people (“organizers”), prepared to face the costs of starting collective action, regardless of the size of the group taken as a whole. They have also suggested that in highly heterogeneous networks, selective mobilization attempts, targeting specific
subgroups of a population, can be more effective than in homogeneous networks (Marwell & Oliver 1993: 130–156).

Attention has also been paid to the relation between collective performance and the network structure of a given population or territory. Gould (1995) showed that levels of collective action by different Parisian neighborhoods in the Commune uprising of 1871 were accounted for by organizational and informal relations between neighborhoods as well as by nonrelational properties. Hedström and his associates (Hedström 1994; Hedström, Sandell, & Stern 2000) also stressed the link between territorial units and mobilization processes, yet with an emphasis on diffusion processes rather than levels of participation. They found spatial proximity, and the resulting increased likelihood of personal acquaintances, to significantly influence the spread of trade union and social democratic party organizations in Sweden from 1890 to 1940.

Yet another important illustration of the networks–movements connection is the view of movements as complex fields of interactions between multiple actors. This had already been noticed in the 1970s by scholars interested in subcultural and countercultural dynamics as well as in interorganizational relationships (e.g., Gerlach 1971). However, this perspective has gained momentum since the 1980s, in parallel with the growing success of the network concept as a key to make sense of contemporary society, beyond classic dichotomies such as that between bureaucracy and markets, and with the renewed interest in agency in social theory. The spread of transnational contention and coalition building has further emphasized the interest in movement networks. All this has translated into growing attention to both interorganizational fields and subcultural and countercultural communities.

Looking at interorganizational fields (Ansell 2003) reflects the fact that it is actually very difficult to think of movements as consisting of one organization. When this happens, as in the instances of the Bolshevik party in Russia or the National Socialist party in Germany, it usually means that the transition from movement to bureaucracy is complete. Movements indeed consist of multiple instances of interorganizational collaboration on campaigns of different intensity and scope. Direct ties between movement organizations include most prominently the exchange of information and the pooling of mobilization resources; indirect ties cover a broad range of possibilities, from shared personnel to joint participation in specific actions and/or events, from exposure to the same media, especially computer-mediated ones, to shared linkages to third parties (whether private or public organizations).

Sometimes, relationships between groups and organizations are recurrent to the point that one can think, for a given social movement, of a distinctive “alliance structure” and “oppositional structure”; other times this does not happen and ad hoc shifting coalition networks prevail. It is important to recognize the difference between a pure coalition, driven by instrumental principles, and a movement network (Diani & Bison 2004). In both cases, networks facilitate the mobilization and allocation of resources across an organizational field, the negotiation of agreed goals, the production and circulation of information. However, it is the presence of a shared identity which qualifies a movement network vis-à-vis a coalition network, and helps make its boundaries somehow neater – better, less blurred. As identity is not a given trait but is the product of incessant negotiations between social actors, which often involve ideological conflicts, movement boundaries are rarely stable. Their instability is also reflected in movement networks’ internal segmentation, even though this may also derive from principles of division of labor or the diversity in issue agendas between different organizations (Diani 1995).

At the same time, social movements, especially but not exclusively those challenging moral values and dominant cultural codes, also have a strong subcultural and countercultural dimension (Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996). Individual networks represent the backbone of
broader social movement communities, where interpersonal ties involve the sharing of distinctive lifestyles or of broader cultural models. While social movement scholars have studied them mostly in reference to “new” social movements (e.g., gay and lesbian subcultures, alternative scenes, radical intellectual milieus), working-class communities continue to attract considerable attention from social historians and historical sociologists. To say the least, communitarian ties strengthen identity and solidarity among movement activists and sympathizers. At the same time, though, they provide the specific locus of social conflict in those cases where the challenge is eminently on the symbolic side, where, in other words, at stake is mainly the definition of identities and the preservation of opportunities for the enactment of alternative lifestyles.

Since the 1990s, research on networks and movements has increasingly explored the impact of technological innovation, in particular information technology, on collective action processes. According to analysts, the spread of computer-mediated communication has affected social movements in several ways (van de Donk et al. 2004; della Porta & Mosca 2005; Earl 2010). First, it has increased their efficiency and effectiveness by facilitating the pooling of ideas and resources, increasing movement activists’ capacity to coordinate actions on a larger scale than previously conceivable, and speeding up diffusion processes. Second, it has introduced a new arena of contention and created new targets for activist campaigns, for example, in the form of movement activists and sympathizers overloading the websites of movement opponents with messages in order to block their operations. Third, it has contributed to the strengthening of specific collective identities and solidarities between people committed to a given cause. Finally, it has also contributed to the emergence of new types of public sphere by offering alternative sources of information to the public, or at the very least, to those sectors of the public sharing similar worldviews and values that are hardly given a voice by mainstream media. At the same time, questions have been raised regarding the ultimate impact of computer-mediated communication on mobilization processes. In particular, it is disputable whether “virtual,” computer-mediated ties may replace “real” ties, based on face-to-face, “local” interaction. Without denying the importance of the practical opportunities for collective action offered by new technologies, it remains to be seen whether they can also generate the shared understandings and – most important – the mutual trust, which have consistently been identified as important facilitators of collective action (Diani 2000).

Thinking on networks and movements is likely to evolve along quite diverse, if compatible, lines. First, we may expect attempts to explore the “black box” of the relation between networks and participation to continue, as advocated by proponents of the “analytic turn” in social movement research (McAdam 2003). In particular, increasing attention is likely to be paid to the relation between networks and culture. It is indeed impossible to disentangle the two, as social ties – and hence networks – only exist inasmuch as they are recognized as such, and this necessarily happens through a process of interpretation and symbolic construction (Mische 2008).

Second, more consistently with the so far dominant, realist view of networks, social scientists need to extend their conception of nodes in movement networks to objects other than individuals or organizations. In particular, a network perspective could contribute substantively to our understanding of protest cycles and protest campaigns. The whole idea of protest cycle presupposes interdependence between events, and so do the techniques of event history analysis increasingly used in this area of inquiry. Events might be treated as network nodes, linked through different mechanisms. For example, organizations operate as ties by promoting and/or participating in multiple events; individual activists operate in the same way; events may also be linked through symbolic means, for example, by narratives that underline continuity between what
would otherwise be largely independent and disconnected episodes of social conflict. The application of a network perspective could generate important insights on how events become linked into a social movement process.

The time dimension should also be introduced more explicitly into the analysis of movement networks. Most studies of networks are based on data collected at a single point in time (see, however, Osa 2003; Mische 2008). More information is needed on how movement networks evolve over time, and how those changes affect patterns of collective action at large. Unfortunately, the data necessary to those analyses are hard to locate, as systematic archives of social movement activity are rare. Nonetheless, some remarkable studies have indeed drawn upon archival records. Court records are another important source of network data, and have been used to account for recruitment to contemporary terrorist groups as well as for the traits of historical examples of contention. Newspaper reports offer a possible alternative, which has not been extensively explored yet (but see Rootes 2003). If data obtained in this way were confirmed to be a valid measure of actual ties, this would represent a major step forward towards network analysis of movements over long time spans.

SEE ALSO: Advocacy networks; Brokerage; Catnets; Coalitions; Diffusion and scale shift; Fields of contention; Internet and social movements; Micro-meso mobilization; Recruitment; Social movement organization (SMO).

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Nonviolence/nonviolent action
KURT SCHOCK

NONVIOLENCE

Nonviolence is an evolving theory and practice of personal and social transformation that rejects the use of coercion and violence in everyday life and in promoting social change (Texeira 1999). Nonviolence may entail a holistic approach, which opposes all forms of violence, including social, economic, cultural, and ecological, or it may apply specifically to prosecuting an acute conflict without resorting to violence or coercion.

Diverse traditions and faiths have promoted nonviolence throughout history, including those of many indigenous cultures, and religions such as Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Traditions within Judaism, Islam, and Christianity have also emphasized nonviolence. Christian peace churches such as the Brethren, Mennonites, and Quakers, for example, embrace pacifism and view violence as incompatible with their understanding of the divine.

There is also a tradition of nonviolence engaged in by individuals outside of religious practice. Henry David Thoreau, for example, was an exemplar of individual civil disobedience: the open violation of unjust laws or policies on the grounds of individual conscience. Thoreau refused to pay poll taxes to the state of Massachusetts because it supported slavery and the war against Mexico. In Resistance to Civil Government he encouraged others to engage in civil disobedience, arguing that when the government is unjust it is the duty of conscientious citizens to do so (Thoreau 1996).

With individual and moral nonviolence, there is an implicit social causality that individual actions will promote a better society; if enough individuals adopt nonviolent beliefs and behaviors, then macrosocial change will result. Nevertheless the primary motivation is individual morality or conscience, and social transformation is not prioritized. By contrast there is an explicit social causality in deliberate and organized collective campaigns of nonviolence to promote social change (Vogele 2010).

Mass-based campaigns of nonviolent resistance aimed at achieving a variety of social and political objectives became a significant force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nonviolent resistance was used increasingly as a means of struggle against injustice, oppression, and foreign domination where in the past violent rebellion or war would have seemed the only option. Nonviolent resistance, to an extent, was increasingly used as a functional equivalent of violent rebellion and war (Randle 1994).

Some examples from this era include Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule from 1849 to 1867, Finnish resistance to Russian rule from 1899 to 1906, the 1905 campaign of noncooperation in czarist Russia, the Egyptian general strike against British occupation in 1919, the Kapp putsch that thwarted a coup in Germany in 1920, and general strikes – which became a weapon of working class protest – in Italy in 1904 and Britain in 1926 (Randle 1994).

Inspired by religious traditions, individual nonviolence, and historical instances of collective mass defiance, Mohandas Gandhi was influential in bridging individual morality and transformation with collective social and political transformation through campaigns of nonviolent resistance. Based on his experience struggling for the rights of Indians in South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, he developed satyagraha, which he applied to the struggle for Indian Independence as well as to struggles for justice within
Indian society upon his return to India in 1915. Satyagraha – or the force of truth – involved both individual and social transformation through nonviolence. Gandhi was significant in developing the first comprehensive theory and practice of nonviolence in the modern era and in challenging the long-held and still dominant assumption that violence is the final arbiter in politics.

Proponents of nonviolent struggle, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King, do not view conflict as something to be avoided or suppressed. Instead conflict is viewed positively as an opportunity to transform society and oneself. Moreover, Gandhi and King were adept at incorporating both moral and strategic aspects into their campaigns. Whether inspired by Gandhian nonviolence or not, nonviolent resistance increased over the course of the twentieth century so that, by the twenty-first century, nonviolence had become a global and modular method for prosecuting struggles against oppression and injustice (see below).

NONVIOLENT ACTION

Nonviolence, as a strategy of social transformation, occurs through the collective, organized, and sustained use of methods of nonviolent action. Typically those adopting nonviolent action are members of marginalized or oppressed groups without access to institutional power. Methods of nonviolent action occur outside of conventional politics and do not involve violence or the threat of violence. Nonviolent action may occur through acts of omission, whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, custom, law, or decree, or acts of commission, whereby people perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not expected by norms or customs to perform, or are forbidden by law or decree to perform (Sharp 2005). Nonviolent action differs from rhetoric, institutional politics, political violence, and everyday forms of resistance; however, its boundaries are context-dependent and may not always be clear cut. Of course, empirical campaigns of resistance may involve various forms of action and those implementing nonviolent action may be met with violence. In fact violent repression is to be expected when elite interests are seriously challenged.

Although differences between nonviolent and violent action are obvious, they share some commonalities relative to conventional politics. Both are “extrainsitutional” or “unconventional” forms of direct action that involve physical and coercive force and the fear of bodily harm. Nonviolent action, by contrast, instead of physically coercing or eliminating the opponent, works through social power and the human mind by use of appeals, manipulation, and nonviolent coercion (Bond 1994).

Methods of nonviolent action fall into three descriptive classes: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 2005). Methods of protest and persuasion are symbolic expressions with communicative content intended to persuade the opponent, expose the opponent’s illegitimacy, provide social visibility to unjust relations, illustrate the extent of dissatisfaction, educate the public and third parties or catalyze their support, and overcome fear and acquiescence. These methods are often the crucibles in which frames are elaborated and disseminated, solidarity is forged, and people are mobilized to participate in other methods of nonviolent action. These methods do not consist of the use of reason, discussion, or persuasion exclusive of direct contentious action. They include actions such as protest demonstrations, marches,
rallies, public speeches, symbolic public acts, and vigils.

Methods of noncooperation involve the deliberate withdrawal, restriction, or defiance of expected participation or cooperation. While these methods may have symbolic significance, they are also intended to disrupt the status quo and undermine the opponent’s power, resources, and legitimacy. These methods may be social, economic, or political. Social noncooperation involves the refusal to carry out normal social relations, such as social boycotts, social ostracism, student strikes, and stayaways. Economic noncooperation involves the suspension of existing economic relationships or the refusal to initiate new ones, such as labor strikes or slowdowns, economic boycotts, refusal to pay rent, debts, interest, or taxes, and the collective withdrawal of bank deposits. Political noncooperation involves the refusal to continue usual forms of political participation or obedience, such as election boycotts and disobeying political authorities.

Methods of nonviolent intervention are acts of interposition intended to directly disrupt social relations or develop alternatives to oppressive relations. Examples range from sit-ins, pickets, nonviolent obstructions, nonviolent sabotage, land occupations, and paralyzing transportation, to developing alternative markets and creating parallel institutions during the course of a struggle. These methods can be subdivided into two types. Disruptive nonviolent intervention upsets or destroys normal or established social relations. Creative nonviolent intervention forges new social relations (Burrowes 1996). Creative nonviolent intervention is significant, because in struggles against oppression it is not only necessary to withdraw participation from oppressive relations, it is also necessary to engage in positive action to build alternatives. The two types of nonviolent intervention are mutually supporting and reinforcing: while disruptive nonviolent intervention (and noncooperation) drains power from the oppressors, creative nonviolent intervention generates power among the oppressed.

NONVIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Major episodes of nonviolent resistance from the second half of the twentieth century onward include the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King that challenged racial segregation and discrimination in the American South (1955–1968); numerous protest movements in more developed countries in the late 1960s—exemplified by the student and anti-Vietnam War movements in the US and Australia, and the student-led insurrection in France in 1968; and a wave of pro-democracy movements from the 1980s into the twenty-first century that challenged dozens of nondemocratic regimes throughout the world. Notable successes include the Philippines in 1986, Chile in 1989, Poland in 1989, Serbia in 2000, and Tunisia in 2011.

Various issue-related social movements have been almost exclusively nonviolent. Women’s movements have advocated nonviolent methods and social relations, adopting nonviolent action as both a tactical choice and a framing element, and cultivating a social critique of violence—from domestic violence to militarization and war making. Labor movements have historically depended on methods of noncooperation, especially the strike, to force concessions from capitalists and the state. “New social movements” that emerged in Western industrialized countries after World War II, such as the environmental and peace movements, have been almost exclusively nonviolent. Many indigenous people’s movements have also been primarily nonviolent. In recent years powerful land rights movements throughout the global South have adopted nonviolent resistance to prevent land alienation and promote land reform.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, social movements implementing nonviolent action had become a modular and global phenomenon. Some factors contributing to the increasing use of nonviolent resistance over the course of the twentieth century include an increasing disparity in the means of violence between rulers and the ruled in most
countries, diffusion of methods of nonviolent action across countries, processes of learning and the transfer of generic knowledge about nonviolent action, and an increasing recognition of the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and the relationship between means and ends.

Conceptual distinctions can be made between social movements that implement nonviolent action as a matter of principle and those that implement it for pragmatic reasons, although empirically there is probably a mix. Participants in principled nonviolent social movements view nonviolence as a way of life and usually hold religious or ethical beliefs that prohibit using violence against others in most or all situations. In contrast, participants in pragmatic nonviolent social movements perceive nonviolent action as the most expedient method for promoting change. Nonviolence is viewed as a means for prosecuting conflicts and not necessarily as a lifestyle (Burrowes 1996).

Distinctions can also be made between reformist and revolutionary nonviolent social movements. In the former, particular policies are perceived as the cause of or the solution for social problems. Movements of this type tend to implement short- to medium-term campaigns aimed at changing public policies within the existing political framework. Moreover, these movements do not usually involve constructive programs. In contrast, revolutionary nonviolent social movements are guided by a structural analysis, and aim to change the basic structures of society. Particular campaigns, which may have a short- to medium-term time frame, are conducted within the context of a long-term revolutionary vision and involve the implementation of constructive programs to build a better society (Burrowes 1996).

The cross-classification of the principled–pragmatic dimension with the reformist–revolutionary dimension provides four types of nonviolent social movements: pragmatic-reform, principled-reform, pragmatic-revolutionary, and principled-revolutionary. These categories are broadly descriptive rather than definitive and are not mutually exclusive. Examples of pragmatic-reform movements include antinuclear and environmental movements in developed countries that target government and corporate policies. An example of a principled-reform movement is the American civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King that incorporated a religious perspective in its challenge to particular policies that upheld racial segregation and political exclusion. Examples of pragmatic-revolutionary movements include the political revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the first Palestinian Intifada (1987–1993) that used nonviolent methods against Israeli occupation. An example of a principled-revolutionary movement was Gandhi’s struggle in India directed at liberation from British rule along with the development of constructive programs aimed at fundamentally transform social and economic relations within India (Burrowes 1996).

DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES

One way to proceed with the analysis of nonviolence is to examine it as an ideology or to examine the beliefs, attitudes, goals, values, and lifestyles of activists that inform their selection of strategy and tactics. Another way is to examine the dynamics and consequences of implementing methods of nonviolent action regardless of the motivation for their use. The second approach may be more useful in uncovering the distinctive nature of nonviolent resistance (Bond 1994). Some important findings from the latter approach are discussed below.

Dependence relations

A common perspective concerning the outcome of struggles prosecuted through nonviolent action is that as long as the opponent lacks the will or capacity to violently repress, then nonviolent resistance has a chance of succeeding. However, if the opponent does not, then nonviolent resistance will be crushed by
violent repression. An alternative, and more accurate, perspective suggests that the crucial variable in determining the outcome of nonviolent struggle is not repression, but rather the presence or absence of dependency relationships between the oppressor and the oppressed (Summy 1994).

One form of dependence, moral dependence, concerns the social distance between the oppressor and the oppressed. The shorter the social distance, the more likely that nonviolent action will succeed; the greater the social distance, the less likely the success. Social distance may increase or decrease through processes of dehumanization and rehumanization. If social distance between oppressor and oppressed is large, then intermediary parties that connect the antagonists must intervene in the conflict for nonviolent resistance to succeed. The oppressor and oppressed may be concatenated through third parties through the “great chain of nonviolence.” In the case of Indian Independence, for example, liberal and socialist Britons and higher caste Indians bridged the social distance between British imperialists and impoverished Indians. This intercession provided leverage to the struggle for national liberation (Galtung 1989).

Other forms of dependence are political and economic. Political authority, for example, depends critically on the strength of a government’s claim to legitimacy. A government’s ability to command obedience is reduced if it is widely perceived as acting in an unjust, corrupt, or unconstitutional manner. Government power will also be severely undermined if any essential group of administrators, police, military, or workers in key sectors such as energy or transportation refuse or threaten to refuse to carry out their duties and competent replacements are not readily available (Summy 1994).

Economic resources of a government must also be constantly replenished. If workers withdraw their labor, people refuse to pay taxes, or third parties, such as important international trading partners, impose economic sanctions on a government, then its power will be undermined. Thus, governments depend on the cooperation of their own citizens, but also on other states, and, increasingly, transnational institutions and organizations. In order for nonviolent struggles to succeed, there must be some sort of dependence relation that can be leveraged by the challengers, either directly or indirectly through third parties (Summy 1994; Schock 2005).

**Backfire**

A dynamic that is crucial to many struggles waged through nonviolent action is backfire: the reduction of the power and legitimacy of an authority that uses violent repression against activists engaged in nonviolent protest. For a repressive event to generate backfire information about the event needs to be communicated to receptive audiences, receptive audiences must perceive the event to be unjust and they must be outraged by it, and authorities must take their outrage into consideration (Martin 2007). For example, the outrage generated by the violent repression of civil rights activists in the American South, which contributed to the intervention of federal forces, was critical to the success of the civil rights movement. The backfire dynamic may be crucial in winning over neutral or uninvolved third parties that serve to concatenate the oppressors with the oppressed.

**Consequences**

From a strategic perspective, there is evidence that nonviolent resistance may be a more effective strategy than violent resistance. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), for example, compared the effectiveness of hundreds of major campaigns of collective action with maximalist objectives, such as regime change or secession, which occurred from 1900 to 2006. They found that nonviolent resistance movements were more likely to succeed than violent resistance movements. This was in part due to the ability of nonviolent resistance movements to attract more widespread support than violent ones and the increased likelihood that the backfire dynamic will be invoked.
Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) examined 67 democratic transitions that occurred from the 1970s through the 1990s. They found that the prospects for a democratic transition increased when challengers refrain from using violence. Moreover, the occurrence of mass-based nonviolent resistance was a significant factor in most democratic transitions and countries with strong and cohesive nonviolent civic coalitions were more likely to be more democratic in the post-transition era. Thus, beyond the effectiveness in promoting regime change, the nature of the post-transition regime was shaped by the form of the transition. Countries where the transition was propelled by mass-based nonviolent resistance movements were more democratic several years after the transition compared to transitions propelled by violent resistance or top-down elite-driven reform. Violent social movements, when successful, tend to be related to the centralization of power, which in turn promotes power differentials between ruling and subordinate groups. By contrast, successful nonviolent resistance movements tend to be related to a diffusion of power throughout society.

In a general comparison of various ways of promoting social change, Martin (2006) argues that nonviolent resistance is more successful than conventional politics and violent resistance in terms of its historical track record, degree of popular participation, compatibility of means and ends, and lower levels of suffering. In conclusion, social scientists are increasingly recognizing the power of campaigns of nonviolent resistance to transform acute conflicts and the relationship between means and ends.

SEE ALSO: Civil disobedience; Civil rights movement (United States); Democratization and democratic transition; Gandhi, Mahatma (1869–1948); King, Martin Luther, Jr (1928–1968); Satyagraha; Strategy; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Organizations and movements
ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG and TIM BARTLEY

Social movements organize people, resources, and ideas for social change. Many do this through formal organizations—often called social movement organizations (SMOs). The concept of a social movement organization is trickier than it may initially seem, since it depends on defining a “social movement” and specifying its relevant set of organizations. Though scholars have defined social movements in a variety of ways, we draw on Snow (2004) to provisionally define social movements as collectivities seeking social change at least partly outside of institutionalized politics. Similarly, though various definitions of organizations have been offered, we view organizations as goal-directed, boundary-maintaining groups, typically with some degree of formal structure.

Many social movement groups, past and present, are clearly identifiable as SMOs—for example, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), War Resisters League, Greenpeace, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and many others. In other cases, it is unclear whether groups are sufficiently organized or change-oriented to be considered SMOs. For instance, Gay Liberation Fronts existed in many US cities in the early 1970s, but it is unclear if they were formal organizations. In contrast, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) is formally organized, but it has at some points been too closely tied to “normal politics” to clearly qualify as an SMO. Sociologists have not developed clear decision rules for identifying groups as SMOs. Instead, they have often drawn on lay Understandings—treating a group as a SMO if its participants see themselves as building an organization that participates in a movement. Alternatively, some scholars focus on the broader category of “advocacy organizations” and view differences in structures, goals, and tactics as continuous rather than discrete (Andrews & Edwards 2004).

Organizations have not always been central to social movement research. Early theories saw mass activity as rooted in social disorganization. Studies of crowd behavior and mid-century “mass society” theories treated collective action as the result of alienation, social isolation, and authoritarian tendencies (see Mass society theory). Similarly, “strain theory” argued that social movements were caused by structural shifts that produced social disintegration and the breakdown of existing organizational and institutional structures (see Strain and breakdown theories).

The civil rights movement had a profound impact on the study of social movements. Sociologists’ sympathies with the movement contributed to the rise of theories that treated activism as rational political activity requiring resources and organization instead of irrational, spontaneous collective behavior. This moved SMOs to the center of the analysis, carried by two influential theories: resource mobilization and political process. Resource mobilization theory developed in part as a response to the professionalization of social movements in the later years of the civil rights movement. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the rise and fall of movements is best explained by the resources available for building and maintaining organizations, not by grievances, which were seen as relatively constant. The resource mobilization paradigm in particular put the structure and strength of SMOs at the center of the analysis. Political process theory also drew attention to organizations, viewing social movements as “politics by other means” for those excluded from the formal polity (McAdam 1982). Researchers
in this tradition have shown not only that political opportunities shape mobilization, but also that grassroots organizational infrastructures are critical, as illustrated by the role of black churches and colleges in the civil rights movement (Morris 1981).

Syntheses of resource mobilization and political process approaches solidified the SMO as a key focus of research. While the SMO was a novel focus in the early days of resource mobilization theory, it now occupies a central place in the sociology of movements.

STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE IN SMOS

One key set of questions has to do with how SMOs make decisions, strategize, and manage participation. Most research in this area engages with one of two strong theories of voluntary organizations. One strand responds to Olson’s (1965) influential statement on the problem of “free riding” in voluntary organizations. Olson argued that since self-interested individuals will tend to free ride on the efforts of others, large voluntary organizations are doomed to failure unless they can provide excludable benefits (selective incentives) to their members. Other work has shown that incentives for participation can take the form of “purposive” and “solidary” incentives (Zald & Ash 1966). Furthermore, as shown by Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980) and others, recruitment to SMOs occurs largely through social networks, which can mitigate the tendency toward free riding. Social movement scholars have also developed alternatives to Olson’s model by emphasizing how expectations about others’ participation and the emergence of a “critical mass” can foster participation. Studies have shed light on the determinants of movement participation, and have reminded social movement scholars that organization is a problem and a process, not merely a structure to be taken as given.

A second strand of research focuses on Michels’ 1911 “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1962), which argues that organizations inevitably evolve from democratic governance toward control by elites, from radical goals toward moderate ones, and from broad agendas for social change toward narrow dictates of organizational maintenance. Michels’ critique of oligarchy inspired some New Left and feminist activists in the 1960s to experiment with informal and antibureaucratic organizational forms (Breines 1989), but these experiments often created new organizational problems. Freeman (1972) warned against a “tyranny of structurelessness” in which power coalesces in the hands of the few even in groups with little formal structure.

Michels’ theory also inspired debates about the efficiency of formal organization – particularly hierarchical and bureaucratic organization – and its effects on movement outcomes. While Piven and Cloward (1979) suggested that formal organization depresses mass mobilization, Gamson (1975) argued that bureaucracy can help movements achieve their goals. Yet it has become clear that this debate posed the question in a limited way: Only two organizational forms were considered (bureaucracy vs. no bureaucracy) and it was assumed that organizational forms were simply vehicles for achieving particular goals (Clemens & Minkoff 2004). Some research has moved past these limitations. Polletta (2002) argues that participatory democracy within SMOs is politically effective under particular conditions. Since its main benefits are to build group solidarity, enhance tactical innovation, and develop leadership skills, participatory democracy works best when costs of participation are high, the environment is uncertain, or when there are few people with developed leadership skills. Clemens (1993) argues that some marginalized groups may be relatively immune to the “iron law” and capable of utilizing bureaucratic structures with a lower risk of co-optation. Furthermore, scholars are increasingly looking more closely at how the internal structures of organizations can facilitate strategic capacity, mass participation, and a resistance to oligarchy (Ganz 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000).
ENVIROMENTS AND FIELDS OF SMOs

SMOs are embedded in and depend on broader environments. Early statements of resource mobilization and political process theories gained power by showing that the emergence and success of social movements could be explained largely by fluctuations in SMOs’ environments (Jenkins & Perrow 1977). For resource mobilization theorists, organizational environments shape SMOs largely through the flow of resources, including funding, space, staff, expertise, and technology. Political process scholars have focused on how the structure of political opportunities shapes the formation, growth, survival, and success of SMOs. Specifically, they have shown that the state enables and constrains SMOs by providing positive opportunities for some kinds of organizations and establishing legal prohibitions against other kinds. By legally recognizing and providing benefits (i.e., tax exemption) to some types of organizations, the state effectively “channels” SMOs, potentially making them more bureaucratic (McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson 1991). Institutional theory provides a third way to think about the relationship between SMOs and environments. Neo-institutionalists argue that SMOs, like other kinds of organizations, tend to adopt organizational forms that are culturally legitimate and taken for granted as appropriate (Clemens 1993; Polletta 2002).

Scholars have also expanded the analysis from particular SMOs to larger “fields” or “populations” of SMOs. Early statements of social movements as “multiorganizational” fields (Curtis & Zurcher 1973) have been expanded greatly in more recent work. Influenced by population ecology theory, some social movement scholars have analyzed the interacting forces that cause populations of SMOs to grow or decline. Minkoff (1999) shows how SMOs constitute the environment for one another, such that the fate and impact of a particular SMO depends partially on its position within an organizational population. SMOs in a field may compete for resources, cooperate on social movement actions, develop a division of labor, or provide resources and other forms of support to each other. Yet the conditions under which cooperation or competition prevails are not yet fully understood. Armstrong (2002) demonstrates that activist views about whether it is appropriate for a movement to be represented by one organization or many can influence SMOs’ ability to develop cooperative relationships.

Examination of the structure and evolution of movement fields has also shed light on the consequences of movement diversification. It has often been assumed that ideological differences in a social movement field reflect a lack of unity and thus indicate movement weakness. Yet some research suggests that ideological and functional diversity may enable movements to appeal to a larger constituency and to respond effectively to complex and rapidly changing political environments (Armstrong 2002). Diversity in social movement fields also enables movements to benefit from “radical flank effects” and may even generate useful strategic innovation.

BEYOND THE SMO

Research organized around the concept of the SMO has generated insight into how actors coordinate collective action. However, scholars have also found that the process of organizing a social movement is not fully captured by a focus on SMOs. The study of SMOs (as a noun) is only a part of the larger project of understanding social movement organization (as a process). Several strands of scholarship shift the SMO out of the center of the analysis.

A cultural turn in social movement scholarship has reinvigorated interest in why people organize. While resource mobilization and political process approaches treated grievances as relatively unproblematic, cultural approaches argue that movements cannot be understood without attention to discourse, framing, and the crystallization of collective identities. This perspective views movements as processes of building collective identities
and framing grievances—and SMOs as one (but not the only) site of this cultural work. The move beyond SMOs is also informed by the recognition that social movement activity is sometimes coordinated through networks, rather than, or in addition to, organizations. What we recognize as social movements may sometimes be extensive advocacy networks, featuring SMOs as well as professionalized advocacy organizations, governmental or inter-governmental actors, and individual policy entrepreneurs. The concept of a “transnational advocacy network” has become especially prominent in studies of global contention (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, some activists have adopted decentralized networks as an organizing principle, eschewing more traditional organizational vehicles. In the environmental movement, for instance, groups like EarthFirst! have adopted radically decentralized network forms.

Finally, scholars beyond the subfield of social movements have realized that the processes identified and described by social movement scholars are evident in other arenas of social life. Thus, the study of social movement organizations is increasingly being replaced by the study of “social movements and organizations” (Davis et al. 2005). Under this rubric, scholars have primarily focused on three kinds of tasks. First, they have refocused attention on social movements that press for change in the policies and practices of organizations beyond the state, including corporations, universities, and nonprofits (e.g., Raeburn 2004). Second, they have argued that social movements are key sites of innovation and diversity in industries and organizational forms (e.g., Schneiberg, King, & Smith 2008). Third, scholars have used theories of social movements to explain the behavior of other types of organizations, with particular attention to “social movement-like” processes among firms (e.g., Swaminathan & Wade 2001).

SEE ALSO: Culture and social movements; Institutional theory and social movements; Multiorganizational fields; Networks and social movements; Participatory democracy in social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO); Voluntary associations and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Outcomes, political
EDWIN AMENTA and NEAL CAREN

Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the political or state-related consequences of social movements. The years 2001 through 2009 alone have seen an acceleration of publications, including 45 articles, 38 in the top four general sociology journals and seven articles in Mobilization (see Amenta et al. 2010). In comparison to mobilizing supporters, fashioning identities among them, and choosing strategies, most macropolitical consequences of challengers are not as directly related to the efforts expended by challengers and not directly implemented by them. Although most studies demonstrate the influence of the largest movements, this research has not addressed how much movements matter. As for the conditions under which movements matter, scholars have been revising their initial hypotheses that the strategies, organizational forms, and political contexts that aid mobilization will also aid in gaining and exerting political influence. Scholars are exploring alternative arguments about the productivity of different actions and characteristics of movements and movement organizations in the varied political contexts and institutional settings they face.

HOW MIGHT MOVEMENTS MATTER IN POLITICS?

Scholars of the political impacts of movements have moved away from addressing whether movements or organizations are “successful” in gaining new benefits or acceptance (Gamson 1990) and have turned to examining the causal influence of movements on political outcomes and processes (Andrews 2004) drawn from political sociology literature. Many scholars focus on political collective goods, or group-wise advantages or disadvantages from which nonparticipants in a challenge cannot be easily excluded (Olson 1965). Collective goods can be material, such as categorical social spending programs, but can also be less tangible, such as new ways to refer to members of a group. Social movement organizations (SMOs) almost invariably claim to represent a group extending beyond the leaders and adherents of the organization and most make demands that would provide collective benefits to that larger group (Tilly 1999). According to the collective benefit standard, a challenger can have considerable impact even when it fails to achieve what it is seeking, but also negative consequences or negligible ones, such as achieving a program that did not benefit constituents. Scholars working from this standard tend to refer to consequences or impacts of social movements rather than successes or failures. From this perspective, the greatest sort of impact is the one that provides a group continuing leverage over political processes. These sorts of gains are usually at a structural or systemic level of state processes and are a kind of metacollective benefit, as they increase the productivity of all future collective action of the group. Gains in the democratization of state processes are perhaps the most important that social movements can influence.

Most collective action, however, is aimed at a more medium level—major changes in policy and the bureaucratic enforcement and implementation of policy. Once enacted and enforced with bureaucratic means, categorical social spending programs, notably, provide rights of entitlement to the benefits, and legal changes and bureaucratic reinforcement of such laws help to ensure the routine maintenance of such collective benefits. Under these circumstances, the issue is privileged in politics, and the political system becomes biased in favor of the group. Regulatory bureaucracies that are products of challenger mobilizations may push on their own to advance mandates in the
absence of new legislation, as in the case of state labor commissions or in affirmative action. Through their policies states can also ratify or attempt to undermine potential collective identities or help to create new ones. Dividing the process of creating new laws containing collective benefits into the agenda setting, legislative content, passage, and implementation of legislation simplifies analyses.

Democratic states generally recognize challenging organizations, and so Gamson’s (1990) “acceptance” is less useful than a modified version of “inclusion,” or challengers gaining state positions through election or appointment, which can lead to collective benefits. Important intermediate influence can come through elections and political parties, as the willingness of officials to aid the constituents of social movements often turns on electoral considerations (Amenta 2006). The connections can be direct and tight, as when movements form their own political parties, which can take office (usually in coalitions) and act on their platforms, as with some Left-libertarian or Green parties in Europe. In polities with direct democratic devices, movements may win or influence policy changes through referendums (Kriesi 2004).

**HOW MUCH DO MOVEMENTS MATTER AND UNDER WHICH CONDITIONS DO MOVEMENTS MATTER IN POLITICS?**

Some scholars view social movements aside from labor as relatively lacking in political influence in comparison to other political actors and institutions (e.g., Skocpol 2003). Others tend to evaluate movements as highly influential (e.g., Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005; see review in Amenta et al. 2010). The global questions have not been addressed systematically, however, largely due to the high data barriers and the general trade-off between the size of the question and the ability of scholars conclusively to answer it. Ascertaining the degree to which movements have mattered politically would require analyses over long periods of time across many different movements, issue areas, and countries and involve demonstrations that movements were at least as causally influential as various political institutions, conditions, and actors previously found to affect policy – a tall order. Although abundant research now indicates that various individual movements, especially the larger ones often the focus of study, and their activities have influenced specific policies, it remains difficult to pinpoint how much even the larger movements have mattered in comparison to other actors and structures in relation to specific outcomes of interest. Also, some types of issues and situations seem relatively impervious to movement influence. In addition, researchers often find that movement influence is often contingent on favorable political or other circumstances (see Amenta et al. 2010).

Far more scholarly effort has been expended on the conditions under which movements are influential. The initial hypotheses about the political impacts of movements were similar to the hypothesized determinants of mobilization. Scholars focused on a movement’s mobilizing structures, framing and other strategies, and political contexts favorable to mobilization. These arguments hold that what promotes challengers’ mobilization will also promote their political influence; in short, specific forms of challenger organization, strategies, including framing strategies and protest types, and political opportunities will result in both mobilization and political influence and benefits for mobilized challengers. Although scholars still address the roles of mobilizing structures, strategies, and political contexts, results indicate that the conditions producing mobilization sometimes make it difficult to achieve influence at stages in the policy process beyond agenda setting. Finally, political mediation arguments reject the search for “magic bullets,” or specific organizational forms, strategies, or political contexts that will always help challengers and argue instead that specific forms of organization and strategies will be more productive in some political contexts rather than others.
The first argument is that whatever aids a group’s mobilization will lead to its making gains. The ability to mobilize different sorts of resources is central to movements (McCarthy & Zald 2002) and mobilization of resources and membership has been shown to influence some state-related consequences in different research. Although research suggests that the largest are most influential, mobilization seems to be only a necessary condition to have political influence (see Amenta et al. 2010). Debates also address which forms of organization are likely to produce political gains. SMOs with greater strategic resources are deemed likely to prevail over others in the field, notably resourceful movement infrastructures, including diverse leaders, complex leadership structures, multiple organizations, informal ties, and resources coming substantially from members (Andrews 2004). Yet organizations designed to mobilize people and resources behind a cause may not be best suited to engage in the tasks of political influence, persuasion, or litigation.

Second, specific strategies and goals of collective action and forms of challenger organization are more likely to produce influence. Cress and Snow (2000) argue that for a challenger to have an impact it must employ resonant “prognostic” and “diagnostic” frames to identify problems and pose credible solutions to them. For movements to be influential research suggests that their frames need to be minimally plausible, and culturally resonant, but their value likely varies by setting. Amenta (2006) finds that the Townsend Plan’s frames did not change much, but its influence varied greatly over time. More important, frames that help mobilize supporters may be counterproductive in trying to influence policymakers (McVeigh, Myers, & Sikkink 2004) or courts (Pedriana 2006). Working from the hypothesis that specific strategies will work differently at individual phases of the policy cycle, recent scholarship has focused on the impact of protest, for which the response of political authorities to collective action is expected to be rapid, on the agenda-setting stage of the policy process. Olzak and Soule (2009) find that institutional environmental protest events influenced congressional hearings, which are associated with policy action (Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005).

There has not been nearly as much work, however, on the strategies that work through slow-moving processes. This is a major gap, as this includes most movement collective action addressing political institutions and electoral politics, as well as legal challenges. Although scholars tend to view movement action addressing institutional politics as “assimilative” and likely to be less influential than protest, electoral strategies, such as supporting favored candidates and opposing disfavored ones, are often far more assertive and influential in politics (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky 2005). Political actors seek to gain reelection and to act on party principles and personal values, and are typically much less afraid of movements threatening, say, to occupy their offices, than to drive them out of office. The finding that movements are less influential in later parts of the policy process may mean that the forms of organization, frames, and strategies applicable to mobilization are unhelpful at best in later stages of the policy process, or that protest has great limits as a movement strategy. Beyond protest, social movements seek to have influence over politics through electoral activity, seeking sustained leverage and not simply a quick reaction (see Amenta et al. 2010 for examples).

A third argument is that once a challenger is mobilized the main thing influencing its impact is the political context or “opportunity structure.” Early claims that in “open” states with “strong” administrative capacities challengers will achieve policy gains (see Kriesi 2004) have been criticized on the grounds that within any country movement influence has varied over time and a state’s bureaucratic capacities vary by issue. The “open” and “strong” specifications have been superseded by more fine-grained conceptual developments in political sociology (see
Amenta et al. 2010). These arguments hold that long-standing characteristics of states and political institutions—the polity structure, the democratization of state institutions, electoral rules and procedures, and existing state policies—influence the prospects of challenges. The centralization and division of power between each branch of government mean both multiple points of access and veto. The level of democratization influences mobilization, and the bases for exclusion from democratic processes increase the likelihood that groups will mobilize along these lines, such as African American civil rights in the US context and workers in the European one. Electoral rules such as winner-take-all systems discourage the formation of new political parties. Equally important, however, the political contexts that promote mobilization, especially those in which a movement’s constituency is threatened, do not always increase the productivity of collective action by challengers (Meyer & Minkoff 2004).

Finally, many scholars have developed different political mediation models, which build on arguments concerning strategy, organizational form, and political contexts (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006). The basic point of this argument is that the collective action of challengers is politically mediated. In a democratic political system, mobilizing relatively large numbers of committed people is probably necessary to winning new collective benefits for those otherwise underrepresented in politics. So, too, is making plausible claims regarding the worthiness of the group and the usefulness of its program. Yet challengers’ action is more likely to produce results when institutional political actors see benefit in aiding the group the challenger represents. To secure new benefits, challengers will typically need help or complementary action from like-minded state actors, including elected officials, appointed officials, or state civil servants. And so challengers need to engage in collective action that changes the calculations of relevant institutional political actors, and to adopt organizational forms that fit political circumstances.

Political mediation arguments do not identify individual organizational forms, strategies, or long-term or short-term political contexts that will always or usually help challengers to win collective benefits. Instead the idea is that certain organizational forms and collective action strategies will be more productive in some political contexts rather than others. Challengers need to moderate strategies and forms to address political circumstances. The standard distinction between disruptive and assimilative strategies is dropped in favor of addressing variations in assertiveness of action (Amenta 2006), with assertiveness meaning the use of increasingly strong sanctions. Sanctions in assertive institutional collective action threaten to increase or decrease the likelihood of gaining or keeping something valuable to political actors—often positions—or to take over their functions or prerogatives and usually involves some sort of institutional action. The institutional collective action of challengers works best by mobilizing large numbers of people behind a course of activity, often one with electoral implications. This collective action may be designed to convince the general public of the justice of the cause and influence elected and appointed officials in that manner, but may also demonstrate to these officials that a large segment of the electorate is willing to vote or engage in other political activity mainly on the basis of a single key issue. If the political regime is supportive and the domestic bureaucrats are professionalized and supportive, limited protest based mainly on the evidence of mobilization is likely to be sufficient to provide increased collective benefits. By contrast, achieving collective benefits through public policy is likely to be more difficult if neither a supportive regime nor an administrative authority exists, and the sorts of limited protest listed above are likely to be ignored or have a limited effect. As political circumstances become more difficult, more assertive or bolder collective action is required to produce collective benefits.
FURTHER RESEARCH

Much work remains to be done. Scholars need to address theoretically the problems that the organizational forms, framing and other strategies, and political contexts that promote mobilization pose for achieving political influence beyond protest. Similarly, more thought is needed regarding the political process beyond agenda setting and the impact of movement action aside from protest. Scholars need to explore further movement action aimed at electoral politics (Amenta, Caren & Olasky 2005; Amenta 2006).

In the quantitative case studies prominent in recent research scholars should prioritize the most consequential policies to challengers and try to pinpoint how much movements have mattered in comparison with other determinants of outcomes. Structural changes such as winning democratic rights and major policy transformations should be at the top of the list. Quantitative case studies can also exploit the advantages of fuzzy set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis software, which can address both the interactions specified by political mediation arguments and the more unusual situation of major changes induced by movements. Also, instead of theorizing about their cases as if they were typical – expecting that broad explanatory claims and findings should apply to all movements (cf. McAdam & Su 2002; Giugni 2007) – scholars should think more about different types of movements and make comparisons with findings regarding similar movements. Also, it would be valuable to address less prominent cases, as most recent research has been about the African American civil rights, feminist, and environmental movements. It is also important to address the fact that movements are not always attempting to create new policies, but sometimes fight to alter or replace entrenched unfavorable policies or defend favorable ones (Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005). Similarly, scholars have paid only scant attention to bids for influence through the courts (Skrentny 2006). Less prominent in case studies have been deep historical analyses to address major institutional changes and to appraise the mechanisms and time-order aspects of theoretical arguments. These analyses can more easily address the impact of movements on electoral politics and from there to policies and other political outcomes. Qualitative studies can address the big questions about major structural shifts in politics related to movements: Did the African American civil rights movement bring about civil and voting rights? Did the women’s suffrage movement cause women to gain suffrage? Is the labor movement responsible for legislation regarding worker organization? Although there remains the standard trade-off between the size of the question and the ability of research to provide conclusive answers, current research has tilted toward the more easily answered questions. More generally, scholars may want to train their attention on the main political outcomes of interest to movements, such as civil and voting rights for the African American civil rights movement, old-age pensions for the old-age pension movement, or abortion policy for the abortion rights and antiabortion movements. In these analyses scholars can address whether and how much and for what reasons movements mattered in key episodes of political change. To address the degree to which movements have mattered and to test complex arguments about the mediation of influence, however, will require research designs that compare across several movements and over long stretches of time.

SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Collective identity; Framing and social movements; Organizations and movements; Political mediation model; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; QCA and fuzzy set applications to social movement research; Resource mobilization theory.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Participatory democracy refers to an organizational form in which decision making is decentralized, nonhierarchical, and consensus oriented. It can be contrasted with bureaucracy, in which decision making is centralized, hierarchical, and based on a formal division of labor, as well as with majority vote. Participatory democratic organizations have been a prominent feature of many progressive movements, including radical pacifism, the civil rights movement, the New Left, feminism, environmentalism, antinuclear activism, gay and lesbian movements, and the global justice movement.

Participatory democratic organizations today claim a diverse lineage, with precursors in ancient Athenian democracy, the New England town hall, Quaker meetings, and Spanish civil war affinity groups. The term itself was popularized in 1962 by the New Left group, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS activists took the term from philosopher Arnold Kaufman to refer to a polity in which citizens were regularly involved in public policymaking. They intended the term to describe a political system, not a mode of organizational decision making. However, at the time, decision making within SDS itself was collectivist and consensus oriented, this despite the group’s formal reliance on parliamentary procedure. The same was true of the militant civil rights group, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). For thousands of activists in the New Left, antiwar, and radical feminist movements, participatory democracy soon became an organizational ethos (Ferree & Martin 1995; Polletta 2002). By the end of the decade, many young activists perceived the political system as intransient, and they turned to building alternative schools, health centers, food coops, and publishing guilds, thus contributing to an enduring cooperative movement (Rothschild & Whitt 1986).

For sociologists writing about the surge of collectivist organizations during this period, the participatory democratic impulse reflected a youthful repudiation of authority that was at odds with the demands of effective political reform. Participatory democratic organizations were conceptualized as “expressive” or “redemptive” in contrast to their “instrumental” and “adversary” bureaucratic counterparts (see discussions in Breines 1989 and Polletta 2002). Since then, many scholars have instead adopted Breines’s (1989) view of participatory democracy as animated by a prefigurative impulse. By enacting within the movement itself values of radical equality, freedom, and community, activists have sought to bring into being a society marked by those values. Far from being antipolitical, participatory democracy has been an attempt to transform what counts as politics.

Still, most scholars have seen participatory democracies as fragile. And indeed, some of the most famous participatory democratic movement groups, such as SDS, numerous feminist collectives, and the antinuclear Clamshell Alliance, collapsed after explosive internal battles about organizational structure. One common explanation for participatory democracy’s fragility is its inefficiency (see discussions in Breines 1989; Polletta 2002). Consensus decision making takes time, decentralized administration creates problems of coordination, and a minimal division of labor sacrifices the benefits of expertise. These inefficiencies are manageable in an organization that is small or has little opportunity for political impact. But when participatory democratic groups grow in size or political stature and face new demands for coordination and funding, such inefficiencies become intolerable. The result is often a battle
between political pragmatists, who are willing to adopt a more centralized and hierarchical organizational structure, and purists who refuse such reforms. Ultimately, either groups bureaucratize or they collapse.

Yet the battles that have wracked participatory democratic groups have usually centered not on the inefficiency of the form but on the group’s failure to live up to its professed egalitarianism. In line with this insight, some scholars have argued that participatory democracy’s vulnerability is its inequity rather than its inefficiency. Michels (1958) maintained that democratic organizations inevitably developed oligarchical structures as those occupying positions based on their expertise developed a stake in retaining their positions. Participatory democrats refuse those imperatives and privilege democracy over expertise. That only means that the hierarchies are informal, scholars in this vein argue. The result is what Freeman (1973) calls the “tyranny of structurelessness” in which the elimination of formal structures of authority only makes it easier for informal cliques to rule freely. When members shut out of decision making protest their marginalization, an organizational crisis is likely, since participatory democracy provides no mechanisms for holding leaders formally accountable.

A third perspective holds that as long as members’ interests are fundamentally congruent, they are unlikely to object to disparities in informal influence (Mansbridge 1982). But when members’ interests conflict, which is likely to occur in all but the most homogeneous of groups, the consensus-based decision making characteristic of participatory democratic organizations offers no way of adjudicating those conflicts. If minorities are not coerced to agree with the majority, then a stalemate is likely. After a series of such stalemates, an organizational crisis may ensue.

Although these explanations have been advanced separately, case studies have shown that two or even three of these dynamics have often operated at the same time. Moreover, the fact that groups have found strategic benefit in participatory democratic organization and that they have done so in groups that are striking in their diversity casts doubt on the inevitability of participatory democracy’s failure. It invites more attention to the conditions in which the form’s potential inefficiency, inequity, and inability to reconcile competing interests become insuperable problems. Perhaps even more important, though, several trends have transformed the ways in which contemporary activists practice participatory democracy, as well as the challenges they face. One trend, especially evident in the women’s movement, is the growth of hybrid organizational forms. In the 1970s and 1980s, activists running rape crisis centers and battered women’s clinics found themselves pressed to adopt more conventional organizational structures by federal funding agencies. Activists discovered, however, that they could combine organizational forms: capitalizing on participatory democracy’s capacity to foster tactical innovation and solidarity and bureaucracy’s capacity to maximize expertise (Matthews 1994). For example, groups combined a hierarchy of offices with informal consultation across levels, divided decisions into those requiring consensus and those not requiring it, and so on (Ferree and Martin 1995). Indeed, scholars say that hybrid organizations have become the norm, in the women’s movement and more broadly (Chen 2009).

That said, many activists remain committed to participatory democracy as a true alternative to bureaucracy. Indeed, the rise of the global justice movement has been accompanied by a resurgence of interest in radically “horizontal” forms. Here, though, a second trend is striking: the formalization of participatory democratic practices. If the creation of hybrid organizational forms responded to the tendency of participatory democracy to produce inefficiencies, the formalization of participatory democratic practices is intended to counter the inequalities that it has often generated. In meetings, roles of facilitator, timekeeper, and “vibes watcher” are intended to minimize unacknowledged exercises of influence. Networks and coalitions are favored over organizations...
as a way to preserve groups’ autonomy. The World Social Forum and associated regional forums encourage participants to share experiences, analyses, and strategies for opposing neoliberalism, and to undertake collaborative projects. However, participants are formally barred from adopting unified positions. Given the diversity of agendas and groups involved in the Forum, and the disparities of power among them, Forum organizers say, any joint positions would require a coercive, and inevitably false, unity.

A third trend is also evident in the global justice movement. The Internet has provided not only a new means of communication, but also new models of action and interaction (Juris 2008). Building on the possibility for collaborative problem solving associated with the Internet, along with its capacity to foster ties of diverse kinds, activists have sought to create movements in which autonomous spheres or publics are linked in multiple ways along the lines of a virtual network. At the same time, contention around corporate access to personal online information and open source software, as well as campaigns for do-it-yourself online copyright agreements, are intended not only to prefigure a more participatory society within the movement but to gain for people outside the movement control of the decisions that affect them. In this sense, the Internet has helped to make central once again the more macropolitical dimensions of participatory democracy that were central to the New Leftists who introduced the term.

Whether and how new digital technologies are transforming the practice of participatory democracy are questions that merit further research. Another important question concerns the impacts of participatory democratic organizational forms. During historical periods or institutional arenas in which participatory democratic organizations are prominent, do they make inroads into the repertoire of institutionalized organizational forms? For example, Rothschild (2000) argues that widespread public support for workplace democracy reflects the popular valorization of terms such as “voice” and “empowerment” by the social justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s. What are the conditions in which particular versions of participatory democracy diffuse across movements? Some evidence suggests that a popular perception of participatory democracy as white and middle class may make it less appealing to activists of color and working-class activists (Polletta 2005). Finally, we know little about whether participatory democratic organizations exist in conservative movements. If they do exist, and are animated by prefigurative goals, then that suggests that radical democracy is a more politically capacious concept than we usually think. If such groups are not animated by prefigurative goals, then we may learn about additional rationales for movement groups to operate as participatory democracies.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Bureaucratization and social movements; Democracy inside social movements; “Iron law of oligarchy”; Prefigurative politics; Social Forum, World.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Racist social movements
KATHLEEN BLEE

Racist movements are organized, collective efforts to create, preserve, or extend racial hierarchies of power and privilege. Such movements explicitly espouse the ideologies of white supremacism and/or anti-Semitism (anti-Judaism or hatred of Muslims or Arabs) that were consolidated in the Western world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Manifestations of intergroup antagonism in earlier times, even conflicts that cross what later would be regarded as racial lines, generally are not considered racial movements because these are not based in modern ideas of race as an essential, biological, polarized, and unchanging attribute of social groups. Denoting as racist only social movements that take place in Western societies is a common practice in sociological research, as most scholars regard white supremacism and anti-Semitism as the legacy of ideologies by which European colonists sought to exonerate their brutal conquests and occupations (Frederickson 2002). However, this restriction has been challenged by studies that use the concept racist (or racial) movements to describe subnational intergroup antagonisms in a number of non-Western societies, including China, India, Indonesia, and Russia.

Racist movements take a variety of forms over time and in different places. Some arise in response to political opportunities for asserting enhanced racial superiority; others as countermovements organized to oppose perceived gains by other racial groups. Some recruit sizable proportions of the population, whereby accruing significant influence over state policy or even the ability to elect candidates to political office (Brustein 1996; Berezin 2009). Such large racist movements often are linked, overtly or covertly, to right-wing political parties, nationalist efforts, or fascist groups (Blee 1991; Payne 2000; Rydgren 2007; McVeigh 2009). In other contexts, racist movements are small and politically marginal. These tend to shun mainstream politics, relying instead on violence or terrorist tactics to achieve racist goals (Blee 2002; Futrell & Simi 2004; Giugni et al. 2005; Futrell, Simi, & Gottschalk 2006).

Racist movements also vary in their ideologies and agendas. Some favor the creation or preservation of racially homogeneous societies, generally through exclusion, expulsion, or extermination of those they regard as racially different. Others promote racial supremacy or separatism within heterogeneous societies. Although movements that promote racial superiority or separatism such as black nationalism or black separatism in the US are sometimes referred to as racist, scholars generally reserve this term for collective efforts that promote white or Aryan dominance because these seek to bolster established racial systems of subordination and superordination. White supremacist, Nazi and neo-Nazi, White Power skinhead, Aryan supremacist, and white/Aryan separatist movements are types of modern racist movements (Barkun 1997).

The ideologies of racist movements typically are quite complex. All have a core belief in racial supremacism or racial separatism, but this may coexist with philosophies that seem quite antithetical, such as environmentalism, women’s rights, atheism, or anticolonialism. The ability to embrace beliefs from widely differing ideologies and social contexts while retaining racism as a central agenda is described as the “scavenger” aspect of modern racism (Mosse 1985). Racist movements are generally adept at recruiting members by presenting racial solutions to a wide range of nonracial social concerns, including anxieties about crime, the quality of children’s education, the global economy, or national pride. Such ideological flexibility is why some racist movements
with very extreme racial views manage to attract a wide base of adherents (Blee 2002; Zeskind 2009).

Until the late twentieth century, racist movements tended to be fervently nationalistic. Racist leaders identified the interests of whites or Aryans as what was best for the nation as a whole and advocated national purges of other races. In the twenty-first century, a number of racist movements have rejected narrow nationalist appeals in favor of global racist politics, what some term a movement of “pan-Aryanism.” The waning of nationalism in these racist movements is due to a variety of factors. Opportunities to spread the influence of racist movements through transnational venues such as the Internet have proven attractive. Also compelling is the global circulation of racist mercenaries and terrorists, as well as a global trade in armaments and other contraband that presents the possibility for enhanced funding of racist movements. Equally important has been the declining support for national governments by racist movements. Many racist movements in the US, Canada, and Europe embrace extreme anti-Jewish philosophies, often based on variants of Christian Identity, a racist philosophy that regards Jews as the powerful and literal descendants of the devil. These movements describe western governments as under the control of a Jewish elite, or, in racist terminology, as “Zionist Occupied Governments (ZOG)” and thus as obstacles to racist agendas (Blee 2002; Durham 2007; Zeskind 2009).

The penchant for secrecy about strategies and future plans that is characteristic of virtually all modern racist movements makes it difficult to predict their future course, but it is likely that they will be small and very violent. In the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, particularly the extermination of millions of European Jews through deliberate policies of racial supremacy, overt racist appeals became less legitimate in many parts of the Western world. Also, racial hierarchies of privilege and subordination were sufficiently institutionalized in much of the West in the postwar period that there was little impetus for mass racist mobilization to challenge existing arrangements. Racist movements that mobilized in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries thus tended to be small groupings of White Power advocates, neo-Nazis, and Aryan supremacists. Except where they allied with political parties in some European and Southern African nations, these movements have had little direct impact on the policies of the nations in which they are located. Instead, some of the most influential racist movements have turned to strategies of violence and terrorism, seeking to disrupt the social order and provoke social chaos, a strategy they describe as instigating an apocalyptic “race war” to eradicate Jews and non-whites.

WHY DO RACIAL MOVEMENTS ARISE?

Theories of why racist movements begin and how they attract adherents generally use frustration-reaction or intergroup competition frameworks. Frustration-reaction theory is based in older scholarly understandings of racist movements as collective and irrational expressions of anger by members of one racial group toward members of another. According to this theory, racist movements might accurately target groups that are responsible for their perceived problems, but, more often, they displace anger from the antagonist to a more vulnerable group that serves as a scapegoat and target of collective aggression. The case of Nazism in Germany – especially before the Nazi seizure of state power – is an example of how racist movements emerge as a response to collective frustration. The Nazis, in this formulation, took advantage of the discontent evoked by economic turmoil and the national humiliation of Germany in World War I to build a popular movement. Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and others became scapegoats for collective anger over Germany’s national distress. When the Nazi movement took control of the German state, such sentiments made it possible to unleash a
“final solution” of racial extermination, with catastrophic consequences (Blee & Creasap 2010).

A competing and later theory regards racist movements as the product of antagonisms that stem from competition between racial groups for social, economic, cultural, or territorial advantages (Olzak 1992; Beck 2002). Competition theory has been used to explain the rise and fall of such racist movements as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a series of largely unconnected white supremacist movements as the first KKK emerged in the Reconstruction-era South. This Klan was a small, loosely organized grouping of rural white men who used terror to bolster Southern white male privileges and combat what they feared to be the growing strength of African Americans and Northern politicians after the Civil War. This Klan collapsed in the 1870s in the wake of federal sanctions and, perhaps more importantly, because whites perceived political or economic competition from African Americans to have waned as the result of racist legislation and renewed white control of the Southern economy. In the mid-1910s, a new Klan emerged in the South, but this KKK movement grew strongest in the cities of the Midwest, East Coast, and West Coast. Competition theory explains the shift in the Klan’s base as the result of changes in patterns of interracial rivalry. White Protestants in Northern and coastal states turned to the Klan when they felt threatened by large numbers of Catholic and Jewish immigrants and the migration of African Americans from the South. The second Klan thus used economic boycotts and electoral politics to curb competition and maintain the privileges of white native-born Protestants. After the collapse of the second Klan in the late 1920s, subsequent eruptions of the KKK were small and concentrated in the South, emerging largely in response to racial integration of schools (Blee 1991; Cunningham 2004; Durham 2007).

Competition and, less commonly, frustration-reaction theories are widely used in the study of racist movements, but there are problems with each theory. Frustration-reaction theory has been criticized for reducing social phenomena to individual psychological states, making it difficult to account for the varying appeal of racist movements in times or places in which people are likely to experience similar levels of anger or distress. Moreover, research on racist movements, even German Nazism, finds that factors other than intergroup hostility are significant in mobilizing people toward racist collective action, and that racist activists are no less logical or rational than others in a similar social context. Frustration-reaction theory can also be circular, using the presence of racist movements as evidence of antecedent collective anxiety. Competition theory is generally more robust for explaining racist movements (Blee & Creasap 2010). This theory suggests that racist movements emerge as the result of economic and political competition among racial groups. The spike in racist movements and racial violence in late twentieth-century Europe that accompanied the influx of migrants from former colonies in northern Africa and South Asia is an example, as is the racist backlash that occurred with postcommunist economic and political uncertainty in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, counterexamples suggest that competition theory might not be universally applicable. The largest racist movements in the twentieth-century US occurred in the 1910s–1920s, 1950s–1960s, and 1980s, times of relative economic prosperity for many whites in which racial competition for jobs and social benefits was relatively low; in contrast, the serious economic depression of the 1930s, with its severe competition for jobs and economic benefits, witnessed comparatively fewer racist movements. A recent variant of competition theory, the “power-devaluation model,” (McVeigh 2009) escapes some of the problems that plague frustration-reaction and competition theories. Addressing the question of what propels socially privileged groups like whites to mobilize in movements like the Ku Klux Klan, this model suggests that
right-wing movements appear when structural changes devalue the economic, political, or status power of privileged groups, provoking interpretive shifts that propel these groups to activate resources and take advantage of political opportunities to reverse their losses.

DATA AND METHODOLOGIES

Racist movements pose complicated problems for researchers. Most evident is the danger of studying groups in which violence is common and directed not only at those perceived to be enemies of the movement, but also at allies, even members. Researchers may find it difficult to avoid becoming a target of a violence that tends to suffuse organized racism. Moreover, since racist groups generally seek to avoid public scrutiny and are particularly concerned about infiltration by government authorities, researchers face danger if they are perceived as disseminating negative information about racist groups or as potential government informants (Blee 2007).

Another problem for the study of racist movements is that they tend to operate illegally or on the margins of legality. Except in the rare cases where racist movements operate in the political mainstream, visible racist activists also face sanction from family, friends, and employers. Most racist movements thus operate in ways that are difficult for authorities and researchers to trace, creating few documents and attempting to obfuscate the identities, intentions, and activities of their members (Sehgal 2009).

Concerns about researcher safety and the inaccessibility of racist groups have had a pronounced effect on the methodologies used in racist movement studies, especially by shaping the techniques of data collection. Much research on racist movements is based on information made publicly available by racist groups, such as group propaganda, speeches at rallies and protests, and interviews with racist spokespersons. These have proven useful in detailing changes over time in the ideological direction of racist groups and their ability to mobilize adherents for public events. However, the validity of such data is questionable since these reflect what racist leaders deem useful to be disseminated and reveal little about how racist groups actually operate. Such important questions as how racist movements are funded, what alliances exist among racist groups, and how organized racists formulate strategies cannot be addressed with information garnered from racist movements themselves. Moreover, such data tend to overemphasize the importance of self-designated leaders, making it difficult to understand the composition and activities of other members. Indeed, many racist movements today contain substantial numbers, even majorities, of women and teenagers who are almost never regarded internally as their leaders or spokespersons (Blee 2007).

A second source of data on racist movements is government intelligence and information from private antiracist monitoring agencies such as Searchlight (England) or the Southern Poverty Law Center (US). These agencies collect and disseminate information from the public events of racist groups, as well as information acquired through arrests and criminal and civil prosecutions of racist members and groups, and from infiltrators or defectors from the racist movement. Such data have been used effectively to analyze the strategic and tactical operations of racist movements across the world. Yet the validity of such information too can be questionable since it is often collected to meet the needs or enhance the political advantages of monitoring agencies rather than for purposes of social scientific research.

A third and much less common source of data on racist movements is ethnographic observation of the inner workings of racist groups or interviews with their members. To get access to accurate information while protecting the safety of a researcher requires lengthy and delicate negotiation with racist activists. These data have only been collected on a small number of racist groups, limited geographical areas, and subsets of racist activists such as women or
teenaged White Power skinheads. Conclusions derived from analyses of these data may have limited generalizability (Blee 2007).

GAPS IN RACIST MOVEMENT RESEARCH

There are large gaps in what is known about racist movements. The difficulty of collecting valid data on secretive and dangerous groups, as well as widespread scholarly aversion to studying loathsome social movements, has resulted in a paucity of research on racist social movements relative to social movements that advocate progressive social change. There is a need for additional research on four important aspects of racist movements.

First, there is virtually no data on global circulation of ideas, strategies, resources, or members of racist movements. It is unclear whether or how racist movements in various parts of the world have coordinated their efforts, or even how the notion of pan-Aryan unity has been received across different racist movements.

Second, scholars do not fully understand how and why people are attracted to racist ideas and movements. The theory that adherence to racist groups is a product of individual pathologies or irrational emotions is clearly inadequate, but a more robust understanding of the mechanisms and motivations of racist movement recruitment has not been formulated.

Third, there is only fragmentary evidence about the range of outcomes that are associated with different types of racist movements. It is unclear, for example, whether the adoption of Christian Identity precepts is likely to precipitate strategies of terrorist violence. It is also unknown whether small, secretive racist groups will prove to be more durable than larger racist movements.

Finally, the connections between racist movements and the social contexts in which they emerge and are sustained need additional study. It is not enough to assert that racist societies provide the social environment in which racist movements can develop, as there is considerable variation in the extent to which this occurs. Rather, researchers need to explore the mechanisms that link the extreme ideologies of racist movements with the normative and institutionalized racist practices of their societies.

SEE ALSO: Antiapartheid movement (South Africa); Antiracist movements in Europe; Christian Identity movement; Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Extremism; Ideology; Nazi movement (Germany); Neo-Nazi movements in Europe and the United States; Right-wing movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Recruitment
STEVEN E. BARKAN and STEVEN F. COHN

Social movements have long been an important basis of political participation in democracies and have achieved major political, social, and cultural changes. Although the influence of social movements depends largely on their ability to recruit members, it is by no means obvious why people choose to participate in them.

This question has been termed “the free rider problem.” As Mancur Olson’s (1965) analysis indicates, people have limited time and energy and must choose to spend these resources in ways that most benefit themselves. Individuals join social movements because they believe that the movement’s goals, if implemented, would yield significant benefits to themselves and/or to the attainment of values they cherish. Although these benefits motivate participation, there is an additional problem. If a movement has few participants, people desiring these benefits might believe that the movement could not succeed unless they joined the movement. Thus, joining the movement might represent a rational investment of their time, energy, and, often, money. However, if a movement already has a large number of participants, then it is unlikely that one more person’s joining the movement would increase its chances of success. In that case, why would additional people join? If the movement is successful, they, along with the participants, would enjoy the fruits of this success; they would have gained all the benefits of participation without spending their own scarce resources of time and energy. In that case, they could use these resources to gain other benefits for themselves, while “free riding” on the efforts of those already participating.

One possible response to this free rider problem is that people who join social movements do not rationally calculate the costs and benefits of their joining. Analyses of social movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries indeed assumed that social movements were not rational enterprises and that those who joined them were, in fact, acting on the basis of irrational impulses. The most prominent proponent of this view, Gustave Le Bon (1897), a French theorist, said that people joined movements because they succumbed to crowd emotions and lost their ability to resist unconscious instincts. This general belief informed views of social movements well into the twentieth century, as these views stressed that movements represented an emotional and relatively unorganized response to a breakdown in social norms and social organization. Individuals were said to be attracted to movements because they were lonely and alienated because of weak social ties and hence sought in movements a sense of belonging they otherwise lacked.

This nonrational model of social movements has since fallen into disfavor. Social movements are now viewed as rational enterprises in pursuit of many kinds of political, social, and cultural changes, and their members are viewed as rational individuals favoring such changes. However, the success of recent efforts to demonstrate the rationality of social movement participants has re-emphasized the importance of addressing the free rider problem: if these people are rational, why do they participate at all? The contemporary literature on social movement recruitment and participation tries to answer this question.

Its dominant response derives from analogous work in complex and voluntary organizations, including labor unions. Organizations generally offer several types of resources to motivate recruitment and higher levels of participation after recruitment. These include (1) coercion; (2) utilitarian incentives such as paid income in work organizations and discounts for various goods and services in voluntary organizations; (3) normative (or purposive)
incentives that appeal to the values, concerns, and ideologies of individuals and, in social movements, lead people to identify with a movement’s goals and to believe that the movement is capable of achieving its goals; and (4) social (or solidary) incentives that make participation socially rewarding in terms of friendships and other personal contacts. Because social movement organizations (SMOs), like other voluntary organizations, typically lack the first two types of incentives, they must rely heavily on the latter two types to induce people to join them and to motivate higher levels of participation after joining. In these respects, normative and social incentives act as selective incentives to induce self-interested people to devote time and energy to participation rather than to other potentially rewarding activities. An additional category of organizational incentives that lead people to feel a sense of belonging to the movement is also thought to be important for levels of post-recruitment participation.

In contrast to many types of voluntary organizations, normative incentives in social movements depend heavily on the movement’s (or its SMO’s) political ideologies and beliefs. These cognitions include the movement’s grievances, goals, and strategies for change. Individuals whose own ideologies and beliefs are congruent with those of the movement are more likely to join it. In addition to these movement-specific ideologies, more general cognitions may also influence decisions to join. These include a liberal vs. conservative belief system, a feeling of political efficacy, and religious ideologies. Movements and organizations that are liberal tend to attract liberal individuals, while those that are conservative tend to attract conservative individuals. People who feel politically efficacious, that is, who believe that citizen participation generally, and their own particularly, can make a difference, are more likely to join than those who are politically alienated. Social movements and SMOs with a religious basis for their activities attract members whose religious beliefs coincide with those of the movement or SMO.

In all these respects, a movement’s set of ideologies is thought to be an important, necessary condition for recruiting members, but it is far from a sufficient condition. The reason for this is simple: many more people agree with a movement’s goals and other ideologies than ever participate in the movement or help it in any other way. This recognition has led the contemporary social movement literature to stress the importance of social incentives. In this view, people join movements because they have pre-existing friendship and organizational ties that induce them to join. For example, agreeing to some friends’ request to join them in a protest wins their appreciation, while declining their request may win their displeasure. In this respect, recruitment into social movements is no different from the many other activities in which social ties play an important role. Accordingly, a host of studies finds that individuals with pre-existing ties to movement members will be more likely to join a movement than those with fewer or no such ties. These ties appear to be especially important for recruitment into high-risk activism like the Freedom Rides in the US South that were a hallmark of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. By challenging the earlier, nonrational model’s assumption that social movements attract lonely and alienated individuals, the emphasis in contemporary work on friendship and organizational networks reinforces the rationality of social movement participation.

Turning to postrecruitment participation, individuals who develop friendships after joining a movement or SMO tend to exhibit higher levels of participation than those with fewer or no such friendships. In this regard, SMOs with a national membership face particular problems because their members are geographically isolated and usually have little contact with each other or with the national organization. To deal with this situation, some national organizations have developed a “federated” structure involving many local chapters. Because these chapters enable interaction and friendships among members who live near each other, they enhance commitment to the organization.
itself and promote higher levels of participation on its behalf.

Organizational incentives are the final type of resource offered by SMOs and are thought to be especially important for postrecruitment participation. These incentives take two forms, perceptions and communication. Members have various perceptions of their SMO. A first perception, *legitimacy*, involves members’ willingness to trust SMO leaders and to support their decisions, even if the members might disagree with some of these decisions. Those with higher levels of perceived legitimacy are more likely to exhibit higher levels of postrecruitment participation. A second perception involves members’ beliefs in the *effectiveness* of their SMO. Postrecruitment participation is generally higher among members who perceive stronger effectiveness. A final perception concerns members’ *commitment*, including their sense of belonging, to their SMO and movement. Members who are more committed also exhibit higher levels of postrecruitment participation. *Communication* with SMO leaders and staff also matters. In particular, members who are contacted more often by their SMO’s leaders and staff or otherwise communicate with them are also thought to exhibit higher levels of postrecruitment participation than members with less or no such communication.

Future work on recruitment should address at least three problems in the literature. The first problem concerns potential deficiencies in the studies of recruitment. An ideal study would be predictive and would study a random sample of adults, predicting which factors would lead some of them to join a particular social movement. Because only a small proportion of adults become members of any given social movement, such a study would need an extremely large sample to have any statistical validity and would be astronomically expensive. Because of this, studies of social movement recruitment are limited in scope. Some studies are retrospective, asking current participants why they initially chose to participate. Results from these studies depend upon the assumption that current participants can accurately remember and will accurately report why they started to participate, and these studies often have no adequate control group of nonparticipants. Other studies are predictive but only in a limited context: for example, they study who among a set of people in a particular locality who favor the goals of a social movement rally actually choose to participate in the rally. As these difficulties suggest, the recruitment literature would benefit from better designed studies, but, because of the nature of recruitment into social movements, such studies are difficult to devise.

A second problem in the recruitment literature concerns the many types of social movements. Many typologies of movements exist, but a common typology divides them, based on their goals, into political or social reform movements, religious movements, self-help movements, and cultural movements. Within each category there are many types of specific movements that have existed in many different nations and localities within nations and across many different decades and centuries. Although many studies of recruitment exist, they do not begin to match in number the sheer quantity of movements, and additional work on unstudied movements may shed new light on the dynamics of recruitment.

Finally, studies of recruitment obviously imply that one is being recruited into something. But what is this something? What does it mean to be a member of a social movement? If someone takes part in just one protest on behalf of a social movement, is that person a member of that movement? As this question suggests, people do not usually sign up for a movement in the way they sign up for many other activities. To compound this problem, some SMOs are organized in a very formal manner, with clear membership rolls and criteria for membership, while others are organized much more loosely, with unclear criteria for membership and only a loose understanding, if that, of who their members are. In the most informal SMOs, members may literally come and go, and it is not at all easy to identify their members. The lack of a clear understanding in movements and SMOs, and thus in
the recruitment literature, of what it means to be a member confounds efforts to achieve a comprehensive understanding of recruitment, however important such an understanding is for the study of social movements.

SEE ALSO: Commitment; Framing and social movements; Free rider problem; Ideology; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Networks and social movements; Participation in social movements; Rational choice theory and social movements; Resource mobilization theory; Social movement organization (SMO); Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The relative deprivation model aims to explain individuals’ decisions to join or start social movements and is based on a certain set of psychological ideas (Gurr 1970). Relative deprivation itself refers to “the gap between what one has and what one expects” (Brush 1996), particularly in comparison to some specific reference group. The concept of relative deprivation has its roots in the early “frustration-aggression hypothesis” of John Dollard, which suggested that when individuals respond to frustration and do not receive a response that relieves their frustration, such individuals will respond with aggression. Relative deprivation has been used as the mechanism to explain where this frustration emerges from.

Analysts of relative deprivation have specified a variety of dimensions of deprivation that individuals may experience. These include aspirational deprivation, having increasing aspirations that are not realized; decremental deprivation, when expectations are stable but available resources are declining; and progressive deprivation, improvement in general social, economic, or power conditions which is followed by a sudden reversal of these trends. In general, in order to experience relative deprivation, an individual must not only experience desire, but also feel that she or he has a right to gain access to the sought-after resources. In addition, she or he must experience a perception that the likelihood of access being blocked is quite high. The contradiction between this feeling of entitlement and this feeling of stymied progress forms a type of cognitive dissonance which becomes activated through the appearance of a structural strain (McPhail 1971).

While many theorists of relative deprivation have confined their analysis to exploring when relative deprivation emerges and what form it takes, some have gone further to specify a mechanism whereby relative deprivation leads to collective action. The combination of feelings of relative deprivation with structural strain can lead individuals to come to see the sources of the blockages to their aspirations as structural blockages. Therefore, these individuals are led to seek structural solutions by working together as part of a similarly situated group – in other words, a social movement.

More sophisticated relative deprivation analyses include deprivation along with other factors, such as the balance of power between parties or resource mobilization. For instance, Korpi (1974) suggests that it is not only how deprived a group feels in terms of power resources that matters, it is also the rate of change in access to these resources relative to other groups, and that, of the three types of deprivation, only progressive deprivation is likely to lead to situations of conflict. Similarly, Tilly (1973), while not writing specifically in the relative deprivation school, notes that violent collective action is particularly likely both when a group is gaining power relative to others and when they are losing it. Miller, Bolce, and Halligan (1977) propose another instance in which the experience of relative deprivation is likely to matter: in the case of uncertainty about the future. They note that only certain disaster is more frustrating than uncertainty. More specifically, models based on the notion of relative deprivation have been used to explain when revolution does and does not occur, how religious movements or cults come into being, and the timing of urban race riots.

The empirical evidence used to demonstrate relative deprivation is usually socioeconomic in nature and collected on aggregate levels, such as census data, even though deprivation itself is an individual experience. In addition, more recent empirical research has had difficulty confirming the usefulness of relative deprivation models. For instance, relative deprivation may be able to explain some small part of the
variation in riots, but it is unable to explain why the majority of individuals who face relative deprivation do not act on this. However, even some analysts who are not fully impressed by the relative deprivation approach point to the likelihood that individual members of social movement organizations may talk about their reasons for forming or joining the movement in terms that can be conceived of as relative deprivation. Others have criticized the relative deprivation model because it cannot be tested empirically without some sort of evidence of feelings of deprivation prior to the collective action episode. The model, therefore, is less commonly employed in sociological analyses of social movements today, though it continues to prove popular among psychologists. Some contemporary scholars do utilize relative deprivation models in analyses of protest among immigrant groups (see, for instance, Grant 2008).

SEE ALSO: Convergence/dispositional theory; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Participation in social movements; Social psychology of movement participation; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Repression and social movements

JENNIFER EARL

The repression of social movements refers to attempts by individuals, groups, or state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police) to control, constrain, or prevent protest. Historically, this has often involved increasing the costs associated with social movement participation (e.g., through violence, arrest, etc.). Commonly studied forms of repression include police action at public protest events, such as arrests and police violence, military suppression of protest events, “disappearances” of activists, arrests and/or imprisonment of activists, infiltration of social movements by informants, covert counterintelligence programs, restrictions of free speech and assembly, assaults on human rights, and murders of social movement activists. In the digital age, repression has also blurred with censorship in states that do not allow unfettered, and/or unmonitored access to the Internet.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF REPRESSION

Since the above examples represent a wide variety of ways to suppress or control protest, scholars have sought to distinguish between different types of repressive actions. Two common distinctions are between overt repression (e.g., public protest policing, see della Porta & Reiter 1998; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy 2003) and covert repression (on covert repression, see Marx 1974; Cunningham 2004) and between coercive repression (e.g., state violence, see Davenport 1995) and channeling (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson 1991). Researchers make these kinds of distinctions because they suspect that the dynamics and consequences of repression may differ depending on the kind of repressive tactic deployed.

The distinction between overt and covert is based on visibility of the repressive acts (or, at least, how visible they are intended to be). For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ran a series of covert counterintelligence programs against selected social movements in the US during the 1950s through early 1970s. These programs used methods, such as tapping phone lines, examining mail, and burglarizing dwellings and offices to gather information, that were meant to affect the ability of social movements to survive and/or deploy certain tactics, without the public recognizing that the FBI was targeting these groups (Cunningham 2004). In contrast, other repressive actions are publicly visible (i.e., overt). Consider, for instance, the Chinese government’s actions at Tiananmen Square, where the government used military tanks to crush protesters and move crowds. The policing of major public protest events is a very common type of overt repression.

The distinction between coercion and channeling is also important. Coercion involves violence, harassment, and surveillance while channeling occurs when laws, policies, or actions reward protest movements for using certain kinds of tactics (typically, more institutional and/or nonviolent tactics) while discouraging others (typically, more radical, noninstitutional, or violent tactics). Coercive repression is well known: the tanks in Tiananmen Square, South American death squads, and murders of civil rights activists in the US are all examples of coercive repression. In contrast, channeling focuses on the proverbial carrots that can lure protesters towards certain tactics and/or goals as well as the proverbial sticks that push protesters away from certain tactics and/or goals. For example, McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson (1991) argue that US tax laws on nonprofit status
encourage social movement organizations to take more institutional action and less political action and thereby “channel” dissent. If social movement organizations were to organize the use of violent tactics for political ends, for instance, their tax exempt status could be threatened. Another well-studied example of channeling involves donations to social movement organizations. Some scholars have argued that philanthropists encourage moderate protest and discourage radical protest by funding moderate social movement organizations and de-funding organizations that radicalize. Although empirical research suggests that funding can be reactive, scholars have not confirmed the extent to which de-funding, in particular, actually occurs.

A less frequently invoked distinction between different kinds of repression involves who is “doing” the repression. The bulk of research on the repression of social movements has focused on the role of state actors even though private groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), White Citizens Councils, universities, and corporations) as well as philanthropists have been implicated in the repression of social movements (Earl 2004). The KKK, for example, engaged in coercive repression against civil rights activists, and corporations have employed private security agents to disrupt strikes. Further, even among state actors, there are important theoretical differences. Militaries charged with repression in authoritarian states are likely to differ from local police agencies, both with respect to how they distribute repression and the types of repressive actions they employ.

All of these distinctions are important because they bear on two fundamental questions that scholars have raised about repression: (1) how can researchers explain the level and types of repressive actions taken against different activists and social movements? and (2) how can researchers explain the consequences, or effects, of repression on activists and social movements? Given the importance of these distinctions, Earl (2003) crossed these three dimensions or distinctions – overt vs. covert, coercive vs. channeling, and distinctions amongst types of repressive actors (national state-based actors, local state-based actors, and private actors) – to produce a typology of 12 different types of repression. These categories can be used to systematize comparisons across research findings and to create hypotheses about dependencies between different styles of repression (e.g., private repression rises when overt, state-based coercion rises).

WHAT IS REPRESSION VERSUS SOCIAL CONTROL MORE BROADLY?

An emerging debate in repression research involves not just distinctions between broad types of repression (as discussed in the prior section), but a debate over what is focused enough to be meaningfully studied as repression (and, hence, comparable to other forms of repression) at all. That is, can the definition of repression be stretched so far that it blurs into general social control and becomes analytically unhelpful to social movement scholars?

One impetus for this debate is the phenomenon of quiescence. In a perfectly repressive situation, one would never see any protest and repressive mechanisms might be covert or unnoticed. Thus, a literature that studies how private and public actors “take on” protesters is already studying a situation in which full repression has failed (Oliver 2008). Thus, a thorough study of repression would need to understand the production of quiescence (Gaventa 1980).

However, as soon as one starts down the path of studying quiescence, a host of theoretical issues beset scholars. For instance, in many of the company towns that Gaventa studied, protest was unthinkable because of the multiple ways in which employees depended on employers (e.g., for company housing, for goods through the company store, for medical care, for the employment of other family members in towns with only one employer, etc.). This meant the employers could create huge costs for the slightest hint of dissent, thereby producing mass quiescence. But this
Repression and Social Movements

Quiescence results from a broad set of social controls that may or may not be designed to control dissent and protest. Whether pervasive employer controls in company towns are designed to limit labor activism or employers simply enjoy limited labor activism as a by-product of company towns designed for other reasons is an important question. It cuts to the heart of whether control measures must be designed to limit protest in order to be considered a form of repression.

Oliver (2008) suggests another case of social control that calls into question the boundaries of repression as a concept. She argues that repression researchers should be concerned with trends in mass incarceration in the US, which have resulted in a massive swelling of state control through jails, prisons, probation, and parole and has disproportionately affected people of color. Oliver asks what the civil rights movement might have looked like if it were not for mass incarceration and, in doing so, calls into question whether forms of social control that are not uniquely tied to protest, but have major implications for protest, should be studied by repression researchers. Similarly, other scholars have questioned whether the subjugation of women should be considered a form of repression. Earl (2004) suggests one alternative, arguing for a reframing of research around the social control of protest, versus repression, which would include both actions intended as repression and more general forms of social control that have demonstrable impacts on protest. Doing so would expose the consequences of analytic distinctions between intentional repression and general social control to future research. Fernandez (2008) advocates a similar approach, arguing for the study of the social control of dissent. However, it is clear that the debate over what “counts” as repression versus social control is still far from resolved.

EXPLAINING THE LEVEL OR TYPE OF REPRESSION

One of the major questions facing repression researchers involves how one explains repression. This casts repression as a dependent variable such that its level/severity, form, targeting, etcetera, become the focus of explanation. Most of this research has focused on explaining the level of particular types of repression. For instance, scholars may separately attempt to explain the number of protests at which police will be present, the number of political murders, or the severity of restrictions on free speech or free association in a country, but scholars have much less frequently examined how an increase in the severity of free speech and free association restrictions might affect the rate of political murders in the same country. However, researchers interested in explaining repression have recently considered how multiple layers of the state may work together, or in tension, in efforts to suppress a social movement.

In explaining the prevalence, level, or severity, scholars have focused on a small set of causal explanations. The most robustly supported explanation is the “threat” model of repression (Earl & Soule 2006; Davenport 2007a). This approach predicts that the more threatening a social movement, a social movement organization, or a protest activity is to the government and government elites, the more likely or severe repressive action will be. Because the emphasis is on threats to regimes, this approach has largely been used to explain repressive acts by governments or actors closely connected to the state.

Scholars working within a threat perspective have differed in whether they consider objective threats or subjective threats to be most important. Scholars who emphasize objective threats have been referred to as “rationalists” or “realists” (Davenport 2007a). Other scholars argue that governments and political elites do not always recognize existing threats, may misinterpret a nonthreat as threatening, or may otherwise exaggerate or downplay objective threats (e.g., Boudreau 2005). Scholars emphasizing the subjectivity of threats refer to the process by which states and/or political elites recognize and/or construct threats as “threat perception.”
Whether concerned with objective or subjective threats, a range of particular factors have been identified as objectively threatening, or likely to be perceived as threatening, including the mobilization of large numbers of social movement supporters and participants, the use of radical or violent protest tactics, and the embrace of radical or transformative ideologies, to list a few.

Other researchers have argued that states are opportunists. Assuming that states would prefer to suppress all challengers, scholars argue that weak challengers, who are vulnerable to repression, will be targeted. Weakness could be indicated by a range of characteristics, such as the social composition of social movement supports and/or the level of resources a social movement has available.

Still others have argued that the level or severity of repression depends on internal dynamics within the organization charged with repression. For instance, recent research on the FBI’s covert counterintelligence programs in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that the organizational structure and decision-making processes of the FBI influenced what groups were targeted for action, the tactics that were used against targeted groups, and the extent to which different groups were consistently and heavily repressed (Cunningham 2004). Others have made similar arguments about organizational and institutional characteristics of police forces in explaining police action at protest events (Earl and Soule 2006). Still others have focused on police knowledge (e.g., della Porta 1995). Ethnographic work on protest policing suggests that police agencies attempt to delicately control large protests through planning and permitting restrictions (Fernandez 2008) but that on the ground interactions between protesters and police during events are also important (Waddington 1994).

Finally, some scholars have tied the level of repressiveness to democratic process, showing, for instance, that states that allow for more citizen voice also tend to be less repressive (Davenport 2007b). This represents an important development both in understanding how repression works internationally and in understanding the implications of democratization for repression around the world.

In contrast to these approaches, which view repression as an outcome of some directional causal process, others have argued for a more emergent view of repression. Specifically, some researchers interested in processes of interaction between insurgents and authorities argue that general explanations of repression are problematic because many repressive outcomes are actually the result of situational interactions and thus cannot be predicted (e.g., police interact with protesters and out of that interaction emerges a police response to protesters).

Other scholars interested in interactions between activists and repressive agents have understood interaction to be less about situational interactions and more about the over-time relationships between authorities and insurgents. Framing the interaction between authorities and insurgents as a predator–prey situation, these students of social movements have argued that causal consistencies may exist. Methodological techniques, such as biological predator–prey statistical models, allow these researchers to statistically diagnose feedback processes between authorities and insurgents. For instance, a general version of one of these models would specify that the actions of repressive agents at Time 1 affect some movement characteristic at Time 2, which in turn affects the actions of repressive agents at Time 3. Some researchers have expanded these techniques to consider how repressive actors, movements, and countermovements interact over time and thereby affect the rate and/or severity of repression.

THE EFFECTS OF REPRESSIVE ACTION

Researchers have also examined the effects of repression on activists and social movements. Most of the research in this area focuses on the effects of repression on either the level of social
movement activity or the tactics deployed by social movements (see Earl & Soule 2010 for a review of this literature).

Before discussing theories about the effects of repression, it is important to understand how this debate is related to major theories on social movements. Some interest in the effects of repression on the level of social movement participation has been generated by the connection of repression to arguments surrounding “political opportunities.” In the political process approach to explaining social movement emergence, mobilization, and success, repression is thought to indicate closed political opportunities. Political opportunities are critical to political process theory because the theory’s fundamental proposition is that favorable political opportunities have a direct (or curvilinear, according to some) relationship with movement emergence, movement mobilization, and movement success.

One could further specify, differentiating between stable and volatile political opportunities. Stable opportunities are often defined as being structural, and hence are called political opportunity structures (POS). Repressive capacities or structural controls on repressive agents (e.g., constitutional limitations on police power) are seen by some scholars as POS. Volatile opportunities vary over time and may be less structural. The prevalence of state repression at a given moment is often referred to as being a component of volatile political opportunities.

Political process theorists argue that repression dampens social movement mobilization. Sometimes framed as increasing the costs of movement participation, the claim is that repression reduces the number of individuals willing to engage in protest. Others interested in rational choice models of collective action, but not in political process or political opportunities, have agreed with this cost-based argument, suggesting that repression raises the costs of activism and thus should reduce the overall amount of activism (Opp & Roehl 1990).

While supportive evidence of this claim has been found, evidence has also been found suggesting that repression radicalizes social movement participants (e.g., Hirsch 1990) or social movement organizations (Zwerman, Steinhoff, & della Porta 2000). Thus, instead of diminishing protest or deterring the use of particularly aggressive tactics, many scholars have argued that repression encourages further protest and the use of noninstitutional tactics.

Still other scholars have sought to reconcile these seemingly divergent empirical findings by arguing the repression has a curvilinear (or, alternatively, an inverted-U) relationship to movement participation and the use of confrontational tactics. Linden and Klandermans (2006) show that the effect of repression may also depend on how activists were recruited into activism, suggesting another way to reconcile discrepant macro findings. Stepping back from this dizzying array of arguments and findings, it is clear that repression research has yet to build a consensus on the effects of repression, or the conditions under which certain effects should be expected.

Some scholars have moved away from debates over the effects of repression on overall protest levels and instead focused on whether repression raises the costs of deploying a particular tactic and thereby reduces the number of individuals willing to use particular protest tactics. This is often referred to as tactical substitution (see Lichbach 1987). For instance, if violent protest tactics were repressed, tactical substitution would anticipate a shift toward less violent protest tactics.

SEE ALSO: Agents provocateurs; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Outcomes, political; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Political process theory; Repertoires of contention; Social control; Social control errors.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Resource mobilization theory

BOB EDWARDS and PATRICK F. GILLHAM

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) developed during the 1970s as a new generation of scholars sought to understand the emergence, significance, and effects of the social movements of the 1960s (see Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1988; Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Rejecting both the view held by some earlier movement scholars that social movement actors were deviant or anomic, and the pluralist assumption that all parties willing to engage in the political process have a reasonable chance that their grievances will be heard and addressed, resource mobilization scholars sought to understand how rational and often marginalized social actors mobilized effectively to pursue their desired social change goals (Freeman 1975; Gamson 1975; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Zald & McCarthy 1987; Staggenborg 1988; Tarrow 1994).

ORGANIZATIONAL-ENTREPRENEURIAL TRIBUTARY OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

The organizational-entrepreneurial branch of resource mobilization theory (RMT) reoriented social movement analysis by taking the analytical insights of organizational sociology and extending them by analogy to social movements. More recent exemplars of this perspective include Minkoff’s (1995) analysis of women’s and race-ethnic organizations; Smith, Chattfield, and Pagnucco (1997) on transnational social movement organizations (SMOs); Andrews’ (2004) study of the impact of the civil rights movement on local communities in Mississippi; a special issue on SMOs edited by Caniglia and Carmin (2005); and Gillham and Edwards’ (2011) analysis of SMO efforts to manage legitimacy in order to preserve key resource streams or exchange relationships. From this perspective a social movement is a set of preferences for social change within a population (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Individuals who share those social change preferences are called adherents, while those who contribute resources of various kinds to help the movement mobilize are constituents. Those who watch from the sidelines are bystanders. A key analytical issue for RMT is understanding how social movements turn bystanders into adherents and subsequently adherents into constituents and ultimately mobilize constituents to active participation. Such tasks of mobilization are undertaken most often by SMOs.

In their classic formulation McCarthy and Zald (1973) identified a trend in US social movements toward the increasing significance of large, formally organized SMOs deploying professional staff to pursue the broad social change goals of their constituents. Early RMT was closely associated with the trend toward professionalization and debates over its impact were a focus of much research (Staggenborg 1988; Andrews & Edwards 2004). Yet, while many SMOs are quite large with professional staffs and substantial resources, most are small, less formally organized groups operating at the local level (Edwards & Foley 2003). At a minimum an SMO is a named group that undertakes actions to further the social change goals of the social movement.

All SMOs pursuing the goals of the movement comprise a social movement industry (SMI). SMIs vary in size, and the capacity of a movement to engage in collective action is influenced greatly by type, amount and distribution of resources within its SMI. RMT expects that the greater the mobilization capacity of an SMI, the greater its potential for achieving some of its social change goals. The broader social movement sector (SMS) is

comprised of all SMIs and their component SMOs. In leaning on organizational sociology to reorient the study of social movements, RMT holds that SMIs and SMOs differ from governmental and market-sector organizations because of watershed differences in goals, their structural location in civil society, and in the varied resources and power they wield. Nevertheless, the SMS has grown dramatically over the last 30 years and has contributed to the increasing social change potential attributed to “civil society” worldwide.

RESOURCES ACCESS

Early formulations of RMT focused on broad patterns of resource availability and paid disproportionate attention to the mobilization of material resources from external sources. By contrast, recent RMT analysts emphasize more explicitly the uneven distribution of resources in a society, and seek to understand how individual and collective actors endeavor to alter that distribution in order to direct resources to social movements. In other words, RMT is becoming more explicitly a partial theory of overcoming resource inequality. Thus, questions of general resource “availability” have shifted toward questions of specific means of resource access.

Two long-standing debates about resource access center on whether social movements obtain their support primarily from internal or external sources and the closely related question about the extent to which external supporters constrain movement goals and activities. Recent developments in RMT seek to reframe this debate in several ways. Research has made it clear that social movements and individual SMOs generally obtain their resources from a combination of internal and external sources. All but the very smallest SMOs gain access to resources by multiple means.

MECHANISMS OF RESOURCE ACCESS

Four mechanisms of resource access are particularly important: self-production; aggregation from constituents; appropriation/co-optation; and patronage (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004).

Self-production

A fundamental mechanism by which social movements gain access to resources is to produce those resources themselves through the agency of existing organizations, activists, and participants. Movements produce social-organizational resources when they launch SMOs, develop networks, and form issue coalitions. They produce human resources by socializing their children into the ways and values of the movement, or by training participants and developing leaders. Movements like those for civil and human rights have produced out of their struggle a moral authority that is a powerful resource. Social movements also produce items with movement symbolic significance like T-shirts, coffee mugs, posters, art, and even cakes and cookies for bake sales, which can be sold to raise money or used directly to promote the movement.

Aggregation

Resource aggregation refers to the ways a movement or specific SMO converts resources held by dispersed individuals into collective resources that can be allocated by movement actors. Social movements aggregate privately held resources from beneficiary and conscience constituents in order to pursue collective goals. Monetary or human resources are aggregated by soliciting donations from broadly dispersed individuals in order to fund group activities, or recruiting volunteers to help with an activity. Yet, SMOs also aggregate other types of resources as well. For example, moral resources held by others can be aggregated by compiling and publicizing lists of respected individuals and organizations that endorse group goals and actions.

Co-optation/appropriation

Social movements often utilize relationships they have with existing organizations and
groups to access resources previously produced or aggregated by those other organizations. Resource co-optation generally carries the tacit understanding that the resources will be used in mutually agreeable ways. In the US context churches and church-related organizations have probably produced resources most often co-opted by social movements from buildings, members, and staff, social networks, rituals, and discourses or moral authority.

**Patronage**

Social movements also gain access to resources through patronage. Patronage refers to the provision of resources to an SMO by an individual or organization that often specializes in patronage. Foundation grants, private donations, or government contracts are common in financial patronage. In monetary patronage relationships actors external to the movement or SMO provide a substantial amount of financial support and usually exert a degree of control over how their money can be used. Patrons may even attempt to influence an SMO’s policy decisions and day-to-day operations. Human resources can be acquired through patronage relationships as when one SMO loans staff to another for a set period of time as is common in issue campaigns or coalitions.

**RESOURCE TYPES**

Despite the obvious centrality of resources to RMT, analysts were slow to develop a clear conceptualization of resources. Analysis and often heated debate focused on a narrow range of material and human resources. Yet, resources important to social movement mobilization are more varied. In recent years RMT analysts have benefited from broader developments in social science and made considerable gains in specifying and differentiating between five distinct types of resources: moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material (see Edwards & McCarthy 2004).

**Moral resources**

Moral resources include legitimacy, integrity, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity. Of these, legitimacy has received the most theoretical attention, and celebrity perhaps the least. Collective actors who most closely mimic institutionally legitimated or “mainstream” expectations gain advantages over groups that fit those expectations poorly. Similarly, celebrity endorsements of an issue campaign can increase media coverage, generate public attention, and open doors to policymakers and resource providers alike. Moral resources tend to originate outside of a social movement or SMO and are generally bestowed by an external source known to possess them, as in a celebrity lending their fame, the receipt of awards like the Nobel Peace Prize by a prominent activist, or the certification by an external credentialing body like the Internal Revenue Service. Nevertheless, some movements succeed in the difficult task of creating moral resources, as was clearly the case with the US Southern civil rights movement or, more recently, the international human rights movement. Because moral resources can often be retracted, they are both less accessible and more proprietary than cultural resources.

**Cultural resources**

Cultural resources are artifacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools and specialized knowledge that have become widely, though not necessarily universally, known. These include tacit knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, forming an organization, initiating a festival, or utilizing new social media. This category includes tactical repertoires, organizational templates, and technical or strategic know-how required to either mobilize, produce events, or access additional resources. Specific cultural resources are widely available in a given society, but neither evenly distributed, nor universally available. In
other words, not every member of a society or social group possesses specific competencies or knowledge that could be valuable to a social movement or SMO. This points to a key difference between cultural and moral resources. Cultural resources are more widely accessible and available for use independent of favorable judgments from those outside a movement or SMO. Cultural resources include movement- or issue-relevant productions like music, literature, magazine/newspapers, or film/videos. Such cultural products facilitate the recruitment and socialization of new adherents and help movements maintain their readiness and capacity for collective action.

**Human resources**

Human resources are both more tangible and easier to appreciate than the above resource types. This category includes resources like labor, experience, skills, expertise, and leadership. Individuals typically have control over the use of their labor and other human resources and make them accessible to social movements or SMOs through participation. Yet, not all participants offer the same mix of capabilities. SMOs often require expertise of varying kinds and having access to lawyers, web designers, social media consultants, dynamic speakers, organizers, or outside experts when the need arises can be vitally important. The use-value of expertise often depends on the situation. For example, a prominent scientist may have little more to offer than a college intern if an environmental group needs to restore its web page after a crash. Similarly, a celebrated musician participating in a blockade contributes no additional human resource to the blockade, yet, from the standpoint of the moral resources contributed by the celebrity’s presence the evaluation would be much different.

**Material resources**

The category of material resources combines what economists would call financial and physical capital including monetary resources, property, office space, equipment, and supplies. The importance of monetary resources for social movements should not be underestimated. No matter how many other resources a movement mobilizes, it will incur costs and someone has to pay the bills. Material resources have received the most analytic attention because they are generally more tangible, more proprietary, and in the case of money more fungible than other resource types (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). In other words money can be converted into other types of resources (e.g., rent for office space, hiring of picketers, purchase of opinion ads) while the opposite is less often the case.

**Social-organizational resources**

There are three general forms of social-organizational resources: infrastructures, social networks, and organizations, each varying in their degree of organizational formality. Infrastructures are the social-organizational equivalent of public goods like the postal service, roads, or the Internet that facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday life. Infrastructures are nonproprietary social resources. By contrast, access to social networks and especially groups and formal organizations can be limited by insiders. Thus, access to resources embedded in them can be hoarded by insiders and denied to outsiders (e.g., donor lists). Such differential access only intensifies existing inequalities among groups in their ability to utilize crucial resources of other kinds. SMOs often seek to overcome the problem of resource scarcity by forming coalitions with other SMOs or by co-opting resources produced by others for nonmovement purposes, like churches, schools, service organizations, occupational groups, or, more broadly, civil society. The ease of SMO access to resources available by forming coalitions or produced by others for nonmovement purposes will vary depending on the perceived compatibility of the groups involved.
EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS

Combining the four means of access with the five types of resources discussed above specifies twenty specific exchange relationships through which social movements or SMOs acquire the various mixes of resources they use to pursue their social change goals (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). As indicated earlier, exchange relationships can be internal or external to an SMO. In addition, they differ in the use-value they provide and are contextualized by time and place. Exchange relationships differ in the use-value of the resources they make available to an SMO, whether material, human or other. Hence, an SMO wanting to influence conservative political elites might seek out as an exchange partner a large nationally recognized religious organization with the capacity to provide legitimacy, and thousands of dollars and letter-writing members, rather than a lesser known organization with far fewer moral, material, or human resources. By contrast, an organization wishing to generate significant media attention may seek out exchange partners known for engaging in innovative and high-profile tactics. The value of exchange relationships is context dependent in time and place. For example, valuable relations with elected officials or celebrities may lose use-value when such individuals are caught up in a public scandal. Conversely, relations might increase in value when minority parties become the majority or when a celebrity wins an award.

This broad view of exchange relations problematizes the long and narrow debate among social movement analysts over the extent to which acquiring resources from external sources constrains the actions of SMOs. That debate has focused almost exclusively on a single exchange relationship—monetary patronage. Yet, as articulated here, SMOs routinely manage numerous exchange relationships providing various kinds of resources. Hence, the impact of “source constraints” or the set of expectations and obligations between exchange partners depends in part upon the specific mix of resource access and resource type (Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Thus, among two professionalized SMOs actively involved in planning a large protest event, they may differ in the source of their moral, cultural, material, human, and organizational resources, which will provide different constraints or opportunities for both SMOs. For example, a union which draws resources from a diverse and more conservative membership base and has close relations to political elites might find it difficult to justify to their resource partners the use of confrontational tactics. In contrast, an SMO reliant on self-generated revenues from speaking fees and merchandise sales and with members that favor the exercise of civil disobedience will find it much easier to justify engagement in confrontational tactics, all else being equal.

CONCLUSION

By wedding together rational actors, strategic action, and organizational theory with the perennial effort by social groups to overcome the differential availability and distribution of resources needed to pursue social change, resource mobilization theory continues to be a central and salient theory for analyzing “politics by other means” (Gamson 1975; Zald & McCarthy 2002). Promising theoretical and empirical directions to take for RMT scholars include explorations of the importance of less tangible resources, such as legitimacy and social media networks, for movement mobilization and the formation of movement coalitions. Moreover, scholars might explore further the breadth of exchange relationships on which movement activists draw, including partnerships with agents of social control and even countermovement organizations and hostile political elites. Resource demobilization or reduction of resources to SMOs also needs further investigation, as it is currently assumed that the processes for mobilizing resources are reversed when SMOs fail. Finally, additional theorizing and research might apply RMT to collective endeavors not typically considered to
be social movements. For example, the emergence of alternative or youth subcultures, the development and diffusion of lifestyle sports, emerging musical or performance genres, as well as the formation, development, and decline of corporations or competing views on global climate change.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Culture and social movements; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Mechanisms; Networks and social movements; Political process theory; Rational choice theory and social movements; Social capital and social movements; Social movement industry; Social movement organization (SMO); Social movement sector.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Rights and rights movements

JOHN D. SKRENTNY and RENÉ PATNODE

The goal of many social movement organizations (SMOs) seeking political change is some kind of right. Rights-based movements have been the signature form of political movement since at least the mid-twentieth century in the West and are increasingly common in other parts of the world.

DEFINING THE SUBJECT: WHAT ARE RIGHTS?

SMOs that direct demands toward the state and seek some solution to a problem or disadvantage do not necessarily seek rights. A right is a guarantee or entitlement, that is, something that one is owed by virtue of membership in a polity or some other collective. Rights can be distinguished from benefits, charity, or public good measures, all of which may flow to an aggrieved group or everyone in society at the discretion of state actors. The distinction is captured in the titles of historian Linda Gordon’s book, Pitied but Not Entitled and Richard Scotch’s From Good Will to Civil Rights. (Of course, whether the state actually fulfills its duties in providing for rights is an open question, and some rights movements are not fighting for new rights, but that rights already in law are actually honored in practice.)

A rights movement, then, is an organized, collective effort using at least some means outside of formal institutions to effect changes that would have the state guarantee some benefit. The basis of the right is either formal membership in a polity (citizenship rights) or membership in the species (human rights).

Most rights-movement scholarship has focused on efforts to expand and deepen the meaning of citizenship. T.H. Marshall’s classic (1950) study offers a helpful roadmap for understanding the goals and trajectories of rights movements. Marshall argued that rights can be classified into three groups that developed in a historical sequence. The first group includes the civil rights. These are the classically liberal “freedoms from” government restriction or intervention. Secured in Western European states in the 1700s, civil rights include rights to due process, property rights, religious rights, press rights, and the right to work in one’s desired occupation. Political rights developed in the 1800s and include the right to vote and the right to hold office. Marshall was most interested in the 1900s development of social rights, or the welfare state rights to education, poverty relief, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and health insurance. His primary interest was in the relationship between Britain’s system of equality—the equality of rights bestowed by equal citizenship—and the inequality of social class.

Marshall’s interest in social rights led his attention away from the goal of many rights movements, especially in the second half of the twentieth century: the right to not be subject to public or private discrimination. For Marshall’s framework to be useful for studying rights movements, we need to also consider class hierarchies and their relationship to identity hierarchies, such as race and gender, which cut across class lines. In this view, we may highlight that the effort to bring civil, political, and social rights typically first involved expansion from the upper classes to the lower (propertyless) classes while being limited to white males. Once civil, political, and (in some polities) social rights were at least formally guaranteed to white men of all classes, much rights movement action focused on equalizing rights across the vertical cleavage lines of gender, race, national origin, etcetera.

Rights movements have clear connections to identity politics and “new social movements,”
though the overlap is not perfect. Not all identity politics are about rights; movements of identity politics may instead seek recognition or to change the view of the group held by others. For example, one issue for activists fighting for gays and lesbians related to how medical institutions, and particularly their official diagnostic manuals, defined “homosexuality.” Specifically, they sought to shift the definition to one that did not classify being gay as a psychological abnormality (Marcus 2002). That said, advocates of gay rights do also seek more rights such as recognized marriages and partner benefits. Thus rights and recognition often go hand in hand, although they are not equivalent.

CLASS-BASED RIGHTS MOVEMENTS

One established research area focusing on class-based movements attempts to explain the trajectories of labor activists seeking the right of collective bargaining (Lichtenstein 2002). There is a growing body of work that focuses on the US case and its crucial nineteenth-century period of labor organization, and situates the US comparatively with cases in Europe where labor was stronger and had greater success. For example, Voss (1993) argued that we can understand the failure of the development of a welfare state in the US in part by understanding the collapse of the Knights of Labor in the nineteenth century. Haydu (2008) presents the other side of the same struggle: Business interests created a kind of class-based movement as well, though it was focused on property and their right to manage their businesses as they saw fit.

Piven and Cloward (1977) offered an influential and broad approach to understanding class-based rights struggles. In addition to the black civil rights movement, they studied three class-based movements including the Workers’ Alliance of America, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the National Welfare Rights Organization. They argued the source of movement emergence and success lay primarily in society’s institutional structures, but also noted that the rights focus of their SMO cases came primarily from “early rhetorical pronouncements by liberal political leaders” which “helped to fuel the discontents of workers and blacks” and “helped to concentrate those discontents” (1977: 17).

IDENTITY-BASED RIGHTS MOVEMENTS

Many key developments in social movement theory occurred through the study of movements seeking rights based on racial and other nonclass identities, especially the black civil rights movement. In the American context, “civil rights” referred mostly to rights of nondiscrimination rather than the more generalized rights to be left alone that characterize Marshall’s use of the term, Morris (1984) built on the theory of resource mobilization by showing how the black civil rights movement was able to use its own resources and institutions (especially the black church) rather than having to rely primarily on outside help to create its movement. McAdam’s influential (1982) political process theory of social movement development, which emphasized the importance of political opportunities such as access to state elites and elite competition, used the black civil rights movement as its case for theory development.

Later studies explored the development of rights for other racial and ethnic minorities, such as Asian Americans (Wei 1993), Latinos (Gómez-Quiñones 1990) and American Indians (Cornell 1988). Still other studies have sought to understand how these rights movements impacted each other (Skrentny 2002).

Movements on behalf of women have a long tradition as rights movements in the US. The 1848 Declaration of Sentiments borrowed rights language from the Declaration of Independence to call for equality for women. There are several studies of the women’s rights movement as it grew in the 1960s and 1970s, including Mansbridge’s (1986) analysis of the failure to win passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in the US and Costain’s (1992) application of
political process theory to women’s rights in the 1970s. Skrentny (2002) showed how American women mobilized to be included in federal employment affirmative action programs and to have Title IX implemented to end sex discrimination in education. McCann developed the theory of legal mobilization in his (1994) study of wage discrimination against women. His study showed that law is not just a source of social control but provides resources to press claims for rights in what he called a “bottom-up jurisprudence.” McCann showed how statutes guaranteeing rights provided the resources to take rights claims to court and fight for equality.

By the late twentieth century, this expansion meant that the range of rights movements extended to just about any group, human or not, that could have a grievance. Scotch showed the crucial role of the state in the development of the disability rights movement. Fejes (2008) explored the origins of the gay rights movement. Kirkland (2008) analyzed the movement for fat rights and the tensions between medicalization and normalization of the identity. Jasper and Nelkin (1992) analyzed the changing views toward animals and the development of a rights frame in their study of the animal rights movement.

Rights movements may also focus on issues rather than identities. For example, Carp (1998) explored the politics of adoption and rights mobilization around family issues. A growing literature examines rights movements pressing conservative issues and identities, such as Wright’s (2007) examination of the militia movement and organization for gun rights in the US.

As Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) note, one common aspect of civil rights movements in the early part of the twentieth century was that they targeted state institutions or businesses. However, as the century progressed, and recognition became a goal in addition to rights, targets diversified and multiplied. Instead of a single target, movements would attempt to win the hearts and minds of the masses on a variety of fronts. The burgeoning popularity of the Internet spurred this development in so far as communication became significantly easier (Bennett 2005).

As previously mentioned, rights are intimately tied to questions of citizenship; thus perhaps the most defining category of rights movements going into the twenty-first century involve rights pertaining to immigrants, both “documented” and “undocumented” (Buff 2008). Within the US, there have been heated movements and counter-movements, especially in Texas and California, regarding the rights of undocumented immigrants in areas such as education or medical care. In most cases, these movements center on the rights of Mexican immigrants. Ironically, immigrant rights movements might not only clash with entrenched majorities but also with the minority groups (such as African Americans) served by earlier civil rights movements, due to fear of competition for economic and social resources. Solidarity with other groups is often crucial to the success of rights movements, but is difficult to achieve in the immigrant case (Johnson & Hing 2007).

RIGHTS MOVEMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: INTERNATIONAL/DOMESTIC INTERACTIONS, GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF RIGHTS, AND GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION

Though there has been a great amount of work on rights movements in the US, rights movements have never been uniquely or even primarily an American phenomenon. In this final section, we explore some of the dynamics of rights movements in other regions of the world, and in particular interactions between states and at the global level. Due to its rising geopolitical and economic importance, we give particular attention to and use for illustration the case of China.

Rights movements have long influenced each other across borders and developments at the international level can impact domestic rights politics. For example, Gandhi’s efforts against racist oppression in India inspired and informed Martin Luther King, Jr’s fight
for racial equality in the US. Indeed, it is hardly a coincidence that many decolonization movements – fighting for the right to sovereignty against European powers, especially in Asia and Africa – occurred concurrently with the black civil rights movement, and the United Nations promulgated the first conventions and covenants for human rights, including the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, at roughly the same time as Congress’ monumental Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Skrentny 2002).

Since the 1960s, the dynamic typically goes the other way: Rights movements in the West often devote much attention to and seek to build networks with developing countries that are often home to rights-denying authoritarian regimes. Some rights movements welcome the international ties, others may be able to go it alone. Despite the existence of a strong authoritarian regime, scholars such as Minxin Pei (2003) argue that, in China, processes such as global diffusion of information, finance, culture, and institutional practices, as well as domestic changes, provide opportunities and impetus for domestic actors to challenge the status quo. The reform and opening process has enabled a growing number of local protests and a strong push for environmental rights in particular.

Not all rights movements against authoritarian states are threats to those states. The fact that rights movements often invoke nationalistic discourse can reaffirm government control and can threaten both ethnic and ideological minorities. Authoritarian governments can co-opt movements, using them as a pressure valve of sorts, rather than promising wide-scale reforms. This is evident in the East Asian cases studied by Weller (2008). In China, allowing small-scale movements allowed space for the airing of some grievances, and the government has been moderately responsive to demands. In contrast, the authoritarian Taiwanese government’s ambiguous response led to calls for democratization, and South Korea’s lack of response to and repression of democracy rights movements led to violent protest and a sweeping regime change.

A major focus of work on the global diffusion of rights regards human rights, that is, rights that one may claim based on membership in the human race and as the basis of human dignity, rather than as part of formal membership in a particular polity. Since there is no institutional machinery for the enforcement of human rights, much of this research focuses on the ability of movements to make use of the ratification of human rights conventions or human rights discourse as resources to leverage rights-protecting action from states. For example, Keck and Sikkink’s influential (1998) study of human rights activism across borders sought to identify the conditions that allowed these groups to have an impact, identifying elements such as the nature of the issue (issues involving bodily harm were more likely to lead to productive impact). Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) sought through various case studies to develop a model for how human rights can matter at the domestic level, showing how domestic movements in oppressive states could use human rights discourse to appeal to Western powers to exert pressure onto the rights-denying domestic political elites.

Yet there is considerable scholarly debate regarding the ability of human rights organizations that target state-level entities to obtain significant change. Scholars may note the European Union’s ability to force would-be members to accept certain rights norms (the “acquis”), but in many cases implementation for new members lags far behind the promises made (Geddes 2003). Elsewhere, cases such as that of China are instructive for considering the potential weaknesses of global rights movements because they suggest a model whereby a notorious, supposed human rights “abuser” can push back, with the aid of economic power and with some degree of success, against critics. Such countries may even claim to ascribe to an alternate, but no less valid, model of rights (Pei 2003). In many of those cases, rights efforts must often target smaller subnational- or local-level politics and policies.
Several contemporary organizations (for example MoveOn.org), incorporated to address global issues, nonetheless may recruit domestic actors in many different countries to focus on relevant local projects or to bring existing projects into the fold. These international nongovernmental organizations, “INGOs,” then serve in part as federated communities in which the actors can network and share information, strategies, and resources (Bennett 2005). However, the efforts of even the most modest of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be frustrated by local governments and at the very least must accept some degree of government oversight. Recently, scholars have developed the term “GONGO” (for “government-organized NGO”) to apply to those cases where boundaries between independent activity and government control are blurred. Lastly, grassroots rights efforts can be frustrated by similarly grassroots reactive movements. The protests surrounding the Olympic torch run prior to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing are just one example; in that case, spurred by Tibetan protests earlier in the year, non-Chinese around the world used the occasion of the torch’s presence in their own cities to protest China’s handling of Tibet and to mobilize for Tibet’s right to sovereignty but were met by equally vociferous Chinese counterprotests (Economy & Segal 2008). Increased contention on both sides of a rights issue can be a key side effect of the globalization of these movements.

SEE ALSO: Civil rights movement (United States); Democratization and democratic transition; Diffusion and scale shift; Equal Rights Amendment (United States); Human rights movements; Identity politics; Law and social movements; New social movements and new social movement theory; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Riots
DANIEL J. MYERS

A riot is an unruly collective act of violence that is temporary, discontinuous from everyday routines, and results in damage to persons or property of either the participants or targets of the collective actor. Although most social scientists have an intuitive sense of what constitutes a riot, the edges of the definition are fuzzy and it can be difficult to determine whether or not some events are actually "riots." For example, it is agreed that a riot is a collective act. That is, more than one individual must be involved and at least minimally coordinate action in order for a riot to occur. Two people acting together, however, would not constitute a riot, even though it is a collective act of violence. Thus, the lower limit for participation, damage, and duration to define a riot is difficult to establish and has led many sociologists to analyze events more ambiguously referred to as "civil disorders" or "collective violence." For most, however, unless there are at least 30–50 people involved, the events last more than a few moments, and there is action that could result in property damage or injury requiring medical attention, a riot has not occurred.

Even those events that consensus would label as riots are a diverse lot. The American sociologist’s vision of rioting is heavily influenced by the race-related urban riots that occurred in the 1960s, including the infamous Watts 1965, Newark 1967, Detroit 1967, and Washington DC 1968 riots. These riots were typically ignited by a confrontation between police and African American citizens and, although injuries occurred, the activity in the riots was dominated by attacks on property and looting (Abu-Lughod 2007). Injuries most typically resulted from attempts by police and military officials to prevent damage and contain or extinguish the riot. These kinds of riots have been echoed in other urban environments over the years, including riots in Britain in the early 1980s, in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict, in Cincinnati, Ohio following accusations of police brutality, and most recently in the Parisian suburbs of France, as immigrants from northern Africa took to the streets and burned thousands of cars in protest at perceived police brutality and poverty.

While these kinds of events are important, there are many other kinds of collective events that have been treated as riots, including food riots, machine breaking raids, murderous ethnic purges, lynching, brawls at sporting events, and even victory celebrations. Horowitz (2001), for example, documents what he calls the deadly ethnic riot, which is a collective lethal attack of one ethnic group on another and includes events ranging across the globe from Hindu attacks on Muslims in India, anti-Catholic violence in Northern Ireland, and attacks on Ibo citizens of Nigeria. In practice, these different types of riots are not completely distinct. Rather, riots are usually complex events in which different kinds of people with different motivations participate in a variety of ways in the larger riot, each overlapping with the other in some ways, but not in others. For example, the celebration riots that followed the string of National Basketball Association Championships in Chicago, and later in Los Angeles, took on many of the characteristics of the urban street riots of the 1960s.

Concern with riots, and crowd behavior more generally, has a long history in sociology, reaching back to the founding moments of the discipline when thinkers such as Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud produced a view of crowds as unanimous, crazed, criminal, anonymous masses whose constituent individuals had ceded control of themselves over to the mob and/or a hypnotically suggestive leader. Although subsequently debunked in...
sociological scholarship, this view of the crowd and of rioters lives on in the popular mind, in journalistic accounts of riots, and even in introductory sociology and social psychology textbooks. Empirical research on crowds, however, indicates that riot participants are certainly not of unanimous mind and in fact their participation and behaviors reveal diverse motivations, actions, and experiences of the event. Furthermore, individuals in crowds are not anonymous, as they typically attend the event in small groups made up of friends and family members. These small groups remain intact throughout the event, move through the larger crowd together, and are the fundamental unit in which decisions about what to do are made. Nor do individuals in crowds become hypnotized by the situation or cede control of themselves to crazed irrationality. In fact, even when engaging in some of the most extreme and heinous atrocities (such as genocidal purges), riot participants retain an extraordinary level of rationality, going to great lengths, for example, to ensure they are killing the right kind of person (Horowitz 2001). Rioters, for example, may stop rioting to actually interrogate those suspected of being on the wrong side. Horowitz relates one such instance in which Sinhalese rioters in Sri Lanka questioned a man once, held him as a prisoner while they proceeded to kill other Tamils, later questioned him further, and eventually (mistakenly, since he was a Tamil) released him.

Because of the unfortunate early history of thinking about riots and crowds, scholars also developed expectations about what kinds of persons would be more likely to participate in a riot. Criminals, socially marginalized, isolated, unemployed, and uneducated were all stereotypes portrayed in earlier writing on riots. As has been the case with mob psychology notions more generally, these ideas have been proven false by empirical research. When the characteristics of riot participants have been compared to nonparticipants (particularly to those living in geographic proximity to riots), few differences have been detected (Mason & Murtagh 1985). Even though, for example, unemployment in a city predicts rioting, the unemployed are not disproportionately represented among the actual rioters – their rates of participation are virtually identical to those who are employed. Nor do rioters tend to be more psychologically frustrated with their circumstances or feel more deprived than nonparticipants. Thus, rioters do not fit the image of marginalized societal refuse held by early crowd theorists.

What, then, is true about those who riot? First, as with most violence, riot participants are considerably more likely to be men than women. Second, rioters tend to be younger than the average person living in the area where a riot occurs, although rioting is clearly not just an activity of the young. More important, however, is simple biographical availability, which in part accounts for the presence of the young at riots. Those who happen to be spatially close
riots to a riot are more likely to join in. Those who are not at work, watching children, or attending classes are more likely to be able to break free from their routines and become part of the crowd. There is, for example, a clear daily pattern of riot activity that peaks after usual work hours and then dies down when people have to return to their jobs and schools (McPhail 1994). Finally, rioters tend to have higher senses of personal efficacy than those who do not participate. They are more likely than those who stay at home to believe that their actions matter and will make some kind of a difference (Snow & Oliver 1995).

ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND RIOTING

Sociological research and theorizing about riots has focused on the causes of rioting. What conditions contribute to its emergence? Many factors have been posited as important contributors to, or preconditions for, rioting. Economic factors such as unemployment and poverty have been cast as both absolute and relative deprivation conditions that produce what is essentially a violent protest about these conditions. This theoretical argument seemed more than plausible and the emergence of so much rioting in poor, urban areas disproportionately involving racial and ethnic minorities buoyed the notion. The research, however, has been less than definitive. Research attempting to explain the variation among cities in riot frequency and riot severity based on relative and absolute deprivation measures as well as other indicators of social and economic well-being has been hard pressed to find any consistent relationship supporting the basic theoretical notions (Spilerman 1970, 1976). Related concepts, such as the pressure that rapid changes in population place on the provision of social services and the notion that poor political representation prevents the opportunity to redress grievances through conventional means, have not fared any better.

More recently, competition theory has been used somewhat more successfully to predict rioting. Here, analysts propose that battles over economic, labor market, and, to a lesser degree, residential turf escalate into collective violence as one group attempts to improve its position or maintain relative advantage over another advancing group. After all this research though, economic factors, however they may have been cast, still remain a fairly weak predictor of rioting. Economic hardship is too ubiquitous and rioting is too rare for economic conditions to directly produce rioting. Thus, economic conditions may be seen as providing fertile ground for rioting and other collective violence, but are not, by themselves, a sufficient explanation for the emergence of violence.

SOCIAL CONTROL AGENTS

The role of state authorities, especially local police, in producing, escalating, and quelling riots has been a major topic of research not only because interaction between police and citizens so often seem to ignite rioting, but also because state authorities have a responsibility to maintain order and therefore are expected to wield repressive forces to bring riots under control, to return the social environment to a state of calm, and to protect the persons and property that might be targeted by rioters.

These two dynamics have produced different hypotheses about the roles of police in riots. On one hand, if confrontations with citizens and heavy-handed policing tactics provide the sparks that set off riots, then increases in police presence ought to increase rioting. Likewise, if police engage rioters with escalated engagement as they attempt to quell the riot, they may inflame, rather than extinguish the riots. On the other hand, repression can actually stop or slow rioting, and although police intervention can lead to more discontent and grievances, police presence, especially if early and formidable, can prevent or reduce rioting by raising the anticipated costs of participation.

The quantitative empirical evidence on the role of policing has been inconsistent. Some scholars have found that larger police forces
are related to more and more severe riots while others have found no relationship or just the opposite. Qualitative and historical studies, however, have demonstrated that it is not just the strength of the police in terms of number and firepower that matter, but rather, how they wield their power and what kinds of relationships exist between the police and the community that matters most. Those communities that have a history of antagonism between the police and some segment of the citizenry seem much more likely to erupt after a publicized instance of heavy-handed police behavior.

DIFFUSION, MASS MEDIA, AND EFFECTIVENESS

The mass media is another key player in understanding the origins and trajectory of rioting, particularly as rioting spreads and becomes a wave of unrest rather than a single event or a few isolated ones. When the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders published its report on the US riots of the summer of 1967, it put substantial responsibility for the spread of riots on the mass media and how it handled reports of the riots, as had the McCone Commission’s report on the Watts riot of 1965. Since then, scholars and politicians have routinely criticized mass media for their conduct during and after riots. The mass media contribute to riots in two main ways. First, they can fan the flames of a riot while it is happening by live broadcasts of the action on the streets. These reports immediately draw the attention of potential participants who can be drawn out into the street and increase the size of the crowd, the complexity of the situation, and the chances for further inflammatory confrontations as police try to control the situation. The pressure for immediacy can also contribute to inaccurate and inflammatory reporting as reporters rely on hearsay and rumors as they quickly attempt to piece together a story. Second, media reports of riots spread information about riots and their outcomes and seem to suggest rioting as a behavioral tactic to potential actors in other locations. Thus, in modern times, mass media distribution has become the key network structure that provides a conduit for the diffusion of collective violence.

Rather than the mindless imitation posited by early crowd theorists, however, modern takes on the diffusion of collective violence are inherently rationalist. These approaches to diffusion understand the imitation process as involving transmission of information about the actions of rioters, the reactions by social control agents, and the outcomes of the riot to other potential rioters in other locations. The potential rioters then evaluate the outcomes of the prior act and then, individually and collectively, make decisions about whether they will be likely to adopt the behavior, should the opportunity arise. When an opportunity does arise, such as when a crowd gathers around to observe an arrest, rioting is then more likely to develop.

Because media distribution areas and the cultural salience of actors are both geographically concentrated, information flows that could inform further rioting are geographically concentrated as well. In addition, the salience of past events wanes quickly as the riots become old news, and thus the chance of imitations are concentrated in brief periods, thereby inducing short-lived bursts of action or mini-waves of rioting reflected in the relatively jagged pattern of rioting most often observed in riot waves.

The rationalist logic requires that riots are observed and evaluated positively in order for the evaluation to lead to imitation. A negative appraisal would presumably dissuade diffusion. Contrary to what might be expected by an outsider viewing the sometimes devastating effects of riots on neighborhoods and businesses, surveys conducted by social scientists after urban riots in the 1960s repeatedly demonstrated that many African Americans viewed the riots positively. Even in the very neighborhoods where the riots caused the most damage, the residents often believed that the riots were necessary to call attention to the problems of the area and would ultimately do more good than harm (Feagin & Hahn, 1974). Many of those who
participated in the riots and later testified before the Congressional committee expressed a sense of pride and efficacy for both their own actions and of others they observed (US Senate 1967–1970). Likewise, in 2005, many French Muslims expressed supportive attitudes toward the actions of rioters, believing that these destructive protests were finally calling attention to the problems of a population that had been systematically neglected by French policymakers. These positive evaluations of rioting are consistent with, and lend support, to rationalist, diffusion-based explanations for the spread of rioting.

Whether riots actually do produce positive outcomes is an open question. There is little doubt that riots draw attention to the community in which they occur and invite speculation about the causes of the riots and what might be done to correct them. Government commissions are formed and legislative bodies investigate and sometimes introduce policy and allocate resources to address the posited problems. Because riots seem to appear in relatively impoverished areas, for example, policy interventions have been targeted toward improving the economic conditions in these areas. The Model Cities program in the late 1960s US was one key federal program that was developed at least in part as a response to the riots of the era (Gale 1996). Thus, riots can definitely produce attention to problems in a community, as rioters often seem to expect. Whether this attention and the resulting programs ultimately have any positive effect is a different question and one that has been harder to demonstrate. Often, the programs are underfunded or dismantled before any effect has been felt. Furthermore, the long-term effects on the economies of riot-stricken areas are difficult to overcome – some areas never seem to recover from the devastation (Collins & Margo 2004).

SEE ALSO: Contagion theory; Convergence/dispositional theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Diffusion and scale shift; Media and social movements; Modular protest forms; Relative deprivation; Social control errors; Urban riots in Europe, post-2000.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Animal rights movement
C. Traini

In the English-speaking world, the expression “animal rights movement” is used to designate activist organizations that, since the late 1970s, have denounced the exploitation of animals. By then, however, the history of social movements for the protection of animals was already more than 150 years old. Indeed, since the start of the nineteenth century, activists appalled at the human treatment of animals have mobilized against the brutality of our customary behavior. The initial concern was with the treatment of cattle and it is only through a gradual sociological process that animal protection extended to pets and then, much later still, to wild species and to their natural environment. This long history of mobilization for the protection of animals is inevitably linked to the evolution, not merely of socially acceptable emotions, but also of the threshold of tolerance of uncontrolled violence (Elias & Dunning 1986). Methodologically, historical analysis has proven essential in reconstructing the genesis of the variety of emotional gratifications thanks to which animal advocacy can still today mobilize activists of widely varying sociological profiles.

In 1824, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was the first activist organization ever founded to reform the ways in which human beings treat animals. In 1840, it became the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) thanks to the patronage of Queen Victoria, and attracted reputable members of the establishment. In other countries, similar groups were created by various parts of the elite. Members of these activist organizations were concerned about the sad spectacles which involved handling cattle and draft animals. However, they focused not so much on animal suffering than on the uncouth practices of those handling the animals. In fact, members of the first organizations to protect animals thought of themselves as educators whose role was to develop standards and to educate the masses. They focused on pedagogy. These early campaigning organizations promoted moral standards based on their aversion to brutality, injuries, and blood, on their respect for self-control and temperance, and on an interest in economic returns. Animal advocacy was considered one of the most effective means of reducing the violence of the lower classes – a concern particularly acute in France where there was the fear that it could trigger riots or even revolution (Agulhon 1981).

During the last third of the nineteenth century, moral protests and mobilization against the mistreatment of animals were characterized by a number of interdependent developments. First, pets, and especially dogs, were adopted in an increasing number of homes and contributed to glorify the intimacy and privacy of a domestic sphere to which middle-class women were henceforth confined (Kathleen 1994). Scandalized by the fate of abandoned dogs and in the name of protecting the weak – part of their private role, women flocked to organizations for the protection of animals that offered them the possibility of participating in the public sphere, from which they were usually excluded. The first dog shelters were created in Great Britain in 1860 and in France in the 1880s. They later became the main activity of animal protection organizations, as is still the case today. The institutionalization of shelters contributed to make a growing proportion of activists think of themselves as succorers, whose mission was to relieve the suffering of well-loved and loving creatures.

Moreover, Great Britain, soon followed by other countries, witnessed considerable outrage about the development of vivisection (French 1975). In 1875, Frances Power Cobbe founded the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection in London. A mere year later, the RSPCA counted no less than ten
British antivivisection associations. According to the *Bulletin de la Société française contre la vivisection*, there were 26 European antivivisectionist societies in 1885: fifteen in Great Britain, three in Switzerland, two in Germany, and two in France. These organizations were initially founded by traditional elites, concerned by the rise of a scientific and medical bourgeoisie but they found considerable support amongst women, shocked at the idea that dogs could be vivisected (Lansbury 1985). Mobilization against vivisection arose at a time when the history of animal protection was reaching a critical turning point. On the one hand, concern with the fate of animals was part of the leveling of compassion that developed in the wake of both Romanticism and democratic egalitarianism. Described as weak victims of powerful torturers, the suffering animal became the focus of a new type of activists, determined to act as *vindicatores*. Animal protection then assumed a critical, even subversive dimension, to the extent that it allowed outsiders to identify with the animal victim, and to protest such an abuse of power (Traïni 2011).

Nonetheless, the description of vivisectors as despicable torturers also aroused the indignation of the scientific community, who rapidly organized a devastating counterattack against the opponents of vivisection. In 1882, British scientists founded the Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research. In 1884, the French psychiatrist Valentin Magnan likened the protection of animals to a form of madness caused by hereditary degeneration. In 1909, in the United States, Charles Loomis Dana, President of the American Neurological Society, described the protectors of animals as sick individuals suffering from zoophilpsychosis (Buettinger 1993). Scientism and sexism thus encouraged the diffusion of a stereotype attributing activism on behalf of animals to an excess of emotions, characteristic of pathologies to which the feminine nature was particularly subject.

Thus, after being defended by the most prestigious elites of a number of countries, animal protection became increasingly seen as the product of excessive sentimentality and therefore an inappropriate emotion in the public sphere. However, since the second half of the twentieth century, several distinct developments have helped to restore the prestige of animal advocacy. First, attachment to pets has become much more widespread across the social classes than in the previous century. The
socialization of children in developed countries is increasingly characterized by emotional and imaginary bonds with pets, stuffed animals, and animal characters in comic strips or cartoons. Second, the discovery of such concepts as biocenoses, the ecosystem, climax, and biodiversity have contributed to the slow emergence of a science, ecology, that provides compelling justifications for the protection of wild species and their natural environment. Specialists in the natural sciences founded organizations to campaign for the protection of wild species threatened with extinction. Thus, in 1961, for example, Sir Julian Huxley and three British ornithologists founded the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) which, 30 years later, claimed 4,700,000 members. The widespread interest in wild species also owes much to those in television and the cinema who, following in the footsteps of Jacques-Yves Cousteau, have contributed to making fauna, previously distant and unknown, into a more familiar televisual presence. Through a child’s eyes, the lines separating pets, stuffed animals, and wild or domestic species seen in TV documentaries or cartoons, have blurred. This evolution appears even more significant since it challenges the distinction between “useful” animals and “harmful” animals that nineteenth-century protectors of animals had promoted. This profound change in the depiction of animality has favored the broadening of the vocations of succorer and vindicator – originally exclusively oriented toward pets – to also include wild species and cattle. Thus, in 1963, British activists from the Hunt Saboteurs Association attracted attention by using their own bodies as barricades. Despite the risks involved, they successfully disrupted fox hunts. The same group of people founded the Band of Mercy in 1972 and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in 1976. They then launched commando operations against industrial livestock farming and laboratories to liberate the largest number of animals exploited by human beings. ALF activists assumed the role of liberators, determined to defy the law and face danger as long as the direct action undertaken could save the life of an animal perceived as worthy of compassion. In March 1979, the dramatic military tactics of the British ALF were imported by activists who liberated animals from the New York University Medical Center. In few years, ALF has completed over 100 clandestine operations in North American labs. The targets of its direct actions include ranches, meat markets, butchers, taxidermists, fur retailers, and so on. The California Attorney General declared it a terrorist organization in 1986 (Jasper & Nelkin 1992). Since then, activists of ALF have made direct actions in order to liberate animals in almost 40 countries.

Moreover, between 1970 and 1978, a group of Oxford-based academics decided to re-examine issues of moral philosophy and animal ethics. Richard Ryder, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and others have fueled debates around the notion of anti-speciesism, that is, the desire to challenge discrimination against members of different species. Some of the activists involved in this philosophical debate organized protest campaigns against animal experimentation, such as Henry Spira in Manhattan in 1976. However, these activists intended to be educators rather than liberators, thereby renewing the original role adopted by supporters of the cause and in contrast with the more recent ALF (Singer 1998). Regardless, anti-speciesist philosophical arguments have, along with green theory, contributed to restore the legitimacy of animal protection. The sophisticated controversies of animal ethics and the university degrees collected by a new cohort of activists challenge the image of an involvement supposedly stemming from mindless sentimentality. In fact, the expression “animal rights movement” does not merely describe a new series of protest activities, but enhances the work of legitimization initiated by one of the most recent generations of animal protection activists. The use of this expression contributes to a motivational framing (Snow & Benford 1988), which aims to locate involvement in the protection animal in a symbolically powerful genealogy. Indeed, in English-speaking countries, “rights talk”...
makes claim to a two-fold legitimacy, linked to its grounding in philosophy and its connection with movements as significant as the civil rights movement.

The preliminary historic analysis is very useful when examining the most recent developments and transformations of the animal protectionist movements. In France, for example, according to the data produced by the Conseil national de la vie associative, 510 new associations “friends or specialists of animals” were created on average every year between 2000 and 2005, that is 2.5 times more than 30 years before. The great majority of these organizations are dedicated to strengthening the tradition of the succorers by offering multiple refuges and care to suffering pets. A smaller number of associations of vindicators were created both to denounce the systematic exploitation of animals by humans and to promote anti-specist theses or vegetarian and vegan diets. The members of these few associations often liken their mission to one of education and work to renew the debates about the necessity of animal protection. They organize happenings to protest against animal experiments, circuses, and cattle transport; they attempt to draw the attention of the media and they mobilize Internet resources to make the public more aware of animal suffering. This new generation of activists – in France as in many other countries – probably contribute to the modification of the most discursive dimension of animal protection. However, there are so far no studies that would allow us to assess how and to what extent they have succeeded in altering not only the discourses but also, and more importantly, the practices of an activist base, which remains heterogeneous.

SEE ALSO: Altruism and social movements; Direct action; Emotion and social movements; Environmental movements; Gender and social movements; Movement/counter-movement dynamics; Rights and rights movements; Social control; Symbolic crusades.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Civil rights movement
(United States)
KENNETH T. ANDREWS

The civil rights movement emerged in the 1950s as a massive challenge to US racial inequality. The movement relied on diverse tactics including litigation, community organizing, and direct action to pursue political empowerment, expanding economic opportunities, desegregating major institutions, altering social relations, and transforming the broader culture. The movement remains one of the central cases in the study of social movements, and it had enduring impacts on American society and politics. This entry focuses on the movement’s origins, organizations and leadership, dynamics, decline, and legacy.

OVERVIEW

The civil rights movement was the sustained challenge to racial inequality from the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s. Most scholars understand this period as part of a much larger black freedom struggle that had origins well before the 1950s and extends up to the present. As a distinct and important phase of this struggle, two key events marked the onset of the civil rights movements: the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education and the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott. Both events showed the efficacy of collective challenges to racial inequality. The Montgomery Bus Boycott was launched after Rosa Parks was arrested for violating the city’s segregation policies on public buses on December 5, 1955. Although Parks’ resistance is sometimes characterized as a spontaneous act of defiance, she was a life-long activist and connected to a network of local civil rights leaders and organizations (Morris 1984). The boycott was supported by the newly formed Montgomery Improvement Association led by a young minister, Martin Luther King Jr. The boycott itself was sustained for over one year until courts ruled that the segregation laws were unconstitutional. The Montgomery Boycott was significant in demonstrating the viability of mass protest and civil disobedience in the Deep South. Building on the boycott’s success, King and other activist ministers founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization that brought together activist ministers from across the South and spearheaded many of the movement’s most important and successful campaigns (Fairclough 1987).

The Brown decision was the culmination of a protracted legal campaign waged by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. The most immediate impact of the Brown decision was the rise in “massive resistance” by white Southerners to challenge civil rights initiatives (Klarman 1994). Within two months of the Brown decision, White leaders gathered in Indianola, Mississippi to found the White Citizens’ Council, an organization that led efforts to resist the movement and federal support for civil rights (McMillen 1971). The conflict over school desegregation came to a head in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, as the local NAACP branch sought to desegregate local schools. Ultimately, President Eisenhower ordered the National Guard to Arkansas to enforce the successful desegregation of Little Rock Central High School by the Little Rock Nine. Through the late 1950s and 1960s minimal change occurred in patterns of school segregation. Thus, despite the high drama of the Little Rock conflict, there was little school desegregation until the late 1960s when the federal courts and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare compelled local school districts to act on the Brown ruling (Rosenberg 1991).

The Montgomery Bus Boycott and its forerunners demonstrated the viability of
organizing a mass movement to challenge segregation in the Deep South, but there were few protest campaigns between 1956 and the beginning of the Greensboro sit-ins on February 1, 1960. This changed quickly as college students throughout the South became involved in direct action protest. The sit-in campaigns targeted segregated lunch counters and other public accommodations in the US South. The tactic had been developed by Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) activists in the 1940s and used sporadically in the 1950s, most often by high school students outside the core Southern states (Meier & Rudwick 1975; Morris 1981). The initiating event in 1960 occurred when four students at Greensboro’s North Carolina A&T began their protest on February 1. Following Greensboro, protest spread to nearby cities with large numbers of black college students. By mid-April sit-in campaigns had been launched in more than 60 cities in every Southern state except Mississippi (Andrews & Biggs 2006). The 1960 sit-ins escalated the Southern civil rights struggle, politicized college students, and pioneered the use of novel protest tactics. Moreover, the sit-ins led to the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that played a critical role in shaping the civil rights movement.

In 1961, CORE launched Freedom Rides that challenged segregation in interstate travel. On May 4, two interracial teams boarded busses in Washington, DC, traveling through the South to New Orleans to arrive on May 17. Freedom Riders faced some harassment in the early days, but the most extensive violence occurred in Alabama. With the foreknowledge of the FBI, Justice Department, and local law enforcement, Ku Klux Klan leaders executed a coordinated assault on the Freedom Riders in Anniston and Birmingham. Students from Nashville traveled to Montgomery to participate in the Freedom Rides and another bloody assault took place further heightening pressure on the Kennedy administration for a quick and nonviolent resolution. Ultimately, Kennedy secured guarantees from Mississippi’s Governor Ross Barnett for safe passage to Jackson where activists were arrested for breach of the peace and violating local segregation laws. Civil rights leaders established training centers to send further Freedom Rides through the South as they too were arrested with little fanfare. Most Freedom Riders refused bail and were ultimately sentenced to Mississippi’s infamous Parchman Penitentiary taking them out of the newspapers and the public eye (Arsenault 2005).

The spring of 1963 witnessed the next major wave of demonstrations. Events in Birmingham, Alabama captured center stage when Martin Luther King’s SCLC launched a massive campaign (Eskew 1997). The campaign targeted business leaders focusing on the primary goals of desegregating downtown establishments, instituting fair hiring practices, and establishing a biracial committee to implement school desegregation. While under arrest, King wrote his famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” that provided a powerful and widely disseminated justification for using civil disobedience and direct action protest grounded in religious, historical, and political context. The SCLC’s strategy in Birmingham was shaped by its unsuccessful campaign the previous year in Albany, Georgia. In Birmingham, protesters used diverse tactics that were designed to divide the elite (Morris 1993). Sustained protest, including the “Children’s Crusade” in which hundreds of children protested and were attacked by Eugene “Bull” Conner’s police force, generated a crisis among local elites and brought massive national and international attention to the conflict. At the same time, civil rights campaigns occurred in dozens of Southern cities through the spring and summer. The summer ended with the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom that brought civil rights supporters to Washington, DC, for one of the movement’s most iconic moments on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.

In the early 1960s the SNCC attempted to organize the most dangerous parts of the rural South with a strategy of building organizational capacity among the most powerless segments of the black community (Payne 1995). This
marked a shift away from prior organizing and protest that occurred in major cities like Nashville, Atlanta, and Tallahassee. Between 1961 and 1963, the SNCC initiated projects in southwest Georgia and in Mississippi. In 1964, an umbrella organization in Mississippi that included the SNCC, CORE, and the local NAACP recruited college students from around the country to work in Mississippi’s civil rights projects. Voter registration was the major focus of local organizing although organizers established Freedom Schools to provide courses on citizenship, literacy, history, and so forth. The Freedom Summer project mobilized support for an independent political party—the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party—that challenged the traditional, all-white delegation of Democrats to the Democratic Party Convention in Atlantic City. Led by local leaders such as Aaron Henry and Fannie Lou Hamer, the challenge was unsuccessful although it brought considerable attention to voter discrimination in Mississippi and helped build support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Organizers and participants in Freedom Summer went on to play leading roles in other movements including the Black Power, antiwar, and women’s liberation movements (McAdam 1988). The Freedom Summer campaign also built a foundation of local leaders and organizations that had an enduring impact on local political and policy in Mississippi (Andrews 2004).

The following spring witnessed what is often considered the last major battles of the Southern civil rights movement in Selma, Alabama. The campaign focused on voter participation and is credited with consolidating support for the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Garrow 1978). Like Freedom Summer, the Selma campaign had roots in community organizing by SNCC activists. However, the SCLC played the leading role during the demonstrations and marches that occurred in 1965. The most well-known events occurred during a planned march from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery. On March 7, the protest ended with demonstrators being beaten by state troopers while attempting to leave Selma by crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The events were labeled “Bloody Sunday” and received extensive national and international attention. A second planned march was canceled by Martin Luther King Jr following a court injunction. Finally, following a favorable decision by a federal judge, a third march from Selma to Montgomery began on March 21 led by King and accompanied by an estimated 25,000 protesters, including major civil rights leaders and celebrities.

Although there was significant continuity in black protest after 1965, the period of intensive mobilizing subsided in the late 1960s. In the South, many activists shifted their attention toward electoral politics and others toward pursuing economic changes through various initiatives including the War on Poverty. The shift toward Black Power had its origins in the Southern civil rights movement. For example, SNCC activists introduced and popularized the term during a 1966 march in Mississippi, and organizers working in the rural South had been questioning the strategic value of nonviolence for several years (Payne 1995). Nevertheless, the Black Power movement gained much greater traction outside the South. The growth of other social movements, including the student, women’s, and antiwar movements, may have further undercut support for the civil rights movement. The attention of political authorities and the mass media shifted away from civil rights as well and toward the Vietnam War, urban riots, and emerging social movements. The legislative gains in the mid-1960s may have accelerated the movement’s decline by exacerbating internal tensions in the movement between moderate and radical activists (Piven & Cloward 1977).

ORIGINS AND EMERGENCE

The civil rights movement’s emergence was shaped by important social, economic, and political forces. These include the collapse of the cotton economy, the urbanization of
black Southerners, growing levels of college enrollment, and a strengthening of civic and religious organizations in black communities.

Race relations in the post-Reconstruction South rested on an institutionalized system of economic, political, and social control of African-Americans. The economic foundation relied on sharecropping that left black farmers destitute, and discriminatory practices throughout other sectors. The sharecropping system was undermined by the mechanization of agriculture and the increasing economic opportunities for black workers in cities. Political domination was established through disfranchisement including poll taxes, discriminatory voter registration procedures, intimidation, and violence. Through white political domination whites funneled a disproportionate share of resources into “whites only” schools and other public facilities. Socially, Southern race relations were governed by a system of Jim Crow laws and practices that relegated blacks to inferior facilities and degrading patterns of interaction.

Changes in the national and international political context facilitated the movement’s emergence in the 1950s. In domestic politics, increasingly favorable court decisions and federal attention to civil rights may have emboldened civil rights leaders and blacks more broadly about the prospects for challenging racial inequalities (McAdam 1982). International politics mattered too. For example, military service during World War II was formative for many civil rights leaders (Payne 1995). The heightened attention to democracy and reactions to the Holocaust may have fueled demands for addressing racism in the United States. Moreover, the cold war played a pivotal role in shaping the emergence of the civil rights movement. America’s system of racial apartheid became a major vulnerability in diplomatic relations thereby providing the movement with an important source of leverage. At the same time, the cold war and McCarthy era anticommunism channeled the movement away from strong alliances with the Left, toward a rights frame, and elevated the significance of congregations and religiously based frames and ideology (Hall 2005).

Major changes occurred within black communities leading up to the civil rights movement. Increasing urbanization provided a context within which black-owned businesses emerged and stronger religious and civic associations flourished. While rural churches had few resources and might share a minister across multiple congregations, urban churches provided the movement’s mass base with its elaborate leadership structure, communication channels, and powerful shared symbols and rituals (Morris 1984). Black colleges and universities expanded in the years leading up to the civil rights movement, especially following World War II (McAdam 1982).

These changes in black institutions were reflected in the growth in civil rights organizations and leadership networks. The NAACP, the largest civil organization, was founded in 1909, and the organization had a federated system of local and state chapters with local leadership. The NAACP also had separate youth and college organizations that played important roles in some of the early civil rights campaigns. The NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund was established as a separate organization in 1939 and led the major legal challenges to segregated schools. CORE was founded in 1942 by an interracial group of pacifists with connections to the Fellowship of Reconciliation. In the 1940s CORE pioneered the use of sit-in tactics and launched integrated bus trips through the South in 1947 to challenge segregation laws. CORE had few local organizations in the South in the 1950s but took on an increasingly important role during and following the 1960 sit-ins. The other two major civil rights organizations – the SCLC and SNCC – were formed during the movement itself. The SCLC was formed in the wake of the Montgomery Bus Boycott as a network of affiliated ministers and congregations. The SNCC emerged from the 1960 sit-ins as an organization of student activists (Biggs & Andrews 2010).
Civil rights campaigns and protest were typically supported by “local movement centers” including leaders and local organizational affiliates from the major civil rights organizations (Morris 1984). However, movement support went beyond formal movement organization and included sympathetic congregations, labor organizations and leaders, and so forth. Although men occupied many of the formal leadership positions, especially in the churches and NAACP, women played pivotal roles as leaders such as Ella Baker, Septima Clark, and Fannie Lou Hamer and as the movement’s rank-and-file support.

MOVEMENT IMPACT AND LEGACY

The impact and legacy of the civil rights movement was broad and complex. Many facets of American society were touched by the movement, including politics, social interactions, workplaces and the economy, culture and popular beliefs, and subsequent social movements. These outcomes were, of course, partial and uneven and faced substantial and ongoing resistance.

The movement dismantled the system of Jim Crow segregation that circumscribed the lives of black Southerners for many decades. Although this consequence is sometimes overlooked, it remains one of the movement’s most significant accomplishments. In the political arena, the movement helped make civil rights a central focus of federal legislation and policymaking through the 1960s. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act are the most widely celebrated victories. Other political impacts include the transformation of the Southern political party system and advancing legislation in other areas including housing and affirmative action. Economic consequences include the desegregation of labor markets and workplaces leading to some economic gains for blacks (Wright 1999). However, significant economic inequality persists, and some scholars point to increases in incarceration as a form of political backlash following the civil rights and Black Power movements.

One of the most important and overlooked consequences of movements is their impact on subsequent social movements. The civil rights movement contributed in fundamental ways to the formation of the Black Power, women’s liberation, farm workers, student/New Left, and anti-Vietnam War movements. Key leaders for each of these movements had formative experiences in the civil rights struggle and adopted major strategies and collective action frames from strands of the civil rights movement (McAdam 1988). Beyond these direct connections, the civil rights movement was and continues to serve as a major source of inspiration and learning for social movement leaders and participants. For example, the civil rights movement aided the revitalization of the US labor movement (Isaac & Christiansen 2002). Undoubtedly, the civil rights movement shaped many countermovements that have sought to undermine or reverse the movement’s accomplishments from the 1950s to the present.

SEE ALSO: Black Power movement (United States); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (United States); Nonviolence/nonviolent action; Riots; Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) (United States); Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States).

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Labor movement
RICK FANTASIA, KIM VOSS, and BARRY EIDLIN

The labor movement is a broad, multidimensional social formation that is generated from the social structures of work and industry in a society. It may comprise both legally recognized and formally sanctioned institutions (like trade unions, political parties, and works councils) as well as less formal groupings of workers and their allies (industrial actions, organizations of strike supporters, workers centers, dissident movements within unions, cultural forms, etc.). Labor movements operate at the intersection of economic practice, civil society, and the state. They are more or less firmly institutionalized in any given society in any given historical period, and can be partly characterized by the extent to which extra-institutional practices are permitted and have been incorporated into the routine operations of industrial and labor relations. The social and organizational composition of a labor movement, as well as the degree to which its practices have been institutionalized, are thus two important analytical axes through which the social logic of a labor movement can be discerned.

Given this inherently relational character of labor movements, we find tremendous historical and cross-national variation both across and within individual labor movements, depending upon the broader sociopolitical context in which the labor movement in question is situated. Indeed, it is only by situating labor movements within these concrete historical and political contexts that we can properly discern and analyze them. As such, this entry will primarily focus on the specific case of the US labor movement and its development over time, while making broader statements about general trends and characteristics where appropriate.

The US case is often considered an exception to broader labor movement trends in the other advanced capitalist democracies. If the structures and dynamics of the US labor movement are distinctive in significant ways, and we think that they are, our analysis will also show similarities with other national cases, and especially in the formative years. The distinctions that have emerged since then as the exceptional qualities of the US case have to do with the exceptional power of US corporations to shape the terrain upon which the labor movement operates. In other words, if there has been a US exceptionalism with regard to labor, it is because it has been relationally constituted by the exceptional position of capital in the US context. Therefore, to the extent that the US labor movement’s historical development has been made to be exceptional compared to other countries through its relations with an exceptionally powerful corporate sector in the US, then it is also true that corporate structures and practices internationally have begun to mimic elements of the US model in ways that have affected labor movements across the advanced capitalist democracies. Thus, while it is important not to generalize too much from the specificities of the US case, it nevertheless offers a useful analytic vantage point from which to develop a broader understanding of the ways in which particular institutional and political configurations work to shape labor movements more broadly.

Having been born in and by the industrial order, the labor movements of the most developed capitalist societies generally took on their characteristic appearance over the course of the nineteenth century, with political parties and trade unions being the most prevalent organizational forms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in its formative decades the US labor movement was not a particularly exceptional case relative to other industrial societies, although the arc of its trajectory would become increasingly distinctive later on. Thus, just as in England and France, two
countries whose socioeconomic development was roughly comparable to the United States, for much of the nineteenth century the American labor movement was composed of skilled craftworkers whose cultures and practices had been constructed to protect traditional skills and craft prerogatives in the face of machine technologies and standardized work practices that employers had specifically designed and implemented to erode them. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, the character of the American labor movement began to take an “exceptional” form, although not at all in the manner in which conventional wisdom has often held. The labor movement in the US was becoming militant and class conscious in ways similar to that which Karl Marx had envisaged in his analyses of the development of capitalist society, most notably expressed in the explosive growth of the Knights of Labor. The Knights were a remarkably egalitarian organization of workers and artisans that, by its height in 1886, had mobilized almost 10 percent of the US working class, across skill level, nationality, race, and gender, into militant local assemblies spread out across the entire country.

In contrast to perspectives in sociology and historical studies that have viewed the US labor movement as intrinsically and exceptionally weak, or conservative, or lacking in collective solidarity (variously attributed to affluence, or the possibilities for upward social mobility, or the spatial expansiveness of the American frontier, or early universal male suffrage, among other factors) the existence of the Knights of Labor in the late nineteenth century suggests the need for an alternative interpretation. A consideration of the dynamics of both their rise and their fall provide us with the lessons for such a reinterpretation. Ironically, it was the rapid and widespread mobilization of workers into the Knights that provoked a powerful mobilization of employers to counter them, with the ferocity of the reaction leading to their equally rapid downfall, as well as to a general weakening of the US labor movement for at least another generation. Unlike in England and France, where the state often intervened to encourage or demand employer concessions in labor disputes, the US government at the time did little to constrain the actions of employers, allowing them free rein to destroy the Knights of Labor. Considered altogether, this suggests that (1) the US labor movement was not intrinsically weak and, if anything, at one time was perhaps more militant and class conscious than its counterparts; (2) the reaction by employers to the militancy of the Knights reshaped the legal, political, and social terrain in ways that made militant worker organizations much more difficult to mobilize and sustain, thus demonstrating the “exceptional” power enjoyed by employers in the US context. One outgrowth of the defeat of the militant Knights was the ascendency of a more pragmatic, conservative, craft-based unionism, embodied by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), which became the overwhelmingly dominant institutional force within the US labor movement well into the twentieth century.

What this brief example illustrates is that labor movements can never be properly understood without considering them in their mutually constituting relationship to the corporate employers of labor (capital). Moreover, the nature of this relationship will strongly affect the role of the state in the society. In the case of the US, the state has not been as strong a force for regulation as it has been in other societies and this has meant that large corporations have been relatively free to operate. With such freedom, large corporations have become firmly ensconced as the dominant institutional player in US society, thus ensuring a relatively weak labor movement. In most other capitalist societies the state has tended to foster more balance in this relationship, by limiting (or regulating) the power of large corporations. It is important to recognize at the same time, however, that, because the society is not a static one, the power and position of the labor movement in US society has not always been consistently weak.

Moreover, the labor movement has never been monolithic and has always combined various competing tendencies. For example, by the turn of the twentieth century, a
massive increase in European immigration was underway, with millions of relatively unskilled workers pouring into the US, attracted to the huge factory complexes where assembly lines and other mass-production techniques were fast becoming the basis for most forms of manufacture. A craft-based capitalism was giving way to highly industrialized forms, thereby paving the way for a new form of unionism. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) which, as we’ve seen, had openly rejected the militant social unionism of the Knights of Labor, was made up of organizations largely shaped by the prerogatives of their own members, native-born skilled craftsmen concerned with protecting their own relatively privileged status within the working class more than with opening their ranks to the unskilled immigrants whom they often looked upon with contempt. Not until the 1930s was a widespread effort undertaken to organize the unskilled workers from the mass-production industries into industry-wide unions. It meant bringing into the same organizations men and women of all races and ethnic backgrounds, regardless of skill level, and these industrial unions formed together under the overall banner of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The attempts to form the CIO unions were met with ferocious resistance by the large corporations, often including organized violence and thereby necessitating a more militant stance and a more combative political framework on the part of the new unions. Politically, CIO leaders abandoned efforts to form independent labor parties in favor of an alliance with the Democratic Party. In the workplace, unions traded organizational stability and legitimacy in the form of “dues checkoff” (where union dues are automatically deducted from workers’ paychecks) and “union security” (where union members covered by a contract are obligated to remain union members for the duration of the contract) in exchange for assisting management in quelling shop floor unrest and ensuring more predictable, stable industrial relations. The result was a dramatic growth of union membership in the immediate postwar decades, but at the cost of undermining unions’ mobilizing capacity at the shop floor level.

Many scholars and labor leaders have looked upon the 30 years following the close of World War II as a “golden age” for the US labor movement, characterized by a “labor–management compact” whereby unions and employers worked together to ensure steady increases in workers’ wages and benefits in exchange for steady increases in worker productivity. But a closer look at the historical record shows that the idea of a “labor–management compact” is illusory in important respects. Although weakened by the crisis of the Great Depression, large corporations quickly moved in the immediate postwar period to reassert and consolidate their power within US society by seeking to curtail the militancy and radicalism of the CIO. An important step in this renewed employer counteroffensive was the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, a broad set
of statutes drafted by corporate lawyers to essentially repeal the Wagner Act that had earlier encouraged industrial unionism. The Taft-Hartley Act achieved a number of the long-standing goals of American corporate employers, including weakening union security in a variety of ways; forbidding the most effective forms of industrial action; imposing a stifling regime of bureaucratic governance over labor relations practice, as well as on the practices of union leaders; while purging communists and radicals from the ranks of the union leadership, thereby removing the clearest and strongest voices for social change from positions of authority in the unions.

The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act illustrated the contradictory position in which US unions now found themselves. Their alliance with the Democratic Party and the passage of the Wagner Act had won for labor greater organizational stability and institutional legitimacy than they had ever previously enjoyed. This allowed unions to secure unprecedented increases in living standards for their members. But that stability and legitimacy came at a price. In a pattern that would recur over time, the Democratic Party proved to be an unreliable political ally when it came to defending labor’s gains. In the case of Taft-Hartley, conservative Southern Democrats allied with Republicans to pass the bill over President Truman’s veto. Furthermore, unions’ reduced level of shop floor organization, combined with renewed employer aggressiveness, hemmed in labor’s broader social agenda. Rather than continue to fight for universal social benefits, such as a national health care system and more extensive pensions, unions settled for the creation of a private system of employer-provided “fringe benefits” that unions negotiated separately with each company.

By the mid 1950s the AFL and the CIO had merged, while largely adopting the political visage of the AFL. It was a period characterized by rapid postwar economic growth, rising American military intervention throughout the less developed world, and a profound ideological conformity imposed under the name of McCarthyism. The corporate-imposed domestication of the US labor movement noted above was often misinterpreted by social scientists as a kind of “natural” outgrowth of institutional maturation that was thought to characterize labor relations in all developed societies. A related version of the same theme saw the “end of ideology” as the inevitable accompaniment to modern socioeconomic development, whereby societies would simply discard any need for radical criticism or ideological debate with regard to the future.

However, underneath such obvious signs of approval that were stamped on the social order by conservative social scientists or the bureaucratic practices that had been imposed on labor relations in the process of domesticating it, there were important countertendencies apparent to the few who took notice. These took the form of dissident movements of workers, often radicalized by their experiences in the largest unions, who fought against the sorts of things that the Taft-Hartley Act had imposed (i.e., they struggled to replace union leaders who were insufficiently militant, overly bureaucratic, or undemocratic, and to wield militant forms of protest and collective action, such as wildcat strikes). In other words, the actions of employers to constrain the labor movement had generated new forms of organization and new forms of action from deep within the labor movement itself.

By the beginning of the 1970s, facing strong competitive pressures from European and Japanese firms, US manufacturing corporations began to squeeze more from their domestic operations by forcing down wages and by mounting a formidable and wide-ranging assault on union organization. Drawing upon a legal arsenal that had been put in place by the Taft-Hartley Act and assisted by a burgeoning industry of management consultants specializing in both union avoidance (slowing the creation of new unions in those sectors of the economy where unions had not had traditional roots, like health care and much of the services) and in breaking unions in the traditional sectors of labor
strength (food processing, meat packing, newspapers, airlines, etc.). While the assault against unionism reached its peak during the decade of the 1980s, it continued through the 1990s and up to the present, with union density rates falling from a high point of 35 percent in the mid 1950s to approximately 12 percent and falling in 2010 (where in the private sector it is less than 7 percent).

Some groups of workers sought to resist the employer assault in this period, mounting impressive campaigns against corporations such as Pittston Coal, Ravenswood Aluminum, Los Angeles property services companies, and more. But, overall, the US labor leadership’s response to the attack was conservative and unimaginative. Many labor leaders embraced a renewed focus on “labor–management partnership,” even as management expressed a preference for eliminating unions altogether rather than partnering with them. Meanwhile, union leaders called for labor law reform as a means of righting the tilt toward management in labor relations. But again, Democratic Party politicians proved themselves to be unreliable political allies, as the labor-backed Democratic presidential administrations of Carter, and later Clinton, failed to deliver on promises of labor law reform.

In the mid-1990s, faced with the demise of its institutions and its position in society, the leadership of the US labor movement began to forge a process of internal change in an attempt to reverse its fortunes. The change began with a “palace coup” within the top ranks of the AFL-CIO, that replaced a conservative, bureaucratic leadership with a reform leadership group drawn from some of the more militant and dynamic unions. Once in place, the new leadership group began a campaign to encourage, cajole, and coerce the leadership of the approximately 60 unions in the Federation to turn more of their efforts and budgets toward organizing new members, rather than servicing the needs of existing union members. They encouraged new, more militant union organizing tactics, including circumventing the bureaucratic system of union representation elections in favor of collective action and disruption; developing “corporate campaigns” to pressure institutional shareholders to protest corporate antiunionism; and seeking to envelop labor struggles within a wider circle of community solidarity, narrowing the distinction between the labor movement and other social movements.

While these reform and revitalization efforts made some headway in slowing the pace of union decline, they did not reverse it. By the mid-2000s, some prominent US labor leaders began to express frustration publicly with what they charged was an insufficient attention to new organizing within the AFL-CIO. In 2005, these leaders formed a coalition of some of the largest US unions that left the AFL-CIO to form the rival Change to Win Federation (CTW). Although the split did not lead to much interfederation conflict, as some had feared, it also did little to revitalize the labor movement as a whole. Within a few years some of the original CTW unions had returned to the AFL-CIO fold, and several CTW unions found themselves riven by internal conflicts.

One casualty of the resurgence of intraunion conflict was the most recent effort at enacting labor law reform. Although President Obama publicly backed the reform legislation, known as the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), as a candidate, he emulated his Democratic Party predecessors in showing little enthusiasm for labor law reform as president. Meanwhile, unions that had played key roles in backing and advancing EFCA, such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and UNITE HERE, diverted resources from mobilizing around EFCA toward fighting internal battles. At the same time, most other union leaders continued their patterns from previous reform efforts of relying on labor-backed Democratic Party politicians to advocate for EFCA within Congress. But with large numbers of newly elected, conservative-leaning Democratic legislators expressing lukewarm support for the bill, and little backing from President Obama, the EFCA legislation stalled in the Senate, where it died before coming to a vote.
Despite the US labor movement’s numerical decline and failure to achieve legislative gains for itself, it remains a powerful and respected political force. While corporations routinely outspend labor in election campaigns by vast margins, few other organizations are able to mobilize the number of voters that unions can. This is especially the case for unions representing workers in the public sector, where union membership has remained strong at more than one-third of the workforce. Since unions’ political mobilizing efforts are usually deployed in the service of electing liberal, usually Democratic Party, politicians, many conservative lawmakers, political action committees, foundations, and wealthy individuals have advanced strategies and policies to limit unions’ ability to participate in the political process. In recent years this has taken the form of increasing attacks on public sector unions, in some cases going as far as attempting to deny collective bargaining rights entirely to public sector workers. These attacks have in turn sparked some of the largest labor mobilizations in decades. The long-term outcome of these mobilizations remains uncertain, but their existence, and the generally positive public response to them, speaks to the continuing importance of unions, and challenges popular notions that unions are somehow outdated in the twenty-first century.

Corporate mobilization against the US labor movement has been particularly aggressive and particularly successful in weakening the conditions of workers and their organizations in recent decades, but the position of labor has become increasingly precarious elsewhere as well. The labor movements in the most advanced economies of Western Europe are still a good deal stronger politically, and more firmly rooted institutionally than are US unions. Indeed, the practice of “social partnership” has, for decades, characterized the relationship between large corporations and the labor movement in much of Western Europe, and is still intact. What this has generally meant is a more consultative, and less openly combative, relationship than in the US, represented by the active existence of works councils in many of the largest enterprises and trade associations that afford labor a voice in corporate planning. However, the deregulation of global markets and the imposition of many neoliberal reforms across Europe (often pioneered in the US, where labor has not been able to offer firm resistance) has shown that societies are now faced with some very similar competitive pressures (to privatize public services, to deregulate markets, to treat short-term shareholder value as a guide in economic policy, etc.). The tendency to cheapen the cost of labor is therefore increasingly an international effort, so that there is a drive to eliminate the differences between national labor movements by weakening them all. Ironically then, faced with the competitive pressures from US corporations in many world markets (given that the impetus and rationale for wage cuts and union busting in the US in the 1970s were blamed on competitive pressures from the other direction!) European societies have seen corporate intransigence increase and union power decline in recent years, expressed most explicitly in the erosion of a host of state social welfare policies. Across Europe a debate rages between the labor movement and allied social forces seeking to defend a European model of social solidarity, and those who would subordinate social and labor policies to corporate power and the exigencies of the market alone.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor movement in Latin America; Labor protest in the European Union; Strikes within the European context; Strikes in US history.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Student movements
CHRISTOPHER ROOTES

Movements for social and political change are typically “youth movements” insofar as it is usually young people who are first to demand changes in or of regimes that appear unable to satisfy popular aspirations to basic human rights, personal freedom, economic well-being, and political democracy. To some extent this reflects intergenerational inequities leading to a “conflict of generations” (Feuer 1969) as the young are especially likely to suffer high rates of unemployment and to harbour aspirations stimulated by contact with or awareness of conditions in states that are socially and politically liberal as well as more affluent. But it also reflects the fact that young people are relatively less likely than their elders to be constrained, by obligations of work and family, to conformity with the dominant regime.

Many of what are indiscriminately called “youth movements,” especially in their initial stages, consist of or are led by students. This has become increasingly true as the proportion of successive age cohorts who experience higher education has risen to the point where, even in many less economically developed countries, around half of all people aged under 25 are or have been students in universities or post-secondary colleges. Mobilizations that begin among university students frequently extend to other young people, especially secondary school students, but it is usually university students who remain at the core of activism.

Although students have been prominent in many revolutions and revolutionary movements, as well as other forms of contentious politics, student movements – social movements comprised wholly or mainly of students – are a distinctively modern phenomenon. Their emergence is predicated upon the existence in a society of a critical mass of students.

Student movements have emerged in all manner of modern and modernizing societies, often as agents of change, sometimes in reaction against change, but usually as challengers of regimes perceived to lack legitimacy or moral authority. They have appeared in authoritarian states in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as in the liberal democratic states of the industrialized world.

Student movements have an important place in the development of social movement theory. In the United States, it was dissatisfaction with the reductionist psycho-social explanations of student protest (see, e.g., Feuer 1969) that stimulated explanations that took social movements seriously as forms of political action (e.g., Keniston 1968; Habermas 1971). In Europe, theories of “post-industrial” society and “new social movements” were developed by Touraine (1971) and others as explanations of the student protest that confounded orthodox Marxist theories.

Sociological interest in student movements was excited principally by the eruption during the 1960s of student protest in the United States and in many states in Europe and the Pacific. Protests against the United States’ prosecution of the war in Vietnam were central to the student movements of the 1960s, but they also had other and deeper causes.

In the United States, the student movement emerged in the early 1960s out of the campaign for civil rights for African-Americans in the South as well as the socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy, which became Students for a Democratic Society in 1960. It came to prominence with the student revolt, in the name of freedom of speech, at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964, the Berkeley events inspiring new scholarly interest in student movements as well as student mobilizations on other campuses across the United States and beyond. The US student movement, fuelled by increasing opposition to
the Vietnam War, spread nationwide before reaching a crescendo in the spring of 1970. In Western Europe, student movements developed in most countries and, most spectacularly, brought normal life to a halt in much of France in May 1968 when students appeared to put revolution back on the political agenda of liberal democratic states. However, student movements also challenged regimes and/or contested government policies in Australia, East Asia, and Communist-ruled Eastern Europe.

Student movements emerged in the advanced industrialized societies toward the end of a period of doubling, even trebling, of enrolments in higher education. As a result, students were everywhere unprecedentedly numerous, both relatively and absolutely. The expansion of higher education had various sources. One was demographic pressure – the swelling, consequent upon the postwar “baby boom,” of the age cohorts from which most students were drawn. But everywhere the main pressures for expansion were political – from governments influenced by human capital theorists to invest in more highly qualified workforces in the hope of improving economic competitiveness, and from newly affluent parents concerned to ensure the career prospects of their offspring. As socio-technical change sketched in the outlines of the “knowledge economy” and began to transform occupational structures, so demand for and the supply of higher education grew dramatically. At the same time, increasing affluence made it possible for unprecedentedly large numbers of young people to enjoy a moratorium upon adult obligation. Youth as a distinct stage of life was born, and the university was its ideal locus.

The numbers of students expanded just at the time that demographic and socioeconomic changes combined to enhance the status and visibility of youth. The entry of this generation produced strains within universities that, in many countries, were elitist and traditionalist. Inadequate facilities, unreformed curricula, and antiquated rules generated conflicts between students who considered themselves adults, and authorities who regarded themselves as acting in loco parentis. These local conflicts with university authorities were, however, symptomatic of wider strains in society.

These were not, however, simply the self-interested complaints of the materially deprived. Everywhere, students were drawn disproportionately from the relatively privileged strata of societies. Actual or anticipated graduate unemployment, sometimes proffered as an explanation of the rise of student radicalism, played little or no part. This was before the peak of the long postwar economic boom and, even in Italy, where the mismatch between output and labor market was legendary, the peak years of the student revolt coincided with historic lows in the frequency of graduate unemployment (Rootes 1995). If there were grievances about employment prospects, they were less about the lack of jobs than about demands for “jobs worth doing.”

Social, demographic, and educational changes provided the actors for student movements, and local difficulties that raised civil libertarian issues often generated the first sparks, but it was events in the wider political arena that accounted for the spread of protest and cross- and intra-national variation in its incidence. Students’ local grievances generally highlighted political rigidities at state level as university authorities found themselves powerless to respond in ways that might defuse protest, as in France where university rectors had no power even to modify dormitory regulations. However, the general political condition that stimulated the development of student movements was an effective vacuum of political opposition to government policies within mainstream political arena.

In the United States, where only a few legislators voiced opposition to the Vietnam War, the draft compelled students to think seriously about the issues, and student opposition expanded to fill the space available. In Western Europe, the sclerotic politics of states frozen by the communist/anticommunist divide were similarly conducive. In West Germany, the absence of opposition was almost
literal, as student socialists had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party and a “grand coalition” government of Social and Christian Democrats overwhelmingly dominated the parliament. The vacuum of opposition was often reproduced at local level. In Europe, the student movements of the 1960s usually began not at campuses such as the Sorbonne, Heidelberg, Munich, or Rome where the institutionalized Left was strong, but at those, such as Nanterre, Berlin, Frankfurt, Trento, and Turin, where the Left was weak or absent. The most propitious condition for the development of the utopian student movements that so captured the imagination of observers was their political and social isolation (Statera 1975:119).

The subsequent development of student movements was the product of interaction between the movements, their environments, and their internal social and political dynamics. Mass media coverage generalized student movements, but raised the stakes and contributed to internal dynamics that were divisive and ultimately destructive (Gitlin 1980). Media attention amplified recruitment but, once the movement had peaked, a “reverse bandwagon” effect exaggerated its decline. By focusing upon the outspoken and the outrageous, media coverage created “leaders” without authority or political acumen, encouraged spectacular and provocative actions, and amplified the incidence of violence. This deepened the movement’s political isolation and encouraged political adventurism, with the result that in several countries, including Italy, Germany, and the United States, small minorities of student activists drifted into terrorism. More generally, frustrated by the limitations of their student constituencies, they rediscovered Marxism and embarked upon mostly fruitless missions to revolutionize the proletariat. Secular processes may have dictated the inevitable demobilization of student movements, but the turn to sectarian theorizing and Leninist organization, because they were antithetical to the civil libertarian and moral protests that had inspired student mobilization in the first place, everywhere hastened the process (Rootes 1980).

Although encounters with apparently unjust authority were crucial to the mobilization of student movements, it was crucial to their survival that official repression should remain moderate and unsystematic. Nowhere in the West did the level of repression of student protest reach the levels usual in Eastern Europe, Asia, or Latin America. Student movements were thus able to develop in the free spaces of liberal democracies aided by the intermittent stimuli of erratic police action. On those few occasions where repression was extreme—as with the 1970 shooting of four students at Ohio’s Kent State University—the immediate reaction was indignant protest, but the longer-term effect was demoralizing and demobilizing. Generally, however, the repression of student movements was mild compared with that of striking workers. State responses were more generally reformist than simply repressive.

In most countries, student movements simply declined, but in the United States and France they collapsed suddenly. In the United States, the invasion of Cambodia demonstrated the impotence of the movement, and the shoot- ings at Kent State raised the stakes. Most students returned to their books, but the most radicalized minority, such as the Weather Underground, resorted to clandestine political violence. In France, the student movement was overwhelmed by the political crisis it unleashed, and outmaneuvered by President de Gaulle’s appeal to the electorate. Thus disconcerted, the libertarians in the movement were no match for the Marxist sects who, emboldened by the crisis, sought to hegemonize a chimerical worker–student alliance. The student movement’s rediscovery of the proletariat occurred almost everywhere and guaranteed the extinction of student movements as activists’ mobilizing efforts were directed off-campus. Only in Germany was the student movement so completely isolated from the working class that, in forming an extra-parliamentary opposition, it looked to broader sections of society, thereby
By 1971, student movements had burned themselves out almost everywhere. The turn to Marxism meant that, in the rare cases where issues stimulated renewed protests by students, they did not generally produce student movements. In 1976, the longest and most widespread student strike in French history paralysed the universities, but it found little wider resonance, both because the political context had changed and because the prominence of leftist groups determined to portray the protests as anticapitalist obscured the elements of cultural critique that had made the 1968 revolt so iconic. Because most protesting students rejected leadership of any kind, the presence of the sectarian left was less an aid to more effective mobilization than an obstacle to it, and the collapse of the protests left no significant legacy (Rootes 1982).

The direct impact of the 1960s student movements upon political structure was extremely limited. Their one nearly universal legacy – the extension of the franchise to 18-year-olds – has made little impact. Nowhere in the West did student movements succeed in overthrowing elected governments. Even in France, the demise of de Gaulle in 1969 was less a delayed result of the student revolt than of his own political miscalculation. Nor did student protests influence elections in the ways they hoped. The election that ended the French student revolt produced a decisive shift to the right. If student protest persuaded Lyndon Johnson not to seek re-election, the outcome was the election not of a liberal antiwar candidate, but of Richard Nixon. Student movements’ impacts upon policy were probably more positive. Student protest certainly raised the salience of the Vietnam War and probably hastened US withdrawal. But the greatest impacts were in higher education where both curricula and governance underwent reform.

The wider political impacts of student movements were diffuse. Graduates of the “generation of ’68” contributed to the radicalization of Labor parties in Britain and Australia, and the secularization of communist parties in Italy and Spain, but their most important legacies were in the other social movements they inspired, the women’s and personal liberation movements chief among them. “Movement entrepreneurs” who learned their skills in the student movement moved on to organize workers and the poor as well as to the environmental and antinuclear movements that emerged in the 1970s. By these means, student movements contributed to the legitimation of protest and the “participatory revolution” in liberal democracies whose effects continue, especially in Western Europe.

In and since the 1980s, observers, especially in the United States, claimed to detect in various campus-based campaigns – from disinvestment in South Africa under the apartheid regime to that against sweatshop labor in developing countries – the makings of a new student movement comparable to that of the late 1960s. But although students were indeed among the early activists in such campaigns and in the antiglobalization/global justice and climate change movements, none developed as a fully fledged student movement. The principal reason is that, in all these cases, students either rapidly found allies in other, more powerful social or political actors, or because their activism quickly sparked mobilizations of much broader cross-sections of society.

The precipitate decline of Western student movements is readily explicable. The conditions of student life and the rapid turnover of student generations scarcely favor a politics of the long-haul. The student movements of the 1960s arose out of an extraordinary conjunction of demography and social change, sustained rises in living standards, the expansion of higher education in response to technological change and changes in occupational structures, and an effective vacuum of political opposition. It is possible that some of these conditions will recur; it is improbable that they will again occur in such conjunction. The 1960s now appear as a transitional stage in the development of industrialized societies in two respects. First, they
marked the point at which youth emerged as a distinct stage of life and was accorded the liberties and rights of adulthood. Second, the 1960s was the crucial decade in the transformation of the university from an elite institution at one remove from society into a site of mass education increasingly integrated with the demands of the market for highly skilled labor.

The transformation of higher education amounts in many places to its dilution. Not only are studies increasingly vocational, but students themselves are less likely to be 18-year-olds straight from school. Students are increasingly obliged to work at least part-time, and policies favoring late entry and recurrent education have encouraged universities to enrol more older students. The status of “student” has, in consequence, become less determinate as students are increasingly integrated into the social and economic mainstream. Cultural and moral concerns have not disappeared from student politics, but they have, with the proliferation of the “new” social movements, become more widespread in non-student politics. Distinctively student politics have, as a result, come more closely to resemble the politics of other sectional interest groups. Thus prolonged student protests in France in 2009–2010 were against proposed reforms of the university curriculum designed better to integrate higher education with the demands of the economy. British students have intermittently protested against the introduction of and increase in tuition fees since they were first introduced in 1998. Nevertheless, when a proposed trebling of fees produced dramatic but short-lived protests in 2010–2011, even in the context of unprecedented cuts to the public sector and welfare provision, students failed to make durable connections with other affected interest groups other than secondary school students who will bear the brunt of the changes. It is, moreover, problematic to designate as a “movement” a campaign and succession of protest events that lasted barely two months.

If student movements have all but disappeared from the liberal democratic states of the advanced industrialized societies, they have continued intermittently to play important roles in authoritarian states. In the 1970s, student movements played critical roles in the democratization of Spain and Greece during years of military dictatorship, in Spain because the universities enjoyed a degree of political immunity and so provided space for political discussion and organization not enjoyed by other groups in society, and in Greece because students dared to challenge an increasingly unpopular regime. In Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, student movements repeatedly challenged communist regimes from the 1950s to the 1980s. Sometimes their protests were bloodily repressed – as in Hungary in 1956 – but student movements kept alive democratic aspirations and so contributed to the eventual collapse of those regimes.

The role of student movements in the democratization of Asian societies is even clearer. In Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, despite often savage repression, student movements provoked political crises in authoritarian regimes that ultimately contributed to the expansion of civil liberties and democratic rights. Student protests against more closed and systematically repressive regimes have had less fortunate results. The student movement in Burma has been aggressively repressed, but perhaps the best-known example, both for the hopes it raised and the brutal way in which they were dashed, was the Chinese movement that focused upon Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989.

In Iran student protests have been the leading edge of protest against the repressive governments both of Shah Reza Pahlevi and of his postrevolutionary successors. The pro-democracy Iranian Green movement of 2009 is often referred to as the inspiration for the Arab Spring that began in 2011 with the successful mobilizations against authoritarian and gerontocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and rapidly spread to other countries in the Arab world. None of these was primarily or exclusively a student movement but students and student organizations played prominent parts.
These, and the many other instances of student movements in authoritarian states, have in common the fact that it was generally students who first challenged oppressive regimes in the name of universalist principles of liberty, morality, and democracy. The critical conditions for the emergence and development of student movements are a suitably moralistic political grievance, an absence of effective opposition within the polity from other, more powerful political actors, and a lack of powerful allies. Chief among the conditions of their success, however, is their ability to attract allies either from reformists within governing elites or from other sections of society, and weakness or inconsistency in the state’s repressive response. Students, relatively unconstrained by the obligations of adult life, may be the least inhibited opponents of authoritarianism, but they are seldom able by themselves to achieve their objectives.

The development of student movements in modernizing societies under authoritarian regimes is common, but their development in fully democratic states in economically advanced societies is wholly exceptional.

SEE ALSO: Age and social movements; Antiglobalization movements; Antiwar and peace movements; Free Speech Movement; Green Movement in Iran; New Left and social movements; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (United States); Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (United States); Weatherman (United States); Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Transnational social movements

JACKIE SMITH

Modern social movements, generally thought of as political, emerged in tandem with modern nation states, as groups of people organized to alternately resist new claims being made by national authorities (such as taxes or military conscription) or to advance their own claims that states provide a variety of public goods and services (such as education, health care, and various forms of financial assistance). Ongoing competition between authorities and citizen challengers generated new structures – including parliaments, bills of rights, and bureaucratic checks and balances – to routinize public participation in national politics and to otherwise enhance the accountability of political leaders to citizenry (see, e.g., Tilly 1984; Markoff 1996; Tarrow 1998). Today, as states increasingly turn to international political arenas to manage their economies and ecologies and other aspects of social life, social movements are becoming increasingly transnational in their structure and focus.

The same rapidly advancing technologies that have fostered the expansion of a global economy have aided the rise of transnational social movements. Relatively cheap airline tickets, more widely available telephone and Internet access, expanding use of English as a global working language, and a globalized mass media enable people from more diverse classes and geographic origins to share information and cultivate cooperative relationships across huge distances (Tarrow 2005; Smith 2008). While transnational social movements were active in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, promoting international peace, an end to slavery, and women’s suffrage, activists in these movements were by and large from privileged backgrounds (Rupp 1997). Today’s transnational activism, which has expanded rapidly since the 1970s and 1980s, involves those of far more modest means. That said, it is still true that many transnational (and other) movements are disproportionately middle class, since people with more and better education as well as time, skills, and resources are the most able to be involved in social movements. But social movement politics by its nature attempts to lower barriers and costs to popular political participation, and many activists seek to confront the inequities they find in their own structures and operations.

Transnational social movements are best seen as networks of actors that are organized at local, national, and international levels. Many include formal organizations that have constitutions, staff members, bank accounts, and boards of directors. Others are neighborhood or friendship groups that meet informally and irregularly and who support each other’s work to promote social change. Individuals are also key players in all social movements, and in transnational movements, we often find members of government delegations to the United Nations playing key roles in social movements. For instance, governments like Mexico have long been supportive of international disarmament efforts, and its delegates have helped peace movement activists get access to information and to increase their influence on official disarmament negotiations.

United Nations officials, such as those in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, are also frequently involved in supporting the work of the transnational human rights movement. Journalists and academics are also part of many movements, helping to popularize debates or to advance new analyses that can assist social movements. Webs of interpersonal and interorganizational connections help expand the flow of information to different actors within movements. Transnational
events like United Nations conferences or transnational meetings of civil society groups have helped increase the strength and density of these network ties, and the increased frequency of these events in recent decades helps account for the rise of transnational movements.

Transnational movements have adopted a number of strategies to promote global change. They can work to advance new international agreements, such as the Convention to Ban Landmines or the International Criminal Court, or to block agreements such as those of the World Trade Organization. They can work to press individual governments to abide by international norms or to ratify treaties. And they can appeal to global institutions or norms in order to strengthen their leverage in national conflicts. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) refer to the latter of these strategies as the “boomerang effect.” They argue that when national political systems are repressive or restrictive, appeals to international norms or alliances can bring international pressure to bear on states, thereby altering the balance of power in national political contests. So when Argentine human rights activists mobilized their transnational networks, they introduced an additional cost (US military aid) to the government if it persisted in flouting international law. In short, transnational movements can and do affect both national and international political processes. Moreover, by shaping international treaties and by working with international institutions, they help define the institutional arrangements of our global political system.

The major distinction of transnational movements is that they mobilize people across national boundaries around a shared aim. They help people define their interests and identities in ways that go beyond the traditional nation-state borders. By facilitating routine communication between people from vastly different regions and cultures, they help enhance understanding and mutual trust while making international friendships more feasible and likely. A member of Amnesty International (AI), for instance, will share more common interests and perspectives with AI members outside her or his own country than she or he will with many of her compatriots. Organizations generate their own internal cultures and identities. And because they generally oppose predominant cultural systems, social movement organizations have a particular need for creating supportive identities that can bind members together and support collective action even in the face of repression (see, e.g., Rupp 1997).

As they attempt to define new activist identities, transnational movements must overcome the considerable influence of the national state in defining people’s primary allegiances and motivations. However, just as the processes of global economic integration help generate the technologies and other infrastructures that support transnational organizing, here too global processes help break down the monopolies states have on their citizens’ loyalties. The globalization of the economy has meant that people’s educational backgrounds are more similar, as are their professional lives and working conditions. Moreover, there are increasingly obvious connections between global forces, such as transnational corporations or international trade laws, and one’s daily experiences and interests, and these provide important foundations for the creation of shared understandings and meanings outside the framework of traditional state boundaries. Indeed, overcoming differences in national perspectives may be far easier than overcoming other differences within movements (Moody 1997). In other words, we can see important foundations for the globalization of civil society to parallel the globalization of economic and political institutions.

Like all movements, transnational social movements seek to enhance their political influence by cultivating alliances with other groups. A long-standing divide exists between social movements organized around issues such as the environment or civil rights and those organized to promote the interests of labor (Waterman 2005). In many contexts,
corporate interests seek to undermine alliance building by framing environmental struggles as contests between jobs or development and environmental conservation. Divisions between richer and poorer activists persist in many movements, as economic class shapes the day-to-day experiences and perspectives of people in important ways. Sometimes, however, transnational movements can help overcome class or caste divisions by providing a broader perspective on the divisions that might exist within a single country. Activists in transnational environmental groups, for instance, are motivated out of a concern for a particular policy, and they will work with any groups they think can help secure their aims. In contrast, within countries we often find that urban–rural divisions or even anti-indigenous prejudices can impede alliance formation within nations.

The World Social Forum is a contemporary focal point for transnational social movements. It began in 2001 as an effort to mobilize against the global neoliberal capitalist order and around the slogan “Another World is Possible.” It consists of a biannual global meeting, accompanied by national, regional, and local social forums that are linked through overlapping networks of participants and through internet sites and other forms of communication. Activists refer to it as a “process,” since it aims to foster ongoing dialogue and learning across time and space. It has mobilized many hundreds of thousands of activists and remains a core site of innovation and activity for the contemporary global justice movement (Santos 2006; Smith et al. 2007).

While social movements address any number of different issues, many work more or less self-consciously to affect the formal means by which citizens can both participate in policy debates and hold their elected leaders accountable for policy decisions. So movements for racial equality have generated laws to protect minority voting rights, and demonstrators protesting against military arms races have helped to advance new legal protections for all forms of public speech. In short, in the course of mobilizing around particular issues, movements help shape the laws and institutions of our democracies. This is exactly what has taken place in the international political arena. As groups mobilized to advocate for human rights or to limit the use of military force, they have found themselves involved in the process of helping define the role of citizens in institutions that were established by states.

Global political institutions such as the European Union and United Nations were formally organized by governments with little desire to see much in the way of citizen participation. International diplomacy was seen as “high politics” that needed to be removed from the pressures of what were seen as poorly informed and passionate citizenries. But because a government’s participation in any international organization generally required that their national legislature approve of the arrangement, governments were forced to yield some space for citizens’ involvement in these bodies. And since the establishment of both these institutions, we have seen efforts by movements to further expand citizen participation in global politics.

Nevertheless, a substantial “democratic deficit” remains, and many national delegates to international institutions are unelected and largely unaccountable to citizens. There are no political parties organizing constituencies beyond the national level. Many international negotiations remain secretive, and even national legislators are denied access to official meetings and documents. Because global institutions have an increasing impact on the policy decisions that affect us, this global democratic deficit has undermined the quality of democracy within nations as well. Some analysts speak of a “hollowing out” of national democracy in recent years as states delegate more of their authority to supranational institutions, privatize more of their services to the corporate sector, and delegate more distributional decisions to local authorities (see Markoff 2004). Thus, after years of growing transnational activism aimed at promoting international agreements for human rights, more equitable
development, and environmental protections, more transnational movement groups are demanding global democracy as the twenty-first century unfolds (Smith 2008).

Another key emphasis of contemporary transnational movements is a call for a more balanced approach to global integration than policymakers have pursued thus far. Since the late 1970s, key players in global politics have emphasized the development of global markets, and they encouraged all countries to reduce tariffs and other measures that limit the flow of goods and services across national borders. Increased global trade was thought to bring economic growth that would benefit all. Unfortunately (but not unexpectedly), for many reasons this simple economic logic has not proved true, and along with unprecedented increases in global trade we find unprecedented concentrations of wealth amid persistent poverty and environmental degradation.

Beginning in the 1990s, many groups began working transnationally to challenge this predominant neoliberal model of economic globalization. They argued that many decisions should not be left to the “free” market, because markets respond only to those with wealth. And many social goods – such as a clean environment or public health – are not readily reduced to simple cost–benefit calculations. These decisions, activists argue, require informed public debate and consultation. At the World Trade Organization Ministerial in Seattle in 1999, transnational movements came together with national and local organizers to demand more accountable and less market-oriented international policies. Activists demanded a greater say in decisions about how national and local economies (and polities) are organized, as they were finding that global institutions were squeezing out possibilities for citizen input into decisions about what kinds of industries operate in local communities, what protections states can (and more often cannot) enact to preserve their natural environments, and how educational, health, and other services are managed. These protests, coupled with declining economic growth and global financial crisis, which began around 2007, helped slow the progress of trade globalization, and opened space for more critical perspectives on the global economy to emerge.

In sum, attention to transnational social movements helps us understand the political processes behind globalization. Because movements are working to connect localized citizens with global political processes, they provide the connective tissue that helps integrate our global polity by mobilizing local communities around global policy debates. They are also part of complex processes of contestation that help define the structure of global institutions and the character of local, national, and global polities. By helping shape institutions, policies, and systems of meaning, they are important actors in the global system. By insisting that the global system be made more open and accountable, transnational movements are essential for the preservation of democracy.

Studying transnational movements is difficult. One needs to have expertise in the politics and cultures of different countries, as well as an understanding of the global political system – which constitutes a unique “area study” of its own. Because of these complexities, most studies to date are case studies of how transnational activism affects a particular national context or of particular transnational campaigns or events. The Global Civil Society Yearbook, published annually since 2001, has sought to trace the evolution of globally organized social change efforts, and it provides useful information about trends in global organization and activism. Electronic newspaper records have allowed for large-scale, comparative analyses of media coverage of movements. Key questions that emerge from analyses of transnational movements are: How have globalizing trends affected the ways people engage in politics? How do transnational forms of activism compare with national ones? How does participation in transnational activism vary across different countries? And, perhaps most importantly, what impacts do
transnational movements have on global political and cultural change?

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Global Justice Movement; Globalization and movements; Social Forum, World; Transnational Zapatism.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Al-Qaeda
FAISAL DEVJI

Emerging as it did from the cold war’s final proxy war, the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, the militant network known as Al-Qaeda was a global phenomenon well before the spectacular 9/11 attacks that made its reputation worldwide. Yet despite its planetary vision of Muslim suffering at the hands of Western enemies, or its equally dispersed recruits who possess no determinable sociological profile, both this project and the movement to which it gave rise are often defined in traditional terms. So Al-Qaeda is either seen to constitute some new and purely internal variation within the closed genealogy of Islamic radicalism, or as representing the updated version of an older European ideology like nihilism, anarchism, or even fascism. These backward-looking visions, however, cannot provide an adequate measure of the phenomenon as a future-oriented social movement.

Al-Qaeda’s life as a movement lies in its remarkable fluctuation and flexibility as an organization. Indeed it is precisely because the movement can no longer be tied to some traditional form of political organization, ideology, or even purpose that its influence can spread so rapidly across a global terrain. For Al-Qaeda operates as a set of services linked to a brand name that is franchised globally. But for this to happen its founding organization, established to fight the cold war’s last battle in Afghanistan, is compelled to shrink to a symbolic point. Similar is the fate of Al-Qaeda’s anti-Soviet ideology, which Alice-like has to pass through globalization’s looking glass in miniature form, reduced to a half-dozen or so sound bites for the benefit of a do-it-yourself jihad against the West as a whole.

All this can be seen very clearly in the various bombings that followed the 9/11 attacks, which in one move established Al-Qaeda as the most potent brand name of the militant’s marketplace. Thus the official reports on the 2005 London bombings tell us that the mobilization of its perpetrators was unprecedented in its rapidity and that, unlike cults, secret societies, or radical groups in the past, these men did not have to be removed from everyday life and immersed in some special environment in order to be indoctrinated. Instead they were mobilized in public places like gyms and on rafting expeditions, their only truly private act being the concoction of explosives. All this was possible only because there existed neither an organization to discipline nor an ideology to indoctrinate them. No traditional organization or ideology can exist for a global cause that refuses to be grounded in any particular struggle. Al-Qaeda thus takes the form of a network rather than a hierarchy. And moving from a hierarchical to a networked form entails the corresponding shift from a vertical to a horizontal mode of dissemination. After all it is no longer an ideology or doctrine, other than a handful of modular sound bites and slogans, that is being transmitted here but a set of practices with instructions provided that are linked to a brand name. All that is required is to download them – or to buy into the franchise.

In this sense Al-Qaeda-inspired militancy represents the democratization of Islamic authority, since its practitioners manufacture their own legitimacy from scriptural and other fragments that circulate globally in electronic form. When authority is no longer tied to a particular society but has become a global commodity, it cannot constitute an old-fashioned hierarchy but depends completely on the purchasing decisions of individual buyers. Such an attitude toward religious authority is not unique to militants but characterizes even the most pacific of Muslim practices. In his book *Globalised Islam* (2004), Olivier Roy points out that the attempt by many Muslims to purify Islam of all
cultural particularity ends up making a global technology of it, which is to say a standardized product to be bought and used in the global arena. Militants of the Al-Qaeda type tend to pitch their practices not to local audiences as much as to global ones, so that their widely disseminated videotapes refer mostly to each other, talking to each other in a frenzy of technological communication from which real people and societies have been excluded. But divested from real people and societies, militant acts cease to have political purchase, having become gestures within a global society that has come into existence but does not yet possess political institutions of its own.

Unlike the “fundamentalist” or “Islamist” politics of a previous generation, Al-Qaeda is concerned neither with states nor ideologies, though it does not therefore seek to overturn these. Alongside environmentalists or pacifists, the men inspired by Al-Qaeda consider Muslim suffering to be a “humanitarian” cause, like climate change or nuclear proliferation, which must be addressed globally or not at all. Indeed the worldwide Muslim community of Al-Qaeda’s imagination is modeled upon and comes to represent the human race itself as a global subject, both of which lack political existence and are therefore defined only in the prose of victimization. In other words the political institutions of states either in their singular or collective forms no longer provide the conceptual framework for militant practices, which exist in a global society bereft of political institutions. Al-Qaeda achieves meaning in this institutional vacuum.

SEE ALSO: Islamic movements; Religion and social movements; Terrorist movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Arab Spring
DANA M. MOSS

Over the past several decades, few puzzles have captivated academic imaginations more than the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Scholars have dedicated volumes to exploring possible causal factors, including the role of oil rents, the “robustness” of coercive apparatuses, Islamist movements, civil society, elite fragmentation, and other such political processes and characteristics (Posusney & Angrist 2005). However, the eruption of what has been dubbed the “Arab Spring” in late 2010 sent shockwaves through the world, decimating myths about Arab sociopolitical gridlock. Sweeping social change in the region appeared largely “unthinkable” (Kurzman 2004) until an unprecedented series of popular movements turned streets into occupied protest zones across the region.

The term “Arab Spring” most commonly refers to the mass protests, uprisings, and revolutionary movements that began in Tunisia in December 2010, and then spread to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It can be argued that no country has been entirely insulated from the “threat from below”; the popular chant al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nidham (the people want the fall of the regime) has been echoed across borders for over a year to date. Arab Spring movements have dethroned long-standing rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya thus far, shaken the stability of regimes in Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, inspired hasty efforts at constitutional reforms in countries like Morocco and Jordan, and prompted ruling elites to reassure ruffled publics about economic growth measures in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. Even those states which have toppled their “pharaohs” have continued to see mass street protests demanding the accountability of new governments, the resignation of the old guard, and the implementation of transparent democratic structures. In other countries like Yemen and Syria, movements have continued with participation in the millions under conditions of extreme violence (including bombings, kidnappings, torture, and mass internment) and resource deprivation.

The sheer magnitude of the Arab Spring can hardly be captured in a single encyclopedic entry, not least because the events are ongoing at the time of this writing, but also because the revolutionary transitions themselves comprise an era of unsettled contention that will span years to come. The synopses below include only some of the watershed moments of the Arab Spring in some of the affected countries, as of April 2012; they are far from a comprehensive list of participating locales, events, movements, important figures, or facilitating conditions. Future scholarship is likely to tease apart these accounts and other popularly understood narratives in order to test their accuracy and their implications for social movement research. The number of actual countries that have experienced the Arab Spring is also likely to be a future subject of debate, since protesters from Israel to the United States to China have attempted with more or less success to harness a visible “occupy the streets” mobilization technique that – at least tacitly – has been influenced by the widespread tactic of street occupation used by Arab Spring participants.

TUNISIA

The Tunisian Revolution is commonly understood to have been caused by a young fruit seller, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire on December 17, 2010, in the small city of Sidi Bouzid. After a confrontation with a female municipal officer, who reportedly publicly humiliated Bouazizi and confiscated his cart after demanding a
bribe, Bouazizi immolated himself with gasoline on the street in front of the governor’s office. Al Jazeera English reported this as “an act that symbolised the frustrations of poor, unemployed Tunisians and triggered the revolt that ousted veteran leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali” (Oct. 27, 2011). Bouazizi died 18 days later, after being visited by then-President Ben Ali.

It is reported that protests in Sidi Bouzid began almost immediately in response to Bouazizi’s immolation, and these demonstrations escalated after several other youths enacted measures of self-harm. Within the next two weeks, via mechanisms that remain unspecified, save for the use of social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, protests had spread to Tunis. Members of professional associations, including lawyers and teachers, also joined the protests as media outlets reported strong public reactions to instances of repression and sniper shootings that killed civilians at public gatherings, including funerals. Confrontations on the street continued through January 14 when President Ben Ali, who had been in power since 1987, fled to Saudi Arabia. However, protests against the government led by the ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), continued almost immediately, and this led to rapid turnover of government officials through the beginning of February.

Despite the flaring of protests intermittently throughout 2011, Tunisia hosted peaceful elections on October 27, 2011, electing the previously banned Islamist Al-Nahda party to the majority led by Rachid Ghannouchi. Due to new gender quotas in the proportional parliamentary elections, women will make up over 40 percent of Tunisia’s new parliament. Elections were not unproblematic, however; several thousand of Sidi Bouzid’s residents clashed with police after learning that some of their votes had been discounted. Debates over the future of Tunisia under a moderate Islamist party are ongoing.

EGYPT

The Egyptian revolution began in late January 2011, and resulted in the resignation of longtime president Hosni Mubarak on February 11. Protests were organized initially to coincide with National Police Day on January 25 in order to protest corruption, repression, economic stagnation, and other grievances, and reports cite that these protests were encouraged through social media sites. Preexisting movements, including a variety of youth groups and the April 6 Movement, distributed thousands of pamphlets encouraging protests and giving instructions on nonviolent confrontation. The main protest site throughout the demonstrations became Cairo’s Tahrir (Liberation) Square; however, protests took over other major city centers as well.

On January 26, all mobile and internet services were shut down in response to the protests and, that Friday, demonstrations swelled in number. It is reported that members of the government released inmates from prisons in an effort to promote chaos, and by January 28 the police had withdrawn from the streets. Mubarak addressed the nation, pledging reforms. The military were deployed and a curfew was imposed, but it was largely ignored. The now-famous incident of pro-government thugs riding into Tahrir Square on camels and horses, attacking protesters with weapons, occurred on February 2, and a series of rock-throwing battles between pro- and antigovernment groups that paralyzed the streets were broadcast live by Al Jazeera to audiences around the world. At 6 pm on February 11, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced in a brief statement over state television that Mubarak had stepped down.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed control of government, and national (as well as international) celebrations erupted with millions of Egyptians cheering into the night. Since that time, a myriad of hallmark events have occurred, highlighting the tensions between continued demonstrations and the transitional government. These
events include (but are not limited to): the raiding of security offices by looting protesters; the passing of a constitutional referendum in March 2011; the announcement of elections to be held in a three-part series beginning at the end of November 2011; massive protests in April and May 2011 calling for Mubarak and members of his regime to be put on trial; protests demanding that SCAF follow through on implementing democratic demands; and demonstrations aimed at reasserting popular democratic demands after protests were banned at the end of March. By August 2011, Mubarak was put on public trial, though this was put on hold as of October 30, 2011 over controversies regarding the presiding judge. After the trial resumed in January 2012, arguments were concluded in February 2012; the results are being deliberated at the time of this writing and the outcome may be announced in June 2012.

In October and November of 2011, street-level violence again erupted as protests continued and demonstrators were attacked, detained, and tortured by security forces; documented instances of police beating women and tearing off their clothing mobilized demonstrations in December 2011. Popular disillusionment with the SCAF regime continues to grow, and activists accuse the government of fueling sectarian violence between Coptic Christians and Muslims. Egypt’s revolution, while far from over, has been cited as the most important catalyst for uprisings in other MENA countries, many of which witnessed a surge in popular protest after Mubarak’s resignation.

YEMEN

Despite it being the Middle East’s poorest country, Yemen continues to host the Arab world’s longest-running uprising. Protests and some armed conflict continue against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power since 1978. The capital city of San’a first witnessed protests by independent activists in January 2011, with thousands amassing on January 27; protests were named the “Day of Rage” on February 3 and the “Friday of Anger” on February 18. Protests have taken place in all major cities in Yemen since February 2011, and continue at the time of this writing with no sign of abating. The initial protests in San’a were led by a female journalist and activist named Tawwakul Karman who, in October 2011, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Thousands joined the small number of protesters in the streets to celebrate the end of Hosni Mubarak’s presidency in Egypt on February 11, but protesters were attacked and kept from occupying San’a’s own Tahrir Square. During this time, youth groups asserted their leadership role in the protests, and tents were erected at the gates of San’a University, thereafter dubbed “Taghyir (Change) Square.” This sit-in was established several days after the erecting of peaceful occupying protests in Ta’iz, which have led Yemen’s protests in number since February.

The complex and ever-shifting roles of Yemen’s tribal confederations, certain factions of the armed forces, the traditional opposition bloc, and the youth groups have resulted in (1) an escalation of fighting between Saleh’s military forces on one side and rebel military and armed tribal factions on the other, (2) the popular delegitimation of the “old” oppositional coalition, and (3) the assertion of demands by the “youth” of the Yemeni protests. One of the most notable events occurred on March 18, 2011, when snipers killed over 50 protesters in Taghyir Square and injured over 200. This resulted in dozens of resignations by Yemeni public officials and some international condemnation of Saleh’s regime. On May 23, Saleh also violated tribal law and sparked a minor war by attempting to assassinate a powerful tribal shaykh named Sadeq al-Ahmar. Saleh’s forces have bombed and shelled protest sites throughout the uprising, resulting in hundreds of casualties in many Yemeni cities and increasing Yemen’s pre-existing refugee crisis. Taghyir Square continues to be a literal tent city for protesters and residents who have lost their homes in
the fighting between antigovernment tribes or defected military units and the President’s Republican Guard and Central Security forces.

On June 3, 2011, a bomb, planted by as yet unknown parties, exploded inside the president’s palace. President Saleh suffered severe injuries and was flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, where he stayed until September 23. Chronic water, food, and fuel shortages paired with constant, low-level violence against the population have brought about the gravest humanitarian crisis in the country’s history (Picard 2011). However, the massive street protests have continued – and even grown – in nearly every city and town. On any given Friday in San’a or Ta’iz, well over half a million men, women, and children in the protest squares chant for the fall of the regime. However, after Saleh’s return to San’a in late September, attacks against protesters increased, and international pressure failed to persuade Saleh to commit to a transfer of power until November 23, 2011. At this time, Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative initially drafted in the spring of 2011, which terminated his presidency and installed vice president Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi as interim president of the republic. Hadi’s presidency was confirmed by a single candidate presidential referendum in February 2012, which was also mandated by the GCC agreement. Since then, Hadi and the unity government led by Prime Minister Muhammad Basandwah have struggled to establish their legitimacy and authority in the face of continued interference by former President Saleh, his family, and expanding antigovernment operations by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Street protests have continued, as many revolutionary activists insist that their demands have not yet been met. The encampments established by popular reform movements in San’a and Ta’iz continue, while throughout southern Yemen, protests in favor of Southerner rights and independence have escalated. As of April 2012, Saleh remains in Yemen after spending time in New York City for “medical treatment.” Yemen will likely provide scholars with a fascinating case of how a primarily peaceful movement can be maintained in what is considered to be the Middle East’s most “backward” and violence-prone country.

LIBYA

Libya’s revolution – also referred to as the 2011 Libyan Civil War – began on February 15, 2011, as protests in the cities of Benghazi, Bayda, and Zintan erupted. Over the next several weeks, security forces attempted to deter the protests by force, while counterdemonstrations took place in the capital city of Tripoli and other cities. February 17 was dubbed a “Day of Revolt,” as protesters inside Libya and in exile called for mass mobilization against Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, Libya’s head of state since 1969. Footage circulated in the international press of African mercenaries, who had allegedly been recruited from neighboring countries by Gadhafi to fight the protesters, and throughout this time reports of deadly attacks against protesters continued. A National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed, and it has been hotly contested precisely when and how the protests transformed into an armed rebellion. Nevertheless, the NTC rapidly recruited a volunteer army, and young and inexperienced militias comprised of college graduates, professionals, and laborers took up arms.

By the end of February many towns were reported to have “fallen” to the rebels, including the key town of Benghazi; however, Gadhafi’s troops recaptured several towns and appeared to be staging a significant military comeback by March. Foreign military intervention began on March 19 under the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized NATO to enforce a no-fly zone, target the Libyan military’s resources and movements, enforce a naval blockade, and impose an arms embargo. In June 2011, Gadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam offered to institute elections, but this
was summarily rejected by rebel forces and foreign powers. Tripoli was captured by the rebels around August 22 at the same time that the NTC issued a written roadmap to transition Libya to a constitutional democracy. On September 16, the UN General Assembly voted in favor of granting the National Council a seat in the congress. Gadhafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011, and by the end of the month NATO announced that it would terminate its operations. Saif al-Islam, Gadhafi’s son and outspoken leader of the regime, was captured in November 2011. The death toll has been reported to be well over 30,000 people. The fall of Gadhafi appeared to give a significant morale boost to the uprisings in Syria and Yemen.

SYRIA

The Syrian uprisings are reported to have begun on January 26, 2011; several protests in support of the Libyan and Egyptian revolutions were organized throughout February, when activists tested the waters for their own targeted protests. As President Bashar al-Asad promised reforms, however, protests were suppressed by a variety of violent means. A media blackout continued in Syria, with information smuggled out of the country by activists. Protests appeared to gather steam in March, beginning in the southernmost town of Dar’a and, since that time, massive demonstrations continued on the streets of Hama, Homs, and other cities, despite widespread use of violence by the security apparatuses loyal to the al-Asad regime. The current president inherited his position from his father, Hafez al-Asad, who ruled Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. Security forces continued to lay siege across Syria, and videos showed the use of tanks and heavy artillery against civilian gatherings, mass graves, and victims of killing and torture of all ages.

The eruption of such mass disobedience in the face of al-Asad’s police state was deemed largely impossible after the 1982 massacre in Hama, in which at least 10,000 civilians were killed in response to an Islamist uprising of a few hundred rebels. While protests have been reported to be largely nonviolent, armed resistance groups have emerged within Syria. A Syrian National Council was formed and asserted demands on behalf of the protest movements. Activists demanded the implementation of a Libyan-style no-fly zone and for the “equipping of the ‘Syrian Free Army’ – an opposition group composed of defecting soldiers,” according to Al Arabiya news. However, in October 2011, NATO refused this request. In February 2012, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, and negotiated a ceasefire with the al-Asad government, as well as a plan to allow journalists and UN observers into Syria. Annan’s plan came under scathing criticism by Syrian activist factions, who claimed that its terms were overly generous to the al-Asad regime and that it allowed the military to continue their assaults. The April 12, 2012 ceasefire was not observed by the government, and Annan continued to express “alarm” (BBC News) over the violence, urging the deployment of UN observers more quickly into Syria. Reports circulated that any Syrian accused of speaking to a UN observer has been targeted with violence. The civilian population, particularly in cities such as Homs and Hama, faced siege warfare, and populations throughout the country have suffered from hunger and other resource shortages throughout the winter and spring of 2011–2012.

As the conflict continued, al-Asad became increasingly isolated in the international community, and the actions of the Syrian regime were condemned by the UN and the Arab League, though he told the UK’s Daily Telegraph in October that the “whole region would burn” were his regime to collapse. The Syrian Emergency Task Force of Los Angeles reported, as of April 2012, that over 12,000 civilians have been killed and tens of thousands have been detained and imprisoned, including hundreds of women and children.
BAHRAIN

The tiny Gulf kingdom of Bahrain, currently ruled by King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, first witnessed protests in relatively small numbers during the first two weeks of February 2011. Violence against protesters occurred during this period, and by February 14 protesters marched to and occupied the iconic Pearl Roundabout in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, and erected tents in order to occupy the area. Early in the morning on February 17, police attacked the protesters camping on the roundabout; several were killed, dozens “disappeared,” and hundreds were wounded. Al Jazeera English reported that hospitals were overrun with the injured; footage during this time showed distraught nurses and doctors protesting against the king and the violence of the roundabout raid. Manama was placed under a military lockdown and a three-month emergency law was declared; the roundabout camp was destroyed and ringed with barbed wire and military guards after protesters were attacked and evicted.

While demonstrators were able to return to the roundabout by February 19, after security forces withdrew from the site, the regime used brutal force to crack down on the protests happening both inside and outside of the capital, and eventually the monument at the Pearl Roundabout was destroyed. Since that time, many incidents of protest and persecution have been reported, though Bahrain did not witness any of the mass mobilization that initially characterized its movement on February 14. Medics and doctors were prosecuted in the courts and several activists were sentenced to life in prison. Parliamentary elections were held to fill the seats left vacant by the al-Wefaq National Islamic Society – Bahrain’s majority party – after they resigned and then boycotted government following the violence in February. Freedom House reported that beginning in February 2011, approximately 1600 activists have been tried in courts, notably medical professionals accused of treating injured protesters. In November 2011, a Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry reported that human rights abuses did indeed take place earlier that year. After a lull in protests, mobilizations re-emerged on the street in March 2012. In response, security forces have launched assaults on protesters and targeted communities with constant tear gas attacks. Bahrain’s hosting of the Formula One Grand Prix mobilized protesters in April 2012, breathing life into a street-level movement that was considered to have been successfully crushed just months before. Protesters continue to call for the abdication of the king, chanting “Down Hamad!”

While very little research has been published to date on the 2010–2012 Arab Spring due to its extremely recent and still-developing character at the time of writing, scholars will have no shortage of existing literature to build on in the realm of social movements, revolutions, international relations, and democratic reform. While the literature has recently been dedicated to uncovering agency and resistance in the Arab world through analyses of everyday practices and interactions (e.g., Bayat 2010), the events of 2011 signal a new era in how the region will be studied. Bloggers, journalists, and scholars have already begun to theorize about the role of the youth population exploitation, rising unemployment, the use of social media, heightened senses of collective efficacy and solidarity of movements, and the frailty of “sultanistic regimes” (Goldstone 2011). Importantly, while the role of Islamist factions in the uprisings have varied and continue to be negotiated, none of the Arab Spring uprisings were Islamist insurgencies or party-led movements, at least in their inception. How this particular movement wave plays out will be the focus of exciting theoretical advances in studies aimed at exploring the sources, processes, and outcomes of significant social change.

Future scholarship should take up a number of questions of multiple strata and temporal variations, including: (1) international responses to national-level rebellions, which vary from intervention to avoidance; (2) the dismantling of the “wall of fear” and the social
importance of emotions in mobilization; (3) the role of “older” forms of political mobilization through tribes and kinship networks versus popular social movements seeking to transcend identity politics and familial ties (Mabrouk 2011); (4) the role of pre-Arab Spring movements, including unions, associations, and Islamist movements in the mobilization processes; (5) movement diffusion across regions and the globe, including nonviolent strategies; (6) strategic variation, particularly in response to different levels of state repression; (7) the critical role of women, youth, and minorities in the demonstrations; (8) temporal and ecological variations in protest emergence, especially between capital cities and peripheral regions; (9) the effects of social media and media coverage; (10) outcomes of democratic transitions, violence, state collapse, humanitarian disasters, widespread unemployment, and other factors across states; (11) an exploration of the counterfactuals, that is, the countries where mobilization was muted (e.g., Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq) or is taking different forms that may end up being no less significant over time; and (12) the Arab Spring’s effects on the Arab–Israeli conflict.

SEE ALSO: Democratization and democratic transition; Identity politics; Internet and social movements; Islamic movements; Islamic women’s movements; Israeli social movements; Repression and social movements; Revolutions; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Attac
FREDRIK UGGLA

Founded in France in 1998, Attac (Association pour une taxation des transactions financiers pour l’aide aux citoyens) has been one of the most prominent groups in the so-called global justice (also known as the antiglobalization or the alter-mondialization) movement, with tens of thousands of members in its country of origin, and national chapters in dozens of other countries. The group has mixed a critique of liberal economic policies in general with a very specific demand: the introduction of a tax on financial transfers as a method to restrain financial markets and raise revenue for development projects.

Attac and its demands were born in a context of radical, extra-parliamentary political currents in France during the second half of the 1990s (Ancelovici 2002; Waters 2004). Its foundation was preceded by a December 1997 editorial by Ignacio Ramonet in Le Monde Diplomatique entitled “Désarmer les marchés” (“Disarm the Markets”). In a milieu marked by financial turmoil following the Asian crisis of 1997 and by incipient opposition to multilateral liberalization, Ramonet’s piece suggested the establishment of a tax on financial transactions. During the following months, Le Monde Diplomatique served as a hub (Waters 2004) around which a group of well-known French organizations and personalities developed Attac as a vehicle to further this demand. As the group was formally created in June 1998, the magazine’s director, Bernard Cassen, became its first president.

During its first years of existence, Attac enjoyed spectacular development. By late 2001, it claimed to have almost 30,000 members in France alone and national chapters in another 40 countries (Ancelovici 2002).

The national chapters sprung up in a more or less spontaneous fashion and maintained their independence from the original French chapter. Accordingly, Attac lacked any central institutions to give direction or exert authority over the national chapters. Thus, the group represented a case of a transnational coalition rather than a federation. This trait would lead to numerous arguments about the group representing a new, internationalist kind of social movement.

In terms of demands, Attac mixed one very concrete aspect (the introduction of a tax on financial transfers; a so-called “Tobin tax”) with criticism of economic liberalism in general. In the latter regard, demands ranged from issues related to tax havens and trade to the defense of public services and opposition to privatizations. Over time, some of the more successful national chapters appeared to focus more on local tangible demands and comparatively less on global ones. With this, they may have tried to overcome an important political limitation of the group: the absence of demands that could mobilize public opinion in general (Uggla 2006).

Operationally, the group claimed to be a “movement of popular education oriented towards action.” Seminars and summer schools were featured prominently along with more traditional forms of protest action. Several of the national chapters also set up “scientific councils” aimed at the production of analysis critical of liberal economic orthodoxy. Additionally, the group was closely associated with the world social forums that were first organized in Porto Alegre in 2001 (Kolb 2005).

Attac’s political position was buoyed by the media attention that the group attracted. While such attention may in large part have been the result of the group’s own media strategies, it is tempting to see another factor at work in this regard, namely the fact that Attac could provide journalists (as well as politicians) with a link to the incipient and unstructured movement that was developing around themes such as...
resistance to free-trade agreements, privatizations, and financial deregulation (Kolb 2005). Thus Attac often became a proxy for the entire Global Justice Movement (Kolb 2005). This served the organization well in terms of attention from the media and from the political establishment. In its native France, in particular, this soon led to political results. As politicians of all hues courted the group (which was ambivalent about such overtures), almost three-quarters of the French claimed to favor the introduction of a Tobin tax by September 2001 (Ancelovici 2002; Waters 2004).

But in other contexts the association of Attac with the broader movement for global justice would prove to be a double-edged sword. As the movement’s protests in Genoa and Gothenburg in 2001 brought widespread rioting and police repression, Attac became associated with violence in the eyes of the public in certain countries. This association, together with the challenge of finding concrete demands with which to attract support and members, eventually led to Attac’s downturn in several countries following the initial successes.

Even in France, Attac would experience a marked decline. Internal conflicts between the founding members and local groups led the group to lose influence in the broader movement. In 2006, the group’s president was forced to resign after supposed fraud in the group’s internal elections. By 2008 – ten years after its foundation – the number of fee-paying members in France had dwindled to around 10 000.

Of the international chapters, several seemed to be dormant.

Even as new protests against the dominant economic system begin to spread around the world, Attac may find it hard to retake its former position. But the group’s signature demand – taxation of financial transactions – fared better, as, during the fall of 2011, it was elevated to the highest European policy levels, and it became one of the instruments with which the leaders of the European Union proposed to respond to the financial turmoil.

SEE ALSO: Antiglobalization movements; Global Justice Movement; Global Justice Movement in Europe; Media and social movements; Social Forum, World; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Bisexual movement
CHRISTIAN KLESSE

Bisexual movements have been politically active in many parts of the world for several decades. Most historical accounts locate the roots of the modern bisexual movement in the early 1970s. In the United States, bi-identified activists have been part of the lesbian and gay civil rights or liberation movements since the mid-1960s. Distinctively bi political manifestos, social or political groups, and community structures have spread from the early 1970s onwards. These steps to bisexual self-organizations took inspiration from the women’s and the gay liberation movements. Early bi activists often advocated a sex-radical agenda which reflected the sexual liberationist ethos of countercultural politics at the time. Bisexual politics in the United States solidified in the 1980s. Local groups mushroomed throughout the country. Bisexual feminists strongly shaped this period of US bisexual politics, which resulted both in the prominence of female key activists in the wider movement and the simultaneous growth of separate organizations. Bi men later formed their own networks. Attempts were made at regional organization throughout the 1980s, with the first national bisexual conference in the United States taking place in 1990.

The organization of regional, national, and (since 1991) international conferences have been a consistent feature of global bisexual politics. Social support structures, networks, and political campaigning groups have appeared in many countries across the globe since the 1980s. In some countries, activists formed umbrella organizations on a national scale. The historical trajectories of bi organizations and politics differ significantly depending on their national, regional, or geopolitical context.

Historically, bisexual groups have often worked in close affiliation with lesbian and gay organizations. At the same time, bisexual activists have worked toward creating autonomous bisexual community structures and distinctive modes of bi analysis and politics. The following explanations are frequently given for this strategy: Bisexual activists argue that forms of anti-bi oppression are highly specific and cannot be explained through recourse to one-dimensional or universalistic theories of “homophobia.” Moreover, bisexuals are often not welcome in lesbian and gay groups and organizations, although many bi-identified people have worked alongside gay men and lesbians in many struggles against the denigration and oppression of same-sex desire, intimacy, and culture. Many bi activists had to endure the bitter experience that they were only accepted as active members of gay and lesbian groups as long they did not make their bi identity public or did not enter a primary relationship with an other-sex partner. The erasure of bisexuality (and bisexuals) from lesbian and gay activism is evidenced in the long-standing conflicts stemming from the resistance of local organizers of Stonewall memorial marches or pride parades to refer to bisexuality in the title, campaigning material, or programming. While it has become more common to refer quite generally to “LGBT” rights or movements these days, bisexuality and transgender continue to be of low concern for many local organizers.

Bisexual activists have analyzed the rejection of bisexuality not only in the heteronormative mainstream, but also in many lesbian, gay, or queer contexts, as either an effect of bi-negativity (or biphobia) (i.e., a mixture of anti-bisexual sentiment and discrimination) or monosexism (i.e., the deep-rooted belief that it is natural to desire only people of one sex). Stereotypes are an integral part of bi-negativity. Common anti-bi stereotypes
include the beliefs that bisexual people are immature, confused, indecisive, morally corrupted, over-sexed, promiscuous, disloyal to the lesbian and gay cause, or cowards who shy away from the consequences of facing the harsh realities of standing up to their allegedly true gay or lesbian identities.

For these reasons, bisexual activists have aimed at building autonomous organizations. This does not mean that many may not at the same time propagate a coalitional politics and advocate cooperation with other movements, such as the lesbian and gay, feminist, transgender, intersex, queer, polyamory, BDSM, sex worker, and other movements. In many countries, bisexual movement organizations have created their own media, including newsletters, magazines, and more recently blogs. Since the late 1980s a range of edited volumes documenting autobiographical and activist writing and research into bisexual politics have appeared in English language.

Bisexual politics tend to focus on issues and concerns around bisexuality. Like other social movements, the bisexual movement has given rise to identity-political strategies and rationalities. Bisexual identity politics are complicated by the inherent diversity of bisexual identities, intimacies, and erotic lives. Historically, the term bisexuality has been associated with manifold and quite distinct meanings. In the nineteenth century, bisexuality became central to the attempts of Western scientists and scholars to explain their core categories of sexual classification: homosexuality and heterosexuality. Western theories of sexuality tended to box human beings according to a crude dichotomic sexual orientation model, which dubbed people as either heterosexual (the majority) or homosexual (and later, when terminology had moved on, lesbian or gay) (the minority). Bisexuality became a category for those who did not fit in either of these boxes or who fell into the “middle ground” of a continuum of desire ranging from exclusively homosexual to exclusively heterosexual. Yet it differed from both in that it was denied the seriousness of a proper sexual orientation (or valid adult identity).

Today most people use the term bisexual to signify the capacity of a person for desiring people of different genders, rather than just one. At the same time, the term has kept the connotations of older meanings of androgyne (or gender ambiguity). Contemporary bisexual identities hinge on either the sexual or the gender angle (or both). Bisexuality is derived from a Western epistemology. This leads to problems in the transnational sphere of sexual politics such as, for example, in the field of international human rights politics. Bisexuality may not resonate with local linguistic practices and cultural identifications. Even if the term bisexual is used in non-Western contexts, it may coexist in symbolic tension with other local frameworks and definitions.

Bisexual movement politics have solidified in many countries over the last few decades. However, they have so far not achieved a degree of organization or institutionalization which would be comparable to the lesbian and gay movements. Bisexual activism is often dependent on sharing spaces and resources of lesbian and gay organizations. Bi spaces are usually temporary and transitory. Campaigning groups are often quite small. The pool of activists which sustains projects such as the organization of conferences and the production of media is often limited. Burnout and a high turnover are common experiences in activist circles. Some interpret these phenomena as an effect of a strong impermanence of bisexual identifications.

Bisexual activists have worked around a vast array of issues, including coming-out support, community building, education, sexual health, antibullying and antidiscrimination work, trade union politics, the repeal of repressive or discriminatory legislation, and the struggle for social, legal, or political rights (e.g., around immigration, marriage, polyamory, etc.). Like other movements, the bisexual movement has not been unified in its political strategies. It contains radical currents and more liberal ones, and bridges a schism between queer and equal rights agendas. Bi politics often oscillate between a utopian approach which exploits the
category confusion inherent to bisexuality for envisioning a world free of binary thought and a more pragmatic one which wants to establish bisexuality as a (third) recognized orientation. Despite the widespread prevalence of the myth that bisexuality comes along with an enhanced capacity for incorporating diversity, bi politics, too, have been riddled with internal conflicts regarding the social divisions of race, gender, class, age, and disability.

SEE ALSO: Feminism and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Identity politics; Rights and rights movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Citizen peacebuilding movements

DANIEL WEHREFENNING

Citizen peacebuilding movements have been around for centuries but have gone through many transformations. They have had to deal with similar issues to other social movements, such as the challenge of keeping people involved long term and sustainably changing society. However, citizen peacebuilding movements face additional challenges which other social movements may not have to deal with.

The cost and risks of joining citizen peacebuilding movements are generally very high. In particular, in their early stages, members are often cast out of their social networks, treated as traitors for interacting and cooperating with the other sides, and sometimes even violently oppressed.

The cohesiveness in citizen peacebuilding movements is also challenging. While many social movements are built around a common theme or grievance, this is often a challenge for many citizen peacebuilding movements. Peace is the vision, but the definition of what peace looks like is the challenge. As many conflicts are asymmetrical, so are the definitions and visions for peace. For example, the peace activist from the weaker group often declares justice and equality as a precondition for peace (more of a political definition of peace), while the peace activist from the stronger group focuses more on interpersonal peacebuilding (a more personal definition of peace). These differences are very challenging in the process of horizontal integration of the various peace constituencies and often hinder the building of a strong combined peace movement. Consequently, we often see separate citizen peacebuilding movements in each conflict party.

The vertical integration with the political leadership creates other difficulties. While social movements often exist as purely oppositional movements to the political process, citizen peacebuilding movements are more dependent on the political process, as the vision of peace has to have a political reality. This mix of being a social citizen movement and at the same time a political movement creates more challenges, in particular when party politics enters the picture and some parties want to absorb or co-opt the citizen peacebuilding movement.

ORIGINS OF CITIZEN PEACEBUILDING MOVEMENTS

Today’s citizen peacebuilding movements tend to be holistic projects that do not just seek an end to violence but also seek to build positive and lasting reconciliation and peace between the parties in conflict. However, historically they started out as nonviolent, antiwar movements.

Peace movements in their earlier forms have been around for centuries. For example most religious traditions have a clear nonviolence foundation. In Judaism the destruction of the Second Temple gave rise to a peace party advocating nonviolent Resistance to the Romans; the Koran reports of the nonviolent struggle of the Prophet Mohammed before the Hegira; and in the early years of Christianity (first century) we find pacifist movement adherents refusing to serve in the military or engage in violent activities, particularly during the time of the first crusades (Boulding 2000). However, these early expressions of nonviolent movements were not yet citizen peacebuilding movements but rather antiwar movements, advocating for nonviolence and pacifism instead of following the common tit-for-tat war philosophy. It wasn’t until the nineteenth century that more organized forms of mass movements toward peacebuilding began.
to appear, such as the first international Peace Congresses in the 1840s in London and Brussels (Boulding 2000). The Nobel Peace prize, the Interparliamentary Union, and the International Peace Bureau formed the first transnational infrastructures for peacebuilding. World War I was the first breaking point for peace movements, and most declined rapidly with the notable exception in the form of some Christian pacifist and some women’s movements that were still active (Boulding 2000). The postwar period then saw an increase in peace education and a rekindled interest in specifically pacifist movements. However, the beginning of World War II was a serious blow to the fragile peace movements, in particular the secular movements since many of their supporters died in the war. Just when the surviving peace groups were reorganizing around the newly founded United Nations after World War II, the cold war set in and dissuaded new waves of peace activists from joining the ranks (Boulding 2000).

What is particularly interesting about the peace movements of this time is that they became more citizen-based, in the sense of being more grassroots organized, but at the same time strayed from some of the peace education philosophies toward more antiwar movements protesting the rapid militarization of the cold war (in particular nuclear proliferation). Also, a second strand of activities developed within the traditional circles of peace movements in the form of nonviolent civil rights movements (including the women’s rights movement). However, the cold war in general was a rather bleak time for citizen peacebuilding with major power politics determining the fate of war and peace rather than citizen activism.

These impediments notwithstanding, there were two developments that were very beneficial to the evolution of citizen peacebuilding. Firstly, the actions of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr introduced a new kind of nonviolent citizen activism, which is instrumental to this day and strengthened the role of citizen movements in bringing political change. Secondly, in the 1950s and 1960s, conflict resolution and peace research became very popular worldwide, which led to the creation of major formalized early peace theories (Boulding 2000). In particular, the contact hypothesis theories propounded by Allport (1954) provided theoretical support for citizen peacebuilding efforts. There were also the pioneering books in the new peace research community, which stimulated future work in this emerging field of research. In the 1980s there was another paradigm shift, at least theoretically, as interest moved from a more national security paradigm to a more common and regional security paradigm. This also brought with it a new understanding of peacebuilding, which was much more proactive than the traditional antiwar perspective (peacemaking).

The end of the cold war can then be seen as the most important change for citizen peacebuilding in recent decades. It changed world dynamics considerably by breaking the bipolar power balance between the United States and its allies and the UDSSR. This in turn gave rise to many more civil wars as well as regional and global institutions and citizen movements, two dynamics that are crucial for current citizen peacebuilding movements world wide.

THEORIES OF CITIZEN PEACEBUILDING

The end of the cold war also inspired more new theories around the emergence of active citizenship in the form of global citizenship (global civil society, see Kaldor 2003) and in intrastate peacebuilding. However, acknowledgment of the role of citizen peacebuilding is often found under different labels like second-track, multi-track, or civic diplomacy and mediation. Theories by numerous scholars (Kelman 1972; Fisher, Ury, & Patton 1983; Fisher 1997; Saunders 1999; Voorhees 2002; Galtung 2004) have focused on these issues. All of these theories focus mainly on nonstate actors (citizen) as the primary agents of change and, while still interested in finding resolutions to social and political problems and differences, they are also concerned
citizen peacebuilding movements

with reestablishing relationships between the individuals and groups of the conflict parties (peacebuilding).

Theses theories outline different levels and mechanisms through which citizen peacebuilding is or can be pursued:

**Back-channel talks.** This is one of the most important but also most secretive kinds of citizen peacebuilding, which is rarely public and thus takes place in the shadows. Participants can vary, but in most cases include important grassroots, civil society, or government actors who are either well connected and respected in their own group and/or have decision-making power themselves.

**One-and-a-half track diplomacy.** This mechanism involves interaction between officials and unofficial actors in conflicts, as distinguished from the diplomatic efforts of official actors but with more elevated political importance compared to other purely civil society or grassroots citizen peacebuilding.

**Second-track diplomacy.** Describes the strategic interaction and intervention of unofficial representatives in citizen peacebuilding. It distinguishes between two kinds of interventions, political second-track diplomacy (unofficial intervention targeted at official actors) and cross-community second-track diplomacy (unofficial interventions with unofficial actors).

**Grassroots peacebuilding.** Many grassroots citizen peacebuilding movements and activities are highly organized, like neighborhood or living-room dialogue groups and demonstrations, but some are also spontaneous. Grassroots citizen peacebuilding often involves internal dialogue within one group, especially in more segregated societies, aimed at informing and strengthening the internal capacity of moving toward peaceful solutions and to lay the foundation for future intergroup relations and peacebuilding.

Fundamentally all of these kinds of citizen peacebuilding emphasize the “bottom-up” input by citizens into the official or semi-official decision-making processes (Hemmer et al. 2006). There is also an important place for “top-down” communication and decision making. However, it is through a process of cross-pollination rather than through the traditional form of “trickle down” diplomacy. There are three main theories that describe this more holistic understanding of citizen peacebuilding (movements).

**Public peace process.** Harold Saunders (1999) conceptualizes a successful peace process as a multi-level process that develops and progresses in multiple arenas at the same time.

Different forms of citizen peacebuilding
while influencing each other. He distinguishes between four arenas: the official peace process of (would-be) peace negotiations; the quasi-official process, made up of citizens outside of the government who consult with officials on specific issues; a public peace process involving dialogue between citizens outside of government; and civil society, in particular, civil society associations and organizations (NGOs) that span various ethnic, racial, religious, economic, social, and other dividing fault lines. Each of these arenas is linked to the others and they cross-pollinate each other. This is built on the idea that dialogue and relationships between citizens outside of governments will complement, support, and energize the official peace process. While officials mainly negotiate issues and interests, citizens change the behavior and reestablish the relationships between the groups in conflict.

Multi-track diplomacy. Another key theory of citizen peacebuilding movements resides in Diamond and MacDonald’s (1996) work on multitrack diplomacy. They emphasize that peacebuilding cannot just be achieved through political negotiation with the addition of some select nongovernment groups, but needs to be a process that includes many different social actors in multiple conflict resolution processes. In their analysis, Diamond and MacDonald differentiate between different tracks and give each track a strategic importance in peaceful change. Eight of the nine tracks fall into the nonofficial category. Media, business, and religion are all different tracks with specific roles in terms of communication, dialogue, and responsibility toward peace. In this multilevel model, with its heavy reliance on unofficial actors, the different tracks work as combined movement toward peace.

Peace infrastructure. Another holistic theory is provided by John Paul Lederach’s (1997) work. He emphasizes that “an important task in the development of a framework for sustained reconciliation is to build a peace constituency within the setting” (Lederach 1997: 94). This is done by linking an active peace constituency with the official peace process through the development of what he calls “mid-range leadership,” which entails key citizens engaged in communication with the political leadership through processes called second- or one-and-a-half-track diplomacy. Lederach highlights the need for an organic and interactive peace process, connecting the whole sociopolitical body as a movement toward peace. He refined this concept in The Moral Imagination (2005), which highlights the importance of getting a small set of people centrally involved at the right places and being able to tap into resources, space, and connections to influence large-scale change. He emphasizes that it is not so much the quantity but the quality of the actors and their connection that matters. The metaphor of the critical yeast vs. the critical mass derives from this (Lederach 1997: 91), building on a web approach of change in which the challenge is to link multiple sets of interdependent processes and different sets of people together into an effective movement to bring about social change. Lederach argues that the most significant citizen peacebuilding movements are those that infuse a new quality of interaction and strategically connect a small group of people in such a way that whole societies begin to be transformed. He argues that this might be a more long-term perspective but is the only way to produce sustainable change.

Synthesizing the theoretical ideas behind the public peace process, multitrack diplomacy, and the peace infrastructure suggests some interesting conditions and strategies under which citizen peacebuilding movements are more likely to be successful. It seems that because political negotiations (first-track diplomacy) are primarily concentrated on peace-making and the political establishment of the peace process, the role of citizen peacebuilding movements is primarily a supportive one. This supporting role, however, seems to break down into two different objectives: The first is the bottom-up push to influence and support the official negotiations through channeling and integrating public opinion and leading its expert council, as well as breaking political stalemates through cross-community actions.
The second objective is to build up civil society and grassroots capacity (peace infrastructure and constituency) to implement the top-down (trickle down) political peace agreement and embed it in a broader long-term concept of citizen peacebuilding and reconciliation. In these two objectives, the various citizen peacebuilding forms (backchannel, one-and-a-half track diplomacy, second-track diplomacy, and grassroots dialogue) have different functions at different times but all work together as a movement to bring a sustainable peace.

**LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM ISRAEL/PALESTINE AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

Unfortunately, little empirical work has been done to test and advance the citizen peacebuilding theories of Saunders, Diamond and MacDonald, and Lederach (Broome & Jakobsson Hatay 2006), in spite of an increasing acknowledgment that citizen participation plays a critical role in conflict resolution. As a consequence little is known about functioning models. However, a comparative analysis of the citizen peacebuilding efforts in the two seemingly intractable conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland shows the evolution of citizen peacebuilding movements from an anti-war toward a positive peace movement over the last decades. Furthermore, it reveals that the more effective and successful use of citizen peacebuilding movements in the Northern Ireland peace process and the failure thereof in Israel/Palestine supports the above theoretical criteria for citizen peacebuilding movements (Wehrenfennig 2009).

In the 1970s and 1980s, we witnessed the early formation of peace movements as anti-war movements in both conflicts. The Peace People in Northern Ireland (1976) or the famous Shalom Akhshav/Peace Now (1978) citizen peace (building) movement are two well-known examples during this period. But despite their success in raising awareness for peace in their respective societies, the antiwar citizen movements in both conflicts did not bring sustainable change for peace. Only when various other forms of citizen peacebuilding, including back-channel talks and one-and-a-half track diplomacy approaches, joined forces with the public peace movements did the major peace process in both conflict zones start. The official peace processes of the 1990s in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine were inspired by citizens acting as intermediaries and laying the foundation in secret back-channel talks and early forms of one-and-a-half track diplomacy. In Northern Ireland, the secret back-channel talks were orchestrated by businessman Brandon Duddy (between the IRA and the British government), priest Harry Reid (between the Irish and British government), and pastor Patrick Magee (between the Loyalist paramilitaries and the British government). In Israel/Palestine the official negotiations were pre-meditated through the unofficial dialogues of two Israeli professors, Dr Ron Pundak and Dr Yair Hirschfeld, who connected key Israeli political actors (e.g., Yossi Beilin, who then became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin) with prominent and politically connected Palestinians (e.g., Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, Ziad Abu Zayad, and Sari Nusseibeh), which turned these informal discussions into the official peace process. This demonstrated, among other things, that relationship building through citizen involvement on all levels of society is crucial in preparing or supporting official peace negotiations (Wehrenfennig 2009).

However, the failure of the peace process in Israel/Palestine and the success of it in Northern Ireland serve as another indicator of the importance and function of citizen peacebuilding movements. With the beginning of the peace process in Northern Ireland we see not only a massive increase in citizen peacebuilding activities, but also a kind of coordination (through civil society umbrella organizations like the Community Relations Council, the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action) and demonstration of how the different levels and forms
of citizen peacebuilding activities can work together to serve the broader peace process. There has been a cross-pollination and coordination between the various types and forms of citizen peacebuilding activities, which best can be seen in the Opsahl commission in 1992 and the Yes campaign for the ratification of the official peace referendum in 1998. The Opsahl commission was a large (independent) citizen research initiative that revealed many hidden social and economic concerns about the future of Northern Ireland and the peace process that the political debates at the time were not addressing. Its findings became the blueprint for the peace talks. The 1997–1998 Yes campaign was a key citizen peacebuilding initiative connecting and mobilizing the various citizen peacebuilding constituencies to convince the critical population on both sides of the conflict that the concessions of the proposed peace agreement, which the political negotiations had worked out, were good and needed to be ratified. The Belfast Peace Agreement was ultimately approved in the 1998 referendum, with a high voter turnout and 71 percent of the population voting in favor of the peace agreement, even though the polls were pointing the other way for a long time. This success is, in large part, connected to the coordinated citizen peacebuilding efforts of the Yes campaign.

Vice versa, the failure of the peace process in Israel/Palestine is also connected to the failure of the citizen peacebuilding movement in the 1990s. While starting strong, with numerous citizen peacebuilding efforts in the early years of the Oslo peace process, the missing coordination between these citizen peacebuilding efforts created oversaturation and misuse that ultimately turned many people away and coined the negative term of “the peace industry.” Furthermore, the missing connection and cross-pollination with the official peace process created a critical distance between the citizen peacebuilding efforts on the ground and the slow-progressing official peace talks. The citizen peacebuilding movement’s failure to connect with and pressure the official negotiations by staying silent and passive rebounded on them as many people turned away from their efforts. Disillusioned by having minimal effect on the official peace process, many people stopped supporting the citizen peacebuilding initiatives on the ground and, finally, when there was some progress in the official peace negotiations, public opinion had turned so much that the citizen peacebuilding efforts did not seem to matter anymore, leading, in part, to the Second Intifada of 2000 (Wehrenfennig 2009). The failure of the citizen peacebuilding efforts in this context appeared to have a negative effect on the potential for peace, and, as a result, it has been difficult to reignite substantial citizen peacebuilding activities in Israel/Palestine.

Citizen peacebuilding movements are very important social movements and a key component for the realization of sustainable peace in most conflicts of our day. In particular, functioning to reestablish the relationship between conflict parties and to coordinate the implementation of peace on the ground, citizen peacebuilding movements appear to be an important addition to the official peace negotiations.

SEE ALSO: Antiwar and peace movements; Irish Republican Movement; Israeli social movements; Northern Ireland civil rights movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Collective (public) goods
PAMELA OLIVER

In economics, public or collective goods are contrasted with private goods. The enjoyment of a private good can be restricted to those who pay for it, and the consumption of a private good by one person makes it unavailable to anyone else. Markets “work” for private goods, where individuals make clear decisions about cost/benefit tradeoffs and prices are the consequences of the forces of supply and demand. By contrast, public (collective) goods are nonexcludable – shared by everybody, whether they helped pay for the good or not – and nonrival – in that one person’s “enjoyment” of the good does not affect another’s. People who share in a public good without paying for it are often called “free riders.” Because people can share in a public good if it is paid for by others, the usual assumptions of the market fail, and economists and social scientists generally argue that public goods need to be provided through taxation or other collective means. Public goods are an instance of the more general matter of externalities, in which one person’s actions or choices affect the costs or benefits to other people who did not make the choice. Within economics, there has been a great deal of elaboration of these ideas. Some goods are nonrival but excludable (e.g., satellite television), others are nonexcludable but rival (e.g., environmental resources); both excludability and rival-ness are continua rather than dichotomies. Public or collective goods vary greatly in important ways that affect the social dynamics of their provision, including their lumpiness and the linearity or nonlinearity of their production functions. Moreover, the same “good” (like clean air or a bridge) can be provided in different ways that have different production functions relating contributions to benefits. Introductory overviews of these issues may be found in the cited references.

At the core of politics is the matter of public or collective goods: How much of goods like schools and transportation systems and military defense should be provided? How should the costs of these goods be distributed across the population? Which goods should be treated as public or collective goods available to all, and which should be private goods available only to those willing and able to pay for them? Laws and customs that favor one group or discriminate against another group are also collective goods. So is the level of environmental pollution. Some things are “public bads” – that is, things that hurt people who did not create the problem. Also, even though public goods are by definition shared, this does not mean that everyone shares equally in them. The same public good may be considered beneficial by some and harmful by others, and even a good that everyone agrees is good (or bad) will generally have different effects on different people. Within the study of public or collective goods, many other distinctions are also made about the production function relating the “amount” of a collective good to the “amount” and type of payment or action that goes into providing it, including whether goods are divisible, whether there are crowding effects, whether it is physically possible to exclude people from “enjoying” the good, whether there are alternatives to the good, and so forth.

The terms “collective action” and “cooperation” are often used in this tradition of theory and research to refer specifically to the act of making contributions to the provision of collective goods, even when those contributions are made by individuals acting alone. In this context, “collective action theory” refers to theories of the conditions under which individuals or groups are willing and able to make contributions to collective goods.

In the world of collective goods and the larger world of externalities, people have “regulatory interests” (Heckathorn 1988), that is, interests

in what other people do or do not contribute to collective goods. People may expend their own resources to motivate or coerce other people to make contributions to a collective good (Oliver 1980). Environmentalists expend effort and resources to win legislation that uses the power of government to force industries to pay the price of reducing the pollution from their factories. Workers may expend effort to persuade or coerce other workers either to cooperate with management or to resist management. Neighbors may use social pressure to affect how others maintain their lawns. There is what is called a “second order collective action problem” involved in deciding whether to pay the cost of actions that affect other people’s likelihood of cooperating with collective action. Third- and even fourth- or higher order collective action problems can readily be defined, as some people expend resources to motivate other people to expend resources to motivate still other people to contribute to collective goods. These chains of nested relations clearly exist empirically and can create many complex strategic patterns and relationships (Heckathorn 1996). The result is that there is no simple single principle for the dynamics of public goods provision. Scholars thus either focus on one class of problems or focus on identifying the differences between classes of problems.

Social movements are generally “about” public or collective goods, in the sense that they seek legislation, policies, or programs that affect people outside the social movement. Social movements also can be considered public or collective goods in themselves, in that the existence and actions of the social movement affect everyone, not just the people who contribute to it. Ideas from collective action theory often illuminate patterns in social movements (e.g., Chong 1991). Research on participant motives regularly finds that the subjective value attached to the collective good itself is a stronger predictor of movement participation (e.g., Muller & Opp 1986) than individual benefits.

One important class of collective good is the prevention of environmental degradation or erosion of common resources. People create environmental degradation (the collective bad) when the harm to the environment they personally experience from their own resource use or pollution-generation is lower than the benefit they receive from their action. A great deal of applied collective action theory addresses the conditions under which environmental degradation can be avoided (e.g., Ostrom 1999). Work on “social dilemmas” in social psychology similarly focuses on behavior in mixed-motive situations and the contexts that make cooperation possible in the face of incentives to defect for personal benefit.

SEE ALSO: Environmental movements; Free rider problem; Motivation and types of motives (instrumental, identity, ideological motives); Rational choice theory and social movements; Selective incentives.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Consciousness, conscience, and social movements
DAVID A. SNOW and ROBERTA G. LESSOR

Few concepts and/or processes have so intrigued and perplexed philosophers, theologians, social scientists, and, more recently, neuroscientists, as that of consciousness (Ornstein 1973; Jaynes 1976; Velmans & Schneider 2007). At its core, “consciousness” translates into awareness, both internal awareness of self and external awareness of context. “Conscience,” on the other hand, can be regarded as the moral component or value-laden dimension of consciousness. Conscience constitutes the core of the “superego” of the Freudian triadic structure of the self (Freud 1962), and the “me” of the Meadian dyadic structure of the self (Mead 1962). In both cases, conscience can be construed as the socially or culturally constraining part of self, and thus inextricably linked to consciousness. Both consciousness and conscience figure prominently in theorizing and analyzing social movements.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The concept of consciousness has long been woven into many discussions of social movements, both descriptive and analytic, dating back at least to the writings of Karl Marx and Fredrik Engels. However, the concept intersects most significantly with the cognate concepts of class and oppositional consciousness, false consciousness, consciousness raising, and consciousness transformation.

Class and oppositional consciousness

Class consciousness, as generally used, means not only awareness of one’s material economic interests, but also, and most importantly, awareness of the extent to which one’s material conditions and interests are shared with similarly situated others, and different from those whose lives are embedded in a contrasting material context within the same socioeconomic regime or hierarchy. There is thus a material, economic component to the concept, as well as a social psychological component.

These elements were clearly accented and linked by Marx and Engels, and carried forward in subsequent scholarly work on class and social movements. As discussed in other entries in the encyclopedia, Marx and Engels saw working-class mobilization, among other forms of mobilization, as being partially contingent on the working class developing a “class consciousness,” a consciousness that signaled the transformation of the working class from a “class-in-itself” into a “class-for-itself.” The former refers to the objective situation of a class without an implication of members’ understanding of their situation in relation to the economic system as a whole and to each other. A class-for-itself, on the other hand, arises when members of a class-for-itself become conscious that their fates are joined, that they are the objects of exploitation and oppression, that they share a common enemy, and that any significant change in their objective situation requires dramatic alteration of the social system (see, in particular, Marx’s discussion of the “small-holding peasants” in The 18th Brumaire (1963: 123–125)). Marx did not clearly specify how or under what conditions this transformative process would occur. Consequently, debate ensued as to whether the emergence of working-class consciousness would occur spontaneously when the social conditions reached a certain unspecified but intolerable threshold, or whether it had to be organizationally molded and facilitated as V.I Lenin pondered and concluded affirmatively in What Is To Be Done? Never in dispute,
however, was the significance of consciousness to the movement.

The flow of history in more than a century since the writings of Marx and Engels set in motion ongoing debate among Marxist scholars (e.g., Lukács). One neo-Marxist challenge has been the presumption of a direct, automatic linkage between class antagonisms and the formation of grievances of sufficient magnitude to mobilize working-class revolt. There have been labor movements and strikes and other outcroppings of working-class unrest (Fantasia 1988; Fantasia & Stepan-Norris 2004), but for a variety of reasons the prophesied proletarian revolution never materialized in advanced capitalist societies. Not only did Marx fail to anticipate the evolution and growth of the middle, managerial class, but the immiseration of the working class failed to reach the level of wretchedness that Marx and others envisioned. Additionally, the development of strident working-class consciousness has been neutralized by multiple, cross-cutting associations and identities rooted in ethnicity, race, religion, and gender; by the existence of national, mythic narratives that highlight, as in the United States, shared belief in the prospect of upward mobility; and by the non-class character of many public issues and conflicts, such as those over crime control, abortion, birth control, school prayer, and evolution versus creationism. These and other conflictual issues have generated different oppositional consciousnesses (Mansbridge & Morris 2001), but they have been based on cleavages other than class.

False consciousness

The concept of false consciousness is generally used to denote an individual’s or social category’s misunderstanding of the character of their life situation and the conditions underlying it. The charge of false consciousness points to a presumably erroneous understanding of the relationship between one’s interests, usually material, and the way one thinks about and acts toward those interests. It implies a cognitive disjunction between perception and reality. Presumably those individuals whose interpretations and actions are encumbered and blinded by their false consciousness would think and act differently if they had a “correct” understanding of their situation.

This conceptualization of false consciousness derives from Marxist theory (see, in particular, Engels 1968) and has long been invoked to explain why the working class, as well as other subordinate classes or oppressed social categories, do not recognize the basis of their oppression and therefore fail to act in accord with their “true” interests. Theoretically, the problem is that the working class or oppressed are unable grasp the causes of their oppression because they are blinded by the dominant, hegemonic cultural and/or political ideology, which they have presumably adopted, albeit unwittingly (see Gramsci 1971).

A number of troublesome issues and questions have dogged the notion of false consciousness and its application for some time (see, e.g., Gabel 1975, and Lukács 1971). Perhaps most troublesome is the issue of interpretive elitism and associated questions such as the following: Who designates social classes or categories as being false consciousness? Is it social movement activists or ideologues, philosophers or social scientists, theologians or politicians, or the media? And what gives those who attribute the label the specialized insight or knowledge to legitimate their attributions? Second, doesn’t attribution of the concept demean the cognitive/interpretive abilities and agency of those so designated? And third, does not the use of the concept ignore the fact that people act toward objects for a variety of reasons – some are instrumental, others affective or emotional, and still other reasons are moral/normative – which can vary in their relative salience to the actor. Thus, the puzzlement of some political observers and pundits notwithstanding, one of the reasons working-class folks in the United States and elsewhere often do not act in accordance with their observed material interests, and their presumed class identity, is due to the greater salience of moral and lifestyle considerations
and their associated identities. The point is that factors other than material class interests can motivate action or inaction, and, as a consequence, determining what is in an actor’s best interest can be a very tricky matter.

For all of these considerations, perhaps it is best to avoid the false consciousness attribution and recognize that there is considerable interpretive variability in how events, lifestyles, and material conditions are understood and rationalized. However, whether invoking the false consciousness attribution or not, the obdurate fact still remains that social movement participation is often contingent on some degree and form of consciousness raising or transformation.

Consciousness raising and transformation

Since both consciousness raising and consciousness transformation imply some degree of change in political awareness or interpretive understanding of the reasons for repression, oppression, inequality, injustice, and the like, the two processes are often used interchangeably. However, it is arguable that there are fined-tuned differences between them, with consciousness transformation involving more wholesale cognitive change as occurs in some conversions, as illustrated by Arthur Koestler’s discussion of his conversion to communism in 1931. As he wrote in The God That Failed (Crossman 1952): “By the time I had finished with Feuerbach and the State and Revolution, something had clicked in my brain which shook me like a mental explosion. ... The whole universe [fell] into pattern like the stray pieces of a jigsaw puzzle assembled by magic at one stroke. There [was] now an answer to every question, doubts and conflicts [were] a matter of the tortured past.”

Such seemingly dramatic and sweeping cognitive changes aside, both consciousness raising and consciousness transformation involve the adoption of a diagnostic frame and corollary attribution scheme in which a problem, or set of problems, and its locus of blame or causality are simultaneously sharpened and generalized. In the case of self-help and some religious movements, the change in locus of blame is usually in the direction of self-internalization and responsibility, whereas in the case of more politically oriented groups and movements the change involves a shift from an internal to an external locus of control – that is, from self blaming to structural blaming, from victim blaming to system blaming.

The feminist/women’s movement in the United States in the late 1960s and 1970s provides ample illustration, as students of the movement noted that the mobilization of women during this period was contingent on the realization that their grievances and problems were not personal and idiosyncratic but systemic and thus political (Bird 1969; Evans 1979). Thus, changing the locus of blame was one of the key functions of women’s consciousness raising groups during this period. A major objective of these groups, as observers noted, was to get women “to recognize the political nature of complaints that [were] conventionally dismissed as personal” (Bird 1969: 216), whether in intimate relationships (Friedan 1997) or in the workplace (Lessor 1984).

Although consciousness raising and transformation typically occur in group contexts, interactional mechanisms or processes are also involved. A major set of such mechanisms include the frame alignment processes of amplification, extension, and transformation (Snow et al. 1986). Amplification and extension function primarily as mechanisms through which consciousness raising is affected. Frame amplification entails the embellishment, crystallization, and invigoration of existing values, beliefs, and understandings so that they are more salient and dominant; frame extension depicts movement interests and framings as extending beyond the movement’s initial constituency or concerns to include issues thought to be of relevance to bystander groups or potential adherents. Such amplification and extension can be accomplished by movement leaders and it can also be done by adherents who come to recognize their situation in the movement’s framing. Frame transformation,
on the other hand, involves changing prior understandings and perspectives, among individuals or collectivities, so that things are seen as strikingly differently than before, as is commonplace with conversions and is illustrated by the Koestler case above.

CONSCIENCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

If conscience is the moral or value-laden component of consciousness, then clearly conscience plays an important role in social movements. The role of conscience within the context of social movements can be seen most prominently in three interrelated concepts: moral convictions and incentives; prisoners of conscience; and conscience constituents.

Moral conviction and incentives

It is widely understood that movement participants are motivated not only by instrumental and solidary (affective) incentives, but also, and often most importantly, by moral incentives. Calls and rationales for participation are often framed, both individually and organizationally, in terms of the moral propriety, obligation, and urgency of taking action. Additionally, some events or situations may be seen as so morally objectionable and provocative that those individuals so affected may feel morally obligated to take up the sword. This is the “moral shock” argument that the observation of, or direct experience with, some events may be so morally reprehensible and emotionally moving that individuals will be inclined to join the cause irrespective of the presence or absence of ties to movement members (Jasper 1997). Accordingly, the moral shock value of some events or happenings is not lost on movement strategists, as with the strategic use of photographs of aborted fetuses by antiabortion activists and of visualizations of animals used in scientific laboratories by PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) to mobilize prospective participants. Whether moral appeals are expressed in terms of moral proprieties and obligations or moral shocks, the salience of moral convictions and incentives, and thus conscience, in relation to participant mobilization is indisputable. Indeed, it is moral conviction that accounts in large part for the “iron in the soul,” which Barrington Moore (1978: 89–91) suggests is key to understanding the persistence of many social movements in the face of repression and resistance.

Prisoners of conscience

It is precisely the “iron in the soul” that gets at the core of prisoners of conscience, a term which is used generally to refer to those individuals who are, or have been, imprisoned because of their nonnegotiable moral beliefs and convictions. The concept appears to have been originally defined, and perhaps coined, by Peter Benenson, who defined a prisoner of conscience as “any person who is physically restrained, by imprisonment or otherwise, from expressing (in any form of words or symbols) an opinion which (s)he honestly holds and which does not advocate or condone personal violence.” Some human rights and nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, have fought vigorously for the rights of prisoners of conscience, and have played a key role in facilitating the release of hundreds of prisoners of conscience worldwide. For example, according to Amnesty International’s 2011 human rights facts and figures, the nonprofit organization was calling for the release of prisoners of conscience in 48 countries. While most of these countries tend to be skewed politically in the direction of authoritarian regimes, from time to time prisoners of conscience can also be found in democratic countries, especially when the state is embroiled in conflict with social movement protestors contesting states’ policies and practices. Illustrative was the imprisonment of Daniel and Phillip Berrigan – both Catholic priests known popularly as the Berrigan brothers – for their leadership in the antiwar and antidraft movements in the United States during the Vietnam War years. Among the protest events they led or engaged in, the one that led most directly to their imprisonment involved
burning the records of a Maryland draftboard in May 1968.

Conscience constituents

In addition to morally inspired adherents or participants and the prisoners of conscience, a third set of conscience-based movement actors include those that McCarthy and Zald (1977) call “conscience constituents.” They include individuals, groups, and organizations that support movement campaigns and activities without benefitting directly from the attainment of its objectives. Conscience constituents function primarily as resource providers. They provide not only financial support, but often spaces to organize and meet, experiential expertise, legitimacy, and even moral support. They do so primarily because the movements they support are morally resonant; they see the movements as warranted and just on moral grounds. Examples of such conscience constituents are abundant in the annals of social movements, including some whites in the case of the black civil rights movement, the Catholic Worker organization in the case of movements for the homeless and the impoverished, and heterosexuals in the case of the gay and lesbian movement.

CONCLUSION

It is well-nigh impossible to reach a reasonable understanding of the dynamics of movement mobilization without consideration of the concepts of consciousness and conscience. This entry has provided an overview of key dimensions of the concepts, and an introduction to the scholarly arguments over their conceptualization and functioning. It is hoped that the entry invites further exploration of the concepts and their multifarious connections to social movement mobilization and participation.

SEE ALSO: Amnesty International; Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Cognitive liberation; Conversion and new religious movements; Feminism and social movements; Framing and social movements; Ideology; Marxism and social movements; Moral incentives; Moral shocks/outrage; Resource mobilization theory; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action)

DAVID A. SNOW and PETER B. OWENS

Crowds, or temporary gatherings as some scholars prefer (McPhail 1991), are a ubiquitous feature of everyday life. People have long assembled to observe, to celebrate, and to protest various happenings in their everyday lives. The historical record is replete with examples of crowds functioning as important textual markers, helping to shape and define a particular event, as well as strategic precipitants and carriers of the events themselves. The storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, which is considered one of the precipitating events of the French Revolution, and the sit-ins and marches associated with the civil rights movement in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, constitute two well-chronicled historical examples of contentious crowds or collective action. Not all such gatherings function so emblematically, of course. Most are mere sideshows to the flow of history. Nonetheless, the assemblages or gatherings more commonly called crowds are ongoing features of the social world and, as a consequence, have long been the object of theorizing and inquiry, ranging from the psychologistic renderings of Gustav Le Bon (1960) and Sigmund Freud (1921), to the more sociological accounts of Neil Smelser (1963) and Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1987), to the highly systematic and empirically grounded observations of Clark McPhail and his associates (McPhail & Wohlstein 1983; McPhail 1991; Schweingruber & McPhail 1999).

Crowds have traditionally been analyzed as a variant of the broader category of social phenomena called collective behavior. Broadly conceived, collective behavior refers to group problem-solving behavior that encompasses crowds, mass phenomena, issue-specific publics, and social movements (Turner & Killian 1987). Today few social movement scholars use the term collective behavior, as it fell out of fashion in the late 1970s because of some of the questionable imagery and theorizing associated with it. Supplanting it is the apparently more palatable term “collective action,” which is conceptualized concretely as “two or more persons engaged in one or more behaviors (e.g., orientation, locomotion, gesticulation, tactile manipulation, and/or vocalization) that can be judged common or convergent on one or more directions (e.g., direction, velocity tempo, and/or substantive content)” (McPhail 1991: 159). Implicit in the collective behavior conception is a continuum on which the collectivity can vary in terms of the extent to which its participants are in close proximity or diffused in time and space. Instances of collective behavior in which participants are in close proximity, such that they can monitor one another by being visible to, or within earshot of, one another, are constitutive of crowds or temporary gatherings. Examples include protest demonstrations, victory celebrations, riots, and the dispersal processes associated with the flight from burning buildings. In contrast are forms of collective behavior or action that occur among individuals who are not physically proximate but who still share a common focus of attention and engage in some parallel or common behaviors without developing the debate characteristic of the public or the organization of social movements, and who are linked together by social networks, the media, or both. Examples of this form of collective behavior, referred to as diffuse collective behavior (Turner & Killian 1987) or the mass (Lofland 1981), include fads and crazes, deviant epidemics, mass hysteria, and collective blaming. Although crowds or temporary gatherings and diffuse...
collective behavior are not mutually exclusive phenomena, they are analytically distinct and
generate somewhat different literatures.

Understanding crowds or gatherings requires consideration of five overlapping
questions: (1) How do they differ from the gatherings typically associated with everyday
behavior, such as audiences and queues? (2) What are the distinctive features of crowds or
temporary gatherings as forms of collective behavior or action? (3) What are the condi-
tions underlying their emergence? (4) What accounts for the coordination of behavior
in crowds or temporary gatherings? and (5) What are the correlates and/or predictors of
individual participation?

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE
CROWDS OF COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR/ACTION AND EVERYDAY
BEHAVIOR

Collective behavior and more routine, conven-
tionalized behavior are not discrete, mutually
exclusive phenomena. Yet the existence of col-
lective behavior traditionally conceived rests
in part on the assumption of significant dif-
fferences between collective behavior and more
taken-for-granted, institutionalized behavior.
In the case of crowds or gatherings associ-
ated with the latter, such as at sports events
and holiday parades, they tend to be highly
conventionalized in several ways. First, they
are recurrent affairs that are scheduled for
a definite place at a definite time; they are
calendarized both temporally and spatially.
Second, associated behaviors and emotional
states are typically routinized in the sense that
they are normatively regularized and antici-
pated. And third, they tend to be sponsored
and orchestrated by the state, a community,
or a societal institution, as in the case of
most holiday parades and electoral political
rallies. Accordingly, they are typically socially
approved gatherings that function to reaffirm
rather than challenge some event, institutional
arrangement, or the larger social order itself.

In contrast, the crowds or gatherings associ-
ated with collective behavior or action, such as
protest demonstrations, victory celebrations,
and riots, usually challenge or disrupt the
existing order. This is due in part to the
fact that these crowds are neither tempo-
really nor spatially routinized. Instead, they are
more likely to be unscheduled and staged in
spatial areas (streets, parks, malls) or physi-
cal structures (office buildings, theaters, lunch
counters) that were designed for institutional-
ized, everyday behavior rather than contentious
or celebratory crowds. Such gatherings have
long been described as “extraordinary” in the
sense that their occurrence indicates that some-
thing unusual is happening. Precisely what it is
that gives rise to the sense that something “out-
side the ordinary” is occurring is rarely specified
unambiguously, however. Lofland (1981) sug-
gests that it is increased levels of emotional
arousal, but such arousal is not peculiar to
crowd episodes. The conceptualization offered
here suggests another possibility: It is the
appropriation and use of spatial areas, physical
structures, or social networks and relations for
purposes other than those for which they were
intended or designed that indicates a break with
routine and that perhaps something outside the
ordinary is happening.

THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF
CROWDS

Crowds have been portrayed historically
and journalistically as if they are monolithic
entities characterized by participant and
behavioral homogeneity. Turner and Killian
(1987: 26) called this image into question,
referring to it as “the illusion of unanimity,”
but not until the turn toward more systematic
empirical examinations of crowds was it firmly
established that crowd behaviors are typically
quite varied and highly differentiated, and that
crowd participants are generally quite hetero-
geneous in terms of orientation and behavior
(McPhail 1991; Schweingruber & McPhail
1999).
Variation in crowd behaviors. Based on field research of crowds, Wright 1978 differentiated between two broad categories of crowd behaviors: crowd activities and task activities. “Crowd activities” refer to the redundant behavior seemingly common to all incidents of crowds, such as assemblage, milling, and divergence. In their overview of empirical research on behavior within what they call collective action gatherings, McPhail and Wohlstein (1983) identified collective locomotion, collective orientation, collective gesticulation, and collective vocalization among the types of crowd behaviors “repeatedly observed across a variety of gatherings, demonstrations, and some riots” (595).

Based on these observations and subsequent overlapping work, the following “crowd activities” (Wright 1978) or “elementary forms of collective action” (Schweingruber & McPhail 1999) have been identified: facing (e.g., common or convergent gaze, focus, or attention); voicing (e.g., common or convergent chanting, singing,booing, cheering, shouting); manipulating (e.g., common or convergent signaling, gesturing); and locomotion (e.g., common or convergent movement, marching, dancing). Given the recurrent and seemingly universal character of these basic crowd behaviors, it is arguable that they do not distinguish between types of gatherings, such as between demonstrations, celebrations, and riots.

To get at the variation in types of crowds, attention must be turned to what Wright conceptualized as “task activities” (1978). These refer to joint activities that are particular to and necessary for the attainment of a specific goal or the resolution of a specific problem. It is these goal-directed and problem-oriented activities that constitute the primary object of attention and thus help give meaning to the larger collective episode. Examples of task activities include parading or mass marching, mass assembly with speechmaking, picketing, proselytizing, temporary occupations of premises, lynching, taunting and harassment, property destruction, looting, and sniping.

Several caveats should be kept in mind with respect to crowd task activities. First, any listing of task activities is unlikely to be exhaustive, because they vary historically and culturally. Tilly’s (1978) concept of “repertoires of collective action” underscores this variation. Tilly stressed that while there are innumerable ways in which people could pursue collective ends, alternatives are in fact limited by sociohistorical forces. His research suggests, for example, that the massed march, mass assembly, and temporary occupation of premises are all collective task activities specific to the twentieth century.

Second, crowd and task activities are not mutually exclusive but are typically combined in an interactive fashion during the history of a crowd episode. The mass assembly, for example, is often preceded by the massed march, and property destruction and looting often occur together. Indeed, whether a crowd episode is constitutive of a protest demonstration, a celebration, or a riot depends, in part, on the particular configuration of task activities and, in part, on who or what is the object of protest, celebration, or violence.

A final caveat follows. The task activities associated with any given crowd episode vary in the degree to which they are the focus of attention. Not all are equally attended to by spectators, social control agents, or the media. Consequently, task activities can be classified according to the amount of attention they receive (Snow, Zurcher, & Peters 1981). One that is the major focus of attention and thus provides the phenomenal basis for defining the episode constitutes “the main task activity,” whereas those subordinate to the main task activity are “subordinate or side activities.” The main task activity is on center stage and typically is the focus of media attention, as illustrated by the extensive media coverage of property vandalism and looting associated with some riots. In contrast, the remaining activities are sideshows, occasioned by and often parasitic to the focal task activity. Examples of subordinate task activity in the case of property or community riots, or both, include spectating or observing, informal, unofficial attempts at
social control, and even the work of the media (Snow, Zurcher, & Peters 1981).

Variation in participating units. Just as empirical research on crowds has discerned considerable heterogeneity in behavior, so there is corresponding variation in terms of participants. Some are engaged in various task activities, some are observing, and still others are involved in the containment and control of the other participants and their interactions. Indeed, most of the individuals who make up a crowd fall into at least one of three categories of actors: task performers, spectators or bystanders, and social control agents. Task performers include the individuals performing both main and subordinate tasks. In the case of an antiwar march, for example, the main task performers would include the protesting marchers, with counterdemonstrators, peace marshals, and the press or media constituting the subordinate task performers.

Spectators or bystanders, who constitute the second set of actors relevant to most instances of crowd behavior, have been differentiated into proximal and distal groupings according to proximity to the collective encounter and the nature of their response. Proximal spectators, who are physically co-present and can thus monitor firsthand the activities of task performers, have generally been treated as relatively passive and nonessential elements of crowd behavior. However, research on a series of victory celebrations shows that some spectators do not merely respond passively to the main task performance and accept the activity as given, but can actively influence the character of the activity as well (Snow, Zurcher, & Peters 1981). Accordingly, proximal spectators can vary in terms of whether they are passive or animated and aggressive. “Distal spectators” refer to individuals who take note of episodes of crowd behavior even though they are not physically present during the episodes themselves. Also referred to as “bystander publics” (Turner & Killian 1987), they indirectly monitor an instance of crowd behavior and respond to it, either favorably or unfavorably, by registering their respective views with the media and community officials. Although distal spectators may not affect the course of a single episode of crowd behavior, they can clearly have an impact on the career and character of a series of interconnected crowd episodes.

Social control agents, consisting primarily of police officers and military personnel, constitute the final set of participants relevant to most instances of crowd behavior. Since they are the guardians of public order, their primary aim with respect to crowds is to maintain that order by controlling crowd behavior both spatially and temporally or by suppressing its occurrence. Given this aim, social control agents can clearly have a significant impact on the course and character of crowd behavior.

The foregoing observations indicate that behavioral and participant heterogeneity are characteristic features of most crowd episodes or temporary focused gatherings. In turn, the research on which these observations are based lays to rest the traditional image of crowds as monolithic entities composed of like-minded people engaged in undifferentiated behavior.

CONDITIONS OF EMERGENCE

Under what conditions do individuals come together collectively to engage in collective task activities constitutive of protest or celebration? Three sets of interacting conditions are discernible in the literature: (1) conditions of conduciveness; (2) precipitating ambiguities or grievances; and (3) conditions for mobilization.

Conditions of conduciveness. The concept of conduciveness directs attention to structural and cultural factors that make crowd behavior physically and socially possible (Smelser 1963). Conditions of conduciveness constitute the raw material for crowd behavior and include three sets of factors: ecological, technological, and social control. Ecological factors affect the arrangement and distribution of people in space so as to facilitate interaction and communication. One such factor found to be particularly conducive is the existence of large, spatially concentrated populations. The vast
majority of campus protest demonstrations in the 1960s occurred at large universities, for example. Similarly, the urban riots of the 1960s typically occurred in densely populated residential areas, where there were large, easily mobilizable black populations (Spilerman 1976).

The heightened prospect of interpersonal interaction and communication associated with population concentration can also be facilitated by the diffusion of communication technology, namely telephone, radio, television, and Internet access. But neither the diffusion of such technology nor population density guarantee the emergence of crowds or temporary gatherings engaging in collective behavior in the absence of a system of social control that allows for freedom of assembly and speech. Political opportunity scholars have argued theoretically and empirically that incidence of public protest against the state diminishes considerably in political systems that prohibit and deal harshly with such crowd behavior, whereas the development of a more permissive attitude toward public protest and a corresponding relaxation of measures of social control is frequently conducive to the development of protest behavior.

**Precipitating events and conditions.** However conducive conditions might be for instances of crowd behavior, it will not occur in the absence of some precipitating event or condition. Although the specific precipitants underlying the emergence of crowd behavior may be quite varied, most are variants of two generic conditions: (1) ambiguity; and (2) grievances against corporate entities, typically the state or some governmental, administrative unit, or against communal or status groups such as ethnic, racial, and religious groups.

Ambiguity is generated by the disruption or breakdown of everyday routines or expectancies, and has long been linked theoretically to the emergence of crowd behavior (Turner & Killian 1987; Johnson & Feinburg 1990). Evidence of its empirical linkage to the emergence of crowd behavior is abundant, as with the materialization of crowds of onlookers at the scenes of accidents and fires; the celebrations that sometimes follow high-stakes, unanticipated athletic victories or defeats; the collective revelry sometimes associated with the disruption of interdependent networks of institutionalized roles, as in the case of power blackouts and police strikes; and prison riots that frequently follow on the heels of unanticipated change in administrative personnel, procedures, and control (Useem & Kimball 1989).

The existence of grievances against the state or some governmental, administrative unit, or against communal or status groups, can be equally facilitative of protest gatherings. Grievances against the state or other corporate actors are typically associated with the existence of economic and political inequities that are perceived as unjust or political decisions and policies that are seen as morally bankrupt or advantaging some interests to the exclusion of others. Examples of protest crowds triggered in part by grievances include the hostile gatherings of hungry citizens and displaced workers in industrializing Europe; the striking crowds of workers associated with the labor movement; and the mass demonstrations (marching, rallying, picketing, vigiling) associated with the civil rights, student, antiwar, and women’s movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

**Conditions for mobilization.** A precipitating condition coupled with a high degree of conduciveness is rarely sufficient to produce an instance of crowd behavior. In addition, people have to be assembled or brought into contact with one another, and attention must be focused on the accomplishment of some task. On some occasions in everyday life the condition of assemblage is already met, as in the case of the pedestrian crowd and conventional audience. More often than not, however, protest crowds, large-scale victory celebrations, and riots do not grow out of conventional gatherings but require the rapid convergence of people in time and space. Research reveals that the assembling process (McPhail & Miller 1973) is contingent on the receipt of assembling instructions, which ordinarily includes specification of time and place and solicitation of
participation, which has been found to be the strongest predictor of participation (Schussman & Soule 2005); availability (relatively free or discretionary time); and ready access, either by foot or by other transportation, to the scene of the action. And the focusing of attention typically occurs through some “keynoting” or “framing” process whereby the interpretive gesture or utterance of one or more individuals provides a resonant account or stimulus for action. It can occur spontaneously, as when someone yells “Cops!” or “Fire!”; it can be an unintended consequence of media broadcasts; or it can be the product of prior planning, thus implying the operation of a social movement.

COORDINATION OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

Examination of protest demonstrations, celebratory crowds, and riots reveals in each case that the behaviors in question are patterned and collective rather than random and individualistic. Identification of the sources of coordination has thus been one of the central tasks confronting students of crowd behavior.

Earlier theorists attributed the coordination either to the rapid spread of emotional states and behavior in a contagion-like manner due to the presumably heightened suggestibility of crowd members (Blumer 1951; Le Bon 1960) or to the convergence of individuals who are predisposed to behave in a similar fashion due to common dispositions or background characteristics (Allport 1924). Both views are empirically off the mark. They assume a uniformity of action that glosses the existence of various categories of actors, variation in their behaviors, ongoing interaction among them, and the role this interaction plays in determining the direction and character of crowd behavior. These oversights are primarily due to the perceptual trap of taking the behaviors of the most conspicuous elements of the episode – the main task performers – as typifying all categories of actors, thus giving rise to the previously mentioned “illusion of unanimity” (Turner & Killian 1987).

A more modern variant of the convergence argument attributes coordination to a rational calculus in which individuals reach parallel assessments regarding the benefits of engaging in a particular task activity (Berk 1974). Blending elements of this logic with strands of earlier theorizing, Coleman (1990) argued that crowd behavior occurs when individuals make a unilateral transfer of control over their actions. Such accounts are no less troublesome than the earlier ones in that they remain highly individualistic and psychologistic, ignoring the extent to which crowd behavior is the product of collective decision making involving the “framing” and “reframing” of probable costs and benefits and the extent to which this collective decision making frequently has a history involving prior negotiation between various sets of crowd participants, namely the main task performers and the control agents (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy 1998).

A sociologically more palatable view holds that crowd behavior is coordinated by definition of the situation that functions in normative fashion by encouraging behavior in accordance with the definition. The collective definition may be situationally emergent (Turner & Killian 1987) or pre-established by prior policing strategies or negotiation among the relevant set of actors (Waddington, Jones, & Critcher 1989; della Porta & Reiter 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy 1998).

THE CORRELATES AND PREDICTORS OF PARTICIPATION

What factors make some individuals more likely than other individuals to participate in crowd episodes? It is clear that the odds of participating in some crowd episodes are greater with personal or organizational requests to participate (Schussman & Soule 2005) and increasing spatial proximity and access to those episodes, schedule congruence, and discretionary time (McPhail & Miller 1973). As well, individuals whose daily routines and expectancies have been rendered ambiguous or who
share grievances that are linked to the occurrence of a crowd episode would appear to be more likely candidates for participation. But both of these sets of conditions typically hold for a far greater number of individuals than those who end up participating in a crowd episode or protest gathering in some capacity other than a social control agent or media representative. So what can be said about the personal and interpersonal correlates or predictors of participation?

There is no simple answer to this question or standard formula for predicting crowd participation. However, research on this question suggests at least four general, sensitizing observations, particularly with respect to participation in protest crowds. The first general observation is that commonsensical psychological indicators of protest event participation, such as intense frustration or strong feelings of deprivation, have not been found to be valid or reliable predictors. For example, studies of individual riot participation, which have been numerous, have failed to find consistently significant empirical correlations between measures of frustration or deprivation and participation (McPhail 1994). This is not to suggest that riot or protest participants may not sometimes feel deeply frustrated or deprived as compared to others, but that these psychological states do not reliably explain their participation or differentiate them from nonparticipants. Such findings are consistent with the second general observation: There are a diversity of motivations for participating in crowd episodes, ranging from curiosity to exploitation of the situation for personal gain (e.g., fun, material goods) to sympathy with the issue for which the episode is a marker or carrier to embracement of and identification with the cause from either a self-interested or altruistic standpoint (Turner & Killian 1987).

That neither a distinctive psychological state or deficit nor a dominant motive have been found to be associated with crowd and protest participation does not mean that psychological or personality factors are without relevance to the issue. To the contrary, one such factor that appears to be consistently associated with participation as a main task performer in protest crowds and riots is the existence of a sense of “personal efficacy” – the belief that one’s participation will make a difference, the confidence that one’s efforts will contribute to the larger cause (Snow & Oliver 1995). This finding, which constitutes the third general observation regarding participation correlates, makes good sense when considered in conjunction with the fourth general observation: Participants in crowd episodes – whether they are victory celebrations, protest events, or riots – seldom participate alone. Instead, rather than being isolates or loners, they are typically in the company of friends or acquaintances; they are, in other words, part of a social network (Snow & Oliver 1995). Thus, participation in crowd episodes, particularly planned ones such as protest events, tends to be embedded in social networks, which also function to nurture a greater sense of both personal and collective efficacy. When these factors are coupled with the previously mentioned conditions for assemblage, and either ambiguity or target-specific grievances, participation becomes more likely and perhaps even more predictable.

SEE ALSO: Collective action (collective behavior); Collective efficacy; Contagion theory; Convergence/dispositional theory; Ecological conditions/determinants; Emergent norm theory; Framing and social movements; Modular protest forms; Participation in social movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Repertoires of contention; Riots.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Employers’ collective action
MICHEL OFFERLÉ

Debates about employers’ collective action have remained inconclusive. Historians, sociologists, and political scientists have established that neither competition between employers, nor the secretive nature of their business practices, nor their supposed individualism, prevent them from acting together or from establishing permanent organizations of various natures. The very rich literature dealing with interest groups (including organizations representing economic interests) demonstrates this fact very convincingly. For instance, Michel Pinçon and Monique Pinçon-Charlot (2000) have shown that when it comes to its sociabilities and its reproduction, the French bourgeoisie behaves like a “collectivist” class.

COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS OF ECONOMIC ELITES

The idea that employers, taken as an aggregate of economic powers (whether or not they are owners of the means of production and exchange), would not need any collective organization since, in a capitalist regime, the power of the state is routinely the power of the dominant economic class, has been challenged by empirical research that underlines the autonomy of social fields and that points out that political professionals are not merely the mouthpieces of the capitalist class (Offe & Wiesenthal 1980; Traxler 1993; Schmitter & Streeck 1999). At present, the debate centers less on the existence of collective action and more on the forms and conditions of its success, which is to say on trying to learn how business acts and how and when it is that business wins (for the US context, see Vogel 1989; Smith 2001; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Offerlé 2009).

Employers’ collective action is at once simpler and more complex than that of other social groups. It is simpler because economic entrepreneurs have at their disposal many more resources than other causes and interests. They can and they have achieved their desired results by remunerating full-time employees. This kind of collective action is also more complex because their significant resources allow for a far greater number of choices, and because the demands made by actors considered as “privileged” must take on specific or acceptable modes of formulation. In fact, collective action is in no way ineluctable: big companies have enough resources to, on the one hand, act alone by remunerating public relations agents and by involving their executive management; and, on the other hand, to form specialized co-optative associations (business roundtables, business councils or Association Française des entreprises privées (French Association of Private Businesses) or associations that are not centered on the strict defense of economic interests (Club Bilderberg, Aspen Institute, Société du Mont Pèlerin) or social gatherings.

This plurality of choices at the top can also be found among the “smaller employers.” The notion of registers of resilience allows us to contextualize the tools by which an individual succeeds in naming, understanding, and protesting (against) his or her fate (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat 1980/1981; Offerlé 2006): depending on the time in which we live and the place we occupy in society, we possess an array of individual and/or collective means to interpret the events that impact our life and to remedy them. To let her anger and her distress be known, a smaller employer can use tax evasion, undeclared work, predation, hunger strikes, and peaceful or violent demonstrations, for example. By contrast, a major employer is able to hire a lawyer to act juridically or a lobbyist to act politically. He will also
be able to act as a predator and/or call on a collective organization that will not act in the same manner or with the same means as the small entrepreneur.

As a consequence, in principle all economic entrepreneurs can “choose” between several forms of individual action and several modalities or levels of employers’ collective action: local, national – professional or inter-professional – and international. Collective action comes up against the many obstacles that sociologists of mobilizations, such as Olson (1965), have highlighted. To counteract individualistic tendencies, targeted individual incentives are offered and, in fact, historically, employers’ organizations have provided services to their members: data on markets, on the credibility of colleagues or competitors, quality standards, and the like. More or less pressing incentives to an agreement can be implemented in small groups of acquaintances. Regarding cartels or consortiums, measures have been adopted that were (or are) coercive in nature and varying in length.

Yet, these groups have very often been perceived as reactive. The literature on the subject often ascribes the employers’ drive to mobilize as threats on the part of the state (or conversely, of politicians’ desire for a coalition with entrepreneurs in a given context), or as a reaction against labor movements or other field-relevant social movements (notably, the various contemporary consumerist, environmentalist, and alter-globalist movements). But, as has been well documented by economic or business historians and social scientists, far from being uniquely reactive, these groups can also be pro-active and participate in the creation of economic institutions (Jones & Zeitlin 2008; Steiner & Vatin 2009; Coen, Grant, & Wilson 2010).

REPERTOIRE OF EMPLOYERS’ COLLECTIVE ACTION

The notion of collective action, from Tilly’s vantage point, focused on dissenting and episodic collective actions and not on daily, routine forms of resistance or ongoing actions, and it is limited to collective actions that are visible in their forms of protest. Building on this limitation and applying it to the repertoire of employers’ collective action, we can show that, for employers and management as well as for protest actors, partially routine forms exist and are used on a regular basis by both agents and organizations. The repertoire is strategic and constrained. Just like repertoires of protest, it varies widely in time and social space.

Turning more specifically to the “top” professional organizations, one can identify two modalities of repertoires that have successively developed within market economy democracies, one more confrontational, the other less so. Examples of the first modality occurred during the end of the nineteenth century and part of the beginning of the twentieth century in France when it resorted to collective modes of action against workers enrolled in the labor movement: black lists, banning of unions, anticollectivist propaganda, control of newspapers, creation of social defense leagues whose objective was to denounce first socialist and then communist doctrines and practices, creation of mutual insurance funds against the consequences of strikes, and slush funds. These forms of control that extend ownership rights and forms of paternalism are initially local. They tend to become national as the workers’ struggle increasingly adopts national symbols and demands. This class struggle was also extended to the political sphere by the massive support – local and national – provided by political parties and members of the parliament, as well as by economic pressures on governments that were considered as dangerous (withdrawal of financing, drain of capital, threats of canceling taxes or investment, subsidization of ultra-right groups and, occasionally, of anticommunist ultra-left groups). Contrary to what happened in Germany or the United States, lock-outs were quite rare in France and the massive occupation of assembly seats by business owners, companies officers, or
business lawyers (as in the United States or Switzerland) was never very common; the relative autonomization of the political profession took place quite early in France.

This militant anticollectivism could also be correlated with paternalistic forms of social support. Some small subgroups of employers were ready to adopt more open forms of mobilization: peaceful or violent demonstrations, shock tactics, and the bombing of public buildings. This is the case of the “Poujadist” movements in France from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the United States examples abound as well (scabs, antiunion brigades, detective agencies put into service, etc.)

More generally, business or professional organizations often have, particularly between the two world wars (in their support of the fascist and Nazi takeovers) and during the cold war years, secretly or openly worked to destabilize regimes considered as threats to the interests of the “free world” (see, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Petroleum in Iran (1953), United Fruit in Guatemala (1954), ITT in Chile (1973)). This often happened in collusion with the American secret service. In the cases of extended mobilizations, small business or small store owners have been able to play a crucial role (see the “bosses strike” of the Chilean truck drivers in 1972 or the mobilization of the Iranian bazaars before the fall of the Shah).

In Western democracies, this initial repertoire was very slowly replaced by a second, much less confrontational scenario that echoes the institutionalization of the labor movement, the transformation of forms of support and the shrinking of the perimeter of state intervention in state-controlled economies. The two main adversaries of organized business found themselves backpedaling. This transformation was also due to the very change in the structure of business (the partial crumbling of commerce, the development of the service economy, and the partial managerialization of business), and the marginalization of protest currents within small businesses. Employers’ associations were (and are) shifting toward the conference room.

In various countries, demonstrations can be tools used by small business and small store owners and their organizations to fight against the high cost of living (particularly in Africa) or against political power (e.g., in Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey in 2001), or against occupation (as in the Palestinian territories.) The open participation in countermobilizations in coalition with other social or political actors wishing to destabilize a government can be observed in other countries (in Venezuela against Hugo Chávez or in Bolivia against Evo Morales). This confrontational form has not totally disappeared in the United States, a country in which the defense of free enterprise and of business freedom remains strident, even though the threat of communism is not a major challenge. Hence, there are wealthy contributors who subsidize collective organizations, such as think tanks and small law offices that fight against unions. The relatively unrestricted financing of electoral campaigns has allowed for the increased participation of corporations and business organizations – particularly that of the American Chamber of Commerce – in the campaign funding of candidates and in lobbying activities oriented to affect decisions on particularly high-stakes laws (such as health insurance or union laws).

Today, economic elites’ collective action is markedly exercised on the register of expertise. Employers’ organizations and think tanks that, to variable degrees, have participated in bringing to the fore and implementing what are globally called the “neo-liberal reforms” (Denord 2007; Phillips-Fein 2009), work essentially from this register of expertise. Such expertise – fiscal, social, economic, even communicational – is marshaled by those organizations claiming that they have access to the best experts, whose credentials include academic diplomas, former employment in top administration or governmental posts, or proven success in managing businesses.
The employers’ associations’ expertise is expressed in writing memos, parliamentary amendments, memoranda, and white papers, in sitting on multiple commissions and in organizing events, and in the practice of lobbying. Lobbying is a broad concept that refers to the use of techniques of control and persuasion, performed in more or less discrete ways, as well as to applying pressure, and agenda setting in public debates. The recourse to the law is particularly developed in the United States where legal counsels of major companies and professional organizations judicialize social or environmental issues.

THE SUCCESS OF MOBILIZATIONS?

Most of the time, large business owners make a show of their unity and solidarity, which can be deployed against the state or against the unions. Nonetheless, many internal divisions do exist within employers’ national confederations, which depend first of all on the size of the enterprise. Even within the looser confederations, such as the MEDEF (French Enterprise Movement) or the Italian Confindustria, there are often conflicts between major wholesalers and the food industry, between car makers and subcontractors, between services and industry, between banks and all the other enterprises, between the garbage industry and recycling businesses, between construction professionals and construction material producers.

American political scientists have tried to measure quantitatively the effects of entrepreneurial mobilizations of specific enterprises or organizations. Mark Smith (2000) distinguishes the unifying from the global stakes that oppose numerous competing groups. On the one hand, even when positions are split, ideologized, and publicized, the “employers” can subsequently assure a common position, as in, for example, the issue of free enterprise, and of employers’ fiscal and social contributions. On the other hand, on certain issues, confrontational or competitive stakes can oppose employers’ factions: as concerns immigration laws, employers do not necessarily share the same economic interests.

Finally, certain outcomes are of concern only to particular niches of entrepreneurs and only involve a measure generated or contested by and for a specific group or a few actors. In this case, the issues tend to be dealt with in a “technical” manner without the politicization implied by a public debate, for example, an exemption, a fiscal measure concerning a group of businesses or one sector only.

In those three ideal-typical configurations, the forms and the arguments vary rather widely. A differentiation, based not only on the issues at hand but on their historical occurrence, has also been proposed, notably by Vogel (1989), who studied the temporal variability of resources by focusing on the cycles of successes enjoyed by business compared to other actors (unions or citizen groups) in American history. The same reasoning could be used for France, where protectionism alternated with free exchange.

The expertise of the employers’ collective action is present in one of the most poorly studied and least publicized aspects of their activity: their contribution to the production of the intermediary of the public sector (by auto-regulation or co-production of a body of technical and economic norms) that structures the possibilities of production and exchange. It is also present in their activities that are most visible in the old neocorporatist set-ups or in the few countries that have kept a level of national negotiation between union and employers. Negotiations or parity management of social systems have become standard modes of operation in which the employers’ organization is a “social partner,” that is, a “syndicate.” The issue now becomes the locus of the negotiation (enterprise, sector, nation, Europe) and the contents of those negotiations.

The possibility of an autonomous collective action on the part of the economic elites and its success depends, of course, on the configuration of political power. It can run up against the patrimonialization of that power (e.g., the
employers’ collective action

Tunisia of President Ben Ali) or into its control (today’s China), since in some countries professional organizations have to submit to state authority. It takes quite varied shapes in stabilize pluralist democracies depending on the form of the state, the modes of representation of interests, and the forms of professionalism of the political body, all of which generate differentiated modes of cooperation and differentiated interpenetrations between political and economic elites: from the individual recourse of a business owner, to collective campaigns of all the businesses and their organizations, not to mention all the forms of niche lobbying and all the neocorporatist transactions.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Collective action (collective behavior); Entrepreneurs, movement; Labor movement; Labor protest in the European Union; Repertoires of contention; Resource mobilization theory; Social control.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Environmental movements
CHRISTOPHER ROOTES and ROBERT BRULLE

INTRODUCTION

Environmental movements are networks of informal interactions that may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying degrees of formality (including even political parties, especially Green parties) that are engaged in collective action motivated by shared identity or concern about environmental issues. Such networks are generally loose and uninstitutionalized, but their forms of action and their degree of integration vary. Environmental movements are, however, identical neither with organizations nor with episodes of protest. It is only when organizations (and other, usually less formally organized actors) are networked and engaged in collective action, whether or not it involves protest, that an environmental movement exists (see Diani 1995: 5; Rootes 2004).

Such linkages are not always readily visible. Where environmental movements are well established, they may focus on less visible lobbying and “constructive engagement” with governments and corporations rather than highly visible protest. Where environmentalism has become entrenched, there are many “subterranean” linkages among groups and organizations, and the full range of movement activities is less and less adequately represented in mass media.

The methodological implications of this are that no one strategy is likely to yield a complete picture. Although studies of protest events (Rootes 2003) may represent the most visible face of the movement and escape the constraints of organizational studies that necessarily omit the less organized parts of the movement, they are unlikely to give adequate accounts of the less public—or simply less publicized—activities of the movement, including a great deal that happens locally and beneath the radar of mass media. Careful ethnographies of national organizations and local campaigns are thus a necessary complement to event-based studies.

THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Although concern about the environment has a long history, modern environmental movements date from the 1970s. The increasingly obvious effects of accelerating industrialization and exploitation of natural resources provided growing audiences for the alarums of conservationists and preservationists, but the radical critique of capitalist industrialism and representative democracy associated with the New left and the counterculture created the public space for the development of new social movements, as well as furnishing their tactical repertoire. Especially in the United States, environmentalism benefited by being a relatively consensual issue in a period of intense political polarization, but soon new, more radical environmental movement organizations (EMOs) that embraced nonviolent direct action arose and spread to Western Europe. Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace arose in reaction against the apparent timidity of conservationist organizations such as the Sierra Club, and in response to the demands from a new, self-confident, and participatory generation to participate directly in activism. The internationalism of the new EMOs and their skillful exploitation of mass media to put pressure on governments and corporate decision-makers were in tune with the times, and these were the fastest growing EMOs during the 1980s.

The history of environmentalism, on both sides of the Atlantic, has been one of

successive waves of critique, innovation, and incorporation. The rise of the new EMOs encouraged innovation in the agendas and tactics of older conservation organizations and, by the end of the 1980s, networking among older and newer organizations and joint campaigns were increasingly common. By then, however, dissatisfaction with increasingly institutionalized reform environmentalism was stimulating the rise of radical ecologist groupings and the environmental justice movement (EJM).

Many organizations formed in earlier waves of environmental concern have adapted to accommodate subsequent concerns and developments in ecological consciousness. In the United States, despite observers’ doubts that established, “wilderness obsessed” EMOs are capable of accommodating the concerns of the EJM, especially since 2000, the Sierra Club and Greenpeace have taken the environmental justice agenda seriously. In Western Europe, the environmental justice frame has been increasingly adopted, especially by FoE, while established EMOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the national bird protection societies have developed a more inclusive ecological perspective and have broadened the range of their campaigns to include issues of habitat and the welfare of human populations (Rootes 2005). The rhetoric of conflict and critique may give a misleading impression of divisions within environmental movements whose existence can be demonstrated by the persistence, despite such differences, of network links of varying degrees of strength and intensity (Dalton 1994).

VALUES AND SOCIAL BASES OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

The rise of values and attitudes favorable to environmentalism is frequently explained in terms of “post-materialism” (Inglehart 1977). According to this thesis, post-materialist values that place higher priority on economic and security needs, chiefly because new, younger generations raised in relative affluence and security replace older generations who, during their formative years, more often experienced economic privation and the insecurities of war. The rise of environmentalism was counted among the consequences of this “culture shift.”

Yet Dalton and Rohrschneider (2002), examining the link between individual endorsement of post-materialist values and membership in environmental organizations, found that the correlation was modest in wealthy nations and almost nonexistent in poor nations. Post-materialism may not be as good a predictor of environmentalism as some suppose because it embraces both post-materialist aesthetic and principled concerns with environmental protection and essentially materialist concerns with safety and security. Even global environmental concern, often considered to be unproblematically post-materialist, might be portrayed as materialist.

Post-materialism is relatively weakly correlated with support for environmentalism because concerns for the environment are held both by highly educated “post-materialist” ecologists, who are not so much fearful for their own security as concerned about global environmental problems whose effects are relatively remote, as well as people, usually less well educated, who are more exercised by fear of the threats that pollution poses to their own immediate material security. Post-materialism is a better predictor of environmental activism than of environmental concern because activism, unlike concern, is highly correlated with higher education, which is itself an antecedent of most forms of political activism. The significant relationship that Dalton (2005) found between national affluence and membership in environmental organizations might simply be because affluence stimulates membership in civic groups generally.

Most research on the social backgrounds of environmental activists and members of national EMOs has concluded that they are
disproportionately highly educated, employed in teaching, creative, welfare, or caring professions, and, especially, the offspring of the highly educated (Rootes 1995). For this reason, environmentalism has sometimes been interpreted as the self-interested politics of a “new class” of traffickers in culture and symbols, opposed or indifferent to the interests of those whose labor involves the manipulation of material things. However, environmental activists are not exclusively drawn from such backgrounds, and approval of EMOs and environmental activism, as well as pro-environment attitudes, are widespread in society.

Grassroots environmental movements involve a broader cross-section of society than do major national EMOs, in part because locally unwanted land uses are more often imposed upon the poor. Women play more prominent roles in grassroots mobilizations than in national EMOs, reflecting women’s greater involvement with, and confidence in acting in, the local community than the wider public sphere. The barriers to entry to the local political sphere are also lower than in national politics. Grassroots environmental activism is thus an important means of social learning about environmental issues, a school for participation generally, and an entry point for new activists and new issues; it is a source of revitalization of the environmental movement, and makes the movement more socially representative.

VALUES AND FORMS OF ACTION

Theorists have distinguished between conservationism, environmentalism, and ecologism, but such clear philosophical distinctions are not usually precisely mirrored in divisions among movement organizations, their members, and supporters. Organizational formalizations of ideological division are more likely in the formal political sphere, where membership tends to be exclusive, than in the movement milieu, where organizations are more fluid, overlapping memberships are common, and the flexibility of the network structure is better able to accommodate differences without overt conflict.

The discursive frames adopted by environmentalists have consequences for the ways in which they campaign and the forms of organization they adopt (Brulle 2000). Yet, as Dalton (1994) discovered, whether European EMOs had originally been committed to conservationism or ecologism made surprisingly little difference to their choices of strategies, tactics, and styles of action. The apparent convergence within the broad environmental movement sector was not simply a matter of the progressive institutionalization and incorporation of more radical organizations such as FoE and Greenpeace; just as FoE and Greenpeace learned the etiquette necessary to smooth dealings with the powerful, so traditional conservationist organizations became less conflict-averse in their tactics and more skilled in the use of mass media. Although EMOs’ values do influence their strategy and tactics, greater effects are attributable to the pattern of opportunities and constraints inherent in the structures of the national political systems within which those organizations operate.

Even where they embrace direct action, environmental movements are almost wholly non-violent, but movement subcultures are not isolated from wider social and political contexts. Violent environmental protests in Italy and Spain in the 1980s were carry-overs from other, wider political ructions – in Italy, the political violence of the 1970s, and in Spain, the temporary association of militant Basque nationalism with environmentalist struggles. Similarly, confrontational environmental protest in Britain in the 1990s rode the wave of more general confrontational protest that rose with the campaign against the poll tax (Rootes 2003). National political cultures explain less than political conjunctures.

The great majority of environmental organizations are either engaged in practical conservation work or focus upon parliamentary
and educational strategies; only a small minority rely on protest, and these are distinguished by the discourses they articulate. Those that employ the discursive frames of deep ecology and environmental justice are primarily responsible for the relatively small number of environmental protests, especially in the United States (Brulle 2000: 246; Carmin & Balser 2002).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

As the numbers of members and supporters of conservation organizations and EMOs have grown since the 1970s, many of those organizations have become substantial operations with annual budgets in the millions, and employees numbering hundreds or thousands. They have, as a result, become increasingly internally institutionalized as formal organizations, internally bureaucratized, hierarchical, and depending upon salaried professional employees rather than enthusiastic volunteers. Although some democratic organizations exist in the environmental movement, the majority are formal oligarchies that lack formal participatory mechanisms and are governed by self-selecting boards (Brulle 2000). These “professional social movement” organizations (Zald & McCarthy 1987) have been labeled “astro turf” organizations (Cigler & Loomis 1995) or “protest businesses” (Jordan & Maloney 1997), in which professional staff dominate the organization and members are merely financial supporters. Some, like Greenpeace, are unabashed about this; others preserve a semblance of democracy in principle but are not less oligarchic in practice (Rootes 2009).

Conventionally, it has been assumed that “success” for a social movement means its institutionalization, usually as a political party. Yet although Green parties emerged from the 1970s onward, and began by the 1980s to win seats in some European legislatures, they were seldom direct products of environmental movements, but more often of antinuclear campaigns or the politically marginalized left. Moreover, they are not institutionalized vehicles of the environmental movement in the way that socialist parties were of the labor movement. Green parties have prospered, especially in northern Europe and Australasia, but their relations with environmental movements have been problematic, especially in those cases where Greens have entered government.

One reason for this is that, where conditions have favored the development of institutionalized EMOs, they have become formal organizations embedded in networks of policy advocacy and implementation, becoming a “public interest lobby” (Diani & Donati 1999) or an “advocacy community” (Bosso 2005). In order to protect their reputations with more powerful actors in government and corporations, environmental organizations that have secured access on the basis of their expertise and politically nonpartisan status, have generally been careful to keep some distance between them and those, such as Green parties, who have sought to enter the political arena directly, especially when the latter are at best minor players in formal politics.

In the United States, where political structures have discouraged the development of Green parties, charitable foundations have been a substantial source of funding for most major EMOs. However, most foundation funding goes to moderate organizations that use the traditional discourses of conservation, preservation, and liberal environmentalism, and has been concentrated on a relatively small number of large EMOs involved in political advocacy work (Brulle & Jenkins 2005). In Britain, foundation funding is less significant, but strongly favors organizations engaged in practical environmental protection and remediation rather than advocacy (Rootes 2009).

Some claim that the institutionalization of EMOs, and their dependence, notably in the United States, upon foundation funding, has robbed them of the capacity and, even of the
will, to mobilize large numbers of people in collective action, leaving them without the “veto power” – the ability to disrupt “business as usual” – that social movement scholars have usually considered to be the ultimate basis of the power of social movements (van der Heijden 1997). Interestingly, however, those organizations that claim to speak for grassroots environmental activists appear to be scarcely less oligarchic than others: most organizations associated with the EJM in the United States lack mechanisms of democratic accountability (Brulle & Essoka 2005).

Nevertheless, recent history suggests that environmental movements may have squared the circle, and that the institutionalization of EMOs has not simply entailed the deradicalization of the movement or a loss of shared identity. In Germany, a substantially institutionalized movement coexisted in the 1990s with the revival of highly confrontational, at times violent, antinuclear protest, as established EMOs gave assistance to local antinuclear groups (Rucht & Roose 2003). In Britain during the 1990s, even as EMOs grew in numbers and size as well as access and influence, reported environmental protest increased and became more rather than less confrontational (Rootes 2003).

The rise of new, more radical groupings such as Earth First! can be traced to dissatisfaction with the apparent timidity of more established EMOs, but shared identity among environmental campaigners has survived even as their tactical repertoires have varied. In Britain, even the radical “disorganizations” most committed to direct action were connected by networks of advice and support to more established organizations. The support of established EMOs for direct action groups may not have been very publicly visible, but the sense of identity among the constituent parts of the environmental movement did not dissolve as a result of the institutionalization of its more established organizations and the reactions against it, but instead grew as groups came to practice a division of labor and to realize the advantages of cooperation. Climate change has not only stimulated the rise of new forms of direct action (e.g., the Climate Camps), but has drawn members and supporters of even conservation organizations into the streets (Rootes 2010).

The European experience shows that it is possible for an environmental movement to retain many of the characteristics of an emergent movement whilst taking advantage of the opportunities presented by institutionalization. Institutionalization has not been a barrier to the mobilization of protest. Whilst some writers have referred to the “self-limiting radicalism” of Green parties, it is the “self-limiting institutionalization” of environmental movements that is the more striking and that has more profound implications for sociological theory.

The survival of environmental movements and their resistance to the deradicalizing effects of institutionalization has distinguished them from the other “new social movements.” Because pressing environmental problems are a chronic condition of an industrialized world, Northern environmental movements, although by no means universally anticapitalist, are recurrently influenced by the critical analyses of their radically anticapitalist constituents, as campaigns against genetically modified organisms and neoliberal globalization have shown.

In the global South, however, environmental campaigns are usually so bound up with campaigns for human, democratic, and economic rights that they often do not take the form of environmental movements. In East Asia, stronger states with more developed and affluent civil societies have fostered more vigorous environmental movements than in sub-Saharan Africa (Mittelman 1998). As in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, environmental movements in East Asia were often used as cover by pro-democracy activists (Lee & So 1999). In the less industrialized states of Asia and Africa, as in recently democratized Central and Eastern Europe, environmentalists’ successes often depend upon support from
Northern EMOs and human rights organizations, with the risk that dependence on foreign assistance displaces the local agenda and diverts the energies of activists away from efforts to mobilize local people. Perhaps for this reason, environmental movements have had greatest impact where they mobilized local people and incorporated local cultural values and rituals, empowering local activists and enabling them to challenge authoritarian states (Lee & So 1999: 291).

Despite frequent references to “the” environmental movement, even to “the global environmental movement,” there remains such variation among and within local and national environmental movements that to speak of a global environmental movement is a triumph of abstraction or aspiration over experience. Obstacles include the wide diversity of material circumstances, cultures, languages, and political circumstances. National environmental movements have flourished under conditions of stable democracy in strong states; the absence of a developed democratic global polity is a major obstacle to the development of a global environmental movement.

IMPACTS

The direct impacts of social movements are always hard to distinguish from the effects of changes external to the movement. The rise of environmental movements from the late 1960s was contemporaneous with the development of legislation and state agencies designed to protect the environment, but the latter was not mainly an effect of the former. Rather, both were products of developing environmental awareness. Environmental NGOs have since sought to channel and develop that awareness, and in that they have enjoyed some success, albeit that their small and particular successes are easier to identify with confidence than their larger impacts.

Environmental activists have played major roles in preserving Californian redwood forests and the Great Barrier Reef, and Greenpeace’s campaign against the dumping at sea of the Brent Spar oil storage buoy changed not only the policies of oil companies but perceptions of the sea as a limitless waste repository. Environmental movements have stimulated and mediated the concerns of the wider public, and reflected and amplified concerns originating in scientific and policy communities. At least intermittently, they have succeeded in sensitizing mass publics and decision-makers to environmental issues that would not otherwise have been so salient. For the most part, it is EMOs that have set the agenda of environmental reform and succeeded in framing the issues as matters of global collective responsibility.

As environmental issues move up political agendas, EMOs may struggle to meet the expectations of others, and, unable to participate effectively in high politics, they may be drawn back to the grassroots. Environmental movements have been the most durable of the new social movements and so they are likely to remain.

SEE ALSO: Advocacy networks; Civil society; Culture and social movements; Framing and social movements; Grassroots movements; Greenpeace; Organizations and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Formal models and computer simulations

PAMELA OLIVER

A formal model is a mathematical representation of some single process, in this case a process that is believed to be common and important in at least some social movements. Closely related are computer simulation models that link multiple mathematical expressions to represent different actors or types of actors in a system. This type of modeling is different from empirical statistical modeling, in which there is a data set of cases and variables, and regression techniques are used to estimate the coefficients for predicting dependent variables from independent variables. Instead, the “data” are all internal to the model itself. However, the results of empirical studies may be used to inform the nature of the mathematical relations or the numerical parameters in the model. An important sub-type of computer simulation models is agent-based simulations in which each actor’s behavior is a function of a set of mathematical relations, the expressions determining one actor’s behavior are in part a function of other actors’ behavior, and the computer program generates the interactions among these actors over time. Some formal or computer models express determinate relations in which the same inputs will always produce the same results. Many models contain probabilistic elements, in which the mathematical expressions increase or decrease the probability that a given action will be taken; probabilistic models yield different results each time they are run, and analysis of them focuses on the distribution of possible outcomes for a given set of inputs.

Mathematical and computer simulation models seek to represent processes or relationships at an abstract and simplified level so that their dynamics can be investigated in a rigorous and systematic way. The results of these investigations sometimes prove illuminating for understanding the dynamics in real social movements. In fields such as engineering, where there is accumulated research about relatively invariant physical relationships and well-defined measures of inputs and outputs, formal models can generate reasonably accurate predictions for the behavior of specific empirical systems. There is generally insufficient empirical or theoretical base to do this in the study of social movements, but scholars are trying to move in this direction. No formal model can represent the full messy complexity of a real social movement, or even of a real protest event or campaign. However, some formal models have provided theoretical insights about movement processes and have pointed to important distinctions among types of movements. Some formal models have generated empirical predictions that have been supported. In other cases, the failure to gain support for empirical predictions has led to the refinement and improvement of formal models.

Because formal models concern abstract processes, many models concern processes that occur in social movements but not only in social movements, and there are a great many different kinds of formal models that can provide potential insight to movement dynamics. Those with the most direct ties to social movements include: (1) decision models of collective action and contributions to collective or public goods; (2) multi-actor models of strategic interaction, including both game theory and models of regime-movement interactions, as well as models of the spread of violence between groups and models of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies; (3) influence models of public opinion or ideological change; (4) models of the assembly or dispersal or crowds and gatherings, including emergency evacuations; and (5) models of contagion and diffusion of movement events or tactics. There are growing
fruitful collaborations between social scientists with deep empirical knowledge of social movement processes and systems analysts and computer programmers with the technical skills needed for writing complex dynamic simulation models. Examples of empirical problems that have been addressed using these methods include generating cooperation for improving the environment, how identities are constructed, ethnic conflict, protest-repression dynamics, and the spread of new ideas.

SEE ALSO: Collective (public) goods; Contagion theory; Critical mass theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Diffusion and scale shift; Experimental methods; Free rider problem; Networks and social movements; Protest cycles and waves; Rational choice theory and social movements; Repression and social movements; Selective incentives; Tactical interaction and innovation.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Genocide and mass killing are a tragic yet recurrent feature of modern human history, having occurred across a broad range of societies. This extreme form of social violence has accordingly become a major subject of interest for social scientists, who have generated a wide variety of explanatory models for why violence occurs and how it spreads over time. However, few empirical or theoretical works have explored the specific roles that social movements have played within historical cases. Genocides and other forms of mass violence often occur in contexts of highly contentious interactions between movement organizations and political institutions. These interactions potentially range from open conflict and violence between official institutions and movements, to exploitation and assimilation, and collaboration and mutual aid. Empirical evaluations of how social movements work within historical cases of genocide and mass killing would undoubtedly improve existing explanatory models for why and how such violence occurs. In order to provide impetus for such an endeavor, we first offer four examples of how movements have historically operated within cases of genocide, and then identify existing areas of social movement theory and research which we believe are useful for further analyses.

One such form of movement–state interaction occurs when successful mobilization by a political opposition movement becomes linked by official institutions with an entire social collectivity. The first critical process here is the creation of official panic. In contexts where state institutions are already weak or imperiled, such as civil war or economic collapse, engagement in contentious collective action by movements may generate a sense of grave threat within dominant political institutions. The second critical process is the linking of the threat posed by a movement and a social group. This connection may arise through claims made by movement representatives, through imputation by official institutional channels, or by members of the domestic population themselves. Genocide and mass killing are more likely to occur when these two processes culminate in a third process: the collective aggregation of the domestic population with the threat, whether real or perceived, posed by the movement.

This form of interaction was likely operative during the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Young Turk regime. Faced with deteriorating military conditions along its border with Russia, the regime struggled to maintain the empire’s territorial and political integrity. In this context, the successful mobilization of Armenian nationalist organizations in central and eastern Anatolia was seen by the Young Turk regime as a threat to their own ethno-nationalist goals. Viewing the entire Armenian population as potential supporters of the separatist movement, the Young Turk regime quickly escalated its policies from compromise to mass deportations and executions (Mann 2005). A similar series of events precipitated the 1994 Rwandan genocide. After an invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a nationalist army based in neighboring Uganda, the Hutu Power government engaged in a strident media campaign linking the domestic Tutsi population with the threatening nationalist mobilization. Violence against the Tutsi population was thus enabled through this linkage between a threatening militant movement and a domestic population, framed as presenting a mortal threat to Rwandan society (Straus 2006).

Another form of interaction occurs when the structures of existing state institutions are threatened by movements demanding
significant social, economic, or political reforms. In order to protect existing power arrangements and deflect attempts by opposition movements to gain a political foothold, states may resort to policies of nationalist war and mass violence against a domestic or foreign population. Similar to the form of interaction above, such a pattern of action is more likely in times of political, economic, or social upheaval, when movements may present real threats to existing institutions. However, unlike the first form of interaction, the threat posed by the movement does not become generalized toward a social collectivity. Rather, state institutions attempt to rally the nation around a pre-existing social conflict, often framed in “organic” nationalistic terms (Mann 2005), and in doing so attempt to demobilize and delegitimate political opposition. Mass violence thus becomes driven, in part, by the need for official institutions to protect themselves from collective challenges to their power and legitimacy by constraining the options of social movements.

This form of interaction may have been one condition that led to genocide and ethnic cleansing in Eastern Europe during the 1990s. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbian and Croatian leaders faced mounting domestic pressures from domestic movements seeking a variety of democratic and economic reforms. As conflict brewed between these nations over issues of national sovereignty and territorial rights, these opposition movements presented increasingly successful challenges through both electoral campaigns and contentious protest. Gagnon (2004) argues that the desire of political elites in Serbia and Croatia to maintain their holds on power led to a specific strategy of demobilization that incorporated, but was not driven by, pre-existing ethnic identities and distinctions. Violence, rather than arising from grassroots “ethnic” sentiments, was used by elites “to change what it means to identify as Serb or Croat and to impose an equivalence between ethnic identity and political position – in other words, a political homogeneity” (Gagnon 2004: xviii). The political construction of this equivalence constrained the options of opposition movements, framing them as potentially “traitors” to an organically Serb or Croat nation.

A third form of interaction occurs when a movement successfully exploits gaps or breakdowns in official institutional power to advance its own social or political agenda. When state power is divided or weak, movements may be able to exploit such a political vacuum by attempting to elevate their own goals and strategies to the level of officially sanctioned practice. A movement may even attempt to make a grab for state power itself, making such an elevation of goals and strategies more certain. This type of interaction contributes to the social formation of genocidal violence when insurgent claims to power and legitimacy become linked with the elimination of some foreign or domestic collectivity, often a rival movement organization. Typically, this is a collectivity that has previously engaged in contentious interaction with the successful movement, or otherwise presented itself as an obstruction to the fulfillment of the movement’s goals. Assuming the mantle of official power thus becomes linked with the elimination of political rivalry framed in terms of group membership.

This form of interaction was present in Indonesia during the 1965–1966 mass killings against known and alleged members of Indonesia’s communist party (PKI). Since 1957, Indonesian politics had balanced tensions between nationalist parties and military factions, religious organizations, and the largest communist party in Southeast Asia (PKI). However, this system was shattered by an attempted coup in 1965, which resulted in the deaths of six army generals and severely weakened central state institutions. Stepping into this power gap, a coalition of surviving military leaders and nationalist political parties, led by General Suharto, blamed the coup on the PKI. This coalition then began to incite and coordinate massive violence against known or suspected communist members throughout the country, eventually resulting
in between half a million and two million deaths (Cribb 2001). This violence was used by the new military regime to consolidate its rule, resulting in the ousting of President Sukarno and the establishment of a military dictatorship under Suharto.

A fourth type of interaction occurs when a movement collectively engages in mass violence on behalf of an official institution, but without any explicit chain of command or set of orders to account for the occurrence of mass violence. In cases such as these, violence arises collectively on the part of a social movement’s members, but only after the violence has been somehow sanctioned by official institutions as both necessary and legitimate. This is most likely to occur among state-sponsored movement organizations, but the most important aspect of such interaction is that a movement looks to official institutions for both inspiration and support for its claims and actions.

Such a form of interaction has been documented in Su’s (2011) study of collective violence in rural China during the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution itself was an extraordinary instance of political mobilization, involving appeals by Mao Zedong for collective mobilization against existing state party leaders and institutions, framed by hardcore supporters as reformist and counterrevolutionary. Focusing on the effects this call to mobilization had within various rural communities, Su finds that violence did not emerge from a specific policy or set of orders given to local movements. Rather, violence emerged collectively at the community level, as local movement participants interpreted the state’s call for a “war” against all “class enemies” as a legitimation of collective violence. This violence was directed against individuals, and their families, previously implicated as involved in exploitative practices during the Great Leap Forward. Rather than emerging from a “master plan” of the state, violence thus emerged as an indirect, collective outcome of interactions between a distant state apparatus and local movement participants.

Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. First, we must note that these four examples are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Indeed, it is certain that similar but distinct forms of interaction have occurred, and that multiple forms of interactions may coexist in many historical cases, but are too numerous to list here. It is also important to note that these kinds of interactions are never sufficient on their own to create genocidal violence. We do not argue here for a direct causal relationship between such movement–state interactions and the occurrence of genocidal violence; genocide and mass killing are complex outcomes of numerous social and political factors which are rarely sufficient on their own (Fein 1993). Rather, we point to such forms of interaction as important context-setting conditions that deserve greater analytic attention. In addition, we argue that such an exploration would provide a useful site of juncture between the study of social and political movements and social scientific explanations for genocide and mass violence.

In encouraging further study of these forms of interaction, we suggest that several existing areas of social movement theory and research provide useful “jumping-off” points. As noted above, particular social collectivities must become linked in some fashion with emergent threats or social problems in order for mass violence to be possible. Such a construction and avowal of “otherness,” assembled in opposition to a shared sense of “we-ness,” has been a defining feature of the study of collective identity (Snow 2001), particularly in its relation to social movements (Polletta & Jasper 2001). In order for such emergent and dynamic identities to become linked with plans of action that lead to mass victimization, framing processes must link these identities together by identifying a problem posed by a particular collectivity, and suggesting lines of action necessary to remedy the problem – in this case, the removal of the collectivity in some fashion (Hunt, Benford, & Snow 1994). Finally, the study of political opportunities, and their relation to mobilization and movement
outcomes, should inform further study of the processes and mechanisms underlying how and when movements and official institutions interact in specific ways (McAdam 1996).

SEE ALSO: Framing and social movements; Identity fields; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; State breakdown and social movements; State-sponsored social movements; Threat; Violence and social movements; War and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Gray zone of politics and social movements

JAVIER AUYERO

The clandestine connections between state actors and perpetrators of collective violence define the gray zone of politics (Auyero 2007). What Tilly (2003) calls “violent specialists” – that is, actors who specialize in inflicting physical damage – play a key, though sometimes not quite discernible, role in the origins and the course of collective violence. Some of these specialists (police and soldiers, for example) are part of the state apparatus; some others (think thugs, gangs, and vigilante groups), however, enjoy important but oftentimes illicit connections with established power-holders. The notion of the gray zone of politics challenges the easy and simplistic state–society distinctions that most of literature on collective action still takes for granted (among government agents, repressive forces, challengers, polity members, etc.).

Boundaries between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics are oftentimes permeable and blurry (Goldstone 2003). State institutions and political parties are often deeply penetrated by social movements. Far from being separate domains, institutional politics and movement actions are deeply intertwined. Groups and individuals who engage in protest (violent or not) may also, later in time, work for political parties, run for office, or occupy government posts to pursue their goals. The very same people can be “outsiders” – sometimes engaging in illegal or violent protest – and, soon after, “insiders” – actively participating in institutional politics (the ANC in South Africa or the Workers Party in Brazil are good examples). The notion of the gray zone highlights the fact that the lines between insurgents and state agents and party activists are also dissolving in the opposite direction. Party activists, local leaders with well-oiled connections with established power-holders, and/or state agents (police) may accept (and sometimes encourage and direct) collective violence (as in the recent “food riots” in Argentina (Auyero 2007)). The gray zone blurs the lines between institutional and noninstitutionalized politics, making the latter seem simply a mode of the former.

The relationship between clandestine political connections, collective violence, and social movements has been the subject of increasing scholarly attention. For example, research on the origins and forms of communal violence in Southeast Asia has highlighted the hidden links between partisan politics and collective violence (Das 1990). Brass’s notion of “institutionalized riot systems” appositely describes these obscure connections. In these riot systems, Brass (1997: 12) points out that, “known actors specialize in the conversion of incidents between members of different communities into ethnic riots. The activities of these specialists, who operate under the loose control of party leaders, are usually required for a riot to spread from the initial incident of provocation.” Kakar’s (1996) analysis of a pehlwan, a wrestler/enforcer who works for a political boss, further illustrates this point: the genesis of many episodes of collective violence is located in the area where the actions of political actors and those specialists in violence secretly meet and enmesh.

Wilkinson’s (2004) study is perhaps the most systematic examination to date of the connections between party politics (electoral competition) and collective violence (ethnic riots). He convincingly shows that:

Ethnic riots, far from being relatively spontaneous eruptions of anger, are often planned by politicians for a clear electoral purpose. They are best thought of as a solution to the problem of how to change the salience of ethnic issues and identities
among the electorate in order to build a winning political coalition. (2004: 1)

Throughout his detailed and insightful study, Wilkinson calls attention to the instances in which political elites instigate riots in order to win elections and brings to the fore what is often the state’s complicity in failing to prevent violence. The state’s response, he argues, is very much conditioned by the “instructions” that politicians give to other state officials telling them “whether to protect or not protect minorities” (2004: 65–85). In other words, political elites and organizers often “incite” violence and prevent repressive forces from responding once riots break out.

Historical accounts of “race riots” in the United States also point to a similar dynamic between members of established political parties and the instigation (or not) of collective violence. Abu-Lughod (2007), for example, documents the attacks committed by the Ragen’s Colts – young party hacks who were financially supported by Frank Ragen, a well-known Democratic Cook County commissioner – on African-Americans during the 1919 riots in Chicago. Years later, during the 1943 riots in Detroit, whites who attacked blacks could count “on police protection and even assistance” (2007: 148).

That party leaders and/or state officials might be “behind” – rather than against – such episodes of collective violence should hardly surprise students of Latin American politics. In a detailed study of “la violencia” – the wave of political violence that killed 200,000 people in Colombia in the 1940s and 1950s – historian Roldán shows that in the state of Antioquia “partisan conflict provided the initial catalyst to violence” (2002: 22). She argues that not only did state bureaucrats “promote” the violence that shocked the region but that police and even mayors themselves actively participated in the partisan attacks. Political elites, she points out, did not simply tolerate or instigate the violence; they were its perpetrators. While party members organized attacks on places and peoples, the police acted as partisan shock troops. In words that should ring true to those studying political violence in other parts of the world, Roldán states that: “while many citizens attributed the escalation of violence to the absence of official forces, these forces were so often the perpetrators of violence between 1946 and 1949 that one wonders why anyone bothered to suggest that the presence of the authorities could have been of much help” (2002: 82). Clandestine ties, Roldán demonstrates, outlast specific episodes of violence and show durable, structure-like, properties.

Ethnographic work by Gunst (1995) in Jamaica and Arias (2006) in Brazil provide further evidence of the collusion between state actors, members of political parties, and violent entrepreneurs such as gang members who are associated with the drug trade. Finally, Luis Astorga’s (2005) historical reconstruction of the intertwining of the political field with the field of illicit drug production and trafficking in twentieth-century Mexico offers another excellent example of the (concealed and often illegal) connections between actors inside and actors outside of the official political system – relations that must be rigorously examined if we are to explain seemingly random upsurges of violence – both past and present.

What do all these cases have in common? They all portray the activation of clandestine connections among political actors well-entrenched within the polity and others located outside of it. When faced with the gray zone of politics most of the categories that we, scholars of collective action, routinely operate with (categories that are very much informed by empirical analyses carried out in the United States and Europe) proved useless, if not misleading. As much as the literature agrees that the interactions between political elites, agents of social control, and protagonists of joint action matter, these remain discrete entities. The imaginary political anthropology of social movement and collective action scholarship lives in a world in which there are clear boundaries between insurgents and authorities, dissidents or challengers and state actors, located in different regions of the social and
political space (as in the “protest side” and the “repression side”). There is an almost complete silence about the possible participation of authorities in the direct promotion of mobilization and/or the straightforward perpetration of collective violence. In part, the notion of the gray zone of clandestinity seeks to address this problem by calling attention to the existing continuities between state actions, routine politics, and extraordinary massive action.

Political analysts should do a better job at integrating “gray zone” relations into the study of “normal” politics. Inattention to these clandestine connections has analogous effects to the inattentiveness to “informal institutions” noted by political scientists Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. In both cases, political analysis “risks missing much of what drives political behavior and can hinder efforts to explain important political phenomena” (2004: 725). Rather than dismissing them as aberrant phenomena or denouncing them on moralistic grounds, the challenge for a proper social scientific analysis is to factor such usually robust relations into our standard models of political action, an analytic integration that should, in turn, allow us to better incorporate violence into the study of popular politics.

SEE ALSO: Riots; Social control; Social control errors; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Green Movement in Iran
HAMID REZAI

Like analysts of Iran during the 1970s, current observers of Iranian politics overwhelmingly described the outbreak of massive protests in the aftermath of the controversial presidential election on June 12, 2009, known as the Green Movement, as surprising and unpredictable. Yet many actors on the ground accurately anticipated the post-election turbulence. Shortly before the election, as rumors about possible election fraud spread through text-messaging and online media, masses of supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, two presidential candidates in the race against incumbent Mahmood Ahmadinejad, shouted slogans such as “agar taqallob besheh Iran qiamat misheh,” or “if there has been cheating [in the election], Iran will explode” (Fassihi 2009). When state officials declared Ahmadinejad as the clear winner the next day, claiming that he had received 62 percent of the votes, millions of Iranians poured into the streets shouting “r’aye man kojast?” or “where is my vote?” to express outrage over what they perceived to be electoral fraud. Since then, many protesters across Iran have been killed and thousands arrested. Several hundred activists have left the country to escape state repression.

The Green Movement is the result of intensifying elite divisions that have existed in the Iranian polity since the 1980s. While fragmentation among the elite was contained by the immediate interference of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the unifying leader of the 1979 revolution, the absence of his charismatic authority since the 1990s has increasingly factionalized the Islamic Republic and shaped the nature of popular contention in Iran.

The political environment for collective mobilization since the 1979 revolution may be divided into the following four settings: (1) consolidation, war, and repression (1979–1988, the Khomeini era); (2) postwar reconstruction and economic liberalization (1989–1997, the tenure of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani); (3) reform and political opening (1997–2005, the tenure of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami); and (4) mobilization in the context of increasingly violent repression (2005–present, the tenure of President Mahmood Ahmadinejad).

After the genocidal massacre of dissidents and the destruction of oppositional political organizations in the 1980s, civil societies and associations re-emerged gradually due to the changing political environment and emerging opportunities since the early 1990s. The available opportunities provided by the increasing fragmentation of the ruling elite and the ideological transformation of many high-ranking state officials into staunch proponents of reform generated a semi-free public sphere that led to the emergence of hundreds of associations and organizations and the publication of a plethora of critical books, journals, and dailies.

The limited electoral competition and the subsequent electoral manipulation and repression utilized by the radical Islamist faction of
the regime to exclude other competitors from the polity provided a unique opportunity for other factions within the state to mobilize the streets for their objectives. The Iranian Green Movement is the meeting point of many actors and strata of Iranian society that have been targets of repression by the Islamic state since its inception. This permissible but limited contesting space allowed women, workers, students, teachers, and secular and religious intellectuals to find allies in the elite. The ongoing elite struggle over power and the ultimate attempt of the radical Islamists to use violence to oust all other factions from the polity compelled many reformists to take to the streets as a last resort in their negotiations with the Islamic state. Regimes that use force to restrict political rights after a long and sustained period of opening risk eliciting resistance from dissidents who have already gained organizational resources to challenge the state’s violent closing (Tarrow 1998; Goldstone & Tilly 2001). As noted above, the tenures of Rafsanjani and Khatami (1989–2005) were accompanied by significant economic and political changes that led to a relative liberalization (Bayat 2007).

If the protests in the aftermath of the controversial election were predictable, they had surprising consequences for both the state and its dissidents. The state witnessed the oceanic outbreak, diffusion, and radicalization of the Green Movement. Dissidents experienced the brutality of the regime’s repressive measures against activists. Regardless of the potential long-term outcomes of state/dissident interactions in Iran, in the short term radical Islamists violently restricted the political environment for dissident activism, and protesters moved from the reformist slogans of “where is my vote?” to demanding radical changes, including the removal of the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. As the regime increases its repressive measures against street demonstrations, activists of the green movements employ online publications, and meetings at the universities, in their homes, and other venues to reduce the cost of their struggle for change.

SEE ALSO: Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979; Islamic movements; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Hooliganism
REN VLIEGENTHART

The study of hooliganism – violence committed by sport fans – has been an isolated area of academic inquiry (Spaaij & Anderson 2010), despite the fact that scholars with varying backgrounds have studied the phenomena. Sociological (Dunning 2000), anthropological (Marsh 1978), and psychological (Armstrong 1998) explanations for the occurrence of hooliganism have been given. These explanations too often emphasize the irrational character of the violent behavior: hooligans are considered to be outrageous, emotional, and involved in a highly ritualized act. In many respects, these assumptions about violent fans resemble the psychological and “convergence” explanations made about participants in protests and riots in the 1960s. However, while social movement scholars have since considered alternative explanations for participation in protests, and even riots, such as shared mobilizing grievances, students of hooliganism have until recently not considered fan violence as inspired by such motivations. This is unfortunate, since oftentimes hooliganism could well be driven by grievances and the urge to express them.

In most cases, hooliganism involves more or less organized groups trying to initiate fights with rival groups. The aims of these fights are twofold. First, hooligans try to humiliate the competing gangs that support other club teams. Second, hooligans use violence to attract attention for their social background and to express grievances related to their social position (Dunning, Murphy, & Waddington 2002).

Interestingly, most of the research considers hooliganism as a particularist phenomenon and does not incorporate theoretical or empirical insights from studies of other types of collective violence. Additionally, most studies focus on the question why hooliganism occurs (at all), rather than on the question of how its occurrence and intensity differs across time and space. Much of the empirical work is qualitative and consists of detailed accounts of violent events, often relating to soccer matches in European countries, and mainly the United Kingdom.

Recently, several authors have explicitly argued that hooliganism should be conceptualized as a form of collective action (Tilly 2003; Collins 2008). This suggestion provides an opportunity to integrate theories that are widely applied in the study of social movements and collective action. In line with this idea, Spaaij and Anderson (2010) propose a holistic model to explain fan violence. This model includes: (1) macro-level variables, such as the political, social, economic, and cultural context; (2) meso-level variables, such as habitus and fan cultures and identities, which are argued to mediate the influence of macro-level variables on the occurrence of hooliganism; and (3) a wide set of individual and collective actor variables that moderate the relations between macro-level and meso-level phenomena and the occurrence of hooliganism. These variables include characteristics of individual participants, the responses by authorities and media, and the aggressive behavior by sport players on the pitch.

Recent empirical studies offer support for the usefulness of considering hooliganism as a form of collective action. Braun and Vliegenthart (2008), for example, find that over time variation in the occurrence of violence by Dutch soccer fans can be explained by deteriorating economic conditions, attention for hooliganism in the media, and social learning. Especially the latter explanation, focusing on the role of soccer players, turns out to be a very strong one: aggressive behavior on the pitch increases the likelihood of violent fan behavior after the match. In another study, Braun and Vliegenthart (2009) integrate these explanations in
a diffusion framework and demonstrate that, like many other types of collective action, variation in hooliganism, both over time as well as geographically, can be well explained by considering it a specific type of innovation.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Convergence/dispositional theory; Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Diffusion and scale shift; Grievances, individual and mobilizing; Participation in social movements; Riots; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Institutional theory and social movements

MARC SCHNEIBERG

During the 1990s, institutionalists studying emergence and change became dissatisfied with theories that stressed contextual sources of stability, path dependence, and conformity, and looked to overcome “excessive determinism” by integrating social movement research with institutional analysis. Bridging these two bodies of work transformed understandings of institutional processes, actors, and structures. It added contestation, collective action, framing, and mobilization for alternatives to theoretical inventories of isomorphism, legitimation, and diffusion. It juxtaposed challengers and advocates of alternatives to states and professionals as key actors. It shifted from images of isomorphic settings characterized by path dependence, conformity, and taken-for-grantedness to concepts of fields as sites of contestation, organized around multiple and competing logics (Davis & Thompson 1994; Davis et al. 2005; Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006; Schneiberg & Lounsbury 2008; King & Pierce 2010; Fligstein & McAdam 2011). This work has employed three broad analytical strategies for linking social movements and institutions to explain change.

MOVEMENTS “OUTSIDE” INSTITUTIONS: SEQUENTIAL PROCESSES

One strategy preserves a bright line between movements, contestation, and deliberate mobilization for change, on the one hand, and institutional dynamics like diffusion, legitimation, and taken-for-grantedness, on the other. It takes movements as “extra-institutional forces” that arise outside – or on the peripheries – of established fields, acting as outsider-challengers to assert new visions of order, disrupt existing arrangements, and secure policies from established authorities to realize those visions. Moreover, it understands movements and institutional dynamics as distinct forces, producing change or path creation either side by side, or as stages in a broader sequence of transformative dynamics. Mobilization, disruption, and asserting new visions evoke contestation within fields over competing logics, public hearings, and debates, and political settlements in the form of new policies and institutions, followed or paralleled by conventional institutional processes of theorization, endorsement by professions, and diffusion (Schneiberg & Soule 2005; Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006).

Such a strategy illuminates whole classes of cases (Schneiberg & Lounsbury 2008). As they mobilized for alternatives to corporate capitalism in the United States, agrarians and independent producers won antitrust policies that disrupted existing market institutions and sparked struggles over market governance, fueling new strategies and regulatory settlements that became codified as best practices, diffused across firms and states, and stabilized new market orders. Civil rights activists fought for equality, securing antidiscrimination laws that created profound uncertainty for employers, prompting theorizing and claims-making by legal and human resource professionals, the codification and diffusion of compliance strategies, and their endorsement by the courts. Waves of environmental mobilization evoked scandal, struggles over competing institutions and legislative activity, prompting shifts in discourse, theorization, and new forms of conventional conflicts among nonprofits, state agencies, and firms. Nor are mobilization-disruption-institutionalization sequences confined to the state. Shareholder activists, anti-corporate groups, and others have mobilized boycotts, takeover threats, and other disruptive tactics against corporations and universities, fueling the development and diffusion of “lean and mean” corporation, black studies
program, and more (Davis & Thompson 1994; Rojas 2006; King 2008).

Understanding how movements mobilize outside fields to contest existing institutions opens up the black boxes of canonical punctuated equilibrium or two-stage models of change. It sheds important light on the sources and dynamics of “pre-institutional” events – shocks, the appearance of innovations – that spark conventional institutional processes of diffusion, endorsement, and legitimation. It also supports a view of institutions as settlements of political contests over the nature and boundaries of fields (Armstrong 2005) – settlements which reflect challenger mobilization for alternatives, and which themselves often combine conflicting logics and contradictions in uneasy truces, laying structural foundations for subsequent mobilization.

MOVEMENTS WITHIN INSTITUTIONS/MOVEMENTS AS INSTITUTIONAL FORCES

A second strategy draws parallels rather than bright lines between movements and institutional processes (Campbell 2005), focusing on how movements mobilize for change within – and with – existing channels, institutions, and power structures. Movements mobilize outside systems to directly oppose existing orders, create legitimacy crises, and disrupt institutions. But they also work to change systems incrementally from within by engaging in conventional institutional processes, by reconstructing the classification, regulatory, and organizational pillars of institutions, and by drawing on existing institutions and taken-for-granted understandings to theorize, articulate, and combine new alternatives with prevailing systems. Here, movements themselves become vehicles for theorization, recombination, and other institutional processes inside fields and organizations (Zald & Berger 1978), often bypassing states and conventional politics entirely.

Scholars highlight four ways movements serve as institutional forces within fields. First, movements mobilize in the system as agents of theorization, classification, and diffusion (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch 2003; Rao, Monin, & Durand 2003; Weber, Heinz, & DeSoucey 2008). By entering policy debates, theorizing waste as commodity, and working in universities to provide students and managers arguments for recycling, environmental activists transformed cultural beliefs and industry discourse about waste, enabling the diffusion of recycling. Similarly, by developing new codes and classifications, insider-champions of nouvelle cuisine and grass-fed beef and dairy, respectively, helped reconstitute the field of gastronomy from within, fostering the spread of new cuisines, and carved out new market niches within the organic foods industry. In effect, movements worked as insiders to reconstruct the “cognitive pillars” of fields through cultural practices familiar to framing scholars.

Second, movements foster change by exploiting the presence of multiple logics and contradictions, working inside fields or organizations as agents of recombination, assembly, and transposition (Clemens 1997; Creed, Scully, & Austin 2002). GLBT activists, for example, gained leverage for reform as firm insiders by simultaneously coming out and fitting in. They articulated domestic partner benefits with civil rights frames, values of fairness, corporate social responsibility, and concerns with competitiveness, while weaving casual mentions of everyday lives and experiences with same-sexed partners into conversations with colleagues to normalize difference and activate listeners’ identities as unprejudiced persons.

Third, movements promote reform by forging, participating in, and becoming part of private regulatory systems, rating, and ranking, and certification schemes (Bartley 2007; King & Pierce 2010). Environmental and anti-sweatshop activists were pivotal in creating certification schemes for sustainable agriculture in forestry and fair labor practices in apparel, reconstructing the normative and regulative pillars of these fields, and mobilizing
those pillars to reshape market forces. Such schemes are increasingly common in transnational settings.

Fourth, movements reconstitute fields from within as “organization generating organizations” that re-populate settings with economic and political forms that embody new logics (Clemens 1997; Rao, Morrill, & Zald 2000; Schneiberg, King, & Smith 2008; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert 2009). Movements do this directly, by creating new organizations and providing them with resources, templates, and technical expertise, and indirectly, by promoting favorable regulation and normative environments. Through these means, movements have fostered new forms of political representation, independent power producers, systems of cooperative, mutual, and public alternatives to corporations, and new classes of food producers, breweries, and restaurants.

Scholars recognize that movements can couple conventional institutional efforts within fields with extra-institutional tactics of disruption and polarization, creating separate organizations for each approach. Yet mobilizing as outsiders to disrupt institutions is not all movements do. Some even eschew open confrontation entirely to pursue change incrementally from within, sometimes quite effectively, prompting a rethinking of how movements and institutions relate and this second broad strategy for analyzing how they produce change.

MOVEMENTS, INSTITUTIONS, INTERACTION EFFECTS

A third strategy addresses how mobilization and institutions interact to produce change. It takes institutions as contexts for movements, enhancing or weakening movement effects on change. It also takes movements as contexts for institutional processes, supporting or undermining theorization and the diffusion of alternatives.

The first line of work extends political opportunity structure arguments about elite allies and the like to consider how other features of institutional contexts enhance or dampen movement effects (Davis & Thompson 1994; Soule & Olzak 2004; King 2008; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert 2009). Movements may be more effective – better able to translate numbers, resources, or actions into changes in policy or organization – depending on prevailing discourse, public opinion or norms, the stages of policy processes, how far changes have diffused in nearby regions or fields, and whether authority structures are multilevel or fragmented. Institutions are conditions for social movements.

The second line of work inverts this imagery to consider how movements are political conditions for institutional processes like diffusion (Briscoe & Safford 2008; Schneiberg & Lounsberry 2008). Incumbents often contest new forms. Under these conditions, new forms will spread slowly, if at all, and diffusion effects will be absent, unless movements for change mobilize to support those forms. Mobilization provides political cover for alternatives, rendering firms and states more receptive to others’ examples, while increasing the broadcast strength of early adopters (Strang & Soule 1998). Movements thus enable diffusion and the institutionalization of alternatives that would otherwise be stillborn.

CONCLUSION

The engagement between social movement and institutional theory has been a productive one. It has yielded new imageries of change – imageries of movements working inside and outside states, organizations, and established fields that seem particularly suited for increasingly transnational worlds and reconfigured relations between states and societies. It has evoked some provocative new ways of linking structure, agency, and action. And it has given a lie to worries about the lack of empirical research on movement outcomes by documenting how movements effect change, whether in a sequence with institutional dynamics, as institutional forces
themselves, or in interaction with institutional processes.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Discursive fields; Environmental movements; Fields of contention; Framing and social movements; Movements within institutions/organizations; Multiorganizational fields; Organizations and movements; Outcomes, cultural; Outcomes, political; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Social change and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

The study of Muslim women is one of the most challenging and contentious topics of inquiry in political and social movement studies. Muslim women have long been stereotyped as oppressed, passive recipients of patriarchy, religion, and politics, rather than as active figures in their own right. Motivated by the overwhelming absence of women as subjects in the literature, the last two decades have witnessed an upsurge in critical scholarship exploring women’s roles as organizers of and participants in movement activity in various locales across the globe.

The term “Islamic women’s movements” (IWMs) may incorporate a large spectrum of Muslim women’s groups, including (but not limited to) Islamist women’s movements (those who perceive Islam to be a total social, political, and economic system meant to inform all aspects of society), Muslim or Islamic feminist movements (those who view Islam as fully supportive of women’s rights, and who prioritize gender in their movement goals), and secular Muslim women’s movements (those whose members self-identify as Muslims but whose activities are not necessarily framed by religion). Analyses of women’s collective action in both “formal” and “informal” contexts have raised issues of how political activity may be construed in “unusual places” (Peshkova 2009), and have seriously challenged underlying notions about politics being conceived as what only men do in formally recognized institutional settings. IWMs may organize through charitable societies, government-sponsored committees, religious study groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), human rights and development organizations, and women-only branches or affiliates of male-run organizations. The issues that IWMs tackle include reforming personal status laws based on sharia, or Islamic law, which govern the terms of marriage, divorce, child custody, mediation, inheritance, and alimony. IWMs tend not to challenge the existence of sharia as a framework for law; rather, groups focus on reforming it to be “correct and more authentic” (Warrick 2009). IWMs also address political corruption, poverty alleviation, democratization, education, social services, women’s access to mosques, violence, and many other topics.

Women’s dress has also become a focal point of protest, especially during periods of forced hair- and face-covering or uncovering by the state or Islamist groups. Because Islam is readily used as an excuse for gender inequities in the status quo, IWMs of all kinds strategically locate their missions and activities within a religiously viable discourse and engage in Islamic interpretation, or *ijtihad*. Uncovering the contexts and meanings of the Koran and hadiths (narrations describing the words and deeds of the Prophet) are at the core of women’s epistemological struggle to legitimize their desired sociopolitical reforms. This project involves critical examinations of the sources of religious knowledge and authority, and the manner in which texts have been used to bolster practices that women deem to be unjust, discriminatory, and contradictory to Islam. These new gender hermeneutics have resulted in a gendered historicization of Islam, a critique of hegemonic Islamic discourses, and their applications to law and culture. This does not necessarily involve a rejection of “tradition” outright, but rather a recognition that “new orthodoxies emerge through changing relations of power” (Moll 2009), and that – in the postmodernist vein – “tradition” is actually a series of *traditions* having different implications for women. Gendered readings of the Koran and hadiths also use the Prophet’s wives...
and female descendants as examples of women leading in business, politics, and piety. As some interpretations note, mothers have had a privileged status in the Koran, which has led some IWMs to emphasize the protection of mothers (and potential mothers) through improved education, health services, and rights as being originally intended by the faith. In this way, Islamic feminists directly challenge patriarchal frameworks and strategically use religious discourse to argue for reforms also in agreement with tenets of secular liberalism. In order to bolster their positions, IWMs assert that their interpretation of Islam – one that typically lends itself to an improvement in women’s status – is the most authentic, valid, and indigenous manifestation of their religion.

IWMs have organized and created formal associations, organized public protests, and produced printed publications since the turn of the twentieth century. While popular movements occasionally arose in response to massive political crises, these associations were typically made up of urban, upper-class women tackling issues of social welfare, suffrage, and restrictions on elite women’s dress. The relationship between IWM mobilization and nationalist struggles – referred to as the “honorable door” for women to engage in public activism and to “earn” emancipation (Fleischmann 1999) – has been complex. Nationalist movements throughout the formerly colonized world have always recruited women to their cause, relying on them as foot soldiers in liberation efforts. Both sides have recognized that women’s status lies at the heart of defining what kind of nation theirs should become. Women’s grievances about their treatment under colonialism and apartheid inspired many to form their own women-specific branches of the nationalist struggle. However, in most cases, male-dominated nationalist movements pressured women to address national liberation first, and to leave the issue of women’s rights for after the revolution. Any acknowledgment by IWMs of existing patriarchy in nationalist platforms resulted in accusations of betrayal. As in the case of Algeria, women have typically seen a swift reversal of their hard-won rights in postcolonial regimes. However, engagement in nationalist struggles (which, for some groups, continues at the time of this writing) has created numerous political opportunities for women to merge ideas of gender equality with the national project, and to demand, sometimes successfully, that women’s status be addressed in nationalist charters.

Islamist women have also been prominent in supporting the activities of male-dominated Islamist organizations since the founding of these oppositional movements critical of nationalist, capitalist, and socialist projects. For example, during the World War II period, the Muslim Sisterhood and the Society of Muslim Women played a vital role in sustaining the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt during periods of state crackdown. IWMs engaged in resistance activities by relaying messages to imprisoned members, opening their homes to Islamist organizers, and spreading outlawed literature. Scholars have noted that when under threat, male Islamists have forsaken ideals of gender segregation and heavily relied on women to sustain their movements. Interestingly, the stated goals of women Islamist leaders themselves did not address gender liberation per se, but rather the preference that women lead in the home and family – the “private sphere” – instead of in public politics. In recent decades, postcolonial democratic and nondemocratic states, powerful Islamists, members of the ‘ulama (community of religious scholars), and politicians have been under increasing pressure to heed the calls of women’s movements, due in part to increasing literacy rates, educational attainments and, in some cases, raised political consciousnesses spurred by the presence of NGOs in poor rural areas (such as in Bangladesh). Male-centered Islamist organizations have responded to women’s grassroots mobilization by revising their founding statements about gender roles and stressing women’s importance as individuals with rights in public political life.
Islamic women’s movements

and work (though women and men are still conceived of as having separate and disparate roles).

Relationships of power and domination between the “East” and “West” or “first world” versus “third world” polities have had numerous effects on women’s activities and the study of their movements. Muslim women’s NGOs, for example, necessarily confront a variety of fundamentalisms in many of the areas in which they operate. While not all fundamentalisms are violent or inherently pose the same challenges, the presence of fundamentalist groups necessitates that women’s NGOs respond to the fear that their organizations are neo-imperialistic and anti-Islam. Many IWMs distance themselves from Western feminist organizations, either as a conscious strategy or because of inherent distrust. It should be noted that while some IWMs do self-identify as feminist (nisa’iyah in Arabic), scholars also sometimes impose the term on organizations that do not. Gender-specific issues are not always prioritized or explicitly stated in Muslim women’s movement activity for a variety of reasons, including the desire to avoid crackdowns by the state for engaging in controversial activities. Responses to Western stereotypes also impact movement goals and the research process itself; Jafar (2007) states that women in Pakistan worry about cementing negative stereotypes of their country when addressing violence against women, and may be hesitant to address such issues, particularly in front of foreign observers.

However, IWMs also publically criticize discrimination and brutality justified by Islam; in India, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, and elsewhere, IWMs have utilized the press in order to publicize crimes of rape or child marriage, using individual cases as an impetus for wider legal reform. Researchers submit that Islamic feminisms have been more effective than secular feminist movements in pushing for personal status law reforms because of their privileged “insider” positions within the faith itself (Moll 2009). Of course, not all Muslim women’s movements shun affiliation with the West; as discussed by Ahmadi (2006) the post-Islamic revolution activities of many Iranian women’s organizations have embraced trans-Atlantic ties with Western-affiliated activists. So while distancing one’s organization from non-indigenous influences has become a strategy of survival for many IWMs, it is important to note that this is not the only preferred or successful option for women’s movements. In addition to bridging the gap between various forms of feminism, some IWMs have addressed class and religious barriers by arguing for the right of nonelite men and women and nonbelievers to study and interpret Islam (Shehabuddin 2008).

The divide between activism and scholarship has been nonexistent in the case of many prominent Islamic scholars; for example, Amina Wadud has given many controversial public sermons in Malaysia, the United States, South Africa, and elsewhere that have sparked heated debates about women’s leadership roles in Islam. Her efforts, dubbed a “gender jihad,” have challenged tenets that ban women from praying in mosques and from becoming imams, or prayer leaders (Wadud 2006). Other activist-scholars include (but are hardly limited to) Omaima Abou-Bakr, Asma Afsarrudin, Zainah Anwar, Asma Barlas, Riffat Hassan, and Afsaneh Najmabadi. Such scholarship and activism continues to explore the effects of Islamic women’s movements on political outcomes and social change, as well as to challenge conventional notions about what constitutes feminism, political action, resistance, and agency.

SEE ALSO: Arab Spring; Framing and social movements; Gender and social movements; Islamic movements; Religion and social movements; Women’s movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Israeli social movements
ROTTEM SAGI

Since the founding of the state of Israel, Israeli social movements have paralleled those of Western democracies, but with a concentration of movements that have pressed for national security and religion. In 1948, Israel was established as a Jewish state and was born out of a contested, transnational movement started in 1870, known as Zionism. As a result of its roots in Zionism, the early stages of Israeli government co-opted social movement organizations for the purposes of state building. This created a political system that allowed social movement organizations (SMOs) easy access to the Israeli polity.

EARLY ISRAEL

Israel is governed by a parliamentary system, which gives citizens 18 years and older the right to vote. The 120 available assembly (Knesset) seats are filled through public election and proportional representation. The threshold for proportional representation, currently at 2 percent, has always been low. When no single party has a majority, they must build coalitions to form a government. This highly democratic system of governance is a product of Israel’s social movement beginnings. Not only was the state a product of the Zionism, but it also relied on SMOs to assist in early state-building. Because SMOs were heavily intertwined with the formation of the Israeli government, SMO leaders were often co-opted by the parties and appointed to leadership roles within the government.

Two iconic examples include the farmers’ association and the Histadrut organization. Israeli farmers received privileged status as a result of the belief that their work was a calling, rather than a job. Farmers were viewed as settlers returning to Israel to care for the land. Histadrut, Israel’s oldest labor organization, went beyond the goals of trade unionists and proposed to help build the necessary political and economic institutions in order to develop a sovereign state. The labor federation became deeply intertwined with the political parties. Following the first election, the Labor Party won 57 of the 120 assembly seats revealing the strength of labor movement. The Labor Party was able to hold onto its majority in the Knesset until 1977.

LATER ISRAEL

Following the Six Day War of 1967, Israel experienced massive economic growth and changes in its political environment. An increased sense of security allowed movements flourishing in other parts of the world, such as environmental and feminist movements, to begin airing grievances in Israel. Some of these SMOs relied on the language used by previous social movements, claiming they were not challenging authority, but encouraging Israeli nationalism. The environmental movement organization, Protection for Nature, attempted to foster a love of the country through infusing patriotism into nature activities. However, these SMOs were not able to get the same privileges awarded to previous organizations. For example, feminist organizations originally associated with various political parties, which provided vocational training and day-care services in exchange for political support, detached themselves from the Knesset in the early 1970s when they sought to question male dominance in Israeli society. They attempted to do so using patriotic rhetoric, but began challenging the broader social structure of society.

Over time, it became increasingly difficult for the newer SMOs to realize their goals in the
same way older organizations had. The government began disentangling itself from SMOs, leading to the 1982 Law of Associations, which regulated interest groups by issuing rules for appropriate conduct and requiring all interest groups to register. Although legally citizens were free to form associations, requests could be denied if organizations acted illegally or undermined Israel’s democratic nature.

ISRAELI SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ARAB CONFLICT

Israel’s unique foundation as a small, contested secular Jewish state surrounded by Arab nations has produced powerful SMOs concerned with national security and the role of religion in government. Prior to Israel’s founding, movements pressed for both more pacific and more aggressive approaches to the Arab world. Two-state solution

Though there were always organizations within the state opposing military action against its Arab neighbors, social movements criticizing Israel’s security practices became more prominent after the Six Day War. In 1942, Ihud was founded as a pacifist organization that supported a bi-national solution to the Jewish–Arab struggle. They fought against the creation of Israel as a solely Jewish state and decried military actions against Arabs by Israel, but failed to affect any change and eventually disappeared from the Israeli political scene shortly after the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

After the post-1967 economic boom, the Israeli polity began to change. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 marked a change within Israeli culture. Citizens began to criticize the government for its failings during this surprise attack. The long-standing, liberal-leaning government, led by the Labor Party, began to lose control of the majority of assembly seats and was replaced by the more conservative, right-leaning Likud party. Mustafa and Ghanem (2010) suggest that the rising percentage of Mizrahi (Jews originating from the Middle East or northern Africa) and ultra-Orthodox Jews, who traditionally voted for right-leaning political parties, contributed to the political shift in 1977. Other theorists credit this shift to the changing economic conditions in Israel, the surprise attack in 1973, and the resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir (Yishai 1998).

Demographic, economic, and security changes contributed to electoral volatility and led to more contested SMO politics. During the 1982 Lebanon War, bereaved parents of fallen soldiers began speaking out about the war. Within the first week of the war, several families of fallen soldiers killed in a battle to conquer the Beaufort Post in Lebanon formed a group known as “Beaufort Family.” They claimed the battle was an unnecessary operation and blamed the government for their sons’ deaths. As the war evolved into a long-term attempt to reshape Lebanese politics, activists staged frequent protests. This was unique in that previously such deaths were seen as a justifiable sacrifice but now families began to blame the government. The Soldiers Against Silence, a group of reserve soldiers, and Peace Now joined the Beaufort Family in voicing dissent. Outside of Prime Minister Begin’s home beginning in April 1983 they displayed long lists with names of the casualties and a fatality count. Within three months, the Labor Party, who initially supported the war, called for a withdrawal from Lebanon. After the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon in 1985, the war became known as the “war of choice” distinguishing it from previous wars of necessity (Levy 2010).

Other leftist movements concerned with the Israeli–Arab conflict became increasingly popular over the years. Women in Black (Nashim BeShachor) is one of the more well known examples. Originating in Jerusalem in 1988, this movement was entirely composed of women who sought to end Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These women met every Friday between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. in designated locations around the country and held silent protests. They dressed entirely in black to symbolize the tragedy of Israelis and
Palestinians. These women held up signs: black octagons that read “Stop the Occupation” (Helman & Rapoport 1997).

**Religious, right-wing, and settlers’ movements**

During the Six Day War, Israel captured a number of neighboring territories with the intention of exchanging them for peace with its neighbors. The settlers’ movement, composed primarily of right-wing religious organizations, viewed the newly captured territories as part of the “entire Land of Israel,” as outlined in the Bible, and was opposed to returning them. One such SMO, “Land of Israel Movement,” was adamantly opposed to a two-state solution and felt the Jews had claim to the “entire Land of Israel.” This organization was predominantly populated by religious leaders and the underground terrorist groups Irgun and Lechi. After failing to convince politicians by directly approaching them, movement members took action by illegally settling in Hebron, a city located in the occupied territories. After increasing pressure on the Israeli government, the settlers’ movement achieved victory with the establishment of Hebron as a Jewish city. In 1969, movement members created their own political party, the Land of Israel Party, and ran in the upcoming elections, but were unable to win a single Knesset seat (Issac 1976).

Kach, a right-wing political organization led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, is another example of the influence of religious right on Israeli politics. Kahane began taking action against the Arabs in 1972 when he and his followers distributed fliers in the city of Hebron, summoning their mayor, Muhamad Ali Jaabari, to a public trial in an attempt to incite conflict. In addition to symbolic actions, Kahane and his followers also used acts of terror to remove Arabs from occupied territories. In 1982, the members of Kach barricaded themselves in the Sinai Peninsula and, in front of the world media, threatened to commit suicide if Israel returned the land to Egypt as part of the Israel–Egypt peace treaty. The Israeli government rushed Kahane to the scene, and the rabbi was able to publicly negotiate with his followers not to commit suicide. This led to his controversial win of a Knesset seat in 1984 as a member of the Kach Party. In 1988 revised Knesset laws banned parties that incited racism and prevented Kach from running in the elections of that year. Kahane was assassinated in 1990 leading the Kach Party to split into two separate political parties, both of which were banned from the 1992 elections because of their original ties to Kach. By 1994 both organizations had been banished from Israel’s political landscape under 1948 antiterrorism laws (Sprinzak 1986).

Not all religious-based political actions are related to the settlers’ movement. Because Israel lacks a constitution, the role of religion in the public sphere is ambiguous and religious organizations have been successful in some areas. Several dimensions of public life are dictated by religious law. For example, secular Jews are legally required to use services provided by state-sanctioned orthodox rabbinate for marriage, divorce, and burial. In order to gain the majority, religious movements often form coalitions with the right-wing parties. In 2006, the rightist bloc won 50 of the 120 assembly seats with a coalition consisting of the ultra-orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism party in addition to other extreme right-wing groups.

The diverse spectrum of social movements in Israel continues to be studied in a number of disciplines. Anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists have all tried to understand the field of social movements in Israel and its relationship with the government and the citizenry. While the majority of scholars have focused on the security-based social movements, research has also been done to understand the impact of religion on the Israeli polity, Israel’s constant state of uncertainty with regard to security and easy access to political representation allows for continued scholarship with regard to movement outcomes, social change, and countermovements.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Co-optation; Interest groups and social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Religion and
social movements; Right-wing movements; State building and social movements; War and social movements; Zionist movement.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Mass society theory
STEVEN M. BUECHLER

Mass society theory is a complex, multifaceted perspective. As applied to social movements, however, the basic idea is that people who are socially isolated are especially vulnerable to the appeals of extremist movements. The theory resonated with fears of fascist and communist movements in the 1930s and 1940s and reached its apogee in the late 1950s.

Ideologically, the concept of mass society has been used by conservative thinkers to express dismay about the leveling tendencies of industrial society and the declining influence of family and community (Swingewood 1977). It has also been used by radical thinkers to bemoan the manner in which large bureaucratic institutions (especially in the guise of mass culture) can pacify populations and reinforce the status quo (Marcuse 1964).

An important sociological predecessor is Emile Durkheim’s analysis of modern society and the rise of individualism. With increasing size and complexity, social integration became problematic in two ways. Anomie involves insufficient regulation of behavior while egoism involves excessive individuation of people. Both signify weakened social integration and loosened social controls that contribute to dysfunctional outcomes, including suicide (Durkheim 1897). The same logic applies to many types of unconventional behavior.

The mass was one type of collective behavior subsequently identified by the Chicago School of Sociology (Blumer 1951). Alongside crowds, publics, and social movements, masses are distinguished by their large size, anonymous nature, loose organization, and infrequent interaction. As such, the concept of a mass connotes a group ripe for manipulation and control.

C. Wright Mills (1956) recognized these dangers in his analysis of the power elite. It gained power in part because of the transformation of publics enjoying democratic dialogue and political influence into masses with neither. With the transformation of publics into masses, “at the end of the road there is totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia” (Mills 1956: 304).

It was in this context that William Kornhauser – trained in Chicago School sociology – wrote The Politics of Mass Society (1959). It remains one of the most explicit statements of the alleged links between mass society and social movements. Written in the shadow of aforementioned totalitarian tendencies, mass society theory sought to explain the rise of extremism abroad and the dangers to democracy at home. Recalling Durkheim’s analysis of egoism and anomie, mass society emerges when small local groups and networks decline, leaving powerful elites and massive bureaucracies on one side and isolated individuals on the other. As Kornhauser wrote: “Mass society is objectively the atomized society, and subjectively the alienated population. Therefore, mass society is a system in which there is high availability of a population for mobilization by elites . . . [p]eople who are atomized readily become mobilized” (Kornhauser 1959: 33, emphasis in original). Put slightly differently, mass society is one where “both elites and non-elites lack social insulation; that is, when elites are accessible to direct intervention by non-elites, and when non-elites are available for direct mobilization by elites” (Kornhauser 1959: 43, emphasis in original).

In a healthy pluralist democracy, both elites and non-elites are partially insulated, intermediate groups are strong, and normal channels of influence are robust. In mass society, both groups lose this insulation, intermediate social buffers erode, normal channels are ineffective or bypassed, and extremism becomes more likely.
Mass movements pursue remote, extreme objectives and mobilize uprooted, atomized people (Kornhauser 1959: 47). Thus, “[m]ass movements mobilize people who are alienated from the going system, who do not believe in the legitimacy of the established order, and who therefore are ready to engage in efforts to destroy it. The greatest number of people available to mass movements will be found in those sections of society that have the fewest ties to the social order . . . ” (212).

This description of mass movements reflects the collective behavior depiction of mass behavior with a remote focus of attention, a declining sense of reality and responsibility, and a highly unstable, shifting focus of attention and intensity of response (Kornhauser 1959: 43–46). This depiction thus links the politics of collective behavior with unreasoning and extremist threats to social order.

Subsequent analysis and research have led many to conclude that the idea that the most socially isolated are most likely to engage in mass politics “is almost certainly false” (Rule 1988: 109). Those who are socially isolated are actually less likely to join while those who are embedded in preexisting social ties are disproportionately likely to do so (Oberschall 1973). Chicago School sociologists Turner and Killian (1987: 390) themselves note that “[s]ubsequent study of totalitarian movements has raised serious questions about the applicability of Kornhauser’s concept of mass movement.”

Other researchers concur that “[v]irtually all of the major claims of the theory have been controverted by an overwhelming body of evidence” (Hamilton 2001: 12). Despite its largely discredited status among academics, literary and journalistic proponents of this perspective enjoy a much wider and perhaps more credulous audience. As a result, “mass society theory proves well-nigh indestructible” (Hamilton 2001: 12) despite its logical flaws and empirical shortcomings.

SEE ALSO: Fascist movements; Nazi movement (Germany); Networks and social movements; Strain and breakdown theories.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Media framing and social movements

RENS VLEEGENTHART

In their study of media content, mass communication scholars commonly rely on Entman’s (1993: 52) definition of framing: “[selecting] some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”

Much of the study of media framing of political issues centers around three questions: (1) How is the issue framed; (2) How can we explain variation in framing – both over time and cross-sectionally; and (3) What are the effects of media framing on public opinion and policymaking? These questions are also of clear relevance to the study of social movements (see also Snow 2008).

EARLY STUDIES

While both media content and framing processes are central concepts for social movement scholars, media framing does not receive that much attention. This is all the more remarkable, since several of the most influential studies that pertain to the causes and consequences of media coverage – and that are widely cited by students of social movements and media scholars alike – deal precisely with that issue. Gitlin (1980), for example, uses the framing concept to assess the interaction between mass media and the US New Left movement in the 1960s. He documents how the media and their initial favorable framing of the movement and its issues helped it to gain broader support. However, the requirements for the movement and its events to remain newsworthy – and thus to contain characteristics such as drama, conflict, and personalization – made the movement’s main leaders increasingly focus on media strategies. Intensive coverage of internal struggles and anomalies within the movement ultimately resulted in erosion of its public support. Tuchman (1978), in her study of the coverage of the US women’s movement, finds that organizational and institutional arrangements, as well as routines in the news gathering process, constrained journalists in their capacity to frame issues independently. Both studies demonstrate the inherent problematic nature of the relationship between movement activists and journalists and the limited capacity of movements to influence mass media content.

On the one hand, social movements, maybe more than any other political actor, need the media to convert bystanders and mobilize supporters in order to attain the changes sought, whatever the institutional arena. On the other hand, journalists need social movements to stage events and “make news.” However, in most instances, their interests do not coincide. While movements are interested in getting favorable coverage for their claims, journalists are interested in conflict and confrontational events that fit their standard news format.

Focusing on the consequences of media content for a social movement, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) suggest three possibilities. First, media coverage can affect on the prospect of participation among movement sympathizers. This is labeled the mobilizing function of mass media. Second, coverage legitimizes the existence of the movement and its claims, contributing to its political relevance and its capacities to influence politicians and policymakers. This is called the validation function. Third, they identify scope enlargement. By getting extensive and favorable coverage, the movement draws attention to the conflict from actors that were not previously involved and might get involved as allies. The most relevant actor here
might well be the general public. A favorable opinion from an involved public is one of the key legitimizing sources for the movements' claims and an important tool to exert political influence. Focusing in more detail on the latter, Gamson (1992) describes how media framing can impact individuals' frames for a whole range of contested issues. He distinguishes between three types of frame formation: cultural, personal, and integrated. For the first one, there is a heavy reliance on media discourse and common wisdom, the second one relies on personal experiences, while the last one integrates the two.

CURRENT FOCUS

While these early studies seem to provide fertile ground for developing a media framing perspective toward social movements, more recent work has to a considerable extent neglected this connection. The coverage of movements and their events have received considerable attention, but studies have mainly focused on why – and not how – certain protest events (Smith et al. 2001) and movements (Amenta et al. 2009) get covered, discussing issues such as selection and description bias. In addition, when considering the consequences of media coverage, attention has focused on the effect of the visibility, legitimacy, and resonance of the movements' claims (the discursive opportunity structure) on support for the movement (Koopmans & Olzak 2004).

Several exceptions exist, however. On the question how movements can affect media framing, Rohlinger (2002) has investigated the role of several pro-life and pro-choice movements in the US abortion debate. Her findings demonstrate that movements can indeed be successful in influencing media framing about the issue of concern. More concretely, journalists are more likely to incorporate the movement's framing when they apply frames that resonate with the wider societal debate and when they develop an organizational structure that fosters an efficient interaction with journalists. Furthermore, Rohlinger's findings show that the media strategy movements choose for their interaction with journalists depends on the political context. When access to political elites exists and they lend a willing ear to the movement's claims, movement organizations are more inclined to remain silent and circumvent any political discussions in order to maximize political gains. If access to political elites is absent, organizations deliberately look for media coverage, often in cooperation with other organizations that pursue similar claims (Rohlinger 2006). In their study on the framing of the 2005 French riots, Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown (2007) investigate the variation in media framing in diagnostic and prognostic terms across countries, outlets, actors, and time. They show that time in particular is of major importance, and that noteworthy changes in framing take place when the conflict over an issue evolves. Snow (2008) suggests considering media coverage of a certain event or issue as an example of a discursive field. This discursive field can be classified based on the level of its stability in terms of the relations between (collective) actors, as well as on the degree of agreement among those actors regarding the focal event or issue. Variation on those continua might well account for variation in framing.

Turning to the effects of framing, there are several studies dealing with consequences of media coverage for social movements, focusing especially on scope enlargement and how framing affects individuals' attitudes and opinions regarding the issues of concern. In many instances, they use an experimental design. Terkildsen and Schnell (1997) combine experimentation with media content analysis, which nowadays is a commonly used strategy to assess media effects. Based on a content analysis of mass media framing of the abortion debate, they discerned five frames and used those frames in an experiment to investigate whether they had an impact on both the saliency and direction of respondents'
attitudes toward women’s rights. The study revealed that the media’s framing of the issue affected public perceptions about the issue—a “political rights” frame, for example, had a positive impact, while an “antifeminism” frame had negative consequences. Another example with a similar methodology is McLeod and Detenber’s (1999) study of the attitudes toward protest and protesters as the main dependent variables. Their findings suggest that differences in coverage not only lead to differences in identification with the protesters, but, more generally, also to varying levels of support for the right of people to protest. Coverage that is framed in terms of support for the “status quo” results in less sympathy toward the protesters and their right to protest.

AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Although existing studies have suggested the usefulness of a framing perspective in understanding the interaction between social movements and the media, this relationship has received only limited attention by social movement scholars until now. Questions regarding the extent to which, how, and in what situations social movements can influence media framing are only partially answered. The same goes for the question of how movement participants and other citizens are affected by framing in the media. Some research suggests that media can have a strong impact on mobilization and even supersede the role movement organizations play (Walgrave & Manssens 2000). But when this happens, or does not, is not yet well understood empirically.

Finally, the moderating role of media framing in the processes by which social movements try to affect politicians and policymakers is largely unexplored. In these instances, a systematic frame analysis of movement communications, media coverage, and political documents could be illuminating. Evidence on the influence of media framing on policy outcomes exists (Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun 2008), but the role of movements in the process has received only limited attention.

SEE ALSO: Bystander publics; Discursive fields; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Media activism; Media and social movements; Pro-life/pro-choice movements; Public opinion and movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Meetings
CHRISTOPH HAUß

A meeting is a gathering of three or more participants who maintain a single focus of cognitive and visual attention while engaging in multiparty talk that is ostensibly related to some common business of the participants (cf. Schwartzman 1989: 7, 61, 274–275); it has clearly marked boundaries in time (beginning and end are officially announced) and space (a spatial environment of mutual monitoring possibilities). These boundaries partially suspend the social structures of the meeting’s environment, thus creating a relatively autonomous unit of social life. The meeting develops its own structures which both enable and constrain the interactions of the participants. These structures include the sequential organization of meeting talk (turn-taking) and topics (agenda), the need to be relevant with regard to the current topic, procedural rules, as well as a number of functional roles related to the maintenance of the meeting itself, usually including the role of a facilitator. These structures are culturally contingent and social movements often develop their own specific meeting culture which – consciously or unconsciously – reflects much of the movement’s identity and the goals for which it strives.

Social movement meetings constitute “free spaces” or “subaltern counterpublics” in which oppositional consciousness and collective identities as well as collective action frames and strategies are developed and contested. Frame disputes are therefore a common feature of such meetings, but the majority of the meeting time tends to be used for information sharing, reporting, and storytelling as well as mundane practicalities such as negotiating time and place of the next meeting, division of labor between various meetings and individuals, devising the nitty-gritty of a particular protest activity, and other everyday routines related to the maintenance of the social movement infrastructure (Glass 2010). Whether or not such issues are treated as “technical” or “political” depends on the micropolitics of the particular meeting as well as the movement culture more broadly (see below) and the dividing line is often subject to contestation.

Despite their capacity to foster opposition to dominant social structures, meetings in social movements are not free from domination themselves. Feminists (as well scholars like Bourdieu and Foucault) have shown how public speech is always disciplined by symbolic orders and the codes of conduct of the social situation, even if these orders are proclaimed as “emancipatory.”

We can distinguish meetings within and between organizations/groups. Interorganizational meetings are of particular importance in – if not constitutive of – social movements because they foster and sustain the informal networks of organizations, groups, and individuals which compose the movement. Although recently social media have made single protest events possible without any prior face-to-face meeting, it is still safe to say that more durable attempts to mobilize for or against social change inevitably include a series of such mesomobilization meetings aimed at maximizing the support from and participation of various social groups and social movement organizations based on the terms (master frames, identities, narratives, strategies, action repertoires etc.) negotiated in these meetings. In that sense, face-to-face meetings constitute a social movement infrastructure behind the scenes of public protest events and preceding such events by months and years (Haug 2013).

In contrast to most meetings in work organizations, participation in social movement meetings is voluntary and activists tend to emphasize the openness of their meetings in the sense that – at least in principle – anyone is
meetings

welcome to attend (though repressive regimes seriously limit the possibility to hold open meetings). Nevertheless, within a particular movement or protest mobilization, the openness and accessibility of meetings often remains subject to contestation because the norm of openness can be countervailed in practice by the politics of time and place (i.e., the dilemma that any scheduled meeting time and place inevitably privileges some potential participants at the cost of others) as well as by opaque channels of information, explicitly closed meetings among influential friends, and other elements of “the tyranny of structurelessness.”

Research has also shown that meetings often function as sites for status contests and provide opportunities for participants to validate their role and status in the larger context of the movement or organization (e.g., Schwartzman 1989: 41f., 70–72). Status is expressed both verbally (style and quantity of speech) and nonverbally, for example, through gestures and one’s positioning in the room (head of the table or back row). Egalitarian activists therefore try to avoid spatial arrangements that provide such positions indicating status and queuing mechanisms are often used to organize turn-taking, thereby avoiding struggles over “airtime.”

Email lists have become a common instrument to facilitate communication among participants before and after the meeting and sometimes to include others who are not able to participate (e.g., circulation of minutes). Apart from extending the scope of meeting communication in time and space, email lists afford divergence, diversity, and individual autonomy, thus balancing the inherent tendency of face-to-face meetings to foster convergence, unity, and the affirmation of the collective (Kavada 2010). While the capacity of meetings to facilitate a sense of collective identity and interpersonal trust is evidently a crucial resource for collective action, a strong urge for harmony and conformity also tends to underpin groupthink and informal hierarchies. To avoid this trap of conflict avoidance, some activists have developed a “fight culture” in their meetings that encourages participants “to challenge each other’s domineering behavior when it happens or to voice unpopular and dissenting opinions when they have them,” thus keeping hierarchies in check and preventing entrenched oligarchies (Leach 2009: 1059). In meetings where a fight culture does not exist, radical activists have nevertheless managed to challenge the hegemony of elitist organizers by encouraging “more empathetic listening habits” among these informal leaders and by training them in a more attentive and inclusive facilitation style (Doerr 2011: 527). Thus, meetings are key for sustaining and challenging the informal leadership common in social movements as well as for establishing good leadership practice.

Contrary to the public impression that movements rely mainly on charismatic leaders, a look at backstage meetings reveals a more differentiated picture. Common leadership roles in contemporary social movements include veterans (have participated in many or all meetings in a particular meeting arena), brokers (have participated in many other relevant meetings), experts (have relevant knowledge about relevant policy fields, the logic of public discourses, or actor constellations), representatives (can speak for and report back to a relevant constituency), mobilizers (are actively involved in mobilizing people to act), organizers (convene meetings, prepare agendas, arrange facilitation, organize a venue, collect participants’ email addresses, and attend to logistical problems), and facilitators (officially in charge of managing the progress of the meeting). The distribution of these roles often varies between topics and sessions, bringing about the kind of amorphous and distributed leadership characteristic of social movements.

Since the end of the cold war, there has been a global proliferation of larger activist conferences comprising a host of different meetings, seminars, and workshops whose primary aim is not to devise an overall coordinated strategy in the sense of a central committee that aims to steer a larger movement, but to nourish “the strength of weak ties”, to share experiences, and
to facilitate cross-fertilization across issues, ideologies, and national boundaries (della Porta & Mosca 2007), not least through the inclusion of indigenous movements. Well-known examples are the Social Forums, the Inter-galactic Meetings called by the Zapatistas, or the conferences of People’s Global Action. Although these conferences have also brought about various campaigns and protest mobilizations, many observers have argued that their core significance is their form, which essentially propagates and searches for alternative forms of governance and reflects the aim to democratize liberal democracy (Maeckelbergh 2009). The global Occupy movement which emerged in 2011 vividly illustrates this when it refused to formulate a list of demands, insisting instead on the importance of its public meetings and the diverse collaborations they bring about. The meeting is the message, as it were, and this message is expressed through a variety of cultures and practices.

MEETING CULTURES AND PRACTICES

Especially in currents engaged in prefigurative politics and radical democratic practices, the process of the meeting and its governing principles are seen as a crucial element of the movement’s identity. The idea of turning the ends (a society without domination) into the means (a meeting without domination) clearly show in the roles and rules of procedure that these activists have institutionalized in order to make their meetings as inclusive and egalitarian as possible without rendering them ineffective: the facilitator is not chairing the meeting but facilitates the progress by asking questions and regularly summarizing the state of the discussion; the timekeeper checks the time assigned to each agenda item; the vibes watcher monitors group dynamics; a minute-taker (or scribe) records important points – often visibly on the board – and helps to keep the discussion focused; and a stacker keeps a list of speakers, possibly applying a 50 percent quota of women speakers or prioritizing those who have not previously spoken (cf. e.g., Graeber 2009: ch. 7).

More hierarchical meeting cultures, which are often associated with the institutionalized labor movement, do not attribute as much importance to the meeting process and focus more on the outcomes. As a result, meeting chairs sometimes impose preordained decisions merely to be rubber-stamped by the meeting. Many fights and factions in contemporary movements are related to diverging ideas about the ground rules of the meeting rather than incommensurable goals per se. A prominent example of such meeting-related rifts took place during the preparatory process for the European Social Forum 2004 (cf. Maeckelbergh 2009: 39–65; Kavada 2010).

Other, more subtle tensions related to different meeting cultures concern the relative importance assigned to the actual meeting in relation to the coffee breaks and pre- and after-meeting talk; the level of politeness required to maintain face and hence the level of contestation possible during the meeting; the degree of authority that can be claimed by any participant (most notably the chair); the role of precoordination of meeting structures and hence the degree of autonomy of the meeting; the permeability of the meeting to its physical environment; the admissibility of emotions as officially part of the meeting; the role of formal turn-taking rules; the disposition to break up into smaller working groups as opposed to maintaining a single plenary session throughout the meeting; and the relative importance of the individual participant to the collectivity and hence the amount and type of dissent necessary to veto a decision.

There are a myriad of manuals, handbooks, and bylaws that attempt to formalize some of these contested dimensions of meeting culture, the oldest and most widespread in the US being Robert’s Rules of Order for “deliberative assemblies,” first published in 1876. Not surprisingly, activists try to establish their own standards with handbooks for consensus decision making and meeting facilitation. Yet, the codification of meeting rules cannot solve the
principal dilemmas posed by the competing choices of meeting procedures.

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Consensual decision-making; Frame disputes; Framing and social movements; Free spaces; Leadership; Master frame; Narratives; Occupy Wall Street movement; Organizations and movements; Prefigurative politics; Social media.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Moral economy theory and peasant movements in Latin America

DOLORES TREVIZO

Eric Wolf (1969), Joel S. Migdal (1974), and James C. Scott (1976) offered compatible explanations about agrarian revolts and revolutions in the developing world that continue to resonate for Latin America. Before presenting their “moral economy” theory, along with important criticisms of that work, I first define some terms. This is followed by an application of moral economy arguments to exemplary cases of recent peasant and indigenous-peasant movements in Latin America.

In much of the region, people who work the land, whether as smallholders, renters, or sharecroppers, or even as agricultural wage workers, are called campesinos. This loosely translates as “peasants,” even though, in the strictest sense of the term, peasants cultivate their own parcels primarily with family labor for the household’s subsistence. In Latin America, both the recently dispossessed as well as the long-term landless may see themselves as campesinos and thus participate in “land invasions” by squatting on private or public property to get the land redistributed to them. Further, most indigenous people who live in the countryside and either work the land, or want to work the land, also identify as campesinos. This means that indigenous movements that mobilize for land (or other agricultural inputs) are simultaneously peasant movements.

MORAL ECONOMY THEORY

Like Barrington Moore (1966) before them, Wolf, Migdal, and Scott argued that the expansion of capitalism and the concomitant rise of centralized states explain various kinds of peasant revolts. While agreeing with Marx (1867) that penetrating markets privatize (“enclose”) the commons and strip (“dispossess”) peasants of their lands, “moral economy” theorists moved in a decidedly cultural direction. They did so by focusing on intra-village solidarity as well as on how peasants constructed a culturally salient set of rights and obligations in relation to landowning patrons. Such rights and obligations functioned as a moral economy to the degree that wealthier patrons were normatively obligated to help peasants by ensuring their subsistence during inevitable production crises. In Wolf’s (1969: 279) words, before the onset of capitalism, “social equilibrium depended on a balance of transfers of peasant surpluses to the rulers and the provision of a minimal security for the cultivator. . . . Reliance on ties with powerful patrons were recurrent ways in which peasants strove to reduce risks and to improve their stability.”

In sum, moral economists not only hold that the expansion of capitalism turns land, forests, natural resources, and labor into commodities, but that the cultural change that results exposes peasants to greater forms of human suffering. Cultural shifts unglue the social relationships that historically functioned as social insurance. When this happens, sudden and widespread subsistence threats may fuel moral outrage amongst peasants because they expect patrons to help them in the way that they had helped their forbears. In other words, it is not merely their sudden material deprivation but also their moral shock at the unresponsiveness of former patrons that ignites peasant protests.

Moral economists were critiqued by those who explained peasant rebellions either by emphasizing rational peasants (Popkin 1979), interclass conflict (Paige 1983), declining state power, and/or the role of outsider political entrepreneurs (Skocpol 1982). Jeffrey Paige, for example, argued that moral economy theory overemphasized subsistence crises as well as
exaggerated the moral bonds purportedly tying patrons and clients in pre-capitalist economies. Samuel Popkin agreed, adding that penetrating markets do not explain protests because he found that peasants from the noncommercial areas of Vietnam were more likely than those from the commercialized areas to support outside revolutionaries (Popkin 1979: 245–246). Popkin further argued that village communities are themselves internally stratified, and differential privileges and power are, as always, the source of individual and intergroup conflict. As such he concluded that peasants are no more communal or solidaristic than anyone else. Rather, they are self-interested, utility-maximizing, rational actors who will join movements when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. In other words, peasants overcome the “free rider problem” to join collective action when credible political entrepreneurs offer them individual incentives that will personally benefit them or their families (1979: 251–253).

APPLICATIONS TO LATIN AMERICA

These criticisms notwithstanding, moral economy theory offers some insights that help to explain recent cases of rural protest in Latin America. To begin with, evidence that peasants work with outside movements to invade lands, reclaim water, or even to overthrow states does not invalidate moral economy theory. Both Wolf and Migdal were explicit that the havoc caused by commercialization makes peasants open to political mobilization by, or with, others. Far from being random “incentives,” land and other natural resources are culturally meaningful. Whether because of their recent ties to it, or the nature of their displacement from it, rural folk frequently feel morally entitled to idle land, even when owned by others. Further, water and forests tend to be defended for communal – not individual – use.

Perhaps because Wolf directly influenced the field, Mexican rural studies lends empirical support to many moral economy claims. For example, in exploring nearly 200 years of agrarian violence from 1750 to 1940, John Tutino (1986) finds that subsistence insecurity is an important determinant of peasant revolts in Mexico. Independent evidence about a large cycle of peasant protests in Mexico during the 1970s shows that peasant land invasions were a reaction to the expansion of capitalist agriculture after World War II. As the theory predicts, the penetration of markets into the countryside slowly commodified land and did so while the population saw dramatic growth. In addition, the mechanization of agriculture in the 1970s resulted in rampant unemployment. Both processes led to widespread landlessness and near landlessness which, in turn, explain why peasants mobilized with outsiders to invade lands in nearly every state of Mexico during the 1970s (Trevizo 2011). They did so, moreover, despite the high cost of significant political repression. More recently, the armed indigenous-peasant Zapatistas (EZLN) won land reform concessions in Chiapas despite the fact that the Mexican government had, in 1992, ended land reform.

Though similar dynamics were at work throughout Latin America in the twentieth century, moral economy theory illuminates some aspects of the recent upsurge in rural protests in the region. This is so because agrarian capitalism (including agro-industry) continues to develop, if cyclically, given the growing demand for agro-crops internationally since World War II, as well as the greater demand for foodstuffs in local urban markets. As was the case in Mexico, the expansion in markets for land displaced peasants from their plots, while the mechanization of agriculture in the 1970s displaced rural workers. As tight urban labor markets are especially impenetrable to rural folk, who generally have lower levels of education than urban dwellers, mass rural landlessness and unemployment resulted. In Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, such people were, indeed, more open to outsiders who helped them to invade lands in the 1960s–1970s.
Since then, recently dispossessed small farmers as well as landless rural workers in Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, and Paraguay, have invaded land, both private and public, in the hopes of getting the government to redistribute it to them. The Brazilian case, the Landless Workers Movement (MST), is currently the largest social movement in Latin America. There, too, the mechanization of agriculture in the 1970s disemployed many rural workers from sugarcane plantations in northern Brazil. Further, the commercialization of rural property dispossessed smallholders from their plots at the very moment that sharecroppers and renters were pushed off the land by landlords. These trends resulted in a sharp increase in the number of landless families as well as widespread unemployment. As many large proprietors are absentee landowners with idle estates, rural folk justify squatting on the grounds that land “belongs to those who work it” (Wolford 2006: 163).

But while some recently displaced peasants participate in land invasions to provoke land reform, others, as noted, join revolutionary movements. This was the case in Central America during the 1980s. There the expansion of agro-industrial exports during the 1970s contributed to the emergence of revolutionary movements in the next decade. As elsewhere, Central American economies responded to the increasing demand for agricultural products by adding cotton, sugar, and beef to their coffee exports. The expansion of agricultural exports beyond coffee further commercialized the land and quickly introduced labor-displacing machinery into agricultural production. Both processes displaced smallholders from their lands, cleared renters and squatters and, in Guatemala, cleared colonos (serfs). Agricultural workers, too, were suddenly unemployed and urban labor markets could not absorb the sudden increase in people looking for work. The displaced masses formed a significant part of the social bases fueling revolutionary conflicts in Central America during the 1980s (Paige 1997).

Although land invasions are prototypical forms of peasant struggles in Latin America, rural folk have increasingly fought the privatization of water and other natural resources. Indigenous peasants in Bolivia, for example, won their “water war” when peri-urban residents and others joined them in 2000 to fight the privatization of water. This, along with the rising cost of water, provoked moral outrage among many in and near Cochabamba. They argued that because water falls from the sky, it is a gift from God and, therefore, belongs to the people. As such, it should be respected as a collective good and managed according to indigenous traditions, called usos y costumbres, that date back to pre-Inca times. They won when the government rescinded the contract with Aguas del Tunari, operated by a transnational consortium (Bechtel) based in San Francisco (Spronk & Webber 2008).

Similarly, indigenous and mestizo groups in Ecuador have not only engaged in a series of land invasions demanding land (1970s–1980s), they have actively resisted capitalist expansion in the countryside by usurping their government’s plans in the 1990s to promote export crops, as well as by fighting the shrimp, cattle, and exotic tree-farming industries. Remarkably, in 1997 rural folk from Junín, an agrarian community with a history of land invasions, successfully chased out a mining company owned by Mitsubishi which had begun copper exploration along with an Ecuadorian state-owned company. The World Bank, as well as the British, Swedish, and Japanese governments, had invested over US$22 million in this failed project. One informant explained that a small number of people shut down the mine that their government assumed would create long-term development because “We love our homes and we love our land . . . we are organized to protect our community” (quoted in Kuecker 2008: 103). As their agrarianism and subsistence ethic aligns easily with environmental stewardship ideas, peasants increasingly employ ecological frames when they work with
Catholic priests to fight for land and other natural resources.

Perhaps because of their many twentieth-century struggles against the commodification of their land, peasant and indigenous-peasant movements in Latin America have been leaders in recent antineoliberal campaigns, such as those taken up by the Via Campesina (Peasant Way). Originally founded in the early 1990s by 47 peasant organizations from all over Latin America and the Caribbean (the CLOC, Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo), the Via Campesina is now a transnational network of peasant groups. Member organizations represent rural folk in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Paraguay. Peasants from Southeast and South Asia, Europe, and Africa have joined Latin Americans to demand, among other things, land reform, “food sovereignty,” protection from dumping, “just prices” for agricultural products, and the right to sustainable development.

Representing an estimated 300 million rural families worldwide, Via Campesina peasants fight to protect land and other natural resources, such as water, seeds, and forests, against the privatizing impulse of “neoliberal capitalism.” Via Campesina’s demand for “food sovereignty” (soberanía alimentaria) echoes the “subsistence ethic” described by moral economists to the degree that peasants assert that “food is our right,” one that ensures both individual survival and a “dignified life” in the pueblos. Edelman (2005) offers a similar interpretation, noting that their demand for just prices is comparable to a moral economy claim, differing only in that the appeal is to global, rather than local, norms.

These cases offer support for the moral economy claim that capitalist expansion strips peasants of their lands, water, forests, and other natural resources. Whether they mobilize with the help of outsiders or not, peasants are cognizant that commercialization exposes them to risks that threaten their subsistence. Dispossession and subsistence crises, or the mere threat of such crises, have clearly motivated both unarmed peasant revolts for land and water and, in some cases, the peasants’ participation in armed guerrilla movements (as in Central America and Peru in the 1980s).

But not all moral economy propositions find such strong empirical support. The research on whether the erosion of patron obligations to peasants fuels protests is inconclusive. About Mexico, for example, Tutino (1986: 31) argued that it is not a subversion of traditional patron–client bonds that fuels peasant unrest but, rather, the widespread perception that elites are responsible for their subsistence crisis. Franz J. Schryer (1990: 177), in contrast, argued that the breakdown of the normative obligations that once tied patrons and clients is key to explaining local land invasions in Hidalgo, Mexico, in the early 1970s. According to him, within one generation of greater commercialization, the cultural system of the old subsistence ethic broke down, including among many Nahua. Landed elites no longer understood Nahuatl, the language of local indigenous peasants, and eventually stopped helping them during economic crises, refusing to lend or rent land, offer pay advances, or even employment.

Both archival and historical ethnography would illuminate the context behind recent findings indicating intra-village conflict due to “individualist” attitudes, economic exploitation, and/or gender oppression. A better understanding of how vertical and horizontal mechanisms of rural solidarity change over time would avoid anachronistic generalizations. After all, moral economists did not argue that the bonds between patrons and clients or among villagers were without conflict. Rather, they argued that the old subsistence ethic comprised normative obligations intended to ensure survival during crises and that such norms are distinct from the quid pro quo exchanges typical of market relations. As several cooperative labor practices – such as the Andean minga or the Oaxacan tequio (collective work) – have survived into the twenty-first century, historical ethnography could explore whether
their subversion by labor markets contributes to protests. How do peasants respond when some refuse to participate in a minga or serve their community through tequio in times of need? While broader examples of various solidarity systems – like the fictitious kin relations known as compadrazco – have existed for centuries in Latin America, the empirical question that remains unanswered is whether the disintegration of solidarity bonds by market relations fuels political unrest.

In sum, recent peasant and indigenous-peasant movements in Latin America lend support to those moral economy claims that hold that peasants fight to preserve their livelihoods when capitalist expansion strips them of their land, or in any way threatens their subsistence by privatizing or polluting other natural resources. However, more research is still needed to illuminate whether the expansion of markets undoes the moral ties that normatively obligate better-off patrons to help poorer peasants in times of need and, if so, the degree to which such broken bonds fuel peasant protests.

SEE ALSO: Agrarian movements (United States); Free rider problem; Indigenous movements in Latin America; Landless Workers Movement (MST) (Brazil); Peasant movements; Quotidian disruption; Rational choice theory and social movements; Repression and social movements; Revolutions; Violence and social movements; Zapatista movement (Mexico).

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Nationalist movements

HANK JOHNSTON

Nationalist movements are a subtype of social movement that make political, economic, and cultural claims based on definitions of a national group or “nation.” Like other movements, they can include individuals, small groups, formal organizations, and sometimes political parties, depending on their breadth of support and the kind of state in which they occur. Contemporary examples are numerous: the Quebecois nationalist movement against English Canadian governance, Scottish nationalist challenges in the UK, Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland, Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza, Basque and Catalan nationalist parties in Spain, Tibetan and Uighur nationalism in China, and the numerous nationalist fronts – Estonian, Lithuanian, Armenian, Chechen, to name just a few – that challenged Russian dominance and contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nationalist movements can mobilize politically, culturally, and/or militarily in both democratic and nondemocratic states to challenge prevailing patterns of sovereignty, political representation, economic opportunities, civil rights, and resource distribution. A defining characteristic of most nationalist movements is a link between a collective national identity and claims of territorial sovereignty (Hechter 2000).

BASIC DEFINITIONS

Although the definitions of nationalism, a nationalist movement, an ethnic movement, and a national state are debated, it is generally accepted in the social sciences that “nation” does not refer to a state, as in member states of the United Nations, but rather to a large community of people with a common identity, of which a shared language, cultural patterns, and religion are usually the most basic elements. Other elements of a nation include attachment to a territory or region, common history, shared traditions, rituals, myths, and unifying symbols such as flags, anthems, and images. As such, nations refer to a people or an ethnic group, and are to be distinguished from states, which refer to the institutional political order (Smith 1976). Thus, the common term “nation-state” is technically incorrect in most instances because the vast majority of modern states are composed of several distinct ethnic-national groups. In many contemporary states, it is common that one ethnic-national group dominates political and economic institutions, which relegates other national groups to minority status (Connor 1972), raising the specter of interethnic conflict, which can sometimes be violent, and nationalist movements, which are embedded in contentious politics.

When one finds political and economic discrimination by the majority, strong cultural and linguistic patterns that congeal minority-national identity, plus perceived opportunities for making challenges against the state, the basic ingredients of nationalist mobilization are present. Structural and competition-based explanations of nationalist movements propose that the combination of economic, political, and – to a lesser extent – cultural grievances with national identity drives movement mobilization (Olzak 1992). In contrast, a “primordial” perspective holds that there is a social-psychological depth in ethnic-national identity and therefore it can be an especially potent basis of mobilization. Although social scientists recognize that many characteristics of national groupings are socially constructed or “imagined” (Anderson 1991), primary socialization by family, friends, and local communities with distinct cultural and linguistic traditions imparts elements of identity that are not easily foregone or forgotten, and can
be activated by leaders as political contexts open. Extreme formulations of the primordial perspective may draw upon vague biological and racial references, but these are widely rejected by the social sciences. Nevertheless, social-psychological research suggests that elements of ethnocentrism, cognition, conformity, and stereotyping help construct, confirm, and intensify national identification, making it plausible that there is a fundamental quality in national identification that needs to be part of the explanatory equation. Moreover, recent theoretical developments in the field of protest studies that stress emotional factors in mobilization further indicate this perspective.

NATIONALIST IDENTITY

While structural factors such as economic discrimination and lack of political access are often severe and long standing, and while there is good evidence of constructivist processes in national ideologies, a singular trait of nationalist movements is the passion associated with their mobilization. These strong emotions are partly based on social-psychological tendencies of ethnocentrism and stereotyping. Ethnocentrism contributes to high valuation of one’s own group and characteristics (Tajfel 1981). Also, there is a large body of research showing how the tendency to stereotype out-groups is a product of basic cognitive processes whereby complex realities are grouped and categorized to make them understandable, even when perception is faulty, unreliable, or limited. These are fundamental processes to how people think, define themselves, and define the groups they belong to. Thus, it is not uncommon that nationalist movements tap emotional responses among members, and may lead to violence. While interethnic violence often occurs outside the context of nationalist movements, many of the same emotions are present within them. The genocide in Rwanda was not part of a nationalist movement, but the ethnic cleansing in Sarajevo was. In a related vein, the genocide in Darfur represents a case where the state mobilized nationalist sentiments of the Arab majority in the north to oppose a regional ethnic-national minority’s claims of political autonomy in the south. Because modern states claim a monopoly on the means of violence, when they invoke majority national identities as justifications for mobilization, it is common that contention takes a violent turn. Regional nationalist movements must often take up arms to defend themselves. The volatility of nationalist identity and the emotions they invoke also make them susceptible to demagoguery and manipulation by leaders.

Examples of the strength of support and destabilizing influence that national movements can mobilize are numerous. The Soviet Union was torn apart by nationalist movements in its non-Russian republics. A nationalist movement split the state of Czechoslovakia in two. Native African nationalism in South Africa defeated apartheid. Nationalist movements in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia all chipped away at the former state of Yugoslavia with devastating results. Extreme Basque nationalism has motivated terrorist attacks in Spain for almost a half century. However, the emotions that drive the strength and intensity of these movements must be understood in terms of how they are channeled by structural factors such as political institutions and levels of repression, and by cultural factors, such as ideologies of nationalism, which vary in how they celebrate the in-group, condemn the out-group, and in how they emphasize and articulate claims and grievances.

NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES

In cultural terms, nationalist movements are animated by ideologies of nationalism, which can occur either at the state level or at a regional level among members of ethnic minority groups. Nationalism is an ideology that appeared in the early nineteenth century as the modern, bureaucratic, and centralized
state began to take shape in Europe. Earlier, the inhabitants of Europe’s loosely federated states and empires had identities that were regional or local. State-building processes in the nineteenth century defined a broader national identity based on a common majority language and symbols that were crucial to waging war with national armies, centralizing state administrations, and legitimating the state’s increasing influence in local affairs. Because the emerging national states of nineteenth-century Europe were rarely ethnically homogeneous, creating a broad-based national identity that transcended regional and linguistic ones always held the potential of stimulating reactive minority-national identities. In this way, the development of nationalism at the state level paradoxically gave rise to ethnic nationalisms at the regional level, which often challenged the cultural, linguistic, and religious hegemony of the national majority group. It is not by chance, therefore, that shortly after new visions of the centralized national state diffused throughout Europe, encouraged by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, that the first wave of nationalist movements mobilized in 1848 against more traditional state forms such as the Hapsburg empire (Hroch 1985).

Reasons for this were that the anciens régimes did not reflect the national identities of the people within their borders. State elites were, in a sense, foreign rulers who demanded taxes but limited the rights and representation of minority-national groups. Also, regional national identities were encouraged by local cultural and political elites as a means to pursue their own interests. Similar processes were at work one hundred years later as indigenous elites animated anticolonial movements in Asia and Africa against foreign rule (Strang 1992).

OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

In structural terms, the openness of state institutions – for example, when minorities enjoy legal protections and access to channels of political representation – influences the trajectory and strategies of nationalist movements. In democratic states, it is common that nationalist movements pursue political party mobilization, plebiscites about regional autonomy, and cultural promotion. Movements here are composed of party organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and citizen groups that freely operate. National identification may be strong among many citizens, but the availability of civil liberties and institutional political channels tends to undercut the attractiveness of nationalist movements as the main vehicle of interest articulation, paralleling a political opportunity explanation of protest (Eisinger 1973). In democracies, citizens balance a complex array of interests, claims, and grievances, as the pluralist model of crosscutting political allegiances would predict. Because of this, nationalist movements in the US are few and relatively weak. There were strands of Black, Chicano, and Indian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, but these were represented by relatively small groups pursuing cultural and/or extreme political demands within broader ethnic-based movements for civil rights and economic opportunities. In other developed democracies of the West, nationalist movements may become potent political forces, such as in Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, and Euzkadi. State responsiveness to less extreme demands, as exemplified by widespread linguistic accommodation or the creation of regional political institutions, means that more extreme groups pursuing full political independence, are marginalized, rejected by most citizens in favor of the benefits of remaining within the existing state. Smaller nationalist movements in Western democracies, such as Welsh, Breton, Lombard, South Tyrolean, Corsican, and Sami, are weak for several reasons. Citizens with strong and animating national identities are few. The benefits that derive from state membership, especially when its policies encourage ethnic pluralism and affirmative action, may be considerable. Also, overall levels of ethnic discrimination may be relatively low,
nationalist movements – while perhaps not abundant – may be available within the existing state.

In nondemocratic states, it is common that institutional channels for expressing minority-national grievances are underdeveloped or nonexistent. Authoritarian regimes often attempt to preempt minority nationalism through policies intended to shift national expression into less threatening activities, and by repressing any attempt to mobilize outside of what is permitted. This was the case in the Soviet Union, where numerous ethnic-national republics were incorporated into a repressive political and economic system that was dominated by ethnic Russians. Russian citizens were encouraged to immigrate to other regions and were often favored in employment at the expense of the national minorities. These patterns have been called “internal colonialism” insofar as the dominant national group exploits the other national groups within state territory, paralleling the domination by colonial powers of foreign peoples (Hechter 1975). In the USSR, the communists attempted to placate nationalist demands by permitting the limited use of national languages and folkloric expressions of national identity, with “nationalist in form, socialist in content” as the guiding principle. The party recruited minority-national loyalists – often educated in Moscow – for top positions in the minority republics’ state and party structures. Combined with a police surveillance to stifle political opposition, nationalist movements were suppressed in the Soviet Union for much of its history, and only began to appear in the late 1980s when the communist regime began to liberalize and when economic crisis aggravated dissatisfaction with the center (Beisinger (2002)).

Research shows that when state repression is great, nationalist movements do not so much disappear as take other, less public forms – a development that can be said to reflect the depth of national identity. When it is strong, national identification can persist under the most adverse conditions, as in the cases of Tibet under the Chinese communists or Catalonia and the Basque region under the repressive Franco regime. Widespread use of a minority language seems to fortify national identity under repressive conditions, especially when state policy seeks to impose the dominant tongue, as in protests in Tibet in late 2010. Moreover, when national identity is strong, state repression and linguistic discrimination can drive nationalist movements underground and force nationalist expression to assume diffuse and duplicitous forms that escape police surveillance. Under repressive conditions, subtle acts of resistance, clandestine actions, and symbolic affirmations of identity keep nationalist resistance alive (Johnston 2006).

**NATIONALIST SECESSION**

Nationalist movements often seek to break away from the ruling state system and establish new, independent states based on the minority national identity. This is a secessionist form of nationalism. Secessionist goals are common where the minority nationalist community is large, regionally concentrated, and the state is seen as politically unresponsive and repressive of minority national rights (such as linguistic rights, as in Quebec). Also, the illegitimacy and vulnerability of the majority state are important factors in the opening of political opportunities for the mobilization of secessionist movements. Where states are weak, secessionist movements are more likely to be successful.

As mentioned, state boundaries fluctuate with wars and treaties, sometimes carving up a territory such that a national minority is ceded to an adjacent state made up of a different national group. When this occurs, especially when there is a strong historical memory of territory lost, irredentism (or revanchism, a synonym) is a common subtype of secessionist ideology. The national minority seeks to reattach to the old state, often aided by the neighboring state, or by groups and organizations within it, as in the case of support from the Republic of Ireland flowing to Sinn Féin in
Finally, movements for independence by colonized nations parallel secessionist movements in that they too seek separation from an ethnically (and racially) distinct state. Anti-colonial nationalist movements were common in the postwar period of the twentieth century as European powers, weakened by World War II, were challenged by national liberation fronts in Asia and Africa. Although colonial societies in Africa and Asia were often segmented and/or tribal, anticolonial nationalism was a powerful unifying ideology. As nationalist liberation movements gathered strength, they could sometimes gain the peaceful acquiescence of the colonial power to withdraw and grant independence. In other instances, long wars of independence had to be fought, as in Indochina, Algeria, and Angola.

The nationalist movements in the former Soviet republics were secessionist, although most started as movements demanding more democratic freedoms. While the Tibetan nationalist movement currently assumes a diffuse and clandestine form that only occasionally breaks the surface of public life, as mentioned above, many of its proponents do not seek to accommodate to Chinese rule but rather to resist it and ultimately secede from it. Because secessionist movements threaten the integrity of the state and the depletion of its territory and resources, they are almost always violently opposed by the state. For example, China is made up of 25 large ethnonational groups (having populations of over 500,000) and many more small ones. The communist regime has crushed Tibetan and Uighur nationalist protests when they occurred, unwilling to entertain any challenges to Han Chinese ethnic dominance. Folkloric expressions such as dance and music festivals may be permitted, but political mobilization is not.

The same logic operates in Russia, which is a patchwork of over a hundred national minorities, of which six have populations over a million. One of these, the Chechens, began to mobilize a strong nationalist movement in the early 1990s, which Russia deemed as a threat to its territorial integrity (Johnston 2008). Russia invaded Chechen territory to squelch secessionist claims, and, for years, the Chechens fought vastly superior Russian forces to a stalemate, twice forcing Russian withdrawals and winning de facto independence. Yet allowing one rebellion to succeed established an unwanted precedent and was a road on which Moscow was unwilling to travel. Ultimately, the Russian army crushed the Chechen insurgency and reincorporated the war-torn region into the Russian federation. Although estimates vary, a conservative figure for civilian deaths in the two Chechen wars is 200,000. Secessionist wars have been among the great tragedies of the last century (Gurr 2000). The nationalist claims of the Ibo people of Nigeria in great part precipitated the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970, which claimed over two million lives. The secessionist war of East Pakistan in 1971 led to the creation of Bangladesh and caused the death of an estimated three million. In 1992–1995, the Bosnian war fueled the ethnic cleansing and genocide in which close to 100,000 are thought to have died, and over two million forced to flee from their homes.

GLOBAL PATTERNS

Recently, interest has grown in how nationalist movements develop in a globalizing context. Nationalist movements mobilize in state systems, which in turn are embedded in the expanding system of global economic integration and international regimes of human rights, indigenous rights, and rights of self-determination (Olzak 2006). The effects of globalization on nationalist movements occur in three interrelated patterns. First, the global diffusion of claims for national self-determination is fueled by the mobilization of other nationalist movements. This is
encouraged today by global communications technology, although the spread and clustering of nationalist claims were seen historically, first in the nationalist revolutions of 1848, and later, in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918 and the creation of new states in Eastern Europe. Second, globalization spreads a world culture that values human rights and civil liberties that encourage nationalist claims. These ideals are fostered by networks of activists in NGOs that promote the discourse of minority-national self-determination and justice. The availability of global-level channels of claim-making through NGO pressure on states opens political opportunities and encourages nationalist movements, not only in developed states but also less developed ones. There also seems to be a tendency of the global human rights regime to reduce violence in less democratic states (Olzak 2006). Finally, a trend in the late twentieth century has been the involvement of international multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in nationalist conflicts. For example, in 2008 Serbia called upon both the ICJ and the General Assembly of the UN to render Kosovo’s declaration of independence illegal. For their part, the Assembly of Kosovo referred to global regimes of human rights and self-determination as justification for its claim of secession from Serbia.

SEE ALSO: Anticolonial movements; Collective identity; Competition theory of ethnic/racial conflict and protest; Ethnic movements; Globalization and movements; Ideology; Modernity of nationalism; Political opportunity/political opportunity structure; Separatist movements.

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Occupy Wall Street movement
HEATHER GAUTNEY

Occupy Wall Street is an ongoing series of protests, initiated on September 17, 2011 in lower Manhattan’s financial district, against alarming trends in social inequality, high rates of home foreclosure and unemployment, and the excessive influence of corporate and financial interests on government. The protests attracted large numbers of participants and gained widespread international attention due to the movement’s broad appeal, to “the 99 percent,” and tenacious use of nonviolent protest against variably heavy-handed police response.

Occupy Wall Street began with roughly one hundred activists camped on a small stretch of concrete in downtown Manhattan known as Zuccotti Park. They chose the Park because of its unusual status as a privately held space, owned by Brookfield Office Properties. Unlike city parks, which have curfews, Zuccotti was available 24 hours a day to the general public as part of an exchange for increased air rights for a development project.

Within weeks of the initial occupation, “Occupy” camps emerged in nearly every major city in the US and abroad, then in small towns, universities, and other social institutions, spawning a massive “Occupy Together” network. These local manifestations were bound by a common theme: “The one thing we all have in common is that we are the 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%.” The slogan is based on a well-known, yet staggering statistic, that a wealthy 1 percent of people in the US own roughly 40 percent of its wealth. Other markers of social inequality cited by the movement include: severe income disparities, education and health care inequality, uneven taxation, runaway debt, and downward trends in social mobility. The movement also associates the US debt crisis and recession with corporate irresponsibility and government deregulation, which enabled subprime lending and the US housing market crash. It is also critical of the government’s use of taxpayer funds to bail out the financial sector, which they see as greedy and corrupt.

The Occupy movement emerged amidst a wave of protest activity worldwide. In early 2011 millions converged in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, and throughout the Arab world, to fight political corruption and bring democracy to the region. In European cities, like Athens, Rome and London, rioting and violent forms of protest signaled widespread outrage over the loss of pensions, jobs, and social services, and a generalized crisis of legitimacy among their political leadership. In Spain, “May 15” or “15 m” protesters took to the streets against political corruption, unemployment, and austerity, calling themselves “the indignants.”

Prefiguring the US Occupy movement, 15 m activists established a giant campsite in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol in Madrid, which disbanded after two short months due to problems with police and local businesses.

Early that summer, small protest encampments appeared in the US, including “Walkerville” in Wisconsin, named after the “Hooverville” shantytowns of the Great Depression. Walkerville activists protested Governor Scott Walker’s Budget Repair Bill, which reduced social benefits like pensions and health insurance, and stripped public employees of their collective bargaining rights. Weeks later, New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts established a small camp called “Bloombergville” to protest Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed budget cuts and public employee layoffs, including 6000 teaching jobs. Shortly after the camp disbanded, a Vancouver-based magazine/activist network named “Adbusters” issued a call on
the Internet for a “Tahrir moment” in the financial district, urging activists to “set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy Wall Street.”

Days after the first tents appeared in Zuccotti, clashes between police and protesters drew massive media attention. Horrifying video of the NYPD pepper-spraying screaming young girls at point-blank range aired primetime on TV stations around the globe, inciting outrage and disgust. Bad turned worse when protesters marched across the Brooklyn Bridge, and a record-breaking 700 of them were trapped and arrested halfway.

Within weeks, Occupy Wall Street proliferated into a national phenomenon, as local Occupys emerged throughout the country, the largest in New York, Denver, and Los Angeles. On October 15, the movement officially went global, organizing a “Global Day of Rage” in which hundreds of thousands rallied in some 900 cities around the world, including 20,000 in New York’s Times Square. As local officials throughout the country attempted to clear the camps, violent confrontations ensued, including a major standoff in the city of Oakland in late October, in which police used projectiles and rubber bullets, critically injuring Iraq war veteran Scott Olsen. Days later, a citywide general strike brought some 30,000 protesters to the streets, and they effectively shut down the Port of Oakland.

A national wave of evictions followed in November, in which police cleared most Occupy camps, including the original site at Zuccotti Park. By then, Zuccotti had mushroomed into a booming tent city housing hundreds of people, with its own newspaper, the Occupy Wall Street Gazette, and a functional kitchen, media center, security apparatus, and “People’s Library.” Tens, perhaps even hundreds, of thousands visited the park, including celebrities like Katy Perry and Kanye West, among many others. The camp also hosted live concerts by David Crosby and Graham Nash, and, later, Jackson Browne. Tourist buses added Zuccotti to their regular routes, and large media conglomerates maintained a constant presence around the perimeter of the park.

During the evictions, thousands of nonviolent activists nationwide were arrested, totaling 5000 by early December. In many cases, including in New York, local officials authorized media blackouts and use of extreme force in clearing the camps. The People’s Library in Zuccotti, which consisted of over 5000 titles, was dumped in the trash by police.

Since the clearing of the camps, the movement has focused on more targeted and localized forms of occupation. Occupy Colleges, Occupy the Department of Education, Occupy our Homes, are just some examples of the countless places, institutions, people, and organizations the movement has tried to claim. Occupy Colleges made headlines in late November when police pepper-sprayed young college students sitting-in at the University of California at Davis. After video of the event was broadcast worldwide, a meme of the infamous “pepper-spray cop” went viral over the Internet and mainstream media, in which the image of Officer John Pike is seen dousing everything from the Constitution to Lady Liberty in pepper spray.

Social media, like Facebook and Twitter, helped elevate the UC Davis protests, and were crucial to the development of the Occupy movement overall. The cyberlife of the movement most likely involves an exponentially larger number of constituents than has been seen in the camps and demonstrations. Membership on the Occupy Wall Street Facebook page grew from a few hundred to hundreds of thousands within the first two months, in addition to the hundreds, if not thousands, of local “Occupy” Facebook pages that have surfaced. In addition to Facebook, Twitter is widely used for sharing news and events, among a vast network of millions of users. Mobile computer devices like the iPhone have enabled activists to virtually attend organizing meetings, regardless of their location, and coordinate street actions in real time.

The organization of the movement itself could be said to parallel the structure of
social media, in which umpteen users constitute a complex web of news, video, and personal communication. The “leaderless” or “horizontal” organization of Occupy has enabled groups from diverse kinds of organizations, like trade unions, third parties, and student groups, to participate in the movement without sacrificing their autonomy. It has also allowed for local specificity. Local Occupys organize rallies, demonstrations, and camp communities in their immediate locales, but remain linked by a common commitment to grassroots organizing, through the mechanism of the General Assembly.

The General Assembly, or “GA,” is the decision-making apparatus of the Occupy movement, open to all interested parties, and led by facilitators who rotate on a regular basis. Specific issues, such as media, outreach, people of color, direct action, and others were handled by working groups—also open and inclusive—that periodically reported back to the GA. Each Occupy has its own GA and set of working groups. Because of the large number of participants in New York, activists formed an additional assembly of working group delegates, called a spokescouncil, based on the grassroots organizational structures of the Global Justice Movement in the late 1990s.

Also deriving from Global Justice activism is the use of consensus process by spokescouncils and general assembly. All meeting participants are invited to join in decision-making processes and build consensus among the group for their ideas. Proposers must first explain and justify their ideas, then field questions and engage in a large-scale group discussion. Votes are cast via a system of hand signals and proposals are revised until a nine-tenths majority approves. Days after the first camp emerged in Zuccotti Park, a pamphlet on consensus process was made widely available in print and online. The movement argues that its grassroots processes can serve as a model for democratizing other social and political institutions.

One of the more controversial aspects of the Occupy movement regards its refusal to issue formal sets of demands. Various policy-related issues have been raised by different parts of the movement, including, but not limited to education, housing, and health care reform; environmental protection; and the development of alternative energy sources. The refusal to issue formal demands, however, is based on the movement’s belief that mainstream electoral channels have been corrupted by money and corporate interests. The term Occupy, or act of occupation, in part refers to processes in which people and groups take back, or take over, what they believe should be commonly held. This “do-it-yourself” form of activism involves circumventing mainstream political channels, which the movement believes are closed to them, and realizing their claims through direct action. Occupation also involves the long march of reform, but wants to transform existing institutions, like those in education or health care, into collectively managed apparatuses that can serve the interests of all stakeholders.

SEE ALSO: Arab Spring; Consensual decision-making; Electronic protest; Global Justice Movement; Grassroots movements; Nonviolence/non-violent action; Policing protest; Social control errors.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

The Plowshares movement began in September 1980 when eight religious activists entered a General Electric (GE) plant outside Philadelphia, armed with hammers and bottles of blood. Inside the plant, they located the nuclear weapons that General Electric was developing. They hammered upon the weapons, poured blood, kneeled in prayer, and waited for security officers. When they were taken into custody, they released a press statement declaring “We commit civil disobedience at General Electric because this genocidal entity is the fifth leading producer of weaponry in the U.S. . . . In confronting GE, we choose to obey God’s law of life, rather than a corporate summons to death. Our beating of swords into plowshares is a way to enflesh this biblical call” (Berrigan 1987: 55, 65).

MOVEMENT STRATEGY

The GE Plowshares action was an expressive act of moral witness, reflecting the prophet Isaiah’s vision: “Nations shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; one nation shall not raise the sword against another, nor shall they train for war again” (Isaiah 2:4). Yet there was also a strategic element to this campaign since the activists knew they would be arrested; this provided an opportunity to argue in court that nuclear weapons violate international laws that prohibit preparations for genocide. When their court date arrived, all eight stated that they were not guilty on two grounds. First, they were upholding the Nuremberg principle, which states that citizens have an obligation to resist their government if it is committing crimes against humanity. Second, they based their innocence on the “necessity defense,” which allows citizens to break a law when imminent danger is present and all normal channels of addressing the threat have proven ineffective. The jury was not persuaded by their defense and the judge imposed prison sentences ranging from 18 months to 10 years (Laffin 2003).

These long prison sentences were designed to deter others from following the activists’ example. But it did not work. Within months, more Plowshares actions had occurred. Within a few years, the movement expanded overseas. Between 1980 and 2006, roughly 50 Plowshares campaigns took place in the United States and dozens more have happened in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Republic of Ireland, and Australia (Nepstad 2008).

MOVEMENT BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES

The Plowshares movement was deeply influenced by earlier Catholic movements against war, particularly the Catholic Worker movement. Under the leadership of Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, Catholic Workers combined direct action campaigns with traditional works of mercy – such as providing food and shelter for the destitute. During the Vietnam War, numerous Catholic Workers were imprisoned for burning their draft cards. Subsequently, a group of radical Catholics plotted ways to shift the antiwar movement from protest to resistance. One of these Catholics was Philip Berrigan, a Josephite priest. He called upon activists to obstruct the US government’s capacity to wage war. Toward that end, in October 1967, he and three others entered Baltimore’s Selective Service office, grabbed conscription files, and doused them with blood. While they awaited trial, they planned another draft board raid. This time, Philip Berrigan was joined by his brother, Jesuit priest Daniel Berrigan, and seven others. Over the next several years, dozens
of draft board raids occurred throughout the United States.

After the Berrigans served prison terms for the draft board raids, they wanted to apply the same dramatic tactics to the escalating arms race. Yet they knew that few could survive the consequences of such high-cost activism without a support system that could provide moral encouragement and assistance with family responsibilities. Hence they began building faith-based communities devoted to war resistance. Philip Berrigan and fellow activist Elizabeth McAlister established a commune in Baltimore in 1973 named Jonah House. One Jonah House resident, John Schuchert, proposed the idea of a plowshares action after attending vigils at the Philadelphia-area GE plant. Convinced that they had to obstruct the production of genocidal weaponry, he realized that activists could enter the GE plant with small hammers concealed in their coat pockets. Such an action would symbolize the prophecy of beating swords into plowshares. Eventually, eight individuals – including Philip and Daniel Berrigan – decided to implement Schuchert’s idea, thereby launching the Plowshares movement (Nepstad 2008).

MOVEMENT LONGEVITY

Over time, leaders devised various techniques to sustain the Plowshares movement. One way that they have successfully recruited and retained activists has been through the development of a theology of resistance that justifies these tactics as part of the biblical prophetic tradition. A second technique has been to provide a strong commune-based support system that offers assistance with emotional, material, and family needs, thereby enabling individuals to overcome the obstacles to high-risk activism. Thus, despite the serious costs associated with Plowshares activism – including prison sentences as long as 18 years – the movement has shown remarkable longevity, persisting for more than three decades.

SEE ALSO: Antiwar and peace movements; High and low risk/cost activism; Instrumental versus expressive action; Religion and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements

HELENA FLAM

Recently social movement research has opened to the idea that emotions are important to collective action. Social movements challenge emotions, such as loyalty, gratitude, or love, that cement society, and reinforce the established institutions and relations of domination. They also redirect (empathy, anger, loyalty), weaken (fear, in-group animosities), convert (shame into anger) or intensify (anger with the opponent, in-group solidarity) the emotions of their members to sustain the momentum, help win over accidental onlookers and deal with movement opponents (Flam & King 2005). An entire spectrum of emotions in various constellations plays a role in social movement mobilization, internal dynamics, and demise. Of these solidarity, shame, anger, pride, and fear receive most attention.

Grief – whether contemporaneous and real, remembered or anticipated/imagined – should also be acknowledged as an emotion mobilizing for collective action, even though this mobilization may be apolitical. The grieving mothers’ movements are energized by grief. They make an issue of the disappeared or murdered political activists, or – potential or real – victimized military recruits, endangered deserters, missing, maimed, or killed soldiers.

Grief is a composite, “flip-flop emotion” or an emotion with typical derivatives – either way it is complex. Individual mothers when on their own strongly differ in how they react to the death, “disappearance,” or maltreatment of their children: (1) they may experience shock, disorientation, or panic; (2) their grief may be combined with a number of feelings such as pain, despair, guilt, anger, helplessness, melancholy, insecurity, anxiety, fear, hope; (3) in terms of actual conduct, they may become either paralyzed and depressed or overactive, either withdrawn or outgoing, either extremely anxious or calm.

Grief can mobilize for politicized collective action. In the early 1980s the German Democratic Republic (GDR) introduced the unisex military draft. It was anticipated or imagined past grief that led a few young East German female dissidents to dress in black and attempt to cross a central square in East Berlin to post their protest letter to the GDR leaders. They were brutally arrested, but once freed they established Women for Peace. The Israeli Women in Black, who since 1988 have held weekly vigils against the Israeli occupation of the Palestine territories, have also either imagined or experienced in person the grief of women losing “their men” in war. Their vigils sometimes include Palestinian women, and they sympathize with their losses as well. Mobilized Latin American mothers said they were grieving not only their losses but also “the insecurity and future of [their] children and grandchildren” (Schirmer 1989: 21).

Grief does not guarantee politicized collective action. The apolitical commemorative practices of some rural Russian grieving mothers just like those of their Nicaraguan or Chilean counterparts underline this point. Mothers who come together in recognition of their mutual grief may wish to quietly remember their disappeared or fallen sons or act on grief’s energizing elements/derivatives such as defiance, anger, hate, and/or hope in relationship to their opponent(s). If – as Western experts claim – grief indeed involves denial of the loss, the wish to reverse it, and find somebody to blame, then these particular grief-particles show elective affinity with politicized collective action.

Grieving mothers themselves stress that as a shared emotion grief can be said to evoke immediate mutual understanding/empathy and accelerated bonding among those affected.
politics of grief and grieving “mothers” movements

by it (Vidal in Schirmer 1989: 18; Shatan in Schirmer 1989: 23; Oushakine 2009: 222, 254–258; Jagudina 2009: 35–47). It helps to underwrite a long-term commitment to each other, shared collective pain, thoughts, actions, and goals. It thus creates a stability necessary but insufficient to reconfigure the world. The extent of reconfiguration or reframing seems predicated mainly upon internal group dynamics, although the type of losses suffered, the national myths, and the changing legal-political context also play a role.

Grief is not a just a matter of rhetoric. The politics of grief – that is, the conflicting discourses that aim to define whether or not it is legitimate and to set down the when-who-how of grief as well as its intensity and duration – do have an emotion as an ultimate experiential basis.

Mothers’ movements make a bid for respect, if their societies bestow it on the figure of a mother. Catholicism elevates the mother of Jesus, Mary, to a saint, and – in the Pietà – glorifies her devotion and pensive commiseration with the sacrifice of his life for mankind in the name of/for his father. Nationalism venerates mothers, claiming both woman’s reproductive powers and her sacrifice of her son(s) for the national collective in wars. Both reduce woman to the sacrificial, apolitical, and asexual mother role. In exchange for acquiescence these ideologies offer veneration. Authoritarian regimes often rely both on intensified nationalism and religion for legitimation – they valorize motherhood and traditional family values (Schirmer 1989: 4–5, 25–26). Grieving mothers play on this venerated, sacred mother figure for greater legitimacy.

The case of the pioneering Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, Argentina – the first 14 mothers marched on April 13, 1977 – cautions against equating claim to an elevated and protected status with its automatic acquisition. The authoritarian Argentinian junta and bystanders initially dismissed the “grieving mothers” as “las locas” (the crazy ones). (Most power-holders at first ridicule mother-activists; in Israel Knesset members referred to Mothers against Silence as “the merry women of Dizengoff St” or “hysterical women.”) Civic courage, shown by mothers’ decision to stage public collective action in repressive regimes, their long-term commitment and perseverance despite arrests, killings, and disappearances decimating their own as yet modest ranks, their growing numbers, and Western support are among the factors necessary to insure their elevated and protected status.

SOLDIERS’ MOTHERS

Women’s antiwar protest can take sexualized forms. In Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, women grieving over many “sons of Athens” lost in the Peloponnesian War, were moved by their remembered or anticipated grief (“we bear sons who go off to fight far away” and “instead of enjoying the pleasures of love and making the best of our youth and beauty, we are left to languish far from our husbands, who are all with the army… our girls growing old in lonely grief”) to go on a sex strike against the war. A recent antiwar sex strike took place in Kenya in May of 2009.

Rather than mobilizing women as sexual beings, in 1870 American writer and philosopher Julia Ward Howe tried to establish a mothers’ day as a day of protest against the war. She wrote “Mother’s Day Proclamation” as a wife and mother, evoking women’s grief, condemning war-related bestialization of men, and calling for an international women’s congress to establish peace. Her Austrian counterpart Bertha von Suttner wrote a very influential book, Lay Down Your Arms, in 1889 in which she showed war caused pain and suffering from a women’s perspective. She became a major pacifist animating many peace groups and congresses.

Although women pacifists had their own organizations within the American, British, and German women’s movements, they did not play a central role, as shown by their modest
numbers but also the fact that only a minority did not give up their antiwar stand when their countries engaged in World War I.

It is unclear to what extent contemporary non-Western movements are aware of these predecessors. The Russian and Nicaraguan soldiers’ mothers movements illustrate their vastly differing activities and typical cleavage lines dividing such movements: apolitical and politicized, urban and rural, dissenting and collaborating groups or activity phases.

Generation after generation of Nicaraguan women have been losing their sons and husbands in (civil) wars. The first Nicaraguan mothers’ organization was formed out of concern for welfare issues but also as a response to Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s strategy of using disappearances of young activists to unsettle and terrorize Nicaraguan society. When the Sandinistas came to power, the organization changed its name to the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs (Bayard de Volo 2004). These mothers’ grief was encouraged, honoured, and harnessed to the Sandinista cause. When the Sandinistas came to power, the organization changed its name to the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs (Bayard de Volo 2004). These mothers’ grief was encouraged, honoured, and harnessed to the Sandinista cause. When the Sandinistas began sending out military draft commissions across the country, in one town mothers actually staged a mass blockade which rendered recruiters powerless. From 1980 to 1984 Mothers Against the Draft mobilized to boycott such recruitment efforts. Anticipating that the real grief of mothers whose sons died while in the Sandinista army would turn into hatred of the Sandinista regime, the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs visited newly bereaved mothers – either ahead of or with their bodies – to stand by them, but also to turn their grief, resentment, and anger against Somoza and the Contras rather than the Sandinista regime. A decade later, in the reconciliation phase, the Association of Mothers and Relatives of the Kidnapped and Disappeared gathered mothers whose grief about their disappeared children had been marginalized and forgotten (Tully 1995).

In the Soviet Union and, later, Russia, women have been pushed into the roles of the asexual Soviet worker, patriotic-militaristic, self-sacrificing Mother Russia, primitive apolitical “baba,” or sweet and caring “babushka.” Encouraged in the early 1980s by the pro-reform military upset about skyrocketing peacetime suicides related to extreme hazing, women who refused to be pushed into these acquiescent roles cooperated with draft commissions to abolish the worst abuses. Similarly, highly educated students’ mothers from big cities mobilized against unfair and corrupt draft practices no longer exempting students. They petitioned, lobbied, and staged vigils and demonstrations for reforms. The first soldiers’ mothers organization, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM), was set up in 1989; by early 2000 it claimed 300 regional committees and 2500 activists (Jagudina 2009: 163–180). These provided legal counsel and practical help to deserters, young men trying to avoid conscription, new recruits trying to escape life-threatening dangers of peer harassment and premature battle. In the late 1980s and early 1990s dissenting urban mothers broke the silence about the secret draft criteria, the hazing system, corruption, cruelty, and mass starvation leading to desertion, suicides, and non-combat deaths among soldiers. They also supported reformers pushing for a voluntary army and sat on an investigative presidential commission.

In 1989 the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. In 1994 they invaded Chechnya. That year CSM was the first Russian organization to issue an antiwar statement. Mobilized mothers protested against the war, organizing marches to find missing soldiers and reclaim their sons. In 1995 300 women walked from Moscow to Grozny in a March of Maternal Compassion. The activists also picketed the Duma (lower house of the Russian parliament), went on hunger strike, and wrote 110 appeals to grant amnesty to runaways, evaders, and captive soldiers. In 1998–1999 they mobilized for amnesty and in 1999–2000, when the Russian army invaded Chechnya again, they mobilized against the war. After terrorist bombings in Russian cities, nationalism and militarism intensified, compelling
soldiers’ mothers to invest in organizational consolidation and networking, while pressing for lists of the wounded, dead, and disappeared as well as for respectful treatment of their bodies. CSM claim to represent 4 million soldiers and sailors, and 8 million parents. In 2004 they infuriated Russian authorities when they initiated peace talks with exiled Chechen fighters. In the same year the United People’s Party of Soldiers’ Mothers was established with the aim of pushing through military reforms.

Rural soldiers’ mothers sometimes assisted in the daily work of the draft boards and military administration, and helped the impoverished parents of fallen soldiers to claim their rights to financial compensation, medical care, and discounts on state-provided utilities, but they have remained apolitical and poor, focused on initiating, co-shaping, and carrying out commemorative – more or less public – actions (Jagudina 2009; Oushakine 2009: 212–218). While the urban soldiers’ mothers cheered when in 1988 Gorbachev condemned the war in Afghanistan as a grave mistake, rural mothers reeled at this turnabout which deprived the deaths of their sons of any sense or dignity – their concern was to ensure that they would be remembered as heroes, while their own “unnoticed grief and ignored pain” (Oushakine 2009: 219) would resurface in personal narratives, social networks, and public space (Jagudina 2009: 172; Oushakine 2009: 208, 211). For most this was the only way to claim social and symbolic significance.

The Palestinian mothers of “martyrs” constitute a contrasting case. They are under massive lay and religious pressure to seem euphoric upon hearing that their children – as suicide bombers, terrorists killed in action, or children accidentally killed by a roaming bomb – turned “heroes” upon their deaths. While they are in a state of shock and despair, they are denied the right to cry openly. Instead they are urged to “ululate” in celebration as well as to prepare a joyful feast (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2003: 392). In a society in which religious, patriarchal, and political pressures combine with the low veneration of mothers, it is unrealistic to expect either individual or collective expressions of grief.

Mothers of the disappeared

“Forced disappearance” may include abduction, torture, secret imprisonment and murder. It became the primary instrument of the governments in Guatemala, beginning in 1966; Chile beginning in late 1973; and Argentina after March 1976. . . .over 90,000 people have disappeared in Latin America [by the end of the 1980s]. . . .secret and anonymous disappearances give no evidence and provide no identification of either the victim or the perpetrator. . . .victims or relatives. . . .are meant to suffer silently. . . .alone. The victim is denied martyrdom; those left behind are prohibited the final ritual of bereavement. . . .(Amnesty International in Schirmer 1989: 5)

Because it is not absolutely certain that the people who have been arrested or kidnapped are dead, there remains hope, with many relatives translating . . . uncertainty into . . . protest . . . publicly . . . chronic mourners. . . . refuse to allow themselves and their relatives to be forgotten. (Schirmer 1989: 25, emphasis added.)

In several Latin American countries mainly female, mostly apolitical, relatives of the disappeared entered the public arena to break the silence about the disappearances employed by the authoritarian states as a means of political repression. They demanded information about the fate of the disappeared, countered open defamation of the victims as terrorists, subversives, or traitors and pressed for “the truth” about those responsible for state terror. Later they also tried to debunk the derisive and accusing statements attributing blame for disappearances and killings to mothers and wives (Schirmer 1989: 20, 25). They usually started as just a few, and in a few years were joined by thousands of demonstrators and activists. While demonstrating, they carried photos or placards of their relatives, flowers, or lit candles, wore white scarves or t-shirts with their names, blocked traffic, made noise with musical instruments, spread leaflets, went on hunger strikes (e.g., the Long Hunger Strike in Chile in 1978)
or chained themselves to or entered government buildings, and travelled to Western organizations and selected Latin American countries to testify. They continued their rounds of police stations, hospitals, prisons, detention centers, morgues, and cemeteries, but also petitioned governments, asked police for information, and politicians for interviews, and presented writs of habeas corpus to the national supreme courts. They also started documenting cases of disappearance based on the testimonies of relatives and witnesses, and turned into experts on human rights. When the first mass graves were discovered, they – as was the case in Chile in 1979 – staged long marches to hold masses there, and/or responded like the Argentinian mothers, leaving no doubt about their priorities: “we don’t want a tomb to cry at, we want to know who was responsible and we want them in prison” (Fischer in Howe 2006: 46).

Even when repressive authoritarian regimes later acknowledged the women’s right to feel pain about the disappearance or murder of their relatives, they demanded its individual and private, not public, expression. After trying silencing by repression, several tried to buy silence with laws offering financial compensation or benefits. Typically, once the authoritarian regime was replaced by a democratic one or put on democratic feathers, even when freshly uncovered mass graves turned the pain of uncertainty into grief over losses brought about by certain politically motivated killings, political leaders still refused to acknowledge and take responsibility for state terror. They dismissed disappearances as cases of personal deviance or domestic problems for which they blamed mothers and wives. Even when they recognized disappearances and killings as political, they approved or applied amnesties. Governments either outright refused to or procrastinated in setting up investigative commissions and prosecuting the guilty, leaving the military and security forces unscathed. Under the pressure of grieving mothers and other human rights organizations, with great reluctance some finally gave in, but half-heartedly or falsifying evidence, adding insult to injury and injustice. Just like the previous authoritarian leaders, their more democratic successors wanted to silence the mobilized women. With time, hope turned into “disappointment and growing cynicism with the legal apparatus” (Schirmer 1989: 20).

Even when forced to recognize the extent of political killings, the new political leaders called for forgetting the past and urged moving on in the name of reconciliation and national unity. Those mobilized mothers who refused to heed these calls, although accused of hindering the democratic processes, continue until today what they had done all along: “present themselves to the public as . . . chronic mourners who refuse to allow themselves and their relatives to be forgotten” (Schirmer 1989: 25).

Official discourses and rituals of reconciliation frame and privilege modes of bereavement desired by the state, the military, and the media, while they negate the experiences of the tens of thousands of people who endured or opposed human rights abuses. They close public spaces to the calls for justice and the justified expressions of rage.

Against the official forgetting the Madres de Plaza de Mayo continue their weekly marches, which remind anybody willing to look that 30,000 persons are still unaccounted for. They have been at it for 33 years. They still wear white headscarves and move silently around. Their headscarves symbolize both their solidarity and diapers. Some mothers stitched into their scarves the names of their disappeared children and the date when they disappeared. Others carry their pictures. Many need a stick to be able to walk.

In Chile, set against the military pretense of having always stood the guardian of the nation, the constrained state commemorations, investigations, and official memory sites, aggravated by the alienating media spectacle of remembering, both apolitical and politicized collective gatherings serve to “[r]eclaim . . . discursive and symbolic space for individual and collective mourning” (Grunebaum 2002: 309). Although they do not involve just mothers, perhaps because these are now freed from the
pressure to act on their own, they convey a clear message: not all, but some “orphans of regime transition” do not allow the official politics of mourning to make them relinquish their rage, their sense of betrayal, and their painful memories of the past. Their commemorative ceremonies may be a private event during which a few family members and ex-fellow-prisoners first circle a crypt of a young man, who first “disappeared” and was later found dead, then listen to a quiet mass (Frazier 1999: 105, 110–112). Alternatively they may entail human rights activists returning to the now empty mass grave in a prison camp, praying or crying for justice, and honouring the dead. The subversion of official memory may take yet another form – of an energetic, politicized funeral procession complete with politicians, human rights activists, and journalists, banners and signs, chanting and marching, and determination not to forget that there were mass killings and no “war” during the junta regime.

All the examples cited here show that grieving mothers and (post-)authoritarian political regimes as a rule engage in conflicts about the general legitimacy of expressing grief and the particular forms its expression should take. The activists, local authorities, politicians, and the media fight or negotiate with each other over: (1) the proper sphere (private or public) for expressing; (2) the intensity and medium of expressing (quiet dignified through loud to ridiculously bombastic); (3) the site for expressing (central, peripheral; city square, special walls, halls, monuments etc., mass grave, cemetery, community rooms, own apartment); (4) the form of expressing (private vs. collective vs. state rituals, monuments, museums, archives); and (5) the symbols for expressing grief (personalized, such as photos; collective, such as black dresses, logo T-shirts, white scarves, or self-made photo and recollection albums; or politicized, top-down regime-signifiers such as war monuments). Conflicts and negotiations, and even evasion, also determine (6) the caretaker responsibilities, that is, who is in charge of expressing grief.

SEE ALSO: Collective memory and social movements; Emotion and social movements; Emotion work; Repression and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Postcommunism and social movements
ONDŘEJ CÍSAR

Social movements in the postcommunist world are generally believed to be underdeveloped and weak. Given that various social movements and their organizations form a standard group of collective political actors in the established democracies nowadays, one might even wonder whether the extant regimes in postcommunist East Central Europe can at all claim to be real democracies. In terms of political mobilization, they seem to be miles away from the Western social movement societies, defined by the presence of capable, institutionalized, and professionalized activist organizations (Meyer & Tarrow 1998). Going beyond the East/West dichotomy, this entry presents a more complex picture of postcommunist social movement activism.

Although communist regimes were based on a particular form of forced and ritualized collective action, such as May 1 marches, through which the citizens periodically manifested their support for the regimes, independent and officially recognized social movements did not exist in nondemocratic settings. In order to demonstrate their loyalty, citizens participated in official state-controlled organizations, which were sometimes able to provide those involved with a limited room for quasi-independent activity at their margins (Fagan 2004).

Although some individuals took part in antiregime dissident collective action, with the notable exception of Poland (the Solidarity movement), it never became a mass-based phenomenon in communist regimes. Generally, collective action and social movement activity were expropriated by the communist regimes, which ideologically identified their origins in the working class movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rhetorically, communist regimes even supported some of the Western-based new social movements, such as peace and feminist movements, since they claimed the movements’ goals were consistent with the official communist regimes’ anticapitalist and anti-imperialist agenda.

The conditions for the independent existence of social movements were created only after the fall of the communist regimes in 1989. In a nutshell, as part of the precarious democratization process the new regimes opened up and sometimes unwittingly provided a wide range of social movement organizations with opportunities for political action. However, despite the opening opportunities, the overall level of citizen engagement and participation in social movements remained very low in postcommunist Europe (Howard 2003). There are at least two reasons for this low level of engagement.

First, since the old regimes identified with and were based on a ritualized version of political mobilization and activism, collective action continued to be viewed as part of communism even after its fall. And although antiregime collective mobilization was understood as a legitimate way of political expression when it was aimed at the nondemocratic regimes, it suddenly started to be seen as illegitimate after the old regimes had successfully been toppled. In general, collective action and protest did not belong to the democratic polity, which was supposed to be based on regular elections only. To put it bluntly, the “specter of Joseph Schumpeter” has been haunting postcommunist Europe since then: while protest is the way to face the nondemocratic regime, it is no way to address political problems under the conditions of democracy. According to this understanding, protest is the indication of a nondemocratic problem, not a part of a standard democratic solution (see also Saxonberg 2003).

Second, as many commentators point out, political freedoms acquired in the new
democratic regimes were not viewed as an opportunity to finally express genuine social needs, but as an opportunity not to participate at all. For postcommunist citizens, freedom literally meant the liberal notion of “freedom from politics,” not a republican concept of freedom to “take part in politics.” The result was general nonparticipation and social movements weakness, which according to Western observers equals to political apathy, cynicism, and alienation from politics on the part of postcommunist citizenry.

FOUR TYPES OF POSTCOMMUNIST ACTIVISM

However, there is at least one exception to this rule, namely trade unions, which enjoyed mass participation under communism, and maintained their relatively participatory character even after its fall. Hence, although political activism in postcommunist Europe is generally defined by low levels of individual participation, this activist type is mostly based on membership organizations, albeit their membership has steadily declined since 1989. Their functioning logic is path-dependent, since these organizations inherited mass membership from the pre-1989 period, either in the form of officially existing regime-controlled organizations or in the form of mass movement against the communist regime (the Solidarity movement in Poland). This participatory activism can be seen as the first type of postcommunist social movement activism.

Compared to other types of social movement activism (see below), the participatory one organizes fewer collective action events, since it relies on formalized and conventional interaction with the political system. Trade unions are integrated in the policy process through institutionalized channels such as tripartite institutions, which were emulated in postcommunist Europe after the West European model. However, according to some researchers, they failed to incorporate genuine working-class interests and only helped the postcommunist political elite to tame trade unions. According to this diagnosis, unions were thus effectively disabled in their effort to advocate the needs of employees severely affected by postcommunist transformation hardships (Ost 2000).

This trade union participatory activism is based on relatively broad membership. The union organizations are thus able to mobilize many people in protest activities in the streets once they opt for protest strategies. In terms of action repertoire, this activist form is characterized by a reliance on a limited number of standard nonviolent strategies such as the petition, demonstration, and strike, which is particularly important for this type. New “cultural” strategies associated primarily with the new social movements, such as performances or happenings, are not utilized very often. The dominant category of demands for this activist form constitutes economic claims and demands concerned with public policies. Participatory activism is clearly materialist in its orientation (Ekiert & Kubik 2001). Drawing on their inherited membership base, trade unions mostly rely on membership contributions: the prevailing mechanism of resource access is individual aggregation. Among other postcommunist social movements, they are a notable exception in this respect, which is due to their roots in pre-1989 organizations.

While most existing studies equate generally low postcommunist participation with weak civil societies and nonexistent social movements, a small, yet growing, body of literature challenges the skeptical account by pointing out a peculiar nonparticipatory activist type, so-called transactional activism, apparently characteristic of postcommunist countries, which is overlooked by those who focus on individual participation only (Petрова & Tarrow 2007; Cisař 2010). Transactional activism, based predominantly on small advocacy organizations in sectors such as the environment and women’s and human rights, is foreign-assistance driven. Transactional activist organizations have derived their resources mainly from external agencies, via patronage.
In the first half of the 1990s, these organizations were supported by American and European state and nonstate actors; since the end of the 1990s European Union (EU) funds have become the most important source of funding. Among the most active supporters of civil society in postcommunist Europe were US-based private foundations, such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and, most important among them, the network of Soros’s Open Society Fund. Apart from private foundations, projects funded by USAID and individual European states were in operation in the region in the 1990s. Also, one of the important sources of funding was the EC/EU program Phare. The Phare program was originally designed to assist postcommunist countries with economic transformation and political reforms; later on the mission changed to helping the accession countries to get ready for EU membership (Mendelson & Glenn 2002). With the EU membership of postcommunist countries approaching (postcommunist countries of East Central Europe became full EU members in 2004), EU funds assumed a much greater role.

Put more concretely, “Americanization” of postcommunist social movement organizations (SMOs) was replaced by “Europeanization,” which further deepened the trends already introduced in the early 1990s, namely their institutionalization, organization capacity building, bureaucratization, and professionalization (Fagan 2005; Čísař & Vrábková 2010). Most environmental and women’s and human rights organizations and movements presently receive some form of international, often EU, funding. And the dependence on international funding has made it possible for these organizations to survive organizationally, even without the need to mobilize resources from individual members and/or supporters, which would be a nearly impossible task in the postcommunist situation of politically rather disinterested populations. In other words, international funding created the conditions for the model previously labeled in the context of US politics as “advocates without members” (Skocpol 2004) to develop in postcommunist Europe as well.

When defining transactional activism, Petrova and Tarrow (2007: 79) underscore the capacity of this activist type to network and establish “ties—enduring and temporary—among organized nonstate actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions.” The presence of this type among postcommunist organizations demonstrates that even though the local organizations generally display low levels of organizational membership, they are able to engage in advocacy-based activism and interorganizational networking. In fact, they substitute for their lack of mobilization capacity by transactional capacity building.

Although data is not available for all postcommunist countries, this activist type seems to account for most of the protest events sponsored by SMOs. As for the size of membership and collective action, transactional SMOs are unable to mobilize a wide following. Their organizations are often based on a couple of dedicated activists and their protests are attended by dozens or hundreds of individuals at the most. In terms of action repertoire, transactional activists employ a somewhat wider portfolio of strategies than the previous category. While they very often resort to nonviolent demonstration and petitioning, they also utilize “cultural” strategies, such as performance, exhibition, and festival.

Issues associated with ecology and the environment, animal rights, and human and civic rights and freedoms are usually the basis of the transactional activists’ political demands. Transactional activists do not articulate economic demands; on the contrary, they display clearly postmaterialist orientation in the structure of their claims. Importantly, in some postcommunist countries these demands surpassed their materialist counterparts. While
Ekiert & Kubik (2001) found, in the beginning of the 1990s, almost no “postmaterialist” demands commonly associated with the new social movements in Poland, these demands, counted as the sum of environmental and human-rights-related claims, constituted one-third of all demands in the Czech Republic, 1993–2005 (see Císař 2010).

Radicalism is a third type of social movement activism that has developed in postcommunist Europe. While the mainstream SMOs display a clearly diversified portfolio of strategies, which indicates that they do not rely on extra-institutional direct action only, radicals engage almost exclusively in demonstrations and direct action. In other words, this difference makes it obvious that radicals remain an extra-institutional political force. Both radical Left movements, which are interested in radical change of the capitalist economy, and radical Right and nationalist organizations, which attack the fundamentals of the present liberal state such as minority rights (e.g., homosexuals in Poland; Roma in Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary), fall into this category of activism. This activist form is based on decentralized activist networks and organizational efforts of individual activists. Radical activists mobilize even fewer individuals than transactional activists, since their demands usually fall outside what is generally regarded as socially acceptable. In postcommunist settings, this concerns especially radical Left organizations, which are unable to get any resonance for their anticapitalist demands discredited by the former communist regimes. On the other hand, radical Right associations, especially racist and nationalist ones, seem to have greater resonance in the postcommunist world (e.g., Hungary, Poland, but also other states).

Compared to the other activist types, the radical strategic repertoire includes a relatively large number of violent direct actions. Radical activist demands often concern issues of national security (radical Right) and foreign policy (radical Left). Both radical Left and Right convene on the criticism of international institutions, especially the EU. However, the two ideologically different camps usually clash in conflicts over other issues. These groups strive to maintain their independence by being dependent on sources generated by their own means. These are, most notably, volunteering, individual contributions, revenues from journal sales, and benefit performances. In other words, they derive their sources via self-production.

For radicals, more than for other activist types, it is not only availability, but also perceived il/legitimacy that determines what counts as a resource. A particular funding method is not understood instrumentally so much as it is seen as an important part of their political expression. From this vantage point, the collective identity of a group is not only defined by its program and demands but also by how the group supports itself. Its collective identity is defined not only by what the group wants to get, but also by how it wants to get it. In the words of a radical Left activist, “independent thinking requires independent money.” As a result, radical activists’ budgets remain comparatively very small.

Civic self-organization, consisting of collective action mobilized without the involvement of an organization or a group, constitutes the fourth type of activism in postcommunist societies. This type seems a somewhat surprising form of collective action capacity among postcommunist citizens and partially questions the skeptical diagnoses of the state of postcommunist civil society based on individual level data on nonparticipation. The important presence of this seemingly organization-independent and often episodic collective action has been demonstrated in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Collective mobilizations of this type tend to be numerous and at the same time small in size. The action repertoire seems to be dominated by petition and nonviolent demonstration, and the portfolio of self-organizations’ claims is quite varied.

As the events in this category take place without direct involvement of organizations and platforms, financial start-up costs are limited.
These costs typically can be derived from the pockets of those directly involved in the action. Dedicated individuals, probably experienced in social and/or political organizing, are a condition for this type of activism to take place. On the other hand, organizers might be individuals temporarily mobilized by some “precipitating event” who would suddenly find themselves in a position to (co-)organize some type of protest.

Social movement and citizen activism in postcommunist Europe cannot be fully captured by a single concept, such as a nonparticipatory or advocacy activism, alone. The pattern of political activism is diverse, including at least four different ways by which political activists organize and express their grievances. At the same time, available research demonstrates the relative importance of transactional activism among other activist forms. This particular type of activism shows that although large numbers of individuals do not politically participate in the postcommunist countries, a stratum of relatively effective policy advocates has nevertheless developed in the region after the fall of communism. Even if there is no individual participation on the micro level, there is a lot of action on the organizational level. In this respect, postcommunist social movements seem to resemble their contemporary counterparts in established democracies, which no longer seem to rely on mass-based contentious action either, more than one might expect (see Meyer & Tarrow 1998; Sampson et al. 2005).

SEE ALSO: Civil society; Democratization and democratic transition; Direct action; Eastern European social movements; Movement society; Radicalism; Solidarity (Poland); Strikes within the European context; Strikes in US history.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


QCA and fuzzy set applications to social movement research

CHARLES C. RAGIN and ALESIA ALEXANDROVNA SEDZIAKA

Much of social life is routine and highly repetitive. Social actors appear to be either constrained by norms or driven by the pursuit of mundane self-interest. For this reason, many social scientists are drawn to the study of non-routine events, especially those that are large scale and collective in nature. Of special interest are events that are culturally, historically, or politically significant in some way – big events that stand out as qualitative departures from the stream of everyday social life. The extreme case of departure from routine is the social revolution, where there is a concerted, collective effort not only to topple an existing state but also to reshape the social order. Of course, social revolutions are rare, as are “mere” political revolutions. Fortunately, however, many of the analytic attractions of revolutions are also present in the study of social movements and other forms of collective action. In many respects, such phenomena provide the opportunity to study large-scale social change in embryonic form.

It is not only their qualitative nature – the fact that they represent significant departures from and challenges to routine social life – that draws the attention of social scientists to social movements and related phenomena. Another feature that makes them an important object of inquiry is that the conditions for their realization are often topographical in nature. That is, for these phenomena to occur at all, a number of conditions typically must be met or satisfied in some way. It is useful to think of these conjunctions of conditions as “causal recipes.” If any one of the essential ingredients is lacking, then the outcome (e.g., collective action of some sort) may not occur or may fail in some other way. To complicate matters a bit, there are often multiple recipes – different combinations of conditions – linked to the same general outcome. A central goal of research on social movements and collective action is to unravel the relevant causal recipes and to specify their various ingredients.

This interest in studying the “causal recipes” linked to “qualitative outcomes” dovetails with key features of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an analytic technique first introduced in the late 1980s (Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). QCA builds on the logic of qualitative, case-oriented research as it is practiced in comparative sociology and comparative politics. Typically, scholars in these fields examine only a few cases at a time, but their analyses are both intensive – addressing many aspects of cases – and integrative – examining how the different parts of each case fit together, both contextually and historically. By formalizing the logic of this type of analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring some of the empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases. QCA uses set-theoretic methods of comparison, representing each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. These combinations can be compared with each other as configurations and then logically simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison. Computer algorithms developed by electrical engineers in the 1950s provide techniques for simplifying this type of evidence. The data matrix is reformulated as a “truth table” and then logically simplified. These procedures mimic case-oriented comparative methods but accomplish the most cognitively demanding task – making multiple comparisons of case configurations – through computer algorithms. The goal of QCA is to summarize – in a logical, shorthand manner – the information in a truth table regarding the
different combinations of conditions linked to a specific outcome.

The affinity between QCA and the study of social movements is apparent in the fact that many of the first applications of QCA involved phenomena related to social movements. In The Comparative Method (1987), for example, Ragin offers two such applications: the comparative study of ethnic political mobilization among linguistic minorities in Western Europe and a reanalysis of Stein Rokkan’s study of the conditions linked to schisms in working-class movements. Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Ragin 2000) presents a detailed set-theoretic analysis of the condition linked to mass protest against austerity measures demanded of debtor countries by the International Monetary Fund. Another example: Ragin (1995) reanalyzes data from William Gamson’s The Strategy of Social Protest, focusing on the different causal recipes linked to the success of challenging groups in their efforts to secure new advantages for their constituents.

QCA has been adopted by a variety of social movement researchers and applied to a wide array of social movement topics. The remainder of this entry highlights a few of these efforts.

Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan (1992), for example, use QCA to identify the conditions that allow social movements to win positive outcomes for their constituents. They examine the implications of the Townsend Movement for old-age policies and movement acceptance in the US and argue that political context mediates the influence of organization and strategic action on movement success. They suggest that undemocratic political systems and patronage-based political parties, bureaucracies, and political coalitions as well as movement organization and action all interact in various ways, culminating in different outcomes across states. Their findings indicate that political structures in the form of extensive voting rights and open parties are essential conditions for achieving higher public pensions and that these conditions combine with organization and allies in different ways across the states. In a subsequent publication, Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005) elaborate political mediation theory showing that movement strategies are effective in some contexts, but not in others. For example, radical policy change requires favorable political conditions in combination with mobilization and assertive action. The authors use QCA to examine the role of movement mobilization and strategy in the generosity of old-age assistance programs across states. They find that little other than mobilization is needed for success in open polities, while assertive strategies must be used when circumstances are less favorable.

Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) use QCA to study the viability and outcomes of 15 social movement organizations for the homeless in eight US cities. Their analysis demonstrates the ways in which organizational, tactical, political mediation and framing factors combine to produce different outcomes (representation, resources, rights, and relief for the homeless). The study of successful SMOs highlights the importance of how well organizations articulate problems and targets of blame as well as courses of action. Cress and Snow (2000) find that viable organizations and well-articulated frames are essential conditions for SMO impact and that they produce significant outcomes in conjunction with disruptive tactics and sympathetic allies or the absence of disruption in responsive cities. In another study of SMOs for the homeless, Cress and Snow (1996) use QCA to assess the role of resources for organizational viability. They show that combinations of specific types of resources (leadership, information, and space for meeting) may be more important than their quantity and that external resources are essential for the mobilization of poor people’s movements.

McAdam et al. (2010) use fuzzy sets and QCA to study the mobilization of opposition against large infrastructure projects in developing countries. They identify combinations of causal conditions (including measures of threat, opportunity, resources, prior conflict, and host country compensation) that are linked to differences in community opposition to 11
oil and gas pipeline projects in 16 countries. They find that, among communities at risk for mobilization, environmental and social threats posed by a project are sufficient to trigger conflict. However, Western funding of projects and public consultation serve as necessary political opportunities that grant opponents access to projects and encourage high levels of contention. Interestingly, determined groups and individuals were able to organize without significant resources or prior movement activity. The authors suggest that threat and opportunity consistently work together to shape resistance to infrastructure projects.

Fuzzy-set QCA has also been applied to the study of the emergence and persistence of activism (Hagan & Hansford-Bowles 2005). The authors examine activism among the youth who moved to Canada in opposition to the Vietnam War and formed antiwar resistance. They are interested in multiple paths leading to initial activism and also to further movement involvement. The comparative analysis facilitates an examination of a diverse respondent-driven sample (as opposed to a random sample) and the analysis of individual cases as wholes. The findings indicate that the causal processes differ for initial and persistent activism, and that they also differ by gender. Pre-existing activist networks do not appear important in decisions about migration, but figure prominently in subsequent movement involvement. The experience of mutual help is an essential and transformative condition that accounts for the change from individual to collectively organized antiwar resistance. Women’s involvement in later activism is greater due to continuing ties to resisters and preimmigration experiences, while men’s activism is conditioned by leftist political attitudes and postimmigration activities.

Applications of QCA are also found in the study of unions, the labor movement, and resistance. Dixon, Roscigno, and Hodson (2004) explore the joint effect of union organization and worker solidarity on strike action. They find that the independent presence of either unions or solidarity does not lead to collective action. Rather, it is the combination of these conditions that produces outcomes – unions facilitate strikes where workers are already interconnected. QCA allows researchers to directly address this combinatorial argument. Brown and Boswell (1995) examine patterns of interracial strikebreaking and solidarity in the Great Steel Strike of 1919. They apply QCA to 16 cities involved in the strike and find that a split labor market was a necessary but not sufficient condition for black strikebreaking. The influx of minority migrants was mediated by government repressiveness and union strength. These findings support the authors’ call for the consideration of political context in accounts of racial conflict.

Wickham-Crowley applies QCA in his work on guerrillas and revolution in Latin America to suggest that multiple conditions advanced by competing theories may be responsible for the success and failure of revolutions (1993: ch. 12). He shows that guerrilla movements secured sustained peasant support under a variety of circumstances. He then suggests that multiple theories of revolutions can be integrated. Ultimately, guerrilla uprisings, peasant and worker support for guerrilla movements, guerrilla military strength, and loss of support from the US combined to produce revolutions while several paths led to failures. These conditions appear to be interrelated in that peasant support is, for example, dependent on the presence of guerrilla uprisings, while US aid to a regime is dependent on internal political dynamics.

The common thread running through these diverse applications of QCA is their concern for causal complexity. With QCA it is possible to address causal complexity even when the number of cases is modest. The key is that QCA applies techniques of configurational comparison that mimic the logic of case-oriented comparative investigation. This emphasis on identifying configurations of conditions facilitates the linking of cross-case comparative analysis with case narratives.

This selective review of applications of QCA in the study of social movements highlights
only a few studies. For other applications to social movements including such topics as union growth, strikes, human rights movements, environmental conflict and others, consult the bibliography of QCA applications at the web site Compass (2012).

SEE ALSO: Case studies and social movements; Comparative research; Ethnography and social movements; Historical research and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The Red Army Faction (RAF) was a terrorist group that was active in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1970 until its dissolution in 1998. It saw itself as an urban guerilla group. But, following Walter Laqueur’s distinction between guerillas and terrorism (1977a, 1977b), it is better characterized as a terrorist organization.

The RAF came into being in 1970, in parallel with communist groups that were offspring of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (Ausser-parlamentarische Opposition or APO). The group did not garner appreciable support among the German public. The group’s ideology may be characterized as anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and nationalist-revolutionary. Without assistance from the German Democratic Republic’s Ministry for State Security (the MfS or “Stasi”), the RAF would not have lasted as long as 1998.

Following the death of Benno Ohnesorg, a student who was killed by a policeman in West Berlin on June 2, 1967, and after April 11, 1968, when a laborer fired shots at Rudi Dutschke, the best-known spokesman for the student movement, different circles within the APO began talking about armed struggle. Rudi Dutschke himself had introduced the concept of the urban guerilla into radical discussions in 1967. Later he came to regard the notion as no-win and reactionary.

In 1969 a group centered around Dieter Kunzelmann traveled to Jordan for military training. This grouping gave birth in 1972 to the June 2 Movement. In 1970 a group centered around Horst Mahler, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, and Andreas Baader traveled to Jordan, where it also went through military training. This group called itself the RAF. The Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionären Zellen or RZ) emerged out of a group centered around the former chair of the Frankfurt SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund or Socialist German Student Union), Karl-Dietrich Wolff. In 1973 the RZ cells began to call attention to themselves with violent assaults. Karl-Dietrich Wolff remained in publishing.

All three groups attempted to ward each other off, even as they exchanged ideas and members with each other. They all saw themselves as anti-imperialist, and they maintained ties (still not well analyzed) to international terrorism. There is still no integrated history of all three groupings, but scholarly research today is at work piecing together previously existing accounts.

Thus far, researchers have distinguished three generations of the RAF. The group centered around Baader, Meinhof, and Ensslin got its bearings from the 1969 *Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla* by Carlos Marighella, and built up an infrastructure using money and weapons that were obtained in holdups. In the summer of 1972 this group launched a wave of attacks on American military installations, German police stations, and the Springer publishing conglomerate. Shortly afterward, most members of this group were captured and incarcerated.

From inside prison, the members of the RAF attempted to use an information system, supported by some of their lawyers, to construct a successor group for the purpose of demanding and obtaining their release from jail. They even succeeded in building this network through a 145-day hunger strike, from mid-September 1974 through the beginning of March 1975, and an accompanying publicity campaign against their terms of imprisonment, which they characterized as “isolation torture.” The accusation of torture, which was largely erroneous, elicited widespread sympathy in
liberal circles and Western Europe. One of the founding members of the RAF, Holger Meins, starved himself to death. He died on November 9, 1974 and his death became a beacon to the second generation. Different infrastructures for this successor generation emerged, though some were destroyed in their incipient stages.

Under new leadership, initially of the RAF attorney Siegfried Haag and later of Brigitte Mohnhaupt (who had already been imprisoned for several years owing to her support for the RAF, and who was able to confer with Baader and Ensslin in jail before she herself was released), the RAF now attempted using different assaults as a means of extortion to spring their figureheads from the group’s first generation out of jail. In 1977 one of the group’s commandos kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and, in order to intensify the pressure, a commando from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a Lufthansa passenger airplane. The hostage takers demanded the release of their jailed companions.

The federal government did not negotiate. A special commando of the Federal Border Guard liberated the passengers on the Lufthansa airline. Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe killed themselves when they recognized that the effort to extort their release had failed. Irmgard Möller wounded herself critically in a suicide attempt but survived. Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe made their suicides look like murder so that the state would be unmasked as fascistic.

Many details of the history of the RAF and of left-wing terrorism in Germany remain unexplained, since the terrorists who were subsequently jailed and indicted did nothing to help clarify the story. The justice system was dependent on circumstantial evidence and not infrequently content with having the accused sentenced because they were members or supporters of a criminal organization. Intelligence reports on the history and structure of international terrorism are frequently not accessible. So far the most profound investigations have come from journalists.

The RAF did not disband until 1998. The June 2 Movement had merged with the RAF in 1980. Little is known about the third generation of the RAF. Members of the RZ, who were active as weapons procurers for the RAF before the establishment of the Revolutionary Cells as an independent group, acted within this network more or less as hired killers for the PFLP and for the terrorist Carlos the Jackal.

Above and beyond the many unexplained substantive historical details concerning left-wing terrorist groups, how they are assessed remains highly controversial among political scientists and sociologists. Thus, for example, Jan Phillip Reemtsma (2007) has provided a good deal of solid evidence allowing him to raise the question of whether left-wing terrorist groups in the Federal Republic should even be regarded as a political phenomenon, or whether they are better characterized as something closer to gangs of failed criminals of the kind described in Dostoyevsky’s 1873 novel *Demons*. Undoubtedly the most ambitious attempt at a sociological interpretation was advanced by Norbert Elias (1997). He argues that left-wing terrorism in Japan, Italy, and Germany should be seen as a delayed outcome of the history of the former Axis powers, countries in which the ideas of civilization and of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force were traditionally highly contested. The history and structure of the RAF, the June 2 Movement, and the RZ are also subject to controversy because their founders were activists during the sociocultural upheaval of the 1960s. To this day in the Federal Republic, the emancipatory or retrograde elements of this upheaval are evaluated in highly different ways. Some scholars regard the RAF as the logical result of the ideas of 1968. For others it merely seems the result of decomposition in the many different motifs of this predominantly youthful upheaval.

SEE ALSO: Radicalism; Social control errors; Terrorist movements; Violence and social movements.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Religion and social movements
GENE BURNS and FRED KNISS

This entry summarizes some of the central foci in the literature on religion’s role in social movements. These include the study of social movements that found new religions; social movements within existing religious organizations (here organizations are broadly defined to include organized religious traditions); and the state context of religious movements, focusing especially on religion–state relationships. (The more common term is “church–state” relationships, but “religion–state” avoids using a specifically Christian term for a concept that applies to multiple religious traditions.) The entry concludes with a discussion of some of the theoretical questions that emerge from an overview of these different issues.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THAT FOUND NEW RELIGIONS

Most of what we now recognize as major “world religions” began as social movements, though not necessarily political movements. Certainly early Christianity and the Protestant Reformation are two prime examples.

The US seems to have been especially fertile ground for religious innovation. An influential explanation uses an economic metaphor: Immigration patterns combined with the constitutional disestablishment of religion in the US produced a vibrant “free market” for religious movements (Warner 1993). Innovative “producers” attempt to appeal successfully to “consumers” and “market niches,” some of which involve social spaces for groups and activities that might be unpopular in the larger society. However, there is some debate about whether the resulting voluntarism in American religion ultimately supports or threatens the social status quo (Warner 1993; Emerson & Smith 2000).

Much as the social movements of the 1960s spurred the development of resource mobilization and a rejection of Durkheimian approaches, a parallel process occurred within the sociology of religion in response to countercultural and utopian experiments of the time that took a more explicitly spiritual or religious turn. The study of “new religious movements” (NRMs), an alternative term to the pejorative label of “cults,” became a recognized literature in its own right. Stark and Bainbridge offered a rational action-based theory of the motivations, commitment, and organization involved in NRMs that shaped much of the ensuing work (Snow & Phillips 1980; Stark & Bainbridge 1985).

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Historically schisms, especially common within Protestantism, have been a central source of change within religious organizations. However, more recent sociological research has emphasized the diversity and conflict that occurs within denominations and other religious groups as a normal matter of course.

A given religious tradition can host quite diverse political possibilities. In the US, white Evangelical Protestantism, currently associated with sexual and political conservatism, has in other contexts fueled populist activism for social and political equality. White Evangelicals were, for instance, a prime base of support for economic populist and antiimperialist William Jennings Bryan, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in 1896, 1900, and 1908. Indeed, until the 1980s, white Evangelicals were a solid voting bloc for the Democratic Party, but they now lean heavily Republican (due to both changing racial and religious politics).
Given that religious groups’ internal cleavages often parallel external controversies, it is not surprising that contemporary analyses of intrareligious movements find issues of identity politics central to debates within religious traditions. For example, the place of women in the public realm (Chaves 1997) and the moral status of sexual orientation has to a great extent been argued within the churches. There is division within the US population as a whole, so that antigay political organizations have become important even as American public opinion slowly liberalizes in its tolerance of homosexuality. A similar, indeed wider, gulf has grown between the American Catholic population and the Roman hierarchy. The laity is also much more liberal on abortion than is the Catholic hierarchy (Dillon 1999). Sexual issues have also been divisive in Protestant denominations, such as the Southern Baptists. Struggles over the legitimacy of tolerance of homosexuality and abortion within Baptist theology, for instance, have remade the Southern Baptists in the wake of an intense organizational struggle over such issues (Ammerman 1990).

But religious opinion at times leads rather than follows public opinion as a whole. The US pro-life movement began as an almost entirely Catholic movement even though it is not the case that the average American Catholic is reliably pro-life. The movement took on a new dimension, however, with the rise of the Christian Right, including such right-wing organizations as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and Focus on the Family. These have drawn particular strength from white conservative evangelicals, especially in the South (Wilcox & Larson 2006).

While many American social movements have had a strong religious component, most religious adherents in the US typically do not connect their religion with political causes. Even when they do, sitting in the same congregation may be one person who interprets the faith in a right-wing direction, and another in a left-wing direction (e.g., Dillon 1999). In contemporary America, while levels of religious participation do correlate with levels of sexual conservatism, for the most part religious behavior and religious affiliation do not predict political ideology well (Williams 1997).

Thus, for instance, the Metropolitan Community Church is a pro-gay rights church founded about 40 years ago by a Southern charismatic minister within Pentecostal Protestantism, a religious tradition that has usually been antigay (Warner 1995). While the church is now more theologically diverse and arguably has achieved mainstream status, similar studies of gender politics have shown that even apparently very traditional, patriarchal religious ideology can be used by some women in incipiently feminist directions.

Not necessarily political in the standard sense, religious innovation within immigrant groups has been of increasing interest in the US. The 1965 overhaul of US immigration law, ending strict quotas that heavily favored European immigration, has dramatically increased the quantity and quality of religious and ethnic diversity especially in urban areas, but increasingly in small-town and rural areas as well. Latin America and Asia have become the primary sources of US immigration; these immigrants are probably more religious and more Christian than are the populations of their countries of origin. They also bring with them a different cultural context for religion than that of Americans of European and African origins. Once transplanted, even otherwise conservative religious ideas and organizations can easily become the basis for mobilization in defense of cultural identities or in promoting religious/cultural/ethnic revitalization. Various case studies of immigrant religion have documented this movement-like quality of transplanted religion (Warner & Wittner 1998). In some European Muslim communities, adoption of explicitly Muslim cultural markers, especially the headscarf for women, has been a defensive reaction against hostility to immigrants and especially Muslim immigrants. While many secular Europeans see the headscarf as a stubborn refusal to assimilate and leave traditional religion behind,
some women in immigrant communities have adopted the headscarf only after arriving in Europe.

A particularly complex set of religious phenomena has been labeled “fundamentalism,” an umbrella term encompassing a variety of religious ideas and movements. Usually “fundamentalism” (Marty & Appleby 1994–2004) is applied to groups with an explicit emphasis on patriarchal gender roles and on a political agenda involving the uncompromising application of religious morality in a way that more established, mainstream groups find objectionable. The term has been applied disparately to the Christian Right in the US, Islamic political movements that are involved in international conflicts (such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas), puritanical Islamic theological movements (such as Wahhabism), Hindu nationalism in India, and some orthodox Jewish groups, among other religious communities and movements. Those within the movements frequently claim to be guarding the true faith, but they typically are selective in their emphases and interpretations of religious tradition and include political causes that reflect contemporary agendas (Snow & Byrd 2007). The idea, for instance, that Islam required theocracy was hardly a long-standing position within Iranian Shia Islam before the Iranian Revolution of 1979; similarly, the Christian Right’s support for low taxes or for Israeli military policy have hardly been traditional positions among its main constituency, white Evangelical Christians. It is important to remember that tradition is often invented.

The examples listed above include groups (such as the Christian Right and al-Qaeda) that would see each other very much as enemies. The term “fundamentalism” is broadly enough applied that it includes, for instance, the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism), favored by a ruling regime that sees itself as an adversary of some anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist movements. The term, “fundamentalism,” then, is used widely and at times a bit vaguely. Scholars have sometimes too easily accepted the rhetoric of their subjects that all such movements really are a return to some long-held religious “fundamentals.”

Still, the discussion of “fundamentalism” has been an important attempt to understand the apparent power of politicized religion in recent decades. To lay as well as scholarly observers, it was striking indeed that the Christian Right and the Iranian Revolution burst upon the scene within a few years of each other. While these were hardly twin phenomena, it may well be that the so-called “new religious right” and other fundamentalist movements around the world were responding to the same globalization processes and socioeconomic strains of late capitalism that were engendering the various new religious movements. Wuthnow (1983) suggests that the political activists of the religious right walked through a door that had been opened by the countercultural left and its new religious movements. That is, the new left and the counterculture had re-legitimized the role of moral discourse in the public arena. Many of the criticisms of racial inequality and the Vietnam War during the 1960s (and, later, the Watergate scandals) were expressed in religious or moral language. And the Democrats, after all, were the first to elect a “born again” president, Jimmy Carter.

A comparison of class dynamics of different religious movements suggests that the term “fundamentalism,” while too vaguely and broadly applied, might still capture something real about a phenomenon that crosses borders. Many of those attracted to new religious movements (discussed above) are from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, and are often well-educated members of the “new class” of information and service professionals characteristic of late capitalism (Snow & Machalek 1984). Both NRMs and fundamentalist movements blur the boundary between public and private; fundamentalist movements, however, are more likely to appeal to classes that are underprivileged in the new global political economy. This may be less true of US Protestant fundamentalists, who as a group have been upwardly mobile economically since their beginning in the early twentieth century. But,
in general, they continue to come from less educated backgrounds (Wuthnow 1988), and thus are less likely to benefit from the growing dominance of the “new class.” There are also other exceptions, as sociologists have noted that fundamentalism sometimes has appeal for highly educated immigrants.

Similarly, the worldwide spread of Pentecostalism suggests that religious growth is correlated with class dynamics but in complex ways that vary from country to country. Pentecostalism is spirit-filled Christianity, involving, for instance, faith healing and speaking in tongues. In some countries, Pentecostalism appeals primarily to the middle class, while in others it appeals primarily to underprivileged classes. Among the reasons Pentecostalism may be appealing is that it builds a sense of trust among its adherents by enforcing a strict moral code and by providing a shared, intense religious experience. When popular among business people, trustworthiness may encourage commercial relationships; when popular in shantytowns, residents may be better prepared to act collectively to meet basic needs and challenge criminal elements or unresponsive governments.

RELIGION AS A FACILITATOR FOR OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

One common approach to the relationship between religious organizational dynamics and broader social movements assumes that there is not much distinctive about religious versus other motivations for social movement participation because religion can be a source of organizational resources in the same way that professional or political organizations, or social networks, can provide organizational resources. Morris’s (1984) study of the role of Southern black churches in the civil rights movement is a now-classic work in this tradition. Another prominent example is Christian Smith’s (1991) account of liberation theology in Latin America. Particularly Catholic ideas did matter (much as religious charisma mattered in Morris’s discussion of black churches), but more significant in the growth of liberation theology was that a minority of left-wing bishops effectively utilized the organizational possibilities within the Catholic Church. Similarly, in a study of the US Central American peace movement, Smith (1996) emphasizes the organizational resources provided by religion and its usefulness for framing tasks and maintaining commitment in the course of the movement.

While religious organizational resources can be central to building a social or political movement, in other cases, religious identities can be important because they include a sense of trust and loyalty, as well as provide a sense of “us” vs. “them.” For instance, Ian Paisley built a hard-line Protestant political movement in Northern Ireland after first building a new Evangelical denomination, the Free Presbyterians. He also contrasted his religious and political beliefs to those of more moderate Protestants who wanted partly to accommodate Catholics. Paisley convinced his followers that such moderates would secularize Northern Irish society, so that Protestant religious identity would no longer be a defining feature of Northern Ireland (Bruce 2007). The organizational resources of the Free Presbyterian Church mattered, as did the fact that its followers were disproportionately rural and far from prosperous. But the denomination was highly decentralized, so that resources could not be marshaled easily for political causes. It was instead the social solidarity of religious loyalties that mattered most.

A typical “commonsense” view of religion, appearing often in journalistic accounts of religious politics, suggests that a given religion has a certain set of beliefs that all its members share, and that members try to shape the world in the direction that their beliefs mandate. Such a view regularly informs news media accounts of the role of religion in politics, when, for instance, journalists assume that Catholics are particularly opposed to abortion. It also informs many academic analyses, especially outside sociology, such as Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” argument. Huntington
argued that, with the fall of Soviet-dominated communism in the late 1980s, world conflict would increasingly take the form of clashes among parts of the world with different cultural heritages, rooted primarily in religious differences. And so Huntington speaks of a Western civilization rooted in Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, an Orthodox civilization where Orthodox Christianity has been the dominant religion (a region overlapping considerably with the Soviet Union and its satellite states), an Islamic civilization in North Africa and the Middle East, and so forth. Proponents of Huntington’s argument would, for example, point to conflicts between the West and Muslim fundamentalist movements. But from such a perspective it is difficult to understand internal conflict within a purported civilization, for instance, the fact that such Muslim movements are often at odds with their own states, and the fact that the Iraq War was quite unpopular in the West. Nor does the perspective help us understand much about why religious movements – from NRMs to religious battles over sexual morality to battles over the religious or secular identity of states – are so prevalent. This cultural consensus approach has trouble explaining religious change and internal diversity in general. To take one example from Huntington’s own work, he asserts that the world went from 22 such monolithic cultures to 6 in about a century but offers no explanation of how or why such autonomous cultures can merge, change, or disappear.

A more subtle twist on this approach is Hunter’s (1991) culture wars thesis, which has been the basis of extended debate and critique (Williams 1997). Unlike Huntington, Hunter emphasizes cultural conflict within societies, but like Huntington he sees religious cultures as central. Explicitly citing Durkheim, he argues that the US has two large, mostly internally consistent cultures driving debate over many contemporary social issues. One is based more on traditional religious moral objectivism and the other moral relativism and situationalism, in both religious and secular forms. Hunter’s argument is more sophisticated than Huntington’s in that it specifically builds upon an understanding of religious change and innovation, drawing upon Wuthnow’s (1988) discussion of the breakdown of denominational identities. In Hunter’s view, the weakening of denominational division allows for cross-denominational alliances based on shared religious worldview and values that transcend religious particularities. It is not accidental that the term “culture war,” far from being a merely academic concept, has been invoked by American politicians and journalists in discussing debates over abortion, homosexuality, secularism, and religion–state relations.

In contrast to such cultural consensus perspectives, framing arguments take religious ideas seriously but focus on the way that particular religious interpretations are relevant to a particular historical context and a particular set of political opportunities. Such arguments usually build upon resource mobilization and political process models to understand how religion becomes part of a movement but see religious frames as essential to the nature and potential effectiveness of social movements in inspiring activists and connecting to a larger base of support (Smith 1991, 1996; Burns 2005).

THE CONTEXT OF RELIGION–STATE RELATIONSHIPS

Although often not made explicit, the question of religion–state relationships is central to understanding religion’s impact on other social movements. As noted earlier, what is often dubbed the “new paradigm” (Warner 1993) in the study of US religion, in contrast to the European secularization paradigm, assumes that the constitutional disestablishment of religion has been central to the diverse paths US religion has taken. That secularization paradigm (e.g., Bruce 2002) also assumes that the religion–state relationship is central but expects disestablishment to lead, in the long run, to the weakening of religious fervor.
Religion and Social Movements

The importance of religion-state relationships becomes especially clear in a comparative context. There are numerous examples of social revolutions or social and political movements, most notably in France and Mexico, with strong anticlerical components directed against an established Catholic Church, or, in the case of Turkey, established Islam. However, in cases where the old regime is perceived to be an enemy of popular religion, as in Iran, revolutionary movements can build upon religious sympathies. But even in a liberal state, there is variety in how much the regime controls religion, from largely forcing it out of public affairs—as has been more true in France—to giving religion a high degree of autonomy, as has been more true in the US.

Theoretical Directions

As implied earlier, the dominant approach in US sociology of religion is skeptical of assumptions that people sharing a religious affiliation mostly share the same beliefs and values. The dominant approach is amenable to Swidler’s (1986) view of culture as a “tool kit” rather than an overarching and internally consistent system of meaning. Thus a given religious tradition includes various ideas that can be used, like tools, to build and adjust multiple social projects.

But among the trickier questions in this “tool kit” approach is how and why a group reaches for one tool rather than another in a particular situation. Further, under what circumstances are new tools acquired, and when are longstanding tools abandoned? The answer surely lies in looking at how religion and culture interact with other social influences and constraints, but developing a systematic understanding of those interactions is no small matter. Framing studies, discussed above, have been one attempt to understand these interactions.

From a different perspective, Beckford (1985) has argued that NRMs involve new identity constructions in response to the decline of old national, ethnic, or religious identities under late capitalism and globalization. The new social movements research, though developed mostly separately from the sociology of religion, includes similar emphases. For instance, research on new social movements in Europe highlights their dependence on informal networks of people who share common countercultural values in opposition to previously dominant forms of identity (such as nation or race) (Kriesi 1988).

Emerson and Smith’s (2000) discussion of how white Evangelicals face race relations in the US is an interesting case of the difficulty in understanding why one “tool” rather than another is popular with a particular group at a particular time. Emerson and Smith argue that there have been genuine attempts by white Evangelicals to reach across the racial divide and address racial injustice, but the theological emphasis on one’s individual relationship to Jesus has channeled the white Evangelical antiracist mobilization away from consideration of systemic or structural racism. And so they plausibly argue that some interaction between race and religion must explain the curious empirical reality that black and white Evangelicals diverge more sharply in their attitudes on racial justice than do blacks and whites as a whole.

And yet it remains unclear why evangelical beliefs per se would have this effect, as they assert: Why would the same evangelical beliefs push blacks towards a more structural view and whites toward a version of “laissez-faire racism” (Tranby & Hartmann 2008)? Here we refer to the view that racial inequality is not an important policy concern but is at most a matter for individuals to address by making race irrelevant, rather than figuring out whether there might be structural reasons racial inequality persists.

Taking a quite different approach to understanding how and when people translate religious commitments into support for political and social movements, Munson (2008) focuses on a different level of analysis, that of individual biography. He argues that his ethnographic data demonstrate that involvement in
The pro-life movement often begins not upon any prior ideological commitment but upon whether individuals come into contact with the movement during “turning points” in their lives when they become “biographically available” for movement activity, initiated through personal contacts that can even be somewhat accidental. Such turning points would include going to college or suddenly having an empty nest. Munson argues that becoming clearly involved in a pro-life religious community often follows, rather than precedes, becoming active in the movement.

Kubik’s (1994) and Zubrzycki’s (2006) studies of the role of Catholics in the politics and national identity of Poland, much like Smith’s (1991) study of Latin American liberation theology, emphasize the context of changing religion–state relationships and the organizational autonomy of Catholicism. While mostly avoiding overt conflict with whatever regime that is in power, the Catholic hierarchy has in many countries an organizational presence that few denominations can match. And so, its independence of the communist state allowed it to be a central actor when Solidarity challenged the hegemony of the Polish United Worker’s Party, as well as a central actor in post-Communist Poland. But Kubik and Zubrzycki are interesting not just because of their discussion of religion–state relations but for their emphasis on the ritual and symbolism that allowed Catholicism to give new meaning to Polish identity and Polish independence. They approach the question of religion’s distinct contribution to social movements by emphasizing such symbolic meaning and religious identity rather than the specific content of beliefs and values. As in Dillon’s (1999) discussion of progressive American Catholics, religious symbolism can provide motivation and meaning that cannot be found within secular political ideologies.

See also: Conversion and new religious movements; Confessional protest; Culture and social movements; Cults; Factions/factionalism; Falun Gong (China); Japanese “new” religious movements (1930–present); Ideology; Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979; Irish Republican Movement; Islamic movements; Islamic women’s movements; Liberation theology/base communities (South America); Movements within institutions/organizations; Resource mobilization theory.

References and suggested readings


Rumor in collective behavior and social movements
GARY ALAN FINE

At the heart of collective action is the desire for secure information. When people gather together, definitive knowledge is often in short supply and the desire is great. Uncertainty produces fear and as a consequence there is an insistent desire to know, placing oneself and one’s community on a firmer footing. Whereas formal institutional actors (states, economic institutions, agencies of social control) generate forms of official knowledge, communities without legitimated information gathering processes depend on uncertain knowledge (or what has been termed “truth claims”). Access to secure information reflects the political structure, and, within movements and collective behavior, rumor plays a vital role.

Rumor is defined as information that is spread without “secure standards of evidence.” It is a form of knowledge whose truth value or predictive value is uncertain, both in its origins and in its accuracy, and, as psychologists Gordon Allport and Leo Postman (1947) argued, it is most likely to appear in circumstances that are characterized by importance and ambiguity. Of course, what constitutes unsecured knowledge is a matter of judgment. Some suggest that official pronouncements are secure by virtue of the standing of their sponsors, while others suggest that the motivation to deceive makes even official pronouncements uncertain; others suggest that outsider institutions may have access to secure knowledge through their connections.

Rumor has often been tightly linked to the analysis of collective action, and is sometimes treated as a form of collective behavior. Rumor is often found in situations of panic, crowd behavior, collective gathering, and the like. We lack comprehensive evidence on the frequency of rumor in periods of stress, but the literature on responses to disasters or political uprisings suggests that rumors are often prevalent. The major theorist of rumor as a form of collective behavior was the symbolic interactionist Tamotsu Shibutani, whose book Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (1966) is a well-deserved classic. Shibutani became assertions about events in the past or present (“The United States Government was aware of the attacks on September 11 and decided not to stop them”) or claims about the future (“the Euro will be discontinued as a transnational currency”). Judgments about the accuracy or usability of rumor have been described by Gary Alan Fine and Bill Ellis (2010) as linked to the “politics of plausibility” (does the rumor claim fit in with widely held beliefs?) and the “politics of credibility” (is the source of the information judged to be an honest broker, not shaped by an interest to deceive?).

Rumor is to be distinguished from both contemporary legends and from gossip, two related discursive forms that sometimes overlap with rumor. Contemporary legends (sometimes referred to as “urban legends” or “solidified rumors”) typically involve longer, more complex narratives of belief that involve traditional, folkloric themes or motifs. Rumors typically are shorter, nonnarrative claims, more likely to be statements of belief than stories. Gossip is an evaluative – or moral – information claim that is presented about a known, but absent, third party (either a personal acquaintance or a figure of general repute, such as a celebrity or political leader). Unlike rumor, some forms of gossip may be certain and secure knowledge, entirely accurate and known directly.

interested in the dynamics of rumor after spending time in Japanese-American internment camps during World War II, where information seeking was prevalent. Through a set of widely dispersed case studies, Shibutani argued that moments of collective action or behavior are frequently characterized by a strong need for information, whereas participants have access to only ambiguous, uncertain knowledge. Ralph Turner suggested that rumor is a form of “intensified information seeking.” At such times people search for whatever information they can glean from others who are often as uncertain and confused as they. Imagined circumstances are believed as they are spread. Shibutani suggested that rumor constituted a form of improvised news as people communicate without means to ascertain the truth of what they hear, attempting to build confidence about the ambiguous events that swirl around them. The Shibutani model is also applicable to other theoretical treatments of collective behavior, such as that of Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1987) who suggest that a central goal of those who gather collectively is to discover the proper norms and expectations for behavior, and, as result, social actors are judging appropriate action often by means of information that they believe they can trust. These models have proved particularly influential in the examination of riots, as folklorist Janet Langlois (1983) demonstrated in her examination of rumors in the 1943 Belle Isle racial riots in Detroit. Langlois notes that similar rumors were spread in black and in white communities with the race of the actors switched, a common occurrence as Gary Alan Fine and Patricia Turner (2001) noted in their analysis of racial rumors. Misleading information, suggesting hostile actions on the part of an outsider group, can produce violence in a social “tinderbox.” In the official analysis of the riots in the 1960s, the Kerner Commission (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968) found that “rumors significantly agitated tensions and disorder in more than 65 percent of the disorders studied.” While riots develop from real grievances, beliefs are also important stimulants for violence. As a result, during periods of institutional threat and collective disorder, governments or civic groups establish rumor control centers, designed to present “accurate” information. Whether these agencies provide true information as opposed to misleading or anodyne claims, designed to dampen hostilities, whether these claims are trusted by angry and frightened residents, and whether they actually decrease the amount of violence are all open to question. However, it is believed that control of information is one means by which civil disturbances can be prevented or shortened.

Because of their unofficial nature, outside of the control of authorities or elites, rumors often suggest the power of conspiratorial groups. The classic study by French sociologist Edgar Morin, Rumor in Orleans (1971), examines a rumor complex which alleged that Jewish dress shop owners were drugging young French women and selling them into forced prostitution (“white slavery”). Whereas once the sources of conspiracy were outsider groups, today, as Veronique Campion-Vincent (2005) argues, there is an increasing emphasis on elites as sources of conspiracy, a set of beliefs that links rumor diffusion to collective action and social movements.

While less attention has been paid to the connection of social movements and rumor, members of movements also search for secure information, and this is particularly evident when social movements are sponsoring collective action. Participants in social movements must evaluate the plausibility of uncertain information as they often lack a direct pipeline to official claims or a means of judging those claims. Scholars of social movements are less prone to examine rumors than those who focus upon collective behavior, but those who focus on the evolution of movements, such as Francesca Polletta’s analysis of the dynamics of movement diffusion, It Was Like a Fever (2006), recognize that informal networks, compelling narratives, and emotional engagement shape movement activity and the commitment of members in the
face of social costs. Movements often depend on narratives to create affiliation, and these narratives may be grounded on contemporary legends or may incorporate rumor. While many social movement organizations are relatively stable and develop their own sources of information, participants often—and understandably—mistrust the information that is provided by official sources that oppose the goals of the movement. As a result, social movements often create their own knowledge networks, which, by virtue of established credibility of the sources of the claims, are treated as accurate and the basis of action. Again conspiracies play into the acceptance of rumor. Those movements that allege the existence of conspiratorial action exemplify this need, as these groups operate explicitly on the claim that “secure knowledge” is false information. Movement organizations that question the official outlines of the attacks on September 11 (9/11 Truther Groups) serve as particularly powerful examples of how alternative knowledge sources are crucial.

While rumor is found throughout society, it is often particularly and dramatically evident in moments of uncertainty and of change, and these are moments at which collective behavior and social movements are present as well.

SEE ALSO: Crowds (gatherings) and collective behavior (action); Diffusion and scale shift; Discourse analysis and social movements; Framing and social movements; Narratives; Networks and social movements; Riots; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Slave rebellions

DAVID K. PETERSON

Slavery has existed in various places and times throughout human history. So too have slave rebellions. Some of the most well-known and compelling stories of all time have depicted these rebellions. Moses led a revolt against the enslavement of Hebrews in ancient Egypt, demanding of Pharaoh to “Let my people go!” This episode is important, if not central, to the Abrahamic spiritual traditions – Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and others. Spartacus, during the Third Servile War in the first century, led a rebellion of slaves against their Roman captors. The tale of this revolt is especially beloved in the Western political tradition. In ninth-century Iraq more than 500,000 East African slaves rose up against their Arab masters in what is known as the Zanj Rebellion. Rebellions have occurred in other places and times and have similarly become the stuff of legend. Because slave rebellions emerge from the site of the most extreme dispossession, in the face of the most terrifying odds, they are paradigm cases of resistance to oppressive power; they represent, in the words of Herbert Aptheker (1943: 3), the preeminent historian on the subject, “the highest form of protest.”

Though slavery and slave rebellions have existed throughout human history, they are uniquely significant in the modern era, particularly in the Americas. In the modern world slavery takes on, according to W.E.B. Du Bois (2003: 67), “a scale and an elaborateness of detail of which no former world ever dreamed.” It is the “imperial width of the thing,” he argued, “the heaven-defying audacity” that makes its modern newness. Slavery was central to the economic development of the European powers and thus also to the bourgeois revolutions that would transform the Old World into the modern world. Modern slavery was also significant in that this most extreme form of human domination emerged alongside unprecedented pronouncements of human equality and conceptions of human agency and freedom. According to Orlando Patterson (1982), the existence of slavery in a given society does not simply contradict notions of human freedom; the existence of slavery produces and gives meaning to the concept of freedom. Slave rebellions held the potential, not to make everyone free, but rather to destroy the concept of freedom itself. For this reason, slave rebellions were extremely threatening both to economic stability and to the coherence of the general principles upon which the modern world was founded; they threatened the ruling system of production as well as the ruling episteme.

Slaves were not considered political subjects by the institutions of the societies in which they were enslaved, not even subordinate ones, and thus could not petition for the redress of their grievances or engage in the repertoire of collective action that typically falls under the category of “social movements.” Slaves resisted, to be sure, and this resistance was constant and took a variety of forms: working slowly, breaking tools, running away, and poisoning the master, for example. Slave rebellions, however, sought nothing less than the total uprooting of the whole system of slavery in a given territory. In all cases, slave rebellions were bloody and violent. In most cases slave conspiracies were discovered before they could reach fruition. In many cases rebellions were short-lived uprisings that may have taken the life of a master and his family or the lives of a few members of the slaveholding class before they were quickly and viciously repressed. In a few cases slave rebellions reached the level of prolonged warfare that stretched out over months and sometimes years. In just one case, in all of human history, the Haitian Revolution, did a rebellion of slaves lead to the total abolition of slavery and the establishment of a republic by the self-liberated slaves.
Though the motivation for rebellion was ever present there are several variables across space and time that impacted upon the likelihood and magnitude of rebellion. These include: the existence and strength of maroon societies, the demographic ratio of enslaved to nonenslaved, economic conditions of production, levels of urbanization, the knowledge and rumor of rebellion elsewhere, discourses of freedom and liberty among free populations, external forces at battle with the slaveocracy. The most important precipitant of revolt was revolt itself; rebellion was contagious despite the effort of those interested in the maintenance of slavery to frame the outbreak rebellion as sparse, deviant, and isolated (Aptheker 1943).

One of the most important ways in which the enslaved resisted their bondage was to “steal away,” or escape the plantation and form “maroon societies.” Maroon societies existed throughout the western hemisphere and not only provided spaces of refuge from the degradation of slavery, they also provided bases from which the institution could be attacked. The largest and most enduring of such societies, known as Palmares, was formed in the mountains of Brazil. Palmares had an estimated population of more than 10,000 people and survived for nearly a hundred years between 1600 and 1700. Maroon societies often joined with and were aided by indigenous people. The largest maroon society in North America was formed by the Black Seminoles, an amalgamation of the Seminole Indians of the southeastern US and escaped African slaves. Maroon societies were particularly prominent and powerful on the island colony of Jamaica. Between the years 1730 and 1739, Jamaican maroons launched the “First Maroon War” under the leadership of an escaped slave named Cudjoe. The British, unable to defeat the rebellious runaway slaves, struck a deal that allowed them to occupy a series of towns under British supervision. This “peace” was broken with the “Second Maroon War” launched by the maroons against the British colonial authorities in 1795. Jamaica is a unique case that highlights the threat posed by maroons to the institution of slavery. Though war waged by maroons was not typically prolonged, maroon societies throughout the New World played a central role in the outbreak of slave rebellions.

It was a maroon named Dutty Boukman who, on August 14, 1791, initiated the great Haitian revolt, which would become the only known successful slave rebellion in history. Within weeks the revolt was joined by more than 100,000 slaves who, in a great and righteous fury, burned hundreds of plantations. Maroons had attacked the plantation society of the French island colony of San Domingo (now Haiti) several times in the centuries leading up to what is known as the Haitian Revolution. Though the initial fury of the revolt was initiated by maroons, it was a self-educated slave, Toussaint L’Ouverture, who would lead the rebellion to defeat the British, Spanish, and French invasions and establish Haiti, the first Black republic in the western hemisphere and the first nation in the modern world to abolish slavery. The usurpation of this most profitable colony drastically altered the geopolitical map of the modern world. It shattered the imperial ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte and left France with little choice but to sell the Louisiana Territory, a move that doubled the size of the US and enabled its expansion westward. The significance of the Haitian rebellion is thus difficult to overstate.

Whereas social revolutions often occur during moments of political or economic crisis, the Haitian Revolution occurred after a decade of sustained and stable economic growth. San Domingo was not only the most valuable French colony but, at the time, it was the most valuable colony in the world. On the eve of the rebellion San Domingo produced 40 percent of Europe’s sugar, 60 percent of Europe’s coffee, and accounted for two-thirds of France’s overseas trade. This value was extracted through the most horrific and brutal exploitation of the enslaved, which, as on the other “sugar colonies” of the Caribbean, eventually facilitated rebellion. Unlike the post-“cotton kingdom” system of plantation slavery that prevailed in the US, the plan for Africans
imported to San Domingo was for them to be worked to death and then replaced. For this reason the Haitian slaves truly had nothing to lose but their chains.

Brutality alone, however, does not explain the emergence and scope of the Haitian Revolution. The climate that fostered such exceptional agricultural productivity in San Domingo was conducive to the spread of disease which regularly claimed the lives of the enslaved. It is estimated that annual death rates of the enslaved were regularly 10 to 15 percent. The unforgiving climate and the commonness of death on San Domingo discouraged European settlement of the colony, resulting in a unique demographic imbalance between the enslaved and the nonenslaved. It is estimated that whites on San Domingo numbered 30,000 compared to 500,000 slaves and 40,000 “free” blacks and “mulattoes.” Only the most extreme brutality could maintain such a situation, making San Domingo a veritable powder keg waiting to explode, and explode it did (James 1963).

The Haitian Revolution sent shockwaves throughout the world, striking fear in the hearts of slave masters everywhere and stoking the fires of hope and yearning in the hearts of the enslaved. The very existence of slave rebellion and conspiracies to rebel troubled the stereotypes of African inferiority and docility employed by slaveholders to justify the institution of slavery. These stereotypes were not just troubled by the Haitian revolt, they were obliterated. Toussaint’s army of slaves-turned-soldiers not only bested the greatest military leaders of the day, including the great Napoleon Bonaparte, they established and maintained a system of political organization. Correspondence between Toussaint and various European and American leaders indicate that he was widely considered, even by his enemies, to be a great statesman. Poems were written about Toussaint by some of the greatest poets of the day, including William Wordsworth, and were widely circulated throughout Europe. His bold example meant that slavery anywhere could only continue through an ever more brutal tightening of the institution everywhere (James 1963).

Certainly the discourse of freedom that was shaking up and transforming the monarchical regimes in Europe and the colonial regimes in the New World was a powerful precipitant of rebellion. It was not that such discourses gave the enslaved an understanding of the value of freedom. On the contrary, nobody understood the value of freedom and desired it more than the enslaved. The existence of such discourses did, however, embolden the slaves by giving them the idea that they might find supporters among those raising the banner of freedom elsewhere. Toussaint took the slogans of the French Revolution – Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity – seriously and assumed he would find support among those pronouncing them. Similarly, Gabriel Prosser planned a revolt in 1800 in the Richmond, Virginia, area which he hoped would be supported by revolutionary France. Gabriel Prosser’s plan exempted Quakers and Methodists from retribution, due to their endorsement of notions of universal equality and their advocacy of emancipation. Though Prosser’s plans were leaked before the rebellion came to fruition, the slaveholding class in the US was stricken with fear that they might face the type of retribution being sought in Haiti at the time. The knowledge of any revolutionary activity emboldened the slaves and increased the likelihood of revolt, but no event had a greater impact than the great Haitian Revolution.

Conditions in the “sugar islands” and in South American regions like Brazil were vastly different than those that prevailed in the US. Cotton, rice, and tobacco, rather than sugar and coffee, were the primary agricultural products in the US. The climate was somewhat more forgiving in North America and so the slave populations grew even after the last captive African was imported. Despite this population growth, the enslaved were far outnumbered by the whites, making the possibility of a successful rebellion highly unlikely. Indeed, most rebellions in the US were either short lived or discovered before they could come to fruition.
The audacity to plan slave rebellions and the courage to carry them out was often strengthened during times in which conflict between a given slaveocracy and an external force was imminent. Such conflicts were viewed as providing both an opportunity to revolt, due to the diversion of repressive force, and also a potential friend in the external force. The largest slave revolt in US history, known as the German Coast Uprising, erupted on the eve of the War of 1812. The rebellion was led by Charles Deslondes, a free black who worked as an overseer on a Louisiana plantation. Deslondes and his associates, in concert with local maroons, overpowered the master (and his son), of the plantation on which Deslondes was employed, seized weapons—guns, cane knives, farming tools and clubs—and began a march to New Orleans, amassing an estimated 200 to 500 slaves and burning several plantations along the way. The rebellious band was reported to have been singing chants of “Liberty or Death!” Deslondes, in anticipation of John Brown’s great plot, planned to seize the armory in New Orleans, liberate the city, and turn it into a refuge for fugitive slaves from across the Americas. Like so many before and after him, despite his initial and unprecedented successes, Deslondes’s liberation army was suppressed by the superior might of state militia in concert with federal troops.

Slaves were sometimes armed by their enslavers in order to fight against opposing forces. For example, the French armed a significant number of slaves in early eighteenth-century Louisiana in order to help combat the Chonaches Indians. Upon realizing the slaves had a friend in the Indians they, instead, turned their arms against their enslavers. It is also well known that the British promised freedom to slaves willing to fight against the revolutionary effort of the colonists. Several of the “Black Loyalists,” upon the defeat of the British, sought refuge in Nova Scotia. W.E.B. Du Bois, in his classic historical text Black Reconstruction in America (1998), attributes the efforts of the slaves against their Southern captors as the decisive factor enabling Northern victory in the Civil War. During the Mexican War in the middle of the nineteenth century whites in Texas attempted to rally their fellow citizens to the cause of the war by spreading the rumor that the Mexicans aimed to arm the black slaves and enlist them in a fight to liquidate the whites. This emboldened the slaves and was the major cause of a few planned and actual revolts. There is evidence that the enslaved planned their revolt to commence as soon as enough whites had left the area to join the war effort against the Mexicans (Aptheker 1943). The slaves took every opportunity to exploit the weakness of those holding them in bondage. Their loyalty was to freedom rather than to the cause of any of the warring parties.

The “conspiracy” of Denmark Vesey highlights the importance of urbanization to the precipitation of rebellion. Urbanization made the monitoring of slaves more difficult and thus enabled greater lines of communication between free and enslaved blacks. This provided the slaves a window to the world, albeit a narrow one, that was closed to those held captive on rural plantations. Upon purchasing his freedom with money he won in a game of chance, Vesey embarked upon an audacious plan for a rebellion that would have been the largest in American history had it not been betrayed by a fellow slave. The scope of the plot was truly incredible, incorporating estimates of up to 2000 slaves in and around Charleston. That such a plot was not leaked sooner is truly remarkable. Like other foiled rebellion plots, the Vesey conspiracy was followed by a trial and the eventual mass hanging of the alleged conspirators. The impact of the discourse on human freedom can be seen here as the rebellion was planned to commence on July 14, Bastille Day, in 1822. Also, the lasting impact of the Haitian Revolution can be seen in Vesey’s plot, which included plans to kill as many whites as was necessary, burn the plantations, sail to the black republic of Haiti, and seek refuge there. Vesey’s conspiracy can be contrasted with that of Nat Turner’s 1831 revolt, probably the most well-known revolt in US history, which involved only a few conspirators,
but which erupted with ferocity, resulting in the killing of 60 whites and, ultimately, the mass killing by whites of approximately a hundred blacks.

The conditions of slavery demanded that measures be taken to keep the enslaved ignorant of the happenings of the outside world. Still, certain information about social and political developments inevitably reached the consciousness of the enslaved and had a stirring effect. The slaves had little ability to distinguish between rumor and fact; so the rumor of various happenings, rather than their actuality, was sufficient to precipitate rebellion. For example, in the early to mid-nineteenth century, debates took place in the various legislative halls of the US concerning the expansion of slavery to the western states, in which those opposed to expansion might frame their opposition in a general denunciation of the institution. Upon hearing rumors of such denunciations slaves were in many instances prompted to suspect that slavery had been abolished but that their masters were simply refusing to comply. Similarly, many slaves believed that the election of Abraham Lincoln meant that slavery had been abolished. So limited was the information available to the enslaved that rumors had a tremendous effect (Aptheker 1943). It was not only rumors of antislavery discourse on the part of whites that precipitated revolt. In 1829, a free black from Boston named David Walker published the scathing "Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World," rumors of which (most slaves were forcibly illiterate) emboldened slaves to rise up against the injustice of their captivity.

Slave rebellions were typically the exclusive efforts of the enslaved themselves and rarely involved the participation of free blacks (excluding maroons). However, slaveholders often attributed the cause of rebellion to activity among the "free" blacks as part of a general effort to contain and constrict them. To accept that the rebellion could be organized and emerge among the slaves was dangerous to the maintenance of racist ideologies which held that the enslaved were docile, cowardly, and incompetent.

The participation of whites in slave revolts was virtually nonexistent with the exception of the decade prior to the American Civil War. The most well-known and influential example of such participation is represented in John Brown’s brazen effort in 1859 to seize the armory at Harper’s Ferry as a first step in the precipitation of nationwide revolt. John Brown is a truly unique and significant historical figure who was committed, with the whole of his being, to the cause of abolition by any means necessary. Prior to the Harper’s Ferry attack, John Brown’s armed band played a role similar to that played by maroons in other times and places by attacking small plantations in various parts of the country and liberating small holdings of slaves. The Harper’s Ferry plot was in the works for 20 years before it was carried out and was based on a very careful study of guerilla warfare. The failure of the revolt was not a foregone conclusion like that of so many rebellions that preceded it. Were it not for a few unexpected mishaps it could very well have succeeded and drastically altered the course of US history. The very fact of the actuality and possibility of rebellion being organized by and finding support among whites, in many ways indicated the unsustainability of the institution of slavery and foreshadowed the Civil War (Du Bois 2001).

Slave rebellions had a tremendous impact on abolitionist movements in a variety of ways. While the horror of rebellions often made whites sensitive to the plight of the enslaved, this was not always the case. The outbreak of slave rebellions often turned the most ardent haters of the enslaved into abolitionists, not because of a softening of attitudes toward the enslaved but rather because of an acknowledgement of the explosive potential of slave rebellion which, as Napoleon Bonaparte painfully learned, could unleash irrepressible rage with the capacity to shatter the economic foundations and expansion hopes of entire nations. With little to no warning, slave rebellions could turn a seemingly stable social
and economic order upside down overnight. Even though slavery was often extremely profitable, the ever-present threat of rebellion could engender calls for abolition. While support for abolitionism is often attributed to recognition of the humanity of the enslaved on the part of the abolitionists, in many cases abolitionist sentiments can be attributed to the fear of the consequences of the righteous fury of the enslaved (Du Bois 2001).

James Baldwin, speaking of the US civil rights and Black Power movements of the post-World War II period, referred to himself as “a survivor of and witness to the latest slave rebellion.” The function of slavery in the US, to facilitate the simultaneous ostracization and exploitation of blacks, was not eliminated with the emancipation proclamation and the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the US constitution, but rather survived in the post-emancipation institutional configurations of Jim Crow racism, the “dark ghetto,” and the prison industrial complex (Wacquant 2002). Accordingly, social movements to combat these institutional configurations have often attempted to frame their efforts as slave rebellions. The use of the slave rebellion frame has been particularly prominent in the US prisoner movement. This is due to the overwhelming racial disparities in incarceration along with the fact that the 13th Amendment to the US constitution outlawed slavery “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” The 1972 Attica Prison uprising was framed as a slave rebellion by the rebels and was eerily reminiscent of past slave rebellions. The uprising involved the seizure of the prison by 1000 inmates, mostly black, and culminated in the death of 29 inmates and 10 correctional officers and civilians. To successfully frame a movement effort as a slave rebellion in the contemporary moment, given the virtually universal acknowledgement of the absolute wrongness of the institution of slavery, is to authorize any means of pursuing movement goals and all haste in the pursuit. Thus, slavery and resistance to slavery may well represent the ultimate social movement “master frame,” pun intended.

SEE ALSO: Antislavery movement; Master frame; Precipitating events and flashpoints; Repression and social movements; Resistance; Revolutions; Violence and social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Social media
BETH GHARRITY GARDNER

The implications of social media for social change are fueling incredible debate at the time of this writing. This is being driven by the unprecedented diffusion of social media technologies and services, such as text messaging, e-mail, blogs, YouTube, Facebook, and the like, over the first decade of this century. For movement scholars, more important than the new digital technologies themselves are their consequences for social movements and protest. To be sure, there is no shortage of fodder for theoretical and empirical questioning. Not only has social media been ascribed a pivotal role in the coordination of rapid, massive, and – in some cases – revolutionary mobilizations in geopolitical contexts as diverse as Iran, Moldova, and Tunisia, but they lend new meaning to the iconic phrase the whole world is watching as actors broadcast events in real time to international audiences. Through the variety of available, easy to use designs, social media enable novel forms of one-to-many and many-to-many communication that reveal surprising contours of an evolving “virtual public sphere” (Langman 2005). By altering the communication landscape these technologies are changing the terrains of contentious politics. They broadly call into question long-standing assumptions about social movements.

Scholars disagree on whether these technologies have truly transformative political potential or if they merely amplify familiar contentious politics. These diverging views tend to hinge on the documented ease of both political- and consumption-oriented uses of social media; the inequality in access to different digital mobilizing tools; and the use of these same tools by power holders to suppress challengers (Hindman 2011; Shirky 2011). While theoretical debates were simplistically divided into optimists versus pessimists, current scholarship has given way to more nuanced approaches for tracking new media. Against this backdrop, three major dimensions for studying the impact of social media on the fates of social movements are noteworthy: the means and motivations for collective action, movement relations to professional news media, and state–civil society dynamics.

A few things movement scholars seem to agree on are that social media tools are providing both new forms of organizing and protest as well as lowering barriers to participation. Affecting the supply-side of conditions for protest, to use Klandermans’ term (2004: 360), are new tactics and organizational forms that are increasing the pace, ease, and reach of activism. Face-to-face contact may not be necessary for the diffusion of practices, but less clear is whether it is necessary for motivating and sustaining protest. Thus still contested is how social media are reshaping the repertoires for movement activism, which, in addition to tactics, carry mobilizing identities and issues. One explanation for differing claims is the dearth of research on the ways in which these technologies may be creating new demands for protest, new issues and stakes, such as when hacker groups built censorship circumvention software to help activists get around state firewalls in Tunisia. Another explanation is the lack of consistency in the methods and objects of study. To assess these differing claims and issues, scholars are examining variation in the uses of these technologies for different ends (Earl & Kimport 2009, 2011).

As these technologies are being used for information access, public speech, and social networking, they appear to be recasting movement relations with the traditional news media. The mainstream media coverage of movement messages has conventionally been viewed as a crucial route to political influence by swaying public opinion, authorities, and elites.
media tools add to this new opportunities and challenges for activists as they have a greater ability to produce and control their own media messages – directly linking participants as well as members of their audience to information, ideas, and other individuals. In conjunction with the ability of movement actors to sidestep media institutions, journalists are curating news from institutional outsiders who can provide immediate accounts for breaking news (Robinson 2010). Social media coverage of recent mass mobilizations provide numerous examples of what can be seen as a leveling of activist and journalist roles, like when US National Public Radio’s senior strategist open-sourced his Twitter feed at the onset of the Tunisian uprising by aggregating and filtering the tweets of fellow users on the ground. Despite trends toward more bottom-up newsgathering, social media also reinforce mainstream news dominance in terms of status and wide distribution. Research shows that professional and citizen communicators frequently continue to link to traditional news outlets (Hindman 2011). How social media are modifying journalistic norms and how movement messages are conveyed internally and to broader publics remain open questions.

The potential for social media to invigorate democratic politics by buttressing civil society and the public sphere is generating yet another path of inquiry. Two recent mobilizations – the Arab Spring and the Occupy movements – are highlighting possible repercussions of social media for accountability in both authoritarian and democratic regimes. In the case of the former, scholars are questioning the role of social media in undermining government monopolies on public communication during the wave of pro-democracy demonstrations that spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East. By tracking the conversations taking place on websites, blogs, and social networking services like Twitter, Howard and colleagues (2011: 13) show that activists used social media to create a viral “freedom meme” that mobilized debate as well as action to put pressure on governments throughout the region. Their findings illustrate features of these technologies that may strengthen the public sphere: the sheer number of participants and the ability of online debates to spread across national borders and precede on-the-ground actions. Other scholars document not only the state’s power to surveil and repress political actors and movements using digital technologies, but the lack of transparency and control for users over the companies providing their social media services (Mozorov 2011; Shirky 2011). However, state efforts to stifle social media have backfired in many cases, as when Egyptian police killed blogger Khaled Said in 2011 for posting incriminating videos of fellow officers and unwittingly galvanized his martyrdom via a Facebook-sparked campaign against police brutality. The implications of social media for state–society relations remain open for further research.

From politics-as-usual to radical transfers of power, new idioms are emerging that reflect the perception of social media’s impact on the means and motivations for political participation. The digital tools that political activists have begun to deploy are often portrayed in mainstream media discourse as the central catalysts of contention (e.g., the “Twitter,” “Facebook,” or “Wikileaks” revolutions). Meanwhile, scholarly concepts are still being charted to anchor evaluations of protests spanning the boundaries of online and offline activism. Undoubtedly social media are providing mobilizing and coordinating tools for social movements the world over, but more questions about their effects on social movement processes continue to arise in the wake of rapid changes in these technologies, and people’s uses of them.

SEE ALSO: Arab Spring; Civil society; Contentious politics; Demand and supply of protest; Diffusion and scale shift; Electronic protest; Hackers; Internet and social movements; Media activism; Media and social movements; Occupy Wall Street movement; Public sphere.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


The nature of social movements in Singapore needs to be understood against this historical background and, in particular, the social composition of a diverse population almost entirely (the exception being some of the original Malay/Indonesian population) of migrant origin, with no roots in the new country and often with social, religious, and political allegiances and links to their country of origin, and to the immediate political and economic circumstances of the first years of independence. The new postcolonial government found itself with a small country divided by language, ethnicity, religion, and culture, heavily dependent economically on the now withdrawing British military bases and with virtually slum-like housing for many of its inhabitants, and with a strong left-wing, mainly Chinese, opposition. The government, under the direction of its ultimately long-serving prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, immediately set about a major program of what was known in Singapore as “nation building” including a massive public housing project designed both to create a good physical infrastructure and to bind the immigrant population to the new country through property ownership; stimulation of rapid industrialization; vigorous suppression of the Left and of the Chinese “chauvinism” that was seen as being its roots; and the creation of numerous symbolic forms of attachment to the new country through such means as a new national anthem, the celebration of National Day as a major public event, the recognition of four official languages (Malay, Mandarin, English, and Tamil) while Malay remained as the national language despite its minority status, and the encouragement of identification with the new state through education, propaganda, the creation of a nationwide network of community centers, and close censorship and monitoring of the media (Clammer 1998).

The result of all this activity was a political culture what some commentators have
termed “soft authoritarianism,” a culture that included retention of the colonial era Internal Security Act allowing arrest and detention of oppositionists, suppression of any independent media, total government control of education, control of voluntary societies and charities through the Registrar of Societies, the introduction of compulsory military service for men, an almost complete government monopoly of housing through the Housing Development Board (HDB) and the Housing Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), in which well over 80 percent of the population lived in government-controlled dwellings, and close surveillance of the population through the extensive secret police and its large network of informers. The result, both in the early days of independence and subsequently, has been the suppression of any forms of social movements other than those created or directed by the state itself (Clammer 2011). The Singapore state has indeed been active in this sphere, having at various times attempted to create the above-mentioned community centers, residents’ committees in the public housing blocks, citizens’ consultative committees, a civil defense organization, a movement to promote Confucianism as a kind of national value system to offset the very materialism and commercial mindset that the government had itself created, campaigns to encourage the speaking of Mandarin amongst the linguistically diverse Chinese population, and the ill-fated attempt to create a national ideology based on supposedly shared “Asian values” somewhat parallel to the official national ideologies of neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia.

The result has been a society that is noteworthy for the absence of independent social movements, which raises a challenge for conventional social movement theory. What we see in Singapore in fact is a situation closer to that which might be expected in a socialist society: state dominance and control or cooption of any emergent movements, and the parallel attempt by the state itself to substitute for spontaneous movement emergence a set of artificial “movements” of its own. But this of course is not to argue that social tensions do not exist in Singapore, as indeed they do. What is sociologically and politically interesting is their deflection by the state through the mechanisms of management, co-option, control of public resources such as housing, supervision of voluntary and charitable organizations, close surveillance of religious institutions and movements, vigorous promotion of a consumer society as the highest good, socialization into national (i.e., government) values through education and military service, and, where these means fail, through direct suppression, including the arrest, and certainly in the recent past, torture of “dissidents,” meaning mainly simply critics and social activists opposed to or promoting alternatives to the government’s hegemonic position. The same party, the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP), has been in office since independence and the organization of the electoral system, government control of the media, and the use of lawsuits against political opponents has ensured that very few opposition candidates have ever been elected to the single-chamber parliament.

But beneath this apparent hegemony opposition does exist, even if it is prevented from taking an institutionalized form. In coffee shops, in the small but significant underground economy, in elite cultural organizations, and most certainly in religious circles, alternative views are voiced. The latter organizations in fact represent one of the most interesting aspects of Singapore society. Paradoxically, in a deeply materialistic society, religion flourishes, both as a marker of ethnic and cultural identity (as with Islam for the Malays, and for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, Hinduism for many Indians, Roman Catholicism for the Eurasians, and Judaism for the small but vigorous and long-established Sephardic Jewish population), and as a sign and source of upward social mobility, as with Protestant Christianity and with newer forms of activist Buddhism such as the Japanese origin Soka Gakkai movement, very popular amongst lower middle class and upwardly mobile blue-collar
Chinese speakers. While religious activity is itself controlled through the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and while socially critical forms of Christian theology and practice such as liberation theology are actively discouraged, and those movements which support it such as the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) or the Student Christian Movement (SCM) have been suppressed or expelled, nevertheless religion in Singapore provides one of the few channels, never fully controllable by the state, in which social activism can to some extent occur and in which alternative value systems to the officially promoted materialistic and consumer-oriented ones can be voiced, even though the dominant form of Protestant Christianity has proved to be a pietistic and Evangelical rather than socially engaged one.

The very absence of social movements in Singapore other than state-authorized ones or nonpolitical elite organizations, such as the Malayan Nature Society, make Singapore a very interesting “negative” case study for students of social movements. Singapore represents what might be called the modernist project still alive and well in Southeast Asia: a concern with “nation building,” social order, control and cohesion, and the hegemony of a particular state-centered ideology and conception of identity. While this has led to a lack of social creativity, an unwillingness of many Singaporeans to engage in civic life and the absence of opportunity structures for new movements to appear, there are signs of cracks in this seemingly monolithic system. These include influences and pressures coming from economic and media globalization, the rise of fundamentalism amongst some religious communities both within Singapore and in its near neighbors, new pressures that are arising from global resource depletion (Singapore is one of Asia’s biggest oil refinery centers), the rise of the new middle class with their demands for mobility, freedom in education, and access to media and information and the expansion of the Internet. Singapore is one of the most “wired” societies in the world, its small size and good infrastructure making this easy to accomplish (more than 75% of all households have Internet access). But while the Internet allows state-controlled information to be disseminated in new electronic forms, it also allows the average citizen access to a much larger world and to forms of communication and information sharing with many other Singaporeans. Perhaps more than anything else IT will change the political culture of Singapore in more liberal directions.

SEE ALSO: Co-optation; Internet and social movements; Religion and social movements; Repression and social movements; Resistance; State-sponsored social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

South Korean transnational fatherhood movement

ALLEN J. KIM

The South Korean transnational fatherhood movement, popularly known as “Father School” (FS), addresses men’s role and identity as contemporary fathers. In 1995, Duranno Christian Publishing established a Father School in Seoul, South Korea, in response to the growing national epidemic of abusive, ineffective, and absentee fathers. Worldwide, new social expectations for fathering are thought to encourage greater balance between work and family roles and focus on emotional involvement. Having celebrated its 15th anniversary in 2010, political notables, including President Lee Myung Bak, and news outlets internationally have recognized the organization’s effort in emphasizing the important role men play in children’s lives. Men participate in conference seminars that challenge them to become more expressive, nurturing, and responsible fathers in contrast with traditional Korean patriarchy shaped by Confucianism. From their evangelical optic, “a healthy family begins with the father.”

BACKGROUND

Since its inception, this nonprofit organization has graduated 200,000 participants worldwide in 230 cities in 45 countries. At the time of writing, 3000 sessions of the FS program have targeted men of diverse backgrounds in settings such as the church, prison, military, corporation, mental hospital, school, and immigrant contexts. The seminal idea for educating Korean fathers came through Do Eun Mi’s vision (wife of family minister Hwang Eun Chul) who experienced a distant, stoic, and abusive patriarchal father. Under Confucianism, which historically shaped familial and state philosophy, extreme patriarchy, filial piety, rigid family hierarchy, and strict gender differentiation were doctrines guiding daily life. These principles continue to influence Korean parenting culture today. The Father School program was formally developed at Duranno Bible College in Seoul, South Korea, by the guidance of elder Kim Sung Mook, who is the organization’s head figure and movement representative.

An essential feature of Korean patriarchy is the “salaryman” stereotype: the East Asian ideal of a white collar, breadwinning, salaried husband and father. Long work hours, stress, after work drinking culture, and South Korea’s high educational costs and academic achievement pressures are thought to be contributing factors to men’s focus on work and absence from the family. Traditional Korean cultural values such as “chae-myun,” referring to the unspoken code of honor and pride steeped in Confucian morality, prevent men from seeking outside therapeutic assistance where the norm of saving face pervades social relationships. The popularity of the movement peaked following the economic crisis of the late 1990s, when many South Korean men lost their jobs overnight along with the breadwinner role central to men’s identities. For some men, new conditions prompted men to reconsider their familial roles and their relationships, or lack thereof, with family members. Participants of FS typically come to attend through the recommendation of former members, the urging of family members, church announcements, or as a result of public outreach marketing campaigns in local communities by the organization.

ORGANIZATION

Fathers’ School International Headquarters (FSIH) in South Korea functions as the central management and administration base for
its domestic and international programs. Domestically, FSIH is responsible for FS South Korea, FS for Special Ministry (seminars for prisons, army camps, high school youth, companies, rural fathers married to foreign spouses, single-parent households, homeless, and government agencies) and Mothers’ School (a complementary program helping women discover their role and identity as spouses and mothers). Regional headquarters, located in North America, Europe, Oceania, and in select countries within Asia, are self-operated and funded.

For their international operations, the headquarters provide resources and manpower supporting stand-alone seminars abroad. The organization adopts and modifies its message of involved fathering in ways that are sensitive to local cultural contexts and seeks to have the “local” brothers or volunteers operate the program independently. Within South Korea, transforming failed patriarchy involves stitching together gendered ideologies stemming from Confucianism, Christianity, and mainstream cultures from both East and West. Membership is not exclusive as both religiously informed and nonreligious programs (called “Open Father” programs) are offered to men of all backgrounds and ages.

FATHERHOOD EDUCATION

FS enlists Christian clergy, professors, government officials, and former members to conduct a 4–5 week program instructing fathers on their identity and role as the head of the family. Conference seminars are composed of small groups of participants with emphasis on personal disclosure, camaraderie, and openness of feelings. Men engage upon a collective journey to explore and remedy obstacles associated with distant Korean patriarchy and its attendant focus on breadwinning and selfishness. The organization assists men to recover their identity and valuable role as fathers seeking to reunify the family through a more nurturing, expressive, and moral fathering role. Their “social campaign” to build strong and healthy families is achieved through a fourfold aim:

1. Recovering the identity of the father.
2. Creation of a new and healthy family culture.
3. Developing strong leadership in the workplace and in society.
4. Establishing new support groups for social service.

Toward this goal each week addresses themes pertaining to the father’s influence: father’s manhood; father’s mission; father’s spirituality; and father and his family. Seminar features include embodied activities such as hugging, letter-writing, singing, family dates, a foot-washing ceremony, purity vows, and other rituals that promote positive fatherhood involvement. FS does not attempt to preserve the traditional family, but rather modernize it in ways that appear consistent with the “New Father” ideal in Western family ideology. Sharing similarities with the Promise Keepers Movement in the US, FS functions as a larger evangelical effort to turn the hearts of men toward their families. However, the movement is distinctive in its effort to prepare immigrant and nonimmigrant men to become a better fit in their contemporary families.

MOVEMENT FUTURE

Non-Western men are undergoing dramatic social changes, and organized international responses such as FS reveal the changing nature of fatherhood. The nuclear family is seen as the core of South Korean society, and this movement’s persuasive efforts are directed at reviving values that champion involved and emotionally expressive dads. Father School faces challenges and opportunities pertaining to its future and mission to reconstitute fatherhood globally. China, India, Japan, and North American contexts have been identified as recent growth areas. While participation has leveled off domestically, the organization’s
shift in reaching unmarried men through their “pre-Father School” program reflects their priority in reaching future dads earlier. Finally, obstacles associated with volunteer burnout, new member recruitment, and funding are viewed as ongoing organizational challenges.

SEE ALSO: Conversion and new religious movements; Gender and social movements; Religion and social movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Strikes within the European context

ANDREW J. RICHARDS

Labor unions have always been, and remain, the principal agents of strike mobilization and organization. However, any assessment of strikes in contemporary Europe has to be placed in the context of the general decline of union power since the 1980s. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the proportion of workers belonging to unions (or union density) fell across Europe, and continued to do so into the twenty-first century, albeit more slowly. While long-standing cross-national differences in union density remained entrenched, the general trend everywhere was downward (table 1).

Yet the relationship between union density, as a measure of union power, and union capacity to wage strikes is complicated. Union density obviously captures those workers who belong to unions and who are therefore, presumably, more mobilizable than nonunionized workers. But other factors affect, positively or negatively, the power and influence of unions regardless of density rates per se (Western 1997; Piazza 2010). For example, institutional supports such as state funding (in France) or works councils (in Spain) enable unions to retain influence and organizational strength, and to represent more workers through collective agreements, than their otherwise low density rates would suggest. Conversely, union density in Britain stands in the middle of the European range, yet few union movements outside the US operate in a less hospitable environment for the organization of workers, let alone the waging of strikes.

In fact, the effects of union power on strike levels are important, but not obvious. Strikes incur considerable costs for unions and their members, thereby begging the question of whether they manifest strength or, rather, weakness. Powerful unions, by definition, can absorb the costs of striking, and mobilize workers on a large scale, but such power should also enable them to achieve their goals without resorting to such potentially costly action. Hence in Scandinavia, where unions remain powerful, levels of industrial conflict are relatively low (see below). Conversely, the monumental British miners’ strike of 1984–1985 – the last truly epic strike of the twentieth century anywhere in Europe – was, on one level, an astonishing demonstration of union mobilization. Yet in reality, it represented the desperate rearguard action of an increasingly vulnerable union, whose defeat heralded a long period of union quiescence and antiunion legislation (Richards 1997). This makes the analysis of cross-national trends in strikes inherently complicated. Low levels of industrial conflict may be associated with cases of both union strength and weakness, while high levels of industrial conflict may take place in contexts of apparent union weakness (for example, Spain).

In a valuable overview, Carley (2010: 2, 3, 9) notes that “industrial action is an area where international comparisons are notoriously difficult.” Given that data sources, definitions of industrial action, and criteria for determining whether incidents are recorded all differ across countries, considerable care is needed in analyzing trends in industrial conflict. Nevertheless, some conclusions may be drawn. Within individual European countries, it is difficult to discern any consistent trend, with strike levels fluctuating from year to year and following no particular pattern. However, cross-national comparison shows that some countries are more strike prone than others. Given the varying sizes of national workforces, absolute figures for strikes are invalid for cross-national comparison. Carley (2010: 9, 12, 13) therefore uses a relative measure...
Table 1  Trade union density (%) in Europe, 1999–2008

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Table 2  Rates of industrial conflict in selected European countries, 2000–2008

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from European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) data – the number of working days lost through industrial action per 1000 employees – to compare 24 European Union (EU) countries plus Norway over the 2005–2009 period. Denmark emerges as the most strike-prone country in Europe, with an average of 159.4, followed by France (132), Belgium (78.8), Finland (72.9) and Spain (60.4).

In contrast, there were averages of only 11.3 for Portugal, 6.2 for both Germany and Sweden, and 5.7 for the Netherlands. Nonetheless, these figures cover a very short time frame, and that for Denmark is heavily inflated by a major and unusual two-month strike in 2008.

In table 2, I use a slightly different comparative measure – the number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts (from International Labor Organization (ILO) data) as a percentage of civilian employment (from OECD data) – for a longer period (2000–2008).

These findings broadly conform to those of Carley, with Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands again at the lower end of the spectrum, and Spain at the higher end. But this time, the average for Denmark is much lower, and that for Italy much higher. These discrepancies are a function of the data and measurements used and time frame adopted. Clearly, any reasonable analysis of cycles of strike action depends on the availability of adequate time series data. For example, a “rough comparison” over time may be made for all EU countries as a whole using statistics from Eurostat, the ILO, and OECD. These data show that the average number of working days lost per 1000 workers across the EU fell from 39 for the entire 1997–2006 period to 30.6 for
Piazza (2010: 290) also demonstrates a generally downward trend in strike levels, and for an even longer time period. Using ILO data on the number of days lost to strikes per worker for the 1952–1999 period in 12 European countries plus Australia, Canada, and Japan, he shows that average levels of industrial conflict peaked significantly in the 1970s, fell but remained high in the 1980s, before dropping drastically in the 1990s.

Strikes are seldom spread uniformly throughout the economy. In most European countries between 2005 and 2009, they were concentrated above all in manufacturing, followed closely by the public sector and transport and communication. Conflict over pay remains the most important cause of strikes in nearly every European country, followed by working conditions and hours; job losses, dismissals, and redundancies; and, occasionally, political opposition to specific government policies on social security, labor law reform, public sector pay and jobs, and privatization (Carley 2010: 15–16).

Paralleling the perennial issues over which strikes are fought are long-standing academic debates on why levels of strike action ebb and flow. Research on labor conflict straddles several disciplines, and no firm consensus exists (Brandl & Traxler 2010: 519). Many analysts (and not just economists) stress the role of economic factors in determining strike patterns. For example, the decline of heavy industry, involving the demise of traditionally cohesive working-class communities, has undermined the structural foundations for the generation of collective action (Richards 1995). The dampening effect on industrial conflict of high and rising unemployment is a well established finding (Brandl & Traxler 2010: 532). Increasing attention is now being paid to the effects of globalization, with its pressures for economic competitiveness and labor discipline, in also reducing industrial conflict (Piazza 2010).

Nonetheless, other analysts — particularly political scientists, sociologists, and labor relations specialists — emphasize the role of labor market institutions and union power in mediating the effects of macroeconomic change (Western 1997). Thus, while globalization reduces strike rates, national union density plays an important intermediary role in determining the exact extent of labor quiescence (Piazza 2010: 289). Other authors also emphasize the importance of union power in mediating the effects of economic change on strike levels, though not necessarily reaching the same conclusions. Tsebelis and Lange (1995) found that strikes increased in those countries where organized labor had been traditionally strong but was becoming less powerful. However, Brandl and Traxler (2010: 519, 532–533) conclude that trends toward “social peace” (that is, reduced industrial conflict) follow from the weakening of unions relative to employers’ and business interests. Yet they also point out that those economic processes which have undermined unions and enhanced the power of employers could, in severe economic crisis, intensify national distributional struggles, thereby promoting the possible future resurgence of industrial conflict.

Either way, the national context — changing union power, the particular configuration of labor market institutions, and the persistence or not of corporatist structures of decision making — remains the key arena for researchers studying strike patterns within and across European countries. In a sense, the British case illustrates the importance of the national institutional context. No European country demonstrates better how adverse economic and political changes, unhindered by any institutional protection for organized labor, had a devastating impact on trade unionism itself, and, consequently, on strike activity. Union membership, after reaching a postwar peak in 1979, declined sharply thereafter, as did strike activity from the mid 1980s onwards. The average number of days lost to strikes per worker in Britain fell from 3074 in 1980–1989 to only 261 in 1990–1999 (Piazza 2010: 290).

The study of strikes remains multifaceted, but, ultimately, the strike, in contemporary
Europe, speaks to the continuing capacity of unions to promote collective action, and even solidarity, amongst increasingly fragmented national workforces. With the structural basis for workers’ collective action now weakened severely, retaining that capacity may depend increasingly on unions’ ability and willingness to join forces, when the need arises, with other, nonlabor-based, movements (Baccaro, Hamann, & Turner 2003).

SEE ALSO: Class consciousness: the Marxist conception; Globalization and movements; Labor movement; Labor protest in the European Union; Protest cycles and waves; Protest event research; Social movement organization (SMO); Strikes in US history.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Syndicalism
ROBERT MACPHERSON

Syndicalism encompasses both a method of labor movement organization and a revolutionary political philosophy growing out of the anarchist tradition. It has also been known as “anarcho-syndicalism” and “revolutionary syndicalism,” with broad definitions including the American and British movements known as “industrial unionism.” Syndicalist practice combines revolutionary anticapitalism, a commitment to workers’ control through democratic unions, and a rejection of both the state and political parties. From the mid-1890s until well into the 1920s a wave of syndicalist mobilization swept across the world, with mass organizations forming in the industrialized core of Europe and the US as well as throughout the colonial world. Some regions, notably Spain, but also many colonial areas, saw large syndicalist organizations active past this period. Recent research into syndicalism has shown it to be an early transnational social movement, nurtured by a network of migrant radicals and forming a more theoretically coherent structure than much traditional labor historiography had supposed.

REVOLUTIONARY GOALS AND ORGANIZATIONAL LOGIC

An emphasis on direct action tactics and a combative stance toward capital and the state were core tendencies in all syndicalist organizations. Many syndicalist organizations have espoused explicitly libertarian socialist goals, whether stated in the form of “socialism” or “anarchocommunism.” Syndicalists thus often reject any formalization of the worker–management relation in an attempt to avoid undermining their revolutionary orientation. However, they also emphasize the importance of daily labor struggles and the winning of concessions from employers and the state provided these are accomplished through the workers’ own efforts. In addition to such solidarity-building struggles, a significant tactical focus has been the “general strike” involving all workers.

Syndicalism’s most defining feature, however, is a prefigurative politics which sought to “build the new world in the shell of the old” by forming democratic union structures which would grow to become the main governance organs of a postcapitalist society. This emphasis on workers’ control of production, eschewing mediation by the both the state and radical parties, has been the major determinant of syndicalist organizational logic. A dual structure is sometimes created by combining industry- or craft-organized unions with a geographically based council system. A federated structure, combining nested sets of democratic assemblies and recallable delegates, is used in order to preserve as much autonomy as possible for local sections while allowing for large-scale coordination. The tactical emphasis on the general strike shows its true importance in light of these organizational forms; a cataclysmic general strike is hoped to lead to the revolutionary overcoming of capitalism and the state in a way that will then allow syndicalist structures to reconstruct society (Rocker 2004).
organizations in Spain in 1868 and Italy in 1869) and the Swiss Jura Federation. The characteristic political and organizational practices of syndicalism made some of their earliest appearances within these groups (Schmidt & van der Walt 2009).

Anarchist-syndicalist links were evident throughout the post-1890 period of mass mobilization. For example, the formation and spread of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) after 1895 involved a coterie of prominent anarchists including Fernand Pelloutier and Emile Pouget. This was an oft-repeated pattern, with anarchists at the activist core of many unions. Even syndicalist strains that rarely used the language of anarchism had fairly direct ties, such as the role of Chicago anarchists in the founding of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).

HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY

Until recently, most historical research has focused on syndicalism in the global core during the period of the early twentieth-century wave. The French CGT grew to almost two million members and precipitated a blizzard of strikes and direct action attacks. In Spain a welter of early syndicalist organizations led to the National Confederation of Labor (CNT) in 1910, an organization which would be well over one million strong at its peak. In the 1930s the CNT became integral to both the battle against Franco as well as the collectivization campaign that took place during the Spanish Civil War. In the US the IWW permanently altered labor tactics with its direct action methods (using the sit-down as early as 1906) and gained an influence well beyond that expected by its peak membership of 100,000 (Darlington 2010).

However, the internationalist orientation and novel tactics of syndicalism suited it just as well to colonial and newly industrialized peripheries; Argentina, Cuba, South Africa, Mexico, Egypt, and East Asia were just some of the areas that saw syndicalist activity. In many areas of Latin America these syndicalist unions, such as the Argentinean Regional Worker’s Federation (FORA), would dominate the union movement for a decade or more, leading combative working classes and often combining urban/rural and skilled/unskilled labor. In China sizable syndicalist movements grew throughout the 1910s, linking up with syndicalist and anarchist radicals in Korea, Japan, and Paris. By the 1930s this transnational wave declined under a combination of state repression, the economic dislocations of the interwar years, and the growing influence of Bolshevik-inspired party models (Hirsch & van der Walt 2010). Despite this, many new syndicalist organizations are currently active worldwide (as well as older organizations like the CNT) and have formed global networks such as the International Workers Association to link up local federations.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Direct action; Labor movement; Marxism and social movements; Prefigurative politics; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

System exiting and social movements
AMBER C. TIERNEY

As has been well documented in the social movement literature, movements can take multiple forms. Accordingly, analyses of coordinated challenge tend to array social movements along a spectrum of variable dimensions. Snow and Soule (2010) suggest that social movements can be relegated to one of two general types of challenge, such that the challenge is either direct (including various forms of specifically targeted protest) or indirect (including movements that exit from or divest in authority). Indirect challenges—the less often examined form of collective action—relate to movements that are covert or ambiguous with respect to the action they employ; that may endeavor to actualize broad-based change through individual conversion; and finally, that bypass authority structures by literally “exiting” or withdrawing from undesirable systems or relations (Snow & Soule 2010).

The concept of system exiting draws from Hirschman’s (1970) microeconomic theory of “exit” and “voice” as alternate responses to organizational decline. Hirschman argued that under a democratic competitive-market system, actors (consumers) could seek redress for grievances (e.g., declining product quality or—in the case of social movements—dissatisfaction with the state) through one of two means: exit or voice. “Exit” refers to the process by which, an actor elects to withdraw from a system or relationship (direct protest), whereas “voice” refers to the process whereby an actor directly communicates their demands (direct protest). In his earliest articulation of the theory (1970), exit and voice were conceived of as two contrapositive “see-sawing” forces. In this light, the execution or engagement of one mode of protest—the “dominant strategy”—limited the degree to which the “subsidiary” mode could be simultaneously employed.

However, later analyses of system exiting reformulated the exit—voice interplay (i.e., “dominant” vs. “subsidiary” calculus) to make sense of Hirschman’s foundational schema within the context of “mono-organizational” regimes (e.g., authoritarian), where market-like conditions are absent (Hirschman 1993; Pfaff & Kim 2003). Though they draw differing conclusions, many of these analyses on system exiting in nondemocratic regimes look to the case of the 1989 revolution against the Leninist German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an archetypal case to examine system exiting (Hirschman 1993; Mueller 1999; Pfaff & Kim 2003; Pfaff 2006). In subsequent work, Hirschman (1993) augmented his earlier thesis, to suggest that both exit (out-migration from East Germany) and voice (protest demonstrations in the GDR) functioned, in tandem, to bring about Die Wende, ultimately culminating in German reunification.

In a similar vein, Pfaff and Kim (2003) advance a sociological theory of exit—voice dynamics that takes social embeddedness into account and thereby delineates the ways in which system exiting has social implications for voice. First, mass exiting functions as a “signaling” device to publicly amplify and reveal grievances against the state. Additionally, a “network erosion effect” can occur where exiting options may siphon off the “resourceful” and “alert” individuals who would be more likely to mobilize, thereby undercutting the potentiality of direct collective action (see Hirschman 1970). Comparably, Pfaff (2006) finds that channels for voice are often blocked by the regime and where opportunities for clandestine emigration arise, exiting becomes increasingly desirable (Mueller 1999; Pfaff 2006). Pfaff (2006) finds evidence to suggest that a positive relationship between mobilization and emigration existed in the
context of the 1989 revolution. Maintaining that emigration from the GDR operated as a signifier of regime vulnerability, Pfaff reasons that exiting served to trigger collective action. However, Pfaff cautions that at a certain point, a critical threshold is reached and exit runs the risk of stifling voice by removing actors from social networks that initiate and drive mobilization (Pfaff 2006: 29).

Alternatively, Mueller (1999) focuses solely on exiting systems, arguing that contextual circumstances constrain exiting dynamics in social movements. Under authoritarian rule, contextual constraints and opportunities, resources, collective identities, and previous histories of struggle engender “hybridized-exiting profiles.” Mueller cites multiple examples of exiting movements – ranging from the flight of the Dalai Lama and his government to the mass exiting of Cubans to Florida – to delineate how contextual factors shape the multiple forms of exiting profiles.

Other studies examine exiting strategies in the context of religious sectarian movements. Johnson (1974) and Wilson (1974) analyze organizational forms of religious groups, including the development of the religious “sect” as an oppositional or “contracultural” social organization that has exited from the traditional church (Johnson 1974: 248). Johnson argues that the religious sect is at variance, theologically, with the mainstream, and as such, elects to exit from the main of the church and create an alternate offshoot “sect” stemming from the original denomination.

Notable works on system exiting amongst communal groups underscore the ways in which intentionally imposed social processes and organizational structures reinforce the rejection of the wider social order. For example, Berger’s (1981) study on a pastoralist commune in Northern California known as “The Ranch,” emphasizes the ways in which “ideological work” maintains the commune by reinforcing quintessential counterculture beliefs through ritual. Kanter (1972) finds that the most enduring communes were those that had the strongest boundaries, were the most centralized and had charismatic leaders who upheld an articulated cultural system of rituals and symbols to maintain commitment. Alternatively, Hall (1978) uses a phenomenological approach to develop a typology of six ideal utopian types (based on two modes: “time” and “social enactment”), that serve as a heuristic to better understand communal life and the ways in which “myth” encourages group formation.

Snow and Soule (2010: 16) point to a host of additional studies that further illustrate system exiting in the context of social movements, including: terrorist groups, separatist and secessionist movements, religious cultic movements, and finally, mass suicide movements, where death becomes the absolute expression of exit (see Hall 1987 for a discussion of the “Jonestown” mass suicide and Balch 1995 for a discussion of the Heaven’s Gate suicides).

As this review demonstrates, traditional and contemporary accounts of collective action require an expanded conceptual window, one that counts system exiting as an alternative form of collective contention in which aggrieved populations can challenge the relevant authority structures through coordinated systems of exiting.

SEE ALSO: Apocalyptic and millenarian movements; Cults; Repertoires of contention; Revolutions; Separatist movements; Social movements; Violence against oneself.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Tea Party movement
(United States)
AMANDA PULLUM

The Tea Party is a conservative movement in the US that surfaced in early 2009. Broadly defined, the Tea Party consists of a loose coalition of allied collective efforts aimed at reducing taxation, reining in the federal government’s spending (e.g., bailout and stimulus monies), and opposing government involvement in health care and related social activities. However, many Tea Partiers have mobilized around additional conservative concerns, and it is difficult to provide a more precise goal or mission of the Tea Party because national and local Tea Party organizations differ considerably in their stated purposes. There are multiple national organizations, but no group is clearly dominant, and each of the local groups may have weak or no ties to the national organizations.

The origins of the Tea Party are the subject of some debate within the movement, but most agree that the Tea Party began in February 2009 with multiple protests opposing the Obama administration’s recently passed economic stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Bennett 2010). Although the Tea Party often bills itself as a grassroots campaign, several Tea Party organizations receive considerable funding from large, national organizations, with the most notable being FreedomWorks and Americans For Prosperity (Mayer 2010). Opponents of the Tea Party have accused these organizations of “astroturfing,” or funding a political project that is disguised as a “grassroots” movement.

The organization Tea Party Patriots states, “The impetus for the Tea Party movement is excessive government spending and taxation.” This national group lists its core values as “fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government, and free markets.” Tea Partiers also include opposition to the Obama administration’s health care reform, opposition to cap and trade legislation, excessive government spending, and opposition to illegal immigration as reasons for joining the movement. Furthermore, many Tea Partiers are also members of the Christian Right, leading to some overlap between these movements (Jones & Cox 2010); Tea Parties also attract some Libertarians as well. As of 2010, polls showed that Tea Partiers tended to be white, over the age of 45, and both wealthier and better educated than the general public (Quinnipiac University 2010; New York Times/CBS News 2010).

Some Tea Party organizations identify themselves as part of “The 9–12 Project.” In March 2009, Fox News commentator Glenn Beck issued a call to “bring us all back to the place we were on September 12, 2001. The day after America was attacked we were not obsessed with Red States, Blue States or political parties. We were united as Americans, standing together to protect the greatest nation ever created” (9–12 Project 2009). Beck encouraged viewers to hold meetings in their homes or communities, and created a list of 9 principles and 12 values with which 9–12 Project members agree. “We Surround Them” – Beck’s assertion that his supporters were numerous, while those currently holding political power were few – quickly became a rallying cry for 9–12 Project groups.

The stated goals of 9–12 Project groups are much broader than those of the larger Tea Party movement. The 9 Principles reflect a concern with nationalism, religion, and family-related issues, and an opposition to affirmative action and social welfare programs; these issues are not clearly noted in other Tea Party organizations’ mission statements. However, due to the movement’s overlap with the Christian Right, many rank-and-file Tea Partiers do express a desire for religion to play a stronger role in
politics (Campbell & Putnam 2011). Nearly all Tea Party groups wish to reduce taxation, limit government spending, and limit the size and scope of the government.

The Tea Party has also attracted members of other conservative movements, such as anti-immigration activists and “birthers.” (Birthers claim that Barack Obama was not born in the US, making him ineligible to be president; some also believe, despite his claims to the contrary, that Obama is a Muslim.) Though not all Tea Partiers support these views, Campbell and Putnam’s data show that Tea Party members have “a low regard for immigrants and blacks” compared to other white Republicans. The presence of these viewpoints has led observers and the Tea Party’s opponents to accuse the movement of racism, an accusation that many Tea Partiers have fiercely contested. The Tea Party appears to be the latest in a series of right-wing and nativist movements in the US; Lipset and Raab (1970) argue that such movements arise when formerly dominant groups are displaced from power. For many Tea Partiers, the election of the first African American president may represent such displacement.

We can summarize the Tea Party as a loosely connected coalition of national and local conservative organizations, holding differing values and goals but agreeing on support of fiscal conservatism, small government, and strict construction of the Constitution. Tea Partiers often identify as Republicans or Libertarians, and Tea Party candidates generally run for office as Republicans. Yet, Tea Partiers argue that the Republican Party is not conservative enough and that Republican politicians, while more responsive than Democrats, do not take into account Tea Partiers’ concerns. Most Tea Partiers, then, might best be seen as conservative Republicans who feel alienated from the party.

The Tea Party has achieved some important electoral victories. With considerable Tea Party support, Scott Brown won the Senate seat previously held by the late Massachusetts senator Ted Kennedy. At the time of this writing, in late 2011, Representative Michele Bachmann served as chair of the Tea Party Caucus, which boasted 62 members from the House of Representatives and four from the Senate. Further, it is reasonable to anticipate that the Tea Party will be an important consideration for the Republican presidential candidate for the 2012 election, and that Tea Party support (or lack thereof) may play a substantial role in the race. Along with CNN, Tea Party Express sponsored a debate in September 2011 in which eight Republican presidential candidates participated before an audience of Tea Party members, and Tea Partiers nationwide posed questions via video. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Tea Party will continue to gain power in conservative American politics.

SEE ALSO: Coalitions; Elections and social movements; Political alignments and cleavages; Populism/populist movements; Religion and social movements; Right-wing movements; Symbolic crusades.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Quinnipiac University (2010) Tea Party could hurt GOP in Congressional races, Quinnipiac University national poll finds; Dems trail 2-way

Transgender movement

AMY L. STONE

The transgender movement in the US has been growing since its start in the late 1960s, focusing on issues such as violence, legal recognition, employment discrimination, media coverage, and poverty. “Transgenderist” was a term first used by transvestite pioneer Virginia Prince in 1978 to describe individuals who, like her, lived as a different gender without hormones or surgery (Valentine 2007). Since the late 1980s, “transgender” has come into common use as an umbrella term that includes individuals who identify as a gender other than the one they were assigned at birth or who otherwise vary from culturally conventional gender roles.

Historian Joanne Meyerowitz (2002) traces the start of the transgender movement to transsexual support groups and organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These early groups included the creation of COG in 1967, the first formal organization of self-identified transsexuals, and the Street Transvestites Action Revolutionaries (STAR), founded by activist Sylvia Rivera and African American drag queen Marsha Johnson in 1970 in New York City. Early protests included the Compton Cafeteria Riots in 1966 in the San Francisco Tenderloin, a riot that preceded the infamous New York Stonewall riots by a few years (Stryker 2008). Other important early organizations included a support group for female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals in the San Francisco Bay Area founded by Louis Sullivan in 1986, which grew into FTM International. These early groups were different than transsexual advocacy groups, which were led by doctors. Creating organizations independent of the medical profession and building community among transsexuals was a critical part of the early transgender movement.

The transgender movement moved from delocalized small groups to a national presence in the 1990s. During this time “transgender” was claimed as a political and social identity within communities. Transgender organizations grew, including direct action groups such as the Transsexual Menace (1993). Legal groups such as the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (2002) and the Transgender Law Center (2002) began to address important legal cases about marriage, name changes, and criminal justice that affect the lives of transgender persons. National organizations such as the National Center for Transgender Equality (2003) and Gender Public Advocacy Coalition (1995) advocated for federal transgender-supportive legislation and policies. This national presence was supported by a growing positive coverage of transgender lives and issues in the media, including mainstream movies such as Boys Don’t Cry and Trans America. These movies were frequently criticized for their use of nontransgender actors; additional criticisms of transgender media coverage include the fixation on individuals such as Thomas Beattie “the pregnant man” rather than coverage of transgender movement issues.

The transgender movement has made legislative and movement gains in the arenas of hate crimes and nondiscrimination laws. In the US, this has led to the establishment of the Transgender Day of Remembrance, held every year on November 20, which was started in 1998 to honor the death of a transgender woman. It has also led to support and passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr Hate Crimes Prevention Act in 2009, which includes coverage of gender identity. This was the first federal law to extend protections to transgender persons. The transgender movement has made progress on state and municipal laws that protect transgender persons from discrimination based on gender, gender identity, or gender expression. As of 2011, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force reported that 44 percent of the US population was covered by transgender-inclusive nondiscrimination laws.
either at the state level (in 15 states and the District of Columbia) or the city level (in 143 cities and counties across the US). In addition, as of 2011, over 400 colleges and 200 of the Fortune 500 companies also prohibit discrimination based on gender identity and/or expression. Passing a transgender-inclusive federal nondiscrimination law has been more complicated and politically fraught. Transgender advocacy organizations have long struggled to get transgender-inclusive language in the proposed federal bill, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which was initially proposed to protect just sexual orientation. Within the gay and lesbian movement, there has been criticism of organizations, such as the Human Rights Campaign, that have been willing to support ENDA without the inclusion of transgender people. There have also been increasing numbers of federal policies that are supportive of transgender citizens and legal challenges that have worked to establish the right to marriage, changing sex, and changing name on legal documents, criminal justice, immigration, asylum, and medical deduction for health care.

Other transgender movement goals have focused on the medical diagnosis and procedures for transitioning from one sex to another. These goals have included altering the inclusion of gender identity disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). This goal is controversial among transgender activists and advocates. On the one hand, the inclusion of gender identity disorder in the DSM allows transgender patients to access medical insurance in some cases and deduct medical care. On the other hand, many transgender activists argue that gender identity disorder as a mental health diagnosis stigmatizes transgender persons. The inclusion of the gender identity disorder of childhood as a mental health diagnosis is particularly controversial. The transgender movement has been more successful at changing the standards of care for transgender patients. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), formerly the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, establishes the medical standard of care for access to surgery and hormone use. Earlier standards of care were criticized by many transgender activists and organizations as relying too heavily on cisgender (nontransgendered) gatekeepers, primarily mental health practitioners, for transgender access to medical care.

The transgender movement has also successfully pushed for inclusion in the larger lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) movement. Although transgender and transsexual individuals have participated in the lesbian and gay movement since its start, there was a consolidation of their inclusion in the movement in the mid-1990s. Early gay activists in the homophile, lesbian separatist, and gay liberation movements had conflicting attitudes about including transsexual and other gender variant participants. Homophile activists excluded anyone who was gender variant, particularly transvestites and transsexuals. In the early radical years of gay liberation, activists initially embraced crossdressers, drag queens, and transsexuals as part of the cause of gay liberation, along with oppression based on race, class, and gender. Early lesbian feminism had a series of disputes about the inclusion of both butches and transsexuals, for example the appropriateness of Sandy Stone, a transwoman, working for the lesbian recording company Olivia Records. Burgeoning transgender activism in New York City and San Francisco altered the strategy of the transgender movement in the early 1990s by pushing for inclusion in both local and national lesbian and gay events and organizations.

Two national events that actively excluded transgender individuals or issues – the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival in 1991 and the 1993 March on Washington for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Rights – drew the attention of activists across the country to transgender inclusion. Transgender women had covertly participated in the lesbian-focused festival for many years. However, in 1991 festival security guards expelled Nancy Jean Burkholder, a transwoman, for not being a “womyn-born womyn,” the technical policy for admission.
Debates raged in LGBT newspapers across the country as to whether or not transgender men and women should be welcome at the festival; an alternative event, Camp Trans, began across the road from the festival, an event that still continues (Gamson 1997). The March on Washington organizing committee in 1993 rejected requests to include “transgender” in the March title to the cheers of some committee members, although there was a transgender-specific caucus area and inclusion in the goals of the march. Despite these conflicts, during the early 1990s many lesbian and gay movement organizations began to “add the T” to their organizational name and mission statement.

The international transgender movement has had variable success. The European Union now has laws that forbid transgender discrimination in the workplace and includes gender identity grounds of persecution eligible for asylum. Canadian transgender military officers are allowed to serve and may receive medical care to transition while in the military, and in 2011 Australian passports could denote “X” rather than “F” or “M” for sex, creating options for intersex and transgender citizens. Most countries have some form of transgender movement organizing, although this organizing may just be small localized groups.

Existing social science research on transgender organizing has a few central foci. First, scholars in both sociology and anthropology have analyzed the taxonomical organization of the category “transgender” and the way this organization alters transgender organizing (Davidson 2007; Valentine 2007). According to Megan Davidson (2007: 61), “different constructions of the category transgender, and who it includes and excludes, are not simply negotiations of a collective identity but, more significantly, negotiations about the boundaries of a social movement and that movement’s efforts to effect social change in the United States.” This analysis includes tensions within the transgender movement between subgroups over what it means to have an authentic transgender identity (Broad 2002). Second, scholars have developed a history of transgender organizing, from Joanne Meyerowitz’s (2002) history of transsexuality to transgender scholar Susan Stryker’s (2008) critique of the erasure and appropriation of transgender history. Other scholars have also analyzed the way that transgender organizing operates in tension with LGBTQ organizing, including the history of transgender exclusion from lesbian and gay politics. Finally, scholars have analyzed transgender movement goals and victories, particularly transgender law and civil rights (Currah, Juang, & Minter 2006).

SEE ALSO: Collective identity; Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Identity politics.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Visual analysis of social movements

NICOLE DOERR and SIMON TEUNE

Visual analysis is the development of concepts and methods to study visual elements of the mobilization, framing, diffusion, and resonance of protest and social movements. In the early 1990s, the “visual turn” in the humanities and cultural studies inspired a theoretical debate about the “power of images” in political conflict (Müller & Özcan 2007). While the visual turn resonated in international relations and media studies, especially in reaction to contentious global media events such as September 11, few social movement scholars have adjusted their focus to the visual realm. Although it is widely acknowledged that visible manifestations are a vital part of social movements and their reception in the public sphere, analysts of social movements have relied almost entirely on text-based concepts and methods.

Visual analysis extends primarily to three aspects of social movement dynamics: (1) visual manifestations as a class of expressions produced in social movements; (2) the representation of social movements in images disseminated in mediation processes; and (3) a larger societal framework granting visibility to certain groups and claims while others remain invisible. Dealing with these aspects, visual analysis speaks to canonized concepts of social movement research such as contentious repertoires, framing, collective identity, media resonance, and discursive opportunities.

In drawing attention to the performative dimension of contentious politics, movement theorists have revealed the powerful visual dimension of historical events constructed and remembered by protesters, bystanders, and opponents. Social movement scholars working in different fields have presented visual analyses primarily in the form of case studies and in an interdisciplinary spirit in order to explore the actors and strategies behind visual mobilization, the constraints upon them, their resources, and the impact of visual struggles both in collective memory and different media arenas. Sociologists and media analysts have investigated the different forms of visual framing displayed in embodied rituals of interaction as well as through distant media communication aimed at mobilizing emotions such as shame and anger (Halfmann & Young 2010), irony or pride (Mattoni 2008). Scholars have applied visual analysis to the relationship between the visual and political mobilization in the context of the prolife movement (Pollack Petchesky 1987), radical environmental movements (Routledge 1997; Delicath & DeLuca 2003), global summit protests (Teune forthcoming), and mobilizations on social precarity (Mattoni 2008) and immigration (Doerr 2010).

A first field of inquiry addressed by visual analysis includes framing processes and the dynamics of political conflict in media discourse. Images are, like texts, a key medium used by protesters to communicate a message. Given the complex and contentious reception of culturally coded images in pluralist publics, these attempts are likely to have varied and potentially ambiguous effects. Moreover, due to the characteristic openness of visual forms (Müller & Özcan 2007), images require a particularly careful and hence challenging reading by movement analysts. Visual theorists in media studies and art history agree that images are associated with a complex stock of cultural knowledge and experiences, frames and identifications, while they are also interpreted, framed and reframed by political actors. In their use of images, social movements tap into the collectively memorized experiences and emotions connected to past political events, and they, in turn, become part of a collective memory via photography, film, and other visual
representations (Romano & Raiford 2006). Because the resonance of social movements is essentially tied to their image in public and commercial mass media, visual representations of protest in these arenas constitute another concern of visual analysis.

It has mainly been media scholars that have shown the impact of images on the reception of contentious actors (Arpan et al. 2006), their role in attracting media attention (Routledge 1997), and mainstreaming social movement claims (Delicath & DeLuca 2003). An open question regards the cognitive and emotional resonance of older iconographic traditions and popular images used by protesters in marches, while also being imitated, copied, or destroyed by countermovements in turn.

Second, visual analysis offers a set of new questions to the study of political discourse and practices of discussion and democracy inside and outside social movements. Social movement theorists have discussed the role of narratives and symbols which help activists create visibility for the perspective and experiences of disadvantaged groups in mainstream arenas of political talk (Polletta 2006). In this vein, empirical studies that combine visual and discursive methods indicate that actual visual images or symbolic texts displayed within group discussion and brainstorming may be a source or constraint for including disadvantaged groups and fostering the diffusion of new ideas (Doerr 2010). Another open question regards the relationship between visual images and political framing as diagnostic, prognostic, and action oriented. In comparison to cognitive linguistic “arguments” exchanged within political discourse, visual theorists have argued that images construct new political meaning mimetically and/or through association with existing symbolic forms and by reimagining older traditions (Müller & Özcan 2007). At the same time, linguistic signs are symbolic forms built on images, metonymies, and metaphors (Delicath & DeLuca 2003). A much deeper analysis of the cultural and cognitive sources, practices of memorization, transposition, and diffusion of ideas is necessary to understand social change and continuity in dialogues between visual and verbal, symbolic, and textual forms of framing.

Third, there is a growing need for research on the visual conditions of diffusion of social movements in increasingly globalized yet culturally diverse societies. Regarding the popularization of new media, it is surprising that few movement scholars have explored visual images as triggers for transnational protest events. While much work has focused on the reception of global icons of protest in mass media, we know little about the place-specific production and strategic mobilization of images by resource-poor local activist groups (Mattoni 2008) and the reframing of protest images by mass media and the police (Teune forthcoming) as well as state actors. Through Internet-based diffusion, images are represented globally in real time. Could visual framing strategies under these circumstances be more effective in diffusing new ideas, and empower transnational movements for social change? In empirical terms, it seems that the number of global images diffused via ICT has not, in fact, changed familiar visual representations in media reporting on protest portraying political conflict (Halfmann & Young 2010). By combining framing approaches with visual analysis we should be in a better position for understanding pathways of diffusion of slogans, images, and visual objects that spread ongoing revolutionary and pro-democracy movements across countries? Successful visual diffusion practices are key for understanding diffusion across cultural and linguistic contexts. It would be enlightening, for example, to see which linguistic and visual frames diffused across different Arabic- and English-speaking audiences, and which new images, texts, and strategies emerged through cross-cultural, cross-linguistic contact.

Visual analysis of political mobilization has three main contributions to offer to the field of social movement studies. First, it enlarges our understanding of existing concepts of social movement studies – framing, identity, and political discourse as well as strategy and resources. Each of these is created not only
by cognitive linguistic mechanisms but also through visual struggle. Second, the study of images in social movements helps understand the resonance and impact of political protest in varying cultural contexts. Third, and more broadly, a systematic inclusion of visual materials and methods will help understand the capacities of and constraints for contentious actors to formulate, diffuse, and popularize criticism and alternatives. How influential are images relative to other factors in accounting, in particular, for why movements emerge when they do and for how successful they are in realizing their goals? Studying the production conditions of visual images, the popular resonance of a particular visual frame, and the constraints imposed by mainstream media may help us to understand how activists reach out more broadly to people outside the movement. By combining different visual methods such as iconography, media analysis, and framing (Müller & Özcan 2007), future research needs to pinpoint the cultural sources and political success of visual mobilization strategies in different local contexts, their reception and diffusion to various environments and the reframing of contested symbols in contentious politics.

SEE ALSO: Diffusion and scale shift; Discursive opportunity structure; Framing and social movements; Media and social movements; Media framing and social movements; Narratives; Resonance, frame.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


Women’s movement in Spain

MONICA THRELFALL

The Spanish women’s movement displays a number of features that clearly place it in the “family” of European women’s movements, yet it also differs in significant ways.

It was a “latecomer” to European feminism, mainly due to the fact that Spain was governed by an autocratic dictatorship until the elections of 1977. It is common to date its “arrival” to 1975, because the UN’s celebration of International Women’s Year gave all the legal, tolerated, and banned women’s organizations the chance to speak out under cover of the international focus on women’s rights, whether by joining in the dictatorship’s formal events or by vociferously boycotting them. The peculiar feature was that there long existed a protofascist women’s organization with countrywide branches, run by the sister of the dictator General Franco. It had originally been set up during the civil war (1936–1939) to galvanize support for the military insurgency, and survived the intervening decades by running an obligatory social service for women devoted to reinforcing feminine stereotypes of wifely and motherly duties. In this traditional, paternalistic, and Catholic climate, women were allowed to legally set up Housewives Associations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s these associations were infiltrated, or secretly set up, by women’s rights advocates from the underground left-wing parties, particularly from the active and influential Communist Party of Spain. The latter also dominated the legal and illegal arms of the trade union movement and addressed some of the women workers’ problems. In this paradoxical context, most of the independent women’s groups, ranging from cultural promotion to women’s liberation, were identified with and involved in the fight for democracy. Thus, a politicized form of socialist feminism emerged quickly into semi- and then full legality as part of the democratic opposition. Two feminists were elected to the first elected parliament of 1977–1979, which was charged with drafting the new constitution, and, after pressure from women’s organizations, it duly included bans on sex discrimination in law and at work and ensuing parliaments passed laws to implement them.

Second-wave Spanish feminism was not only molded by opposition to a vindictive long-ruling dictator but was also vitalized by the memory of the democracy he had crushed. The parliaments of 1931–1936 had granted women the right to vote, to custody over children, some equality at work, divorce by mutual consent, and a groundbreaking abortion law – all revoked after the civil war. So instead of looking back to an era of (virtually nonexistent) liberal feminism, it was a radical and bloodied first-wave that was the second’s precedent. But it had shown how much a handful of determined women engaging with institutional struggles could achieve. As soon as democratic institutions returned, feminists operating inside the elected parties’ power centers, such as local governments, used them to set up policy committees, advice bureaus, and services for women. Unusually the Spanish Socialist Party openly launched a women’s birth control center it had financed, while the Communist Party had backed a previous underground one.

When the Socialist Party won the 1982 elections it had promised little for women, nevertheless the women’s movement campaigns to defend doctors and nurses arrested for performing illegal terminations forced the party to introduce an abortion law as one of its first measures in 1983. Socialist feminists also convinced the government to set up an official Institute for Women which took the sex equality campaign forward on many fronts, supporting the spread of women’s organizations throughout
the country through institutional recognition and subsidies for their activities. Even when conservatives were returned to power in 1996, the women’s movement had become sufficiently established for them not to abolish the Institute or the women’s rights centers across the country, even when several of them focused on issues of male violence against women. By then the worldwide campaign for granting women political power had taken root in Spain, with several women promoted to prominent positions, at one point holding the posts of president in both houses of parliament under a conservative administration (2000–2002) – a first in Europe. When the Socialist Party returned to power in 2004, it did so committed to full “gender parity” for all elective posts (a long-standing demand of its feminist wing that all public bodies should achieve a composition of no more than 60% and no less than 40% of either sex). The prime minister duly appointed a gender-balanced government, a first in Europe after the groundbreaking case of Norway in 1980. Far from window-dressing, this was followed up by several new equality laws aimed at eradicating violence and alleviating women’s burden of care for the young and the elderly (Valiente 2007, 2008).

Thus the Spanish women’s movement is distinguished by the strength of socialist-feminism among its ranks, and in particular by the latter’s, as well as by liberal feminism’s, institutional orientation. In this sense, Spain has seen its share of “state feminism” (Stetson & Mazur 1995) while also demonstrating that individual parties at local, regional, and national levels have been the ones to institute change following instigation by women’s organizations and policy advocates (Threlfall, Cousins, & Valiente 2005). Law reform, policy innovation, and the establishment of services to bolster equality have been feminism’s overriding focus, at the expense of conceptual or theoretical innovation. Nonetheless, feminist academic research, mainly among historians, sociologists, lawyers, and political scientists, has flourished. While the lesbian wing of the movement did not achieve a high profile in the first decades of democracy, it did achieve registration of civil partnerships in some regions, starting with Catalonia in 1998, as part of the wider lesbian and gay and transgender movement. The legality of same-sex marriage was recognized in 2005, making Spain part of an advance group of ten countries of the world, and 4500 couples married in the first year of the law.

SEE ALSO: Feminism and social movements; Gay and lesbian movement; Gender and social movements; Suffrage movement, international; Women’s movements; Women’s movements in Europe.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS
Zionist movement

Zionism means different things to different people depending on their ethnic, religious, and national identities, but it is defined most succinctly as, “a movement seeking to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law” (Engel 2009: 1). The term Zionism comes from the word “Zion,” a biblical name for Jerusalem. In August 1897, over two hundred Jews met in Basel, Switzerland, to establish the World Zionist Congress and founded the Zionist Organization (ZO). This event marked the formal establishment of the Zionist movement. From its inception this transnational movement has worked to establish a sovereign state the Jewish people could call home. It finally achieved its primary goal on May 14, 1948 when the state of Israel was established as a sovereign Jewish homeland.

THE FOUNDING OF A MOVEMENT

Theodor Herzl is credited as founder of the political Zionist movement. He grew up in Vienna and initially identified more closely with German rather than Jewish culture. In 1891, Herzl moved to Paris as a correspondent for a Vienna newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*. Like many other Western European Jews at the time, Herzl initially felt that the best way to end anti-Semitism would be to convince all the Jews to convert to Christianity. However, a series of anti-Semitic events all across Europe and Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries caused him to question this solution. For example, the openly anti-Semitic politician Karl Lueger was elected by popular vote and was eventually appointed mayor of Vienna in 1895. Prussian law restricted non-baptized individuals from joining the army. Under Romanian law, an individual could not be considered both Jewish and Romanian. In Russia, the assassination of Czar Alexander II sparked a series of large-scale anti-Jewish riots, known as “pogroms,” blaming the Jews for the czar’s death. These riots sought to expel Jews from the region and resulted in many deaths. For Herzl, the Dreyfus affair in France was the final straw that propelled him into the Zionist movement. Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish officer in the French military who was convicted of treason in 1894. Two years after he was placed in solitary confinement, new evidence proved that Major Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy was the true perpetrator. However, this evidence was suppressed by high-ranking military officials, Esterhazy was acquitted, and falsified documents brought new accusations against Dreyfus. News of the military’s cover-up began to spread, and in 1899 activists pressured the government to bring Dreyfus back to Paris for a new trial. Herzl, who was covering these events as a correspondent, began to question if Jews’ religious beliefs were the real reason behind these conflicts. In response to these events, he became increasingly concerned with the increasing amounts of anti-Semitism and the future of Jews. This was a concern for many Jewish intellectuals in Europe and Russia at the time. Prior to Herzl’s Zionist movement, a number of Jewish thinkers, such as Perez Smolenskin and Leo Pinkser, called for the mass migration of Jews to Jerusalem. However, it was Herzl who sought political and financial support for such a large-scale migration.

Herzl had unknowingly come to the same conclusion as other Jewish thinkers of the time. Similar to the ideas set forth by authors such as Leo Pinkser, Herzl concluded that Jews would always be perceived as alien in European society because they were a minority of the population wherever they lived. The solution was for Jews to be “granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation” (Herzl 1896: 24).
A key difference existed between Herzl’s political Zionism and other plans for mass Jewish migration: Herzl felt that government approval was the only way to achieve sovereignty. In order to be successful, the Jews needed to obtain government approval before resettling in a new land and calling it their home.

In pursuit of his goals, Herzl attempted to solicit the support of Baron de Hirsch, a multimillionaire who had already founded the Jewish Colonization Association. This organization encouraged mass Jewish migration by financially supporting agricultural settlements in Argentina for persecuted Russian Jews. However, de Hirsch disagreed with a political approach and only supported philanthropic efforts to relocate persecuted Jewish communities. After failing to solicit support from a number of other philanthropic organizations, Herzl took his message to the Jewish public and published Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in 1896. There were a number of critics, especially among the highly religious community. Orthodox Jews distanced themselves from early Zionism. In fact, most participants viewed Zionism as a secular movement. Finally, Herzl found a firm basis of support among student organizations, such as Kadimah. In order to discuss his revolutionary ideas, Herzl brought together the first ever congress of representatives of the Jewish people. The Zionist Congress lasted three days and consisted of 204 delegates from all around the world. It was at the congress that the ZO was established. Herzl proclaimed the movement a success because it was able to bring together elements of the Jewish community.

FINDING SPACE FOR A JEWISH HOMELAND

In Basel, the ZO established a plan of action to obtain a legal Jewish home in Palestine: promote the settlement of Jewish agriculturalists and skilled laborers in Palestine, organize Jews at the local level, create a sense of Jewish nationalism, and begin gaining government approval. Following the first congress, Herzl was elected as president of the ZO and local federations were established all over the world. Anyone who paid a small annual fee of one shekel, or its equivalent, was considered a Zionist and was granted the right to vote for a delegate in congress. In addition to expanding the movement and establishing the organizational structure, the early work of Herzl and the ZO focused on meeting with officials, such as Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey, in order to gain a charter for an autonomous settlement. The first major fragmentation in the movement occurred when the ZO received its first formal offer from the British government for an autonomous settlement in East Africa. A large faction of the community opposed any land outside of Palestine. In light of worsening conditions in Russia and failed negotiations in Istanbul, Herzl urged Zionists to consider the offer a temporary shelter until they could legally secure a home in Palestine. Herzl died of a heart condition in 1904 before the ZO finished evaluating the area. The investigation determined that the land was unsuitable for agriculture and the ZO Congress rejected the offer. A number of delegates in favor of the British offer seceded from the ZO and formed the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO), which searched for an autonomous settlement in any part of the world. This was the first of many divisions within the Zionist movement. Though it conducted negotiations with various governments, the JTO never succeeded in finding a suitable home and was eventually disbanded shortly after World War I by the leader and original founder, Israel Zangwill.

David Wolffsohn was elected as head of the ZO in 1904, following Herzl’s death. This marked a change from a political focus to a practical focus within the Zionist movement. A combination of slow-moving diplomatic efforts and the failed Russian revolution in 1905 forced the Zionists to seek alternative approaches to mass migration. The ZO established the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in order to raise money for the purchase of land in Palestine. Though they did not have the
government approval to create an autonomous state, they still attempted to use legal means of obtaining land for their new settlement. The majority of this land was owned by merchants who often lived outside of Palestine and paid taxes on the land in exchange for holding the land titles. Though they were technically tenants, the peasant families who worked these plots for generations thought of the land as theirs because they rarely, if ever, came into contact with the landowners. Roughly 80 percent of the land purchased by the JNF before World War II was purchased from these landowners. Thus, much of the land that was purchased was already inhabited by local Arab communities. Zionists assumed that the local Arab communities would welcome the Jewish settlements because they would also benefit from the newly built infrastructure and the increased capital that came with these settlements. They thought that the local residents would support Palestine as a Jewish homeland and prefer a Zionist-led government over the Ottoman rule. However, as more Zionists immigrated to Palestine, many of the local Arabs were displaced, and they began to resent the Jewish settlers.

POPULATING PALESTINE WITH JEWS

Zionists were not the first Jews to arrive in Palestine. Though the harsh living conditions deterred most Jewish immigrants from seeking refuge there, a few settled in the holy cities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed, forming the “Old Yeshuv.” These individuals felt it was their religious duty to move to Israel. Their goals differed greatly from those of early Zionism. They primarily lived off halukka, which was money that had been collected from Jews in the Diaspora. Jews considered giving halukka a duty because it was a religious commandment for Jews to settle in the Holy Land. However, this idea was rejected by the “New Yeshuv,” those individuals who immigrated to Palestine as part of the Zionist movement. The New Yeshuv wanted to realize the utopian vision set forth by Herzl’s (1902) book, Altneuland (Old New Land). Herzl imagined a liberal, egalitarian society that resembled the welfare state. He rejected the class system and imagined a society that encouraged private entrepreneurship, but was built on agricultural cooperatives and welfare. In this model, land and natural resources would be publicly owned. Thus, the Zionists focused on creating a self-sustaining settlement that did not require outside funding and was supported by agricultural collectives. Initially, only those Jews who could exemplify this liberal tradition and who were willing to work as part of these collectives were permitted to immigrate.

The New Yeshuv are often separated into waves of immigration referred to as aliyah, a Hebrew term that literally means “ascent” and refers to the biblical ascent of the Jews up the Judean Hills. Prior to World War I, there were two waves of immigration to Palestine associated with the Zionist movement. The composition of immigrants in each wave reflects both changes within the Zionist movement and the changing political situation in Europe and Russia. The First Aliyah was the first wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine, which occurred from 1881 to 1904. Though these immigrants rejected the goals of the Old Yeshuv, they were still heavily reliant on outside funding because they had no agricultural experience or infrastructure. The First Aliyah was a symbolic representation of the start of a future nation. They created the first agricultural cooperatives and established the use of Hebrew as their primary language. In contrast to the First Aliyah, the Second Aliyah was predominantly composed of young, well-educated Jews (writers, historians, journalists) who opposed the use of local Arab labor to work the land. The majority of these immigrants were born in Russia or Ukraine. Though they were raised in the traditions of socialism, they were open to democracy and an open party system of governance. When they first arrived in Palestine, they became agricultural workers. Many, like Ben Gurion, would eventually become political leaders of the established state of Israel. The
first two waves of Zionist immigrants laid out the structure, but they lacked numbers. This would change following World War I.

With each progressive wave of immigration, tensions rose between the non-Jewish locals and the Zionists. As new settlements arose, more locals were displaced. As a result, unemployment rates rose among non-Jews living in Palestine. As the Zionist movement grew, so too did the idea that whenever possible Jewish farms should be worked by Jewish labor, referred to as “Hebrew labor.” This increased unemployment rates among the non-Jewish population and added to their resentment of the Zionist movement. This economic competition eventually led to the formation of the “Arab nation,” which opposed the Zionist movement and the idea of an autonomous Jewish homeland in Palestine. Many Zionists believed that either these tensions would resolve as economic conditions improved or two separate but parallel economies would arise: a Jewish and a non-Jewish system where members would compete within their own communities but not against each other.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE

World War I brought about a number of changes to the burgeoning Zionist movement. When Turkey entered the war, the governing body in Palestine began instituting a number of laws which limited the power of the Jewish settlers. The Turkish government forced the Jews, who were subjects of the Allied Powers, to either become Ottoman citizens and serve in the army or leave the country. As a result, many of the Jews were expelled from Palestine or fled. This caused a major depletion in the already small population struggling to survive in Palestine. Finally, the Ottoman Empire fell, and the British took control of Palestine. In 1920, Britain installed a local regime to govern the country until the League of Nations could determine its future. By 1922, the League of Nations ratified Britain’s right to govern Palestine. This gave Zionists hope because, unlike the Ottomans, the British government endorsed the Zionist movement. In 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration which endorsed the establishment of a national Jewish homeland in Palestine. This newfound hope caused the membership rate of the ZO to swell to six times its prewar count. However, this success was short lived because after Britain took control of Palestine, the growing countermovement in the region caused Britain to question its allegiance to the Zionist movement.

The countermovement declared that the Arab nation had a right to Palestine and wished to create an “Arab state.” The tension between the Zionist movement and the Arab nation often escalated into violence in Palestine. As a result, the British placed military forces in the region to police the area until an agreement could be reached. However, these forces were expensive to maintain, and Britain had not initially planned to act as peacekeepers in a querulous region.

Meanwhile, Eastern Europe was becoming an increasingly dangerous place for Jewish communities. Roughly 60,000 Jews were killed in pogroms between 1918 and 1920. At the same time, other countries began restricting the number of immigrants they accepted into their countries. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Jews wanted to escape to Palestine. The prospect of so many Jews immigrating to Palestine worried the British, Arabs, and Zionists alike. The British required that the ZO guarantee a year’s financial support for each new Jewish immigrant who entered the country. Almost 650 new immigrants entered Palestine each month during the Third Aliyah (1919–1923), increasing the number of Jews seeking employment by 50 percent. This aliyah was primarily composed of socialist Jews who were trained in agriculture and who were motivated by the Zionist Workers’ Movement. Luckily, the British instituted ambitious public works projects in order to build infrastructure. This helped absorb the new additions to the labor force and improved the absorptive capacity of the local economy. The composition of the Fourth Aliyah was quite different
from the third in that the majority of these immigrants were motivated by personal reasons; most of these Jews were from lower-middle-class communities and were looking for economic opportunities available in Palestine. Differences between Third and Fourth Aliyah immigrants revealed deeper disagreements within the movement regarding the fundamental goals of the Zionist movement.

Up until the mid-1920s, the Zionist movement experienced little fragmentation, but as immigration into Palestine increased, divisions developed within the movement. The increased desire to immigrate coupled with the British immigration restrictions led to disagreements concerning which Jews should be allowed into Palestine. Some, known as “General Zionists,” focused on the economic goals of the Zionist movement and were content to sacrifice political autonomy in exchange for economic security for the Jewish people in Palestine. The General Zionists thought that focusing on economic gains over political gains would ease the tension with the Arab community. Others, known as “Revisionists,” focused on the political goals of the Zionist movement and wanted to challenge the British immigration restrictions, lack of funding for Zionist projects, and restrictions on Jewish settlements in Transjordan. The Revisionists wanted immediate mass migration to Palestine and assumed the Arab community would reject any plan set forth by the Zionists. Some of these differences, such as the role of Arabs, would continue to divide political parties even after Israel gained statehood.

The British became more involved as peacekeepers in the region following a dispute over a sacred site in Jerusalem in 1929. Though the religious Jews living in Jerusalem rejected the goals of the Zionist movement, the ZO felt it was their responsibility to defend all Jews living in Palestine. Disagreement over who had the right to worship at this site escalated into violence, and in one week 133 Jews and 116 Arabs lost their lives. The worldwide economic depression and increased violence in Palestine worried the British, who were hesitant to spend any more money to maintain the region. They sent a representative to find out the source of the violence. The Shaw Commission concluded that the growing violence was a result of the threat felt by the Arabs and recommended limitations on the expansion of the Jewish community. As a result, the British severely limited Jewish immigration and land purchase.

The Arab countermovement saw this as an opportunity to advance its claims and gain autonomous control over Palestine. To get London’s attention the Arabs began boycotting British goods and a small, radical faction began endorsing violence against the Jews. The Arabs decided to continue demonstrating until their demands were met. They called for a ban on Jewish immigration to Palestine, a ban on land transfers from Arabs to Jews, and an Arab-controlled government. In 1936 the Palestinian Arabs threatened to attack both the British and Jews if their demands were not met by May 15 of that year. The Arab revolts that broke out required Britain to send more resources to the region in order to keep the peace. When the British finally suppressed the uprising in 1938, they had sent over 17,000 army troops and two airforce squadrons. This was a steep price to pay at a time when Europe was becoming an increasingly hostile place. Britain created the Peel Commission to solve their problems in Palestine so they could focus on other areas of the world. The commission called for a partitioning of the region. The Arabs rejected this offer and continued to revolt. Britain sent Colonial Secretary MacDonald to assess the situation and devise a solution. He asserted that the Zionists were at the heart of the unrest and proposed a severe limitation on Jewish immigration and a immediate halt to land transfers from Arabs to Jews. Though the Arabs still rejected this plan because it did not guarantee them sovereignty over the region, Britain endorsed it, and in 1939 it became known as the White Paper. The increased restrictions on the Zionist movement signaled a shift in Britain’s allegiance.

During the Holocaust, the Zionist movement’s attention was split between actively
pursuing the creation of a Jewish homeland and rescuing Jews from Germany and Eastern Europe. The General Zionists favored a more political approach and wanted to make deals with the Arab community so the British would increase their immigration quota. The Revisionists favored a more militaristic approach in which the ZO would work to get a Jewish majority in the region and declare all of Palestine a Jewish homeland. As World War II progressed, Zionists became increasingly focused on rescuing Jews. Many Zionist organizations, such as the New Zionist Organization and Histadrut, coordinated clandestine operations to bring Jews to Palestine outside of the British immigration quota. The ZO knew that, compared to the Arabs, they had little bargaining power. By 1942, the ZO became more assertive and stated that their goals were to create a Jewish commonwealth where the Zionists had complete control over immigration. This declaration signaled a change from a gradual development of the region to a push for complete Jewish sovereignty over the entire region and all who lived there, including the Arabs.

THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The end of the war brought with it a significant number of displaced persons and new hope for the Zionist movement. Many of the Holocaust survivors were unable to return to their homeland and were referred to as “displaced persons.” They demanded resettlement. In an effort to maintain its own strict immigration quotas, the US urged Britain to repeal the White Papers and allow these Jews into Palestine. Britain did not wish to further antagonize the Arabs and declined to lift immigration restrictions in Palestine. As a result, the Zionists took to a more militaristic approach. They had developed a security force, Haganah, during the first waves of immigration to protect the agricultural collectives. When the White Papers signaled that chances of achieving a sovereign state were slim, the Zionists expanded their security forces. Along with many Revisionist Zionists and Jewish soldiers who fought in the British Army during the war, Haganah began attacking British installations and bringing illegal Jewish immigrants into the region. Their goal was to establish a Jewish majority in order to gain statehood. The British deported those Jews who were caught attempting to immigrate illegally into Palestine and sent them to detention camps in Cyprus. The sight of Jewish Holocaust survivors being detained behind barbed wire in Cyprus outraged many, including US president Harry S. Truman. The damage to the prestige and property of the British was too much for them to handle after being devastated by World War II. They returned control of the Palestine Mandate to the United Nations, who formed a special commission (UNSCOP) to assess the region and its future. UNSCOP proposed a partition in which 55 percent of the region would become an independent Arab state, 45 percent of the region would become a sovereign Jewish state, and Jerusalem would be governed by an international regime. Though the Arabs and British were adamantly opposed to the agreement, the Soviet Union, US, and Zionists were more than happy with the partition plan. On May 14, 1948 the Zionists realized their initial objective, and Ben Gurion declared the new sovereign Jewish homeland the state of Israel.

Though many define Zionism as a movement seeking to establish a sovereign Jewish state, not everyone agrees with this definition. In 1975, the UN passed Resolution 3379, which determined that Zionism was a form of racism. By a vote of 72 to 35, the resolution was passed as an effort to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination. Though the resolution was revoked in 1991, many still view Zionism as a racist movement infringing the rights of the local Arab community. Others view Zionism within a religious context. According to Sizer (2004: 20), “Christian Zionism is born out of the conviction that God has continuing special relationship with, and covenant purpose for, the Jewish people, apart from the church, and that the Jewish people have a divine right to possess the land of Palestine.” Definitions of
Zionism can vary widely based on an individual’s religious, ethnic, or national identity.

When the Zionist movement succeeded in creating a sovereign Jewish homeland, their goals began to shift. Many of the organizations created by the Zionists became the foundational structures of the newly formed state of Israel. Many of the early political leaders in Israel were active members of the ZO. The initial goal of the movement was to create a sovereign Jewish state that all Jews living in the Diaspora would eventually migrate to. However, many Jews had found new homes in other areas, such as the US, and were content to support the cause without immigrating to Israel. Today, the Zionist movement is a highly institutionalized, transnational movement that is significantly more diffuse than it once was. Though many Zionists today still feel all Jews should immigrate to Israel, others hold the belief that the goal of the Zionist movement is to support Israel as the Jewish homeland and assist Jews living in Diaspora all over the world.

SEE ALSO: Islamic movements; Israeli social movements; Movement/countermovement dynamics; Nationalist movements; Religion and social movements; Right-wing movements; Transnational social movements.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS